


WAR AND THE ATOM

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WAR

AND



☛ THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS HAS highlighted once more the persistent problems of modern warfare. Will nuclear missiles, as the "ultimate weapons," dominate and decide the war of the future? Hence, should we concentrate on them to the utmost of our ability, even if that means neglecting the conventional means and methods of warfare, particularly our land and sea forces?

There is no denying that the advocates of nuclear war as the most potent form of coercion known today have a certain basis in logic. If all wars of the future are fought and finished by means of nuclear bombs, carried to their targets through the air, and if, because of the enormous destruction caused by them, the struggle is finished within a few hours or days, then the slow effect of land and sea power will have

By Dr. Anthony E. Sokol

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
little influence. In that case we cannot but bend all our energies toward the preparation of the coming push-button war, both offensively and defensively, even if we must starve our armies and navies to do so. They could, in that case, serve only as a sort of gendarmery, for the occupation and policing of a defeated enemy country.

This reasoning may sound perfect in itself, but logic is only as good as its premises; if they are wrong, then logic leads to dangerous nonsense. We must, therefore, review some of the premises tacitly made by the nuclear enthusiasts. We cannot be content with the question of how many square miles a single atom bomb can devastate, or whether it can sink a battleship—the answer being obviously that it certainly can, if it hits it right—but we must go back to first principles and basic problems.

ATOM

**A perusal of Soviet strategy and its effectiveness
A proposal for a dynamic strategy for the United States**

Figure 1



Nature and Function of War

The very first of these is the question, "what is the nature and function of war in the life of nations, and how does nuclear warfare fit into the picture?"

It is well known, though not always fully realized, that war is not an end in itself but an instrument of national policy, one of the many devices used to achieve the national objective. As the German theoretician of war, Clausewitz, expressed it in his classical work on the subject, war is the continuation of policy by other means; that is, by means of violence and force instead of peaceful measures such as diplomacy or economic, political, psychological or ideological forms of pressure. War, being costly and risky, is resorted to only if the national objective is of paramount importance; if the foreign opposition to its achievement seems to be insensible to any other means of persuasion; if the chances of winning the war, at a cost less than the value of the objective, appear favorable; and if war promises the real accomplishment of the main national goal.

Being thus an instrument of national policy, the ultimate purpose of war is not just to win a victory over the opponent—though that is normally its primary and immediate

aim—but to contribute its share to the achievement of the national objective by forcing the opponent to give up his opposition to its realization. It is, or should be, a part of a higher design to safeguard a nation's basic interests in its pursuit of life and happiness, to which national policy and all its instruments must be subservient. Thus war must be, and remain, the obedient servant of peace, just as death must serve the purposes of life, and not the other way.

To be sure, nations have at times forgotten this simple truth and have made national policy the tool of military victory instead of its master. But this has usually had tragic results for them; an example of this was General Ludendorff's domination of Germany's civilian government and its diplomacy in World War I.

Gradations of Warfare

International relations may be visualized as a line representing national policy directed toward the achievement of the national objective (see Figure 1). Its instruments form a graduated scale of coercion, ranging from ordinary diplomatic exchange—the mildest and most frequently used type of international action—to some form of "cold" that


is, unbloody war. When a point is reached where the importance of the objective seems to justify the application of violent force, the change is made to warlike means. But even then, only as much pressure is exerted as is necessary to achieve the national objective. Any additional use of violence would appear wasteful and dangerous. Hence war, also, does not consist in a uniform application of force but shows a gradation of intensity, beginning with a simple "police action" involving a minimum of shooting and bloodshed, and including limited war, general war and finally all-out or total war. This latter is the extreme form of national exertion, in which everything is risked and every possible means used to obtain or maintain an absolutely vital objective. It is fortunately quite rare and does not, as a rule, occur more than once a century, while other grades of war, those of medium intensity, may average one a decade. Minor conflicts of a more local nature, happen almost every year in the history of mankind.

Neither in peace nor war will any responsible government rely on any single instrument of foreign policy to the exclusion of others. Every important action will always represent a combination of various methods; one supplementing and strengthening the others.

Unfortunately, the national objective which war should help realize, is sometimes forgotten after hostilities begin. Reason often being one of its first victims, war has a way of influencing people's thinking so that military victory itself becomes the ultimate objective. This may mean that the goal for which the war was fought will not be reached; that a totally different one will take its place; that no real advantage will be gained from all the toil and suffering of the war; that



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Wide World Photo

Destruction is not war itself; if it is not kept within certain bearable limits, it may defeat the very purpose of war

it will result in a situation which is not peace and relaxation, but only an interval used to prepare for another conflict. In other words, unless we keep in mind our main national objectives, victory may mean winning the war but losing the peace.

