HAPPY BIRTHDAY
U.S. MARINE CORPS

Congratulations on your 244th anniversary

We salute you on this day of great celebration and remembrance. Thank you for your unwavering honor, courage and commitment in defense of our freedom by land, sea and air. Semper Fi!

L3Harris.com

The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.
November 2019
Volume 103 Number 11

IDEAS AND ISSUES

10 “Make Less the Depth of Grief”
Col John McKay
Capt Scott A. Holmes
2ndLt Rykar B. Lewis
Mr. Jason Breidenbach &
Mr. Wayne Breakfield

12 The First of Many
Capt Scott A. Holmes

17 The Professor in Korea
2ndLt Rykar B. Lewis

20 The OV-10
Mr. Jason Breidenbach &
Mr. Wayne Breakfield

26 Barriers to Interwar Innovation
MAJ Ryan Dunbar
Mr. Justin Williamson
LtCol Timothy E. Grebos

28 For Lack of Doctrine

31 If Practicable? Exactly!

34 Getting Back Into the
“Cold Weather Business”
Ms. Zsofia Budai
LTC Lester W. Grau
1stLt Ross W. Gilchriest
1stLt Woody Dewing
Col Mike Fallon
LCpl Armstead Liebl

38 Arctic Riverine Operations

44 Team China, World Police

49 The French Foreign Legion

52 A 2025 Squad Firefight Tactical “hot spot”

56 Fighting Over Parsley?

59 The Resurrection of General O.P. Smith
Maj Ryan W. Pallas
Lcdr Jonathan Lushenko

63 Warrior Scholarship for the Junior Officer

66 Po River Valley Wargame
Capt Matthew Tweedy
2ndLt Jonathan Scott
1stLt Walker D. Mills
Maj Alfred B. Ruggles
Mr. Paul Westermeyer

69 Memoir ‘44

72 A New, Old Kind of PME

75 We Should Study More Dead Russians

78 Historiography for Marines

79 The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook
Capt Valerie J. Cranmer

83 2018 National Defense Strategy
BGen J. Scott O’Meara
Maj Robert P. Gerbracht

87 On Mules and Mosaics

90 Operation FROM THE SEA
Capt Daniel D. Phillips

93 Operation FROM THE SEA

DEPARTMENTS

3 Editorial

6 Special Notices

7 Letters

9 CMC Birthday Message

98 Observation Post

99 Books

104 Index to Advertisers

104 Writers’ Guidelines

99 Book Review

The Marine Corps Gazette (ISSN 0025–3170) is published monthly by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas that will advance knowledge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Periodicals postage paid at Quantico, VA, USPS #329-340, and at additional mailing offices. • OPINIONS expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Department of Defense, Navy Department, or Headquarters Marine Corps. “Marine Corps” and the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor are trademarks of the U.S. Marine Corps, used with permission. • MEMBERSHIP RATE: Annual $42.00 • MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: Contact Member Services, 1–866–622–1775. • ADVERTISING QUERIES: Defense Related Industries/Business: Contact LeeAnn Mitchell, Advertising@mca-marines.org 703-640-0174. All other Advertising Contact James G. Elliott Co. Inc., Phone New York: 212-588-9200 Chicago: 312-236-4900 Los Angeles: 213-624-0900. • COPYRIGHT 2019 by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation. All reprint rights reserved. • EDITORIAL/BUSINESS OFFICES: All mail and other queries to Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Phone 703–640–0140. Location: Bldg #715, Broadway St., Quantico, VA 22134. • E-MAIL ADDRESS: gazette@mca-marines.org. • WEB ADDRESS: www.mca-marines.org/gazette. • CHANGE OF ADDRESS: POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Marine Corps Gazette, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or e-mail: mca@mca-marines.org. For credit card orders, call 866-622-1775. PUBLISHER’S STATEMENT: Publication of advertisements does not constitute endorsement by MCA&F except for such products or services clearly offered under the MCA&F’s name. The publisher reserves the right to accept or reject any advertising order at his absolute discretion.
The Marine Corps Gazette is proud to announce the commencement of its annual Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest. The contest honors the essay that is the most original in its approach to the various aspects of leadership. Authors should not simply reiterate the 11 Principles of Leadership or the 14 Leadership Traits of an NCO addressed in the Guidebook for Marines. Authors must be willing to take an honest, realistic look at what leadership, either positive or negative, means to them and then articulate ways and methods of being an effective leader of Marines.

Background
The contest is named for Gen Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC(Ret), who served the Corps for 34 years. Upon graduating from the Naval Academy in 1925, Gen Hogaboom saw service in Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. Following action in a number of key Pacific battles in World War II, he later served first as assistant division commander, then division commander, 1st Marine Division, in Korea in 1954–55. Gen Hogaboom retired in 1959 as a lieutenant general while serving as the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and was subsequently advanced to the rank of general.

Prizes include $3,000 and an engraved plaque for first place; $1,500 and an engraved plaque for second place; and $500 for honorable mention. All entries are eligible for publication.

Instructions
The contest is open to all Marines on active duty and to members of the Marine Corps Reserve. Electronically submitted entries are preferred. Attach the entry as a file and send to gazette@mca-marines.org. A cover page should be included identifying the manuscript as a Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest entry and include the title of the essay and the author’s name. Repeat title on the first page, but author’s name should not appear anywhere but on the cover page. Manuscripts are acceptable, but please include a disk in Microsoft Word format with the manuscript. The Gazette Editorial Advisory Panel will judge the contest during February and notify all entrants as to the outcome shortly thereafter. Multiple entries are allowed; however, only one entry per author will receive an award.

DEADLINE: 31 January

E-mail entries to: gazette@mca-marines.org
Mail entries to: Marine Corps Gazette
Hogaboom Writing Contest
Box 1775
Quantico, VA 22134

Sponsored by: Raytheon
Editorial: Happy Birthday Marines

First, everyone at the Gazette and the Marine Corps Association & Foundation wishes all Marines and friends of the Corps a happy 244th birthday. Whether in plush ballrooms, on the mess decks of the fleet, or in remote austere locations across the globe, we gather to celebrate the fellowship of our Corps, remember our fallen comrades, and rededicate ourselves to the ideals MajGen John A. Lejeune summed up as “military efficiency and soldierly virtue.”

This month’s cover highlights the broad range of topics presented in the magazine. From history and esprit de Corps, to leadership, amphibious operations, and an analysis of the National Defense Strategy, we offer a range of content authored by Marines from the ranks of lance corporal to brigadier general—and of course our 38th Commandant’s Birthday Message.

In addition to all of the cover articles, I encourage a close reading of the following stand-out articles. First, on page 10 we have published a speech given by Col John McKay (Ret) at the Marines Memorial in San Francisco about the life-altering loss of loved ones in war that is especially relevant during this season that recognizes the history of the Corps.

Two articles this month are based on the life and service of Gen O.P. Smith. In “The Professor in Korea,” by 2ndLt Rykar B. Lewis on page 17, the author describes the careful calculations, foresight, and personal ethics of this “professorial” man who led 1st Marine Division in the Korean War. In “Barriers to Interwar Innovation” on page 26, MAJ Ryan Dunbar, U.S. Army, presents an essay examining the obstacles to innovative thinking created by pre-conceived ideas and ambiguity about the next conflict. “Fighting Over Parsley?” is a fairly obscure historical example of expeditionary operations presented on page 56 in which LCpl Armstead Liebl studies the Spanish interventions on Persil Island off Morocco in 2002. Of note, LCpl Liebl is a third generation Marine carrying on the family tradition of dedication to the profession of arms, BZ, Marine.

Several of our offerings this month present contrarian views and may generate some controversy in our ongoing professional discussion. In “The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook” by Capt Valerie J Cranmer on page 90, the author proposes a “checklist for success” through standardization of every conceivable practice in the Marine Corps. Commander’s intent, “trust tactics,” and decentralization to the lowest capable level of leadership simply cannot and do not work in the Information Age. Finally, in “Operation FROM THE SEA” on page 93, Capt Daniel D. Phillips presents an imaginative vignette describing the failure of a future forced entry operation and the “loss of the Pacific” because of improper implementation of our maneuver warfare principles. Whether you agree or disagree with any of these authors’ positions, I encourage you to use all the resources available on the Gazette web page www.mca-marines.org/Gazette to share your thoughts. Be professional, be tactful, be fact-based, and let your voice be heard.

Once again, Happy 244th Birthday. Semper Fidelis!

Christopher Woodbridge
New Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps

SgtMaj Troy E. Black received the Sword of Office from SgtMaj Ronald L. Green during a Relief and Appointment ceremony at Marine Barracks Washington, 26 July 2019, signifying his new position as the 19th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. SgtMaj Black, a 31-year Marine veteran, assumed responsibility as the senior ranking enlisted Marine in the Corps.

Reunions

Org: USMC Vietnam Tankers Association Reunion
Dates: 31 October - 3 November
Place: Seattle, WA
POC: Bruce Van Apeldoorn bvanapeldoornsr@gmail.com

Correction

In the article, “A Command Climate Survey” (Oct19, p. 26), Dr. Fred Galloway’s bio should have read that he is a distinguished professor at the University of San Diego. The Gazette apologizes for the error.

MV-22 Completes Trans-Pacific Flight

Marines with Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) completed a trans-Pacific flight in MV-22 Ospreys, transiting from Darwin, Australia, to their home station at Marine Corps Base Hawaii on 19 September. The flight consisted of four MV-22 Ospreys from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 363, reinforced, and was supported by two KC-130J Hercules from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152. It was conducted to improve the Osprey trans-Pacific concept that was developed and refined over the past three MRF-D iterations.

For an aircraft that is accustomed to getting combat-loaded Marines in and out of landing zones, the trans-Pacific flight demonstrated the tremendous breadth of capability the Osprey brings to the table. (From www.marines.mil.)

Quote to Ponder:

For years, Marine Corps combat histories have cited brilliant examples of physical courage in battle. The demands for moral courage are daily events in peacetime, as well as war. Any lack of honesty or complete moral integrity in all matters destroys the main fibers of the military profession. Any temptations to give our seniors reports that they would like to hear rather than what they should hear, to mislead, to misinform, to falsity performances or to exaggerate readiness status – does nothing but damage to the Corps and its character.

“The Old Gunny Says …”
—Leatherneck Magazine, 1962
The Defense Industrial Base and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and Intent

President Donald J. Trump issued an Executive Order 13806, which was compiled and published in September 2018. How many members of Congress, secretaries in the cabinet, or chiefs of the Services have read it?

How does this apply to all the Services? It demonstrates how we as a Nation will fight and win wars we choose to participate in, regardless of our Allies’ involvement.

The Marine Corps’ future will depend upon how well we fare financially with Congress, defense contractors, and lobbyists. These segments will help determine the force design for our Marines, aircraft, and naval shipping. Among the combat ships for the Navy, amphibious warfare is not a high priority. Specifically, the CH-53 is the strategic workhorse for the GCE, ACE, and LCE.

Wake Island

“Well Done” to Maj Bates for the fine article published in the May 2019 edition of the Gazette. Maj Devereux, as accurately reported, made mistakes; however, under the circumstances, he surmounted the odds and made Marine Corps history during this early stage of the war. Devereux’s leadership and tactics are further recorded in LtCol Walter L.J. Bayler’s extraordinary 1943 publication, “Last Man Off Wake Island.” LtCol Bayler later served as Marine Air Group Communications Officer on Guadalcanal (Legion of Merit w/Combat “V”). Of note, Col Bayler was present at the Japanese surrender of Wake Island on 4 September 1945. Col Devereux was released from brutal Japanese captivity as POW on Hokkaido Island, Japan, on 15 September 1945.

LtCol J.P. Leonard III, USMC(Ret)

Having lived and worked on Wake Island for eighteen years after my retirement from the Marine Corps, I enjoyed Maj Bates’ article. Wake is a fascinating island and is heavily steeped in Marine Corps history. It was a favorite overnight stopover for Gen Carl Mundy when he made his visits to WestPac as Commandant. One thing I wished Maj Bates included in his article is a mention of the actions of Capt Henry “Hammerin’ Hank” Elrod, the first aviator to receive the Medal of Honor during World War II. After all of VMF-211’s aircraft had been destroyed, members of the squadrons continued the defense of the island, fighting as infantry. Unfortunately, Capt Elrod was killed on the final day of the battle. Capt Elrod and LtCol Alfred A. Cunningham, the first Marine Corps aviator, are honored at the Georgia Aviation Hall of Fame located at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

Ronald Wheeler

Thanks to Maj Ralph S. Bates, Sr., for his reminder of the heroism of the Marines of 1st Defense Battalion and VMA-211 who fought bravely in the first days of World War II to defend Wake Island, (MCG, May 2019). As a postscript to his fine review of the action, we should remember the defenders of Wake Island for their bravery and sacrifice.

Capt Elrod’s heroics were not known to Marine authorities until after the war ...

LtCol Mike Janay, USMC(Ret)

Now for the “hard stuff.” First, the national pool for recruits is decreasing because of obesity, drug abuse, and legal problems. The Marine Corps will have to “compete” with the other Services. Second, the Navy-Marine Corps Team desperately needs re-partnering to begin to be perceived as a naval expeditionary force. Third, the Marine Corps is the only Service with the MAGTF configuration which “teaches and trains” our commanding officers to control ground, aviation, and logistics elements concurrently. No one else can do it! Finally, how to beat the enemy’s anti-access/area denial capabilities? We could resurrect Navy ships rusting away and doing nothing in the Reserve Fleet by placing mobile-swarm airborne launchers on their decks. It would be cheaper and easier to neutralize the threat by attacking it.

In conclusion, the recruiting and retention issues can be handled by the Corps itself. But amphibious and spare parts for our aircraft (the F-35 is an absolute tactical CAS necessity and it uses 130 pounds rare earth metals per aircraft) require multiple sources of supply and manufacturing!

The entire Gazette is now online at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.
In the storied history of our Corps, certain unimpeachable images stand forth as unparalleled in capturing the tradition and ethos of what it means to be a United States Marine. Now we celebrate the 244th birthday of our Corps and recall the thoughts, reflections, and esprit that epitomize all Marines. The Gazette offers memoirs and heartfelt tributes as a salute to all Marines past and present, those still living, and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to our great Nation.
A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

This year, the Marine Corps celebrates 244 years of warfighting excellence and uncommon valor. United States Marines define the world’s image of elite warrior-citizens. We take great pride in the legacy built by those who came before us and in carrying that legacy into the future. Capabilities, battlefields, and adversaries change, and Marines continue to adapt to every challenge—prepared to fight and win wherever and whenever our Nation calls. What does not change is the Marine spirit—a warrior spirit rooted in our core values.

The strength of our Corps is our Marines. Our success depends on all Marines embodying the values in which our Corps was founded; it requires leveraging the talents and ingenuity of every Marine to strengthen our Corps. Since 1775, courageous Marines have answered the call to fight for freedom and shaped our reputation as the most feared fighting force the world has seen. Marines from each generation approached every battle with a lethal combination of versatility, perseverance, and adaptability that has allowed us to prevail in any clime and place.

