In April 2021, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen David Berger, testified before the House Appropriations Committee—Defense Subcommittee. His testimony addressed areas the Marine Corps must improve to remain competitive against near peer adversaries like China and Russia. At the core of his testimony was an issue the Marine Corps is all too familiar with: retention. He explained that “[n]one of our Force Design 2030 aspirations are possible without addressing the people within our ranks.” None of them. The Commandant knows that retention is a national security issue. He is not simply concerned with accessions—the Marine Corps can find people. The concern is retaining the right Marines and putting them in the best positions. Quality individuals will always have other professional and educational opportunities outside the Marine Corps, so retaining them is difficult.

Although quantifying the quality of talent in any organization is difficult, there are efforts are underway to do so. In his Marine Corps Gazette article, “Talent Management: Harvest the High Hanging Fruit,” LtCol Kevin Chunn presents analytical methods to identify quality enlisted Marines, such as modernizing composite scores for senior enlisted Marines. This moneyball approach to retain quality Marines is a worthy endeavor. However, this article does not present new formulas on how to retain the best Marines; instead, it defines some factors limiting quality retention and provides policy solutions to these issues. Some of these policies can be implemented by the Marine Corps. Other policies would need Congressional approval, but the Marine Corps could lobby for these changes.

These proposals are separated under three categories: enlisted, officer, and solutions that apply to both. For enlisted Marines, this article argues that college degree requirements limit some Marines’ ability to earn a commission. As a result, this article recommends removing degree requirements for non-commissioned officers (NCO) and above who meet certain criteria. Other militaries, such as the British, Australian, and Israeli militaries—all with formidable officer corps—operate under similar or more progressive commissioning models. For officers, this article presents a new program called Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Lite. This program would empower officers to stay in their specific assignment up to six years if they agree to decline their promotion during this time. The solutions under the blended category propose increasing education opportunities for both officers and enlisted, while allowing outside education to satisfy portions of PME requirements.
Gen Berger’s changes to talent management will require sweeping changes in manpower management and policy. (Photo by Sgt Olivia Knapp.)

The last solution proposes a free market assignment program that permits Marines to apply for jobs above their pay grade and, if accepted, be paid at that higher pay grade (e.g., an O-3 could apply for an O-4 job). Similar programs already exist in the Army and Navy.

Some of these proposals require a selection process. For the Marine Corps’ current programs, such as resident Expeditionary Warfare School, it generally selects “elite” Marines—usually the top ten percent. Indeed, these Marines deserve to be selected, but these spots should not be limited to the top performers. The Marine Corps should also select “average” performers, who are above average by most other standards, to increase its quality spread and retention. The Marine Corps will never achieve the highest quality force by only focusing and rewarding the top performers. Those Marines will arguably leave the Marine Corps no matter what the Marine Corps offers them. Instead, when the Marine Corps targets “average” performers, it can incentivize retention and motivate professional growth within the organization while still retaining talented Marines. This novel approach, offering more opportunity to less-elite Marines, will increase and improve the Marine Corps’ band of human capital. In other words, by mixing these groups, the “average” performers will learn from the “elite” performers, increasing the “average” performers worth to the organization. In turn, this change will increase quality spread.

That said, this article does not address every issue these changes will require, such as amending specific laws. Hopefully, however, these ideas will create conversation about new approaches to quality retention. The Marine Corps will never be as flexible as a Silicon Valley startup, but it should not be inflexible. If it does not adapt, the Marine Corps’ shift to fighting as an inside force will matter little.

Enlisted Marine Solution
Reform Enlisted to Officer Requirements

Degrees do not provide the same marker for success they once did. Today, college degrees exist on a spectrum: they can be difficult to achieve or achieved by paying tuition and attending slightly above half of the courses. In fact, attending class can mean logging into Zoom and saying “my camera is broken” while eating leftovers in your bed from the night before. Yet, that degree provides some of the necessary requirements to become an officer, placing that individual “closer to getting a commission than an experienced NCO with outstanding evaluations.”