Only a great statesman knows how to use all the instruments at his disposal for the achievement of the national objective at minimum cost in national substance. It is, in fact, one of the greatest tasks confronting him, only equalled perhaps by the formulation of the national objective itself. Once it is established, the statesman must devise the proper policy for its realization, weighing the importance of the goal against the price of reaching it. He must visualize, at least in a general way, the contribution which each of the categories of national action can make; coordinate them into a national grand strategy, and indicate the individual strategies that each branch must follow to realize the common goal. It is easy to see that this constitutes an almost superhuman task and that few mortals are equal to it.

Because of the complexity of the task, the Communists have devel-

oped what they call the "science of political action," a much-vaunted, allegedly fool-proof method of arriving at the proper objective, the correct national policy and the best strategy to implement it. Actually, all it amounts to is the realization that there are many ways to kill a cat, and that the cheapest of them may be as good as any. In accordance with this pseudo-scientific formula, the Communists will patiently and systematically study their opponent; seek out his particular weaknesses, be they political, social, economic or psychological (such as the feeling of frustration among colonial peoples) and then try to take advantage of whatever levers the situation offers them. Again, this is not an entirely new or unknown procedure; every state does the same and the Germans even carried it to a high degree of perfection under the title of "Geopolitics." But what is new is the skill and success of the Russians in playing the game; the thoroughness with which they will make use of any opportunity to achieve their goal in a "peaceful" way; practically eliminating aggressive war by their own forces from their tool chest. Instead, they will try subversion with-

in the opposing state, playing on: the dissatisfaction of minorities or other social groups; the gullibility of some people and the misguided idealism of others; economic pressure in the form of offers to trade, or by withholding trade; psychological or ideological measures to the utmost of their usefulness; even military action by one of the satellites so that Russia itself will not be involved—in short, anything that promises results short of a general shooting war. Because they realize these possibilities and are adept at playing the political pipe organ, the Communists have in most cases been able to achieve their purposes without having to resort to war.

In contrast to this, the Germans were much more ready to use the instrument of war to achieve vital objectives; resorting to warlike measures before all non-violent solutions had been exhausted. As a result, they gained much by war, but in the end lost it all, paid a heavy price, and certainly cannot be said to have reached their national objectives, whatever they were. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been quite successful with their policy. Counting only those conquests which were made without the par-

EASTERN POLAND

ticipation of Russian armed forces, and which to this date remain under Communist control, we arrive at the following impressive list:

1939-45: The eastern half of Poland (obtained from the conquering Germans as a price of Russian neutrality).

The 3 Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (occupied when the Germans were too busy to object).

Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania, for a similar reason.

1945-56: Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Rumania

Yugoslavia (although extracting itself from Russian control, it nevertheless remained Communist).

China (although not a

ESTONIA

satellite country in the strict sense of the word, nevertheless at present an important and potent member of the Communist bloc).

To these countries, which together have a population of some 800 million, must be added North Korea and North Vietnam, both gained through wars involving Communist armies, but without the direct participation of Russian forces.

On the other side of the ledger, Finland stands as the sole example of the deliberate use of war by Soviet Russia to gain its objective. In contrast to the above list, the course and results of that deviation from usual Communist strategy certainly would not encourage a repetition.

On the basis of these experiences, the Soviets have evolved a regular pressure machine which, as far as every individual instrument within it is concerned, is probably inferior to the corresponding part of our arsenal, but which represents an

efficient team organized and operating to spread Soviet control anywhere and at all times, by any means, fair or foul. Having a definite and positive objective to work toward, the Communists have: devised a strategy calculated to pursue it under varying conditions; developed a full set of instruments to apply it, and are employing flexible tactics to carry it out. Their success with this method cannot be gainsaid, as shown above. But lest we overrate the efficacy of their procedure, we must remember that it was neither the attractions of Communism nor the efficiency of their "scientific" politics which caused the countries behind the Iron Curtain to join the Communist camp. It was the presence or vicinity of the Russian war machine. What forced free countries to submit to Communism was their helplessness and hopelessness, caused by the absence of any effective counterforce. Because of this, Russian control must remain tenuous, for as soon as a balance of power is re-established in Europe,

LATVIA

CHINA

YUGOSLAVIA

RUMANIA

LITHUANIA

the desire for national independence may reassert itself. But even if Russia now should lose control over some of its satellites, it must be remembered that they have acquired them at almost no cost to themselves, and that they have been able to exploit them for over 10 years for the sole benefit of the Russian fatherland.