Throughout the 244-year history of the Marine Corps, our Nation has required Marines to adapt capabilities and fighting styles to defeat adversaries in all domains. The Marines who took to the seas with naval counterparts to combat the Barbary Pirates solidified our role as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. World War I saw Marines fighting sustained land campaigns and returning from those battles to immediately begin redesigning how to go to war. Those innovations laid the foundation for the amphibious landings of World War II. Combat operations in Korea and Vietnam brought harsh climates and unforgiving terrains that again forced Marines to adapt and overcome. In Iraq and Afghanistan, urban battlefields and counterinsurgency tactics demanded innovations in warfighting strategies and capabilities. Today, we find ourselves once again facing new and evolving threats in different operational environments. Like our predecessors, we will move forward with the lessons learned from past conflicts while redesigning the force and innovating for future conflict with any adversary who dares to fight.

Marines, congratulations on 244 years of excellence. Like the first birthday message published by 13th Commandant General John Lejeune in 1921, this message serves as a reminder of the legacy we are charged with upholding. Today is our day to celebrate our heritage and to honor the sacrifices of those who fought before us. It is also a day to recommit ourselves to our core values and resolutely pursue the strength of character that defines United States Marines. And it is a day to look toward future battlefields, to prepare to uphold the distinguished warfighting legacy of our predecessors wherever our Nation calls.

Happy Birthday, Marines!

DAVID H. BERGER
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps
On 22 February, Col McKay, USMC(Ret), gave the following speech at the Marines’ Memorial Club in San Francisco, CA, to the Annual California Gold Star Parents’ Honor and Remembrance formal dinner.

Thank you, General Huly. Contrary to what the General has just related, I was very kind to him when he visited me at HQMC. In point of fact, I was known as the “friendly infantry monitor!”

General Myatt, your efforts and significance in making this all-important event possible are both recognized and deeply appreciated. Thank you, Sir, Gold Star Parents, I am humbled before the magnificence of your courage and fortitude. You have done me a great honor. In peace, children inter their parents; war violates the order of nature and causes parents to inter their children.

We live in a society that skirts around speaking of grief, even more so, of death. All of you are poignantly enduring one of the most tragic events in any person’s life. You are all in a dark, raw place. The meaningless flutter of platitudes, the misplaced focus of awkward proffering of condolences in the guise of others’ own—almost universally minor—trials and tribulations, more often the fumbling offerings of insensibilities that neither grasp nor can even begin to appreciate your acute pain. These gestures, well meaning in principle, offer scant recognition that you, all of you, are in an unknown and terrible twilight from which you will never entirely emerge. You are literally transformed, forever changed. And, let’s be honest, the change is lifelong and not always propitious. It is true that some degree of redemption from, a coming to grips of sorts with, the mortality of your dearly beloved, and, yes, with your very own mortality, does occur. That is but meager comfort, much less any recompense, for the irreplaceable losses you have suffered. You have an absolute right to whatever you are feeling and whenever you are feeling those feelings. It is correctly said, “To weep is to make less the depth of grief.” Absolutely no one can, nor should they ever try to, deny you your departed loved ones. They are the children you lovingly brought into the world and unfailingly stood by, the loved ones you will forever cherish, and whom you so lovingly adored. Each and every one of them has been viciously ripped from your arms, violently torn from your sides, unforgivingly rendered from you forever, physically removed from your undying adoration, from an indiscernible emotional and physi-
cal devotion of unfathomable depth. You are driven upon your knees by the overwhelming conviction that you have nowhere to go. The heart of grief, its most difficult challenge, is not “letting go” of those who have died but, instead, making the transition from loving in the present to loving in separation. In being loved and always remembered, they are forever in your hearts. And, from your hearts, you will evermore speak of them.

I am no stranger to the loss of loved ones to abject violence. Nor will I ever be unburdened of grief. Grief is universal. Yet, and yet, grief is so intimately personal. How we grieve is who we are. And, as were your loved ones ... each and every one of us present this evening is a unique individual. And, as individuals, we grieve individually, uniquely, each within our own private solitude. That does not assuage the pain, the reality of ultimate loss, but it does give due to the fact we are each human individuals. The grave poignancy of the grief shared within this room puts on vivid display the increasingly rare type of individual your loved ones embody and represent. Yes, I intentionally use the present tense. For they have done more, and paid the ultimate price through their sacrifice, in upholding the universal legitimacy of humanism. Individuals such as your sons, daughters, spouses, or siblings aren’t supposed to exist anymore, except in our honeyed remembrances of the so-called greatest generation. Your presence this evening puts a lie to that tale. Perhaps more importantly, our gathering together on this evening of honor and remembrance unapologetically and openly displays a collective embrace of the critically important sensitivity of sharing that which all but defies sharing.

The very commemorating of your loved ones’ lives provides a clear marker of the significance of each and every one of their singular presences on this earth. Though we walk together down an unpredictable, painful, draining, and exhausting path, we collectively seek hope.

We seek the courage not to forsake hope. In loss, hope hides itself. Through our gathering together this evening, collectively commemorating our losses, we are challenging hope to once again show us the way forward. Allow strength from life’s surges of the cruelest kind, {cast} light upon the darkness of despair, through hope, faith, love, and the common bond of this shared evening.

I am privileged beyond description to have shared a few moments with you. Thank you.

>Editor’s Note: The video of Col McKay’s speech can be found at https://www.youtube.com.
The First of Many
The Marines’ first amphibious assault on New Providence
by Capt Scott A. Holmes

Within his logbook, Lt James Josiah wrote, “At 2 P.M. Cast off from ye Warf In Company with ye Commodore Ship Alfred, Columbus & Cabot, Light airs from ye Westward & much Ice in ye River.” The date was 4 January 1776. The wharf that Lt Josiah was writing about is located outside of Philadelphia, and he was on board the Continental Navy ship Andrew Doria. As Josiah looked over the rails of the Andrew Doria, he saw the newly formed Continental Marines board his ship and the surrounding Continental Navy vessels. Led by Capt Samuel Nicholas, over 200 Marines loaded aboard the ships. The Continental Marines were not even three months old, but they were embarking on their first amphibious assault in a long and illustrious future that lay ahead.

At this time of the year, the water was frigid and many parts were frozen. This made movement difficult, delaying their departure date by a few days. Eight ships were in the fleet. The Alfred was the largest with multiple cannons. She had 20 nine-pounders and 10 six-pounders. On her bow, she had an elaborate figurehead of a man in armor drawing his sword as if riding into battle. Most of the ships were top of the line, newly built by the Continental Navy. They were commanded by Commodore Esek Hopkins, who made his flagship the Alfred. The other ships in the fleet were the Columbus, Cabot, Andrew Doria, Wasp, Hornet, Fly, and the Providence. Once on board, the Marines did not know where they were going or what their mission would be. This was all to be briefed on the way down to their target.

Commodore Hopkins was the only person who knew the destination and targets before he passed on the information to Capt Nicholas. Hopkins was ordered by the Naval Committee to sail down to Virginia. If he chose not to do so, the Naval Committee and the Continental Congress surely thought Hopkins would sail to Georgia or South Carolina as the possibility of a large campaign in the South was becoming more real. However, Hopkins had a better idea. He was going to sail to the Caribbean islands of the Bahamas. This proved to be a wise decision because the British had just sent two frigates and two sloops-of-war to Virginia, and Hopkins’ fleet could very well have been destroyed. The same may have occurred in Georgia and the Carolinas as the British built up their military mass there for a southern campaign. The British Sailors hinted to their superiors the idea of an American attack in the Bahamas, but when Hopkins’ fleet eventually sailed, the British believed his destination to be New York City or Boston. In picking the Bahamas, Hopkins understood what others did not: the logistical needs of the army as well as the importance of surprise and strategy.

Before the war, many American Sailors had traveled throughout the Caribbean for trading purposes when they were loyal to the British Crown. The Americans were familiar with the waters and knew the islands and their inhabitants quite well. In fact, the islanders cared for the Americans more than the British because they benefited more from their relationship; however, they generally cared for whichever deal benefited them the most.

The logistics of the Continental Army were poor. There was a serious lack of heavy artillery and black powder. Over the years, the British had established forts in the Bahamian capital city of Nassau. These forts consisted of cannon and huge armories full of gunpowder. The British assigned a company of the 14th Regiment of Foot to protect these supplies and weapons. However, the Americans found that this company of the 14th Regiment of Foot had been called to Boston to reinforce the British garrisons there. Additionally, the British sloop HMS Savage only visited the harbor occasionally. While Hopkins’
orders were to sail down to Virginia as reinforcements, his decision to attack the Bahamas was not totally against the Continental Congress’ will. On 29 November 1775, just nineteen days after the creation of the Marine Corps, the Continental Congress realized the Bahamas provided mass stores of gun powder and cannon, so they issued a resolution:

Information being given to Congress that there is a large quantity of powder in the Island of Providence, Ordered that the foregoing Committee take Measures for securing & bring[ing] away the said powder.7

Hopkins saw the opportunity for glory and was not going to let it slip away. The fleet finally set sail in February after being stuck for six weeks behind the thick ice of the Delaware Bay.8 While they waited in the ice, more reports came to Hopkins about how desperate GEN George Washington was for gun powder. Hopkins wanted to take action. Nicholas was in command of over 200 Marines with his two main lieutenants: Matthew Parke and John Fitzpatrick.9 As the fleet left the Delaware Bay, the Marines still believed they were heading to Virginia or further south. What the Marines did not know what Hopkins’ orders were after dealing with Virginia. His orders ended with the phrase, “You are then to follow such course as your best judgment shall suggest to you as most useful to the American cause.”10

As Hopkins sailed into the Atlantic, the risk grew. This was the first fleet that the Continental Navy had put together, and its destruction would surely devastate the morale and future of the Continental Navy. The men were poorly trained for maritime warfare as they had only been merchants and knew only the basic rules of sailing and little of fighting on the open ocean. The threat of a growing number of British warships in the area loomed. The British had already deployed a 28-gun frigate, the HMS Liverpool, and there was a good chance it could cross paths with the American fleet.11

From the beginning, luck was not on the side of the Americans. Disease found its way onboard most of the ships. Smallpox was a huge concern; on 18 February 1776, it became a reality when the Alfred had to bury a man at sea who had succumbed to the disease. The next day, the Columbus did the same. Fear of the disease spreading grew among the men, lowering morale.12 In the days following the deaths of the two Sailors, storms appeared and the winds grew heavy. The fleet had lost visual contact of the Hornet and the Fly. In reality, the two ships had collided with each other; the Hornet was forced to return to port, the closest being Charleston, SC, to make repairs. However, the Fly made repairs and rendezvoused with the fleet on 1 March in the Caribbean.13 Two more weeks went by and nothing horrendous happened; the Sailors’ morale was lifting, and they were only about one day of sailing from their anchor point. Then tragedy struck again. On 1 March, the Columbus buried another sailor who died from smallpox. Hopkins reported in his logbook that four of his ships were infected with the disease.14

Later that same day, the fleet was sailing down the coast and spotted two sloops from New Providence belonging to the British Navy. The flagship quickly caught up to them and seized them as the first prizes of the Continental Navy.15 Later that afternoon, the fleet anchored on the southwest side of Grand Abaco in twelve fathoms of water.16

The assault on New Providence had two objective points: Fort Nassau and Fort Montagu. Both had guns and powder the Marines could take back to the colonies for use in Washington’s army only. Over the past few months, the British had moved some of the guns and troops from the fort to help reinforce Boston, but there were still enough guns and powder to make the mission a successful one. Fort Nassau was built in 1697 and overlooked the western entrance to the harbor. It was a fort of superior technology and heavy firepower. The fort was armed with cannon, including twelve-pounders, eighteen-pounders, eight-inch bronze mortars, five and one-half inch howitzers, and bronze Coehorn mortars. However, at the time of the attack, the fort was falling apart. The local loyalist militia thought the British infantry would kill themselves by simply firing the guns because of how old the guns were and because the walls were probably not sturdy enough to withstand artillery fire.

Fort Montagu was a different story. It was built between 1741 and 1742 and was located approximately one mile east of Fort Nassau. It was more simplistic than Fort Nassau, but larger, and it guarded the vulnerable rear entrance to Fort Nassau. Fort Montagu, at the time of the attack, maintained a strong defense, including eighteen-pounders, twelve-pounders, nine pounders, and six pounders. It also contained a large powder magazine, barracks, and a guardroom. Fort Montagu was not falling apart like Fort Nassau, but it did have one major flaw: its simple square shape made it extremely vulnerable to any type of assault.17

The assault was scheduled for 2 March. Hopkins knew the forts could be easily taken because the British failed to leave enough infantry to defend them, and the local loyalist militia was unprepared. The plan was to take the two sloops that had been captured the day before and hide the Marines below deck. The ships were known to the locals, so the Americans believed they could come into port, unload the Marines, and take their objectives. Once the sloops entered the sight of Fort Nassau, however, the plan fell apart. There were warning shots fired, and it was clear that the British knew the sloops had been captured and were not friendly. Hopkins’ fleet and the two sloops fled, hoping to attack the next day.18 That night, Hopkins called for a council of war to figure out the next move. He wanted to go to the western side of the island to have the Marines
attack the town from the rear; however, there was no road for a march and no water deep enough to make anchor. Despite these issues, a decision was finally made.

As the American fleet sailed over the horizon and into the view of the British in the early morning of 3 March, the alarm guns were sounded and troops were called to arms. The British governor, Montfort Browne, decided it was necessary to defend the powder and put Fort Nassau’s commander, Maj Robert Sterling, in charge.19 The Marines made an amphibious landing at a point called “The Creek,” which was located a mile and a half south of Fort Montagu. This was the first amphibious assault in the history of the Marine Corps.

Over 200 Marines and 50 Sailors took the beach with the Wasp and Providence in support;20 they landed near a group of free slaves, and the Marines encountered no resistance. Capt Nicholas made a report in his journal about the first amphibious landing:

The inhabitants were very much alarmed at our appearance, and supposed us to be Spaniards, but were soon undeceived after our landing.21

The Marines under Nicholas formed into two columns and marched toward Fort Montagu. Despite being under cannon fire from 110 local militia under the command of Browne, not a single American casualty was taken. Browne then took his militia to Fort Nassau, and the Marines easily captured Fort Montagu. The militia tried to “spike” its artillery but failed to do so properly.22 Nicholas and his Marines were tired. Nicholas later wrote,

I thought it necessary to stay all night, and refresh my men, who were fatigued, being on board the small vessels, not having a convenience to either sleep or cook in.23

Hopkins knew he could now take Fort Nassau, but to help save American lives and show the courtesy of eighteenth century warfare, he sent a message to the British:

If I am not Opposed in putting my design in Execution the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants Shall be Safe, Neither shall they be Suffered to be hurt in Case they make no Resistance.24

Browne understood this and knew he could not defend the city or the harbor from the outnumbering American force. Knowing the Americans wanted the powder he did what he knew best. The powder was the single most important item Browne possessed; thus, he loaded it all onto the HMS St. Johns. In total, there were over 100 barrels of powder, and Browne sent them to the British-occupied town of St. Augustine, FL. This was Hopkins’ major fault of the operation that later found him in trouble with the Naval Committee and in the likings of Congress. He failed to use the other ships of his fleet to block the few lanes out of the harbor. The powder escaped under the cover of darkness aboard the HMS St. Johns and made it to its destination safely.25

The following day, Nicholas was met with an invitation from Browne to take the city and Fort Nassau if he liked. Nicholas wrote in his journal,

On our march I met an express from the Governor … The messenger then told me I might march into the town, and if I thought proper, into the fort, without interruption.26

Not a single shot was fired, and the Marines took the city and the fort. Browne was arrested in chains and taken aboard the Alfred.