Our culture’s obsession with tangible credentials limits our ability to grasp that self-education and experience can be more important than a formalized degree, and although success within higher education can demonstrate discipline while developing critical thinking skills, there are other reliable methods to develop and showcase these attributes. In the past, a degree may have been sufficient or necessary to guarantee a quality officer, but this reality no longer exists.

Instead of this outdated process, the Marine Corps should identify and select NCOs and above that meet certain requirements to bypass the bachelor’s degree requirement. To be eligible for selection, enlisted Marines would need an associate’s degree and a certain Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score. Alternately, instead of an ASVAB test, the Marine Corps could develop a more encompassing test that is not merely written but includes spoken, written, and reaction components—similar to the one used in Army’s Battalion Commander’s Assessment Program. To provide another selection and evaluation layer, officer selection officers and commanding officers could screen enlisted Marines applying to this program. The operating theater will always demand intelligence and relevant experience. What it does not always demand, however, is an undergraduate degree.

This change would accomplish several goals. First, it would reduce the wait time burden of allowing an NCO to attend college for two to four years while creating more new officers sooner. Second, it would allow the Marine Corps to retain a Marine’s knowledge instead of losing her skills while at college. Third, this approach provides another opportunity for the Marine Corps to identify quality Marines and persuade them to stay in the Marine Corps. Fourth, it would provide another route to become an officer; the current enlisted to officer pathways all require a degree, which can be a difficult barrier for some due to time and monetary constraints. Lastly, a less rigid approach to commissioning would be especially beneficial for underrepresented minorities.
individuals are better represented in enlisted ranks compared to officers. Reducing barriers would help increase these underrepresented demographics in the officer corps while retaining their institutional knowledge and expertise. As Gen Berger noted, “soliciting a more balanced, more diverse force because our belief fundamentally is that we’re going to make better decisions. We’re going to fight and operate better if we’re a more diverse force.”

These changes could provoke concerns of creating unqualified or “second tier” officers. Certainly, Marine officers and enlisted Marines play different roles, and among those differences are that officers write more, draft more evaluations, and are responsible for larger planning activities for their unit. Not every degree is useful for these responsibilities; however, some are. But the Marine Corps does not evaluate officers on the type of degree, only on the existence of a degree. The relevant experience and writing skills selected NCOs have may not outweigh every degree, but it does outweigh some degrees the Marine Corps would accept to meet this requirement. The skills these Marines may lack can be enhanced by cost-effective solutions, such as more educational opportunities, which will be addressed in this article, or changing PME to encompass classes the Marine Corps deems necessary.

Other militaries, with established officer corps, operate in similar or more “radical” fashions. For example, if an individual has succeeded on certain tests, the Australian military does not require a college degree to become a Navy, Army, or Air Force officer. England and Israel follow a similar model. In fact, most junior Israeli officers do not have an academic degree. As these militaries realize, a degree alone is not determinstic of a service member’s value to that Service. What is valuable is a person who is self-motivated to continue their lifelong learning. The key is to detect these people whether or not they already possess certain degrees. Implementing this a streamlined path for some enlisted Marines to the officer corps will improve quality retention and increase diversity in the officer corps.

Officer Solution
Limited Duty Officer Lite
Limited duty officers are technical experts in their fields and generally remain in their fields for the entirety of their career; our sister Service and the Marine Corps already take advantage of this program. A more nuanced approach would allow Marines to stay in their assignments by forgoing promotion during that time period. The ability to decline a promotion right already exists; however, it can be a career ender if exercised. It does not need to be. If an otherwise great officer is satisfied with his current grade and career options, perhaps an option to decline promotion would suffice. Limiting the number of times an officer could do this—three years in a row and no more than six years in a career—could strike an appropriate balance for this program. To limit its use, the Marine Corps could approve or decline these requests on a case by case basis.