These examples strongly indicate the Russian reluctance to go to war as long as there is a chance of getting what they want some other way. Their reluctance is strengthened by the Marxist belief in the inevitability of the eventual collapse of the capitalist countries. According to it, all the Communists need to do is to wait patiently and take every opportunity to help along this natural evolution by causing the capitalist world as much trouble as possible. Since thus the objective of a Communist control of the world is bound to be realized eventually and automatically, this doctrine does not call for all-out war, though local or limited conflicts are not excluded if the

risk is small and the expected results worth-while.

Since the Western World is just as unlikely to unleash a total war without being provoked into it, the probability of its occurring within the foreseeable future is remote, while that of "small" wars is considerable. If, therefore, we should prepare ourselves almost exclusively for a conflict in which the strategic airforce and nuclear weapons would play the decisive role, we may find ourselves very ill-equipped for the more probable partial conflicts, in which neither of the two are of paramount value.

That this is not just a nebulous theory but a deduction backed by actual and contemporary experience, was illustrated in Korea, in French Indochina and, indirectly at least, in the Suez Crisis. In the first two instances the Western Powers involved in the struggle had either complete or comparative air superiority and a monopoly on atomic weapons. Yet these advantages insured neither a military victory nor

NORTHERN BUKOVINA

ALBANIA

BULGARIA

HUNGARY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA


the full achievement of the national goal. It was land and sea power which carried the burden of the fight and without which it could not even have been conducted. They were, to be sure, greatly aided by air power, but it was an auxiliary, not an essential element. Stronger land forces might have brought about a complete victory. Larger air forces or a hydrogen bomb could not.

This is also a lesson which the British and French should have drawn from their warlike preparations during the Suez crisis, namely, that they had given too much weight to their air forces and neglected the older services to the extent that they found themselves, in the moment of need, inadequately equipped to handle the military situation confronting them. They had to postpone decisive action until they could build up sufficient strength in conventional forces.

These 3 examples illustrate an old experience; that is, that war rarely occurs under the conditions which the planners assume and prepare for. Life is too complex to be foreseeable in all details. All we can hope to do is to be ready for a number of possible cases. As far as the armed forces are concerned, that means they must be organized on as broad and inclusive a basis as possible, neglecting no form of warfare or weapon, or of method of fighting. To concentrate on nuclear weapons to the detriment of others would be to prepare for only one type of war, and that is the unlikely one of the total conflict between the giants of the modern world. It would leave us comparatively helpless in any other kind of conflict and thus expose us to piecemeal defeat. In other words, land and sea power are still essential today; still vital instruments of our foreign policy, which can be fully carried out only by efficient cooperation of all members of the fighting team, together with the peaceful measures at our disposal. This all-inclusive preparation may be expensive in money and manpower, but it is still the cheapest and safest for us in the long run.

We may then summarize this part of our argument by repeating that the task of national policy is to realize the national objective, using whatever means are available and

promising of results. One of these means, to be used only in the most urgent circumstances, is war. But even if a state resorts to this violent, costly and risky measure, it will, or at least should, choose the least fierce form of it, applying merely the minimum force necessary to impose its will on the opponent. Only in very rare cases will all-out war occur, with no consideration for cost, damage or suffering caused. Usually the definite threat of greater misery to be suffered if war is continued, or the realization of hopelessness of winning the conflict, will suffice to induce one of the belligerents to give in and withdraw its opposition to the other's demands.



How does war help achieve the National Objective?

In order to be able to impose its will upon another state whenever it becomes necessary, each sovereign nation maintains armed forces, that is, a comparatively small delegation of its members trained and equipped for military action, offensive or defensive. If, in war, these forces are eliminated or otherwise incapacitated from performing their tasks, the nation as a whole is in danger of being overrun by the enemy, with all its members, its territory, and its property exposed to such harm that it appears wiser and cheaper to accept the other's will rather than to pay the heavy price of foreign occupation, spoliation and other war damages.

Therefore the chief aim of war strategy is to defeat or neutralize the enemy's armed forces, after which he will generally be ready to sue for peace. This peace—and with it the cessation of damaging action—will be granted by the victor only under conditions which will promote the achievement of his national goal. If, however, as unfortunately does happen in the heat of battle, the national objective is lost sight of and military victory becomes an end in itself, if the demands made of the vanquished are too high, or the pressures exerted to enforce them exces-

sive, then even a successful war may become meaningless and deprive the victor of the fruits of victory. It may hinder rather than help the attainment of the national objective.