The raid was a huge success. The Americans did manage to capture some barrels of powder. The fleet then spent two weeks loading all of its captured prizes onto its ships.

Fort Montagu today. Fort Nassau no longer stands. (Photo from http://www.thebahamasweekly.com.)
ONCE A MARINE, ALWAYS A MARINE
Order Custom Challenge Coins to celebrate
your USMC birthday, unit, event and more!
Contact us today to get your FREE Quote:
(775) 461-3725
www.RangerCoin.com

FREE
Lapel Pins of your design
Die setup charge may still apply - call for details

A Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business
Officially Licensed: ARMY • USMC • NAVY • USAF • USCG • VA • VFW
because there was not enough room on his own ships. However, sickness was still killing some of the men, and many took desertion on the island to get away from it. The fleet finally set sail on 16 March back toward Rhode Island, and along the way it captured four prize ships. The Marines performed these captures with outstanding musket fire. They finally returned on 8 April with seven dead and four wounded from the trip back. One of the dead included Lt Fitzpatrick, one of Nicholas’ personal friends.

Upon return, individuals were both praised and reprimanded. Capt Nicholas was promoted to major for his brave actions. Hopkins’ reputation was tarnished for disobeying orders and attacking the Bahamas despite documentation stating he could. He was also reprimanded for failing to secure the lanes of escape from the harbor and allowing the most important asset, the powder, to escape.

It was the first of many overseas attacks by the United States. It is astonishing that even though most of the Sailors and Marines were untrained, they performed as if they had been doing it for years. The seized cannon greatly helped the artillery-starved Continental Army.

The raid at Providence did have one major impact that was more important than guns or powder. The British were now forever paranoid. They knew they had been vulnerable where they least expected it, and now they had to concentrate more naval powers in other areas that held guns and powder. It also hurt the British because the guns and shot seized in the raid would be used against the British five years later at Fort Griswold and other battles. Over the years, the Marines and the United States took what they learned on the Raid of Nassau and transformed it into an art form.

Notes
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. United States Marine Corps History Division, Marine Corps University, (Online), available at https://www.usmcu.edu.
30. Marine Corps University.
31. Ibid.
Every war needs a hero. The Korean War saw many brave men serve with outstanding distinction; however, few equaled the accomplishments of MajGen Oliver P. Smith. Gen Smith was assigned to command the 1st Marine Division as it prepared to deploy to Korea in July 1950. His leadership skills were instrumental in preparing his division for the landing at Inchon and ensuring the successful conduct of the operation. During the remainder of his time in Korea, Gen Smith led the 1st Marine Division in the successful recapture of Seoul and guaranteed the division’s survival in the onslaught of Chinese forces at the Changjin Reservoir. Gen Smith’s calculated military maneuvers, foresight, leadership skills, and personal ethics earned him a place as one of the greatest heroes of the Korean War.

Gen Smith was not the stereotypical Marine; nevertheless, his leadership abilities earned him the respect of the Marines under his command throughout the Korean War. He was well known for taking care of his men and was determined never to waste a life if he could help it. Tall, thin, mild-mannered, and gray-haired, Gen Smith looked more like a professor than a Marine general. Even members of his command dubbed him “the Professor” because of his love for studying military history. He was also known to stand up for what he believed to be right; his feuds with MG Edward “Ned” Almond, USA, are ingrained in Marine Corps history. There was arguably not a better man to lead the Marine Corps in Korea than Gen Smith.

Gen Smith was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Marines in 1917, soon after the United States entered World War I. But the war passed without Smith seeing combat. Nevertheless, Smith was still in the Corps during the outbreak of World War II. He saw combat at Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and Okinawa, earning multiple awards for combat heroism. It was no shock that, as a major general, he was summoned to command the 1st Marine Division in July 1950, shortly after North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Gen Smith retained this position until May 1951. He led the division during the roughest fighting of the war and proved again to be a highly capable leader.

Smith’s first challenge of the war was to see that the 1st Marine Division was ready for action in GEN Douglas MacArthur’s planned amphibious landing at Inchon. This was no small task. The division had less than 3,500 men filling the ranks in July 1950. The Marine Corps overcame this manpower shortage by mobilizing the Reserves across the Nation. Gen Smith saw to it that another 13,000 Marines were added to the division within a month. By the first week of August, the 1st Marine Division possessed 17,000 Marines ready for action at Inchon. Gen Smith successfully overcame the manpower shortage, but there were many more obstacles to face in Korea.

Under Gen Smith’s command, the division executed a flawless amphibious landing at Inchon. But even then, Smith began butting heads with MG Almond, the Commander of X Corps, of which the 1st Marine Division was part of. Smith’s tactics, mannerisms, and leadership skills were in stark opposition to Almond. No sooner had the Marines landed at Inchon before Almond began pressuring Smith to move quickly to recapture Seoul. Yet Smith moved with caution, knowing his two-regiment division would be fighting in an unknown urban area. He kept his men in good condition and his units in close proximity to one another. This action infuriated Almond, who placed speed of maneuver above all else.

Regardless, Smith’s caution was well founded. Enemy resistance across the Han River was intense and increased as the Marines moved closer to Seoul. The North Koreans soon
switched from delaying tactics to defending to the last man. But Smith utilized close air support from two Marine F4U Corsair squadrons that arrived at the newly captured Kimpo Airfield to help dislodge the North Koreans. In spite of this support, the Marines had to fight fiercely just to make it to the streets of Seoul.

After the 1st Marine Division and elements of the Army’s 7th Division recaptured Seoul, Gen Smith was still wary of bringing in the South Korean government officials so soon after the battle. Even as GEN MacArthur brought President Syngman Rhee and his entourage back into Seoul, Gen Smith took safety precautions. He positioned two Marine battalions along the route the dignitaries would take and around the palace, although out of sight. Thankfuly, the Marine units were not called upon to defend against an attack on the dignitaries. Yet, Gen Smith made sure his units were ready, just in case. The caution and well-calculated moves of Gen Smith were a constant annoyance to Almond. Regardless, Smith’s actions saved the 1st Marine Division time and time again.

Perhaps no other instance demonstrated this fact more than the incident at the Changjin Reservoir. As the X Corps moved from Seoul and raced toward the Yalu River, the 1st Marine Division was assigned to spearhead the advance. Almond wanted to advance as quickly as possible, but Gen Smith did not agree with the strategy. He advanced with caution, wary of being ambushed while his units were spread out. He kept them in close contact with each other and proceeded, observing all the military principles of advance. This, of course, simply frustrated Almond. But Smith was unsure of what lay ahead. Even after Chinese units destroyed part of the Army’s 7th Division, Almond pressured the Marines to advance faster.

It appeared that the X Corps’ commander was turning a blind eye to the fact that the Chinese were entering the war. The only thing that seemed to matter to Almond was reaching the Yalu River.

Gen Smith, however, did not share this mindset. His division moved northwest from Hungnam toward the Changjin Reservoir, an area of land known for its harsh terrain and weather. The Marines encountered small numbers of Chinese all along the way. Thus, Smith did not want his men to be strung out in such dangerous terrain while it was unknown whether larger Chinese units were ahead. His caution was justified. On 27 November, lead elements of the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments encountered substantial Chinese units. Gen Smith pulled his division together and formed a defensive position around Yudam-ni, east of the reservoir. Soon, six Chinese divisions slammed into the 1st Marine Division, launching unremitting attacks for days. The Marines were not the only ones attacked. All across the front, Chinese units were surrounding and destroying American and United Nations units.

On 1 December, Almond ordered the general withdrawal of X Corps. It would be a fighting withdrawal the entire way. Gen Smith moved his division out of Yudam-ni the same day, bringing the division’s equipment and wounded along. The Marines were heavily supported by squadrons of the 1st MAW stationed on carriers in the Sea of Japan. By 4 December, the 1st Marine Division reached Hagaru-ri with 1,500 casualties. However, the division was still in good shape as the Marines remained in proper formation the entire way, concentrating in regimental or battalion strength wherever possible. The Marines had much experience fighting Asian armies in the Pacific and knew to keep their perimeters tight during nighttime. Such tactics ultimately preserved the division.

It was at Hagaru-ri where Gen Smith made a remark to correspondents that would go down in history: “Gentlemen we are not retreating. We are merely attacking in another direction.” In reality, the 1st Marine Division was attacking, and it took the Marines two days to travel the twelve miles to reach Koto-ri, arriving on 7 December. Even so, Smith chose to fight his way out of Koto-ri rather than be evacuated by Air Force squadrons. He was unwilling...
ing to abandon his vehicles and equipment to the Chinese. It was a bold decision. Nevertheless, Gen Smith at last led his division to Hungnam after thirteen days of isolation. All the division’s equipment and wounded were brought along, and the Marines—though tired—were still in good fighting shape. Such unit cohesion in the face of disaster was remarkable. Gen Smith deserves great credit for the successful withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division.

Gen Smith’s foresight and successful leadership during the Changjin Reservoir Campaign earned him a place in Marine Corps legend. For fighting over half-a-dozen Chinese divisions while marching his Marines 70 miles in 13 days from the Changjin Reservoir to Hungnam, Gen Smith earned the Army Distinguished Service Cross. Before the war was over, Smith continued to lead the 1st Marine Division in the first U.N. counteroffensive and defend against the Chinese Communist Spring Offensive of 1951. For his heroism and exceptional service in Korea, Gen Smith earned the Navy and Army Distinguished Service Medals as well as the Silver Star. After the war’s end on 1 September 1955, he retired from the Marine Corps as a lieutenant general. In recognition of his numerous combat awards, LtGen Smith was promoted to the rank of four-star general, an honor that was well deserved.

Gen O.P. Smith was one of the greatest heroes of the Korean War.

Gen O.P. Smith was one of the greatest heroes of the Korean War. In July 1950, he successfully brought the 1st Marine Division to full strength so it could execute the Inchon Landing on 15 September. His actions in the Inchon-Seoul Campaign created strife with the X Corps’ commander, yet his caution and foresight earned him the respect and loyalty of his Marines. Gen Smith’s leadership skills at the Changjin Reservoir brought the 1st Marine Division out of the disastrous situation intact and ready to continue fighting for the remainder of the war.

Without a doubt, “the Professor” proved to be among the greatest Marines in all of history. Gen Smith’s outstanding leadership of the 1st Marine Division in Korea should be remembered for the rest of time.

Notes
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. This Kind of War.
12. A Short History of the Korean War.
14. Over the Seawall.
This picture of a daytime flight of an OV-10A maneuvering through the smoke-filled air over Kuwait on 25 February 1991 is an image I will never forget. I saw something that resembled hell. The flames were so hot I could actually sense the heat as we flew by. The impaired visibility forced us to stay under the smoke layer, flying closer to the ground and increasing the risk of being fired upon by Iraqi anti-aircraft weapons. The air reeked of partially burned fuel and covered the airplane with a thin oily film as we flew our mission. On this day, just before we took off, we received a message that the aircraft we were to relieve on station had been shot down. As we flew toward Kuwait, we wondered what happened to our squadron mates who had been flying the ill-fated aircraft. What was going on for our Marines on the ground? This mission felt like a blur as we coordinated support for the rapidly moving ground forces, letting them know what was ahead and making sure air support was available where and when needed. We watched for our fellow Marines and listened for a radio call from the downed crew that never came. We found out later one of our friends was been killed and another captured when they were shot down. It was a flight that still lives with me when I remember the Marines with whom I was privileged to serve with during Operation DESERT STORM (ODS).

In November 1990, Marine Observation Squadron One (VMO-1) received orders to support Operation DESERT SHIELD, which meant preparing twelve OV-10 Bronco aircraft and their crews for a trip across the Atlantic. The squadron was to embark on the aircraft carriers USS America (CV-66) and USS Roosevelt (CVN-71) en route to Saudi Arabia. The next few weeks were busy for the aviators, maintainers, and support personnel. On 27 December, the OV-10s took off and landed in Rota, Spain, where they began hopscotching across the Mediterranean Sea with the first OV-10 arriving in King Abdul Aziz airfield in Saudi Arabia on 17 January 1991. Less than 48 hours later, VMO-1 flew its first mission in support of ODS.

I was a member of the squadron when these orders were received, and it was a remarkable time to see the Vietnam-era designed aircraft return to flying combat missions. The OV-10 supported Marines for over two decades and created memories that are worth sharing since this aircraft has been retired and will slowly fade into the distance of history.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States Air Force and Marine
Corps began pressing for a simple and inexpensive fixed-wing aircraft to perform the airborne forward air controller mission and support counterinsurgency operations. The OV-10A Bronco was the first aircraft specifically designed for counterinsurgency and limited war operations. It filled a gap left by jets, which were too fast for most aspects of counterinsurgency warfare. The Bronco was designed to be faster than helicopters that were too slow and vulnerable for many missions. This aircraft replaced the venerable but very vulnerable Cessna O-1 Bird Dog, an observation aircraft that had been serving the United States military since 1947. The OV-10A promised to deliver exceptional performance and armament that would completely rewrite the forward air controller (FAC) mission.

Two Marine Corps majors, K.P. Rice and William H. Beckett, first derived the concept for the OV-10. They had served together in a Corsair squadron in 1949 and later became neighbors in Santa Ana, CA, in 1961. The two often discussed modern aircraft design and the apparent trend toward sleek, complicated, and expensive jets. They surmised the military was forgetting that close air support was a job better suited for a more conventional aircraft that could stay close to the troops, fly slowly enough, and stay on station for a long period of time. They decided the aircraft needed to be a durable observation plane that could find and destroy the enemy. They envisioned an aircraft that was faster than helicopters, but slower and more versatile than jets, featuring twin turboprop engines. They wanted the aircraft designed to be simple and easy to maintain. Lastly, the aircraft needed to be capable of operating from unimproved landing surfaces, allowing it to be with troops in combat areas giving combat battalions access to their own air assets.

