MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

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IN EVERY MARINE RAIDER
LIES THE ELITE FIGHTING SPIRIT
OF A MARINE.
MARINE
RAIDERS

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

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The 246-year history, and ethos of the Corps continue with the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor ceremony at the end of every Crucible. *(Photo by LCpl Sarah Stegall.)*

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September 1, 2021

Dear Members,

I'd like to take this opportunity to thank LtGen William Mark Faulkner, USMC (Ret), for his countless contributions to the Marine Corps Association and our Foundation and ultimately to the betterment of our United States Marine Corps. Through his actions and leadership, Mark has embodied the spirit and mission envisioned at the founding of the Association in 1913, by then-LtCol John A. Lejeune and articulated in our current mission statement: "To be the preeminent association for all Marines and friends of the Corps dedicated to leader development, recognition of professional excellence and expanding awareness of the rich traditions, history, and spirit of the United States Marine Corps." We, at the Marine Corps Association, wish Mark and Janet nothing but happiness and success as they begin a new chapter of their lives in North Carolina.

I am humbled at the opportunity to take the helm of the Marine Corps Association and follow in Mark's footsteps. I am excited by the prospect of continuing to support our Commandant's future force design initiatives through the programs and awards that the Marine Corps Association provides to Marines.

This is our Association and will continue to be recognized as The Professional Association of the United States Marine Corps.

Semper Fidelis,

C.G. Chiarotti
Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret)
President and CEO

MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION
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MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

NOVEMBER 2021

Editorial: 246 Years of "Military Efficiency and Soldierly Virtue"

One hundred years ago this month on the 1st of November 1921, the 13th Commandant, MajGen John Archer Lejeune, first directed that "a reminder of the honorable service of the Corps be published by every command, to all Marines throughout the globe, on the birthday of the Corps." Since then, that message known as *Article 38, United States Marine Corps Manual, Edition of 1921* has been read at every birthday celebration. Whether part of the precision of close order drill at a parade, the plush formality of an evening birthday ball, or an austere ceremony in a forward operating base or aboard ship, the words of the 13th Commandant, often read from a theatrically antique-looking scroll, still inspire us all to hold fast to the lore of all those who have born the title Marine. One year ago, I wrote that during the "persistent pandemic environment, observances of the Marine Corps' 245th birthday will certainly be unusual ... gatherings may have limited attendance, "social distancing," … and … in some cases these events may be cancelled outright." I think few of us thought we would be facing many of the same challenges and restrictions twelve months later. Yet we are, and yet again Marines will adapt and overcome to celebrate our long history as "Soldiers of the Sea."

In addition to the Commandant's 246th birthday message on page 4 and the articles featured on our cover, I enthusiastically recommend several other noteworthy pieces in this month's edition. On page 12, Maj Thomas Schueman shares a compelling personal history of combat operations in Afghanistan at the platoon and company levels in "Wish for the Impossible." This month focuses much of the *Gazette's* content on a foundational part of the Corps' culture no less important than our history and traditions: leadership. Starting on page 34, six articles present a range of observations and recommendations on the enduring principals and evolving practice of leadership in the Corps. On page 41, "Innovating the Commandant's Professional Reading List" by Capt Cameron Lahren looks at adding incentives and accountability to the professional reading program. In "We Must Get Back to Mission Tactics" on page 43, frequent contributor Capt Michael Hanson focuses on applying one of the primary tenets of maneuver warfare to tactical leadership.

We also continue several of our recurring Ideas & Issues features including the Maneuverist Papers on page 80, and our Strategy & Policy series starting on page 60 with articles examining two of our longest standing strategic partnerships: NATO in "Decentralized Decision Making" by Col Mark C. Boone on page 67 and the Republic of Korea in "Katchi Kapshida!" by LtCol Matthew R. Crouch on page 72. We also continue the ongoing discourse on Future Force Design and Innovation starting on page 48 with articles addressing Civil-Military Operations in great power competition and the maritime domain, and operating in a degraded C4 environment.

Once again, on behalf of the entire Association and the staff of the *Gazette*, Happy Birthday Marines. Semper Fidelis!

Christopher Woodbridge

10 November 2021

A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

On 10 November 1970, Commandant Chapman challenged all Marines, active and inactive, young and old, deployed or recently returned from combat, "not to look back, but instead, to look to the future." He insisted that we celebrate our anniversary, "not as an end of almost two centuries of dedicated service, but as preparation for new service, new dedication, and new achievement." Those sage words resonate across time and are as applicable today as they were 51 years ago.

Our Corps holds to traditions that link us to the elite warriors who wore the uniform before us, but the traditions we hand down through the generations go far beyond tangible displays, symbols, or customs. The most important traditions that link us to our past and must be carried into the future are the intangible ones—traditions of courage, trust, discipline, loyalty, respect, perseverance, adaptability, and leadership. Today, 246 years since our warfighting legacy began, we celebrate those traits that have been forged in all Marines—past and present.

The character of Marines, our unwavering commitment and relentless pursuit of excellence, remains unchanged from that of past generations, even as the character of warfare is ever-changing. These changes will require us to do what Marines do best—adapt and innovate to win any battle or respond to any crisis. Just as Marines who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan over these past 20 years adapted to the demands of protracted counterinsurgency operations—which would have been all too familiar to the Marines of 1970—we will adapt to the demands of the present and future, while learning the hard lessons from our recent past. We can't know for certain where future battlefields will be, or how our methods of warfighting will be redefined as threats to our Nation evolve, but we can ensure that the Marines who fight those battles will be forged of the same courage, spirit, and warfighting excellence as all Marines before them.

We who serve today represent an unbroken chain that stretches back 246 years. As we mark our anniversary, we remember those who went before us, and as we look over the horizon to "new service, new dedication, and new achievement," solemnly swear to uphold their example of honor, courage, and commitment.

Happy 246th Birthday, Marines!

Semper Fidelis!

David H. Berger
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps



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MARINES

A Response to "Mindlessness in Maneuver Warfare"

We welcome the opportunity to respond to the criticisms of MAJ Joseph Williams in "Mindlessness in Maneuver Warfare" (*MCG*, Aug 21) for several reasons. First, we see this as an opportunity to clarify some basic misunderstandings about maneuver warfare theory. Second, because we recognize the significant influence Williams has on the officer corps as the Director of Curriculum Development for Expeditionary Warfare School, we believe it is important to correct such errors. Third, we have a deep and abiding respect for Soldiers, having served several tours with our sister Service, one as an instructor and three as a student in the Airborne School, Ranger School, and War College.

MAJ Williams specifically cites only "What Marines Believe" by Two Maneuverists (*MCG*, Jun20) and Maneuverist No. 1 (*MCG*, Sep20), so we are not sure how much of the series he has read. Although we believe that later Maneuverist Papers address his criticisms in depth, we feel it is important to respond nonetheless. We applaud the *Gazette* for publishing MAJ Williams' article in the same issue as Maneuverist No. 11, "Annihilation vs. Attrition," which clarifies much of the relevant terminology.

First, we are curious where the "mindlessness" from the article's title factors in. Nothing in MAJ Williams' criticism seems to point to mindlessness. Rather, we suggest much of his criticism stems from misunderstandings and Service cultural differences.

MAJ Williams' initial criticism has to do with the "attritionist-maneuverist debate," which he finds problematic. Williams writes:

> The concept of attrition warfare, which allowed for the duality of attrition and maneuver styles of warfare, makes the concept of maneuver warfare at least partially invalid. The reality of warfare mandates that many aspects of combat ultimately end with a contest of attrition. At the point of low-level tactical conflict, relative combat power at the decisive point and Clausewitzian factors generally determine the winner. Attrition is a necessary evil of our profession and the primary burden with respect to commanders' application of combat power against enemy forces.

So much to unpack. First of all, MAJ Williams seems to be arguing that the attrition warfare construct includes both the attrition and maneuver styles. If so, that is a fundamental misunderstanding and indeed a logical impossibility. Whether you believe establishing the maneuver-attrition construct was a good idea or not, attrition warfare was set up as the antithesis of maneuver warfare and therefore does not include it. We are inclined to give MAJ Williams the benefit of the doubt and assume he merely means that the attrition warfare construct provides an alternative to maneuver warfare. Yes. But that is no particular insight; that was precisely the purpose in creating the construct. But then, he goes on to propose that the mere existence of an alternative to maneuver warfare somehow invalidates maneuver warfare. That is no more logical than to argue, for example, that a taste for the single life invalidates the institution of marriage. He goes on to argue that combat comes down to attrition. Here, he makes a common and fundamental error: equating attrition with destruction. The former is a generally ineffective mechanism for imposing defeat on an enemy. (See Maneuverist No. 11, *MCG*, Aug21.) The latter is a central fact of warfare. As we discuss in Maneuverist No. 10, "On Defeat Mechanisms," (*MCG*, Jul21) destruction can serve the purpose of either attrition or systemic disruption. Further, we categorically disagree that "many aspects of combat ultimately end with a contest of attrition." We argue that MAJ Williams is wrong on the historical record: most defeats occur not because one side has been ground down below some unknowable defeat threshold (i.e, attrition) but because one side is somehow "broken" (i.e., disrupted), whether functionally, formationally, cybernetically, psychologically, conceptually, and/or morally—usually through high levels of sudden, destructive violence. As for "relative combat power at the decisive point and Clausewitzian factors generally determine the winner"—that depends. If by relative combat power he means numerical superiority, we disagree. If instead he means combat power as *Warfighting* describes it—that is, as consisting of various physical, mental, and moral factors, including a superior understanding of what makes the enemy tick and a better concept of operations for taking the enemy apart—then we are in full agreement.

MAJ Williams characterizes the construct as a "self-licking ice cream cone." Here is one thing at least we agree with him about: We have no interest in continuing the maneuver-versus-attrition debate, as we have said repeatedly. We mentioned it in Maneuverist No. 1 because it is a historical fact. We have asserted that establishing that construct was probably a tactical error in the first place because it fostered unnecessary resistance. But as the issue remains a point of misunderstanding, we believe we must address it at least one last time. There are two ways that Marines have tended to distinguish between maneuver warfare and attrition warfare. The first is by the different chosen defeat mechanisms. Maneuver warfare pursues defeat by systemic disruption, attrition warfare defeat by attrition. This distinction was not clearly expressed during the formative years of the maneuver warfare debate. We have discussed this at length in Maneuverist No. 10 and will not repeat the details here. The more common distinction is by the tactical and operational methods used, although the two are by no means unrelated. Pursuit of defeat by disruption tends to encourage an outward focus on understanding the enemy deeply as a system to identify ways to break that system apart. It encourages the use of methods that tend to be disruptive of coherent functioning, such as surprise, superior tempo, and striking at key functions like command and control, logistics, or fire support. Pursuit of defeat by attrition tends to encourage a focus on optimizing the application of superior combat power and therefore an inward focus on efficient internal functioning. Disruptive

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methods like surprise or tempo tend to be less important than the efficient and methodical application of destructive force against the target set. These are generalizations to be sure, but we suggest they are outline two distinct approaches to warfare, one based on looking to tear apart the enemy and the other on the superior execution of one's own methods. It is noteworthy that Bill Lind, perhaps the person most associated with the attrition warfare/maneuver warfare dichotomy, switched from the term "attrition warfare" to "methodical battle" as the antithesis of maneuver warfare.[1]

MAJ Williams' main theme seems to be that maneuver warfare, as described in *Warfighting*, should be considered a mindset and not a style of warfare. He overly focuses on the distinction, and we confess we are unclear on what that distinction is and where the demarcation exists. It seems clear to us that maneuver warfare is both. Indeed, it would be a serious disconnect if the latter were not a direct derivative of the former. Gen Charles Krulak's foreword to *MCDP 1* describes maneuver warfare as both a "philosophy" and a "way of thinking." That clearly sounds like mindset to us. Gen Alfred M. Gray's foreword to the original *FMFM 1* describes maneuver war as a "philosophy for action," which sounds to us like mindset transitioning into application. Krulak's foreword also states that *Warfighting* "provides the authoritative basis for how we fight." That seems unquestionably like style to us, if we understand MAJ Williams' distinction. Moreover, both the maneuver and attrition approaches described above would seem to qualify as styles.

MAJ Williams wants to see what he calls the "1-tack series"—*Marine Corps Operations*, *Strategy*, *Campaigning*, and *Tactics*—describe what he would call the Marine Corps "style" of warfare, by which we infer he means he wants them to take the form of prescriptive how-to manuals. He argues that those manuals should be revised to

> define institutionally accepted methods for battlespace framework, center of gravity, orders of battle (our own DOCTEMPs), and other key aspects of "how we fight" across the levels of war. The doctrine should determine what activities occur at what minimum and maximum echelons. For example, what echelons do or do not issue commander's intent, conduct center of gravity analysis, exercise design activities, issue campaign plans, publish formal written operations orders, or seek to achieve a decisive fight?

We suspect that the different Service views of what constitutes doctrine are at play here. Reading between the lines, this seems to be the crux of MAJ Williams' criticism—namely, that Marine Corps doctrine is not more like Army doctrine: templated, formulaic, detailed, "how-to." Dare we say, methodical? In the end, as far as we can tell, MAJ Williams appears to be criticizing maneuver warfare doctrine for not being what it never proposed to be.

In another indication that part of Williams' misunderstanding may be due to cultural differences between the Services; he takes particular aim at the statement that "a leader's primary weapon is his mind" from "What Marines Believe" (*MCG*, Jun20). He criticizes that statement as being too exclusive and from it concludes that *Warfighting* was "written for officers by officers, discounting the responsibilities of not only leaders but also followers." MAJ Williams apparently does not understand that while "leader" may be synonymous with "commissioned officer" in the Army, in the Marine Corps "leader" is universally understood to include all Marines lance corporal and above. Any Marine will read the phrase as inclusive, not exclusive.[2]

As to the target audience for the manual, he errs. Gen Gray directed that *Warfighting* be written for all Marine leaders from lance corporal to general in an easy-to-read format. Gen Krulak declares in his foreword to the manual: "I expect all Marines—enlisted and commissioned to read this book, understand it, and act upon it." Talking with Marines of all grades for over 30 years we have come across very few who found *Warfighting* difficult to read.

In his criticism of *Warfighting,* Williams claims that maneuver warfare is not compatible with the realities of what small tactical units face. We believe he misses the point; the manual is about the nature, theory, and conduct of war, and war encompasses strategy, campaigns, major operations, and tactics. It is not and was not meant to be a small unit "how-to" manual. In Marine Corps doctrine, that role is reserved for Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs) and Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs). *MCO 5600.20R* affirms that MCDPs are to describe "the philosophical underpinning of the Marine Corps and the Marine ethos" and that MWCPs are to describe "the operational foundation of how the Marine Corps fights" and that each MCTP "align, amplify, and further detail the doctrine discussed in its respective MCWP." We submit that Williams' recommendation for the Marine Corps to "adapt the '1-tack-series' to clearly define common doctrinal methods" misses the mark. To do so would change the Corps' doctrinal system from one that flows from conceptual to functional to detailed to a system that focuses on techniques and procedures at all levels, a serious mistake because it undermines the theory and concepts that are the foundation of our doctrine.

At one point, Williams recommends:

> The authors [of *Warfighting*] should specifically bring to light and distinguish between the Clausewitzian elements of fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance within an environment of chaos and violence before describing how Marines are expected to interact cognitively and emotionally in such environments.

We find this ironic. It was *FMFM 1* that in 1989 first seriously discussed the Clausewitzian elements of fog, friction, uncertainty, chance, chaos, and violence, and the response to them, in a U.S. military doctrinal manual—strongly influencing the joint and other-service doctrine that followed. *Warfighting* treats those factors in greater detail and more seriously than any Western doctrinal manual we know of. We also worry

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specifically that his recommendation is an indication that he does not appreciate that those Clausewitzian factors do not merely exist "within an environment of chaos" but rather constitute a complex, nonlinear system that *creates* the chaos. We invite him to read Maneuverist No. 3, "The Dynamic, Nonlinear Science Behind Maneuver Warfare" (*MCG*, Nov20).

In what appears to be an aside to his main concern, Williams asserts that Marine Corps schools "fail to provide students environments defined by uncertainty and friction." We too have observed this deficiency in recent years, but that is not fault of *MCDP 1*, which, in addition to emphasizing those factors more strongly than any other doctrinal manual we know of, explicitly advocates for free-play, force-on-force exercises, which capture those dynamics.

Perhaps the most concerning statement in the entire article is this:

> Commanders are responsible for generating organizational tempo. Among other means, commanders readily accomplish this through the issuance of increasingly detailed guidance.

MAJ Williams got the first part—the responsibility for generating tempo—right. But the second part—the issuance of increasingly detailed guidance—is, frankly, antithetical to Marine Corps maneuver warfare theory, which advocates for decentralized mission tactics as a direct response to the fundamental uncertainty, chaos, and dynamicism of warfare. Such a basic misunderstanding concerns us. MAJ Williams' thinking seems more compatible with old Soviet maneuver theory, which perhaps is no surprise: the Army has always been more attracted to detailed command and control. We encourage MAJ Williams to read Maneuverist No. 12, "On Decentralization" (*MCG*, Sep21).

Finally, we must admit that we are perplexed by MAJ Williams' closing assertion that "now is not the time for glorifying a well-known and accepted delinquency." What does that mean? Who is glorifying what, and how is it a delinquency?

We will close by reiterating that we have the utmost respect for our Army brethren. Nothing we have said should be construed as being critical of the Army way of doing things. The Services have different requirements and very different cultures—for very good reason. For a number of reasons, including traditional roles and missions, the Army and Marine Corps have taken very different approaches to doctrine. We suggest that one should make sure to understand the thing one is proposing to change, and how and why it got to be the way it did, before proposing sweeping changes to it.

Notes

1. Translated from bataille conduit, the term for the French military doctrine developed between the World Wars. See Robert Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919–1939*, (Hamden, CT, Archon Books 1983).

2. By the way, nothing in the statement that "a leader's primary weapon is his mind" leads logically to the deduction that "only leaders need to be able to think," as MAJ Williams mistakenly concludes.

Marinus

Maneuverist No. 12

I just finished reading Marinus Paper No. 12 "On Decentralization." I do not believe I'd had this one early, but it is tremendous. Marinus discusses a problem that has been a reality since Desert Storm, where ever increasing access to information by higher level headquarters influences the tendency towards greater centralized control. Centralized control results in sluggish execution and solutions that are misaligned with the reality on the ground. The information received by the higher level headquarters is not as correct as needed or optimal for making good directive decisions for subordinate units.

Consider how Col John Boyd's OODA loop provides insight as to why decentralized decision making by commanders is always more effective. Across the top of the model, the OODA loop depicts "implicit guidance & direction" influencing observation. In other words, the implicit feel for the situation at hand influences the information the commander closest to the action knows he needs in order to inform his orientation and assist his decisions and actions, discarding the rest.

By having the best feel for the situation immediately to his front, subordinate commanders are in the best position to sort through all the information available to accurately find the critical information requirements he needs to decide what to do. There are mountains of information available, but only discrete elements are truly important for decision making. Distant headquarters might be awash in information, but they can't know or sense the elements that are truly critical.

One way to reduce the pre-disposition for high-level headquarters to exercise directive control is to seriously reduce their size. Field Marshal Slim—of World War II Burma fame—once asserted the periodic need to arbitrarily reduce the size of headquarters. He suggested a size reduction of 50 percent every now and then. Sounds like a sophomoric approach, but smaller staffs combined with a high operational tempo would, by default, limit the amount of obtuse control possible.

With joint headquarters, layers of functional components like land component commands, MEF headquarters, divisions, and regiments, the battalion commanders at the end of this chain are going to find themselves with a lot more direction than they need or want. Training like we fight, peacetime reductions in these headquarters done now, might put more Marines to train to be at the tip of the spear. Adapting to the reality of the next big war and facing challenges never considered will likely demand new command and control structures regardless.

Alex Vohr

Correction

In the September edition of the *Gazette,* we incorrectly identified the author of the article "Marines in the Space Domain." The work should be attributed to Capt Chase A. Decker, CPT Michael P. Duffy, US Army, Capt Chase A. Nelson, and LtCol Jason P. Quinter. The *Gazette* staff sincerely apologizes for the error.

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Wish for the Impossible

... but understand the war you are fighting

by Maj Thomas Schueman

If Carl von Clausewitz's aphorism in *On War* is true, "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means," then what happens to a nation engaged in combat without a clearly defined policy?[1] A ship at sea without a means to navigate or ability to anchor falls victim to the currents and tides. If the same ship adrift at sea is subject to two captains with conflicting orders or two oars rowing in opposite directions, it remains in an equally perilous situation. America's most protracted war lacked a trenchant strategy. The quagmire in Afghanistan commenced with noble intentions but floundered. Clausewitz concluded the first and most critical responsibility of the statesman and the general in respect to developing strategy is "rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, *not to ... wish* to make of it something which, it is *impossible* for it to be."[2] Marines will always fight and win on the battlefield, but they cannot win wars imbued with *wishes* for the *impossible*.

Infantrymen exist to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver. The Marine Corps is an organization that specializes in the application of violence. The bulk of Marines' training is devoted to tactics that induce the enemy into a combined arms dilemma. The combined arms dilemma offers the enemy two choices: The enemy can remain sheltered in place but will suffer from indirect fire and die. The enemy can displace and meet the Marines in the open but will suffer from suppressive machine gun fire combined with a maneuvering force and die. In 2010, Marines deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to wrest control of the region from the Taliban. British troops over a period of five years attempted and failed to pacify the volatile region. One British general compared it to "mowing the lawn" because of the fact the Taliban would return every time they left an area.[3] As conditions worsened throughout Helmand Province, President Barack Obama authorized the Marines to attack. BGen Larry Nicholson gave the order to, "Run every ****** who shoots at you out of the district."[4] However, top government and military officials attempted to gene-edit the pugnacious Marines into a Peace Corps.

>Maj Schueman is an Infantry Marine. He is currently attending the College of Naval Command and Staff in Newport, RI.

GEN Stanley McChrystal proselytized his counterinsurgency approach as gospel. McChrystal's panacea to end the insurgency was simple, "Earn the support of the people and the war is won."[5] So simple he designed a "government in a box."[6] However, this cookie-cutter recipe refused to yield to the complexities in Helmand Province and resulted in repeated failures. McChrystal sought to "take away any incentives that might drive commanders and their men to ... kill ... insurgents."[7] Instead, McChrystal perpetuated a vacuous neologism of "courageous restraint." McChrystal's imposed limitations extended "beyond what the law of war calls for because our vibrant civil society recoils from the inexorable human suffering that goes along with achieving political aims by military force."[8] McChrystal's convoluted concept created a conundrum for

1st Platoon, K 3/5 preps for combat (Sangin, Afg). *(Photo by author.)*

our troops on the frontlines. The intransigent Marines obstreperously pursued a more kinetic approach in Helmand. The leadership in Kabul's *raison d'être* was to win hearts and minds, but the reality on the ground quickly revealed a need for high explosive solutions and not chai tea. President Obama's deleterious announcement of an eighteen-month withdrawal gave the strategic advantage to the Taliban:

Dear shadows, now you know it all,
All the folly of a fight
With a common wrong or right.
The innocent and the beautiful
Have no enemy but time.[9]

Despite a lack of time, GEN David Petraeus was not content to "go gentle into that good night."[10] Petraeus maintained the zeitgeist of his predecessors, and the imprimatur of nation-building persisted. Petraeus felt "the surge that mattered most was the surge of ideas."[11] The consentient rejection of these ideas in Helmand did not deter Petraeus. Rather, he concluded that the eighteen-year-old Infantryman needed to operate at "the graduate level of warfare," which required grunts to act as "constables, project managers, dispute adjudicators, and community organizers."[12] The tactical acumen of our warriors pervaded the front lines, but a Sisyphean task precluded any declaration of victory. Who were these men, and what was the cost of their leaderships' faulty machinations?

Substantial losses did not deter 3/5 Mar. Instead, day after day, they did what Marines have always done—take the fight to the enemy. While McChrystal and Petraeus pontificated chimeric approaches to ending the insurgency, scout/sniper Sgt Matthew Abbate formulated his own erudite "Rules of War":

1. Young warriors die.
2. You cannot change Rule #1.
3. Someone must walk the point.[13]

Abbate understood simple truths about the nature of war that escaped those responsible for shaping our strategy. In Kabul and Washington, DC, it was evident that all it required to win the war was to convince a tribal people with an inchoate national identity that they should embrace Western ideals; once they had a taste of freedom, they would wholeheartedly abrogate the Taliban. Never mind the surveys that "confirmed widespread Pashtun resentment of our troops."[14] The Marines superficially accepted whatever exegesis of the *Counterinsurgency Manual* McChrystal or Petraeus preached. They knew someone had to walk point and that you could not change Rule #1.

Sgt Matt Abbate in Sangin. *(Photo by author.)*

In Kabul and Washington, DC, it was evident that all it required to win the war was to convince a tribal people with an inchoate national identity that they should embrace Western ideals ...

As the Higgins boats approached the beachheads during the invasion of Normandy or as Patton's tanks rolled into the *Battle of the Bulge,* no one would have dared utter the phrase "courageous restraint." No one would postulate the troops should "surge ideas." However, in 2010 our highest levels of leadership dared to implore such measures as brave men like Sgt Jason Peto, LCpl Arden Buenagua, and Lt William Donnelly gave their last full measure in the killing fields of Sangin, Afghanistan. The commander of Marine forces in Afghanistan, Gen Richard Mills, exclaimed, "I don't think there's ever been a battalion in the Marine Corps at any time, in World War II, the Korean conflict, Vietnam, that has pulled a tougher mission than what 3/5 has right now."[15] I agree with Gen Mill's sentiment and offer a personal account of the confusion, anguish, and frustration.

September 2010, I was sitting on a beach in Camp Pendleton, CA, nursing a PBR. Nine years prior, I was sitting in theology class on the South Side of Chicago when Brother Brennan turned on the television. A plane had just crashed into the World Trade Center, and as we sat in silent nervous confusion, a second plane flew into the towers. Brother Brennan began to pray, "Holy Mary Mother of God." Now, I was praying that I would not puke as the hangover from the previous night's

debauchery was agitated by the sun, waves, and ocean breezes everyone else seemed to enjoy. Lt Robert Kelly aptly noted my hapless state and said, "Dad [Gen John Kelly], can you grab Tom another beer?" A lieutenant's options are limited when a general offers you a beer. You accept and say, "Thank you, Sir." A week prior, Rob invited Lt Cameron West (my best friend) and me to a beach BBQ. We came to the fleet together and wanted to share our last day stateside together. The three of us attended Infantry Officers Course 4-09, and reported to the *Darkhorse* during the fall of 2009. We spent the last year training our Marines for combat in the mountains of Bridgeport and the deserts of Twentynine Palms. Although we were the same rank, I looked up to Rob as a mentor. He was prior enlisted and fought in some of Iraq's fiercest battles. Rob always did things the hard way. No shortcuts. He was tough and a disciplinarian but loved his troops.

A month after our beach bash, I still suffered from a hangover, but this one stemmed from carnage, chaos, and cacophony. Late in the evening of 8 November 2010, I sent Rob an email from my company's command operation center. It was my first time since I arrived in Afghanistan that I had access to a computer, and I needed to check-in with Rob. I needed his reassurance that everything was going to be okay. A few hours later half-asleep in my mud hut, I awoke to my company commander trying to articulate something. I thought I heard him say, "Lt Kelly's dead." I thought I must still be asleep. Some nightmare, or maybe he mumbled something else. "Sir?" "Rob was killed this morning." I wanted to puke again. In my mind, I was back at the beach, and there was Heather his wife, Kate his sister, his mom, the general. His brother, Cam was missing a leg, but he was there too—Rob. I buried my face in my sleeping bag and wanted my mind to go black. I wanted to see and feel nothing. But every time I closed my eyes visions of a casualty assistance calls officer in his dress blues knocking on the door to execute his solemn duty haunted me. I began to get physically ill. A few weeks prior while out on patrol, a similar episode occurred. I heard a casualty evacuation transmission over the radio, and one of the urgent casualties was Cam. But, at that same moment, I was engaged in a firefight of my own and pushed it out of my mind. As I reentered the patrol base, Will Donnelly (subsequently killed leading his platoon in a pitched battle on Thanksgiving Day) met me and said, "Cam's hit. It doesn't look good." I searched the austere patrol base for somewhere to be alone, and the only private place I could find was our makeshift detention facility. I broke down with such a fierce intensity that I became delirious and took a day to recover.

Lieutenant's Schueman (L), Kelly (M), and West (R) during IOC. *(Photo by author.)*

This was the first of many worst days of my life while fighting in Sangin.

The loss of Rob started to elicit a similar response, but a call over the radio snapped me out of it. An enemy ambush trapped a squad attempting to evacuate a casualty. So, I pulled it together, assembled a quick reaction force, and launched out of the gate to help my boys. The quick reaction force successfully alleviated pressure on the pinned down unit and started its return to base when the rear element was isolated by enemy machine-gun fire. I was located at the front of the patrol and ran to link-up with my squad leader to formulate a hasty plan. I was one meter from him when an explosion ripped through the earth. Crumpled, I regained consciousness and ran back to the blast site. Sgt Trey Humphrey lay in an enormous crater. His left foot was gone: "I'm sorry, Sir. I can't believe I stepped on an IED." This was the first of many worst days of my life while fighting in Sangin.

My patrol log captured another *worst day's* events:

10 Dec 2010

Corporal Mcloud and Spivey hit an IED as we return to base. I ran up to the front and after coordinating a few things start helping with Mcloud. Teague comes up to me and hands me Mcloud's fingers. I say thank you, and tell him to hold security. Mcloud doesn't have a hand anymore, and I throw his fingers in a canal. Both Mcloud's legs are gone, and I hold the meat to his legs while Nikirk wraps a bandage. Mcloud is going in and out of consciousness, and I force him to keep talking to me. He almost didn't go on the deployment because he was worried about seeing his newborn baby

boy. But, I assured him he'd make it back and pleaded with him to deploy. Now as I choke back tears, I tell him he's got to make it home to teach his son to play baseball (Mcloud was a baseball star in high school). One of the hardest moments of my life to keep composed. We only have one poleless litter, so Sgt Decker runs up to a compound and rips the door off to make an improvised litter. Spivey is crying that he is cold. I take off my top and wrap him in it. We return to base. I have no shirt on under my flak, and I am covered in guts. I went into COC [command operation center] to drop off the pressure plate of the IED, and Colonel Kennedy is in there. He looks pretty alarmed but doesn't say anything to me.

(EKIA): 1

(FWIA): 2

"What does Sangin mean? They sent us there to fight—so we fought."[16] Gen Kelly's acerbic summation aptly

Lt Schueman conducts a KLE in Sangin. *(Photo by author.)*

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

COL WILLIAM F. MORGAN, USMCR (RET)

E. ROCQUE KRAMER



R. C. LEBEAU

JOSEPH PUTKOWSKI

Kilo 3/5 in South Korea (March 2010, before the Sangin deployment). *(Photo by author.)*

captures the connotation of those that fought there. The Taliban overran the Sangin District less than a year after the Marines pulled out, and the Afghan Army abandoned all their posts: "That news has prompted soul-searching among veterans of the district—where more U.S. and British troops lost their lives over the years than in any other in Afghanistan."[17] Quixotic strategies aside, I am grateful for my opportunity to fight in Sangin. A survey Bing West conducted while in Sangin reflects this sentiment. In response to the question, "If you had it to do over again, you'd: I'd be right here 92%."[18] We would all do it again because it will always be the most meaningful work in our lives. Gen James Mattis conveys gratitude for his combat experiences and pity for those that did not partake, "I feel sorry for those who were not there with us when trouble loomed ... those who were not so fortunate to discover what we were privileged to learn when we were receiving our master's and PhDs in how to live life."[19] In Gen Kelly's address to the Semper Fi Society of St. Louis on 13 November 2010, he captures the essence of the fighting men that held the line in Sangin:

> We who have served and are serving refuse their sympathy. Those of us who have lived in the dirt, sweat and struggle of the arena are not victims and will have none of that. Those with less of a sense of service to the nation never understand it when men and women of character step forward to look danger and adversity straight in the eye, refusing to blink, or give ground, even to their own deaths. The protected can't begin to understand the price paid so they and their families can sleep safe and free at night. No, they are not victims, but are warriors, your warriors, and warriors are never victims regardless of how and where they fall.[20]

Those of us who have lived in the dirt, sweat and struggle of the arena are not victims ...