To prove this point, we need only consider the case of Germany and Japan in WW II. Basically, our national objective which led us into the war against them was to eliminate the danger which they posed against ourselves and the world in general. In view of the aggressive spirit which dominated both countries, this could only be done by their military defeat; all peaceful means to restrain their expansionistic tendencies having proved to be futile. By crushing them completely, however, by disarming and eliminating them as centers of all national power, we created a power vacuum which did not serve the achievement of our national objective. As is only natural, the vacuum was quickly filled by others who, in their turn, revived the threat to world peace which we had fought to save. As a result, we are now facing an even greater peril and actually must do everything possible to rehabilitate our former enemies so that they can serve as part of the ramparts against the new wave of aggression.

It is now realized by many that, at least in the case of Japan, we used more force to win than was absolutely needed. Like Great Britain, Japan is so highly dependent on imports that an effective naval blockade will soon cause the island empire to starve. After we broke through the country's last line of defense, its navy, Japan lay prostrate before us and our sea power alone could force it into submission. It was not necessary to invade the islands, to call—and pay—for Russian assistance, nor to drop atomic bombs. These actions possibly hastened the Japanese surrender but they did not cause it, as the Japanese had known for a long time that the hour of defeat had struck, in fact, ever since the Battle of Leyte Gulf eliminated the Japanese Navy as an effective means of resistance. After that there was no hope for them to obtain the necessary food and raw materials to continue the war, and suing for peace was only a matter of weeks.

In our effort to put more pressure

on Japan than was needed, we made concessions to the Russians in order to draw them into a war which was already decided. We thus enabled them to occupy Manchuria and a part of Korea; delivered to them the strategic Kurile Islands, and thus weakened the position of Japan. The control of Manchuria, the most industrialized part of China, and the enormous booty of weapons and equipment found there by the Russians and turned over to their Chinese sympathizers, strengthened the Communists in China to such an extent that they were eventually able to overthrow the nationalist regime. What all this means to us today needs no emphasis. Of course it is quite possible that the Russians would have come in anyway and that there was nothing we could do to prevent them, but at least we did not need to pay them for this disservice.

The point to be brought out here is only this, that the application of excessive, that is, unnecessary pressure to reach our objective is to be avoided, even if it leads to a brilliant military victory. To use excess energy in order to reach one's goal is like the well-meant but disastrous effort of the bear to chase away the fly from his friend's nose by hitting it with his paw.



Conventional Warfare versus Strategic Air War


It is often assumed that it is the nuclear bomb which revolutionized modern warfare and stood in opposition to conventional methods of fighting. But that is not the case. The real difference lies between a war waged by the armed forces of the opposing nations on the one hand, and a war against the entire population of the enemy country on the other. The difference lies in the method, rather than in the weapons which could be used, in either case. This "total" type of warfare not only makes the entire population of a country the target of battle,

but it practically ignores the armed forces which are organized to defend it. Thus it actually uses all the terrors of war instead of only making a threat of them. While the usual mode of warfaring gave the defeated nation a chance, after the debacle of its armed forces, to stop the war by the acceptance of the victor's conditions, thereby escaping the full terror of war, strategic bombing leaves no such alternative. The modern version of this all-out struggle is aimed at the destruction of the enemy's cities, with their population, their productive capacity, their function as nerve centers of the nation. It was first advocated systematically and as a substitute for other modes of fighting by the Italian general Douhet and it readily appealed to technologically-minded people. But even Hitler realized that it was a method of fighting applicable only in certain limited situations. He did not unleash its full fury against Poland, France or any of his other neighbors against whom he could use his land forces. Only when he could see no other way of winning the contest, as with Great Britain, did he resort to bombing civilian centers from the air. Naturally, he would have done the same to the US, because here similar conditions prevailed.

The same was true of Stalin and his Russians. If they did not use wholesale strategic bombing of German cities as one of the chief implements of their strategy, it certainly was not because they were either unable or too humane to do so. A nation that could produce 25,000 planes and 40,000 tanks in one year of war could surely develop the bombers necessary for that task. But what the Russians wanted, just like the Germans, was to capture the productive potential of the opponent and put it to work for their own benefit, not to destroy it and make it worthless. Nor were they interested in spending their own substance to rebuild a devastated enemy before they could begin to put him to work for themselves.