From this idea, the Marine Corps LDO Lite program is born. Imagine a Marine judge advocate, a lawyer in the Marine Corps, who is comfortable never promoting to captain if it means he can be a litigator for six years. This person excels at litigating, and in fact, they are the best litigator in his office. Their dream is to be a litigator until they die. In the civilian world, this Marine could be a litigator for his entire career. But in the Marine Corps, that option is impossible. Without this new option, this Marine will finish his tour and return to the civilian world, seeking a similar job. However, LDO Lite allows the Marine Corps to retain this Marine by fending off outside opportunities and providing opportunities that align with career interests.

The knee-jerk reaction to this suggestion is that it runs afoul of that age old axiom, that every Marine officer is a line officer. Line officers are not re-
stricted to their specialties; for example, a Marine judge advocate can work in non-legal positions. But this recommendation does not alter the Marine Corps' entire culture. It creates a more flexible Marine Corps that can implement its use when necessary. Because the Marine Corps still retains control over who can exercise this option and when it can be exercised, it can limit its use. Dedication to subject matter expertise is valuable to the service and should be rewarded with "promotion" in a different sense than rank. Moreover, this program offers a secondary benefit: it will help the Marine Corps address the problem with the "current up or out system in place" that Gen Berger has expressed concern about.

**Blended Solutions**

*Increase Educational Creativity*

Both Marine officers and enlisted Marines serve a vital purpose in the Marine Corps; neither are more important than the other. Yet, there are more educational and professional opportunities available for officers over enlisted provided by the Marine Corps. To achieve a more balanced and critical-thinking workforce, the Marine Corps should increase—and actively promote at the lowest levels—the amount of educational and professional school opportunities for all Marines. As the Marine Corps moves to smaller and more technically advanced units (e.g. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations), the most junior Marines among us will be expected to make incredibly complex decisions. Creating better critical thinkers at the enlisted level will provide better results at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

To incentivize Marines pursuing this education, PME should not be limited to military schooling. There should be more avenues to earn credit for PME completion through civilian schools and military courses outside a specific PME school. Providing this flexibility will create a more dynamic force. When individuals attend mostly the same courses throughout their career, they generally learn the same information. Recognizing outside course credit for PME requirements will allow Marines to pursue more of their passion areas while still achieving the PME desired results. For example, courses through the Marine Corps' Continuing Education Program (CEP) could be used to satisfy some PME requirements. This change would not eliminate PME requirements. It would simply reduce the number of classes necessary to complete that PME. Similar to how colleges credit certain Advanced Placement exams, the Marine Corps could apply a similar model here.

If the Marine Corps is looking for specific areas to address with more education opportunities, statistics and data literacy are strong starting points. Data literacy is critical to the Commandant’s *Force Design*. Future conflicts are highly reliant on networked sensors, shooters, reliable command and control, and maneuvering across the electromagnetic spectrum. All these actions require data and algorithms—built into sensors, cyber security, and automation—to think and act with the speed of relevance. Now apply this reality to planning. If Marines lack these skills, how will they develop an accurate center of gravity analysis on our adversaries? Instead of creating its own programs, the Marine Corps should establish relationships with schools offering courses in these programs for service members—even if those courses do not culminate into a degree. Additionally, many courses are free, such as Massively Open Online Courses, which offer courses and degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, and many other top-ranked schools. Other schools offer “micro” degrees or certificates, such as Cornell’s cybersecurity certificate.

Another area ripe for improvement is the ability to write. The difference between an officer who can write well and the officer who cannot can be career changing—for both the individual and the Marines under their command. Writing well shapes Marines’ evaluations, explaining to promotion boards and assignment monitors why they should be promoted or selected for a position. Clear writing also can be the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful mission. Although one does not have to be a great writer to be a great speaker, the former tends to increase the latter’s ability. In short, these skills affect Marines, their units, and the Marine Corps at large. Our Commandant’s reading list provides great books to increase one’s horizons, and reading...
While the Marine Corps prides itself on being flexible and adaptable, it still maintains an operating manpower model and culture from the 20th century.