3/5 Mar's deployment to Sangin, Afghanistan, resulted in 25 Marines killed in action and hundreds wounded. These men that enter the arena deserve statesmen and generals that refuse to send young men to fight in fields of folly without a cogent strategy that offers every advantage to kill the enemy.

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Operation FOCUS

Start of the six day war

by LtCol Matthew Neely

In June 1967, Israel launched one of the most successful military operations in the history of warfare. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War has a number of names—the "Third Arab-Israeli War," "Naksa" (Arabic for "The Setback"), but "The Six Day War" provides the most accurate description of the conflict. The Arab World opposed the creation of an Israel State in 1947 and refused Israel's right to exist. Nineteen years after the creation of the Jewish state, Egypt, the unofficial leader of the Arab World, Syria, and Jordan mobilized their forces along Israel's borders. Israel was surrounded and outnumbered by three nations committed its destruction. This did not come as a surprise; Israel had a number of contingency plans ready to execute. From 5–10 June 1967, Israel focused all military power available on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, launching a preemptive attack that produced a decisive victory and drastically changed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. In six days, Israel overwhelmingly defeated three nations and announced to the Arab World that *they have the right to exist*.

Operation FOCUS (MOKED in Hebrew) was the name of the Israeli Air Force's initial air campaign in the 1967 conflict. The operation took years of intelligence collection, planning, training, and in the end, it was the decisive factor in Israel's victory.

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Strategic Context

Egypt

Known at the time as the United Arab Republic, Egypt was the regional power in the Middle East. Egypt's allegiance at the time was with the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and had the strongest military in the region led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, an Arab Nationalist who sought to unify all Arab States. One unifying goal of the Arab states was the destruction of Israel. This objective cultivated closer ties with Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. Egypt supported Palestine guerrilla attacks within Israel that set the stage for conflict in 1956. Known as the Second Arab-Israeli War, Israel quickly defeated Egyptian forces and seized control of the Sinai Peninsula. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in Sinai to manage the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw from the peninsula. The UNEF established a buffer between Egypt and Israel in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. In 1965, Nassar had 70,000 of his forces committed in Yemen to support the Yemen Arab Republic in a civil war.[1] Of note, Egyptian forces had used chemical weapons during operations.[2] In May of 1967, Nassar ordered the immediate withdraw of UNEF forces from Sinai and Gaza. Egyptian military force replaced UNEF Forces along the border. Estimated Egyptian Military figures in 1967 were 200,000 troops, 1300 tanks, 1,050 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), 160 Surface to Air Misses, 950 Anti-aircraft guns (AA), and 431 combat aircraft.[3] Nasser named the military operation AL-QAHIR (Conqueror) and stated to Syrian Leaders that "Egypt was ready to fight with every resource it had to destroy Israel's air force and occupy its territory."[4] On 22 May 1967, Nasser ordered the Straits of Tiran closed to Israel flagged vessels. This action closed Israel's southern port and access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

In six days, Israel overwhelmingly defeated three nations ...

Syria

Syria maintained a close alliance with the USSR and remained a staunch enemy of Israel. Their main objective was the destruction of Israel and the reestablishment of Palestine. Syrian dictator Gen Hafiz Amin was often at odds with Egypt over their level of commitment against Israel. In 1964, during an engagement between Egypt's Nasser and Syria's Amin, Amin stated Egypt was "selling out Palestine for a few bushels of American wheat."[5] This was in reference to American efforts to deescalate the tension between Egypt and Israel through economic means. Nasser was quick to accuse Amin of "stabbing Egypt in the back"[6] by attempting to bring Egypt in a war with Israel prior to an alliance between the nations. While Egypt was engaged in Yemen, Syria maintained pressure on Israel. One month in 1966, Syria conducted 75 guerrilla attacks against Israel.[7] In November of 1966, the Egypt-Syrian treaty officially joined the two nations against Israel. Skirmishes between Syria and Israel continued into 1967 with Syrian forces shelling Israel settlements and forces. In March of 1967, the Israeli and Syrian conflict intensified with in a mas-


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sive air battle consisting of up to 130 aircraft ended with the Israel Air Force (IAF) establishing air supremacy over Damascus.[8] Though the IDF quickly returned to Israeli airspace, this air-to-air engagement would be a premonition of what is to come. Estimated Syrian military figures in 1967 were 63,000 troops; 700 tanks; 585 APCs; 1,100 AA; and 127 Combat Aircraft.[9]

Jordan

The years leading up to the Six Day War positioned King Hussein in a difficult situation. Receiving military aid from the United States placed Jordan at odds with other Arab nations with closer ties to the USSR. Palestinian refugees from the first and second Israeli-Arab wars participated in Syrian sponsored guerrilla attacks against Israel from the West Bank. This led to Israeli counter attacks into Jordan's West Bank. Neither Syria nor Egypt would commit forces to defending Jordan from attack without formal alliance. Following the Syrian-Israeli Skirmish in January of 1967, Nasser asserted, "Hussein works for the CIA"[10] implying the King was supporting Israel and the United States against the Arabs. King Jordan had to weigh the risks. A war with Israel would be without the aid of any nation. By remaining neutral in an Arab loss in a third Israeli-Arab war, he would risk losing his country in a Palestinian revolt for not getting involved. By remaining neutral with an Arab victory, he would risk Egypt or Syria invading in retaliation for not getting involved.[11] Jordan was to lose in any scenario, but the best option was to join Egypt and Syria and avoid becoming decisively involved in any conflict. Estimated Jordanian Military figures in 1967 were 46,000 troops, 287 tanks, 210 APCs, and 18 combat aircraft.[12] In the event of war with Israel, Jordan would receive air support from Syria and Iraq, and allow Syrian and Iraqi troops on Jordan soil. This immediately ceased military aid from the United States out of fear Egypt would benefit from the equipment. The United States re-directed twelve F-104 fighters and anti-aircraft guns and ammunition destined for Jordan to Turkey.[13]

Iraq

The Iraqi Republic was supportive of the Arabs against Israel but provided little military support other than 106 combat aircraft.[14] H-3 airfield in western Iraq was in position to support Syria and Jordan if required. Politically, Iraq had established a new form of government through a coup in 1958 and was on its third leader at the time of the 1967 war.

Israel

In nineteen years of existence, Israel fought and won two wars (1948, 1956) against the Arabs. The 1956 withdraw from Sinai under UN pressure allowed Egypt to reoccupy the peninsula as victors. The short interwar periods were filled fighting guerilla attacks against Syrian and Palestinian forces. Israel received military support France, the United States, and Great Britain. In 1963, Levi Eshkol was elected to be Israel's Prime Minister. As security conditions deteriorated and war seemed inevitable, Eshkol would appoint Gen Moshe Dayan (Ret) as Israel's Minister of Defense. In comparison, Dayan was to Israel as the former U.S. Sectary of Defense James Mattis was to the United States. He was a career military professional that led and commanded many of Israel's previous campaigns. Because of the security environment and geographic disadvantage, the IDF had developed numerous contingency plans to defend Israel. The required intelligence collection for the plans was supported by Israel's Shin Bet organization, known presently as Mossad. Mossad's web of spies throughout the Middle East had infiltrated many Nations. The IDF understood what tasks in the contingency plans were essential to the operation. From these tasks, the IDF developed training to support the plans. With the buildup of Arab forces in Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and northern border with Syria in 1967, Israel mobilized reserve forces. War was going to happen, but Israel did not know when. Israel viewed Egypt closing of Straits of Tiran as an act of war and pleaded with the UN and United States for assistance. U.S. involvement supporting the Israelis would undoubtedly bring the USSR into the conflict backing Syria. Neither world superpower wanted direct involvement. Israel would be alone in the conflict. Estimated Israeli Military figures in 1967 were 210,000 troops; 1,000 tanks; 1,500 APCs; 50 SAMs; 550 AA guns; and 286 combat aircraft.

USSR and the United States

Soviet investment in Arab nations at the time were estimated at over 2 billion in military aid alone, notably 1,700 tanks and 500 jets.[15] The USSR's closest ally in the region was Syria but continued to warm ties with Egypt. War in the Middle East was not in the best interest of the USSR, and Moscow intended to foster the growing Soviet influence with Arab nations without leading to conflict. For the USSR, Israel was not worth the risk of a nuclear war with the United States. The only way the USSR would enter an Arab-Israeli war is if the United States entered in support of Israel. The United States was Israel's largest advocate in the United Nations. The United States was only four years removed from the Cuban Missile Crisis and fully committed in Vietnam by 1967. The only way the United States would enter an Arab-Israeli war is if the USSR entered in support of the Arabs.

Operation FOCUS

On 5 June 1967, the IDF received the password "Red Sheet" to execute Operation FOCUS. At 0710, the first sixteen aircraft were "wheels up." Twenty minutes later, the IDF had launched over 250 aircraft in what would be the first of three waves of attacks against Arab Forces.[16] Israel was not going to wait to be attacked and seized the initiative to conduct offensive operations. Israeli pilots proved their superior training by flying their French built fighters and bombers in radio silence 50 feet above the ground to avoid early detection.[17] Their initial targets were the airfields in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq with the objective of destroying the operational capability of the runways and destruction of aircraft. The Egyptian military anticipated any attack from Israel would begin in the morning and took to the skies each day to conduct patrols. The specific timing of the air campaign was

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designed to strike after the Egyptian aircraft finished their patrol. When the first Israeli aircraft released the first munitions over Egyptian fields, many of the pilots were eating breakfast with only four training aircraft airborne.[18] Jordan's advanced radar system identified a massive amount of aircraft and passed the information that the war had begun. The message was indecipherable when it reached the Egyptian Defense minister in Cairo.[19] Though Egypt attempted to scramble aircraft in the air, any that became airborne were quickly destroyed. Israeli aircraft utilized runway penetrating bombs on the airfields and 30mm cannon for the grounded aircraft, preventing Egypt from scrambling additional aircraft. The first wave ended around 0800 on 5 June and left Egypt paralyzed. Israeli fighters and bombers returned to base to rearm, refuel, and exchange pilots ready to execute wave two of the attack. The IDF had trained its ground crew to prepare an aircraft for its next sortie in an astonishing eight minutes from landing to taking off again.[20] Fresh pilots briefed on their intended targets and disciplined ground crews enabled the IDF eight sorties per aircraft each day.[21] Missions conducted north in Syria achieved similar results, destroying airbases with few losses. Jordan's two airfields and eighteen aircraft were quickly destroyed by overwhelming force, their calls for Iraqi and Syrian aircraft were unanswered. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraqi aircraft in range were all decisively engaged by Israel. At 0815, Dayan initiated the ground offensive into the Sinai. Air supremacy was achieved in record time, allowing IAF to concentrate fires to support ground maneuver. In three hours, the IDF destroyed seventeen airfields and over 300 of Egypt's 431 combat aircraft.[22] By mid-day on 5 June, the IDF had destroyed 5 Syrian airfields and two thirds of Syria's 127-combat aircraft.[24] By the end of the first day, Iraqi airfield H-3 was destroyed with ten of their aircraft.[25]



Attack routes taken by the Israeli Air Force on 5 June 1967.[23] ***(Photo credit:*** **Israeli Defense Force Historical Division, Publications Division Israeli Minister of Defense,** ***1968.)***

Intelligence

Israel's Mossad was arguably the world's most effective espionage organization that had infiltrated Egypt's and Syria's high political commands. Three individuals of note were Wolfgang Lotz, a former SS officer in the German army advising the Egyptian military; Eli Cohen, an Arab Jew with close political and military ties in Syria; and Anwar Ifrim, Nasser's personnel masseur, who provided realtime tactical updates to Mossad.[26] Two Mossad operations that contributed to the success of Operation FOCUS were Operation DIAMOND, the defection of an Iraqi pilot with a sophisticated MiG-21 fighter, and the suspected espionage of the Arab Coalitions planning event in Morocco in 1965.

Cohen was a businessman in Syria that was once considered in the running for deputy minister of defense.[27] He was credited with passing locations and capabilities of Syria's military along the Golan Heights. In 1965, he was caught with the help of the USSR and hanged. Similar, Lotz provided details on Egyptian capabilities until his capture in 1964. Ifrim was the most important spy to Operation FOCUS because of the information he provided on Egypt's aircraft and air operations.

Operation FOCUS's success can be attributed to detailed planning, reliable intelligence, disciplined training, and flawless execution. By striking first, Israel gained the element of surprise and could mass combat power against an unprepared enemy force. This was of

no surprise to the United States. On 26 May, declassified memos forecast that Israel could defeat Egypt in 24 hours if they took the offensive but would take two to three days if Egypt attacked first.[28] Israel had to decide to wait to be attacked or attack first. Because of their intelligence, Israel understood war was inevitable and made the decision to attack. The capture of the advance MiG-21 in 1966 provided the IDF a chance to train against the Arab's best weapon system. This operation today would be akin to North Korea capturing an American F-22 Rapture. The IDF trained its pilots in simulated dogfights to prepare pilots for air-to-air combat. Though unconfirmed officially, key information on Arab capabilities and command and control was achieved in Casablanca, Morocco, in 1965. In 2015, former Israeli military intelligence director MajGen Shlomo Gazit revealed that Mossad listened in on secret negotiations between Arab leaders as they discussed preparations for war with Israel. This information provided Israel on Arab plans and indications of attack. This also provided the IDF with information on the weak coordination between the nations.

Planning Considerations and Strategic Goals

The main assumption was that the IAF could destroy Arab air bases if they attacked first. Israel would only have days before the UN convened a security council and negotiated a ceasefire. Strategically, the largest assumption was that the USSR would only participate if the United States was involved. Israel was at a disadvantage numerically 210,000 troops to the Arabs 319,000.[29] But this disadvantage could be overcome with the destruction of the Arabs air force in the early phases of the war. With air supremacy achieved, the IAF could support IDF ground maneuver and decimate Arab forces with air support. Israel had a significant advantage over Arab forces because of the amount of training IAF pilots and ground forces had conducted in preparation for the operation.

Operation FOCUS undoubtedly obtained its strategic objective by destroying the air forces of three rival nations in a single day. This caused the enemy to withdraw forces and supported the ground offensive to expand Israel's territory by an estimated 400 percent.

Israel's endstate for Operation FOCUS was the destruction of enemy airfields and aircraft on the ground to support a swift ground offensive and prevent the IDF from being attacked from the air. Israel achieved this through meticulous planning, intelligence on enemy locations, and training pilots and ground crew, facilitated by the procurement of aircraft from France and the capture of a MiG-21 from Iraq. The Six-Day War would have significant impacts on international relations that resonate today but would not have been as successful if not for Operation FOCUS. The operation highlighted the importance of how deliberate planning drives intelligence and training requirements to prepare a military force to conduct a successful operation. Ultimately, training and the use of combined arms can quickly diminish any numerical disadvantage.

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27. Tova Dvorin, "Revealed: Spy Eli Cohen Had Help from CIA, Syrian Agents," *Israel National News*, (April 2015), available at http://www.israelnationalnews.com.

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29. *Comparative Analysis Arab and Israeli Combat Performance of 1967 and 1973.*

Attack Aviation Innovation

The Marine Corps in the interwar years

by Maj Will Mendizabal

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Post-World War I, many believed another world war in the future was highly unlikely; therefore, military services faced considerable challenges for survival. Shrinking budgets and a general repulsion for war spurred the Marine Corps to fight for relevancy. Within the Marine Corps, attack aviation overcame significant factors in austere conditions to secure its role as an integral element of warfighting. Author Stephen Rosen describes innovation as a "new way of war, with new ideas of how the components of the organization relate to each other and the enemy, and new operational procedures conforming to those ideas."[1] Despite facing many challenges for survival, Marine Corps' attack aviation innovated its function to become an integral part of the air-ground fighting force. During the interwar period (1918–1939), the Marine Corps' attack aviation secured its role in the Corps' execution of warfare by establishing a shared vision, capitalizing on individual innovators, and refining the lessons learned from operational experiences.

As the Marine Corps wrestled to establish its mission at the end of World War I, Marine leadership was skeptical of aviation's usefulness and efficacy. Senior Marine pilots and a homogenous officer corps recognized that Marine aviation was best employed supporting ground forces with air-to-surface fires. In 1920, Marine aviator Maj Alfred Cunningham wrote in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, "It is fully realized that the only excuse for aviation in any Service is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions."[2] Marine pilots emphasized to leadership and the officer corps that Marine aviators would be Marines first and pilots second, thereby strengthening its *esprit de corps*. The common vision to support the individual ground Marine was a key contribution factor to progression during the interwar period.

Marine attack aviation's common mission of providing ground support manifested its efficacy as a critical capability contributing to the Marine Corps' success. After World War I, the Marine Corps advertised itself as a "small wars" force and later as an amphibious landing force.[3] Through these role changes, Marine aviation's mission to support the ground force reinforced its importance to the air-ground team and provided vital for mission accomplishment. The uniformed idea of Marine aviation's purposefulness during these dire times, combined with the contribution of visionaries, helped change the employment of its aviation component.

Visionaries like Alfred Cunningham and Lawson Sanderson also proved pivotal in advancing the success of Marine aviation. Cunningham, titled the "unofficial father of Marine aviation," had a vision of the role aviation in achieving success.[4] Other individual innovators, such as Marine pilot 1stLt Lawson Sanderson, pioneered dive-bombing and increased the effectiveness of weapons employment, thus aiding aviation's relevancy within the Marine

H-1 aircraft conduct training over the Camp Pendleton coastline. *(Photo by Capt Conor Riley.)*

Corps. Before dive-bombing, aviators released bombs horizontally, an inaccurate method of weapons delivery. In 1919, while conducting operations in Haiti, 1stLt Sanderson fitted a mailbag as a "bomb rack" onto his JN-4 Jenny airplane and proved a 45-degree dive was much more accurate.[5] Other Services later employed the same dive profile because of improved accuracy, and the pioneering tactic bolstered the credibility of Marine aviation.

Marine Corps attack aviation capitalized on 1stLt Sanderson's innovation by improving tactics and overall support within Marine leadership. Marine aviation continued developing employment tactics and techniques to improve the air-ground team. In addition to the contribution of individual innovators, Marine aviation's operational experience during the interwar years shaped the Marine Corps' employment of attack aviation and further improved its efficacy.

The Banana Wars proved to Marine Corps leaders that aviation's close air support was an integral part of the Marine Corps' expeditionary mindset. During operations in Nicaragua in 1927, Marine pilots refined operational lessons and performed valiantly in the town of Ocotal, Nicaragua, helping seal attack aviation's role. During this mission, Marine pilot and close air attack proponent Maj Ross Rowell led a five-aircraft formation to help free a small, besieged Marine force. Upon arrival and assessment of the situation, Maj Rowell commenced diving attacks to employ machine gun fire and fragmentation bombs on Sandinista rebels; subsequently, upon the completion of the second attack, enemy forces began to flee. After the event, the Commanding Officer of the infantry personnel stated that the air support was the "deciding factor" in routing the rebel force.[6] Such indelible events convinced Marine leadership of aviation's effectiveness to the overall mission. Operations in Nicaragua during the Banana Wars proved aviation's significance to the Marine Corps.[7]

The Banana Wars proved … that … close air support was an integral part of the Marine Corps' expeditionary mindset.

Marine aviation's superb performance during critical times in these Central American conflicts transformed its employment. The success of these missions changed the mindset of Marine leaders, causing them to appreciate the efficacy and usefulness of Marine

An AH-1Z helicopter conducts carrier qualification training aboard an LPD. *(Photo by Capt Conor Riley.)*

Corps aviation. Events such as those in Ocotal, Nicaragua, helped convince Marine leaders to officially write Marine aviation into the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*.[8] Writers of the aviation section conceptualized the employment of Navy and Marine aircraft, along with naval gunfire, as the sources of gunfire for opposed beach landings.[9] Then Commandant, MajGen Ben H. Fuller, instructed that aviation "form an integral part of the Fleet Marine Force and are organized for the support of that force in its operations with the fleet."[10] The Banana Wars showcased Marine aviation's operational successes and proved its significance to the air-ground team.

The interwar years brought many challenges to Marine attack aviation. Shrinking budgets, military services wrangling to maintain relevancy during a period geared towards world peace, and Marine leaders skeptical of aviation's usefulness were only a small number of problems facing aviation advocates. Marine attack aviation obtained relevancy and evolved its employment through various means. A common vision for aviation within the Marine Corps to support the ground forces allowed its proponents to focus its efforts and tactics, creating a unity of effort that facilitated innovation. Marine aviation visionaries such as 1stLt Sanderson furthered Marine aviation's standing and credibility within the aviation community and helped secure attack aviation's role. U.S. conflicts in Central America further refined operational experience for its pilots and proved to aviation skeptics of its integral role. The contributing factors improved the employment of Marine attack aviation and forever changed its role within the Marine Corps.

H-1 aircraft conduct training over Camp Pendleton, July 2020. *(Photo by Capt Conor Riley.)*

Notes

1. Stephen P. Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," *International Security*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Summer, 1988).

2. Alfred A. Cunningham, "Value of Aviation to the Marine Corps," *Marine Corps Gazette,* (Quantico, VA: September 1920).

3. Richard R. Muller, "Close Air Support: The German, British, and American Experiences, 1918–1941," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, eds., (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

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5. Fred H. Allison, "Marine Air Support," *Marine Corps Gazette,* (Quantico, VA: November 2006).

6. Ibid.

7. "Close Air Support: The German, British, and American Experiences, 1918–1941."

8. Ibid.

9. Edward C. Johnson, "Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912–1940," *History and Museums Division*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1977).

10. Ibid.

The South African War

Lessons for great power access competition

by Capt Will McGee

>Capt McGee completed eight years of service in the Marine Corps as a Ground Intelligence Officer and entered Yale Law School in 2021. A 2013 graduate of the Naval Academy, he earned a Masters in Philosophy in Modern European History at Cambridge University, UK, as a Nolan Scholar. He continues to serve as a captain in the Marine Corps Reserves.

When they signed the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902, Alfred Milner and Lord Kitchener could rightly have been confused about what their signatures ended. The war, which began in 1899, was not expected to last longer than a few months, as the British Army should have quickly defeated the ad hoc Boer Commandos that opposed it.[1] Three years later, the conflict had devolved into a protracted counterinsurgency campaign against an opponent who defeated the British three times in open battle and then melted away into the vast expanse of South African farmland. Often overlooked as a predecessor to the First World War, or tangentially discussed as part of the biography of notable participants, the South African War deserves attention in its own right as an example of expeditionary conflict.[2] This article will describe the South African War and discuss what insights can be applied to the current great power access competition.

The Dutch East India Company established a series of ports along the coast of Africa in the early 1600s to resupply ships on the route Asia. The most significant of these colonies, the Cape Colony at the Cape of Good Hope, was situated on the most southern tip of Africa. Its location allowed control of the trade routes around the cape and, as the British Empire crept across the seas, it became an increasingly sensitive location. After changing hands several times, by the 1820s, London controlled the colony and began to settle the area with British immigrants. The Dutch inhabitants, resentful of British control and the imposition of the English language, trekked northeast beyond the reach of the British colonial government. They established two republics, the South African Republic (hereafter referred to as the Transvaal Republic) and the Orange Free State.

Although having fought colonial wars with the two Boer republics, and having signed multiple agreements to respect the territorial integrity of their neighbors to the north, the discovery of diamonds on the banks of the Orange River permanently altered British interests in southern Africa. Business prospects drove the creation of mining companies and, within a few short years, entrepreneurs like Cecil Rhodes (of Rhodes Scholarship fame) heard the siren call of the diamond mines, migrating from Britain to Kimberley, and establishing a dense pocket of British citizens further north than Capetown.[3]

The subsequent discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand region of the Transvaal Republic in 1886 was like gasoline thrown on the flames of industrialization. The region exploded in size—Johannesburg grew from nothing to a city of 100,000 inhabitants in a decade.[4] Just like the diamond mines, many of these workers were British, as they possessed the technical expertise to operate the complicated mining machinery required to extract resources.[5] Non-skilled labor was drawn from the inhabitants of the surrounding areas: indigenous workers on the mines came from as far afield as modern-day Zimbabwe and Mozambique.[6] The rapid transformation of agrarian society into the international center of gold production out-paced existing governmental structures.[7] Concerns emerged regarding the Boer capacity to manage the burgeoning industry, specifically its demand for low cost, reliable, indigenous laborers.[8]

Most pertinent to the perspective of the British Foreign Office and its voting public, British immigrants, termed "uitlanders" by the Boers, were denied citizenship. Before long, complaints of mistreatment filtered back to England. To the government of the Transvaal, these uitlanders were a threat as they would outnumber Boer voters if they were given the franchise.[9]

Unsurprisingly, as its citizens crept across the border into the Transvaal and the scale of available gold deposits became clear, British attention began to refocus on the Transvaal. As the preeminent world power, the United Kingdom stood at the center of the international financial system. Britain's currency, the pound sterling, rested on its gold reserves. A series of financial scares and war threats in the preceding years made this an increasingly precarious guarantee and the supply of gold available to increase the size of Britain's reserves became a vital national issue. The possibility that the local government

was incapable of providing a friendly economic environment to the mines was a threat to Britain's international position.[10]

Most of the financial interests in the Transvaal had longstanding political ties to the British Cape Colony. The most significant figures in the mining industry often held roles in the colonial administration; Cecil Rhodes, for example, was the Cape Prime Minister as well as one of the most powerful interests in the Transvaal through his ownership stake in the De Beers corporation.[11] The grievances of the uitlanders and financial interests of the mining companies mingled to form a combustible mix.

On 27 December 1895, Leander Starr James and 600 other armed men stormed north toward Johannesburg hoping to overthrow the government of the Transvaal Republic. They were unsuccessful as the government in Pretoria sent another armed column to intercept them. As evening fell on 2 January 1896, Jameson and his force surrendered after briefly exchanging fire.[12]

The causes of the now-infamous Jameson Raid are of some debate; however, from the perspective of the contemporary Transvaal Republic, two aspects were clear.[13] First, many of the participants of the Raid had links to the mining industry, and second, the raid had been planned and executed with the awareness and financial support, if not active participation, of leading figures of the British and Cape Colony governments.[14]

The raid had international implications for the competition between the contemporary Great Powers: the Kaiser sent Paul Kruger, Prime Minister of the Transvaal Republic, a telegram with congratulations for defending his country from "external attack." The telegram spurred an outburst of anti-German indignation amongst the British public, further highlighting the Transvaal question to the British government.[15] The raid united the Boers against perceived British adventurism. Taxes on uitlanders were spent to modernize the military, and the two Boer republics committed to an offensive and defensive alliance.[16]

Although this picture depicts the muster of a North American settler militia over a century prior, participants in the Jameson Raid probably were not much more professionalized than this. *(Photo: "First Muster" a National Guard Heritage Painting by Don Troiani, courtesy of the National Guard Bureau.)*

By 1897, as the situation in the Transvaal continued to spiral downwards, the British sent Sir Alfred Milner to fill the roles of High Commissioner for Southern Africa and Governor of Cape Colony. Adding Milner to the smoldering confrontation was like adding heat to fuel and oxygen, as war was on his mind from the outset. While sailing from London, Milner requested the Under-Secretary for Colonies for "a brigade-division (3 batteries) of artillery and a regiment of infantry" to reinforce key terrain in the east of the Cape Colony, asking him to "hang on like grim death to the decision and not let the Government slip out of it."[17]

Unsurprisingly, relations between the Empire and Transvaal Republic continued to deteriorate. Within two years of his arrival, Milner telegraphed Joseph Chamberlain,

> The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievance, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain.[18]

Although the bulk of the incendiary "helot" telegram dealt with the conditions of the uitlanders, the role of gold cannot be dismissed as a significant factor in the growing conflict.[19] In subsequent negotiations between the Transvaal Republic and Cape Colony, mediated by the Orange Free State, Chamberlain and Kruger exchanged ultimatums by telegram each demanding unacceptable concessions. War began shortly thereafter.[20]

The first phase of the war was disastrous for the British Army, fighting with outdated tactics and equipment against an adept mobile opponent who combined the most modern weapons with generations of local campaigning experience. Seizing the initiative, the Boers laid siege to Ladysmith, Mafeking, and Kimberley, forcing the British to commit to a relief effort. Accustomed to fighting colonial wars against scattered and technologically out-matched opponents, British conventional tactics had not developed since the set-piece engagements of the Crimean War forty years earlier.[21] They proved unsuitable against the Boers whose innovative use of terrain in the defense, embrace of maneuver through mobile cavalry columns, and employment of technology like smokeless powder and the most modern artillery pieces created a decisive advantage. The British relief campaign met with disaster during "Black Week,"

when the Boers inflicted devastating defeats at the battles of Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso.

Magersfontein is an instructive study.[22] Schooled in the tactics of colonial wars, the British commander, LtGen Paul Metheun, hoped to strike quickly and catch the Boers off balance. The Boers dug in on a line with their backs against a series of small hills, overlooking an open plain. Metheun, failing to make a proper reconnaissance, fired his artillery on the hills and the bombardment completely missed the Boer trenches. He then dispatched his kilt-clad Highland Brigade on an overnight movement through broken terrain to attack at dawn.

Marching in a massed column, the 3,500 Highlanders were paralyzed by the concentrated rifle fire of their opponent as day broke, unable to move forward or retreat. The eight yards of wool wrapped around the Highlanders' kilted legs, intended for northern European campaigns, was as suited to the 95 °F temperature as Metheun's tactics were suited to an entrenched peer adversary.[23] Lying motionless under the brutal South African sun for nine hours without water, the Highland Brigade broke, leaving almost a third of their force behind as they retreated to safety.

The second phase of the war was marked by British adaption to the new environment. Reinforcements, including soldiers from Australia and New Zealand, arrived on the shores of the Cape Colony in the spring of 1900. The commander of British forces, Gen Sir Redvers Buller, was relieved and his replacement went on the offensive, defeating the Boers at the battles of Paardeberg and Tugela Heights; finally relieving Ladysmith, Kimberly, and Mafeking; and capturing Pretoria and Bloemfontein, the capital cities of the Orange Free State and Transvaal Republic.

Having expected Boer resistance to collapse when their capitals fell, the British experienced a rude surprise when the Boers disbanded into commandos operating from their home regions. These commandos consisted of mounted bands of self-supplied Boers operating in familiar territory, relying on family for support to continue their guerilla campaign. The massive geographic scale of the former Boer states acted in their advantage: the Boers melted away and struck vulnerabilities like railroad tracks or isolated units.[24]

The last phase consisted of the protracted counterinsurgency campaign against these commandos. The British instituted a system of dispersed blockhouses from which they patrolled the surrounding countryside. Between the blockhouses stretched an expanse of barbed wire to constrict the mobility enjoyed by the Boer commandos. To separate insurgents from the population, the British swept non-combatant Boers into concentration camps and implemented a scorched earth strategy to destroy farms, livestock, and crops.[25] This proved effective, and the Boers formally surrendered at the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902.[26]

At this juncture, the reader would be justified in asking what lessons can be drawn from this summary, which are relevant to today's access struggle.

The purpose of establishing maritime access and denial is to control areas of key terrain that enable the flow of shipping and deny freedom of maneuver to the adversary. Capetown was strategically important because of its location midway between Britain and India. Loss of the port, and the colony surrounding it, would have threatened the flow around the Cape. In this regard, it is no different than any of the other strategic passageways around the world. Blocking the Strait of Malacca, for example, would impact almost half of the international shipping fleet.[27]

Permanently securing these sensitive passageways requires a ground force that can embark on ships, and this force must exist in sufficient numbers to secure multiple locations for extended periods. The establishment of advanced naval bases explains the continued relevance of the Marine Corps to the Navy. Policy discussions about maritime access and denial by nature include both Services; efforts to establish and maintain maritime supremacy cannot be bifurcated into neatly separated lines of effort.