It may be objected here that at this time the Soviets actually are building a powerful strategic air force capable of using nuclear weapons. Unless it is to be used for the purpose of destroying large centers of population and production, it

would have little meaning. Certainly the Russians are not going to spend all the cost of such a force unless they are planning to use it in case of need. To resolve this seeming paradox, we must consider that today the US has taken the place of Germany as Russia's chief antagonist. But while the Soviets could hope to seize and make use of German industry, and hence were reluctant to damage it unnecessarily, they have no such hesitation in the case of the far-away US. Even so there was, at first, no point in planning a strategic air campaign against this country, because there was little chance of obtaining decisive results, as long as only conventional bombs were available for the purpose. This limitation disappeared, however, as soon as Russia developed atomic bombs of its own, because now the Soviet masters can actually hope to deal us a crippling blow, even if only a few planes reach their targets. Now they see a possibility of defeating us by air bombardment, not necessarily to be used, but at least to be held over our heads, as a serious threat. That they are still not too anxious to apply this particular form of war, because they evidently realize our current superiority in this field, is evidenced by their repeated demands that nuclear warfare be forbidden. We may be quite sure that the Communists would not try to proscribe any type of pressure in which they felt they held the advantage.



Destruction as an Instrument of War

Our next problem is the place of destruction in war. There is no doubt that destruction and suffering are inherent in warfare, because they and the fear of even greater damage are what force nations to accept otherwise unpalatable terms. But destruction is not war itself; on the contrary, if it is not kept within certain bearable limits, it may defeat the very purpose of the war. Even if we disregard the humane—or rather inhumane—aspects of the

problem, destruction is, as such, not a very efficient tool of war. In view of the strong defense that any vigorous and technologically developed people will put up to avoid or minimize it, it becomes an exceedingly costly and uncertain method of overcoming opposition. Particularly if the opponent can reply in kind.

The Germans had to find out the hard way that this mode of fighting does not pay in the end, because at the final reckoning they received more than they gave. Nor was the Allied bombing of German cities an unqualified success. In fact, some British authorities maintain that it was one of the most expensive failures in the history of British warfare. While it certainly helped to soften German resistance and prepare the country for the Allied invasion, it did not by itself force it to its knees, nor eliminate the necessity of defeating the German land forces. At the same time it required such a heavy expenditure in men and material that it delayed and made more difficult the decision on land. On the other hand, experts on Asian affairs believe that the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan did more damage to us in the long run than to Japan, because it gave us the reputation of being ruthlessly anti-Asian, a belief which is hard to eradicate from the Asian mind and makes it suspicious of all our motives and actions.

Of course, it may be thought that the introduction of the enormously destructive nuclear missiles will have the effect of forcing the attacked nation into submission so quickly that actually lives and property are saved by this method, as contrasted with the slow-working performance of conventional warfare. But there is no definite assurance of this fact and several arguments may be used to throw doubt upon it.

First, the tools of war have become steadily more effective and more lethal in the course of history. But the cost of war in human lives has not, fortunately, increased in the same proportion. Sword and arrow killed just as many, relatively speaking, in their time, as did cannonball and torpedo later on. One reason for this difference is the increasing cost of manufacturing the deadlier weapons, another the corresponding improvement of protective devices


and measures. The evolution of offensive and defensive weapons proceeds in a sort of seesaw fashion, but in time they usually more or less come to match each other.

Second, terror and destruction not only spread fear among the attacked people but they also stir them up and inflame their will to resist and retaliate to the utmost. The example of Great Britain, Germany and Russia shows clearly that destruction alone, even with great suffering and loss, is not sufficient to force a great people into surrender. At least not as long as hope exists that they eventually can turn the tables upon their tormentors; that in time they can stage a comeback and win the final victory. They only give up when there is no hope left. That usually happens when their military forces, their human sword and shield, are wiped out or definitely and obviously defeated. Decision in war is, after all, based as much on psychological as on material conditions. It is the fear of even greater damage to be suffered by an unchecked enemy rather than the present and actual, but only temporary, harm which causes nations to yield to coercion.

Finally, we come to a peculiar characteristic of aerial warfare which stands out in strong contrast to other forms of warring. Land power, for instance, has what may be called a double effect. An army advancing into enemy territory not only deprives the opponent of his land, manpower, resources and communication lines, but it also gains these assets for itself. The more it weakens the enemy, the more it increases its own basis of strength. The same can be said of sea power, though here it applies only to lines of communication and the access to resources. Strategic air war, however, has only a single-action effect—destruction. While it eliminates enemy assets, it does not gain them for its own side. Thus, to be as effective as a land campaign, it must be at least twice as intense.