After contemplating the design characteristics of the aircraft, the two men decided to build a fiberglass mock-up. They assembled a full-size mock-up as much as possible within the limitations of the space provided by Rice’s garage, which prevented them from attaching the wings. Rice and Beckett then used the mock-up to begin selling the concept to the Armed Forces. Initially, they encountered a lack of enthusiasm for the idea because their design did not carry large numbers of weapons or bombs. However, adding that kind of weight would have completely gone against their design concept of a light aircraft stationed with front-line troops. Eventually, interest in a light combat aircraft arose for a variety of reasons. The Marine Corps wanted a small, fixed-wing aircraft for helicopter escort rather than using Army helicopter gunships because of their light weapons. The Air Force was interested in short takeoff and landing aircraft that could be used for counterinsurgency operations. It also wanted an aircraft suitable for the FAC mission that was less vulnerable and more capable than the O-1. Lastly, a need arose for an aircraft that could be cheaply produced for emerging nations. Robert S. McNamara’s Department of Defense settled on trying to fulfill all requirements with a single aircraft. In March 1963, eleven companies presented designs for a light armed reconnaissance aircraft. The North American Columbus Division NA-300 won the contract with their submission of the OV-10 Bronco.

Development of the OV-10A officially began in October 1964. A flying prototype was available by July 1965. The initial design was smaller than the production OV-10A, and it had twin 660-horsepower Garrett-AiResearch turboprop engines as well as a one-man crew. The prototype carried several passengers in a cramped compartment behind the pilot. Following successful tests, requirements were added, including an observer as a second crewman, 300 pounds of armor plate around the crew and engines, an increased internal fuel capacity to 250 gallons, more communications equipment, and increased weapons carrying capacity to 2,000 pounds. Overall, the empty weight of the aircraft increased by 29 percent. Because of the added weight, the wings were lengthened from 30 to 40 feet to improve lift, and the engines were increased to 715 horse power. After incorporating the new design requirements, the first production OV-10A was delivered in June 1967. Of the 271 OV-10As produced, 157 were delivered to the Air Force, and 114 were delivered to the Marine Corps. The production OV-10A was capable of being operated from rough clearings, primitive roads and waterways, prepared runways, and aircraft carriers.
The twin boom design of the OV-10A was reminiscent of the P-38 Lightning, with a large fuselage section hanging from the main wing between the booms. The cockpit in the middle fuselage section was set well ahead of the engines for superior visibility. Along with the high horizontal stabilizer connecting the two booms, this section worked well for dropping cargo and paratroopers from a removable hinged door in the rear. The twin boom design aligned the tail surfaces with the engine’s prop blast. This provided maximum directional control during takeoff from unimproved surfaces, even with only one engine. The OV-10A was sufficiently rugged and designed to withstand jet fighter load factors of eight Gs. Cargo bay volume was 75 to 110 cubic feet with a maximum weight of 3,200 pounds. In addition to the 2,000 pounds of external weapons carrying capacity, the aircraft was armed with four M60 7.62mm machine guns and 500 rounds for each gun. Ordnance for the OV-10A included bombs, 2.75-inch and 5-inch rocket pods, heat-seeking missiles, and 20mm gun pods. The landing gear also handled rugged terrain and enabled the aircraft to operate from unimproved surfaces. To test that capability, a runway was built that looked like curving waves. The OV-10A easily rolled over the runway’s hills and valleys.

Performance of the OV-10A was outstanding. Rather than cruising at 1,000 feet like the O-1 Birdog, the OV-10A cruised out of the range of small arms at 3,500 feet. To get a closer look, Bronco pilots dove to observe suspected enemy locations and then used the aircraft’s power to return to 3,500 feet. Maneuverability was also exceptional; pilots enjoyed a turn radius that was so tight a 360-degree turn could be completed within the confines of a large sports stadium. In spite of the increased level of complexity of the OV-10A in comparison to the O-1, the aircraft did not present a serious increase to overall maintenance needs. True to Beckett and Rice’s original concept, the OV-10A was designed to live with the troops.

In 1968, when the United States was heavily involved in Vietnam, the first Air Force Broncos arrived as part of an evaluation called Operation COMBAT BRONCO. After the evaluation was completed, the OV-10A was deployed to the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) at Ben Hoa and the 20th TASS at Da Nang. The 23rd TASS performed special operations missions with the OV-10A from Nakhom Phanom, Thailand.

Three Marine Corps VMOs flew the OV-10A in Vietnam. VMO-2 was the first to receive the Bronco in July 1968 and operated the aircraft from the Marble Mountain airstrip near Da Nang. VMO-1 began operating the aircraft in October 1968, and VMO-6 operated the OV-10A from Quang-Tri but was soon withdrawn and eventually disestablished in January 1977. During the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps used the OV-10A Bronco to perform almost every role for which it had been designed, including as a FAC, radio relay station, artillery spotter, helicopter escort, visual reconnaissance, convoy escort, and attack aircraft. It performed every aspect of its mission profile as well or better than anticipated. In addition to the four M60 machine guns, the normal Marine Corps load out was four rocket pods; two were filled with 5-inch Zuni white phosphorus rockets for marking targets and the other two with 2.75-inch, folding-fin, high-explosive rockets for attacking targets.

The Navy also had tremendous success with the OV-10A. One of the more famous Navy squadrons to use the OV-10A was the Short/Vertical Takeoff and Landing Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4). They became known as the Black Ponies. VAL-4 began combat operations on 19 April 1969, flying air support for the mobile riverine force in the Mekong Delta and supporting the Navy SEALs. The squadron performed patrol, overhead air cover, scramble alert, and gunfire and artillery spotting.

In Vietnam, the Bronco’s capabilities allowed it to do what the Services needed and thwarted enemy troops. The enemy in Vietnam learned it was a mistake to open fire on an OV-10 because doing so would only bring bombs and rockets from an unseen fighter bomber waiting for a target. Pilots were prohibited from firing on targets unless the enemy fired first. To confront the frustration of not being able to shoot at the enemy, pilots sometimes went great lengths to get the enemy to shoot. Gordon Evans, a Marine first lieutenant in 1971, remembers flying a patrol twenty miles west of Da Nang when he spotted a group of about ten North Vietnamese soldiers lined up on a dike.
He made a close pass to get them to fire—nothing. He went around again, “They just didn’t pay me any mind,” Evans says, “They knew what was going on. So I went around to make still another pass, real slow. My backseater got agitated and said, ‘I don’t think this is a good idea. We’re gonna get hosed.’” But there was still no fire from the men on the dike. “I was all of 24, bullet-proof, and knew everything,” he says, “I dropped my gear and my flaps, put all the lights on in the airplane—this is daytime—and went by in a landing configuration” to make the best possible target. Evans finally elicited a response, “Several guys on the dike pulled down their trousers and mooned us.” Overall, pilots enjoyed the fact they could do a significant amount of damage to a target before the larger weapons, dropped by F-4 Phantoms or other aircraft, were available.

Two OV-10As from the Marine Corps OV-10 Night Observation Gunship System program were modified to include a turreted forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor with a co-bore sighted laser target designator and turreted 20mm M197 gun slaved to the FLIR aimpoint. The system was tested in the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam quite effectively. It was able to identify and successfully attack and sink boat targets, taking away a safe haven for the Viet Cong in the region. Consequently, the Vietnam War provided the impetus and the testing ground for the utility of the Bronco as a night observation aircraft, but it would be almost ten years before the Marines developed the OV-10D.

**OV-10D**

Working with the OV-10A as a foundation, the Marine Corps sought to develop a relatively cheap night interdiction aircraft to spot enemy movements. It started with two aircraft, but more were converted in the late seventies. North American Rockwell modified two OV-10As with a FLIR and a M-197 20mm gun turret under the fuselage. The nose was lengthened by 30 inches to accommodate the upgrade. The resulting aircraft was designated as the YOV-10D Night Observation Gunship. The large cargo area proved ideal for carrying the ammunition for the M-197. The underwing hard points were also modified for carrying fuel. The Marine Corps was satisfied with the new aircraft, but still sought improvements. The engines were upgraded to Garrett T76-G-420/421s, each producing 1,040 shaft horsepower. Improvements to the electronics and avionics were also made, and the gun turret was eliminated because of budget limitations. In 1978, eighteen OV-10A’s were converted to the OV-10D. Eight aircraft were delivered to VMO-1 and nine were delivered to VMO-2. One aircraft remained with North American Rockwell for additional testing. The OV-10D gave the Marine Corps a truly multi-role aircraft. Primary missions included day or night visual/FLIR reconnaissance, FAC, tactical air controller, artillery and naval gunfire air spot, helicopter escort, and close-in fire suppression.

**“I was all of 24, bullet-proof, and knew everything.”**

**Use in the 70s and 80s**

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the VMO’s supported the three active and one Reserve Marine divisions as well as MAWs for a wide variety of exercises and operations. VMO-1 was part of 2d MAW and operated from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, NC; VMO-2 operated from MCAS Camp Pendleton, CA, as a member of 3d MAW; and Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36 operated OV-10s for the 1st MAW at MCAS Futenma, Okinawa, Japan. VMO-4 was part of the 4th MAW operating from Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA.

The observation squadrons supported Marines in every clime and place throughout the two decades between Vietnam and ODS. If the helicopter squadrons were conducting vertical assaults, the OV-10s were there to provide escort. If a fixed-wing squadron needed airborne FAC support to train their aircrews, the OV-10s were there. When a division command post exercise needed an airborne radio relay, they called for the OV-10. When a recon battalion or ANGLICO needed to keep their jumpquals current, the OV-10 squadrons were called upon. When an infantry battalion deployed to Twenty nine Palms for a combined arms exercise (CAX), an OV-10 detachment was there to lead the way. The OV-10 squadrons supported nine CAXs per year to include the Reserve CAX. The OV-10s even embarked on LHAs to support amphibious operations on the West Coast and in Europe. If the Marines went, the VMO squadrons were ready to go. In the early 1980s, the VMOs started supporting the counter-narcotics mission by working with law enforcement agencies to intercept aircraft and maritime craft attempting to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States. The utility of design of the OV-10 enabled it to remain useful as the missions changed and the decades wore on.

During ODS after flying that first combat mission, VMO-1 provided continuous surveillance along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia border in support of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions as well as other coalition forces. While conducting surveillance along the Saudi Arabian-Kuwaiti border on 29 January 1991, VMO-1 aircraft provided the first warning of Iraqi forces massing on the border as the Battle of Khafji began. The squadron was instrumental in coordinating close air support for Wild Eagle—a Marine ground unit in close proximity to the Kuwaiti border—enabling it to successfully disengage from the invading Iraqi force. Once again, the OV-10 helped Marines complete their mission.

Then, in late January 1991, Iraqi forces began igniting oil wells in Kuwait. By the end of February, more than 700 oil well fires were burning throughout the oil fields of Kuwait. On 24 February 1991, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions moved into Kuwait toward Kuwait City to liberate the country and drive out the Iraqi forces. VMO-1 aircraft continued to provide close support to the Marine divisions, flying under the black smoke layer generated by the hundreds of oil
well fires. Some of the flames rose several hundred feet into the air and forced aircrews to seek paths through the fires to find positions from which they could accomplish the mission. After completing a mission in the area where the oil wells were burning and returning to King Abdul Aziz airfield, the aircraft was covered with a thin layer of oil and fire residue.

While the OV-10 was upgraded over the years after its introduction in Vietnam, it was retired shortly after ODS when the military Services went through a force reduction process. This aircraft, and the Marines who flew and supported it, provided invaluable support to the Marines in the two plus decades from Vietnam to ODS and were there to fly missions when the Marines needed them most.

The OV-10, however, has continued to serve with distinction in various roles, but never far from danger. In California, the OV-10 is being used to fight forest fires. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CALFIRE) acquired fifteen OV-10As from the Department of Defense in 1993. The OV-10As were converted to support firefighting and provide aircrews with a platform that is “newer, larger, faster, provide a larger field of vision for the crew and are more maneuverable” than previously used airframes. The “greenhouse canopy” and the amazing nimbleness of the OV-10 was exactly why CALFIRE wanted to use it as a command and control center aircraft during wildland fire operations. The OV-10 provides tactical coordination with the ground commander, providing details such as location, movement, and spread of the fire. They also direct air tankers to their drop points. CALFIRE’s OV-10s have been upgraded with the avionics and navigation-communications systems required to properly coordinate firefighting assets, and they can loiter over firefighting operations for up to five hours.

In 2015, Special Operations Command brought the Bronco back to life to help in the fight against ISIS as part of an operation called COMBAT DRAGON II. Marine Corps Gen James N. Mattis expressed that using a complex weapon system like the Air Force F-15E to support troops patrolling streets would “amount to overkill.” A concept was developed to acquire an inexpensive, simple, nimble combat aircraft capable of long loiter and on-call reconnaissance and attack duty, able to operate from austere airfields under primitive conditions and to deliver precision ordnance and employ state-of-the-art technology including electro-optical and infrared sensors, laser-guided munitions (the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System [APKWS] II), and encrypted radios and night-vision gear.1

After a series of funding challenges and processing through several possible airframe candidates, two of a dozen former Marine Corps OV-10D+ models that were previously operated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms were chosen for Operation DRAGON II. The aircraft, upgraded to include such features as glass cockpit, laser guided rockets, and connected to the battlefield network allowing them to acquire, accept, and transfer data, were re-designated as the OV-10G+. The OV-10G+ also used an off-the-shelf sensor turret. The two Bronco crews were able to eliminate targets through windows and in doorways, as well as attack fighters taking cover under roofs and overhangs. The Broncos performed like snipers in the sky for special operations forces hunting ISIS in Iraq. They observed the enemy in great detail from altitude, collected intelligence, and hunted the enemy. Although this operation was in no way an indication that the OV-10 would be returning to active duty in large numbers, it did prove the design that began in the 1950s was still able to adapt and perform with absolute relevance in the modern high-tech battlespace.

**Notes**

Barriers to Interwar Innovation

How to innovate during ambiguous times
by MAJ Ryan Dunbar, USA

When studying the history of warfare, it quickly becomes evident that success is determinant upon the ability to adapt and change through innovation. This need to identify and exploit change through innovations—such as new technologies, doctrine, organizations, tactics, and strategies—gives rise to the idea of military revolutions and the revolutions of military affairs. These changes confront militaries either during war or in peacetime when preparing for some unknown future war. It is easy to see the need for innovation and change when confronted with it directly. However, the true difficulty arises when trying to innovate and change during the interwar periods, when the next conflict is ambiguous and barriers to military innovation are higher.

Innovation during an interwar period routinely falls into the trap of fitting the innovation into a preconceived notion of how the next war will be fought. This barrier comes in two forms: How does this innovation enable how I want to fight the next war? As well as how does this innovation fit into the last war? To break this barrier down, innovators need to show how the innovation changes war rather than fitting it into a preconceived notion of war. The interwar period between the world wars offers examples of countries forced to innovate. A study of the British view of the next conflict highlights the dangers of fitting innovations into a preconceived notion of how you want to fight the next war. A study of the French view of the next conflict demonstrates the dangers of fitting innovation to fight the last war. Finally, a study of the German view of the next war demonstrates that a blended approach, and avoiding the traps, leads to successful innovation during an interwar period.