The expansion and development of the mining industry on the Witwatersrand created a hyper-local economic zone dominated by British citizens yet governed by the Transvaal Republic. The treatment of these Uitlanders was politically sensitive in Britain; certainly not a stabilizing factor as the region spiraled to war. As much as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and militarization of the South China Sea has driven the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* shift of focus to Great Power competition, there has been surprisingly little discussion in military circles on the long-term impact of these sites or how the web of associated businesses will influence regional politics.[28]

The Chinese-financed port of Hambantota was built by Chinese workers contracted to Chinese companies. Sri Lanka defaulted on the loan and the Chinese now have a 99-year lease and controlling equity stake in the project.[29] Supposing (against all odds) that the port does become profitable, what will the impact be on the local political scene and in 40 or 50 years, after two generations of Chinese businessmen have lived in the port? How will Chinese domestic perception of the treatment of its citizens drive activism in the region? Consider the role of Russian minorities in Putin's justification for the annexation of Crimea and Donbas—how will these constituencies affect Chinese audiences? What is the perception of America in these areas and does the employment of U.S. military personnel advance or injure our interests?

As the example of the South African War demonstrates, political control is easily expanded by developing economic interests, which then can translate into concerns that can only be adjudicated through military means. Economic interests and political considerations go hand-in-hand. Are the tactical echelons of the Marine Corps, operating independently in a communications-denied setting, truly prepared to be successful in operational environments like this?

Finally, consider the state of the British Army at the beginning of the war. Their form and function were derived from experiences in low-intensity colonial wars and the almost-Napoleonic set piece engagements of the Crimean war forty years earlier. This showed in the

initial stages of the South African War as British tactics and equipment did not match that of their adversary, nor were they suitable to the environment or operational context. Innovative approaches like the blockhouse/wire strategy ultimately proved effective, yet this was the case because the British Empire could afford to apply overwhelming resources to the problem.

Compare this to the current state of the Naval Services. Neither the Navy nor Marine Corps has faced a sustained conventional campaign against a peer adversary since World War II. As the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* called for a return of focus to great power competition, some reflection on the role of institutional memory would be worthwhile to understand the context in which *Force Design 2030* occurs.

It is worth stating at this point that the formative combat experiences of the majority of currently serving Marines and Sailors came in Iraq or Afghanistan. There is no transitive property in warfare, just because something worked once does not mean that it applies everywhere. Experience is specific to environment, operational context, and adversary. The Marine Corps must be cautious and deliberate about projecting lessons learned in a specific setting onto a different problem set.

The war in Iraq was characterized by a low-intensity conflict against an irregular opponent amongst a civilian population. Friendly forces enjoyed almost uncontested control of the skies and a massive technological overmatch. Neither will be the case in a conventional fight against a peer opponent. The experiences of the Ukrainians and Russians in the Donbas regions are at least worth examining to understand how a data-enabled conventional force operates.

Take, for example, the role which special operations forces have carved out in the last two decades. Their expansion occurred in the context of a relatively secure operating environment against a dispersed, technologically inferior enemy. In a conventional campaign against a peer adversary, neither of these will be the case. At some point the AUMF (and along with it the worldwide operational commitments that justify the continued relevance of these forces) will end; Russia and China will not. Continued investment in these capabilities will be less defensible when that happens. Given equal funding, which secures more meters in a defense—special forces teams or infantry battalions?

To maintain maritime access, the United States will need to continue to build and reinforce partnership through exercises such as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). ***(Photo courtesy U.S. Navy.)***

Consider also the increase in unmanned intelligence surveillance reconnaissance platforms. The insatiable demand for overhead video exceeds current supply and so increasing the number of available assets is a reasonable decision. That being said, this demand occurred in an environment in which there was intense pressure to minimize collateral damage necessitating overhead imagery to corroborate on-scene requests for indirect fires and to accurately apply them—and friendly forces enjoyed almost unquestioned air supremacy. Will the next conflict occur in these conditions?

The Navy has not faced a sustained naval campaign against a conventional opponent since World War II. Much of our current force structure and doctrine are revolve around the dominant technological offset of that era (Carrier Strike Group) even though advances in anti-ship missiles and information technology have radically altered the maritime threat landscape. How would a modern naval battle proceed? Probably differently than it did in the 1940s, not least as our capital assets today are much more easily located and targeted.[30] An independent observer reading the ProPublica investigations into the MCCAIN and FITZGERALD collisions (as well as the Corps' 2018 Hornet crash) could be forgiven for questioning the combat readiness of the fleet.[31] How would it perform if, like the British Army of 1899, it was pitted against a well-equipped competent adversary? Answers could be determined by a force-on-force exercise conducted by operationally representative units using threat doctrine and tactics.[32] A force-on-force exercise would be significantly more useful to informing development of the Marine Corps' operating concepts than simulated and virtual wargaming.

As the Naval Services plan for competition with great powers intent on using political, economic, and military levers to establish and maintain maritime access, they must do so aware to their own institutional memory and with a full understanding of the political context in which their capabilities will be employed. We must seize this opportunity to prepare for the next conflict untrammeled by our experiences in the last, so that we do not follow the

British Army's example by marching shoulder-to-shoulder towards concentrated rifle fire, kilts swinging proudly into irrelevance.

Notes

1. The term "commando," which in modern usage typically denotes a member of a specialized military unit, is derived from the South African term that described the contemporary military forces of the Boer Republics. These commandos were voluntary militia organizations with roots dating to the earliest settlement of the region.

2. See, for example: Christopher Sykes, *The Man Who Created the Middle East,* (New York, NY: William Collins, 2017). Readers perhaps will be more familiar with the names "Anglo-Boer War," "Boer War," or "Second Boer War." The term "South African War" is the currently accepted name in the field as it acknowledges the comprehensive nature of the war rather than specific participants and avoids partisan controversy.

3. Frederick Johnstone, *Class, Race, and Gold: A Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa,* (London: Routledge, 1976); and Geoffrey Blainey, "Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid," *The Economic History Review,* (London: Economic History Society, 1965).

4. Charles Van Onselen, *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand,* (New York, NY: Longman, 1982).

5. *Class, Race, and Gold*.

6. Peter Warwick, *Black People and the South African War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

7. "Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand"; and Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," *History Workshop,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

8. Alan Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 1890–1920*, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985); and "Lost Causes."

9. Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War,* (New York, NY: Random House, 1979).

10. "Lord Milner."

11. "Lost Causes."

12. *Boer War*.

13. See, for example: Tlou John Makhura, "Another Road to the Raid: The Neglected Role of the Boer Baganwa War as a Factor in the Coming of the Jameson Raid, 1894–1895," *Journal of Southern African Studies,* (Milton Park: Routledge, 1995); "Lost Causes"; and Richard Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, (Milton Park: Routledge, 1980).

14. Joseph Chamberlain (British Secretary of State for Colonies) was certainly aware of the impending raid. Cecil Rhodes (Prime Minister of the Cape Colony) was one of the primary planners of the raid, as well as one of its financiers. See "Lost Causes" and *Boer War*.

15. Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914,* (London: Penguin, 2012).

16. Edward Cook, *Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War,* (London: Arnold, 1901).

17. Cecil Headlam, ed., *The Milner Papers: South Africa 1897–1899,* (London: Cassel & Co., 1931),

18. Ibid.

19. Staff, "Rewriting the South African War," *HNET,* (n.d.), available at https://www.h-net.org. Also see, Iain Smith, "Capitalism and the War," in Omissi and Thompson (ed.) *The Impact of the South African War,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). This was by no means lost on contemporary observers: see J. A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects,* (London: 1900); Jan Christian Smuts and Francis Reitz, *A Century of Wrong,* (London: 1900); Cook, *Rights and Wrongs*.

20. *Boer War*.

21. Drawn from descriptions of colonial warfare and the Jominian tradition in mid-19th century armies in Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, (London: Routledge, 1983).

22. The following description of the Battle of Magersfontein taken from *Boer War*.

23. Sources for temperature calculation as follows: data from Staff, "Monthly Weather and Climate Forecast Kimberley, South Africa," *Weather Atlas*, (n.d.), available at https://www.weather-atlas.com; apparent temperature calculation from Staff, "Apparent Temperature," *Planetcalc Online Calculators*, (n.d.), available at https://planetcalc.com.

24. *Boer War*.

25. Contemporary use of this term did not encompass the connotations it has to a modern reader, although it should be noted that these camps were known in contemporary accounts for their horrific conditions in which somewhere between 20,000–28,000 Boer civilians died. Elizabeth Van Heyningen, "The Concentration Camps of the South African (Anglo-Boer) War, 1900–1902," (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009); and *Boer War*.

26. *Boer War*; and Middle East.

27. Staff, "The Strait of Malacca, a Key Oil Chokepoint, Links Indian and Pacific Oceans," Independent Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Energy Information Administration, (August 2017) available at https://www.eia.gov.

28. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, (Washington, DC: 2018).

29. Maria Abi-Habib, "How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up A Port," *New York Times*, (June 2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com.

30. James Holmes, "The U.S. Navy Has Forgotten What It Is Like To Fight," *Foreign Policy,* (November 2018), available at https://foreignpolicy.com.

31. Robert Faturechi, Megan Rose, T. Christian Miller; "Years of Warnings, then Death and Disaster: How the Navy Failed Its Sailors," *ProPublica*, (February 2019), available at https://www.propublica.org; and Robert Faturechi, Megan Rose, T. Christian Miller, "Faulty Equipment, Lapsed Training, Repeated Warnings: How a Preventable Disaster Killed Six Marines," *ProPublica,* (December 2019), available at https://features.propublica.org.

32. One would think this common sense but consider this quote regarding Sea Dragon 2025, the Marine Corps' 2017 Ground Combat Element experiment: "in order to prepare 3/5 for their role in the experiment, they were manned at 100 percent of the MCF 2025 T/O and to the greatest extent possible, personnel were of the appropriate rank and had the required training for their billets." These conditions (100% manned and fully trained) are probably not representative of the current Marine Corps operating forces. Quote from Headquarters Marine Corps, *MARADMIN 186/18, Release of Final Report For Sea Dragon 2025 Phase I Experiment Campaign*, (Washington, DC: March 2018).

When They Come Knocking

The burden of leadership

by Maj Ryan Pallas

The enormous gravity of our chosen profession is never easily articulated in the written or spoken word. I have pondered countless nights how to convey the burden of leadership, or more plainly, the responsibility of being a Marine, to family, friends, and fellow Marines. This work is an attempt to remedy that shortfall. I must admit it is a flawed and incomplete work—and to no fault but my own. We are a storied culture, and this is an attempt to add to that story.

Throughout our lives, we are held accountable to those who knock on our door. This can occur metaphorically and physically. Metaphorically, it signifies the daily measurement of our ability to serve in specific roles while meeting or exceeding the expectations of those around us. Our daily interactions are defined by a particular bond or title: son, brother, husband, father, subordinate, peer, superior. Our ability or inability to answer these knocks can produce consequences—sometimes fatal.

Throughout my career, I have identified three knocks: *the personal/professional, the enemy, and the actual.* The personal and professional fall within the metaphorical category and are expectations set by our families, friends, and fellow Marines and measured by how well we satisfy those expectations according to others and ourselves: "Am I a good son?" "Am I a good husband?" "Am I a good Marine?" The measurement of these tasks is not easily quantifiable. Nevertheless, the daily requirement to perform well in these roles persists throughout a lifetime, reflected in our legacy. This is true for any role we play in life—what continues to remain after our passing is the test of a life lived in the service of others. The goal of any leader is the continued success of their Marines, even in the leader's absence, whether in garrison or combat.

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The professional aspect evolves further into the daily role we model as Marines—from first thing in the morning until our head hits the pillow at night: 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. At the gym or the grocery store, we are constantly evaluated by leaders, peers, subordinates, and—for those serving in a joint capacity—other Services. Consistency in these roles is infinitely more challenging than it seems and is something I took for granted as a young lieutenant. For example, subordinates can sometimes fail to appreciate a colonel with 28 years of service prepared to lead, mentor, and perform every day, fully aware another promotion is absent from their future—something I observed when working on a large staff. However, this is the consistency we should all strive to achieve. We as leaders must be ready for the unknown to arrive at our doors every second of

Marine Corps officer candidates with Lima Company, Platoon Leaders Class 2nd Increment, Alpha Company, and Delta Company, walk across the parade deck after completing Officer Candidates School (OCS) on Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, 14 August 2021. Friends and family in attendance show their support during the OCS Class-237 graduation and commissioning ceremony. *(Photo by Cpl Sean Potter.)*

every day. There is no distinction between on and off duty. When we can no longer answer the knock, it is time for us to move on.

MajGen Ray "E-Tool" Smith, a Vietnam veteran serving during the Tet and Easter Offensives, spoke of this accountability. He discussed a Marine who gave the ultimate sacrifice leaving him to wonder if he turned out to be the type of leader this fallen Marine wanted him to be. This is a reminder of the expectations placed upon us as Marines and our chosen profession. I have found throughout my career being unable to meet the expectations of those you lead is far more disappointing than failing to meet the expectations of those you are led by.

The second knock, also metaphorical, is the enemy. We cannot choose the time or place when a non-governmental actor or peer adversary will act on their own accord, but we must be ready. The expectation has been, and always will be, Marines will answer the call. This comes at a great expense to the individual Marine: time away from home; long and sleepless nights; weekends at work; and absentee birthdays, holidays, and anniversaries when deployed. However, for all who wear the uniform, these are necessary and noble costs to endure. This burden is not borne alone. Our family and friends have endured many, if not more severe, hardships than our own. They endure the sleepless nights and long hours in silent service as their loved ones depart repetitively throughout a career, disrupting normal day-to-day lives. These knocks are never answered alone, which brings me to the last and most impactful knock any of us can receive.

It is often portrayed as a lone government vehicle, service members in dress uniforms, a chaplain, and a folded flag, walking silently to the door of an unsuspecting spouse or family to say, "On behalf of the President of the United States and a grateful nation." This knock is one Marines, families, and friends always hope to avoid. These knocks are met by fear, screams of anguish, tears, rage, or sometimes, overwhelming silence. For those who have been given the sacred duty of delivering such a knock, it is an experience which cannot be accurately summarized within this article. The important takeaway is through our daily preparation and desire to meet the demands of the figurative knocks discussed previously, we can mitigate to the utmost of our abilities this final physical knock from occurring. The words of James Warner Bellah come to mind:

A Marine Corps recruit with November 2 Company, 4th Battalion, Recruit Training Regiment, holds an Eagle, Globe, and Anchor during the Crucible on Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC, 3 December 2016. The Crucible is the final test of everything the recruits have learned during the recruit training process and the last event before becoming Marines. ***(Photo by LCpl Sarah Stegall/Released.)***

> A dead soldier who has given his life because of the failures of his leader is a dreadful sight before God. Like all dead soldiers, he was tired, possibly frightened to his soul, and there is on top of all that never again to see his homeland. Don't be the one who failed to instruct him properly, who failed to lead him well. Burn the midnight oil, so that you may not in later years look upon your hands and find his blood still red upon them.

There is no distinction between on and off duty.

I hope to never fail in answering a knock at the door, or through my lack of preparation, deliver a knock to an unsuspecting family that their loved one gave their life for my own shortcomings.

I think MajGen Smith is right. As many of us do, I too, have a friend who gave his life in service to this country. I spend a significant amount of time wondering if I am the Marine today he would have wanted me to be and if the Marine Corps is better with me around. My hope is to convey this burden of service to the men and women I serve side-by-side with, like those who took the time to instill this responsibility to me. I would also like to convey to my family and friends as a son, brother, husband, friend, and father, that the burdens endured are not mine alone. I want to thank each of them for their unwavering support as they remain silent pillars of strength I draw from in my own repeated attempts to answer this call, usually coming at their expense.

My greatest fear: my inability to answer the door when it knocks.

USMC

Leadership Lessons from Privates First Class

I'm in charge, Sergeant Major

by Col Mike Jernigan

"Leadership has no level. Leadership has no title. Every individual has traits of a leader. The most unexpected person can be a great leader."[1]
—Bob Nardelli, Former Chief Executive Officer, Home Depot, 2004

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We typically do not think about the youngest in our profession having something to teach us. Recently, I happened to see an interesting exchange. A small group of Marines was marching between locations. They had a strong cadence and were in step. A sergeant major saw them and growled, "Stop!" A confident, "Detail, Halt," came from the middle of the formation. The sergeant major asked, "Who's in charge?" A private first class stepped out of the formation, stood in front of the sergeant major, looked him in the eyes, and said clearly, "I'm in charge, Sergeant Major."

The sergeant major then graciously and gently both encouraged and corrected the Marine: "Your cadence sounded loud and crisp. But you need to step outside the formation and give your cadence from the side and the back of the formation." The private first-class acknowledged, "Aye, aye, Sergeant Major," implemented the corrections, took his leave, and resumed marching the formation toward their destination.

I was struck by several factors by this encounter. My initial reaction was that it was good for my morale to see a private first-class take responsibility and respond appropriately to a sergeant major. Correspondingly, I was encouraged that the sergeant major did not "flame" the private first-class and demonstrated that "professional competence is not enough to be a good leader; good leaders must truly care about those they lead."[2] Why did observing this briefest of conversations between two Marines with twenty years of life and Marine Corps experience separating them resonate with me? I reflected on the situation and realized that this private first-class exhibited several positive leadership attributes, and I could learn from him.

A Leader Has Courage

I am pretty sure I was not the only one in this situation when the sergeant major yelled out "Stop!" who thought to himself, "Oh, [insert expletive of choice], I'm about to get chewed out for something I don't even know what I or what one of these knuckleheads did." The private first-class displayed his courage when asked, "Who's in charge?" by immediately responding, "I'm in charge."

Leadership and courage have obvious applicability to combat. This relationship is, quite frankly, why the Marine Corps trains Marines the way it does. Courage helps deal with acute stress; leadership inspires that courage. Acute stress is a reaction to a stressor that causes the body to dump all of its adrenaline and triggers every "fight or flight" survival instinct. It is what somebody experiences during and immediately after an automobile accident—or when somebody is shooting at you. A common reaction to acute stress is fear. Fear is mankind's reaction to danger. The private first-class I observed may have thought of his surprise engagement with a sergeant major as "danger" and its associated fear. Marine Corps foundational training is on overcoming fear. Controlling fear increases one's ability to react to physical threats and survive.[3]

Beirut Marine Capt Robert Mastrion explains that there are three types of fear in combat: fear of helplessness, fear of physical weakness, and fear of the realization of death.[4] The fear of helplessness can be seen in sports. Occasionally, opposing teams appear to be evenly matched, yet one team does not play well on game day; the further they get behind—the worse they do. Armchair analysts call this getting "psyched out":

the losing team, before or during the game, considered the situation hopeless and is beaten before the game begun.[5] Mixed-martial arts fighter Conor McGregor is famous for this technique and is known as "a master of the mental game, defeating some opponents before the first punch is thrown."[6] Typically,

> Marine units don't fall prey to this type of fear ... because our entry-level training given to enlisted Marines and officers instills in them a sense of supremacy and self-confidence that insulates them ... Thus, it is critical that the self-confidence our young Marines have when they initially join the unit be reinforced, not eroded.[7]

The second type of fear, that of not being strong enough to complete the necessary task, is brought on by fatigue. The more tired one is, the more one is susceptible to the fear of weakness.[8] The Marine Corps addresses this fear directly and is notorious among military Services for its physical fitness demands of every individual. Marines can be described as low-paid professional athletes for the amount of conditioning work they do and length of "season" they have. The Marine Corps' high standards of strength and endurance directly mitigate this source of fear.

The fear of realization of death produces anxiety and causes people to feel "powerless to overcome what may occur."[9] It is important to note that this fear stems from an absolute certainty that death is imminent, not a likeliness or possibility. Winston Churchill's doctor and World War II veteran, Lord Moran, wrote *The Anatomy of Courage.* In it, he explains why some men fight on against seemingly insurmountable odds while others cower in shell holes and flinch at the slightest noise. Variables that enhance courage include camaraderie, a sense of duty, a sense of personal honor, and resilience—among others. The Marine Corps capitalizes on all of these factors and inoculates against the fear of death in its entry-level training and then sustains that resistance as part of its enduring culture. Most surviving Medal of Honor recipients, when asked why they conducted their valorous acts, explain to the effect: "Since I was going to die anyway, I might as well do something." The Marine Corps venerates its heroes and teaches all of its members that it is better to die well than to live as frightened men who failed their duty.

Back to the private first class addressing the sergeant major; he may not have been in physical danger, but it is likely that he thought he was about to be (figuratively) shredded into little pieces. This private first-class displayed what Roman playwright Plautus explained two thousand years earlier: "Courage in danger is half the battle."[10] Where do eighteen-year old novices learn the courage to stand face-to-face with intimidating men? Massachusetts State Senator and Marine SSgt Robert Hall believes that Marine Corps Recruit Training teaches this concept. He wrote, and attributes his life successes to, an essay called "Everything I Need to Know, I Learned in Boot Camp." Hall explains, "Courage isn't the absence of fear—courage is being afraid and still doing what needs to be done."[11] The private first-class used the courage he was taught at Recruit Training to step up to the sergeant major and accept responsibility.

A Leader Is Responsible

That acceptance of responsibility is critically important to the credibility of a leader. The private first-class-in-charge remembered that old adage taught at boot camp: whenever two Marines are together, one of them is in charge. He recognized and accepted his responsibility as the one calling cadence—even if that meant having a conversation with a sergeant major. Leaders are marked by their willingness to take responsibility.[12]

A Leader Is Prepared

Before the surprise encounter with the sergeant major, the formation of privates and private first-classes sorted themselves. One was determined to be senior. He organized them into ranks and called cadence. They marched as they had been taught at Recruit Training. The private first-class in-charge did not know that a surprise pop quiz was coming. He only knew that he was senior and accordingly must do what he had been taught. He kept the formation in step as they moved toward their next commitment. Similarly, any well-qualified leader prepares for what is approaching, whether known or un-

The most junior Marines often prove through their actions that rank does not make you a leader—being a leader makes you a leader. *(Photo by Cpl Timothy Lenzo.)*

known. Every leader must gird for the coming unknown test of his leadership: non-commissioned officers complete non-resident professional development courses, lieutenants have conversations with previous wars' veterans, and commanding generals read works of ancient warriors and historic figures. Leaders study, practice, and prepare for both expected and unanticipated situations.

As I reflected on this exchange with the private first-class, I remembered an encounter with a different private first-class years earlier at Camp Lejeune. He was new to the unit, and the "salty" non-commissioned officers were having some fun at his expense and sent him on a quest to find a specific administrative form. After a period of no success, he asked the first sergeant.

"First sergeant, where can I find an Eye Dee Ten Tee form?"

The first sergeant recognized the joke for what it was, "Marine, they are sending you to look for form that doesn't exist—an ID10T form. They are calling you an idiot. Who gave you this task?"

The private first-class was loyal and reluctant to identify his non-commissioned officers. The first sergeant let him off the hook (knowing that there were only two NCOs in that platoon at the time) and said, "Private first-class, I believe it was Cpl _____ and Cpl _____ who gave you this task. That's not how we do things in this unit, and they have something coming to them for treating you this way. What do you recommend I do to them?"

The private first-class looked at the deck and twisted his cover nervously, "Whatever you want to do, first sergeant."

The first sergeant bellowed as only first sergeants can, "It's not what I want to do private first-class; it's what you think needs done!" He then proceeded to question if specific parts of the private first-class' anatomy were made either of brass or cotton. The private first-class allowed that his were metallic, squared his shoulders, looked the first sergeant in the eye, and in a strong voice demanded, "I want them to get down on their knees and beg for forgiveness in front of a company formation!" The ludicrousness of the statement caught everyone in earshot by surprise and they howled in laughter. As innovative justice was awarded that day, I reflected on what this private first-class showed me.

Leaders Are Bold

The private first-class took the challenge offered him by the first sergeant and responded with boldness. His brashness accelerated his acceptance into the company. Boldness is rewarded on battlefields and boardrooms. Both require leaders "willing to think and act in an independent fashion—men who as they consider each situation, will act in a bold and decisive fashion."[13] Leaders are expected to seize the moment with resolute action.

Leaders can use humor to build resilience, address adversity, and develop camaraderie.

Leaders Use Humor Appropriately

Humor can effectively defuse stressful situations, as the private first-class demonstrated. Leaders can use humor to build resilience, address adversity, and develop camaraderie. However, the humor must never be biting or at the expense of others. *We are laughing at our situation together* builds teams, but *we are laughing at you* creates divisions. Leaders are responsible for both outcomes. A person who can maintain his "lightness of mind" will not easily be unraveled in combat, and teams that laugh at themselves are stronger for it.[14]

Leaders Come in All Sizes

As I reflect on these two exchanges with privates first-class, I recognize that leadership is rank independent. John Wooden was a basketball coach with the University of California Los Angeles. He won ten national championships, including still-unmatched seven consecutively. People who played for him went on to be professional athletes, published authors, successful business owners, and U.S. Senators. He was known as a leader and a mentor who had an ability to express ideas simply. Regarding leadership, he said, "A leader can be led."[15] As I reflect on what I learned from these two private first-classes, I realize rank does not make you a leader—being a leader makes you a leader.

Notes

1. Personal conversation between author and Bob Nardelli on 21 August 2004.

2. Simon Sinek, *Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don't*, (New York, NY: Portfolio, 2014).

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Warfighting Skills Program, Marine Corps Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Institute, 1990).

4. Robert Mastrion, "Understanding Fear," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: September 1986).

5. Ibid.

6. Jeff Wagenheim, "Just Like That, Conor McGregor is Back in Control," *ESPN,* (January 2020), available at https://www.espn.com.

7. "Understanding Fear."

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Quoted in Aubrey Newman, *Follow Me II: More on the Human Element in Leadership*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992).

11. Robert A. Hall, "Everything I Need to Know, I Learned in Boot Camp," *Marine Corps Times*, (Arlington, VA: Army Times Publishing Company, March 2000).

12. J. Oswald Sanders, *Spiritual Leadership*, (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1967).

13. Ludwig Beck et al., *Die Truppenführung [Troop Leading]*, (Berlin: German Field Service Regulations, 1933).

14. Steven Pressfield, *Gates of Fire*, (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1998).

15. John Wooden and Steve Jamison, *Wooden: A Lifetime of Observations and Reflections on and off the Court*, (Lincolnwood, IL: Contemporary Books, 1997).

Leadership Purpose

Cohesive philosophy and perspective on leadership is essential

by 1stLt Austin Lynum

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It is every leader's responsibility to sustain the warrior spirit in their Marines. *(Photo by Cpl Luke Kuennen.)*

Many Marines spend a large portion of their time in the Marine Corps struggling with depression, anger, and lack of purpose. Often, they remember why they joined but still become disenfranchised. As leaders, it is easy for us to fall into this trap as well. When this happens, we can look back to the Marine Corps' leadership philosophy to refresh our world view, gain some motivation and purpose, and recalibrate our leadership compasses.

While searching our leadership philosophy, you might notice a discrepancy in our doctrine. There is a mismatch in text between *MCWP 6-11* and the *Marine Corps Manual*, and it is not trivial. It aptly illustrates an issue consistently seen in junior leaders and senior leaders alike—our purpose is lacking. Specifically, there is one subparagraph in the *Marine Corps Manual* that was changed for the worse. Paragraph 1100, subparagraph 1, of the *Marine Corps Manual* should be deliberately revisited because it is sorely lacking in its present form. To inform our deliberations, we should look to the version of the same subparagraph stated within *MCWP 6-11*. This article provides views on our leadership purpose in an attempt to kickstart the conversation.

The current "Purpose and Scope" of Marine Corps Leadership is defined in one sentence: "The objective of Marine Corps Leadership is to develop the leadership qualities of Marines to enable them to assume progressively greater responsibilities to the Marine Corps and society."[1] Nothing in this sentence is inherently disagreeable, but it is significantly less engaging than the version in *Leading Marines* below:

> 1. Purpose and Scope
>
> a. The primary goal of Marine Corps leadership is to instill in all Marines the fact that we are warriors first. The only reason the United States of America needs a Marine Corps is to fight and win wars. Everything else is secondary. In North China in 1937, Captain Samuel B. Griffith said, "Wars and battles are not lost by private soldiers. They win them, but don't lose them. They are lost by commanders, staffs, and troop leaders, and they are often lost long before they start." Our leadership training is dedicated to the purpose of preparing those commanders, staffs, and troop leaders to lead our Marines in combat.[2]

It is unfortunate that we are left with such a baseless shell of a purpose, especially when the previous version was so descriptive and engaging. Likewise, it shows us a tangible root to our beliefs and a clear delineation of what all officers know as the burden of command. The failure of an enterprise is never on the backs of our Marines but rests solely on leadership. In this realization, we gain the understanding of the importance of effective leadership throughout the ranks. Lackluster leaders will be the cause of failure, which is unacceptable because "Marines and

the Corps do not fail ... the Corps must succeed."[3]

It is also interesting how great the contrast is between these two purposes. One is "to instill in all Marines the fact that we are warriors first,"[4] emphasizing the individual character of all Marines within the group—which *Leading Marines* takes so much time and passion to articulate. It comes full circle logically and in good form.

The new purpose of Marine Corps leadership does not tie it to any external logical structure but feeds back into itself. If your purpose in life is to live for the sake of living, then what is your purpose? Yes, it is to live, but what does that even mean? This circular logic is akin to a self-licking ice cream cone. If the objective of Marine Corps leadership truly is "to develop the leadership qualities of Marines," we are already in a logical loop. How is our purpose solely to perpetuate the means of reaching our purpose? Someone will have to do some critical thinking to get us out of this one. Continuing to read, we get a purpose to our objective, which is good; it is that hint of critical thinking we need. Unfortunately, it is telling us that the only point of developing our leadership qualities is to enable us to take on more responsibility.

Leading Marines tells us, "Stars, bars, or chevrons are only indicators of the responsibility or authority we hold at a given time."[5] Considering that our own philosophy holds rank as an indicator of responsibility, is our ultimate purpose as leaders to climb the ladder to the highest rank possible? Is our failure to promote to the next rank our ultimate defeat?

The phrase "responsibilities to the Marine Corps and society" provides a hint at the context necessary to get us out of the circular logic we would otherwise fall prey to. From this phrase, we could build the requirements of leadership that form our underlying purpose. Specifically focusing on our definitions of the Marine Corps and society, we can develop our context and foundation for leadership, assuming that our definitions for each term are strong and universally known to Marine leaders. Considering the gravity of the assumptions that need to be made in this situation, the benefit of including the phrase "responsibilities to the Marine Corps and society" is outdone by the ambiguity it leaves on the table—unless we include the definitions of these terms.

Our previous leadership purpose gave us an inherently palatable and logical basis for its observance. There is a strong statement of fact that—in good Marine Corps fashion—denies dispute, basing our leadership on amplifying the warrior spirit of our Marines. As previously stated, many Marines remember why they joined but still feel disenfranchised. Most of those Marines joined partly for the warrior spirit they saw in the Marines. There is a consistent trend of Marines getting into hellish fights and coming out the other side with a win, whether that is in a bar or on a battlefield. That appeals to a lot of combative young men and women. It is part of the warrior archetype Steven Pressfield talks about extensively in *The Warrior Ethos*. Then we join the Marines; we get away from the fight of boot camp, Officer Candidate School, and The Basic School; and we lose sight of our warrior spirit. *Leading Marines* says, "there is an unnatural feeling of being 'left out' among [Marines] not able to go"[6] when other Marines are in the fight. This extends to any time a Marine is not in the fight, unless our leaders are able to remind us and refocus us on our inherent warrior spirit.

From the perspective of, say, a communications unit in the air wing, it is easy to fall back to the mindset of a uniformed bureaucrat that fulfills a niche foreign policy requirement. The challenge is finding a nested, functional purpose that survives the reality of support units and maintains the combative mindset of the warrior spirit that allows us to fight failure. We are not the 0311's finding a way to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Our job is to support them, so how do we make a support mission into a fight? There are sustaining and shaping aspects to support missions, but are there also decisive aspects? With some critical thinking, it is not hard to find decisive aspects of all occupational fields, so they need to be emphasized to engage our warriors.