Let us now assume that a major conflict between the Western World and the Communist Bloc does break out and is carried on in the form of a nuclear exchange between the antagonists. Whatever else might happen, of however long or short duration the fight may be, one thing is sure, that it will leave both sides

badly devastated and exhausted. Even if our side gained the final victory, the damage suffered by all participants would create the conditions of chaos, of misery, of hopelessness and frustration which are the very best breeding ground for Communism. It certainly could not be a part of our national objective to promote and facilitate the spread of this sinister doctrine. Moreover, this country, which after 2 world wars was able to assume the role of the granary, the bank and repair shop for the war-devastated countries, friend and foe alike, to help them overcome and rebuild the ravages of war, would itself be hurt so badly that it could offer little aid to others. The devastation of a large part of the world would remain, would continue to fester, finally to finish what the war had begun, namely, the complete disintegration not only of entire nations but of human civilization as a whole. To resort to sheer destruction as the chief instrument of our national policy would thus seem uneconomical, uncertain to achieve the desired results and wholly unwise.



Retaliation as a Factor in War

As we have seen, a state will go to war, even with insufficient justification, only if it feels sure that it has a good chance of winning the conflict. To start it under any other circumstances, except in self-defense, would be suicidal and lunatic. The same goes for the use of certain weapons. No belligerent will employ any new ones if he knows that the enemy has, or can develop, a superiority in them. He will only try them out if he feels sure that he has a monopoly, a decided advantage in their number or their use, or if he thinks that he can inflict more relative damage by their use than he will suffer himself. Thus the Germans used submarines against British commercial shipping because Great Britain was very vulnerable to that kind of attack while Germany was not; they used poison gas in World War I because they thought they were ahead of others in

that type of weapon. Knowing that their opponents had caught up with them in the meantime, they did not avail themselves of it in WW II, since it would have given them no particular advantage. They resorted to strategic air warfare against Great Britain, because they thought their Luftwaffe better prepared for it than that of their enemy, and again later on, when they had a practical monopoly on buzz bombs. But it is more than doubtful if they would repeat this experiment in another war.

It is, then, largely the fear of retaliation which makes nations refrain from employing unusual weapons in war, especially those of the mass-destruction and terror type. If the other side also has them, they may offer as many disadvantages as benefits and therefore be no asset to the user. Because we had a monopoly of atom bombs in 1945, we could demobilize our armed forces as quickly as we did, since the bomb served to balance and offset the Soviets' superiority in conventional forces. Being defenseless against the new dreadful missile, the Russians could not attack us without suffering unbearable damage to themselves. But the very potency of the bomb made it impossible for us to use it in any but a case of extreme necessity, so that the Communists could make their step by step incursions on Central Europe with impunity, since we lacked the means to stop those local expansions.

But even this precarious balance of power was changed radically when the Russians first exploded an atomic device in 1949. Now the equilibrium between atom bomb and conventional forces was disturbed, with the scales tipping in favor of the USSR, which had both. To regain some form of equality we not only had to revitalize our land and sea forces, but also had to develop a system of alliances to encircle the Communist "heartland" and help us contain aggression at least within its existing limits. NATO, SEATO and other such groupings were the result of this endeavor. While none of their members at that time, except ourselves, had any atomic strength to contribute to the partnership, they did have manpower and the capacity to rebuild the conventional services which, for a time, we had

neglected. The Korean war soon emphasized our need of them, as well as the fallacy of depending solely on strategic air forces and nuclear weapons for the defense of this country's vital interests.

But let us return to our imaginary war between the 2 power blocs. We assumed that as soon as hostilities began, perhaps even before they were officially announced, planes and guided missiles would speed across the borders to rain nuclear destruction on the enemy. In such a contest we would hold a certain advantage, not only because we probably are still ahead of the Soviets in nuclear weapons, but also because we could start our attack from positions close to Russia, while the Communists would have to cross great distances to reach us. To be closer to Russia than Russia is to us is, after all, one of the main advantages of our system of alliances which we have built up so patiently and with so much cost to us. But the advantage of distance only holds for ourselves, and does not apply to our allies who adjoin Communist territory in Europe and Asia and are thus within easy reach of the enemy.

Nevertheless, as was pointed out before, the Communists may not want to drop nuclear bombs on them because they wish to capture them as intact as possible, and because they would prefer to concentrate their atomic fury on this country, the backbone of the Western Alliance and hence their chief antagonist. But if one of our allies, or we ourselves from allied bases, begin to drop these deadly missiles on Russia, the Soviets might be forced to retaliate against our comparatively defenseless partners. However, even if we refrain from using allied bases and instead start our attack on Russia from our own territory, the Soviets will have to overrun Europe in order to deprive us of its assets and make up in productive capacity for the damages we may cause them in their own land. In other words, whatever happens, the Russians will occupy Western Europe as quickly as possible. We will then be placed in the most unpleasant dilemma: shall we leave them undisturbed in this dominant position to consolidate their power and solidify their control, or shall we start atom-bomb-

ing the cities and factories of our friends and allies, destroying Western Europe as well as Russia? Or is there another alternative in a war conducted mainly by strategic airpower and atomic missiles, directed against the countries and the peoples themselves instead of their armed forces?