Looking at the British attitude toward innovation and change during the interwar period, it is evident that they had a preconceived notion of how the next war would be fought. To that end, the British evaluated innovations against their utility and significance in fighting that war rather than their utility and significance to warfare in general. Innovations in two significant areas clearly fell into this trap: naval forces in relation to the prominence of submarine warfare and the organization of the army.

Broadly, the British view of naval warfare was that U-boat warfare would not occur because of provisions within the Treaty of Versailles. Additionally, one of the relatively new innovations of the interwar period was the development of sonar, which gave navies the apparent means of detecting submerged vessels. This fit nicely into the theory of how the war would be conducted and gave British naval theorists the false sense of security that no further innovation was required. Falling into this trap resulted in the lack of further innovation toward submarine or anti-submarine warfare, paving the way for the rise of the U-boat threat again in World War II.

When determining how they wanted to organize to fight the next ground war, the British opposed the employment of a large standing army on the continent of Europe. The belief was Britain’s allies would carry the weight of the conflict on the land, supporting the British pursuit of a small infantry- and artillery-based military with the idea of limited liability. Armored warfare did not fit into the mold of limited liability. Since innovations in mechanization and armored warfare were dissident with the conflict the British wanted to fight, both political and military channels prevented innovations in those fields. Politics withheld the requisite funding to pursue modernization while the leadership in the military stifled the reports and careers of innovative thinkers. Because they ignored innovations that did not fit the desired nature of war, the British faced a conflict they assumed they would not fight, were left as the only
opposition to Germany on the European continent, and lacked the ground forces to resist German forces on the continent.

While the British focused on innovations on the wrong next war, the French focused on innovations that supported winning the last war, falling into the second trap of innovating during an interwar period. With their nation bearing the brunt of the conflict in World War I, the French were sensitive to the security of their nation and adopted a defensive mindset focused on methodical battle to the detriment of their mechanized and armored forces.5

The French view of a defensive war focused on how to best fight a defensive battle, similar to their experience in World War I. Despite the rise of more mobile platforms on the battlefield, they focused on the idea of static defenses, which led to the rise of the Maginot Line.6 Since an armored force is primarily an offensive weapon, it did not fit into the nature of the desired war. As a result, the French generally did not pursue the development of the doctrine for a modern armored and mechanized force to the extent they should have and diverted funding and education toward a defensive strategy.7 While they did not completely ignore the innovation of armor on the battlefield, the lack of funding and education resulted in the misunderstanding of how to best utilize tanks.8 Because they ignored the armored force’s potential for maneuver and the implications of increased maneuver on the nature of warfare, the French began World War II with a thin static defensive line and an inadequate maneuver force to react to penetrations. As a result, they could not counter the German advances and exploitations.

The Germans evaluated the next conflict, and the potential impact of innovations on that conflict, entirely differently than the British and French. Instead of focusing just on the last war or just on how they wanted to fight the next one, they focused on both while also evaluating how current innovations were changing the nature of warfare. They did this through a series of deliberate studies conducted by the general staff. These studies yielded the view of the future conflict based on the nature of changes caused by innovation in warfare: mobile offensive action supported by mechanized and armored forces.9

The German pursuit of innovations in the armored force was not merely technological. Based on the evaluation of the last conflict (static, prolonged warfare) and the preferred future conflict (decisive, short warfare), they realized that technology provided the means to conduct warfare the way they preferred. However, the decision still needed to be made on what innovations to prioritize because of the increase in innovations within almost every field of warfare during the interwar period. This is where the analysis of the innovations themselves, and the impact those innovations have on the nature of warfare, becomes vital and overcomes the natural traps to innovation. Based on observations and reports from British and Soviet experimentation with tanks, the Germans realized the potential for not only maneuver but rapid penetrations and exploitations—both of which were unattainable during the First World War.10 This led to both the pursuit of the technological innovation as well as the reorganization of forces and adapting of doctrine and tactics to fit the changing nature of war. As a result, the Germans were the best equipped, organized, and trained force at the advent of World War II and achieved sweeping successes in the early years of the war, even after the allies had time to respond to the surprise invasions by Germany.

Innovation with respect to warfare is necessary for the survival of militaries and their countries. While innovation often occurs during conflicts, that innovation is mostly reactionary and is generally easier because of the lack of barriers to and appetite for innovation. It is the innovation during the interwar periods that is truly difficult because innovators find barriers focused on preconceived notions of how the next war should be conducted and often are ignored or poorly funded as a result. To effectively leverage innovation during these periods, innovators and militaries must realize how the innovations change the nature of warfare and adjust their technology, doctrine, and organizations accordingly. Effective innovation during an interwar period has the potential to set the conditions for victory early in a conflict, but militaries must realize that innovation must continue to occur during the conflict lest they lose those early advantages.

Notes
6. Makers.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
The failure of the German Army to develop an amphibious doctrine in the interwar years was a significant cause of Germany’s defeat in World War II. Flush with victory from the subjugation of much of Europe in the summer of 1940, the German Armed Forces, the Wehrmacht, appeared to be more than capable of easily conquering England in 1940. Yet, despite tactical and strategic breakthroughs in thinking during the 1930s, the German military never seriously considered or planned for a seaborne invasion of England prior to 1940. Germany’s failure to do so meant England survived to continue fighting.

Despite enormous pressure on England following France’s surrender on 25 June 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill rallied the nation to fight on and reject Adolf Hitler’s peace overtures. Germany, having almost no experience in carrying a war overseas, was faced with the challenge of crossing the English Channel. In November 1939, when Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander of the Kriegsmarine, first ordered a study of invading England, the idea seemed preposterous for a land-centric power, and the study languished. When France fell, Germany was confronted with the reality that a seaborne invasion of England may be necessary.

Originally, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, Deputy Commander of the Wehrmacht, drew up plans for a continued war with England which held a landing and occupation of England as the absolute last resort. On both 3 and 12 July, the German Chief of General Staff, General Franz Halder, proposed crossing the Channel as if it were a typical river operation, with the Air Force, the Luftwaffe, acting as artillery and the Kriegsmarine acting as engineers. On 13 July, Hitler issued Directive No. 15, ordering the Luftwaffe to begin attacks against England. Finally, on 16 July, he issued Directive No. 16, which stated his intention to invade England under the code name of “See Lowe” or “Sea Lion.” None of the Services, especially the Army and Navy, were enthusiastic about the prospect of a cross-channel invasion. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Army Group A Commander, felt it had to be a large bluff to pressure England into peace.

In accordance with Directive No. 16, for any invasion plan to succeed, the Luftwaffe had to gain air superiority.

>Mr. Williamson is a Diplomat with the Department of State and was attending the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College when he wrote this article. He has served in Mexico, Spain, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
over Southeast England. The Royal Air Force, if not destroyed, would wreak havoc upon any invasion fleet and any German forces that managed to make it ashore. However, from the beginning, the Luftwaffe cooperated very little with the Army, the Heer, or Kriegsmarine. Herman Goering, Reichsmarschall of the Luftwaffe, ignored the Heer and Kriegsmarine’s concerns over the invasion, convincing Hitler that his Luftwaffe could win the war alone. 6

In devising the new doctrine from scratch, there is no indication that the Wehrmacht paid much attention to the development of amphibious doctrine by Japan or the United States before the war. The Japanese had been practicing amphibious operations as early as 1921 and had published their first official doctrine, Summary of Amphibious Operations and Operations Defending Against Amphibious Attacks, in 1924. 7 In the United States, the Marine Corps had also been actively practicing amphibious operations since the 1920s and published its doctrine, Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, in 1934. 8 Previous German seaborne operations only consisted of bringing naval troops directly into port for very limited objectives. Even the near-disastrous invasion of Norway in April 1940 failed to give the Wehrmacht any real experience to draw from. The loss of 6,000 men, several cruisers among many other ships, and many aircraft soured German forces on large naval actions and showed how daunting it would be to cross the English Channel under fire. 9

With no experience to draw upon, the Heer and the Kriegsmarine fought over the best course of action on everything from night versus dawn landings to the sequence of troop landings. One Heer plan called for a massive dawn assault on the south coast by 25 to 40 divisions between Dover and Lyme Bay before then driving on London. 10 Having no means to transport that many divisions nor protect them, the Kriegsmarine insisted on a much narrower front and a reduction of the invasion force, which General Halder considered “suicidal” because he felt the actual invasion was “subordinate” to the air and naval campaign. 11 Next, the Heer called for ten divisions to land from Ramsgate to Brighton with a simultaneous landing in Lyme Bay, but the Kriegsmarine convinced Hitler to cancel this plan. 12 Eventually, the final plan called for eleven divisions in the first wave, eight in the second wave, and six in the third wave. All told, the divisions were expected to cross the Channel in six weeks if the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine could keep the Channel free of interference from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF), which was an unlikely proposition. 13

Without an established doctrine or specialized landing craft, the Wehrmacht had to figure out how to get ashore. One proposal called for a fleet of fast boats with aircraft engines for power, and another—fielded by Gottfried Feder, the State Secretary of Economics—called for a “war crocodile” that would be 90 feet long and creep along the sea-bed toward England from France. 14 Scouring Europe for solutions, Germany found that the large numbers of river barges, or phrams, that crowded European rivers would have to be used. These were hardly suitable for a seaborne invasion, being flat bottomed, towed, and few having the power necessary to make it across the channel. The Wehrmacht needed to only look at the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 to see the folly of relying on towed barges moving back and forth to troop ships; the barges were too slow and often drifted off course, and they allowed the enemy to cut down invaders faster than they could be replaced. 15 Plans were modified so the first waves would use self-propelled craft, and later waves would rely on the towed phrams. 16 The Wehrmacht eventually accumulated nearly 4,000 mixed craft of phrams, tugs, motorboats, and large transports. 17

As planning continued, training pamphlets were hurriedly written, and the Heer began trying to devise amphibious tactics. Commanders said...
they needed at least nine to ten weeks to prepare for an invasion, putting the earliest date for invasion at 20 September 1940. Field commanders worked out the precise details of the assault and concluded that the troops needed to be drilled on everything from loading and unloading equipment to covering fire, disembarking under fire, a flexible command system, and the organization and expansion of the beachhead. Everything the Japanese and Americans had practiced in the 1930s, the Germans were attempting to develop in weeks. Uncharacteristically ambivalent to war planning, some units did not begin training until mid-August. The Germans succeeded in making one innovative thing the Japanese and Americans had attempted in the 1930s, allowed England to survive. Modern commanders and planners can look at this German experience and learn several lessons. First, planners must always look at what potential military problems lie on the horizon and think about how to tackle them. Second, commanders should not be so myopic that they fool themselves into thinking they will never have to face a scenario they have never faced before. Look at military problems, possible solutions, and the political-military environment and coming up with new doctrines and innovations is essential for military leaders to be prepared to fight the next war.

Without a history of amphibious operations nor an established doctrine, it is unsurprising that Germany floundered in devising a plan against England. Germany’s failure to recognize the need for amphibious doctrine, even as war clouds gathered in the 1930s, allowed England to survive. Modern commanders and planners can look at this German experience and learn several lessons. First, planners must always look at what potential military problems lie on the horizon and think about how to tackle them. Second, commanders should not be so myopic that they fool themselves into thinking they will never have to face a scenario they have never faced before. Look at military problems, possible solutions, and the political-military environment and coming up with new doctrines and innovations is essential for military leaders to be prepared to fight the next war.

Notes
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
11. Hitler.
Early on the morning of 1 July 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia began its day’s march, continuing the invasion of Pennsylvania. Learning of a fight brewing between LtGen A.P. Hill’s Third Corps and what was believed to be a group of militia, LtGen Richard Ewell steered his Second Corps toward the town of Gettysburg. Approaching from the northeast and moving between the Chambersburg Pike and Carlisle Road, Ewell’s corps entered the growing battle at Gettysburg from almost behind the Union line. Although Confederate commander Gen Robert E. Lee’s orders were to avoid a general engagement until the entire Army could be brought up, Ewell’s position on the battlefield—in relation to the ongoing skirmishes across McPherson’s Ridge—made his decision to join the battle an easy one. Poor execution initially blunted the effect of the attacks by Second Corps; however, by late afternoon, all of Lee’s Army was engaged and Ewell succeeded in driving the Union I Corps and XI Corps back through Gettysburg toward the high ground south of town.

As the Union right flank fell back through Gettysburg, Lee sent Ewell another order to attack Cemetery Hill, the high ground south of town, “if practicable.” According to Reardon and Vossler’s account in The Gettysburg Campaign, June-July 1863, Ewell performed a perfunctory reconnaissance of the ground, saw the beginnings of a stout defense, and received reports about possible Union activity behind his left flank. Then, realizing that he ‘could not bring artillery to bear’ on the hill ‘and all the troops …

If Practicable? Exactly!
A leadership lesson from the Gettysburg battlefield
by LtCol Timothy E. Grebos, USMCR

Gen Robert E. Lee. (Photo by Julian Vannerson.)
Gen Richard S. Ewell. (Photo from National Archives and Records.)
Gen George G. Meade. (Photo by Matthew Brady.)
Ewell's decision not to attack remains controversial. Some historians fault the discretionary tone of Lee's order and argue that Lee should have commanded Ewell to attack without leaving any question to the order. Others blame Ewell, arguing that Ewell should have recognized the situation and taken the high ground with or without clear orders to do so. Many historians agree that if the venerable Gen Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was alive and in command at Gettysburg, he certainly would have seized the initiative and the hill. During a battlefield study of Gettysburg Campaign, expertly guided by Col Doug Douds, USMC(Ret), a professor at the U.S. Army War College, I had the chance to consider Lee's discretionary order to Ewell, the tyranny of time and distance affecting both Ewell and his Union adversaries on Cemetery Hill, and whether another commander—such as Jackson—might have made a different decision regarding the attack. While we may never know the full effect of Lee's orders, whether an attack by Ewell would have been successful, or if another commander might have chosen a different course of action than Ewell, there are several vital lessons that today's Marine leaders can learn by critically examining Lee and Ewell's dilemma.

Civil War historians have championed a wide spectrum of interpretations regarding what Lee meant to communicate to Ewell by stating, "if practicable." In Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, Bowden and Ward claim the phrase was simply a part of Lee's vernacular as a Southern gentleman, and the order he gave Ewell was every bit as direct as any order he issued. Conversely, Harry Pfanz argues in Gettysburg, The First Day, that does Edwin Coddington in Gettysburg: A Study in Command, that Lee's order was indeed discretionary, and Ewell—as the man closest to the ground truth of the situation—was expected to apply his judgment just as Lee expected from any of his corps commanders. I argue that neither of these views are entirely correct and that almost all of the debate surrounding Lee's "if practicable" remark misses his true intent—providing an extremely important lesson to Marine leaders. In the context of the Gettysburg battle, Lee's order to Ewell is as clear and direct as any he issued: take the high ground south of the town. However, looking at the order in the context of the overall Gettysburg campaign, Lee's "if practicable" remark proves not to be a statement of discretion, but of guidance. Having previously focused solely on the battle, or more specifically on the first day of the battle, I too initially interpreted Lee's orders as one that gives Ewell latitude—potentially too much latitude—to decide whether or not to attack the heights of Cemetery Hill. Taking a broader view of the campaign, largely as a result of Col Douds' unique and extraordinary approach to understanding the Gettysburg battle as part of Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania and the larger Confederate strategy, Lee's "if practicable" remark reveals itself as the commander's guidance Lee intended. Lee certainly expected his corps commanders to exert their discretion in the execution of their orders. Experienced leaders recognize that every order is discretionary to some extent, especially in the face of the enemy, and Lee was no doubt an experienced leader. I argue Lee's "if practicable" comment was intended to give Ewell guidance regarding the extent to which he should expend effort and resources to take the heights, given the unfolding circumstances and what Lee anticipated would happen in the future.