The fight against failure is a real thing in any specialty, so keep the standards high, explain the purpose, and define success and failure for the warriors you lead. The old purpose and scope contain a quote by then-Capt Samuel B. Griffith, explaining the burden of command as discussed before: the Marines win battles and wars, but their leaders lose them. This is the basis and motivation for the ultimate focus of leadership, which is preparing to lead in combat so that we win every time. There is no place for failure, so we must constantly fight it. This is aptly covered in all venues of leadership training, but for some reason, it is not applied in the operating forces to the extent it should be. To help improve the quality of our leaders, the stated purpose of Marine Corps Leadership, as defined in the *Marine Corps Manual*, must be changed to accurately reflect the end state for effective Marine leaders—winning in combat.

Good leaders would rather not be leaders if success is defined by promotion because gaining rank does not win the fight. Rank has nothing to do with their reasons for joining. They joined to be part of the best corps of warriors in the world, to fight, and to be mentors and role models to their Marines. They would rather define success as effective and responsive support to the Marines in contact so that they win every time. For this reason, we need to reexamine the purpose of Marine Corps leadership to support the warfighter, not ourselves.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Manual*, (Washington, DC: 1980).

2. *Marine Corps Manual*, Paragraph 1100, as it appears in the appendices of Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCWP 6-11*, *Leading Marines*, (Washington, DC: 2002).

3. *MCWP 6-11, Leading Marines.*

4. *Marine Corps Manual.*

5. *MCWP 6-11, Leading Marines.*

6. Ibid.

Innovating the Commandant's Professional Reading List

Creating incentives and a formal program

by Capt Cameron Lahren

Cpl Brown finishes cleaning the bolt of her weapon after a long firing week on the rifle range. She is proud that her attention to detail and discipline has paid off for her first expert rating. She spent long days sitting in a classroom reviewing shooting fundamentals, which was followed by hours of practicing uncomfortable firing positions. She knows that when her expert score is recorded by her battalion S-3 her composite score will be high enough for promotion. She trained hard and knows that she deserves the results. Cpl Brown's rifle range example illustrates the ability of the Marine Corps to tie annual training requirements to a Marine's career. Replace Cpl Brown's situation with any Marine running the physical fitness test or the combat fitness test, and the result is the same. The Marine's performance results in reward or remediation. The same holds true for a Marine battalion. If all Marines have not completed their annual and fiscal training requirements, then a battalion must remediate. If a battalion finishes its annual requirements early, then it garners favorable attention.

But this same level of importance is not given to the Commandant's Professional Reading List even though it is an annual training requirement for all Marines. The Marine Corps has unintentionally created a perverse incentive system in which it fails to invest in a program that tracks reading completion for the force. The Marine Corps should innovate the Commandant's Professional Reading List by using available off-the-shelf technology to incentivize participation across the Corps. By doing this, the Marine Corps can create a system of record to track reading completion and standardize reading completion criteria.

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The Marine Corps requires reporting seniors to record reading completion via directed comment in a Marine's fitness report or reflected in a Marine's proficiency and conduct marks. *ALMAR 015/17* establishes the annual reading requirement and record process for all Marines. It states, "Each Marine shall read a minimum of five books from the 'Commandants Choice' or 'Grade Level' sections each year." However, unlike every other annual or fiscal training requirement, the Commandant's Professional Reading List is not established in a system of record. There is no standard, centralized way to track individual completion. Without a system of record, a battalion training section cannot verify completion. A Marine has no way to display reading completion over multiple years without referencing multiple fitness reports. A new reporting senior cannot verify that a Marine is reading new books from the reading list instead of recycling those he or she already read. These issues can be answered with the introduction of a program called Accelerated Reader (AR). AR is reading software developed for K-12 students that "assesses whether students have read books or selections of text." AR also creates individual user profiles much like a learning profile in MarineNet to record and track books read per student. The profiles enable a system to record the completion of every book read in a Marine's career. With a program like AR, a reporting senior can ensure that a Marine has met the professional military education requirement for the year, and a battalion commander can track the annual training status for the battalion.

AR evaluates reading completion through the use of online quizzes. Instead of being subjected to non-standard evaluation criteria such as book reports, AR quizzes hold Marines to the same evaluation standard. If a company commander of 180 Marines used 1-page book reports to verify the reading requirement, he would read 900 pages of reports per year. If the company commander delegated the responsibility to his platoon commanders, they would read 220 pages per year. The task of reading and grading of papers turns the

Marine Corps into an English lab for lieutenants. Because of the length of the reading list, the fair grading of the essays is a challenge if not impossible. I think most professionals in academics would agree that a reputable English teacher would not grade a book report if he has never read the book. However, if a platoon commander is to fairly grade every Marine in the platoon, then the platoon commander would have to read 34 books from the reading list. A company commander would have to read 47 books from the list to be able to fairly grade everyone in his company. Instead of putting the reading and grading onus on the platoon or company commander, an AR quiz serves as a standardized automated test. This standardization reduces the untenable workload for the officer ensuring compliance with the reading list, and it eliminates subjective evaluation by commanders.

The Marine Corps is looking for a system of record that objectively tests reading completion and records completion across the force.

According to a sales representative at Renaissance Learning, the software developer for AR, the program would cost a Marine an estimated ten dollars a year to implement for all active duty Marines. The 10 dollars would pay for a quiz for every book and a customizable platform with 100 quizzes for testing. A program that costs less than 2 million dollars is a drop in the bucket for a Marine Corps with a budget over 25 billion dollars.

A notable concern for using the AR program is the risk of cheating while using an online database for testing. A Marine could obtain the answers in advance, have another Marine take the test, or watch a movie, such as *Ender's Game*, instead of reading the book. Tests that are deemed important for a Marine's advancement, such as the Regional, Cultural, and Language Familiarization, are conducted with either a proctor supervising at work or at a Learning Resource Center with paid test proctors. To mitigate cheating, testing should be conducted in the same manner as Regional, Cultural, and Language Familiarization tests. This also the reduces, if not eliminates, the ability of quiz takers to memorize the answers to quizzes by changing the order of answer choices for each quiz. In addition to quiz monitoring and quiz choice variations, AR quiz writers watch the movies of books to ensure quizzes are free of questions easily answered from a movie. Therefore, the details that stand out in the film version of *Ender's Game* are not tested in the AR quiz version.

The efficacy of a program like AR for reading comprehension is another concern for implementation across the force. If research shows that AR does not work as advertised, then the Marine Corps would be wasting an investment. In 2013, Jan Shelton conducted research on the effect of AR for 5th graders' reading comprehension. Page five of Shelton's research found that reading comprehension and reading ability did not show "statistically significant effect for gender by group." Mirroring Jan Shelton Nichols research, a team from the University of St. Thomas researching student responses to using AR also found that "limited number of studies conducted to investigate achievement shows that AR does not usually result in gains." In other words, a student's ability to comprehend what he reads does not improve with the use of AR. These research findings do not negate the positive potential use for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is not concerned with improving reading comprehension for its Marines. The Marine Corps is looking for a system of record that objectively tests reading completion and records completion across the force. It is unfair and maybe foolhardy to believe non-education trained Marine officers could evaluate increased reading comprehension in the operating forces. A Marine officer is at best checking for completion and basic understanding when evaluating papers. AR also checks for completion and basic understanding with automation and greater fidelity.

The Marine Corps would need to field the program across the entire force for it to be a viable system for record for the Commandant's Professional Reading List. A localized solution at one of the MEFs would not allow for a Marine's reading record to follow him after a permanent chance of station to a different MEF. The acquisition process for AR would need to cover every Marine in the force.

In summation, the AR program innovates by incentivizing individual Marines to participate in the Commandant's Professional Reading List. The program does this by eliminating subjective grading and completion criteria with standardized testing. The AR program incentivizes by potentially reducing tens, if not hundreds, of hours of reading and grading of book essays by commanders. For ten dollars a year per Marine, AR adds incentive for all Marines by creating a system of record that follows a Marine for his or her career. This system of record prevents the resubmission of previously read books, and it adds credibility to a Marines' professional military education biography. Most importantly, AR is an incentive for the Commandant because it forces commanders to ensure that the annual training requirement of the Commandant's Professional Reading List is met. Just as Cpl Brown is held to a high standard on the rifle range, the Commandant's Professional Reading List would be held to the same standard as all other annual training requirements with AR.

USMC

We Must Get Back to Mission Tactics

Practicing what we preach

by Capt Michael Hanson

The Marine Corps prides itself on being an organizational practitioner of maneuver warfare, a method of warfare that emphasizes speed and tempo to out-cycle an opponent and neutralize his ability to resist before he can react effectively. According to *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, it is the Marine Corps' official style of warfare. However, a significant contradiction currently exists between what our Corps practices and what it preaches. When it comes to teaching subordinate leaders about taking initiative and rapidly exploiting opportunities to achieve maneuver warfare's fullest potential, we indoctrinate them in the classroom and in our professional writings with an expectation that we do not honor in the field. This will not serve us well in combat and, in the next fight, may deny us victories and even lead to defeat. To prepare for war with a peer adversary, the Marine Corps must return to its doctrine or risk being outmaneuvered by a bolder opponent that allows his subordinate leaders to practice real maneuver warfare while we give lip service to it.

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Evidence of this disconnect can be found in the lessons we draw from *Infantry Attacks* by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. In it, the author offers a collection of vignettes from his own personal experiences as a first lieutenant in World War I. In addition to a simple yet engaging prose, the author includes many detailed maps and sketches that illustrate terrain, enemy dispositions, effects of fires, and friendly movements that clearly explain his keys to success and define the tenets that made him a legend among infantrymen worldwide. As such, this work is probably the finest example of maneuver warfare in practice below the battalion level of any book on the Commandant's Professional Reading List. Likewise, the book is regarded as something akin to holy gospel among infantry Marines, as it is frequently quoted in professional writings and referenced in debriefs.

It is easy to understand why this book is so prized: Rommel's results speak volumes to his style of leadership and the tactics, techniques, and procedures he employed. In summarizing his greatest victory in this war, he wrote:

> The capture of Mount Matajur occurred fifty-two hours after the start of the offensive near Tolmein. My mountain troopers were in the thick of battle almost uninterruptedly during these hours and formed the spearhead of the attack by the Alpine Corps. Here—carrying heavy machine guns on their shoulders—they surmounted differences of eight thousand feet uphill and three thousand downhill, and traversed a distance of twelve miles as the crow flies through unique, hostile mountain fortifications.
>
> In twenty-eight hours five successive and fresh Italian regiments were defeated by the weak Rommel detachment. The number of captives and trophies amounted to: 150 officers, 9,000 men, and 81 guns. Not included in these figures were the enemy units which, after they had been cut off ...

To practice maneuver warfare, the Corps must enable and trust the informed initiative of junior Marines. *(Photo by Cpl Sarah Anderson.)*

> voluntarily laid down their arms and joined the columns of prisoners moving toward Tolmein.[1]

Rommel's fantastic conquest—whether measured in speed, distance traversed, or the number of enemy personnel and equipment captured—is all the more amazing considering the extremely low price he paid in contrast to what he inflicted on his enemies:

> The losses of the Rommel detachment in the three days of attack were happily low: 6 dead, including 1 officer; 30 wounded, including 1 officer.[2]

Rommel's capture of Mount Matajur, the culminating event in the aforementioned series of actions, won him his country's highest military award—the Pour Le Merite, or the Blue Max—as well as prominence in the annals of war long before he became the Desert Fox.

One of the most common themes from this work, and one that is relentlessly drilled into the head of every Marine leader, is the ability to function amongst chaos in order to capitalize on any momentum before the enemy can react. Marine leaders are expected to recognize opportunities and ruthlessly exploit them to gain and maintain tempo over an opponent that cannot keep up and to deliver the fatal finishing blow to the enemy in the most expedient manner. This is the personification of maneuver warfare, and Rommel's book is essentially an instruction manual for platoon and company commanders on how to conduct it. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps does not currently live up to some of the ideals it espouses when promoting this book.

The Marine Corps talks a great deal about small unit leaders taking initiative in an uncertain environment but in practice halts subordinate leaders, like Lt Rommel, before they attain the effect that they are taught to strive for. The seminal events of the entire book—the remarkable battles in the Tolmein Offensive high in the Julian Alps in the fall of 1917, specifically the herculean feats that young Erwin Rommel accomplished—would not happen in today's Marine Corps in a similar setting. It is quite a bold statement, but one worth repeating in more detail: a first lieutenant or Capt Rommel in today's Marine Corps would not achieve the breakthroughs, the deep penetrations, the exploitations, the pursuits, or the capture of so many enemy troops and equipment as the actual Rommel did in Italy in 1917. He would not accomplish these exploits because he would be stopped cold by a rigid and unforgiving higher headquarters command structure that seeks control at the expense of opportunity.

The 21st century Marine Rommel would not be able to exploit the fleeting opportunities before him because he would be required to consult his higher headquarters before acting. He would be forced to wait for a decision from higher, which could come entirely too late for him to affect the coveted exploitation, whereas in 1917 young Rommel simply decided and acted on the spot. The methods of communicating back then were field telephones and runners. Telephones required each end to be physically connected by a hard wire, while runners took significant time to move between nodes—especially in such harsh mountainous terrain. As such, commanders were comfortable not having instant communications with their subordinates and trusted them to make decisions on their own and act on them. So, in a sense, Rommel in 1917 was quite fortunate not to be burdened with the communication technologies of today. If the Marine Corps were fighting the Tolmein Offensive today, our young Rommel would not seize anything beyond his initial objective because the windows of opportunity on anything beyond it would close before he received approval to exploit.

Furthermore, if this same battle played out today, lieutenant or Capt Rommel would not dare move forward without clear communication with his higher headquarters—though not because *he* would be uncomfortable with losing the ability to communicate with his higher command but because *his higher command* would be uncomfortable with him moving forward without the ability to communicate back. Herein lies the greater problem, and it is systemic. One would think that the proliferation of light weight portable radios would enable small unit leaders distributed across a wide battlespace to rapidly identify and exploit opportunities, whether by coordinating supporting fires or vectoring follow-on units into their path to reinforce success, but the truth is quite the opposite today. Instead, the multitude of radios that exist at the platoon level act as chains that tether combat power to a distant command post that constantly requests more and more information from all of its various units. This system produces an overwhelmed command node that attempts to alleviate its uncertainty by demanding even more information which only strains itself more and saps tempo through a form of paralysis by analysis in the process. The ultimate result is very often clogged lines of communications, slow orientation on situations, late decisions, and missed opportunities.

Once again, in a contemporary Tolmein Offensive, our young Rommel would be halted in his tracks with the loss of communication to higher headquarters. He would not move forward without this link and would in fact turn back from his objective in a frantic search for a suitable location to reestablish communication. This could cause him to forfeit the very tempo that is vital in maneuver warfare. This abdication of the tactical initiative is entirely self-imposed by a rigid higher headquarters system that values control over mission tactics—the very thing that enables maneuver warfare. Amazingly, *MCDP 6, Command and Control,* warns against this very phenomenon where it states plainly and definitively that "equipment that facilitates or encourages the micromanagement of subordinate units is inconsistent with our command and control philosophy," because "such technological capability tends to fix the senior's attention at too low a level of detail." Though *MCDP 6* very presciently identified today's problem it also offers tomorrow's solution:

> The reality of technological development is that equipment which improves the ability to monitor what is happening may also increase the temptation and the means to try to direct what is happening. Consequently, increased capability on the part of equipment

brings with it the need for increased understanding and discipline on the part of the users. Just because our technology allows us to micromanage doesn't mean we should.[3]

Therefore, higher headquarters that command like this do not practice maneuver warfare and are out of compliance with Marine Corps doctrine, as *MCDP 1, Warfighting* states:

> It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, *in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized.* That is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior's intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the point of decision will naturally better appreciate the true situation than a senior commander some distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance.[4]
>
> In practical terms, this means that we must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities. We must not try to maintain excessive control over subordinates since this will necessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative. We must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit opportunities as they arise, rather than adhering insistently to predetermined plans that have outlived their usefulness.[5]
>
> *MCDP 1-3 Tactics* warns of the dangers that excessive control can inadvertently breed: Attempts to impose control also can easily undermine the initiative upon which Marine Corps tactics depends. Marines can become hesitant, they may feel they must wait for orders before acting. We are not likely to move faster or gain leverage over a competent opponent unless Marines at every level exercise initiative.[6]

Unfortunately, we are already there. Marines are in fact hesitant and wait for orders before acting. They are hesitant because they have been conditioned to be. They wait for orders because their higher commanders expect them to. Fortunately, we already possess the solution to this systemic problem: mission tactics derived from clear commander's intent. It is high time that the Marine Corps follow its own doctrine. The characteristics of modern warfare demand it, specifically in the communication degraded or denied battlefields we expect to fight on in the future.

Higher headquarters nodes must become comfortable with their units operating out of communication. A unit out of communication for two hours should not be the cause for all adjacent units to drop what they are doing and begin searching for that "lost" unit. Had that been standard operating procedure in the Tolmein Offensive, the Alpine Corps would not have experienced any success. Likewise, higher headquarters must become comfortable operating out of communication as well. As recent force-on-force exercises have demonstrated, it is the higher headquarters nodes that are frequently targeted, destroyed, or forced to frequently displace lest they be targeted and destroyed.[7]

Finally, the realistic nature of combat operations in harsh terrain, such as the Julian Alps, makes radio communication unreliable due to intervening terrain between communication nodes. Whether from the restrictions imposed by the physical environment or by enemy activity, we should expect communications to be limited and train to operate with as little reliance on them as possible. Regardless, if the next fight is in the mountains, the jungle, a large city, or across a wide area where units are so distributed that they cannot range each other with radios, higher echelons of command must ease up on such rigid expectations of control.

Adherence to mission type orders and trusting subordinates to use their own best judgment is essential in the future operating environment. Doing so will free the current lieutenant and Capt Rommels across the ranks and enable them to conquer the next Mount Matajur.

Notes

1. Erwin Rommel, *Infantry Attacks*, (Provo, UT: Athena Press, 1979).

2. Ibid.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 6, Command and Control*, (Washington, DC: 1996)

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: 1997).

5. Ibid.

6. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-3, Tactics*, (Washington, DC: 1997).

7. Personal observation of the author as an observer/controller with TTECG during multiple force-on-force exercises.

Impact on Leadership

Addressing how social media changes the way Marines react to being led

by BGen David Reist & SgtMaj Ken Conover

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Discussion has always occurred about the "old Corps vs the new Corps." Marines of old and today have proven their mettle in combat; this missive does not question valor. Rather, is there a need to alter the manner in which Marines are led today and do those of the current generation not appreciate the impact of social media? The premise offered is that social media is altering the way Marines learn, think, and how they react to leadership—and that younger generation of leaders are influenced by the way they lead because of social media.

First, when we (the older Marines) joined the Marine Corps, we left our home, our family, and our friends and joined the Corps. The Corps did not join us—we joined the Corps! We were indoctrinated with the Corps' ethos, its customs, and its methods of doing things. We rarely called home or visited, so we became totally immersed in the Marine Corps, good or bad. But today, a Marine can (and does) communicate daily with family and friends leveraging iPhones, Facebook, and Instagram. They do not have that reinforcement of Marine Corps ideals surrounding them 24/7. Hypothetically, if something happens in the Marine's workplace during the day, the issue can be discussed and vetted with non-Marines that same day—giving that Marine a non-Marine "take" on the situation. This is not necessarily bad, but the opportunity to balance what Marine leadership is directing can (and is) discussed/judged by non-Marines. With the number of parents/friends who likely have not served in the Marine Corps, this likely leads to *why did it get handled that way* advice from the friend back on the block or a parent (an arm-chair quarterback so to speak).

In the past, part of becoming a Marine meant giving up daily contact or communications with family and friends. Today, social media has reduced this isolation. *(Photo by Sgt Christian Oliver Cachola.)*

Second, the event above can and is often shared across social media. Imagine that Lt Smith takes action during the day on a matter and then that evening Lt Smith's actions are shared on a social media platform by the impacted Marine. If positive, it is a good thing. If negative though, it will gain legs and be re-tweeted—and bad news travels exponentially faster than good news, sometimes all the way to political leadership. It is fair to assume that any negative story will not offer an honest perspective telling all sides of the story but rather portray a snapshot that makes the situation look bad in favor of a disgruntled Marine. You can imagine the scenario as this unfolds: Someone's spouse up the chain of command sees the post on social media and Lt Smith is asked by his chain of command "What happened?" This likely will not get asked nicely and by now the story is out and correcting is difficult, if not impossible. In the meantime, SSgt Jones, the platoon sergeant, goes looking for the Marine who posted the story and nothing good is likely going to happen

in that encounter. Lt Smith grew up with social media as did the Marine who posted the story. The staff sergeant may not have and for sure the battalion commander and sergeant major did not (may be savvy today though). How does Lt Smith react to making decisions in the future knowing social media can destroy his day? How does a battalion commander or sergeant major now look at social media and how do they lead knowing anything they do is subject to immediate proliferation? In the past, the "bitching" was between Marines, not shared outside. Also, if a mundane issue, will the commanding officer back the lieutenant or yield to pressure? This goes towards trust and as former Secretary of State George Schultz stated, "Trust is the coin of the realm. When trust is in the room, good things happen. When trust is not in the room, good things do not happen."

Third, leadership at times today is misconstrued as micro-management. Many things have changed: open squad bays to individual rooms; contracted mess halls vs mess duty; contracted lawn care vs responsibility for individual areas; contracted security forces vs area guards; and uniforms that do not require as much attention to detail. These have been put in place for a better "lifestyle" for Marines but some question if these conveniences are taking away from camaraderie, discipline, and attention to detail. Some do not understand that the attention to detail paid in the police of their area is directly related to effectiveness in combat. When you see a Marine that has not shaved on the weekend or an area that has trash along a fence-line, this is a degradation of discipline. This erosion cannot be instantly regained when deployment for combat is required. Organizational and individual discipline is the hallmark of the Marine Corps.

Fourth, is the desire to command and influence in today's environment. Command has always been something a Marine officer aspired to attain. They wanted to influence the emerging Marines and put their thumbprint on those Marines. Simply stated, some look at simply "surviving a command tour" or in other cases declining Command as the risk is not worth the reward. Do the senior leaders today appreciate the demands placed on younger leaders with all the emerging regulations and social changes (e.g., transgender policies, sexual harassment reporting requirements, etc)?

Fifth, and related, is how Marines learn today. Older Marines went to class and went to the library. Computers facilitated data storage/retrieval—something you typed your papers on and printed off. The younger generation are using computers to learn. There is a fundamental disconnect between teaching and learning (in society too), and leaders must appreciate this as they lead their Marines today.

Company-level leadership is the key to success in the continued transformation of Marines. The company level is the center of gravity for most—if not all—issues that will surface in a young Marines experience with the Corps. How are we developing company leaders today and how do we recognize leaders who excel at the basics? How are we ensuring the basic standards are being maintained and is it clear today what that standard is? If things are in a state of disrepair, is the standard and message clear?

Good officers and SNCOs who understand the basics naturally affiliate good order and discipline to combat proficiency. Undisciplined units will get the hell kicked out of them in a fight. This focus takes time to square away and should there be a concern that young leaders have too much on their plate to both understand the basics and instill them daily? This translates into talking about what "right looks like" and why. The SNCO in the FMF is merely an extension of the drill instructor and the company-grade officer is that "commandership" that junior Marines observe daily. What they learned in boot camp/Officer Candidate School is then simply an extension to their tours in the FMF. It cannot be stressed enough the link between disciplines serving as the central component of effective warfighting.

This should/will then translate into how a young Marine thinks before articulating a message across social media. How do we train leaders to lead today in the emerging world of social media and whatever comes next? We must first appreciate that leadership is complicated with endless variables that has always been a balance between the young and old. Although much can be taught via a distance learning program/computer lesson, leadership requires discussion and a Socratic approach. Leadership is like professional development or PT—you have to continue to work at it daily. Officers need to continually understand what and how their troops think and then motivate them to be good Marines and team players. The number of "likes" on a post is not important in a cohesive team; winning in combat is paramount. Society does not emphasize these points. Mentorship and talking with subordinates (not "to" but "with") remain paramount. All need to learn from these exchanges. Articulating intent (the essence of maneuver warfare) and trust will always win the day. Trust is paramount.

Leadership has always been hard to describe, teach, and do. When we see a good leader, it is often hard to exactly define why that style is so effective. On the contrary, bad leadership rapidly rises to a visible level. In today's society within the social media environment, leadership techniques may require a different approach and perspective, not appreciated by those of yesterday. Let us appreciate what younger leaders have to deal with that is different from our tenure and help each other maintain the legacy of our Corps.

Let us offer a starting solution: Look at building trust and paying attention to the small things. Trust, as stated, is the most important quality. This goes back to Gen Lejeune and fostering that parent-child relationship. A child who trusts his parent would never knowingly release a harmful social media post. Simultaneously, we must get back to the basics and emphasize what is key to success in combat: discipline. Both of these take time but will pay endless dividends.

USMC

Civil Affairs in Support of Littoral Operations

Facilitating future expeditionary advance base operations through civil reconnaissance

by Capt Benjamin Melendez

>Capt Melendez is currently the S-3A for 2/14 Mar. He previously served as a Civil Affairs Team Leader with 1st Civil Affairs Group. While on active duty, Capt Melendez served with 2/11 Mar as an Artillery Officer. In the civilian world, he is a civil engineer in the power delivery sector.

As the Marine Corps continues to restructure itself into a relevant and formidable fighting force for great power competition, so too must Marine Civil Affairs (CA) adapt itself to readily support the MAGTF. Much of the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for Marine CA forces to be successful and relevant to commanders in support of expeditionary advanced base operations (EABOs) are already present in the three Reserve Component Civil Affairs Groups. By embracing a focus that civil information management and reconnaissance operations should support EABOs, CA Marines will be able to provide relevant and useful information to commanders and help drive advanced Civil Military Operations (CMO) planning and non-lethal targeting.

The U.S. military establishment has shifted its focus from counterinsurgency and stability operations to great power competition, with an emphasis on the littoral regions of the Indo-Pacific. The Marine Corps now seeks to redefine itself in light of this transformational shift, with Marine CA being no exception. Recent *Marine Corps Gazette* articles by LtCol Anthony Terlizziand, CWO4 James Jabinal, and Col Valerie Jackson as well as in Marine Corps Civil Affairs Operating Concept publications call for a true professionalization of the Marine CA force and highlight the importance of civil engagement and civil reconnaissance in support of littoral operations, especially in regard to EABOs.[1]

How should the existing CA force prepare for the future? What does Marine CA civil information management (CIM) and civil reconnaissance (CR) in support of EABOs look like? More importantly, what is the utility for the commander? What do CA Marines need to know prior to planning and executing CR missions?

This article will attempt to address these questions as they pertain to the force as it exists now: the Reserve CA Marines of 1st, 3rd, and 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG).

CA Marines meeting with community and education leaders in Phitsanulok, Thailand. *(Photo by author*

To conduct civil affairs activities and specifically CR in support of EABOs, it is paramount that CA Marines understand what EABOs are. At its core, EABOs fit into the larger concepts of Littoral Operations in Contested Environments where EABs facilitate sea control through dispersed positions that can employ precision fires, serve as forward arm refueling points, act as anti-access/area denial strong points, or even as logistics hubs. This is to be accomplished with "risk-worthy" units and assets from austere locations throughout the currently contested INDOPACOM area of operations.[2]

While there is an emphasis on EABs situated in preferably uninhabited locations throughout the thousands of islands that incorporate Melanesia, Micronesia, and the Indonesian Archipelagos, it is likely that some of the locations that could ideally support EABs are populated. Furthermore, the waters off most of these island chains in the South China Sea and the South Pacific are busy shipping channels or fishing grounds. The realities of quickly establishing expeditionary airfields and logistics hubs will likely necessitate the use of existing airfield and port facilities. Even the employment of precision fires systems, such as HIMARs, may require surface transportation infrastructure for some aspects of their mobility and employment.

It is here, civilians may have a profound impact on MAGTF operations. In the negative sense, actions by malevolent local populations, displaced civilians, or just general daily patterns of life may prove significantly disruptive to MAGTF operations. Conversely, local civilian support may assist MAGTF operations through the access of critical facilities, supplies, and information. Inasmuch as civilian populations are often part of the operating environment and will affect military operations, their potential influence cannot be ignored and requires CA forces to identify their potential impact on MAGTF and joint forces operations. Therefore, robust Civil Preparation of the Battlespace and early and continuous CR throughout the competition continuum is key to identifying civil factors affecting the MAGTF.

CA Marines may find themselves working in a time-compressed environment where they are unable to conduct all encompassing and thorough CR and civil engagements (CE) missions. This is often the case during multilateral exercises, pre-deployment site surveys and MEU type deployments. Given this reality, CA Marines should devote their time to CR in support of EABOs, examining the civil dimension of critical infrastructure and organizations that may support or hinder EABOs as well as the surrounding communities.

To conduct civil affairs … in support of EABOs, it is paramount that [Civil Affairs] Marines understand what EABOs are.

CA forces must also be able to provide useful information that is distinct from what other staff sections provide. The respective staff sections are all capable of providing information about lengths of airfields or berthing spaces in port facilities; however, CA's value is in providing a civil focused context to this information. Who might be affected and what might the locals do if a farm is converted into an expeditionary airfield? Or how might a community heavily dependent on Chinese tourism respond when an EAB is established in its vicinity? CA Marines can develop this information early and continuously by participating in regional exercises or as a part of MEU or UDP type deployments.

In order to provide this critical information, CA Marines must have a thorough understanding of what each potential facet of EABOs encompass. For example, CA Marines must understand what establishing an expeditionary airfield entails. What are the required spatial dimensions and what are the general sustainment requirements? This knowledge helps CA Marines assess how the civil environment is impacted by MAGTF operations and in turn how it may affect the MAGTF, thereby helping focus CIM and CR collection plans and drive future non-lethal targeting and information operations efforts. Certainly, the other traditional civil affairs activities still apply; however, those should be secondary to EABO aligned CIM and CR.

CA Marines must establish strong working relationships with other members of the MAGTF staff to understand their information requirements and concerns. This symbiotic relationship helps ensure the CA Marines are able to produce a useful product for the commander and his/her staff that facilitates decision making. CA Marines should stay abreast of the evolving EABO related doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the various MAGTF components. This could be achieved through information exchanges such as working groups, active duty exercise participation, and constant liaison between the Reserve CAG IMA staffs and the operations section of the supported units. Moreover, CA Marines should draw upon the experience of their fellow CA Marines with prior experience in the most relevant EABO related fields and MOS.

The Commandant's restructuring initiative leaves the bulk of CA forces within the Marine Corps Reserve Component.[3] Therefore, the CA units of the Marine Corps must shift their mindset to be in line with the Active Component. Focusing on CIM and CR in support of EABOs is best accomplished through creative local training and participation in INDOPACOM exercises. Initial fiscal year drills should introduce CA Marines to the concepts and potential requirements of EABOs. In this phase, briefs from SMEs of the relevant components develop an understanding of what the commander's potential information requirements are and how the civil dimension may impact their mission.

CA Marines meeting with muncipal public works officials at a water treatment facility, Phitsanulok, Thailand. *(Photo by author*

Field exercises should similarly be aligned with an EABO focus. Field exercises should be conducted in local communities (with full cooperation and transparency of civic leadership) for added realism. Similar training in real communities was previously conducted successfully by Army CA forces within the United States and should be replicated by Marine CA units.[4] For example, with proper coordination and detailed planning, a field drill could be devoted to conducting a CR on a local small airfield, harbor, or fuel storage facility and the surrounding environs. The emphasis should be on interacting with the locals and not just on the collection of technical information; such training will likely be more realistic than if executed in the traditional manner with role players.