The Detering Power of "Terror Warfare"

Evidently the answer is that we must avoid this type of war as much as possible. We cannot expect our allies to be happy with such a grim prospect of being liberated only at the cost of their lives and their countries, nor does it seem to fit into our own endeavor to bring about a better life for all in this world. But is not the development of nuclear weapons and strategic air warfare calculated to do this very thing, namely, to scare potential aggressors away from starting a shooting war?

That may hold true in a case where the opponent does not have the ability himself to resort to these new modes of fighting. Even then, however, circumstances of a political, psychological, economic or military nature may not make its employment advisable, as we have seen in Korea for instance. But if the other side also has the means of nuclear air war, then there is no relative advantage on either side and they cancel each other out. Then the deterrent effect is lost, and the side which has other means of fighting may win the final victory, regardless of whether nuclear weapons are used strategically or not. Hence they do not necessarily prevent the outbreak of wars, because they will either not be used at all, or they will reduce both sides of the conflict in approximately the same proportion without bringing about a decision.

These arguments indicate clearly that we must have, and develop to the utmost of our ability, all the requisites of strategic and nuclear warfare, but also that we must not

completely rely on them either as a deterring force or as a war-deciding factor. Unless we are adequately provided with other means of fighting, the possession of atomic bombs alone will neither guarantee the maintenance of peace or safeguard our national security, nor assure us of winning the final battle and a meaningful victory.



What are the Requirements of a Successful Strategy for Us?

On the basis of the preceding considerations we may now attempt to indicate a basic military strategy for the Free World, which will have a chance of stopping Communist advances without the risk of a general holocaust and total ruination. This strategy and the forces designed to carry it into execution, will have to fulfill the following conditions:

1) It must, in conjunction with other forms of national power, prevent general wars from starting, or if they do break out, limit them in time, place and intensity to the very minimum of violence, destruction and suffering. (Strategic air warfare with nuclear weapons, although an integral part of our power, does not by itself promise to do so.)

2) It must discourage or be able to nip in the bud, "cold war" measures; that is, moves to nibble away our assets piecemeal by steps short of a shooting war. (Nuclear retaliation cannot do this, because it involves the use of tools too powerful for the settlement of such local conflicts.)


3) It must enable us to set our own strength against the weakness of the enemy, not the reverse, so that, if war breaks out, we can defeat him with the minimum effort and cost. (This requires a careful analysis of our respective abilities and powers, not only the military but also the political, ideological, economic, psychological, etc.)

4) It must provide the means to carry out our national policy under a great variety of circumstances, not just one set of assumed conditions.

(This means a multiplicity of tools rather than a single instrument.)

5) It must not alarm or discourage our allies, whom we need as much as they need us, by threatening war measures against our enemies which would also badly hurt or wipe out our friends. Nor must we give them the feeling that we are deserting them by withdrawing troops and fleets from Eurasia.

6) We must be careful that our strategy, and the tools to carry it into execution, do not violate our own conscience or the moral convictions of the world at large, because one of our main assets is our own firm belief in the righteousness of our cause and having world opinion concur in this belief. (Nuclear warfare does not seem to be one of the best methods of convincing people of the justice of our cause and our policies.)



What Military Force is Needed for this Strategy?

In order to devise the proper forces needed to implement this strategy, we must consider some of the factors which constitute our real strength and endeavor to find the main weaknesses of our probable enemies.

Few will doubt that we are ahead of them in industrial production, including, at least potentially, the manufacture of weapons and other tools of war. But this productivity depends on the uninterrupted flow of raw materials, without which it would quickly deteriorate. Many of these are not found in our country at all, or not in sufficient quantity. They have to be imported, which in most cases means that they must be carried to us across the seas from all parts of the globe. This brings up the problem of the ocean and our dependence on it, in other words, our need for adequate sea power.

We are by nature favored with a geographic location which, while offering us the roadbed of the seas to connect us with the rest of the world and its resources, also serves to isolate us from the Eurasian continent

on which our main opponents are situated, thus protecting us from direct attack by land. This holds true, of course, only as long as we control the seas, so that we can use them to carry goods, men and weapons, maintain our links with allies and suppliers, and deny such privileges to our enemies.