At the point in the battle, when Lee issued his infamous "if practicable" order, neither he nor Ewell knew that the growing meeting engagement at Gettysburg would be the culminating event in the invasion of Pennsylvania or the importance the heights surrounding Cemetery Hill would be later in the battle. Lee wanted Ewell to take the high ground, but he wanted Ewell to know it was not to be taken "at all hazards," as Col Strong Vincent purportedly ordered Col Joshua Chamberlain to hold the ground at Little Round Top. Lee was all too aware men and materiel were in short supply for the Confederacy, and conserving his force was certainly one of his top priorities. I argue Lee anticipated that Ewell and his corps were needed for a future fight and wanted to communicate to Ewell that he should not expend every last effort in the attack; thus, he added the infamous, "if practicable," remark to do so. Regardless of what Ewell decided as his course of action, Marine leaders can learn from Lee and Ewell the increasing value of the commander's guidance on the dynamic and fluid modern battlefield. Even with today's technology, providing commanders an unprecedented situational awareness of actions at the lowest echelons in their formations, there is often no better person to make the decision than the Marine in the fight. Leaders must give mission orders that clearly define an end result desired and provide broad guidance while giving freedom of maneuver to the leader closest to the action. Standing on Oak Ridge looking southeast toward Ewell's approach to Gettysburg and the heights beyond, acutely aware of the early morning, long march, the hard day of fighting Ewell's men had endured, and the uncertain enemy situation that lay in front of him, it is certainly easy to understand his tactical assessment of the situation and ultimate decision not to attack.

When considering Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill in the dying light of 1 July, the Marine leader can learn from both the truths and uncertainties as Ewell understood them. Specifically, modern Marine leaders must remain keenly aware that the forces affecting them on the battlefield, what Von Clausewitz called "friction," also affect the enemy. The unfavorable truths facing Ewell regarding his own forces undoubtedly influenced his conclusion to attack Cemetery Hill was "not practicable." His forces were tired after a long march and a day of fighting, and Ewell knew he would not be able to get artillery into position to support his attack. Ewell gave the Union forces the benefit of the doubt when assessing his enemy's ability to reorganize following their chaotic retreat through town. While he remained acutely aware of...
the obstacles his forces would have to overcome to mount an attack, Ewell conceded to the enemy every advantage in his estimates of their disposition and the status of their defenses. In a letter written in January 1878, Union Gen Winfield Hancock recounts the battle and paints a picture of chaos and confusion upon his arrival to Cemetery Hill. By Hancock’s own admission, a concerted effort by Ewell’s Confederates at the decisive moment might have carried the day. Whether Ewell could have organized an attack at the precise hour that Hancock’s defense floundered remains debatable. What remains certain—and is the important lesson for the Marine leader to take away—is that any friction that friendly forces face is also affecting the enemy. Recognizing that friction affects both friend and foe provides the Marine leader an opportunity to seize the initiative and take bold, decisive action. Historians agree that had it been the more aggressive Jackson, and not Ewell, in command of Second Corps, he would have chosen the bold course of action and carried the attack up Cemetery Hill.

One of the greatest criticisms of Ewell’s actions on the first day at Gettysburg was that he did not display the initiative that was the hallmark of his predecessor, Stonewall Jackson. James McPherson writes in *Battle Cry of Freedom*, “Had Jackson still lived, he undoubtedly would have found it practicable. But Ewell was not Jackson.” Historians agree that Lee’s order to take the hill “if practicable” was well suited to Jackson’s discretion and comfort in reacting to the conditions on the battlefield to achieve the desired result. Ewell, in contrast to Jackson, required more precise instructions than Lee was accustomed to issuing. Ewell served under Jackson from January 1862 until Jackson’s death in May 1863; yet, there is little evidence that Jackson shaped Ewell’s perspective as a commander. According to Frederiksen’s article on Ewell in *The Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History*, Ewell often complained about Jackson keeping him uninformed about his plans. In analyzing the relationship between Jackson and Ewell, Col Douds drives home a final leadership lesson from the battlefield at Gettysburg.

In reply to the claim that the first day of Gettysburg would have seen the Confederates capture Cemetery Hill had Jackson been alive and in command, Col Douds responds, “Yes … but why wasn’t he?” Col Douds’ purpose is not to question the circumstances around Jackson’s accidental shooting by his own troops, but instead to question why Jackson failed to mentor Ewell and foster in him the same aggressiveness and boldness that were the trademarks of Jackson’s victories. Jackson was duty bound to professionally develop his subordinate commanders and had ample opportunity to teach Ewell how to interpret Lee’s orders, how to identify and seize tactical advantages, and how to lead as he himself did. As stated by Col Douds during his tour, there should have been nothing keeping Ewell from being Stonewall Jackson incarnate, ready to exploit an earlier victory and charge up Cemetery Hill. Marine leaders must understand the importance of developing subordinates and mastering the techniques to do so. Developing Marine leaders must not only learn what to do in given situations, but why; it is the responsibility of the seasoned leader to pass along the lesson. As the title of Nathan Fick’s Colby Award winning autobiography so adroitly articulates, we as Marine leaders are all only one bullet away from turning over our command. We must take every opportunity to prepare our successors to carry on, armed with the judgment and initiative required of bold, decisive leadership.

Looking back in hindsight, it is easy to interpret the events of the first day at the Battle of Gettysburg as a turning point in the Civil War. It is equally as easy to point to Ewell’s failure to take Cemetery Hill as the seminal event of the first day’s fighting and the cause of the ultimate Confederate defeat. However, a thorough analysis of the Gettysburg battle, the Gettysburg campaign, and the Civil War presents a myriad of perspectives that counter this simplistic view of events. While the debate surrounding Ewell’s failure to take Cemetery Hill will probably never be settled, there can be no debate regarding the important lessons developing Marine leaders can take away from a study of Ewell’s dilemma. Mastering how to give and receive guidance, how to remain bold and decisive with the knowledge that friction infects both sides of a battle, and how to develop subordinates’ understanding of what should be done and why it should be done will prepare the Marine Corps leader to face any challenge, on any battlefield.

---

**Notes**


As the Nation’s forward deployed, rapid response force, the Marine Corps must be prepared to address any threat to the security of the United States and its allies. The 2018 National Defense Strategy clearly identifies Russia and China as “the central challenge[s] to U.S. prosperity and security” and thus provides the strategic-level guidance for allocating resources and planning for the future. Deterring and, if necessary, defending against Russian or Chinese aggression requires the Marine Corps to develop a force that is significantly distinct from the one that conducted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—not least because the former nations are characterized by an entirely different climate and topography.

Today, the Marine Corps is still inadequately organized, trained, and resourced to fight in cold-weather environments. However, its leadership recognizes this as a problem and has taken significant steps to address the issue. Nonetheless, more must be done if the Corps is to succeed in a cold-weather conflict as part of the joint force. As Gen David Berger, who recently assumed command as the 38th Commandant, continues to review his priorities for the Corps, he must take into consideration the kind of specific climatic challenges that a conflict with Russia or even China would entail. The Marine Corps should re-evaluate its cold-weather training objectives and practices, strengthen its presence in Europe, and better address cold-weather capability gaps and shortfalls.

“Frozen Troops Can’t Fight”; The Importance of Cold-Weather Operations

Operating in cold regions poses a unique challenge for the military. The myriad of difficulties that arise when temperatures consistently dip (and stay) below freezing are well documented in both historical context and contemporary cold-weather training. The cold, snow, and terrain hamper mechanized and armored vehicles; dismounted movement is slow and requires proficiency on skis and snowshoes. Specialized gear is necessary for both mobility and basic survival, and practicing good cold-weather hygiene can mean the difference between life and death.

Getting Back Into the “Cold Weather Business”

How the Marine Corps can best prepare to fight and win in cold regions

by Zsofia Budai

“The ascendant threats posed by revisionist powers and rogue states require change—we must become more lethal, resilient and as a consequence, a more capable deterrent.”

—Gen Robert Neller, 37th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, 2018

“Our goal [as the Marine Corps] will always be not merely to meet new and emerging threats, but to maintain a margin of overmatch over potential adversaries.”

—Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, 2019

Ms. Budai was a Department of State student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College academic year 2018–19. She is currently serving in the Policy Section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
During extended periods spent outside. Both the cold temperature and terrain significantly slow down all aspects of combat power, including maneuver, fires, sustainment, and command and control. None of this means that military operations in cold regions are impossible—indeed, countries such as Norway have effectively used the climate and topography to their advantage—but it does mean that the Marine Corps must train differently than it has thus far in the post-Cold War era.

The National Defense Strategy states, “The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” Heeding this directive is especially critical when considering the capabilities of near-peer adversaries. As Gen Berger put it in his prepared statement for his Senate Armed Services Committee testimony, “Strategically our goal is to win before fighting—to conventionally deter our competitors from taking actions that threaten our national interests.” Because we cannot predict the nature of that conflict or crisis, we must be prepared to handle any threat, anywhere, anytime.

In order to maintain a credible deterrent force that will effectively dissuade potential enemies from initiating or escalating conflict, the United States must rebuild its military dominance, which has unfortunately deteriorated over the years. Defending the American homeland and American allies requires being able to operate effectively in cold-weather, in both defensive and offensive positions. If an adversary knows that the United States and its allies are ill prepared to fight in cold-weather or on mountainous terrain, it can (and will) exploit this deficiency to its advantage.

The “Cold Weather Business”

Early in 2018, Gen Neller acknowledged, “We haven’t been in the cold-weather business for a while.” Fortunately, under his leadership, the Marine Corps made significant progress toward reintegrating cold-weather considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Marine Corps Task List emphasizes the need “to conduct combat operations as a component of a MAGTF or other task force in mountainous, high altitude, and cold weather environments,” arguing that such operations “require specialized warfighting doctrine, training, and equipment.”

Then-CMC Gen Neller directed the Marine Corps to maintain a number of cold weather–capable infantry battalions, and a Cold Weather Metrics Working Group was established to create unit readiness standards for cold-weather operations. Recent doctrinal publications also highlight both the importance and difficulty of fighting in cold-weather and mountainous regions, warning that “much institutional knowledge has been lost.”

Putting doctrine and directives into practice, the Marine Corps has renewed its focus on cold-weather training and exercises at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) near Bridgeport, CA, which has an annual throughput of 6000-plus personnel, and at other DOD installations, such as Exercise ULLR SHIELD in 2018, which allowed an aviation unit to test its aircraft in the extreme cold of Fort McCoy, WI. Perhaps even more significant, the Marine Corps deployed its first rotational unit to Norway in early 2017; Marine Rotational Force-Europe has subsequently grown to 700 Marines and participates in a variety of training and exercises with NATO allies and partners. Indeed, the Marine Corps’ entire focus in Europe has shifted to the Arctic and high north, with the termination of the Black Sea Rotational Force in late 2018 and the progression of the relationships the Corps has cultivated with the Norwegian Armed Forces since the 1960s.

Building a Cold Weather–Capable Fighting Force: Recommendations for the Marine Corps

Despite these significant steps forward, the Marine Corps must continue to re-evaluate how it prepares to fight and win in cold-weather environments, including on the territory of allied nations. The recommendations below reinforce the former and current Commandant’s vision for a more lethal and resilient force, one that can credibly deter and defend against adversaries in harsh climates.

First, the Marine Corps should reexamine its cold-weather training objectives and practices. Although the throughput of MCMWTC is impressive, the Marine Corps should reassess whether quantity or quality is the ultimate goal. The focus should be on the latter. Maintaining cold weather–capable units requires continuous training because the human body quickly loses its ability to operate in the cold and at high altitudes once removed.
from that environment. Several cold weather—capable infantry battalions will be sufficient, as long as those battalions consistently train and exercise for the cold. The Marine Corps should also take greater advantage of the facilities and expertise offered by other Services; fighting as a joint force in the cold requires training as a joint force in the cold. Alaska has a climate and topography similar to that of Scandinavia, providing an excellent training ground for exercises that involve amphibious landings to secure islands or beachheads during a winter storm. (Interestingly, Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska recently suggested that Gen Berger consider building up the Marine Corps’ presence in his home state in order to better prepare Marines for cold-weather operations.)

Second, the Marine Corps should strengthen its presence in Europe. The rotational unit in Norway should include all elements of a MAGTF—command, ground, aviation, and logistics—to provide for more effective training based on real-life scenarios. If a crisis were to occur, having a MAGTF in theater would allow for a much faster and more effective response, as that particular unit would already be well integrated with host-nation and other NATO forces. Overall, II MEF should send more rotational units to NATO and national exercises in Europe to forge relationships and increase interoperability. This is critical because NATO members must be able to fight and win together despite differences in doctrine, equipment, and tactics. The Marine Corps should better integrate with the U.S. Army, which maintains a strong presence in Germany and Poland and exercises in these and other countries year-round. Sweden and Finland—key NATO partners—also offer opportunities for training. Marines have participated in their national exercises in recent years and should continue to do so, especially in the winter months. As is the case in Norway, these nations’ armed forces maintain a high degree of cold-weather readiness simply because they must; that is the environment in which they live and train. Consequently, Marines can gain a great deal of cold-weather and high-altitude proficiency by working together with these soldiers in their home countries, adapting both planning and operational considerations for the benefit of the Marine Corps (and, indeed, the entire joint force).

Third, the Marine Corps should better identify and address cold-weather capability gaps and shortfalls. Cold-weather equipment and gear must be constantly tested and re-evaluated; what works in wet cold does not necessarily work in extreme cold. Once again, cooperation with allies is critical: the best observations and suggestions for improvement often come from those nations that have a long history of specializing in cold-weather operations. Fortunately, the Security of Supply Arrangements that the United States maintains with a number of allies and partners also provides for the mutual supply of defense goods and services, allowing the DOD to integrate technologies produced abroad. The Marine Corps should take advantage of what countries such as Norway and Finland have to offer for survivability and lethality in the cold. The defense acquisitions process is slow and cumbersome, but it...
must be adapted to meet the needs of a Marine Corps ready to address 21st century security challenges.