Conclusion

While the Marine Corps prides itself on being flexible and adaptable, it still maintains an operating manpower model and culture from the 20th century. The Commandant is trying to solve this issue, and Marines must follow suit in this endeavor. These proposals provide a path forward, not the only path. There are certainly other ideas out there that should be explored, but what all should realize is that the current model is outdated.

This article proposes numerous solutions to the quality retention problem. Transitioning more enlisted Marines to the officer ranks will help the Marine Corps retain their skills while eliminating potentially dated requirements. The LDO Lite option will help the Marine Corps compete against civilian jobs that can provide consistent experience in a field that a Marine is passionate about, especially in technical fields. The pro-
posals under the blended category may be the most important solutions offered in this article. Educational opportunities must continually evolve and be offered at all levels, enlisted and officer. Additionally, building flexibility into PME models will create more dynamic Marines. Marines that feels they can continue to grow as critical-thinking leaders in their fields will want to stay in the Marine Corps. Lastly, the Free Market Assignment—the most radical proposal of all—empowers Marines to achieve greater success no matter their rank, something that every individual craves.

Marines pride themselves on overcoming friction and setbacks, and retention is an area ripe for exploitation and creativity. In an era where “75 percent of [American] youth are unqualified for military service,” there has never been a more important time to retain quality Marines. Replacements are scarce; the current personnel, with continued support and education, are the best personnel. As a result, bold Marine Corps’ policies are necessary to address these issues. With these changes, the Marine Corps can achieve “an intellectual edge over our adversaries” and create a 21st century talent management model.41

Notes

2. Ibid.

3. Cpl Jennifer Webster, “Editorial: A Broken Promotion System,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, (December 2015), available at https://www.dvidshub.net. (“Composite scores use a combination of time in service, time in grade, rifle score, physical and combat fitness test scores and average in grade proficiency and conduct scores to assign each Marine an individual score. In addition, bonus points (up to 100 points per category) are awarded for education, special duties, recruiting and as a reenlistment incentive.”) See also LtCol Kevin Chunn, “Talent Management: Harvest the High-Hanging Fruit,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: December 2020).


9. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


15. Staff, “Marine Corps Requirements,” Marines, (n.d.), available at https://www.marines.com. (This mindset itself should be evaluated, but it is outside the scope of this article. For example, should every officer be required to take an intro cybersecurity or data analytics course? An advanced history course?)


18. See https://www.idf.il/1-1-182976-1-6291810-1-4821949-1-1/. However, the Israeli military does require officers to obtain a degree to reach advanced ranks, such as major. To continue their own self-education, most Marines would have to obtain a bachelor’s degree as they are pre-requisites to most graduate degrees.


23. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways or War, (Washington, DC: May 2020), available at https://www.jcs.mil. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently admitted that the military has a problem: it lacks “educational creativity.” To solve this issue, the Marine Corps does not need to completely overhaul its PME or faculty staff, etc. It can simply leverage the opportunities that already exist within and outside the Marine Corps. When it comes to education, the Marine Corps’ goal is “intellectual overmatch against adversaries”; the path of least resistance will help us achieve this goal in the quickest and cheapest manner.)

Expeditionary Warfare School receive 41 weeks of resident PME before they reach ten years of service—not counting the time spent at The Basic School.


27. There are some limitations with this idea that will need to be addressed further. For example, the class reduction proposal would work well for non-resident Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) because it already allows students to tailor the curriculum depending on operational commitments. But what about resident school? If a Marine is attending resident EWS but only has to take 75 percent of the course load, what would she do the rest of the time? This type of flexibility is an opportunity, not a burden. This Marine could take advantage of CEP to continue their self-education. In fact, one of CEP’s goals is to “to fill the educational white space often created when a Marine is not actively engaged with formal schools.” Or EWS could offer “electives” that were offered at DC consortium schools like Georgetown.


31. “Reinventing the Leader Selection Process.”


37. “Reinventing the Leader Selection Process.”

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.


41. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways or War, (Washington, DC: May 2020).

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