This means that one of our fundamental needs, as well as one of our basic advantages, is mobility. Fortunately, our national character, our industrial development and our sea power, can combine to give us special mobility on land and on the water. But since our opponents are geographically closer to our allies and to the prospective theaters of war than we are, having the advantage of interior lines, we must increase and utilize this mobility to the highest possible degree. This is not impossible, because the Russians, our chief antagonists, despite their many soldierly attributes, traditionally evince a lack of that quality. It is the cumbersome slowness of their war machine, its inability to react quickly to changing situations, together with its crushing power to overcome stationary obstacles, which earned it the epithet of "steamroller."

If we cannot match superior mobility against this comparative sluggishness in order to balance our deficiency in numbers, we may see the Communists overrun the Eurasian rimland, in which most of our allies, much of the world's population and a large share of its resources are located. If they could accomplish this unchecked, they would have won the first and possibly decisive round of the contest. No Maginot Line or other stationary defense will deter or stop their advance once it gets under way. Only a highly mobile army, backed and supported by sea and air power, will adequately perform the task of confusing and demoralizing the Communist steamroller, so as to slow it down and gain time.

For in modern war, more than ever before, time is of the essence. Yet if we carefully study the Russian war potential, for instance, we shall find that practically all existing conditions favor the Soviets in a war of short duration, when their strong and war-ready land forces and accumulated war material, the

comparatively short distances they need to cover to gain their objectives, the organization of their industries, the absolute control their government exercises, as well as the element of surprise, might help them to gain major victories before we could even get fully mobilized. For the preponderance of our industrial capacity cannot be made effective until some time after the beginning of hostilities; our active forces are few and widely scattered; our democratic allies are slow to agree on any issue or common strategy. In short, in a war lasting only a few days or weeks the Soviets would hold all the trumps, while our strength can only slowly be developed to its maximum.

It is, however, almost an axiom that a nuclear war would be a short one. That means that it might be over and decided long before we could throw our industrial superiority and our other assets into the balance.

The force we need to implement a strategy which will either prevent war or end it with our victory, without causing so much damage that we might lose the peace following it, is, then, a fighting team composed of a strong army, a powerful navy and an air force equipped to cooperate with the others, even to wage offensive and defensive war if necessary, but not one which feels that it can bring about decisions and carry out our foreign policy all by itself. In short, we need a well-balanced body of harmoniously cooperating services, each one of which fully realizes its dependence on oth-

ers to render the maximum service to the nation.

One of the main requirements of this fighting team is mobility, the power to move quickly and surprisingly on sea, on land and in the air, to throw large forces into battle on short notice, to support and maintain them effectively, and thus to constitute a threat which no aggressor anywhere can or will overlook. This means an army well trained and equipped for amphibious warfare, spearheaded by a sufficiently large Marine Corps, transported as much as possible by plane, followed by fast ships constantly ready for service, protected and aided by speedy warships, by fleets of planes and by the most modern weapons available. It means a widespread net of the best available defense against any form of attack, including planes and missiles with nuclear war heads. It also means a continuous strengthening of our allies, so that they can do their share of retarding and weakening an invader, to keep him at bay until we can come to their rescue. To do this, they will have to be convinced of our ability as well as our readiness to send reinforcements when necessary to the common cause, not just in the form of nuclear bombs which may liberate them to death.

To conclude, even though for a number of years the atomic bomb did represent the most effective asset in our attempt to prevent the wholesale conquest of the world by Russian Communism, its value was always limited, potential rather than actual, and is now becoming more

and more doubtful. No national policy embracing the whole world, and an almost infinite variety of possible situations, can be based entirely or even predominantly on the employment of nuclear weapons. To be sure, we still need them as well as all the other scientific implements of the modern arsenal, together with the most perfect instruments of delivering them and the best means of defense against them. We must do whatever we can in this field to keep abreast of developments and maintain our present leading position, so as to be prepared for the catastrophe of another all-out war, even though this might be an unlikely contingency.

But in addition to all that, we still need a powerful amphibious, or rather triphibious, force along more conventional lines, to stop or frustrate the much more likely forms of aggression anywhere and in the shortest time possible. This force, properly organized and equipped with all the modern tools of war must be, above all, highly mobile and ever ready, so that it can quickly go to the aid of our allies, stop local wars or decide them in our favor, or land and operate in the rear of an advancing enemy. Properly used, it would be capable of assuring us of victory, either without the wholesale slaughter and ruin of nuclear war, or after an indecisive stalemate resulting from it. Thus it would prove to be an indispensable and invaluable instrument of our national policy and still one of the main pillars on which rests our national security. US ♣ MC

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
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