This quality training provides perspectives by people who are invested in the day-to-day operations of such facilities or organizations. It is key that the Marines understand that this is not "just another infrastructure assessment" but rather a purposeful CR to ascertain civil information about a facility necessary to support EABOs. This type of training opportunity can be further expanded to home site annual trainings and in the real world as part of INDOPACOM related exercises.

Participation in overseas exercises such as BALIKATAN or COBRA GOLD by CA Marines enables an opportunity to gain valuable experience and exposure in an important AO and provides a chance to practice CIM and CR of key strategic human terrain. CA Marines deployed to the INDOPACOM area of operations should also seek opportunities to practice their CR skills during exercises and operations that they support. It is important that information collected in CEs and CRs is distilled into a product that a commander will find valuable. This may take the form of a Marine Corps Operations Overlay centered on the civil dimension, a product researched and practiced in previous iterations of COBRA GOLD by 3rd CAG. Civil information and assessments must be uploaded into the Marine Corps Civil Information Management System to prevent the knowledge being lost and the effort wasted.

The emphasis should be on interacting with the locals and not just on the collection of technical information.

In conclusion, by embracing a focus on skilled execution of CIM and CR operations in support of EABOs, CA Marines may serve a critical role providing pertinent and useful information to commanders tasked with leading the Marine Corps restructuring into a relevant and formidable fighting force for great power competition.

Notes

1. LtCol Anthony Terlizzi, "The Civil Affairs Force," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: March 2020); CWO4 James Jabinal and Col Valerie Jackson "Forward and Enduring," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: September 2019); and Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Concept for Civil Affairs*, (Washington, DC: July 2019). Civil Reconnaissance is defined as: "CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. CR focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented at the tactical level by using ASCOPE. CA Soldiers or other forces can conduct CR, as required. Examples of other specialties and assets that can conduct CR are engineers, medical, MP, and unmanned aircraft systems. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCRP 3-03A.1, CA Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, (Washington, DC: July 2007).

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4. Janette Pippen, "Military training to be held in Swansboro," *Jacksonville Daily News*, (August 2019), available at https://www.jdnews.com; and Maj Ruth Castro, "Active Component and Reserve Civil Affairs Units Conduct Exercise for Upcoming USSOUTHCOM Mission," United States Army Reserve, (March 2016), available at https://www.usar.army.mil.

Littoral Operations in a Civil Environment

Civil affairs and great power competition

by Maj Zach Ota

75 years ago, the Navy and Marine Corps concluded the greatest power competition in human history and set upon constructing a new security order in the Western Pacific. On the hard-won battlegrounds of Micronesia, the Marianas, and Okinawa, civil affairs Marines and Sailors translated the military achievements of World War II into strategic advantage. These effects endured through a subsequent great power competition and into the current day. Highly educated civil affairs personnel applied their understanding of the local population to inform, enact, and refine policies that transformed these Pacific islands into strategic outposts.

Although contemporary conflicts have varied in location and character, Marines have continued to demonstrate the intelligence, ingenuity, and humanity to foster cooperation with civilian populations around the world. As the Marine Corps reorganizes and refocuses its outlook on great power competition in the Pacific, these lessons serve as a foundation upon which to influence and gain access to the civil environment. While the character of competition and conflict has changed, its eternal nature remains anchored in human relationships. Marine civil affairs forces are critical to build, maintain, and integrate these key networks of relationships in support of naval campaigns.

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Our Marines fight with courage and compassion in chaotic situations. How will we ensure our Marines have the means to survive and thrive in complex civil environments? *(Photo by SSgt Victor Mancilla.)*

Forgotten Lessons of Great Power Competition

As the U.S. military girded for war in 1941, senior leaders in the Army and the Navy recognized that the Services were unprepared to, among other things, engage with civilian populations under enemy control. To prepare for civil military operations at an unprecedented scale, the Department of War and Navy established training pipelines to propel civil affairs forces into the fight. The Army established the School of Military Government in May 1942 and the Navy likewise established a civil affairs course at Columbia University.[1] On 17 August 1942, 10 days after the 1st MarDiv landed at Guadalcanal, the first course at Columbia convened with 57 students.[2]

War demands soon outpaced the capacity of the Army and Navy military government courses. In March 1943, the Army and Navy harnessed the power of American academia to address the shortfall in civil affairs officers.[3]

Prestigious institutions—such as Yale, Harvard, Princeton, and Stanford—constituted the Civil Affairs Training Schools to teach practical matters such as language proficiency, local government organization, public health, and judicial systems to be employed in occupied areas.[4] In a process that rivaled U.S. wartime assembly lines, the Civil Affairs Training Schools educated 450 civil affairs personnel each month.[5] By March 1945, the Navy educated an additional 1,333 officers and nearly 300 Army officers at the civil affairs school at Columbia University and another school opened at Princeton University.[6]

As these highly educated civil affairs personnel matriculated into the fleet, staff planners harnessed their expertise to gain an understanding of the civil environment, devise appropriate policy, and maintain long-term access to these strategically vital bases. Navy and Marine civil affairs teams witnessed their first civil-military operation of World War II in the Gilbert Islands. In his after-action report, Maj Ryland, the senior Marine observer on Tarawa, recommended a series of improvements for future operations. The more impactful recommendations included integrating military government planners with operational planners, coordinating with supporting units, organizing post-assault labor parties, and retaining "complete control over all civilians."[7] In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps agreed upon a division of labor for civil-military operations—Marines would conduct civil affairs during the assault phase of an amphibious operations, and the Navy would assume responsibility for long-term governance during the occupation phase.[8]

Subsequent assaults into the Japanese-held islands proved a daunting challenge to civil affairs planners. Decades of increasingly self-contained Japanese administration limited the demographic information available to planners. As the official Navy history recounts, "no one knew, even approximately, how many people, both Micronesian and Japanese, would be found in the islands."[9] As such, military government planners "prepared for as many eventualities as possible."[10]

Civil affairs teams indeed encountered many eventualities. The ability of civil affairs forces to accurately assess and appropriately engage civilian populations maintained momentum and created operational capabilities. Marines seized Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands without force, and civil affairs personnel "had one of the happier experiences in the Central Pacific."[11] With 658 inhabitants in comparison with an eventual garrison of 7,165 troops, these islands were subsequently developed into critical bases to support the continued offensive against the Japanese.[12]

Conversely, fierce fighting and fanatical resistance required 155 civil affairs personnel to control 18,390 civilians on Saipan and an additional 93 personnel to control 11,465 civilians on Tinian.[13] As one military government officer observed, "the Japanese civilians are greatly relieved that the propaganda about the way we would treat them has proved to be entirely false," but "this does not mean that any gratitude which they may feel towards us should be interpreted as affection."[14] Given these conditions, the naval civil affairs forces still proceeded with the public health, safety, political, financial, and economic initiatives that engendered U.S. support in the Marshall Islands. The results were equally successful. No major acts of sabotage or subversiveness occurred in the Northern Marianas during the war, and the islands served as key bases for the strategic bombing campaign against Japan.[15]

The accurate assessment of the civil environment was more important on Okinawa than anywhere previously in the Pacific War. Decades of isolation from the western world ensured that Tenth Army staff would have to make a critical planning assumption regarding the amicability of the Okinawan population. With an estimated pre-war population of 450,000, Okinawa was the largest Japanese population encountered by the Americans thus far in the Pacific war.[16] Excessively harsh measures against the civilian population risked turning a potential ally into an enemy, and unduly permissive measures risked fouling the viability of the island as a staging point. Although culturally distinct from the Japanese, contemporary events reinforced U.S. perceptions that Japanese subjects on the outlying islands would be as hostile as on the home islands. After Japanese subjects committed suicide rather than surrender on Saipan in July 1944, U.S. planners accounted for a "fanatically hostile population" on the remainder of the Japanese islands.[17]

Civil affairs planners, however, drew on their education and experience to guide their interactions with Okinawans. Former Yale Professor George Murdock served as a naval officer in the Tenth Army Military Government Section and produced the *Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands* in November 1944.[18] The handbook, "designed primarily for the use of Army and Navy commanders and their staffs and subordinates who may be concerned with military government and the control of civil affairs in the Ryukyu Islands," exhaustively detailed all dimensions of Okinawa.[19] The handbook was the most comprehensive U.S. study of Okinawa prior to 1945 and served as a reference for civil affairs planners. The Tenth Army staff subsequently directed civil affairs officers to employ local law enforcement agencies, adhere to local governmental structures, and cooperate with local political leaders.[20] Guided by scholars and experts, the Tenth Army staff developed a plan that established American authority but incorporated Okinawan participation into the occupation plan.

On 1 April 1945, the 1st MarDiv landed on Okinawa alongside adjacent Tenth Army assault forces. As in Micronesia and the Marianas, civil affairs forces set upon the task of controlling the civilian population in support of the naval campaign. In May 1945, BGen William E. Crist, Deputy Commander for Military Government, declared, "experience to date has confirmed the rosiest expectations of the most confirmed optimists."[21] Through years of education, analysis, and preparation, civil affairs officers accurately assessed the disposition of the Okinawan population.

Navy and Marine civil affairs teams were the critical capability that imple-

mented policy, connected military objectives to strategic goals, and built the foundation upon which long-term base access was secured. For a modest investment in personnel, education, and resources, the Navy military governments perpetuated the hard-won victories in the former Japanese islands. Though planning with incomplete intelligence, the Tenth Army staff harnessed the great depth of information provide by scholars and experts. With feedback from civil affairs forces on the ground, these planners facilitated U.S. operations, spared the population from additional suffering, and prevented turning a potential ally into an enemy.

Lessons Relearned the Hard Way

58 years after landing on Okinawa, the 1st MarDiv marched into Baghdad after destroying the fourth largest army in the world.[22] As in the Pacific during World War II, operational planners faced great uncertainty regarding the disposition of the civilian population. Unlike in World War II, however, Marine units in Iraq had fewer civil affairs forces planning and accompanying their initial assault. To replicate the ratio of civil affairs forces to civilian population on Saipan, coalition forces in Iraq needed 219,000 civil affairs troops. The total number of U.S. forces on the ground during the invasion of Iraq numbered 149,000.[23]

The shortfall of civil affairs forces was compounded by the rapidity of the march to war and of the advance into Iraq itself. While it took Marines three years to reach the enemy's capital city in World War II, it took the coalition force less than three weeks to reach Baghdad. It is unreasonable to expect a competent civil affairs force to be generated within this time. It is reasonable to expect, however, that civil affairs planners should have identified this shortfall during planning. Without adequately prepared civil affairs planners at the component and joint force headquarters, though, Marine forces lacked the ability to identify, let alone address, this critical resource shortfall.

Marines gallantly filled the void of dedicated civil affairs forces. Operations in Iraq demonstrated the maturity, adaptability, and cultural awareness of Marines operating in a foreign country and in unfamiliar roles. Often geographically separated from higher headquarters, these Marines seized the initiative, built relationships, and engaged with the population to wrest control away from insurgent forces. Marines, whether civil affairs forces or not, highlighted the potential that resides within our organization. While Marine Civil Affairs Groups expanded in number and size, active duty artillery battalions adapted to address the shortfall in civil affairs capabilities. Marine infantry battalions redesigned their training to better operate in the civil environment. The aptitude of our active duty Marines to understand and cooperate with civil populations created opportunity where there was previously none.

Individual adaptability and cultural learning, however, was a hasty tourniquet that stopped the hemorrhage of lives and operational initiative that resulted from pre-war organizational shortfalls. Lacking institutional mechanisms to develop and sustain civil affairs capabilities increases the likelihood that future generations of Marines will have to relearn these hard-won lessons.

The most important lesson to be learned from the Marines Corps' two decades of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan is that regional civil affairs expertise cannot be generated on demand, and its absence can prove detrimental to the mission. Published in July 2018, *Joint Publication (JP)* 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, recounts, "following the invasion of Iraq, coalition forces did not completely occupy the territory of Iraq; thus coalition forces were unable to completely dominate the operational environment." *JP 3-57* details the mindset of planners, stating "as a matter of US policy, the US was not 'occupying' Iraq ... it was 'liberating' Iraq." Coalition forces in Iraq failed to heed Maj Ryland's admonishment from the Gilbert Islands to obtain "complete control over all civilians."[24] As *JP 3-57* concludes, "the absence of a military government produced a political/security vacuum in the time between military victory and the establishment of an interim authority."[25] Civil war ensued as a result of this false planning assumption. In the next great power competition, the consequences of such a miscalculation may be even more catastrophic.

Lessons to Remember in 2030 and Beyond

Although operations in Iraq demonstrated the importance of persistent civil affairs engagement across the continuum of competition and conflict, our force structure still dictates an antiquated

The United States wants a Marine Corps and needs a company of Carter Malkasians. *(Photo by Sgt 1st Class Brock Jones.)*

model of civil affairs development and employment. While the Marine Corps may again rely on the mass mobilization of civil affairs experts as it did in World War II, it cannot count on generating this capability in time to answer priority intelligence requirements during planning. The Marine Corps needs a cadre of actives duty civil affairs experts that can inform, refine, and apply policies on a continuous basis in order to compete with peer adversaries.

The World War II model of mobilizing regional civil affairs experts worked in the deliberate advance across the Western Pacific but could not keep pace with ship to objective movement in Afghanistan or the shock and awe march to Baghdad. The tactical mobility afforded by our concepts and equipment is constrained by our capacity to understand the populations in which we maneuver. To mitigate this shortfall, we must develop regional civil affairs expertise well ahead of potential conflict and employ them persistently in great power competition.

To be relevant in great power competition, Marine civil affairs forces must be masters of regional social, economic, political, and defense matters. A deep, meaningful understanding of foreign societies is difficult to be generated on demand, however. Similarly, the relationship between civil affairs personnel, regional experts, and planners takes time to develop and yield tangible operational benefits. As contemporary conflicts demonstrated, we may likely lack the time before conflict to generate forces that can affect planning and influence the civil environment. In peace, we neglect this facet of conflict to our detriment in war.

These experts must also become regional specialists within their fields. The *Commandant's Planning Guidance* simplified the problem of preparing civil affairs forces for worldwide employment. Instead of covering every country and every society in the world, Marine civil affairs forces can now prioritize and align resources to locations that are vital to naval campaigns. The Batanes Islands is the Philippines, the Riau Islands of Indonesia, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India all stand out as areas of interest that are often outside the traditional areas of influence of national power. Marine civil affairs forces developed and employed in these strategic chokepoints offer the Marine Corps and the joint force a unique low-cost, high-return investment in support of naval campaigns. Just as in Micronesia, the Marianas, and Okinawa, a modest investment in civil affairs personnel specifically educated on these societies can have an outsized effect on relatively small populations that occupy strategic terrain.

Contemporary Marine civil affairs forces must be persistently engaged in their region to be effective. Through persistent civil engagement, Marine civil affairs can own and manage the network of interpersonal relationships that facilitate access, cooperation, and support for military operations. Building and maintaining these ties will fortify key partners and allies against the economic, political, and social influence of malign actors. In competition or conflict, civil affairs Marines would be the access point to unleash the power of local support networks.

Especially in the competitive space short of war, these ties increase the resilience of our partners, deter subversion, and decrease the likelihood of armed conflict. Across the competition and conflict spectrum, Marine civil affairs forces can integrate the instruments of national power to achieve desired effects on key littoral terrain. By harnessing the full authorities and funding sources available to the interagency and nongovernmental organizations, Marine civil affairs can achieve effects that no other Marine equity can provide. These effects would be most beneficial on key littoral terrain that is outside the area of influence of U.S. embassies and consulates. By extending the reach of all aspects of national power, Marine civil affairs forces ensure that service equities and interests benefit from interagency cooperation and vice versa.

Marine civil affairs forces cannot simply be conduits for funding projects, though. Marine civil affairs forces are the critical reconnaissance capability to confirm or deny planning assumptions for naval campaigns. By employing their training in civil reconnaissance and engagement, civil affairs Marines can define and expand the range of viable policy options on key littoral terrain. This informs operational planners on the civil considerations that affect the region, especially in subnational locations that may escape the level of detailed analysis that attaches and desk officers can provide. In this regard, Marine civil affairs personnel can inform commanders of critical gaps in the cognitive civil environment.

Finally, and most importantly, the effects generated by Marine civil affairs forces must be planned and integrated into joint force operations. Educated Marine planners must represent the interests, capabilities, and equities of forward-engaged Marine civil affairs forces in order to leverage their full effects for the joint force. Just as Marine forward air controllers uniquely harness the effects of Marine close air support, so must Marine civil affairs planners advocate their capabilities in a combined and joint naval campaign.

Competition and conflict are increasingly occurring amongst the cognitive civil environment. In this paradigm, persistently engaged civil affairs forces are increasingly important to gain an advantage in the littorals. Marine civil affairs must be discreet, knowledgeable of societies inhabiting key littoral terrain, and persistently engaged in their aligned regions to be relevant to ongoing and potential naval campaigns against peer adversaries. Judicious application of these capabilities turned the Pacific into an American lake at the end of World War II. Resourcing, educating, and modernizing the employment of Marine civil affairs forces will ensure that our partners and allies will continue to prosper in its waters.

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Succeeding in a Communications-Degraded Environment

Lessons applicable to MAGTF operations worldwide

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The Marine Corps has a long-standing and strong relationship with Norway dating back to 1926, when Marine volunteers supported CDR Richard Byrd's flight from Svalbard, Norway, to the North Pole.[1] Two of the four Marines, Lloyd Grenlie and George James, were radio operators who demonstrated typical Marine Corps ingenuity by actually constructing the short-wave radio sets taken on ship.[2]

Since that time, technology has completely transformed the ability to instantaneously transmit voice, video, and data information across the globe. However, the unique difficulties of communicating in the arctic have not changed. These challenges are compounded by harsh, mountainous terrain as well as contested freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.[3] While units have been successful by mastering the fundamentals of command, control, communications, and computers (C4) planning and execution, a capability gap exists supporting the requirements of Marine forces in the polar regions of Norway.[4] This article provides context to these challenges, advocates leveraging emerging technologies while maximizing current capabilities, and explains how Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa (MARFOREUR/AF) is working to satisfy requirements and mitigate risk.

Unique C4 challenges exist in the polar environment. *(Photo by LCpl Aaron Fiala.)*

During the Cold War, Marines helped protect NATO strategic northern flank and since then have conducted episodic exercises in Norway.[5] With the focus on the Middle East, the Service's ability to conduct large-scale cold-weather operations atrophied.[6] To improve United States European Command and NATO's ability to employ forces in a country that shares a 126-mile border with Russia, beginning in January 2017, MARFOREUR/AF began a proof of concept by introducing a persistent rotational presence in Norway: the Marine Rotational Force

Europe (MRF-E). This force also advances Service core competencies and supports enduring U.S. interests in promoting security in the arctic.[7]

Approximately half of Norway lies within the Arctic Circle, which begins at 66° northern latitude. The challenges of communicating in this region include severe magnetic storms, the polar cap absorption phenomena, and high mountains with heavy metallic concentration—all of which are detrimental to radio signals.[8] Satellite Communications (SATCOM) are especially problematic because of the extremely low takeoff angle needed to access equatorial geostationary (GEO) satellites.[9] Low takeoff angles are also impacted by scintillation, which is the refraction of radio signals through the atmosphere.[10] Further, the cumulative effects of cold, dampness, and ice shorten battery life as well as exacerbate maintenance and supply issues.[11]

Limited access to Defense Satellite Communications System and Wideband Global SATCOM System Super High Frequency Military X-band above this latitude has been a recurring after action item from Exercise Cold Response.[12] Commercial SATCOM provides more than 80 percent of the military's requirements as a result of demand far outstripping supply, with the Marine Corps predominantly using Ku-band.[13] While Ku-band can provide additional bandwidth, it also uses GEO satellites and commercial SATCOM terminals which experience the same difficulties as X-band. Current protected-band Extremely High Frequency Milstar SATCOM presents the same constraints as other GEO satellites.[14]

Out of the options available to provide 24/7 broadband arctic coverage, the highly elliptical orbiting "Molniya" constellation of satellites are the most efficient. The Russians have been using the Molniya constellation for over 50 years because of the ability to cover their entire country with few ground stations and, in 2010, announced plans to develop a new Molniya satellite cluster.[15] Northrop Grumman's Enhanced Polar System is an upgrade based on Advanced Extremely High Frequency scheduled to be operational in 2018 that will operate in the highly elliptical orbiting, providing continuous jam-resistant SATCOM in the North Polar Region.[16] In addition, the Canadian Armed Forces is leading efforts with the United States, Denmark, and Norway on plans to build a new X-band, Ka-band, and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM constellation in the Molniya orbit called the Enhanced Satellite Communications Project that would provide complete coverage of the Arctic region as early as 2021.[17] While there are many advantages of Molniya, some of the drawbacks include the requirement for multiple satellites to support complete access, continuous tracking by ground stations, and the prohibitive costs of maintaining a spare satellite in orbit, which in the event of a failure would result in an extended gap while a replacement is launched.[18]

Other wideband SATCOM options currently available have shown merit and warrant further investigation. Inclined GEO orbiting satellites are older satellites that have been allowed to drift in an elongated figure eight pattern to save fuel and extend their lifespan. While inclined constellations require a minimum of three satellites to provide continuous coverage as well as a ground-station tracking antenna, their satellite capacity is often cheaper than other commercial GEO satellites.[19] The Norwegian Defense Material Agency conducted tests with a Skynet X-band inclined satellite at 82° northern latitude with one satellite providing 44 percent coverage each day. Inclined satellites have already proven their operational effectiveness in support of U.S. Africa Command unmanned aerial vehicle missions.[20] Another potential area that has shown promising results is Ka-band. The Norwegians conducted a Ka-band measurement campaign at several locations throughout their country, which showed higher success rates with slightly higher ground terminal elevation angles compared to Ku or X-band.[21]

Commercial SATCOM provides more than 80 percent of the military's requirements ...

Narrowband UHF follow-on tactical SATCOM experiences the same challenges as wideband, with larger, high gain antennas needed to improve reception even in southern Norway. An emerging narrowband capability that may show promise is the Navy's Multiple User Objective System, designed to provide smartphone-like communications almost anywhere on the globe and which has conducted successful demonstrations north of 65° latitude.[22] MARFOREUR/AF has requested to participate in the limited test and evaluation phase.

The Defense Information System Agency's (DISA) Enhanced Mobile Satellite Service, which interfaces with the commercial Iridium satellite constellation through a DISA-controlled and secure satellite gateway, is the only current viable means of voice and limited data communications in the arctic. The Iridium constellation is a mesh-network of 66 mission satellites with multiple on-orbit spares that is not reliant on third-party terrestrial infrastructure. The constellation is located in low earth orbit operating on UHF L-Band, with a global footprint up to 90° north. Included in Enhanced Mobile Satellite Service paid-for, unlimited-use service offerings are standard and secure voice, short burst data (2-way, 2.4 Kbps data); global data broadcast (one-to-many, receive-only data); and the Distributed Tactical Communication System (DTCS), a one-to-many "netted" voice and data capability that links multiple radio users assigned to the same "net." The DTCS Version 1 (V1) provides voice capability up to 250 miles anywhere on the globe and the Version 2 will provide global range. The MRF-E is testing DTCS V1s and will soon participate in Headquarters Marine Corps C4's DTCS V2 limited user evaluation. In addition to DTCS, Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module compliant SHOUT Nano devices deliver secure Position Location Information and two-way messaging

UHF SATCOM networks are dependent on various satellite constellations. *(Photo by Cpl Tommy Huynh.)*

short burst data service—similar to Blue Force Tracker. Lastly, Iridium NEXT; Iridium's second generation constellation, will provide greater bandwidth and data speeds and is scheduled to be operational in 2018.[23]

Satisfying initial MRF-E C4 requirements has been a true multinational and joint effort. The Norwegians have one of Europe's most technologically advanced telecommunications infrastructures and have permitted use of their terrestrial backbone to extend Marine Corps Enterprise Network services via the Deployed Site Transport Boundary. The Deployed Site Transport Boundaries are monitored with network health, scanning, and remediation tools at MARFOREUR/AF G-6 and the Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations Group in Quantico, VA. Upcoming discussions with Norwegian Joint Forces J6 and Cyber Headquarters along with Marine European Training Program events with Marine Forces Cyber Command will explore opportunities to share resources while strengthening our cyber perimeter.[24] DISA Europe's exceptional support has been critical to provisioning a dedicated circuit and is partnering with MARFOREUR/AF to improve and expand C4 support in Norway. Future initiatives include establishment of a commercial SATCOM terminal at Vaernes, Norway, and potential participation in Marine Corps Tactical System Support Activity's Deployed-Marine Corps Enterprise Network limited objective experiments to provide a lighter footprint with the ability to operate untethered vice solely reach back.

Operating in polar latitudes also requires a return to communications fundamentals while embracing new concepts. Essentials include development and rehearsal of a Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency communications plan and close coordination across staff sections to integrate cyberspace operations and electromagnetic spectrum operations into the MAGTF's planning process.[25] Very High Frequency and UHF line of sight have proven to be the most reliable for short and medium range communications. Ground and aerial retransmission, relay sites, and couriers will be essential to supporting the scheme of maneuver and a lost art worth resurrecting is Morse Code because of its short burst transmissions even with poor radio signals.[26] The Aurora Borealis, most active between 60° and 70°, usually peaks about every 28 days, leading to a total blackout of High Frequency (HF) communications.[27] Outside of this period, directional Near Vertical Incidence Skywave HF antennas and amplified TRC-209s have demonstrated their effectiveness. Directional antennas also present a smaller electronic warfare target to fix, intercept, or jam.[28] In January 2017, Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) approved the requirement for the Marine Corps' next generation of HF radios, which will provide Internet Protocol and on-the-move capabilities. AN/TRC-170 tropospheric radios are an underutilized resource although limitations include a maximum range of 150 miles, requiring potential retransmission sites with the associated logistical and force protection considerations. Scintillation also impacts tropospheric radios, with the impacts more prevalent during the summer months.[29] Norway is an ideal testing ground for the next generation of tropospheric radios, expected to be fielded within the next five years. With limited options available, unclassified data services are provided with costly Broadband Global Area Network and commercial air cards. Most importantly, an appreciation for the physical and mental toll extreme weather takes on Marines must be considered.[30]

MARFOREUR/AF is coordinating with CD&I on formalizing these requirements, including a mobile network "Over-The-Snow" capability, and nominating the northern latitude communication problem set for a possible Center for Naval Analysis study. Once refined, remaining capability gaps will be included in EUCOM's Integrated Priority List. Further, MARFOREUR/AF G6 will continue to coordinate with CD&I, C4, Marine Corps Systems Command, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab to seek opportunities for rotational forces to participate in limited user evaluations of communications equipment in the arctic region, including testing Ka-Band and inclined satellites. A critical aspect of improving our interoperability is collaborating with, learning from, and strengthening our symbiotic relationships with our Norwegian hosts as well as our British and Dutch allies who have operated in the region for much longer than we have. Significant strides have been made achieving interoperability as 2nd MEB fully integrated into NATO's

networks during Exercise COLD RESPONSE 16 and upcoming NATO Exercise STEADFAST COBALT will establish a coalition Federated Mission Network.[31] When provided the training and resources, today's Marines demonstrate the same resourcefulness and skill as Lloyd Grenlie and George James showed 91 years ago: finding solutions to the most complex C4 challenges "in any clime or place."

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Foreshadowing Far East Conflicts

Today's analysis on tomorrow's war

by 2ndLt Tristan Hancock

The United States continues to lessen the American presence in the Middle East and the stage has been set for the next major conflict. As the Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana once said, "Only the dead have seen the end of war." Military analysts and high-ranking generals alike have echoed that China is the United States' pacing threat. Throughout the training period of The Basic School in Quantico, VA, young lieutenants entering the FMF are given the opportunity to hear from numerous guest speakers. Many of these guests are high-ranking officers who speak about what type of warfare the United States can expect to see in the years to come. LtGen Smith, MajGen Alford, and BGen Watson are just a few notable speakers who have faced this question, yet the answer always remains the same: *China is our pacing threat.*

To understand why the People's Republic of China is seen as the most imminent threat by so many, one must seek the wider view of the global situation as well as analyzing the organic capabilities of China. The reality is that China has brought power transition theory to fruition. As their global power rises, the world is likely to see conflicts fabricate and current norms be disrupted. To analyze how these potential conflicts might look, one needs to take into account both China and the United States' strategy and capabilities as well as the actions of foreign allies on the matter.

According to *MCDP 6,* "The highest class of information is understanding—knowledge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situation to gain a deeper level of awareness of that situation."[1] This passage is a reminder that just acknowledging China as the United States' pacing threat is not enough. The Marine Corps must continue to excel as an organization through training and advancements in research to ensure they are able to handle the rising threat. By continuing to be one step ahead of the closest competitor, the United States not only has the knowledge that China is a threat but also the understanding of what must be done to stay on top. Coming to this understanding of what must be done has been no easy feat, however. Following the advice of Sun Tsu's tenant that "warfare is the Tao of Deception," the Chinese have downplayed and actively hid the truth behind their defense spending and financial stability for decades.[2] This has forced the United States to rely on satellite imagery and extrapolation to conclude the current capabilities of the Chinese. This idea of deception by the Chinese is part of their hybrid style of warfare or what China's Communist Party Central Committee deemed the "three warfares."[3] The elements of the "three warfares" include: influencing public opinion, spreading specific information, and utilizing the "three warfare" system to legitimize Chinese claims. By spreading specific information to the public, the Chinese government is directly influencing public opinion both positively and negatively. Within their own country, the Chinese can manipulate the perception of their government; however, globally their facade has largely failed. Since much of the world has seen through their deception, however, it frees China to utilize another strategy called "salami slicing." Salami slicing strategy is one which strategically accomplishes small goals that, although may be seen as aggressive, will not likely trigger a major military response from opposing nations.[4] Through this lens we can see that in recent events, China has been able to cause friction and test their limits without sparking a major conflict, whether it be building artificial islands to house military infrastructure or impede movement in the South China Sea. That is not to say there were no consequences to their actions. The United States, for example, has begun freedom of navigation operations to combat the Chinese blockades and patrols in the South China Sea.[5] The ugly truth, however, is that these new military islands and restrictions of movement in the South China Sea are just the beginning. China has a long history of entering conflict only to emerge stronger. Maj Gayl (Ret) points to examples of Taiping, general unrest in the 19th century, and Korea

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China has brought power transition theory to fruition.

causing a total of 460,000 Chinese deaths; yet, after each the country was more proud and stronger than ever.[6] Given their history coupled with a salami slicing strategy, the Chinese have prepared themselves for war while trying to remain at the point of advantage. They have invested in defensive capabilities such as ballistic missiles, submarines, groundbased aircraft, and navy surface ships to protect themselves against any potential major conflicts.[7] While their focus is to protect the area close to home, China is also utilizing their carriers to secure a protected trade route in the Indian Ocean.[8] While this is not an inherently aggressive act, they hypocritically seek freedom of movement in other regions of the world for themselves while they limit movement for others in waters near their nation. These are not the only operations the Chinese are conducting offshore.

Since the fielding of the J-20 (China's primary fighter aircraft), China has been practicing long range missions to destroy high value targets. They have been doing this in conjunction with Russia, who is currently their closest ally but also the United States' second highest threat in terms of power.[9] Because of the provocative actions by China in recent years, there is a growing number of experts who predict a major conflict soon. The grim reality is that any result short of a swift victory for the United States or China would result in mass casualties. If the Chinese were invaded on their own territory, history shows they have a preponderance for, and little fear of, waging warfare based on attrition. Though the United States is not as fond of attrition warfare, they would have little say in Chinese offensive actions if a major conflict were to be brought onto American soil. Additionally, China has recognized that a direct conflict with American forces would be futile since both sides would ultimately be weakened because of the inherent costs of a war of this magnitude. They have instead opted to engage in their hybrid style warfare.[10] MGySgt Anderson said it best when he wrote that the Chinese have "no sense of fair play" and their leaders "can be brutally flexible in the pursuit of security."