Conclusion

Preparing the Marine Corps for cold-weather operations will be neither cheap nor easy, but U.S. defense priorities are clear: addressing the threat from revisionist powers “requires both increased and sustained investment.”21 Conducting more cold-weather training and procuring more gear and equipment will require cuts elsewhere, especially in an uncertain budget environment. Fortunately, the European Deterrence Initiative—which stands at $6.5 billion for fiscal year 2019, with a request for $5.9 billion for fiscal year 2020—is able to support rotational forces and perhaps more in the European Command area of responsibility. Fortunately, the European Deterrence Initiative—which stands at $6.5 billion for fiscal year 2019, with a request for $5.9 billion for fiscal year 2020—is able to support rotational forces and perhaps more in the European Command area of responsibility.22 The cost of failing to prepare for cold-weather conflict is inexcusably high; adversaries will be ready to exploit these weaknesses to their advantage, especially if they are well trained for the cold.

The Marine Corps has been forced to innovate and adapt to a changing threat environment many times over the course of its history; there is no doubt that it will be able to relearn how to fight and win in cold-weather environments. By renewing its focus on cold-weather training, deploying additional Marines to northern Europe, participating in exercises with allies experienced with cold-weather, and procuring the necessary gear and equipment to succeed in the cold, the Marine Corps will prove once again that it is prepared to take on America’s adversaries as part of the joint force.

Notes


2. Senate Armed Services Committee Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David Berger, USMC Nominee for Appointment to the Grade of General and to be Commandant of the Marine Corps, United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, (Washington, DC: April 2019).


5. Doctrinally defined as “any region where cold temperatures, unique terrain, and snowfall significantly affect military operations for one month or more each year.” See Headquarters, Department of the Army, and Headquarters Marine Corps, ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 12-10A, Cold Region Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, January 2011).


12. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, “Presentation for Command and Staff College,” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, January 2019).


14. Note that the figure includes personnel from sister Services and allied and partner nations. “Presentation for Command and Staff College.”


18. The U.S. Army rotational armored brigade combat teams are headquartered in Poland; the Army also maintains a sizeable presence in Germany, including the U.S. Army Europe headquarters in Wiesbaden and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck.


Mobility in the Arctic is frequently accomplished by tracked vehicle, hovercraft, or boat. In the winter, when the ground and lakes are frozen, vehicles with wide tracks and high clearance are optimal for moving over the terrain. In the summer, the ground thaws, and tracked vehicles quickly tear up the fragile ground cover and create large mud scrapes and pits, hindering mobility. Consequently, in the summer, small and large vessels are optimal for moving and maneuvering troops and supplies. The Russian Arctic boundary is 24,140 kilometers long. The mighty rivers, the Northern Dvina, Mezen’, Pechora, Ob’, Yenisei, Lena, Indigirka, and Kolyma, flow northward to empty into the Arctic Ocean. Economically, the most important of these is the Yenisei. The Yenisei, the world’s sixth-largest river, flows some 100 kilometers to the west of the Russian industrial city of Norilsk.

Norilsk is a large inland Arctic city, located 500 kilometers (310 miles) from the North Pole. Temperatures get down to -50 degrees Centigrade (-58 degrees Fahrenheit), and its average annual temperature is -10 Centigrade (14 degrees Fahrenheit). Polar nights extend for two months over the city. The cold period extends for some 280 days a year. Norilsk is also one of the most polluted spots on the planet. No roads or railroads join Norilsk to other cities, and the only way for people to travel to other cities is by aircraft. What keeps the 173,000 residents of Norilsk there? Norilsk is sitting on top of the planet’s largest known deposits of nickel, copper, and palladium and also has significant deposits of cobalt, platinum, arsenic, cadmium, lead, selenium, zinc, and coal. The Norilsk mines produce 17 percent of the world’s nickel and 41 percent of the world’s palladium. The production of Norilsk nickel alone provides two percent of Russia’s GDP. Norilsk smelters turn the ores into metals before shipment.

Norilsk gets its goods to market by moving them over 80 kilometers of single-track railroad to the all-weather river port of Dudinka on the Yenisei River. Cranes load the metals onboard ships and barges, which sail north on the Yenisei to the Arctic Ocean, turn west, and then proceed to the major Arctic port of Murmansk (or international ports east). Once there, the metals are reloaded onto railroad cars and moved to waiting factories throughout Russia or sold to international customers.

Protecting the Arctic

The Russian Federation recognizes the importance of the Arctic and Northern Sea Passage. The Northern Sea Fleet and its subordinate 14th Army Corps and Aerospace Forces (air defense and air force) units are responsible for defending most of this vast area. Ground combat forces include the 200th Separate Coastal Defense Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade. Airborne units from the 98th Guards Airborne Division and Northern Fleet Spetsnaz units are frequent participants in joint and combined exercises. This time, however, a company from the 106th Guards Airborne Division participated.
The 200th Separate Coastal Defense Motorized Rifle Brigade is a veteran Arctic unit. It was formed from the 131st Motorized Rifle Division in 1997 and became a Coastal Defense unit of the Northern Fleet in 2012. It is headquartered in Pechenga and has a primary mission of defending the port of Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula. The 61st Naval Infantry Brigade has been stationed at the military garrison town of Sputnik since 1966 and upgraded from a regiment to a brigade over the past two years. It serves as an amphibious assault force and a coastal defense force for the Northern Fleet, an operational command on equal footing with Russia’s four military districts. The 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade is the newcomer. It was formed in 2015 and stationed at Alakurtii. Its mission is to control the territory between Murmansk and the New Siberian Island and cooperate in operations with units of the Airborne Forces and Northern Fleet Naval Infantry. All three brigades are located on the Kola Peninsula close to the Finnish and Norwegian borders. In 2015, the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade embarked on a three-month Arctic Ocean cruise which included a riverine landing at Dudinka, a movement to Norilsk, and three amphibious and air assault landings at various Arctic islands. In August 2017, the Northern Fleet conducted another Riverine exercise at Dudinka.

Preparation for the August 2017 Exercise

This exercise was larger than the 2015 exercise, involving almost twice the number of personnel and combat equipment while—for the first time—employing self-propelled and rocket artillery. Northern Fleet ships and support vessels, ground troops and naval infantry subunits, Northern Fleet Naval Aviation, and airborne subunits from the Central Military District took part in this exercise. Two thousand servicemen and 200 major military systems, including Su-24 bombers, wheeled and tracked fighting vehicles, and the Grad multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), deployed during the exercise. The naval support included large antisubmarine warship (Udaloy-1 Destroyer Class) Severomorsk; landing ships (Ropucha Class) Kondopoga, Aleksandr Otrakovskiy, and Georgiy Pobedonosets; and support vessels including the tanker Sergey Osipov, the rescue tug Pamir, and the mooring lighter KIL-164. These ships and vessels sailed some 1,900 nautical miles in transit from the Arctic port of Severomorsk. The Norilsk airport runway was being renovated at the time, so all equipment and supplies arrived by maritime transport.5

The 14th Army Corps was responsible for preparing the force for the ground portion of the exercise. The Army Corps was organized in the spring of 2017. Colonel Magomedali Magomedzhanov, Chief of the 14th Army Corps Combat Training Department, conducted extensive command and staff training exercises involving the Separate 200th and 80th Motorized Rifle Brigades and participation in a performance-graded command staff training exercise for Northern Fleet mixed forces.6

The bulk of the preparation for the ground exercise fell on the command of the ground component, Colonel Aleksandar Bezborodov, Commander of the Northern Fleet’s 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade. He noted, On being instructed to prepare for an inter-service battalion task force tactical exercise, we set about devising the exercise scenario, which was subsequently refined and clarified during reconnaissance of the maneuver area. We also conducted meticulous planning for our operations in the river port of Dudinka and in the vicinity of the Yergalakh Water Intake Station, some 10 kilometers south of Noril’sk. During this period the smallest details relating to collaboration were coordinated with the administration of the Noril’sk Industrial Region, and all issues relating to the preparation and equipping of the exercise areas were agreed upon. Schematics and drawings of the facilities that were to be built were made available to them.7

In mid-July, a naval support team sailed to Dudinka aboard the Russian Navy’s large maritime transport (Project 550M ice-class passenger/cargo ship) Yauza. The bulk freighter carried the motor transport group’s equipment for hauling gear, accessories, supplies and materiel, communications equipment, and other facilities and equipment. Passage to the exercise area took a week. The Yauza delivered the rest of the gear on a second trip. The Northern Fleet Sailors and local workers constructed roads, earthworks, and structures in two sectors approximately 150 kilometers apart. Local authorities from Dudinka,
the city of Nikel, and the Norilsk Nikel
Mining and Metallurgical Complex re-
solved any arising problems.

The result of all this effort was the
construction of an encampment accom-
modating 1,000 men, a food and issue
supply point, and a vehicle park. Exer-
cise lanes for live fire tactical exercises
were completed on schedule both in the
Dudinka port, where an amphibious
assault force landing was scheduled, and
10 kilometers from Nikel in the vicinity
of the Yergalakh Water Intake Station.
A full-scale mock-up of the Water In-
take Station was constructed 500 meters
from the actual station. It included the
security barriers and defenses.

Overall commander of the exercise
was vice admiral Nikolai Yevmenov,
the Commander of the Northern Joint
Strategic Command. The naval con-
tingent was led by the commander of
the Northern Fleet’s Kola mixed-force
flotilla VADM Oleg Golubev. The
opposing forces consisted of Spetsnaz
troops from the Central District and
Northern Fleet. The assault landing
force consisted of a battalion tactical
group from the 80th Arctic Motorized
Rifle Brigade as well as paratroopers
and naval infantry. A company of air-
borne soldiers from the 106th Guards
Airborne Division (Tula), with vehicles,
was airlifted into the naval reconnais-
sance airbase at Olenogorsk (about
100 kilometers from Murmansk). The
vehicles were moved by rail to the am-
phibious warfare ship’s embarkation
points. The paratroopers learned how
to load their vehicles for shipborne trans-
port and conduct a riverine assault as
they joined the assault task force before
embarkation. An amphibious assault
company, reconnaissance platoon, and
battery of BM-21 MLRS from the 61st
Naval Infantry Brigade joined the force
in addition to elements of the Northern
Fleet Spetsnaz force. The assault force
boarded the craft and set sail on 10 Au-
gust. The voyage lasted eight days.

Going against the Yenisei River’s
strong current was a bit of a challenge,
particularly because there is less ma-
neuver room in the Yenisei Estuary and
River than in the Kara Sea. The assault
force vessels split into two groups. The
first group was the deep-draft Udaloy-1
Class Severomorsk and Rapucha Class
large landing ships Aleksandr Otrakovskiy
and Georgiy Pobedonosets. It took
38 hours to sail from the Kara Sea to
Dudinka—some 370 nautical miles.

Let the Games Begin

The Northern Fleet ships arrived at
the river port of Dudinka on 18 August.
The amphibious assault landing was
conducted on an undeveloped Yenisei
River beach. The exercise combat phase
began on 21 August. According to exer-
cise play, terrorists had mined the shore
in the vicinity of Dudinka and captured
an important industrial facility. A joint
force of Northern Fleet forces supported
by aviation and Spetsnaz of the Cen-
tral Joint Strategic Command was in-
structed to retake the facility in order
to support the amphibious assault force
landing and its subsequent advance into
the interior of the peninsula.

Combat began with the delivery of
an airstrike against terrorist positions
and the infiltration of Spetsnaz teams
into their rear to adjust gunfire from the
ships. Upon receiving target coordinates,
gunners of the large antisubmarine war-
fare ship Severomorsk opened fire against
reinforced enemy positions on shore. Ship-based helicopters then delivered
teams of military engineers to the beach.
The engineers cleared approaches to the
beach through the mines and prepared
a beachhead unloading site, marking it
with signal flares. Naval infantrymen,
who had disembarked onto fast boats
carried aboard the Severomorsk, support-
ed the engineers’ work. After preparing a
position for the landing of the amphibi-
"
inland to protect facilities at Norlisk and nearby Nikel from foreign forces intent on disrupting or destroying vital economic facilities. The combat force needed to make a 100 kilometer move across the Taimir Peninsula. Tracked vehicles were loaded onto railroad flatcars and accompanied by security subunits formed from Northern Fleet naval infantry. Wheeled vehicles conducted a road march. Over 50 vehicles took part in the rail-and-road march, including Lynx armored paratrooper vehicles, MT-LBv armored personnel carriers, MLRSs on Ural truck chassis, 2S1 122mm self-propelled howitzers, and TTM-4902PS-10 articulated all-terrain tracked carrier vehicles. The force and vehicles closed in on their encampment and vehicle lager site.

The next combat exercise began on 28 August in the northern part of Krasnoyarsk Krai within the vicinity of Chernaya Mountain and Yergalakh Mountain in the foothills of the Plutorana Plateau. The joint force mission was to protect the main industrial hub of the Arctic region. The main fighting took place near the facilities of the Norilsk Nikel enterprise, located a short distance from the city in the estuary of the Medvezhka River. According to the scenario, Northern Fleet reconnaissance and assault landing personnel discovered several teams of commandos. They called in an artillery strike on the enemy concentrations. Grad MLRS batteries and 2S1 self-propelled howitzers moved up to the firing line. Unmanned aerial vehicle coverage identified additional targets for the artillery. Under cover of artillery, Northern Fleet Arctic Brigade and airborne troops advanced to the enemy positions, firing as they advanced. Their mission was to surround and destroy the enemy commandos. Su-24 bombers and Northern Fleet Naval Aviation helicopters provided fire support from the air. Detachments of Spetznaz and airborne troops deployed behind “enemy lines.”

Later, the Northern Fleet Arctic Brigade and airborne troops traveled by army vehicles to another exercise area. Their mission was to encircle the sabotage groups and suppress their resistance. During the final stage, the Arctic brigade, airborne troops, and Spetznaz conducted a live fire drill with their assault rifles, grenades, and heavy machine guns.

On 30 August, the force returned by conducting a short return road-and-rail march. Naval infantrymen, soldiers of the Arctic Brigade, and the paratrooper company began loading equipment onto the large landing ships moored at Dudinka. During the return voyage, the assault force conducted an amphibious assault landing at Guba Belush’ya (Belush’ya Bay) on Yuzhnyy (Southern) Island in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. The landing was conducted on 6 September from the large amphibious warfare ship Georgiy Pobedonosets. The Northern Fleet naval infantry contingent was onboard with its equipment. The amphibious warfare ship moved close to the shore and lowered its ramp directly onto the large landing ships docked at Dudinka.

The landing force is 100 percent mechanized and task organized with organic artillery, air defense, engineers, and support troops. Russian ground forces, airborne, and naval infantry are all fully mechanized.

Smoke is essential to defend the landing force from top attack. Russian ships are designed to generate their own smoke; however, getting smoke up to the water’s edge and inland is a problem. At the same time that this exercise was underway, Northern Fleet Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical forces experimented with a concept to adapt a powerboat to lay smoke screens. A landing craft provided by the Kola Flotilla’s assault ship forma-
tion was equipped with the newest model TDA-3 smoke generator, normally mounted on a KAMAZ-truck chassis. This smoke generator can place a raised smoke screen without covering the speedboat itself, which allows the boat to maneuver safely. It was tested for the first time in the Gryaznaya Guba on 15 August 2017. It showed an exceptional efficiency in laying a smoke screen to the shore.25 The TDA-3 is a newer system that provides quicker and larger coverage than earlier systems. It uses an aircraft engine to disperse an aerosol fog in a horizontal or vertical pattern. The experimental combination of smoke generator and fast boat for laying smoke screens may become a regular feature of Arctic amphibious landings.