To combat the unfair playing field the Chinese have set, it is important for Marines to remember another passage from their own doctrine: "There are two dangers with respect to equipment: the over-reliance on technology and the failure to make the most of technological capabilities."[11] This is where China falls short. It is true that China has a large navy, one that is even larger than that of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom combined.[12] China also just commissioned a third aircraft carrier in 2019, but their equipment is outdated and inferior to that of the United States.[13] For example, according to an article written by *Task and Purpose*, "Chinese carriers are believed to be slower and can only operate at sea for roughly six days before needing to refuel, whereas U.S. nuclear-powered carriers can operate continuously for years as long as the crew is resupplied." Additionally, the aforementioned ship commissioned in 2019 was an abandoned Soviet Union carrier skeleton from 1991 that China purchased and finished for their own use. It features outdated technology such as the ski-jump deck that was part of a flawed STOBAR system (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery). This system, as the name suggests, acts as a ramp to launch aircraft and thus requires less speed but comes at a price. The aircraft taking off must be as light as possible; therefore, the Chinese aircraft will be limited to only a few rockets and minimal fuel. China does not expect to have any new flat deck carriers until 2024 at the earliest.[14] The next item in question is the aircraft that come from these carriers. The J-20 was very likely created using F-35 blueprints but never reached the same level as the advanced American model. For this reason, China changed the role of the J-20. Unlike the F-35, the J-20 is aimed to have "laserlike focus on destroying the slower, unarmed planes that support U.S. fighters with its long flight range and long-range missiles, thereby keeping them out of fighting range."[15] Though it is clear there are similarities to the F-35, it is also important to note the Chinese could not achieve exact replication. In terms of submarines, Gen David Berger does acknowledge that it is also important to note the underwater developments occurring in China.[17] Their submarines have changed very little since the 20th century, but one way the Chinese are improving their capabilities is through the increased use of underground naval bases. Bases, such as the ones located at Jianggezhuang, Yulin, and elsewhere across the Chinese coastline, inhibit the United States from reconnoitering the actions of the submarines.[18] This seemingly rudimentary change in Chinese tactics has given them a slight advantage. With the strategy and capabilities of China in mind, it is important to remember the words of Clausewitz that "war is a Zweikampf"[19] and that the United States and its Marine Corps still have a say in what is to come.

Also, it is important to not lose sight of the ramifications of COVID-19. Enormous amounts of time, effort, and money have been poured into the effort to combat the virus. American lawmakers have even warned that in the coming year the military will likely see budget cuts because of the reallocation of funds to the healthcare sector.[20] In contrast, the actions by China in recent years have been a warning to the United States to bolster their military and further militarize the Far East.[21] This continued action by American forces in the region combined with continued diplomatic support for opposing nations such as Taiwan has not set well with Beijing.[22]

One of the most contentious of the U.S. relationships is the one it has with Taiwan. Though it is globally recognized as an independent nation, China continues to claim it belongs to the Republic of China. This has long been disputed by Taiwan with little avail; however, in 1979, congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act: "The [Taiwan Relations Act] ignores One China sovereignty and mandates U.S. provision of military capabilities directly to Taiwan for its self-defense."[23] Over time, however, this support for Taiwan has evolved into more of a security alliance. Some agree that it is these types of alliances and feelings thereof that will likely lead to a major conflict.

With the probability of conflict at hand, the next course of action is to

decide how one might act when faced with a war. Gen Berger has a clear vision of what that might look like. He has outlined how Marines will likely be involved with submarine warfare in terms of disabling landbased capabilities "by offering forward logistics and support, as well as sensor and strike capabilities."[24] Gen Berger is also changing the Marine Corps as a whole in order to better prepare for the next major conflict. He has initiated a massive shift from anything that does not align with traditional Marine operations. He hopes to stray away from a sustained warfare mindset and instead focus on naval-based operations and expeditionary warfare. His plan includes reducing the size of the Marine Corps and cutting out any unnecessary equipment to allow funds and space for "long-range strike capabilities and unmanned systems."[25] Leaders in the Marine Corps are not the only ones who recognize that China is the pacing threat for the United States. As mentioned earlier, the Navy has been carrying out freedom of navigation operations for months to oppose Chinese blockades and implemented travel restrictions in the South China Sea.[26] Outside of the physical realm of warfare, the DOD has already drawn a line in the sand when it comes to power grids and cyberspace. The DOD even went as far as threatening Chinese hackers when they issued the statement that read "if you shut down our power grid, maybe we'll put a missile down one of your smokestacks."[27]

With all the talk about a future war on the horizon against a major competitor, it would be important to analyze the capabilities of the United States as it stands. According to the Heritage Foundation's Index, the United States is barely able to meet the demands of defending itself:

> The foundation based its assessment on the ability of America's armed forces to engage and defeat two major competitors at roughly the same time, and judged that the U.S. military currently could handle only one major enemy.[28]

Since the most likely scenario of a major war involves Russia coming to the aid of China, this assessment poses a major concern. A major part of this assessment is because of outdated equipment. The American Navy currently has around 300 ships, half of which are over 20 years old, and only a third are available day to day for operations. Of the 100 that are operational at once, only 60 on average are located in the vicinity of China. This leaves the United States at nearly a six to one disadvantage.[29] While the sheer numbers seem like impossible odds, it is important to remember the deficiencies in the Chinese fleet noted earlier. Additionally, U.S. naval capabilities, though outdated, still greatly exceed that of the Chinese. U.S. carriers are able to accomplish a much wider array of missions including the ability to launch fighters, fighter-bombers, surveillance and airborne-control aircraft, and even small transports.[30] This is highly advantageous when one considers the limited aircraft that the Chinese are able to launch from their decks. Additionally, the planes being launched from U.S. carriers are also technologically superior. The F-22 and the F-35 are both highly sophisticated and are integrated with premier stealth technology. Though it is true that the F-35 has a limited range when compared to other aircraft, when in direct comparison to its Chinese and Russian counterparts, the F-35 is much more all-encompassing. The J-20 and the PAK-FA were only designed for one specific mission set; however, the F-35 can gather, analyze, and disseminate information quickly. According to *Business Insider,* "The F-35 plays like a quarterback, sending targeting information to any platform available."[31] These are the capabilities that pave the way for future American success in warfare. Nevertheless, it would be remiss to think that in the event of another world war, that only the world's superpowers would be involved. Thus, one must take a larger sample of major powers into consideration.

Though many Americans do not see much agreement with China for their actions in the South China Sea, there are nations who still ally themselves with China. Brunei, a small peaceful nation in the Pacific, has watched the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) become increasingly divided by the issue of the South China Sea. In a small attempt to preserve the relative peace, they have voiced their support for China's claims in the region.[32] Additionally, nations were kept from trade deals involving the American F-35. Consequently, many of them will likely choose to purchase the Chinese J-20. Depending on the magnitude of sales and who purchases them, this could be a major issue for the United States.[33] In conjunction with Australia, India, and Japan, the United States recently stated the need to advance a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific."[34] ASEAN members also reaffirmed "the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation and overflight" in the region.[35] The European Union Ambassador Nicolas Chapuis takes the warning to China even further by stating, "We need to have a common understanding to say 'no' to bullying and intimidation, coercive diplomacy, 'wolf-warrior' diplomacy."[36] The united States has not only voiced support but also taken action to fulfil the moral obligations outlined by the committees it attends. By providing training, arms, and military protection to nations like Taiwan who are opposing the oppressive Chinese power, the United States is preparing them to help in the future potential conflict. Some American military analysts feel as though this support is too much commitment and the United States is just

By providing training, arms, and military protection to nations like Taiwan … the United States is preparing them to help in the future potential conflict.

being used.[37] If this support is what the global community the United States aligns itself with is promising, then it is their duty as a world leader to uphold those promises. Nations like Taiwan are not just looking for other nations to fight their battle either. Through the support and training provided by the United States, Taiwan has already been launching missions to reconnoiter Chinese vessels in the Taiwan Strait.[38] This global support for freedom is crucial in the effort to not only prevent a major conflict in the far east but also to win in the event prevention fails.

Through the analysis of China and the United States' strategy and capabilities, as well as other nations actions on the matter, it is clear that a major conflict is not inconceivable in the near future. As China sets its eyes on controlling the South China Sea and the surrounding areas near its nation, it is understandable why they are seen as the current aggressor. The United States, however, is playing directly into their strategy. It is important to note the United States is doing so in an effort to prevent a major conflict, but how long can this last? With tensions rising, Chinese claims emboldening, and the involved parties increasing, it is only a matter of time until the peace collapses. Without drastic diplomatic measures taken post haste, it is likely many of those alive today will see the next global conflict in the Pacific.

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DPRI

Strengthening U.S.-Japanese Posture in INDOPACOM

by Maj Nick Oltman

The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is a United States-led and Japanese-supported INDOPACOM posture and force redistribution plan consisting of nineteen interrelated and interdependent initiatives.[1] The goals of DPRI are to reduce the U.S. footprint on Okinawa and better position U.S. forces.[2] These initiatives will have lasting military, diplomatic, and economic implications for both governments.

The force redistribution is part of a 26-year effort to ease tensions and return land occupied since World War II. DPRI mandates the United States to return thousands of acres of land used by the U.S. military to Okinawa.[3] DPRI shifts 5,000 Marines and 1,300 dependents from Okinawa to Guam; 2,700 Marines and 2,000 dependents to Hawaii; 1,300 Marines to Australia; a Marine KC-130 refueling Squadron (approx. 420 Marines) from Okinawa to Iwakuni, Japan; and 800 Marines to locations in CONUS.[4] The core programs of DPRI include the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), movement of forces off Okinawa, and the preparation of Iwakuni, Australia, and Guam infrastructure to meet naval training and support requirements.

The 2012 DPRI program of record provides an improved INDOPACOM posture to counter regional threats by enabling a stronger U.S.-Japanese relationship, hardening the mutually supported military basing in the area, and securing the economic ecosystem for the United States and Japan. DPRI is coming to fruition as Japan integrates more robust military capabilities, to include U.S. Major Defense Acquisition Programs, further distributing lethality.[5] This initiative places Japan and the United States in position to protect free and open trade routes through every domain, supporting the United States' free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.[6]

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The Corps continues to establish capabilities on Guam. The Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz Operations Officer briefs RADM Benjamin Nicholson, the Joint Region Marianas Commander, during a visit on 10 June 2021. *(Photo by Cpl Andrew King.)*

Where We Are Today

The movement of forces and capabilities across INDOPACOM has begun in tandem with base infrastructure and facility development. Camp Blaz (Guam), the Marine Corps' first newly opened base since 1952, is ready to receive follow on III MEF units. Missile defense initiatives on Guam are moving forward along with the construction of naval maneuver ranges. Guam's flow of forces is expected in 2023, followed by the movement of forces to Hawaii. The movement of a Marines KC-130 refueling Squadron to Iwakuni is complete; the FRF has broken ground north of Camp Schwab on Okinawa (completion date ~2030); and Australia has reached the programmed 2,500 large MAGTF in 2019. DPRI is well on the way to establishing a more resilient force distribution and military infrastructure to support training and operations that promote economic security and geopolitical relations throughout the region.

Why DPRI Works: Improves Diplomatic Relations with Japan

DPRI will strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and convey the United States' commitment to INDOPACOM stability. DPRI is returning land and resources, including military bases, to the Japanese, easing long-held tensions

with Okinawa. DPRI will provide an opportunity for Japan to further their defense role in the region through their purchase of military capability and a renewed national focus on national defense, thus becoming a more capable partner in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

DPRI addresses the burden of U.S. troop hosting on Okinawa. Okinawa carries the majority of U.S. forces in Japan; 25 percent of all facilities used by U.S. Forces in Japan, and about half of the U.S. military personnel are located on Okinawa, which comprises less than 1 percent of Japan's total land area.[7] DPRI addresses this disproportional and legacy posturing by removing 10,000 Marines, returning 1,000 acres of land, consolidating bases, and returning Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Not only will DPRI improve favor in Okinawa's eyes, but it will have a positive socio-cultural impact in Japan and promote political stability. DPRI meets the Okinawan's desire for less U.S. military presence following the 1995 atrocities, ultimately reducing the number of Marines on the island by over 50 percent.[8] The Okinawa relief is evidence of the United States' long-term commitment to the alliance and the desire to ease any residual social tension.

DPRI impetuses more responsibility on the Japanese in INDOPACOM. Japan has seized the opportunity, as evident in their 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines. The guidelines look to further the alliance and improve Japanese defense capabilities and posture. These initiatives include a record-high 11 percent increase in defense spending, 70 percent increase in the purchase of Foreign Military Sales, and the development of multi-domain defense force, which postures Japan to collaborate with the United States in every warfighting domain.[9] Having a strong ally in close proximity to China will continue to be beneficial for collective East Asian security.

Distributed Basing

DPRI will alter U.S. INDOPACOM force posture, distributing U.S. forces and capabilities on Okinawa, mainland Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and Australia. This geographic distribution will enhance lethality, support operational and strategic resilience, and enable Japan to better support U.S.-led operations. This redistribution will challenge the Chinese hegemonic aspirations in the region.

INDOPACOM forces are primarily distributed between Korea, Japan, and Hawaii. These bases afford a critical positional advantage, reinforce the joint force's ability to compete, extend its operational reach, and enable sea control, sea denial, and deterrence.[10] However, these advantages are countered by China's U.S.-focused, anti-access/area denial strategy. The primary objective of the modern Chinese strategy is to disrupt the network of U.S. military bases.[11] The Chinese threat has invigorated a reevaluation of the force posture and application of resources to distribute U.S. basing infrastructure in INDOPACOM.

DPRI will alter U.S. INDOPACOM force posture, distributing U.S. forces and capabilities on Okinawa, mainland Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and Australia.

DPRI distributes military capability in INDOPACOM, building a more resilient Guam. Guam will embark a MEB outfitted with MV-22 and CH-53 Squadrons permanently on the island, expand Anderson Air Force Base, modernize Naval Base Guam, and add multiple range complexes and a modernized missile defense system. Guam will complement the existing bases in the INDOPACOM region, increase naval readiness and operational flexibility, and better support joint maneuvers into the region. Furthermore, a more capable Japan can support future distributed basing in INDOPACOM.

Japan's assumption of a larger role in East Asian security effort supports the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* and aligns with DRPI by bolstering partners and sharing responsibilities for common defense.[12] This paradigm shift also aligns with Japan's 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines. The closing of U.S. bases on Okinawa allows the Japanese Self-Defense Force to leverage this existing infrastructure to train and increase their warfighting capacity. Japan's acquisition of standoff systems, to include long range anti-ship missiles and F-35A/B, permits Japan to integrate more seamlessly with U.S. forces in the area. Japan can shoulder more responsibilities and fit their new capacity and capabilities gains into a U.S.-led contingency force.

Secures the Economic Ecosystem

The U.S.-Japan alliance will enable opportunities for economic prosperity throughout the region.[13] Japan and the United States account for over 30 percent of world's gross domestic product, a significant portion of international trade, and a major portion of international investment. Total trade between the United States and Japan reached $303 billion in 2019 and over $500 billion in foreign direct investment.[14] Japan, with a newly understood interdependency on their own nation's security with global security, has the need to protect economic interests beyond their economic exclusion zone.[15] DPRI supports the growth of a more capable U.S.-Japanese alliance that will contribute to East Asian security, protect trade routes and freedom of navigation, and support U.S.-Japanese economic interests.

A mutual vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, coupled with a desire to protect lines of communication, is paramount to the success of the U.S.-Japanese economic relationship. Like China, Japan is also one of the United States' main debt financiers, and as China continues to threaten the free flow of trade, the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to be capable of responding in the East and South China seas. With more distributed basing and capability, the United States and Japan (and other

allies) can better protect and ensure the globe's vital lines of communication remain open.

Counter Argument

The financial cost of DPRI is significant to both the United States and the Government of Japan. It will cost an estimated $8.7 billion to move forces to Guam, $2.7 billion to move forces to Hawaii, and $22.7 billion for the FRF.[16] For over $30 billion, it appears the United States is decreasing presence near the South China Sea and degrading deterrence against China's expanding reach by removing forces from Okinawa.[17] Indeed, transferring critical forces off the island may present little benefit other than noise and population reduction on Okinawa and further splitting American forces from the nine-dash line.[18] DPRI is also shaping a more robust Japanese Self-Defense Force, which is contrary to the U.S.-Japan post World War II agreements and may present a future security dilemma.[19] Many experts argue other tenable courses of action may achieve the same result as DPRI, including prepositioning of equipment in INDOPACOM and maturing joint basing with the Japanese and other allies.

The benefits of DPRI outweigh any opposition. DPRI improves diplomatic relations with Japan, military force posture, and the East Asia region's economic conditions. Leaving the INDOPACOM posture "as is" will only lead to a predictable, stagnate force posture that cannot contend with the aspiring Chinese hegemony. DPRI bolsters the Japanese military presence, putting China against the first and third ranked economies and supporting militaries Furthermore, a strengthened U.S.-Japanese relationship better counters the Chinese hegemonic aspirations by mutually supported trade agreements and foreign direct investment, providing partners an attractive counter to China's expansion.

Conclusion

DPRI provides the United States, Japan, and INDOPACOM an important capability to engage in the increasingly dynamic security environment. DPRI enables a stronger U.S.-Japan relationship, operationally and strategically, by distributing and hardening the basing in the region, and thus potentially provides a more secure economic ecosystem for the United States and Japan while effectively countering the ever-increasing China threat.

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Decentralized Decision Making

A paradigm-shift in thinking for NATO and future U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region

by Col Mark C. Boone

"Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity." [1]

—GEN Patton

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The 21st century has ushered in an era of intense technological advancement, changing the character of warfare. Hypersonic weapons, autonomous platforms, ubiquitous sensors, big data, quantum science, additive manufacturing, and artificial intelligence are but a few of the technological developments changing the landscape of the world and warfare as we know it. The conduct of warfare, from its fundamental principles to ethical framework, is being challenged.

As state and non-state actors alike strive for overmatch in this technological arms race, the West, namely the United States along with its fellow NATO allies, currently possesses the human resources required to develop, maintain, and hone overmatch at all levels of warfare. The West can ensure intellectual overmatch by fostering a culture of decentralized decision making where a relationship of trust and mutual understanding exists between leaders at all levels. It is based upon understanding "intent" and where the encouragement of subordinate-driven initiative and decentralized decision making at all levels is *expected*.

This requires a revolution in thinking, a paradigm shift institutionalized across the NATO enterprise. Change must occur across our institutions from our entry training to our career professional development and unit certification processes. A culture of kinship, trust, and mutual respect among leaders at all levels needs to be revitalized. If NATO can do this, true primacy will be gained at all levels of warfare resulting in speed, tempo, and battlefield lethality far surpassing our adversaries. As the DOD—namely the Marine Corps—approaches capacity and alliance building throughout the Asia Pacific, this same developmental calculus must be considered. Time, space, and disaggregated operations throughout this region will require decentralized decision making of the highest order. Long standing partnership such as Australia will be well suited to make this paradigm shift; however, emerging security partners, such as Vietnam and India will require substantial assistance in technological development and mindset.

The conduct of warfare ... is being challenged.

"U.S. Forces could, under plausible assumptions, lose the next war they are called to fight." [2]

—RAND Corp. 2017

The Battlefield of the Future

Future battlefields will be volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA).[3] They will be trans-regional, multi-functional, and multi-dimensional, requiring enhanced joint interoperability well inside the adversaries' weapons engagement zone.[4] Communications will be degraded, the massing of any assets or personnel will be costly, and all domains, air, land, sea, cyber, and space will be contested.[5] Massive convergence of capabilities in time and space across all domains, physical and non-physical, will be required. Electromagnetic signature reduction will become the new art of camouflage and immediate combat decisions will be made through sheer instinct, frontline

analysis, and most importantly, a clear understanding of mission objectives. "Commanders intent" will rule the day.

> ***"The most important six inches of the battlefield is between your ears."*** [6]
> ***—Gen James Mattis***

Hooked on Technology

After nearly two decades of counter-insurgency (COIN) centric conflict in the Middle East, the United States has an entire generation of officers, many now senior, who have grown quite dependent on technology. An operational environment of airspace dominance, instantaneous access to information, uninterrupted communications, and the unblinking eye of unmanned platforms providing realtime battlefield imagery has created a generation of leaders with an insatiable appetite for information.[7] Worse, this environment has eroded our decentralized decision making. Decisions are now made levels above where they should be because of the technological ease of involvement and a desire for absolute precision. When senior officers step down from the strategic or operational levels of warfare into the tactical, they create resentment, a lack of trust, uncertainty amongst subordinate leaders, and an environment of dependency.[8]

The problem of technologically driven command and control (C2) and decision making has been further exacerbated through the application of COIN principles during the last two decades of operations. COIN involves significant measures to embrace the local population with strict avoidance of collateral damage. Avoidance of unnecessary civilian casualties and protection of non-combatants are principles of warfare enshrined in International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Conventions; however, COIN application took these principles to levels unforeseen before in warfare resulting in constriction of authorities, reduced subordinate initiative, and direct involvement and oversight by senior commanders in tactical operations with suboptimal results.

This has resulted in an overly centralized command philosophy where decisions are made after massive data analysis to examine all exigencies, thus stifling subordinate initiative and development.[9] Under the auspices of these unrealistic expectations, the targeting authority for lethal actions has been removed from the operator and restricted to upper echelon decision makers. Decisions that should be made by captains are now being made by colonels. Precious time is lost when the targeting decision cycle requires approval from a hierarchal chain of command.[10] The future VUCA environment will not permit this manner of operations. Approval authority for kinetic and non-kinetic fires will need to be maintained at battalion, company, and at times squad level.

> ***"The higher the authority, the shorter and more general will the orders be. The next lower command adds what further precision appears necessary. The detail of the execution is left to the verbal order, to the command. Each thereby retains freedom of action and decision within his authority."*** [11]
> ***—Gen Helmet von Moltke, 1869***

Auftragstaktik: A Philosophy of the Art of War and Leadership

At the turn of the 19th century, the Germany Army developed *Auftragstaktik,* a new philosophy for waging war. Designed to enhance speed of action, Auftragstaktik was refined during the internal struggles of trench warfare in World War I, resulting in the operational concepts of the elastic defense in 1916 and the assault tactics of 1918. Following the war, these concepts were further developed in the German Army Field Manual of 1933, which promoted the aggressive Blitzkrieg tactics of World War II.[12]

Auftragstaktik was not simply the issuance of mission command orders, a C2 system, or laissez-faire free for all. It was a way of thinking, encompassing an understanding of warfare, leadership traits to be exemplified, C2 mission command orders, and an emphasis on relationships. This new way of thinking was institutionalized through the training and education of the entire force, introduced during basic training, and continued throughout their careers. Leaders at all levels embraced these groundbreaking concepts and developed a professional kinship based on trust and knowledge of each other's abilities.[13]

Auftragstaktik was a broad-based institutionalized philosophy encompassing the art of warfare, the strength of which was anchored in *relationships*. Relationships based upon mutual trust, keen insight into each other's abilities, and respect amongst warriors. It was an environment where commanders at all levels developed the "*what*" of commander's intent with the expectation that subordinates would exercise the full scope of their initiative, experience, intellect, and ingenuity to derive the "*how*" of mission accomplishment.[14] Subordinate driven action and decision making was not just expected; it was an institutional vow. Mistakes were expected and corrected as part of professional development, while inaction or indecisiveness was not tolerated.[15] Critical thinking and a joy of responsibility were derivatives of self-generated discipline, and the Germans understood the importance of operating one up and thinking two down.[16] Auftragstaktik created a culture of decentralized decision making with a universal understanding that no operational plan survived contact with the enemy and a belief that every action in combat is

unique, requiring initiative, rapid assessment, and aggressive action.[17]

"There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard work, and learning from failure." [18]

—GEN Colin Powell

Developing a Culture of Decentralized Decision Making

Since World War II, several American military organizations have attempted to replicate the theory of Auftragstaktik. The Army has made strides with its development of Mission Command and the Adaptive Leadership Training and Education model focused on problem solving skills and critical thinking; however, neither have been institutionalized across the force.[19] The DOD pioneered the "Joint All Domain Command and Control System" to enhance decision making at lower levels, but this concept is still embryonic.[20] The Marine Corps, renown for adaptability and emphasis on their NCO leadership, has released *MCDP 7, Learning,* outlining a visionary philosophy where the mind is the weapon surpassing all forms of technology.[21] Despite these measures, the overall focus across the joint force remains on centralized decision making.

The true spirit of Auftragstaktik, understanding "intent," the inherent relationship between leaders, and the delicate balance between authority and responsibility, has been overlooked and has not been institutionalized in U.S. military training centers and universities.

A complete paradigm shift in thinking is required in our teaching methodologies from "*what to think*" to "*how to think*." A cognitive leap must be made from competency-based learning to outcome-based learning. Our training institutions must shift from report card box-checking to discovery learning and development. This change must cover the entire educational spectrum from our entry-level training to our senior-level professional development and must be institutionalized in our training centers for deployment and combat readiness.[22] Additionally, this must include joint multi-domain exercises in a C2 denied environment, challenging and stress checking our processes, equipment, and people.[23]

Emotional intelligence must be a key attribute of leadership allowing for subordinate level involvement in decisions and outcomes. We need to instill the importance of developing deep and enriching professional relationships throughout the force, relationships developed through shared hardships, rigorous real-world training, and in places like the officer and staff-NCO clubs, where tactics and life lessons are shared from teacher to scholar.

A cognitive leap must be made from competency-based learning to outcome-based learning. Our training institutions must shift from report card box-checking to discovery learning and development.

"The future operating environment will place new demands on leaders at all levels. Our leaders must have the training, education, and experience to meet those demands." [24]

—Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr., 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps

The King of Domains: The Human Domain

Message to the Joint Force 2015

Critics argue that decentralized decision making and mission command are dying concepts. An argument is made that technological advancements in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and big data analysis will overcome the need for critical thinking and human decision making on the battlefield. Leaders will be replaced by machines, and fighting will be done largely by unmanned platforms.[25] History will prove them wrong. History is already replete with inventions that have changed how war is fought but not its essential nature. These innovations will also fall into that category.[26]

The inventions of today and tomorrow will create a new paradigm in warfare, one in which the Sailor, Soldier, Marine, or aviator—enabled by technology—will still be required to make decisions.[27] We currently have the domains of sea, air, land, cyber, and space; however, the human domain reins above all. Future warfare will be faster, more lethal, and more dispersed than ever witnessed before. Leaders at all levels will operate off instinct and commander's intent in an environment of degraded communications, cloaked identification, strained supply lines, and extremely dispersed formations. The emergence of new weapons with significant range and lethality will require forward unit control. In this environment, decentralized decision making will become even more paramount and small unit leaders at the company and squad level will require operational authorities historically maintained at the brigade level and higher.

Undoubtedly, to assist leaders, emerging technologies to enhance decision-

Training among NATO Alliance members, in this case Armenia, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United States, can help to develop the necessary culture of tactical initiative and bias for action at the small unit level. (Photo by Sgt Henry Villarama.)

making processes should be explored and utilized. Technologies, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Deep Green, a system to enter into the adversarial decision-making process or the Real-Time Adversarial Intelligence and Decision Making, which uses predictive analysis and simulations to analyze enemy actions, should be further analyzed.[28] Another emerging technology to enhance decision making is Think, Analyze, and Connect, a massive search engine for analysis being implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for collaboration and decision making.[29] The Joint Assistance for Deployment Execution, designed for planning and course of action comparison, is yet another within this family of systems.[30]

With the emergence of the Global Information Grid, everyone now has access to the same data. Senior leaders, non-natives to the digital era, are at a distinct disadvantage. Anyone harboring information at higher echelons will quickly become irrelevant and part of the problem.[31] Knowledge is only powerful if it is shared and sharing information must be viewed as a way to enhance decision making amongst subordinates. The German model of *Auftragstaktik* placed emphasis on the tactical commander for flexibility in making decisions to affect the overall intent.[32] Technology should not be used as a means to micromanage but to enhance our subordinates' ability to observe, orient, decide, and act faster than our enemy.[33]

Now, in an era of advanced technologies with the potential to create over supervision, more emphasis must be placed upon the issuance of clear and concise commander's intent, the sinew between the mission and the concept of operations.[34] Decentralized decision making is the only way to harness the collective energy of the joint force enhancing lethality and survivability on the modern battlefield. The concept of the "Strategic Corporal" is still valid and needs to be rekindled.[35] At the same time, we must focus the development of our senior leaders on the strategic application of all instruments of national power, critical thinking, and the art of enabling decentralized decision making by their subordinates.[36]

Training must be challenging, setting conditions for a real-world experience ...

"I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign ... but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way." [37]

—GEN Grant's Instructions to GEN Sherman (1864)

Enabling the Paradigm Shift

Much has been written about the future of warfare. We know it will be trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. New technologies will emerge altering the very character of warfare and victory will go to those who harness the chaos of the VUCA environment using speed and tempo to enhance their lethality. The future battlefield will require decentralized decision making with operational authority pushed to the lowest level possible. In this complex and volatile environment, NATO can establish and maintain strategic and operational primacy over our adversaries through investment in our human capital. To achieve this, NATO must revolutionize the way we think from "*what to think*" to "*how to think*." This radical change must be institutionalized across the force from the onset of training through career progression. Training must be challenging, setting conditions for a real-world experience where all domains are contested. It must stress test our people, equipment, and processes to ensure operational readiness and resilience.

What the Alliance needs is a new culture of *Auftragstaktik* where commanders develop true relationships with their subordinates, a culture where the commander's intent is the watch word of operations, and where the "*how*" of mission accomplishment is left to subordinates. We must foster an environ-

ment where our subordinates know to take action in the absence of orders. We must train to an expectation of initiative and encourage them to employ their ingenuity, experience, and knowledge of the environment to ensure that the commander's vision becomes a reality.

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"Katchi Kapshida!"

We go together: rewarding service on the far side of the world at MARFORK

by LtCol Matthew R. Crouch

>LtCol Crouch served in the G-3 for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Korea from July 2019 to July 2020. A former Site Commander, Norfolk, and Commanding Officer MAG-49 Detachment D, he has served on staff at Marine Corps Forces Command, I MEF (Fwd), as an ACE Executive Officer with VMM-264 (26th and 22nd MEUs), and as Pilot Training Officer and Weapons and Tactics Instructor with HMM-268. His service includes multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and two and a half years in the People's Republic of China as an Olmsted Scholar. He is currently the CMC Senior Fellow to the Atlantic Council.

Each year, roughly one-third of the Marine Corps engages with the assignments team at Manpower and Reserve Affairs to determine where their next set of orders will place them in service to the Nation and the Corps. This year those discussions will be informed by an increased focus on the Marine Corps' role in the Indo-Pacific. Geopolitical competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is shaping attitudes throughout government, and within the DOD, the Indo-Pacific is front and center. The Commandant, rightly recognizing the critical nature of our Service's role in supporting that "Pivot to the Pacific," is placing greater emphasis on individual service in the region and asking that Marines of all ranks and backgrounds consider a tour in the Indo-Pacific. Traditionally, the confluence of the needs of the Marine Corps, individual career milestones, and personal preferences have conspired with apprehensions about life overseas to make filling requirements in the Indo-Pacific theater (Japan and Korea) difficult.

This article seeks to dispel those apprehensions, clarify the personal and professional benefits of service in Korea in particular, and compel Marines to consider Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK) as an assignment of choice this year in their solicitation for orders. In Korea, Marines serve daily with a professional and dedicated ally in a rewarding assignment, where each Marine's actions are contributing to a critical aspect of national security, and work is relevant, educational, and rewarding. In addition, the sophisticated coalition and joint operational environment offers the individual Marine an unbounded opportunity for professional growth. Lastly, because of a palette of features, quality of life in Korea is high and filled with enriching life opportunities for leisure and travel. This potent trio of strategic relevance, professional development opportunities, and high quality of life make service on the far side of the world worth discussing with your monitor.

In Korea, Marines conduct routing exercises with the ROK Marine Corps. *(Photo by LCpl Jorge Rosales.)*

Strategic Relevance

"Katchi Kapshida," a slogan heard throughout the coalition forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), means "We go together!" It speaks to the iron bond between ROK and U.S. forces who continue to fight side-by-side in the ongoing war between the two Koreas (ROK and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]). After 70 years, the strategic, operational, and tactical conditions in the Indo-Pacific Theater and on the Korean Peninsula ensure that the ROK continues to play a strategic role on the world stage. Consequently, the environment remains tense, challenging, rife with complexity, and indicative of a unique opportunity for individual service in the Marine Corps. As we actively pursue competition with

the People's Republic of China, seek greater integration with our coalition partner and the U.S. Navy's fleets, and simultaneously place emphasis on III MEF as our main effort, service in MARFORK is becoming more interesting, engaging, and significant.

MARFORK acts as the service component to the sub-unified command, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). It functions as a training synchronizer and coordinating agency for Marine Corps units that need access to the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO) to achieve training readiness goals, as well as the principal U.S. agent for the development of increased combat capabilities of the ROK Marine Corps, the world's second largest Marine Corps.[1]

Formally, the mission statement reads:

> MARFORK, as the Marine Corps Service Component to USFK and United Nations Command (UNC), commands all U.S. Marine Corps forces assigned to USFK and UNC, and advises USFK and UNC on the capabilities, support, and proper employment of Marine forces. MARFORK supports the introduction of U.S. Marine Corps forces onto the Korean Peninsula, coordinates operational sustainment for U.S. Marine Corps forces, and facilitates security cooperation with the ROK Marine Corps in order to set conditions for Marine forces to achieve joint and combined theater objectives.[2]

In layman's terms we seek to:

1. "Set the Force": Fulfill the obligations as a component to USFK/Combined Forces Command (CFC)/UNC while ensuring the stage is set for the introduction of Marine forces to the KTO.[3]
2. "Build the Alliance": Maintain and strengthen the relationship between ROKMC and the U.S. Marine Corps, actively pursuing the goal of improved lethality and interoperability of our forces.
3. "Develop the Combined Marine Component Command (CMCC)":[4] This is the culmination of efforts and the synthesis of the work between the ROKMC and MARFORK applied in the coalition environment in concert with III MEF (Commander, III MEF serves as the commander of CMCC during wartime) to ensure all Marine forces fight effectively as one.

Pursuant the mission, MARFORK remains postured for the potential of escalation from Armistice conditions to Wartime footing. In this vein, MARFORK serves as the agent assuring successful reception of Marine Corps forces on the Korean Peninsula during operations under the USFK/CFC/UNC umbrella. In cooperation with the FMF INDOPACOM, I and III MEFs, and others, MARFORK facilitates the planning and preparation of force flow on to the peninsula during contingency or crisis. Additionally, MARFORK ensures that the requisite host nation support is in place, and those steps that provide for the bed down, sustainment, and onward movement of Marine forces in support of any operations in Korea are taken.

Pursuant the mission, MARFORK remains postured for the potential of escalation from Armistice conditions to Wartime footing.

Enabling the above serves as a potent tool to further U.S. national strategy because in practice at the intersect of "Setting the Force," "Building the Alliance," and "Developing CMCC" sits the routine readiness training of U.S. and ROK Marine Corps units, helping Marine units hone their fighting edge. At the heart of that intersection is the seminal training program administered by MARFORK: the Korea Marine Exercise Program (KMEP). KMEP is the umbrella bilateral training initiative for all ROK and Marine Corps bilateral training in the KTO and a powerful tool to facilitate overall CMCC readiness.

By design, KMEP training includes skill sets across all the warfighting functions and serves as an opportunity for III MEF units to schedule Mission Essential Task training events on the Peninsula. Each session includes a bilateral component that provides opportunity for ROKMC units to increase their own lethality alongside U.S. Marine forces. KMEP serves to address ROKMC and U.S. Marine Corps interoperability for infantry in the mountain and winter environment act as the vehicle for bilateral aviation operations in the brand new ROKMC Marine Aircraft Group, and support the maturation of the ROKMC Targeting process through work with their Intelligence and Fires Divisions. This list is not nearly comprehensive.

Currently, the development of ROKMC capabilities and improved interoperability with U.S. Marine Corps forces are the driving forces of our efforts to "Develop CMCC." In addition to the tactical-evel efforts being made through the KMEP iterations, MARFORK staff has the privilege of serving as subject matter experts for the ROKMC HQ staff as they modernize and improve their Corps. Currently, MARFORK staff members are working with ROKMC HQ to develop advanced combat logistics capabilities, build enduring relationships with MARFORPAC for enterprise level subject matter expertise, introduce aviation capabilities into the ROKMC operating forces, develop a future aviation command and control (C2) capability, and much more.

As a member of the MARFORK staff, you will play a critical role in contributing to the above. Meaningful, interesting work with a great ally is the basic ingredients for job satisfaction and the foundation for an outstanding tour.

Professional Development Opportunities

Fulfilling each aspect of the MARFORK mission provides the staff work that is unique, demanding, and international in character. While Korea remains at war, the command structure and relationships of the forces in Korea retain significant complexity. The

senior U.S. military officer in Korea serves not only as the commander of USFK but also as the commander of the enduring UN mission, UNC, as well as the bi-lateral ROK/U.S. military force, the Combined Forces Command. As the Marine Corps' service component command in this intricate environment, MARFORK plays the critical role of providing service advocacy to USFK and, as a fully integrated part of the USFK team, maintains relationships with elements of the UNC and CFC staffs. This advocacy protects Marine Corps equities and informs joint and coalition planning across the entirety of the KTO.[5]

In execution, this means that the MARFORK staff works closely with joint and coalition staff in the development of operational plans that directly shape the situation on the Korean Peninsula. This effort has a diverse and decidedly international character as the daily work often has implications on the strategic relationship between the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK. Tasks for the individual staff officer can range from serving as the liaison to one of the other service components (learn about the joint world); to co-authoring the U.S. Marine Corps ROKMC policy for Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) production and employment (develop coalition experience).

The mission also presents opportunities to cross the country surveying the potential bed down sites for units destined to come to the KTO in the event of war with the DPRK.[6] Staff members learn the complex requirements of force sustainment, develop as true subject matter experts in the needs of a battalion or a squadron, and sharpen their international trade craft through host-nation support coordination (learn logistics). These opportunities just scratch the surface of what professional development is to be had, as the staff in Korea deals with everything from Time Phased Force Deployment Data to rewriting the operational support plans for Korea.

One of the critical parts of the MARFORK mission is to provide assistance to U.S. Marine Corps units seeking access to the excellent training venues on the Korean Peninsula. While MARFORK does significant work on the operational level, there are opportunities to take a bite out of the tactical level in its role as a training facilitator. MARFORK seeks to provide concierge support to visiting units, assisting in everything from predeployment site surveys to ammunition requisitions. Staff use their host nation familiarity to ensure visiting units are able to access range space on the timelines they need and with the necessary resources to achieve their mission essential task list-based training objectives. From live fire and maneuver exercises at U.S. Army-owned training complexes to bi-lateral JTAC shoots at Yeonpyeong Island, MARFORK staff is serving as a critical enabler of III MEF unit training through direct coordination with 8th Army, 7th Air Force, and ROK Army and Air Force agencies on behalf of the visiting units.[7] This effort ensures that critical training not possible at a unit's home station can be accomplished.

U.S. and ROK Marines training near Pohang. *(Photo by Sgt Isaac Ibarra.)*

Every day MARFORK staff is "going together" with the USFK, UNC, and ROKMC by exchanging expertise and guidance to ensure hard learned lessons benefit fighting forces in their assigned roles and responsibilities throughout the region. "Developing the CMCC" and "Setting the Force" grants the individual Marine in Korea a chance to work at "Strengthening the Alliance" by building friendships and professional acumen in themselves and in their ROK counterparts. These efforts require intelligence, maturity, wit, and initiative. The Marine that takes on the challenge of serving at MARFORK will be witness to truly exciting developments in themselves and across the USFK team. They will be gratified by the impact that they play in helping those developments build the success of the ROKMC, CMCC, and the entire U.S. effort in the KTO.

High Quality of Life

Korea, known as the "Land of the Morning Calm," is a hospitable country whose population is appreciative of American efforts to bolster its security. The high quality of life in Korea today is characterized by the modern developed features of the ROK, its rich cultural tradition, the ease of travel within the country and throughout the region, and significant investments by the U.S. and ROK governments into U.S. bases. These features in concert make a tour for any Marine or Marine family rich and enjoyable.

Roughly the size of New Jersey, Korea is a modern and bustling economic powerhouse. Currently the world's 12th largest economy,[8] with just over 51 million citizens,[9] it has an extensive rail system and other public transportation that

makes the entire country, from Seoul to Busan, affordably accessible while on liberty. Travel within the country presents opportunities for families or individuals to enjoy the benefits of modern cities, vibrant beaches, an extensive national parks system, historically significant sites (particularly to Marines), and exposure to the rich Korean food and culture.

Regional travel similarly offers a chance for once in a lifetime adventure. Korea's key location within Asia and the ease of access to Incheon International Airport make travel throughout Asia convenient and affordable. Even over a short 72-hour pass, one can travel to other countries for a quick vacation reset. South Korea presents convenient and affordable opportunities for travel to interesting places and exotic locales throughout the continent, it is common for service members to travel to places such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Australia—just to name a few. There is perhaps no other posting in the Marine Corps that affords such a diverse series of choices for adventurous tourism.

While being in a foreign country is not without its challenges, increasingly, the burdens on service members and families are being reduced as USFK policy continues to work toward a higher quality of life for all U.S. service members stationed in the ROK. In 2019, the USFK campaign plan introduced a fourth line of effort: "Make Korea the Assignment of Choice." In conjunction with this, the curfew on forces has been lifted and major investments have been made in facilities to improve quarters and life support services. Simultaneously, access to base amenities has been expanded through the relaxation of ration card, commissary, and exchange policies—all making life in Korea more akin to garrison living at home.

Camp Humphreys, the location where most Marines in Korea work on a daily basis, features two elementary schools (with a third under construction), a middle school, and a high school. The student body is rich with diversity and composed of children who can identify with your child's Marine brat experience (a first for our family). Students who participate in high school sports have an opportunity to travel within Korea and across Asia in competition. In total, the time in Korea provides a student a wonderous and enriching experience with friends that can relate both to the challenges of overseas living as well as those of our chosen lifestyle.

For the present, with the ongoing efforts to improve life for the entire USFK team, each month brings about more improvements as deliberate efforts are completed to make Korea one of the more desirable assignments in the service. From new schools to massive athletic complexes, whether single or accompanied, Marines will find something to be thrilled by when they accept orders to "Go Together!" and join the MARFORK family.

Final Appeal

In the course of a career, the Marine Corps asks every Marine to step away from their MOS and out of the tactical unit; this phase of our careers is used to meet less glamorous needs of the Marine Corps and to broaden our abilities. These tours can sometimes feel less than worthwhile as the mundane aspects of staff work contrast poorly against the dynamic variety of the daily activity of the Fleet.

For any Marine (officers and staff non-commissioned officers in particular take note) seeking to expand their knowledge of the joint and coalition world, remain professionally relevant, and spend their obligatory staff tour doing work that is personally rewarding and career enhancing, an overseas assignment MARFORK is unique in the Marine Corps.

MARFORK offers the individual Marine a place to both step out of their comfort zone (always a chance to grow) but also improve themselves through joint and coalition partnership exchange. It offers an opportunity to serve and live in a rich culture with its own dynamic history and deep ties to the Marine Corps. It is a chance to develop professionally and to be relevant in meaningful ways seldom encountered outside of deploying directly into harm's way. Significantly, it also offers unmatched opportunity to go through this experience with your family, providing them both incredible enrichment and access to a community that has a shared military culture and lifestyle.

MFK is a duty assignment ideal for individuals who seek a joint, coalition work-load that is nested in a truly full-spectrum geopolitical atmosphere. Its mission guarantees a tour with edifying opportunities. The garrison amenities, cultural exposure, and liberty venues provide Marines and families an unmatched opportunity to go together for adventure. If good pay, foreign travel, and congenial employment sounds interesting, then put Korea down as your assignment of choice!

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCWP 7-10 (Formerly MCWP 3-40.8), Marine Corps Componency*, (Washington, DC: 2018).

2. Capt John J. Parry, *What MARFORK Can Do For You: How Your Support for MARFORK Supports Your Readiness*, (unpublished).

3. Ibid.

4. CMCC is the functional Marine component to CFC, which directs both U.S. and Republic of Korea forces during crisis and contingency operations.

5. *What MARFORK Can Do For You*.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Information available at https://www.investopedia.com.

9. Information available at https://www.worldometers.info.

Resource Allocation in Amphibious Operations

Forgotten Pacific battles

by Mr. Joseph Miranda

A major issue for military planners is resource allocation. This is especially so in a campaign involving numerous independent actions over a vast area of operations. Decision Game's Forgotten Pacific Battles (*World at War* magazine #71) covers six different U.S. amphibious invasions of Japanese held islands during World War II: Tinian, Engebi, Parry, Eniwetok, Guam, and Angaur. These islands were critical positions for the United States to build airbases to cover the advance through the Central Pacific, with the final campaign objective being the seizure of the Marianas from which B-29 bombers could be launched to attack the Japanese Home Islands.

There are three different ways to play the game: simultaneous, fighting all six island battles at the same time; sequenced, fighting each island assault in historical order and individual, fighting each battle as a stand-alone scenario. The sequenced version gives players both the big picture of the campaign going down to the tactical resolution for each island battle.

Since the United States is on the offensive, there are several strategic decisions to be considered. This being island warfare, the game includes rules for amphibious operations. Historical beaches are shown on the map, but the United States can select other landing sites via play of assault boat markers. The United States begins the game with a limited number of amphibious boats (landing craft). How the player allocates amphibs to each of the island battles is a major decision. This allows the United States to weight the forces committed to each of the islands. For example, a larger fight like Guam might require more landing forces than Parry or Anguar. The marker allocation also provides some operational choice about setting the course of the campaign.

>Mr. Miranda is a prolific board wargame designer. He is a former Army Officer and has been a featured speaker at numerous modeling and simulations conferences.

Island geography is a factor. A planning factor is overcoming that geography as well as Japanese defenses. The United States has to determine which landing beaches will facilitate movement inland. Reefs are major obstacles to amphibious landings, and there is a distinction between opposed and unopposed landings. You need to have support fire to overcome these obstacles.

The Japanese on Guam can use engineers to build fortified caves. Again, more firepower and combat engineers are required to secure the islands.

The Japanese have more limited choices being on the strategic to operational defense, but there is opportunity to go over to the tactical offensive by attacking at critical points. Banzai charges can enhance such attacks.

Additional forces can appear in the course of a game. The Japanese have a limited ability to replace losses. The United States can bring in certain reinforcements. Again, decisions about how one allocates these assets weight operations on the islands.

On the tactical level, Forgotten Pacific uses the *Fire & Movement* game system, a common rules set for operational level (units are generally battalions or brigades/regiments) games in the 20th century. Units have attack and defense ratings for combat and a movement allowance. The game makes a functional distinction between *leg* and *mobile* units; the latter have mechanized capability and can conduct exploitation actions. Also in Forgotten Pacific, Japanese units can conduct a limited form of infiltration, representing their small unit tactics below the scale of the game and underground fortifications and tunnels dug throughout the islands. This builds in tactical and terrain factors into an existing rule. It also adds to the asymmetry of the situations, with the Japanese and United States players having to think in different tactical terms. It also means you have to remember the other guy's capabilities.

Another part of combat power, and one which brings in both tactical and operational considerations, is with Support Fire markers. The markers represent various types of artillery, air and naval gunfire support, plus sometimes armor and special tactics. Effectively, you are calling in divisional and non-divisional assets. Players draw these markers at random from a pool, with the randomness representing a wide range of command control, logistics, and friction factors. You do not always get what you need, given the chaos of battle. Players receive a limited number of these markers, and how they allocate them is a major factor in weighting tactical operations. Overall, this subsystem brings in Clausewitzian friction elements to the proceedings.

On the defensive, players can declare "stiff resistance," negating retreat results at the cost of increased unit casualties. While this is a tactical decision, it can have a major impact in a wider battle, especially given the space to force ratio of the island battles. Often, a retreat will mean loss of critical terrain, whether for the Japanese a key defensive position or, for the United States, a beachhead. So you may choose to stand and fight. It's non-material considerations that count.

Another non-material factor is the Japanese employing *Banzai* attacks, which can run up casualties on both sides. Banzai is useful for critical situations and last ditch counterattacks, but use it too much and your army falls apart. Along with infiltration, it provides another asymmetrical capability. The United States can counter with increased firepower. Both sides have to take advantage of their strengths.

Victory in the game is measured largely in terms of airfields captured on the islands. While each island battle may seem minor, they all add up to a much greater picture. This gets back to the overall objective of the campaign, which was to seize forward positions on which to build up U.S. airpower and logistical bases. Players have to think in terms that are tactical up to operational and even strategic in the campaign for the Central Pacific.

Marine Pacific Games

Forgotten Pacific Battles is a solitaire game using the standard Fire & Movement (F&M) rules and a series of exclusive rules covering each scenario. There are individual scenarios for the islands of Engebi, Eniwetok, Parry, Guam, Tinian and Angaur. Each scenario can be played separately or as part of two different campaign games. Designed as a solitaire game, the scenarios include instructions for a two player version. The unit counters represent company to regimental-sized units that participated or might have participated in the battle. The islands are depicted at a scale of 500 meters to the hex with Guam being depicted at 1 mile to the hex.

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Operational Art and Maneuver Warfare

Maneuverist Paper No. 14

by Marinus

In the decade leading up to the codification of the doctrine of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps, a number of thoughtful officers within the Army devoted a great deal of attention to a phenomenon they called *operational art*. Officers in the Marine Corps joined the conversation, and in 1990, the Marine Corps published *FMFM 1-1*, *Campaigning*, which was revised in 1997 as *MCDP 1-2*. This effort was critical to the Marine Corps because it occurred at a time when Marine forces were transitioning from being thought of as essentially tactical to being recognized as truly operational formations.

It is true that the theory of operational art is not central to maneuver warfare theory. The two developed essentially in parallel, as different aspects of the broader post-Vietnam Era military reforms. They are indirectly related, however, in that maneuver warfare includes the idea that all leaders must consider how their decisions and actions impact the broader situation and not merely their own immediate situation, which is central to the logic of operational art. This paper provides details on the German, Russian, Soviet, and American efforts to develop a theory of operational art.

German Efforts

From the latter years of the Napoleonic Wars through the early years of World War II, the Prussians and Germans evidenced attributes of a superb learning organization. Names associated with their tactical and operational innovations are familiar: Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Alfred Count von Schlieffen, and Hans von Seeckt. Only one comes to mind, however, when we think of strategic creativity, Carl von Clausewitz. Herein lies the problem, for as strong as the Germans were tactically and operationally, they were weak strategically. This is crucial because if what an observer declares to be operational art does not link tactical success to strategic goals, create specifically designed units and headquarters, and employ unique operational formations, it is not operational art. As we shall learn, this is the reason Blitzkrieg does not instantiate operational art.

Alfred Count von Schlieffen's study of history led him to conclude that for the German Army to reestablish effective maneuver in modern war the army had to replace:

> an arithmetical concept of operations, which added up battles into a campaign, with a dynamic one that developed out of deployment and rolled on, self-sustaining and gathering velocity in a grand enveloping action encompassing the whole European theater of war.[1]

His renowned "Schlieffen Plan" focused on continuous movement to overwhelm the enemy—psychologically as much as physically—rather than aiming toward a single war-ending battle. In 1914, this plan, as modified by Helmuth von Moltke

Study of the "Schlieffen Plan," developed between 1905 and 1914, illustrates both German tactical and operational successes and their strategic failures. *(Photo credit: U.S. Army Center for Military History.)*

the Younger, failed and a 440-mile-wide near-stationary front formed. Maneuver did not return to the Western Front in the following four years of grinding war.

The peace treaties ending World War I severely limited the size of the German Army and the types and numbers of weapons it could possess. Hans von Seeckt, first as the post-war chief of staff and then as chief of the Army Command, set out to study and learn from the recent conflict, and to build a small but highly professional army. He saw the value in an honest examination of the war. He also believed that a cadre of well-trained and well-educated officers and noncommissioned officers would be the basis upon which to mobilize a larger force in the event of war. Seeckt endeavored to isolate the army from larger political and international issues and to re-establish an officer corps with traditional Prussian values. Though he had the loyalty of most officers, there was an opposing faction advocating for greater mechanization, a return to a mass army, and closer ties to the political leadership. While never seen as a formal group, this latter group had noted proponents like Werner von Blomberg, Minister of Defense and later Minister of War. For the most part, the efforts of both groups centered on tactical, training, and technical issues. One notable exception was Ludwig Beck, who in 1933 and 1934 oversaw the writing of *HD-300, Truppenführung*, which was an example of operational thinking, a rarity among German officers of the period.

When Adolph Hitler came to power, he found the views of those in the school advocating for a large, mechanized army more akin to his own ideas. Eventually, he replaced the traditionalists with German officers who tended to focus on the technical aspects of war and saw in the National Socialist movement the means to create the large army they believed the nation needed. Surreptitiously at first and then openly, Germany began to modernize and enlarge its army well beyond the limitations the Allies imposed after World War I. When that army went to war in 1939 and achieved colossal success, observers around the world sought to understand why.

Two schools of thought have emerged on Germany's development of operational art. The first asserts that the German Army made a deliberate attempt to solve the early 20th century's operational and tactical challenges and, in the effort, constructed an operational theory we now know as Blitzkrieg. The second school maintains that the German military simply scaled up its tactical concepts to an operational scale. The first is an intentionally constructed myth that endures to the present day. The second is the historically accurate account, of which too few U.S. military officers are aware.

The myth had its origins in literature that appeared in the early days of World War II, which claimed that the rapid success enjoyed by the Wehrmacht was the result of a radical new form of warfare. The myth grew after the war, largely at the hands of British military theorist Basil H. Liddell Hart who put forth the notion that the Germans had based Blitzkrieg on his ideas. He sought to draw Gen Heinz Guderian into this distorted version of history, which was not difficult as the latter was trying to embellish his own post-war reputation. Retired Israeli Defense Force BGen Shimon Naveh, writing about an exchange of letters between Liddell hart and Guderian, states that this correspondence "discloses the fact that Liddell Hart imposed his own fabricated version of *Blitzkrieg* on [Guderian] and compelled him to proclaim it as his own."[2]

Numerous books in the succeeding years advanced the bogus belief that Blitzkrieg was the product of a deliberate undertaking, an example being Charles Messenger's 1976 work, *The Blitzkrieg Story*.[3] The fable was alive and well in 2015, as made evident by articles such as Tal Tovy's "1930's German Doctrine: A Manifestation of Operational Art" whose defense of the claim that Blitzkrieg was the result of deliberate German design rests on the unsupported assertions of Liddell Hart, reiterated by Azar Gat in *British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm*, and on Guderian's self-serving memoir written eight or nine years after the events in question occurred.[4] Gat obviously changed this view, for he

... the famous "Blitzkrieg" was not developed before the war in any formal or orderly manner, indeed, was not even a German term but one created by foreign media.

wrote later in *The History of Military Thought*: "Only recently have scholars begun to realize that the famous 'Blitzkrieg' was not developed before the war in any formal or orderly manner, indeed, was not even a German term but one created by foreign media."[5]

Matthew Cooper, in *The German Army 1933–1945*, in 1978 wrote flatly that "*Blitzkrieg* is a myth. It is a word devoid of any meaning, having substance not in fact, but in fiction, serving only to mislead and deceive."[6] German historian Michael Geyer, arguing that Blitzkrieg was not a new concept, declares:

> The core of these operations did not consist in any particular use of new means of warfare, but in a kind of operational opportunism that knew no pre-set and standardized methods, only the fullest possible exploitation of success with all available means in the pursuit of the ultimate goal of overthrowing the enemy by breaking the will of its leadership. ... It was the opposite of doctrine.[7]

This line of argument bears attention as a corrective to the emphasis that many military theorists placed, and continue to place, on the German contribution to operational art.

In summary, the German military scaled up the lessons it learned during World War I as its army endeavored to break the stalemate on the Western Front with infiltration tactics. It married these emerging tactical concepts to new weapons and equipment—tanks, airplanes, and radios, which the internal combustion engine and the vacuum tube made

possible. However, the Germans missed the essential logic of bridging from strategic goals backward to the tactical actions that, properly assembled in time, space, and purpose, would facilitate achievement of those goals. Moreover, in their failure to create a comprehensive operating concept, the Germans lost sight of the importance of intelligence and logistics, a shortcoming in capabilities that proved their undoing in World War II. Finally, because they did not identify the need to integrate the battlefield from the enemy's strategic rear to the opposing front lines, their operations lacked coherence.

Americans, in the late 1970s and 1980s, studied closely the German military successes, but they did so in the context of a highly articulated, theoretically developed model presented by their Cold War rival: the Soviet Union.

Russian and Soviet Efforts[8]

From the end of the Russo-Turkish War until the outbreak of World War I, Russian military thinkers wrestled with the problem of how to conduct military operations over greater distances with increasingly larger and better-equipped forces. One authority writes of this period:

> Between 1878 and 1914, the Russians redefined their understanding of operations and of their preparation and conduct to produce a concept that was either linked to, but theoretically and practically distinct from, strategy or tactics. ... It is to these developments and their consequences that the modern concept of Soviet operational art owed its origin.[9]

The most prominent intellectual during this era was Genrikh A. Leyer (Leer in some texts) who exercised great sway on Russian military thought until after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. His orientation came from the Napoleonic paradigm and a belief in scientific laws, which proved to be obstacles to new ways of thinking about operations. Countering his thoughts were those of Polish banker Jan Gotlib Bloch, who first saw the linkage between the military front and the civilian rear, and those of Hans Delbrück, who introduced the idea of strategies of annihilation and attrition.[10] (See "Maneuverist No. 11," *MCG*, Aug21, for an explanation of Delbrück's flawed interpretation of these purported strategies.)

The debacle of the Russo-Japanese War gave rise to a group of "realists" known as the "Young Turks" who sought ways to achieve mass and mobility with a modern army while retaining control. Among these were:

- Nikolay P. Mikhnevich who showed some understanding of war as an art form.
- Aleksandr A. Neznamov who favored maneuver with a concentration of firepower, decisive initial operations, and the use of covering forces.
- Aleksandr A. Svechin who made sober calculations on offense versus defense, introduced the "waiting operation," saw the importance of meeting engagements, and most importantly, introduced the term and early concepts of operational art.

These advanced concepts had little impact, however, on the way the Russian Army fought in World War I.[11] In the aftermath of World War I and the Russian Civil War, two opposing schools of thought arose. In one camp were Leon Trotsky and Aleksandr Svechin, who argued for concepts based on a militia system, priority of the defense, and reliance on attrition in what they expected to be a war that was protracted but limited in intensity and geographical scope. Trotsky feared doctrine would become dogma before the Soviet military fully grasped the lessons of the past two wars. Svechin introduced the idea of a linked front and rear and opposed the idea deep battle. In the other camp were Mikhail V. Frunze, Red Army commander in the Civil War, Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, Vladimir K. Triandafillov, and Georgii S. Isserson. Frunze proposed a "unified military doctrine," which joined political and military thought. Tukhachevskii was a proponent of deep operations and combined arms mechanization. Triandafillov wrote on deep operations and unification of front and rear. Recent scholarship places Isserson as the foremost Soviet operational theorist, especially for his authorship of the 1933 *Fundamentals of Deep Operations*, which along with Svechin's 1926 *Strategy* codified the concepts of operational art.[12] The intellectual ferment that these two schools of thought created proved beneficial in the end because it forced proponents to study deeply rather than to assert their ideas without historic or analytical evidence—an unfortunate trait of much contemporary American military thought.

The Stalinist purges of 1937 and 1938 halted further development of operational art. The dire conditions the Soviets faced in 1939 and 1940 caused them to work feverishly to bring back what they had so foolishly thrust aside two years earlier, but it took until 1943 before Soviet fielded forces could execute the concepts in a rudimentary form.[13]

The Soviets came out of World War II with a comprehensive and cohesive operational doctrine. Nonetheless, they began examining the performance of their forces during the war and evaluating that doctrine against the postwar political and military situation. They concluded they needed to change the army's force structure, creating new combined arms armies. It was also during this period that the Soviets created what we know today as deep battle and deep operations, both enabled by mobile groups. Soviet thinkers soon turned to the challenges of an atomic battlefield and reorganized their mechanized armies into more agile formations while retaining the concept of operational maneuver. In 1960, the Soviets deemed that the threat of nuclear weapons demanded yet another change of the army's force structure as well as a new doctrine. They reduced the size of their ground forces and lessened the number of soldiers and weapons in maneuver units while creating and emphasizing the importance of strategic nuclear forces. Operational art took a backseat to strategic concerns. As the Soviets neared parity with the United States in nuclear weapons and observed the latter's adoption of a strategy of flexible response, they returned to the concept of operational maneuver, strengthening it with the introduction of operational maneuver groups.

Marines can gain insights on this important period by reading any number of the multitude of books and pamphlets on Soviet operational art authored by retired Army COL David M. Glantz. A good place to begin is with his "Soviet Operational Art Since 1936: The Triumph of Maneuver

Warfare" from *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art.*[14] Condoleezza Rice's "The Making of Soviet Strategy" in *Makers of Modern Strategy* also provides a good overview.[15]

In its final form, Soviet operational art answered the operational challenge with a concept that integrated several distinctive solutions. First among these were new types of operations: *deep battle* that saw units fighting their way to the rear of an enemy's battle area, *deep operations* that brought operational maneuver groups into an enemy's strategic rear, and *successive operations* that forced an enemy to face continuous battle. Massive column formations and the echeloning of formations facilitated these operations. To control these large formations, the Soviets developed new organizations to exercise command and control (C2), the *Stavka* or Unified Supreme Headquarters, and fronts or army groups. C2 would be detailed and centralized. To conduct maneuvers, the Soviets formed linear holding groups, columnar shock groups, forward detachments, mobile groups, and operational maneuver groups. To manage forces across vast areas, the Soviets created theaters of war and linked the strategic rear to the tactical front. At a macro level, operational art provided the bridge from strategy to tactical actions, generated tactical shock with the breach of an enemy's linear defenses, and sought operational shock (a form of systemic disruption) vice attrition with penetration to an enemy's vital rear area.

American Efforts

The Americans who planned for and led the Nation in its fight against the Axis Powers in World War II proved to be adept strategists despite a lack of any notable previous experience. They developed a global strategy, supporting campaigns, and numerous operations that the U.S. military and its Allies prosecuted in two major theaters—the European and the Pacific—and across several other theaters to include the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. In the larger theaters they organized subordinate fronts and areas, as examples the Pacific Ocean Area and the Southwest Pacific Area. These civilian and military leaders of America's "greatest generation" imagined and then created the plans that moved a strategic vision through the campaigns, operations, battles, and engagements that brought that vision to fruition.[16] Americans proved particularly skilled in logistics and intelligence. Although it is unlikely they were aware of or used the Soviet-invented term, operational art, as the means to carry their strategy into tactics, that term covers much of what they did in a little more than three-and-a-half-years of war.

Surprisingly, five years afterward in 1950, this mastery of war had faded when the United States, as part of a United Nations effort, fought to save the Republic of Korea from the aggression of its northern kin, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A decade and a half later, any remnant of mastery was gone when the United States went to the aid of the beleaguered Republic of Vietnam. The U.S. government had no strategy worthy of the name during the Vietnam War, and the war's seventeen "campaigns" served only to mark dates between significant events. As a result, the U.S. military fought battle after battle—never refusing to engage the enemy—without a meaningful strategic and operational framework. As has frequently been noted, it won every battle, sometimes at great cost, without winning the war.

A number of U.S. military officers who served in the Vietnam War and remained on active duty vowed to learn from the United States' all too-evident shortcomings and to take actions that would ensure the nation never repeated its mistakes in a future war. They were severely disillusioned with the doctrine taught during their professional military education. This was particularly true of the junior officers—the lieutenants, captains, and majors. Under the stewardship of a handful of similarly disillusioned senior mentors, a small group of these officers undertook to reform both doctrine and professional military education from 1975 to 1990. Though their labors were initially disparate, the products they produced eventually merged into two powerful and overlapping warfighting concepts, *AirLand Battle* and *maneuver warfare*. In true Kuhnian fashion, a new paradigm replaced an older one.

The mentors—several of the most notable being ADM Stansfield Turner, GEN Donn Starry, and Gen Alfred M. Gray—ensured that a theoretical understanding of war and operations underpinned their apprentices' work. U.S. military officers returned to the study of history and the classical theorists. As a result, Clausewitzian theory and key elements of Sunzian thought informed the fifteen-year-long intellectual renaissance. Early on, these officers recognized that the absence of any means to connect battles to strategy was a critical failing in Vietnam, and they endeavored to return campaigning to U.S. doctrine.

During the tenure of ADM Turner, who assumed the presidency at Newport in 1972, the Naval War College did some

ADM Stansfield Turner's tenure at the Naval War College saw some of the earliest thinking and writing on strategy, policy, and joint operations. ***(Photo by U.S. Navy official photo.)***

of the earliest work, especially concerning policy, strategy, and joint operations. The College had a junior and a senior course, the former for majors and lieutenant commanders and the latter for lieutenant colonels and commanders. Both courses sought to study military history through the eyes of classical strategists beginning with the Peloponnesian Wars and continuing to contemporary wars. Another portion of the course concentrated on the conduct of naval operations.[17]

Motivated by advancements they perceived the Soviets had made while the United States was engaged in Vietnam, as well as the startling results of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, officers of the Army focused on the emerging ideas of operational art. The 1976 revision of *Field Manual (FM) 100-5*, *Operations*, introduced the doctrine of Active Defense. This started a doctrinal debate, as critics perceived it focused too heavily on the defense and attrition. This debate proved healthy for the institution, and it continued until a revised version of *FM 100-5* introduced AirLand Battle doctrine in 1982. That manual introduced a new set of terms: the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.[18] The impetus for this new construct came from the German Army's use of the terms and a journal article by the influential defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak.[19] Before long, this naming convention and the graphics that briefers created to depict it engendered the idea that the levels corresponded to echelons of command. Questions arose as to what units operated at each level. Was the corps a tactical, an operational, or perhaps even a low-level strategic organization? There were similar questions about what activities fit within each level. Few of the discussions around these issues were productive.

A co-author of the 1982 *FM 100-5*, LTC Huba Wass de Czege, recognized the problem, and when he outlined the 1986 version of *FM 100-5*, he introduced the "structure of modern war" as strategy, operational art, and tactics.[20] The manual provided this definition: "Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."[21] This definition of operational art corresponds with that of its originator, A.A. Svechin, who conceived the term in 1922.[22] In 2011, Wass de Czega reinforced his conviction on this matter in the online *Small Wars Journal*:

> Operational art is not a level of war, or the art of generalship. It is what goes on in the [commander's] mind, the mediating and balancing interaction between his strategic and tactical reasoning.

Wass de Czega went on to explain how the confusion over operational art as a level of war had arisen in the first place:

> We doctrine writers of the 1980's inserted operational art as a mid-level of war between tactics and strategy—making it the art of translating the governing strategy into the implementing tactics of the "tactical echelons." And thus, making operational art the province of "campaigning" generals. Because of the way I was conditioned to think then, that strategy was the business of the upper echelons and tactics the business of the lower ones, I miss-translated an idea borrowed from Soviet doctrine about the mediation between strategy and tactics. I was then a product of indoctrination in the U.S. Army's War and Command and Staff Colleges. These institutions, and the business schools of the time, taught based on the industrial age organizational model of the head (where strategic decisions are made) and the rest of the body (where tactical decisions implement the strategy). I now believe that, without violating the historical meaning of the terms strategy and tactics, this is a much more useful and natural way to think of the relationship between tactics, strategy and operational art.
>
> In fact, this allows one to close the conceptual gap between our bifurcated way of thinking about warfare between nation states and that between states and armed movements of any kind.[23]

BG Huba Wass de Czege was instrumental in developing the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. *(Photo courtesy Ft. Leavenworth Hall of Fame.)*

The likelihood of putting the levels-of-war genie back in the bottle is slim but worth the try. Among the several reasons is the fact that the tri-level structure has been one of the causes of military officers shunning the study of and participation in strategy as they focused on operations and battles. Antulio J. Echevarria, a noted historian and retired U.S. Army officer, points this out when he writes:

> the American way of war tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs, whether on the scale of major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes. This tendency is symptomatic of a persistent bifurcation in American strategic thinking—though by no means unique to Americans—in which military professionals concentrate on winning battles and campaigns, while policymakers focus on the diplomatic struggles that precede and influence, or are influenced by, the actual fighting. This bifurcation is partly a matter of preference and partly a by-product of the American tradition of subordinating military

command to civilian leadership, which creates two separate spheres of responsibility, one for diplomacy and one for combat ... *the American style of warfare amounts to a way of battle more than a way of war*.[24]

Another highly respected historian, Hew Strachan, declares that the focus in Clausewitz's *On War* on the aphorism "war is a continuation with an admixture of other means" has caused readers to believe erroneously that this is a statement about the nature of war. In actuality, war's nature "is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." This error, he maintains, has contributed to a conflation of policy and strategy in the minds of many current civilian and military leaders. According to Strachan, the conflation has effectively diverted senior military officers from thinking about strategy, thus disconnecting strategy from operations, and in turn precluding conceptual thinking about smaller conflicts.[25]

We know of no source Marines can turn to that better places operational art in the context of policy, strategy, war, and warfare than the 1986 edition of *FM 100-5*. Commanders and planners will find current joint terminology verbose and confusing compared to the concise language of *FM 100-5*. As an example, compare the definition of operational art in the Army manual—"Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations"—to the following *Joint Publication 1-02* definition: "The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means."[26] This definition says nothing about tying strategy to tactics and hides the idea of conducting operations behind the ends, ways, and means construct. Moreover, it adds words that have marginal utility. What does "supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment" add to an officer's understanding of operational art?

Marines wanting to delve deeper into the U.S. military's post-Vietnam intellectual renaissance have several excellent sources regarding the Army and Marine Corps but few for the other Services.

To push the argument further, compare the 1986 FM 100-5's definition of strategy, to *Joint Publication 1-02's* definition. The former: "Military strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force."[27] The latter: "A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."[28] Would we expect a nation or its military deliberately to offer an imprudent idea or set of ideas? Even if an idea is imprudent, is it still not a strategy, albeit a poor one? Will the phrase "synchronized and integrated fashion" improve a leaders's understanding of strategy? We remain convinced that Marines will be better off if they are able to place operational art in its larger context and to converse in plain, simple English.

Conclusion

The development of operational theory in the United States was an important outgrowth of the post-Vietnam War military reforms. In the Marine Corps, it was an important adjunct to the development of maneuver warfare theory. Many people inside and outside the military mistakenly believe that the Army and Marine Corps, and later the larger joint community, drew most, if not all, of their ideas about operational art from German ideas worked out in the years leading up to World War II. While Army and Marine Corps leaders certainly showed great interest in German interwar military thought, many of the key operational ideas offered in the 1980s with respect to operational art came from Russian and Soviet literature. The theoretical rigor long associated with operational art mostly stemmed from path-breaking work done by the Soviets after World War I.

Marines wanting to delve deeper into the U.S. military's post-Vietnam intellectual renaissance have several excellent sources regarding the Army and Marine Corps but few for the other Services. For Marines, the most comprehensive view is offered by Ian T. Brown's *A New Concept of War: John Boyd, The U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare*.[29] The best overview of the Army's actions is Richard M. Swain's "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army."[30] A useful official document is John L. Romjue's *From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982*.[31]

Notes

1. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945," *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

2. Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

3. Charles Messenger, *The Blitzkrieg Story*, (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976).

4. Tal Tovy, "1930's German Doctrine: A Manifestation of Operational Art," *Military Review,* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, May–June 2015. See also Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, (New York: Ballentine Books, 1957). (Originally published in German in 1950.) See also Azar Gat, *British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

5. Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

6. Matthew Cooper, *The German Army 1933–1945*, (New York, NY: Stein and Day Publishers, 1978).

7. "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945."

8. The spelling of the names of Soviet officers differs among various publications. We have chosen to use those of Richard Harrison in his several books on the Russian and Soviet military.

9. Bruce W. Menning, "The Imperial Russian Legacy of Operational Art, 1878-1914," in *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, eds., (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005).

10. Delbrück's notion of two types of strategies led to much confusion later including within the U.S. military. For a discussion of this issue see *MCG,* Aug 2021.

11. For details on this period, we refer readers to Richard W. Harrison's "Twilight of Empire, 1904–1917," chapter 1, *The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940,* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2001).

12. See Richard Harrison's translation of Isserson's major works, *G.S. Isserson and War of the Future: Key Writings of a Soviet Military Theorist,* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2016); and Kent D. Lee's translation of Svechin's *Strategy*, (Minneapolis, MN: East View Information Services, 1992).

13. Richard W. Harrison's "Twilight of Empire, 1904–1917" from *The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940* and Jacob W. Kipp's "The Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1917–1936" from *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art* are excellent references for this period.

14. David M. Glantz, "Soviet Operational Art Since 1936: The Triumph of Maneuver Warfare," *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, eds., (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005).

15. Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy" in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* Peter Paret, ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

16. Michael R. Matheny presents a persuasive case that the American military practiced operational art at a high level in the Second World War in *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011). He contends that the competence exhibited by American officers stemmed from the professional military education they received in Army schools and colleges during the interwar years. I believe a similar case exists for Navy and Marine Corps officers and the lessons taught by Naval War College instructors during this same period.

17. The remaining third addressed the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, which links operational requirements to the then Five-Year Defense Plan. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systemis now the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process and the Five-Year Defense Plan is now the six-year Future Year Defense Plan.

18. Headquarters Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5*, *Operations,* (Washington, DC: August 1982). The co-authors of this manual were Lieutenant Colonels Huba Wass de Czege and Leonard Donald Holder, Jr.

19. John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1972–1982,* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984); and Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security*, Winter 1980/82, 6179.

20. *FM 100-5, Operations*. LTC Richard H. Sinnreich joined the co-authors of the 1982 edition of this manual in writing the 1986 edition.

21. *FM 100-5*.

22. Jacob W. Kipp, "General Major A.A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory" in Aleksandr A. Svechin's *Strategy,* (Minneapolis, MN: East View Information Services, 1991, a translation of *Strategiia*, Moscow: Voennyivestnik, 1927).

23. Huba Wass de Czege, "Thinking and Acting Like an Early Explorer: Operational Art is Not a Level of War," *Small Wars Journal,* (March 2011), available at http://smallwarsjournal.com.

24. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward an American Way of War*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004).

25. Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For additional discussion on this issue see, Paul K. Van Riper, "From Grand Strategy to Operational Design: Getting it Right," *Infinity Journal*, (Fall 2014), available at https://www.infinityjournal.com.

26. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02*, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* (Washington, DC: November 2010).

27. *FM 100-5.*

28. *Joint Publication 1-02*, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*

29. Ian T. Brown's *A New Concept of War: John Boyd, The U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare,* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2018).

30. Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army," *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*, B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, eds., (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).

31. John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982*, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984).

MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION
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GEN ROBERT E. HOGABOOM LEADERSHIP WRITING CONTEST



Gen Robert E. Hogaboom.

The *Marine Corps Gazette* is proud to announce the commencement of its annual Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest. The contest honors the essay that is the most original in its approach to the various aspects of leadership. Authors should not simply reiterate the Eleven Principles of Leadership or the Fourteen Leadership Traits of an NCO addressed in the *Guidebook for Marines*. Authors must be willing to take an honest, realistic look at what leadership, either positive or negative, means to them and then articulate ways and methods of being an effective leader of Marines.

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Background

The contest is named for Gen Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC(Ret), who served the Corps for 34 years. Upon graduating from the Naval Academy in 1925, Gen Hogaboom saw service in Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. Following action in a number of key Pacific battles in World War II, he later served first as assistant division commander, then division commander, 1st Marine Division, in Korea in 1954–55. Gen Hogaboom retired in 1959 as a lieutenant general while serving as the Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, and was subsequently advanced to the rank of general.

Prizes include $3,000 and an engraved plaque for first place; $1,500 and an engraved plaque for second place; and $500 for honorable mention. All entries are eligible for publication.

Instructions

The contest is open to all Marines on active duty and to members of the Marine Corps Reserve. Electronically submitted entries are preferred. Attach the entry as a file and send to gazette@mca-marines.org. A cover page should be included identifying the manuscript as a Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest entry and include the title of the essay and the author's name. Repeat title on the first page, but author's name should not appear anywhere but on the cover page. Manuscripts are acceptable, but please include a disk in Microsoft Word format with the manuscript. The *Gazette* Editorial Advisory Panel will judge the contest during February and notify all entrants as to the outcome shortly thereafter. Multiple entries are allowed; however, only one entry per author will receive an award.

End the Manpower Road Show

by LtCol Gary J. Sampson

Like me, many Marines who read the *Gazette* probably received the same notification via *Marine Online* that I did on 12 March 2021. It announced a short survey on the effectiveness of the 2020–2021 manpower management "roadshow" that had been conducted virtually as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey asked if I had watched the online video, which replaced the in-person all-hands brief (typically carried out in a base theater someplace). I had, and did I have a call either on the phone or via video chat with my monitor; again, the answer was yes. The final portion of the survey was a free-form text box for additional thoughts and ideas. Not until I started writing in that box did I realize I had some thoughts on this topic—hence this piece.

It is not hard to figure out why Manpower and Reserve Affairs would conduct a survey on this issue. But instead of limiting discussion and feedback on this matter to point-to-point inputs in a relatively anonymous survey form that may never have an effect, let us discuss it here in the pages of our professional journal and intellectual marketplace; I will start. Here is what I wrote in the survey text box, verbatim:

> While it is nice to be able to sit across from my monitor and interact with them, the logistics required to do so can reduce the quality of the interaction even under the best of circumstances. For example, during the traditional in-person roadshow interview, you (as the interviewee) almost always have to go somewhere outside your own office building or space. When I was on a fellowship in the Boston area, this meant driving 60–90 minutes to Newport, RI, then accessing an unfamiliar base, unfamiliar buildings, finding (hopefully in time) the office tucked away someplace where the monitor was at to speak with him for 10–15 minutes. Reversing the process and adding the time commitment, you are looking at a half-day sunk into a very short interview interaction. Same sort of logistics for seeing the monitor in Okinawa, which I have done a couple times. Going to a different base from where you live/work, etc., etc. Going virtual takes all that "overhead" out of the way. I can do a quick phone call with the monitor from my desk at work, or from my computer or phone at home. It takes just 10 or 15 minutes—no other logistics required. The quality of the information shared and the dialogue are comparable to what you get in person, minus a little bit of not being able to see the person (if using the phone), or seeing them via a screen. This is to say nothing of the logistics and burden the monitors and support staff undergo to carry out their "Long March" every year. Virtually, the monitor isn't jet-lagged. They aren't wondering how their family is doing back home while they are globetrotting to see their managed population of officers. I see a lot of good reasons to continue with virtual and really just some arguments like "this is how we have always done things" to go back to the in-person model. I know one of the arguments for the way it has traditionally been done is that it shows the organizational commitment to manpower and talent management. OK, I get that, but maybe the cost and time savings you get from virtual roadshow/interview you can reinvest back into making the system itself work better and be more effective in matching talent with "employers" in the manpower ecosystem. Yes, I am alluding to looking at best practices and benchmarking with changes taking place in other Services' talent management processes, like the Air Force and Army. We can learn a thing or two from how they are giving more agency to the individual soldier/airman and unit commanders. Our centrally-managed process is anachronistic and needs updating.

>LtCol Sampson is Section Head for Executive Support at Information Intelligence Division, Deputy Commandant for Information, Headquarters Marine Corps. Previous Pentagon assignments include Forces Analyst, OSD Red Team, and Special Assistant to the 19th and 20th Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is an Intelligence Officer and Northeast Asia (China) Foreign Area Officer.

Because a virtual roadshow offers the same value at a fraction of the cost, Manpower and Reserve Affairs should end the in-person roadshow now and reinvest the savings …

As you can see, all my thoughts centered on how the traditional, in-person roadshow is wasteful and unnecessary. Because a virtual roadshow offers the same value at a fraction of the cost, Manpower and Reserve Affairs should end the

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in-person roadshow now and reinvest the savings it reaps in both time and money into fundamental manpower management reforms that improve the year-to-year experiences of the customers who interact with the process. Such reforms will benefit not only the individual Marines and their families, whose lives and Marine Corps experiences are profoundly affected by the outcome of our talent management system and process, but to the unit commanders and staffs who are working to build the best teams to accomplish their mission.

The *Force Design 2030* process continues to bring profound changes to how the Corps organizes and equips itself to meet future challenges. Now is the perfect time to make the same caliber of changes and investments in the future on the *people* side of the ledger—all to make the Corps better able to compete for the talent it requires to compete and win against the Nation's strategic rivals. Modernize our manpower and talent management systems, processes, and procedures now, and start by ending the annual manpower roadshow.

USMC

Quote to Ponder:

"Only a fighting nation can make itself responsible for world peace, and such a nation must organize its material resources and manpower with the highest possible degree of efficiency."

—Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1887–1975, Chairman, Director General, Premier and first President of the Republic of China 1931–1975

Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations

reviewed by Maj Skip Crawley, USMCR(Ret)





DECISIVE AND INDECISIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS: The Western Front, Summer 1944. By Charles J. Dick. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016.
ISBN: 978-0700622931, 485 pp.

Charles J. Dick, a "former airborne and ... intelligence officer in the British Army" who directed the Soviet Studies Research Center at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst 1989–2004, has written a magnificent book detailing the operational art. Dick's book, *Decisive and Indecisive Operations*, is divided into two volumes. Though both volumes cover the summer of 1944, they are studies in contrast. One volume is set on the western end of the European continent and illustrates what happens when the operational art is not applied during a campaign; the other volume is set on the opposite end of the European continent and demonstrates the very different results when the operational art is successfully applied during a campaign.

Volume 1, *From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944*, analyzes the military situation on the Western Front. The author's analysis spans from Operation COBRA, where the Allied forces succeeded in their breakout from Normandy, to the dash across France culminating in the near stalemate at the Franco-German border as a result of logistical strain and a stiffening German resistance. Dick makes the argument that by failing to apply the operational art—by concentrating, at best, only on winning the next battle, and at worst, focusing on seizing terrain, instead of focusing on destroying the German Army—the Western Allies (namely the Americans, British, and Canadians) squandered their chance to decisively defeat the German Army in 1944 on the Western Front and end the war earlier.

>Maj Crawley is a former infantry officer who served during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. He is currently the Central Regional Network Coordinator for the Marine for Life Network.

Volume 2, *From Defeat to Victory: The Eastern Front, Summer 1944*, covers the Eastern Front in the same time period from Operation BAGRATION, the destruction of Army Group Center and to the Soviets reaching their culmination point on the outskirts of Warsaw. The crucial difference lies in how the Soviets applied the operational art as they fought their campaign. When the Soviet forces were forced to halt because they were outrunning their supply lines, they were in a very advantageous position to resume their offensive when they were logistically able to do so in January 1945.

What Is the Operational Art?

"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."[1]

If you understand this exchange, then you understand the essence of the operational art. We won all the battles in the Vietnam War, yet lost the war. How is that possible? Ultimately, the battles we fought did not contribute much toward accomplishing our strategic goal of winning the war. If you fight battles—*even if you win every engagement,* like we did in Vietnam—that do not contribute toward winning the war, then are an irrelevant expenditure of time, resources, money, and lives. As Dick explains, the operational art "must produce a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts, which results in

progress toward a successful campaign and thence strategic success." More succinctly, the operational art is "the critical connecting link between strategy and tactics."

If the Vietnam War illustrates the steep cost of the failure to apply the operational art, an outstanding example of its successful application is MG Nathanael Greene's 1781 Southern Campaign. In 1780, we suffered two major battlefield defeats. An entire 5,000-man Continental Army surrendered to the British at Charleston in May 1780, the greatest American defeat of the Revolutionary War. Three months later, we lost half an army at the Battle of Camden because of MG Horatio Gate's incompetence and disastrous handling of the battle. But in the first nine months of 1781, Greene fought four battles, *lost all four battles*, and freed North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia from British control—except for the ports of Charleston and Savanah. But most importantly, Greene's dogged resistance convinced LTG Charles Cornwallis of the futility in attempting to defeat the American forces in the lower southern states. LTG Cornwallis's army was then maneuvered into Virginia—where his army was eventually encircled and defeated at Yorktown.

How was Greene able to force LTG Cornwallis to abandon the conquest of the lower southern states? While each of the four battles was a tactical defeat for Greene, in the sense that the British held the field of battle after each engagement (18th century definition of "winning" a battle), the end result was always favorable for the American cause. Hearing of Cornwallis' "victory" at Guilford Courthouse—the first and largest of the four battles—where Cornwallis lost a quarter of his army while Greene's was ready to fight again the next day; one member of Parliament stated that "another such victory would ruin the British Army."[2] Later in the campaign, Greene laid siege to Ninety-Six, a fortified village. Upon the approach of the British relief column, Greene was forced to lift his siege and withdraw. Knowing Greene would again lay siege to Ninety-Six once the relief force left, the British abandoned the position. While Greene failed to take Ninety-Six through direct action as intended, his presence yielded the same results. In the end, each of Greene's "defeats" contributed to the successful prosecution of his campaign—and ultimately the war.

The Western Front: "Culmination short of a strategic result"

After successfully landing at Normandy, the Western Allies were hemmed in their lodgment for approximately six weeks before they successfully broke out and dashed across France—only to stall at the German border as a result of an over-extended supply line.

> ***It is just enough to be proficient in tactics to win the next battle; rather, it is necessary to be proficient in the operational art ...***

But why did the Western Allies fall "short of a strategic result" prior to reaching the operational culmination of the campaign because of outrunning their logistics? Or, as Dick asks, why did they not inflict "more damage on the enemy and ... [seize] major bridgeheads over the Rhine to launch the final campaign from a favorable line of departure?" The author asserts that the Allies did not convert "minor tactical achievements into bigger ones ... [they failed to convert] tactical into operational success and operational success into campaign-changing success." It is just enough to be proficient in tactics to win the next battle; rather, it is necessary to be proficient in the operational art, "to know where, when, and how to seek battle" and to convert that initial tactical success into greater operational success.

In theory, the U.S. Army understood the importance of destroying the German Army. Eisenhower's mission from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), after securing a "lodgment on the Continent,"[3] was to conduct "operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces." Eisenhower asserted, correctly, that taking the Ruhr was the best objective to accomplish his CSS-directed mission. Establishing the Ruhr as his objective would force the German Army to defend the "heart of the German war economy," providing the Allies an opportunity to destroy the Wehrmacht in the West *and* cut the heart out of German industrial capacity.

So far, this logic makes sense; the Allies have a concise mission, a viable strategy, good objectives, and they won the great majority of the battles they fought. But at the end of campaign in the Summer of 1944, strategic success eluded them. Why? As Dick demonstrates, the Allies failed to turn "tactical into operational success." Two examples, Operation DRAGOON and the seizure of Antwerp, illustrate Dick's point.

Operation DRAGOON in August 1944 was conducted primarily because Eisenhower wanted to use Marseille and the other southern French ports to augment the capacity of the ports along the French Atlantic coast. However, Eisenhower did not insist that DRAGOON be conducted simultaneously with the Normandy landings; doing so would land Allied forces in the rear of the German Army in Normandy to cut off its retreat and destroy it (the original plan, named Operation ANVIL). The potential of Operation DRAGOON was not realized because of Eisenhower's focus on fighting separate battles (Normandy and Marseille) instead of destroying the Wehrmacht in France through a pincer movement.

Eisenhower recognized the importance of getting the port of Antwerp

into operation as soon as possible, considering "Antwerp of first importance of all our endeavors on entire front from Switzerland to Channel" (Eisenhower telegraph to Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery). While Antwerp was easily liberated by the British 21st Army Group on 4 September, it was not usable until both banks of the Scheldt Estuary—which connected it to the Atlantic—was cleared of Germans. Despite the absolute importance of Antwerp in accomplishing his CSS-directed mission, Eisenhower did not order Montgomery to clear the Scheldt Estuary until a month had passed; even then, it took another month to clear the estuary. Dick suggests that if Eisenhower ordered Montgomery to clear the Scheldt Estuary as soon as Antwerp itself was captured, the logistical situation for the Western Allies would have greatly improved:

> Enough supply and transport would quickly have become available to allow all British and American ground units and formations, as well as reinforcements as they arrived, to move forward. Possession of Antwerp as a working port would have been a combat multiplier.

Ultimately, had Eisenhower ensured the expedient functionality of the port of Antwerp, then it is likely that the Allied forces would have been able to secure bridgeheads over the Rhine as opposed to losing momentum at the German border. Since Eisenhower understood the importance of Antwerp, why did he not ensure it was put in operation sooner? In the end, he allowed a dissipation of Allied effort, telling LTG Omar Bradley to take the Brittany port of Cherbourg (which was not greatly used after its capture because it was too far from the front line), allowing Montgomery to attempt MARKET GARDEN, and allowing other subordinates to pull him in various directions at various times. A critical part of the operational art is making the right decision and concentrating resources toward it. In the case of Antwerp, Eisenhower failed to do so.

Dick acknowledges how Eisenhower and his subordinates were tactically proficient and won battles; however, he criticizes them for failing to turn their tactical successes into operational successes because they were thinking at the tactical level, not at the operational level. Commanders need to think ahead in time and space; they need to think beyond the tactical level to achieve strategic objectives with the least cost in time and lives.

Dick asserts that logistical restraints prevented the Western Allies from concluding the war on the Western Front in 1944; but, if they had successfully applied the operational art, they could have "seized major bridgeheads over the Rhine to launch the final campaign from a favorable line of departure." They would have a "strategic result" that would prompt their final drive into Germany. This is exactly what the Soviets did on the opposite end of the continent during the same time frame.

The Red Army: Practitioners of the Operational Art

From its inception, the Red Army was a proponent of the operational art. Why? As Dick explains, "The Red Army, as befitted a force intended to spread revolution at the point of the bayonet ... [and] was to carry any war into the enemy's territory from the outset" emphasized "annihilation ... the attainment of decisive victory and destruction of the enemy."

In the 1920s and 1930s, a group of Red Army officers developed and refined a doctrine of the operational art and developed the tools for its implementation. They formed mechanized corps to conduct exploitation and developed the capability to drop large numbers of paratroopers behind enemy lines—a capability that is utilized only for offensive operations. However, Stalin's Great Purge of 1937–38 decimated the Red Army's officer corps and removed its most capable officers, including those who developed the doctrine and were "capable ... of implementing its demanding operational theory." The purge negated the work of those who developed the Red Army's doctrine of the operational art. The doctrine developed in the 1920s and 1930s had to be reconstructed at great expense in the blood spilled during the first three years of the war.

How did the Soviets implement their doctrine of the operational art in practice?

- Step 1: Attack on a narrow front, accepting "heavy initial casualties" to gain a penetration.
- Step 2: Turn the penetration into a breakthrough, unleashing tank armies and "shock groups" into the rear of the Germans.
- Step 3: Endeavor to destroy entire German formations by enclosing them in pincers. The offensive culminated when the Red Army outran their logistics.

The Red Army successfully applied the operational art against the Germans in the summer of 1944; however, this success needs to be put in context. Stalin allowed his generals the latitude to conduct operational maneuver; Hitler did not. Hitler's incessant "micro-control of operations" and his "no retreat" policy prevented the Wehrmacht, with very few exceptions, from utilizing their superior ability to conduct maneuver warfare to counter the Soviet's attacks with their increasingly overwhelming advantage in manpower and material.[4] After Kursk, the only viable option the Wehrmacht had to stave off disaster were "counter-offensive[s] against an overstretched enemy advance."[5] Something Hitler, obsessed with holding territory, would not permit.

This answers the question of why Soviet operations on the Eastern

A critical part of the operational art is making the right decision and concentrating resources toward it.

Front were successful in achieving their strategic objections in the Summer of 1944 while the Western Allies were not. The Soviets applied the operational art, destroyed numerous Germany formations, and made tremendous gains. The Western Allies fought successive battles, attrited the Germany Army to a large extent, and gained much territory; however, they failed to destroy the German Army as a viable fighting force.

Weaknesses

While I enjoyed reading both volumes and learned much about the operational art, there are a few issues with *Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations*. Most importantly, there is a problem with Dick writing in Volume Two as if the German High Command—*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)*—made the decisions on the Eastern Front. In fact, Hitler made all operational- and strategic-level decisions for Germany from the start of Operation BARBAROSSA until the end of the war. It is inexplicable to this reviewer that Dick, a former director of the Soviet Studies Research Center, does not understand this. Dick's analysis of German options for each campaign year is cogent, correct, and insightful; however, he writes as if he believes that OKW made the decisions when only Hitler did.

The second problem with Dick's narrative is his failure to understand that Gen Ulysses S. Grant executed operational maneuver in the summer of 1864 while fighting Gen Robert E. Lee during the Overland Campaign in Virginia. Dick congratulates Grant on using "brilliant maneuvers against Vicksburg" in 1863 but then states that Grant fell back on "attrition" for the 1864 campaign. Absolutely not true. As Grant biographer, Jean Edward Smith, explains, Grant took "an enormous gamble," exposing "the Army of the Potomac to piecemeal destruction" when he moved "the Army to the south side of the James River [where he] would cut Lee's supply line," force Lee to the open, "and prepare for a final showdown."[6] If Lee had realized what Grant was doing, he could have potentially defeated the Army of the Potomac in detail as it was divided on separate sides of the James River. In fact, the actual operational maneuver went well; however, after Grant got them into position to take Petersburg, two corps commanders stalled in front of Petersburg despite outnumbering the Confederate troops 50,000 to 7,000. When they finally attacked 48 hours later, Lee's army arrived and the situation devolved into a siege. Smith believes that the risks Grant took in 1864 were greater than the ones he took at Vicksburg in 1863 and that Grant maneuvering the Army of the Potomac south of the James "might have ended [the war] eight months sooner" if not for the timidity of the two above corps commanders.[7] Like the previous criticism, this reviewer does not comprehend why Dick, author of this excellent two-volume book about the operational art, fails to recognize Grant's execution of the operational art in 1864.

Lastly, Dick utilizes the British practice of unit designation for American units. Naturally, Dick utilizes the British practice for British formations—Montgomery's command is correctly rendered "21 Army Group," but he inappropriately utilizes it for American units. So, Bradley's "12th Army Group" becomes "12 Army Group" and Patton's "3rd Army" becomes "3 Army." This designation is inappropriate for U.S. units.

Conclusion

Every Marine officer is well trained and schooled in tactics. Most officers intuitively understand the importance of sound strategy. But there is a lack of understanding of the operational art that connects tactics and strategy. Charles J. Dick has put his experience to good use in writing an outstanding treatise of the operational art, which illustrates the connection very well.

Many years ago, I read Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's classic memoir, *Lost Victories*. At the time, I read a quote stating that anyone desiring to understand the operational art should read *Lost Victories* once a year.[8] After reading *Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations*, I argue that Dick's book supersedes *Lost Victories* as the single best book to read concerning the operational art. While I do not suggest reading *Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations* once a year, I do strongly recommending reading this book if an officer wants to understand the operational art and its correct application.

... there is a lack of understanding of the operational art which connects tactics and strategy.

Notes

1. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, (New York, NY: The Random House Publishing Group, 1982).

2. Angus Konstam, *Guilford Courthouse 1781: Lord Cornwallis's Ruinous Victory*, (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2013).

3. David W. Hogan, Jr., *A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943–1945*, (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2006).

4. Mungo Melvin, *Manstein: Hitler's Greatest General*, (London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010).

5. Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories*, (Minneapolis, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2004).

6. Jean Edward Smith, *Grant*, (New York, NY: Simon & Shuster Paperbacks, 2001).

7. Ibid.

8. Reviewer attempted to find the source of the quote but was unable to.

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