- The sources do not indicate when the transfer of command from naval forces to ground forces took place for the assault landing forces. In decades past, this was usually a function of the range of naval gunfire, but this transfer of command was probably determined by the ground advance to a geographic feature or designated line.

- The assault landing force consisted of a battalion tactical group from the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade as well as paratroopers and naval infantry. It utilized organic vehicles and weapons in an integrated battle plan. It would have been simpler to use a single motorized rifle, paratrooper, or naval infantry unit, but the Russian military is intent on exposing all services to the conduct of the demanding mission of Arctic riverine combat while working at small unit integration and coordination between services (Russian airborne is separate from Russian Ground Forces). This exposure includes learning how to load and land various types of military vehicles on the ‘tween decks of the large amphibious warfare ships. This type of integration at this tactical level is difficult for most national services; however, these three ground combat elements (ground forces, airborne forces, and naval infantry) use similar equipment, tactics, training, and doctrine. Some naval infantry officers are commissioned from the Airborne Ryazan Higher Command School, and senior naval infantry posts are often held by airborne officers.

- Arctic riverine assaults are best conducted during the summer; however, they may be required at any time of year. The river port of Dudinka is an all-weather port, and the Yenisei flows year around. However, there is sometimes sea-ice buildup where the river enters into the Yenisei Estuary, which floods the surrounding area and requires the services of icebreakers to get transport moving again.

- Norilsk is clearly a major economic facility, and Russia has now conducted two riverine exercises to prepare to protect Norilsk should it be necessary. The first exercise was an unopposed landing followed by a rail-and-road march inland and a live fire exercise. The second exercise was more complex: a lightly opposed landing with a mined beachhead and artillery support. This involved a larger force and was followed by a road and rail march, seizure and defense of a critical facility, combat-employing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery, and ground maneuver. The Russians are developing Arctic riverine combat skills in digestible stages. Clearly they are now the world’s most experienced force in this type of combat.

**Notes**


3. The Eastern Military District has responsibility for the Chukotka Peninsula and eastern entrance to the Arctic passage.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


11. “In the Thick of It—the Arctic Infantry.”


13. “Northern Fleet Destroyer Sails up Yenisei from Kara Sea for First Time.”


15. Ibid. The Severomorsk mounts two AK-100 turreted 100mm guns. They fire a 28.6 kilogram (63 pound) round at 50–60 rounds per minute. There is an antiaircraft high-explosive fragmentation round and a variety of high-explosive frag rounds for ship or shore targets. The Severomorsk is a Udaloy-class destroyer used primarily in the antisubmarine role. If needed, additional fire support could also have been provided by the three landing ships which each mount two turrets of twin-barreled 57mm AK-257 guns, two 122mm MLRS 30-rail launchers, and two AK-630 six-barreled 30mm Gatling guns.

16. Ibid.

17. “The Arctic is Closed to Diversionary Forces.”

18. “Battle in Medvezhka Estuary.”

19. Ibid.


22. “Northern Fleet Training to Defend Major Arctic Industrial Facility.”

23. “Battle in Medvezhka Estuary.”


>Author’s Note: The author assumes responsibility for the veracity, accuracy, and source documentation of the material, including no use of classified material and conformity to copyright and usage permissions. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Team China, World Police
Let China fight banana wars, so we can win the next generation of warfare
by 1stLt Ross W. Gilchriest

Throughout the early 20th century, the U.S. Government repeatedly used military force to intervene in foreign countries to protect rapidly growing American economic interests in the Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia with the so-called “Banana Wars.” The Marine Corps bore much of the burden in these conflicts, and many of our organizational heroes—such as Smedley Butler and Chesty Puller—earned their fame during this period. As America’s interests expanded from the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli, Marines went ashore to protect them.

China’s current regional situation mirrors the United States during the Banana Wars era. The best example of this growth is President Xi Jinping’s landmark foreign policy initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI seeks to recreate the ancient Silk Road by connecting the economies of Asia, Africa, and Europe using a network of Chinese-built infrastructure and technology (see Map 1 on next page).

Essentially, the BRI involves the massive transfer of Chinese wealth, industrial capacity, and people which would cover “about 65 percent of the world’s population, about one-third of the world’s GDP, and about a quarter of all the goods and services the world” once completed.1 Consider this China’s Marshall Plan, but while American aid and investments to Europe following World War II totaled about $130 billion in 2016, the projected total investment for the BRI ranges from $4 trillion to $8 trillion, dwarfing the Marshall Plan by at least a factor of three.2

As in the Banana Wars era, it appears likely that direct Chinese involvement will follow the investment because many strategically important projects could be threatened by regional security and governance concerns.3 For example, after armed unrest in the state of Rakhine during the spring of 2017 disrupted trade flows to the port of Kyaukphyu, Beijing became directly involved with the peace negotiations between the ethnic groups and government in Myanmar.4

Additionally, key Chinese citizens overseas and BRI projects have become targets in their own right. In August 2016, a suicide bomber attacked the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan. The bomber was later identified as a Uighur Muslim, part of a minority ethnic group that lives in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang where China has imposed strict controls on its citizens in order to combat separatist terrorism.5 In neighboring Pakistan, the problem is especially acute. Despite the efforts of Pakistani forces, jihadist terrorists and Baloch nationalists have increasingly targeted Chinese projects.6 In December 2018, the Chinese Embassy issued an official warning to all Chinese organizations and
nationals to be on alert for imminent terror attacks. Should violence against Chinese people and property escalate beyond Islamabad’s capability to respond, it would cripple the strategic value of the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will protect China’s trade from an American naval blockade in the Strait of Malacca. The corridor will allow Beijing to import and export goods from the port of Gwadar. Additionally, the Chinese have been developing a series of ports with explicit or potential military purpose in countries such as Djibouti, Sri Lanka, and most recently Cambodia. Though Beijing prefers to rely on partner-nations’ security forces, how Chinese leaders respond to continued escalations of instability will determine the success or failure of the BRI.

While solutions from private military contractors to local economic development have been proposed, it seems highly likely that Chinese military intervention will become necessary at some point. Interestingly, Chinese films such as Wolf Warrior 2 and the recently released Operation Red Sea—inspired by the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) evacuations of Libya in 2011 and Yemen in 2015—signal that, at least on some level, Chinese society is acclimating to the idea of using its military for foreign intervention. This represents a historic shift in Chinese foreign policy, a shift that will require the development of an expeditionary force characterized by global presence, rapid mobilization, and operational flexibility—in short, a Marine Corps very similar to our own.

In the very near future, the PLANMC will look remarkably similar to the U.S. Marine Corps in terms of equipment, size, and purpose. A 2016 National Interest article noted Chinese acquisitions of equipment capable of conducting and supporting amphibious operations, such as dock-landing ships with well decks and air-cushioned landing craft. In terms of personnel, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) plans to expand the PLANMC to well over half the size of the active duty U.S. Marine Corps in order to better protect its...
increasing overseas commitments such as the naval bases in Djibouti and Gwadar. The Chinese Defense Ministry acknowledges that these facilities are primarily to be used as staging areas for anti-piracy, humanitarian, and peacekeeping missions; media reports are estimating personnel capacity at around 10,000 in Djibouti alone. In 2017, the South China Morning Post reported that the PLANMC doubled in size from 10,000 to 20,000, with an ultimate goal of 100,000 in the near future. Additionally, military exercises have been increasing in both scope and size. The “Military Report” program of China Central Television reported that on 12 March 2018, the PLANMC conducted a “massive groundbreaking maneuver” of over 10,000 troops, or roughly half the total force, in the southwest province of Yunnan and the eastern province of Shandong—the “largest ever trans-regional training of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Marine Corps” to date. This is a significant increase from the first live fire exercise conducted in the Xinjiang Autonomous region in 2016, which included only a battalion-sized element and conducted limited operations. The March 2018 exercises also combined “diverse modes of transport including air, water, railway and motor,” each a crucial component of Chinese infrastructure investment in
Chinese Marines descend from a tank after arriving at the designated battleground. (Photo provided by author from http://globaltimes.cn.)

Notes

4. Ibid.

5. Olga Dzyubenko, “Kyrgyzstan Says Uighur Militant Groups behind Attack on China’s Embassy,” Reuters, (Online: September 2016), available at https://www.reuters.com. The reader may also be interested to know that the government of China officially labels provinces with large non-Han ethnic groups and notable separatist undercurrents as “autonomous regions.” When I visited Tibet in October 2017, I learned that my idea of autonomy is quite different. For instance, at the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, considered the holiest and most sacred temple in Tibet, guards armed with automatic weapons march in formation counter-clockwise around the square, ignoring the Tibetan Buddhist tradition of navigating any holy place in a clockwise manner. Furthermore, the sentries on every roof and the armed personnel carriers staring down temple’s entrance suggested that Chinese authorities are vigilant in ensuring that “terrorists” do not threaten the “stability” of the regions the PRC has “peacefully liberated.” I visited the cities of Urumqi and Kashgar in Xinjiang in May 2018. I witnessed the repressive counterterrorism measures being taken by the Chinese government, as has been widely reported on in the past six months: police checkpoints, the removal of Islamic symbols on buildings, re-education camps, and invasive electronic and biological surveillance using artificial intelligence. Some estimates claim that over one million Uighurs have been sent to the “re-education” camps.


9. I saw Operation Red Sea in a Beijing theatre on 17 March 2018. It was not good—three hours of melodramatic, Rambo-style action, propagandistic dialogue, and a weak plot that felt like an uncoordinated mash-up of Captain Phillips, 13 Hours, and Blackhawk Down. Of note, the movie ends with a totally superfluous scene of the Chinese Navy warning some unknown adversary in the South China Sea, “You are about to enter Chinese waters. Please turn around immediately!” In my opinion, the movie’s implicit message was much more interesting than its content.


13. Ibid.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


>Author’s Note: The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and in no way represent the views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps prides itself for being a lethal fighting force with a unique esprit de corps and the ability to perform in any clime and any place, despite a dearth of funding. A 38-day training period in Nimes, France, with the French Foreign Legion (FFL) afforded me the opportunity to immerse in the culture of another NATO infantry outfit with an international reputation similar to that of the Marine Corps. This opportunity, particularly with as unique a force as the Foreign Legion, provided several learning moments for me as a platoon commander that both reinforced and provided new perspectives to my approach of the Marine Corps infantry’s mission. The most salient points I took away from training with the Foreign Legion was that tradition and interpersonal communication are effective routes to building esprit de corps, and small cultural differences and approaches to training and tactics can provide significantly different approaches to problems in today’s combat environments.

The similarities between the Foreign Legion and the Marine Corps are substantial. For instance, Foreign Legion officers routinely joked about the need for more funding, their constant squabbling with the big Army, and that there is always someone in their government trying to get rid of them permanently. The Foreign Legion is known for its high standards of discipline, challenging recruit training, and respect for their history. For example, the Battle of Camerone is an 1863 battle in which the Foreign Legion, outnumbered 65 to a force of over 2,000, witheld Mexican forces for over 10 hours in what the Foreign Legion refers to as its “baptismal event.” The wooden hand of Captain Jean Danjou, the Commanding Officer at Camerone, remains in the Foreign Legion base in Aubagne as a testament to the ultimate sacrifice in the name of the Legio Patria Nostra (Legion Our Country). There are placards in the town of Bouresches, outside Belleau Wood, which refer to Camerone as the equivalent of Belleau Wood for the Marine Corps. Celebrated on 30 April, Camerone Day is the most important day on the Foreign Legion’s calendar, and the events in its honor are reminiscent of 10 November for the Marine Corps. Throughout my time with the Foreign Legion, the similarities between the two forces repeatedly appeared. Danjou is our Dan Daly, Camerone our Belleau Wood, and the challenges that face modern infantries in today’s operational environment are a shared challenge. Both the Foreign Legion and the Marine Corps strive to address small budgets and unknown threats with a combination of strict discipline, esprit de corps, and challenging training to prepare our infantry forces. Given these similarities, how does the Foreign Legion’s approach differ from ours, and how do these differences manifest themselves in the Foreign Legion’s training?
First, unique daily traditions and the process of recruit training in the Foreign Legion create a different environment than most Marine Corps garrison bases. The recruit training and indoctrination process for Legionnaires is an entirely different path from a Marine Corps Recruit Depot. The Foreign Legion accepts recruits from across the globe as long as they can make it to a Foreign Legion recruiting station in France and pass initial interviews, screening, and background checks. Over the course of basic training, and once in the regular regiments of the Foreign Legion, the FFL maintains strict adherence to several traditions that turn recruits from all over the globe with “not the slightest thing in common” into a cohesive fighting force of Legionnaires. The Legion mandates that French must be spoken at all times during working hours with French language training during the initial stages of training. Legionnaires are expected to memorize the Legion’s Code of Honor and dozens of chants—with verses in French, German, and English—that were created and sung by Legionnaires on campaign in Indo-China, Algeria, Morocco, and beyond. For the first five years of a Legionnaire’s enlistment, they are given a new identity and not permitted to return home or live off-base. Legionnaires at the 2nd Regiment live in four-man squad bay style rooms, and town liberty is dependent on performance and inspections conducted by SNCOs. Many forms of punishment that are no longer available to NCOs in the Marine Corps remain available to their peers in the Foreign Legion. For the first five years of a Legionnaire’s enlistment, they are given a new identity and not permitted to return home or live off-base.

For the first five years of a Legionnaire’s enlistment, they are given a new identity and not permitted to return home or live off-base. Legionnaires at the 2nd Regiment live in four-man squad bay style rooms, and town liberty is dependent on performance and inspections conducted by SNCOs. Many forms of punishment that are no longer available to NCOs in the Marine Corps remain available to their peers in the Foreign Legion. For the first five years of a Legionnaire’s enlistment, they are given a new identity and not permitted to return home or live off-base. Legionnaires at the 2nd Regiment live in four-man squad bay style rooms, and town liberty is dependent on performance and inspections conducted by SNCOs. Many forms of punishment that are no longer available to NCOs in the Marine Corps remain available to their peers in the Foreign Legion. For the first five years of a Legionnaire’s enlistment, they are given a new identity and not permitted to return home or live off-base. Legionnaires at the 2nd Regiment live in four-man squad bay style rooms, and town liberty is dependent on performance and inspections conducted by SNCOs. Many forms of punishment that are no longer available to NCOs in the Marine Corps remain available to their peers in the Foreign Legion. For the first five years of a Legionnaire’s enlistment, they are given a new identity and not permitted to return home or live off-base.

This strict adherence to traditions and Foreign Legion culture is integrated into the daily battle rhythm in the Deuxième Régiment Infanterie. Each day, all NCOs and above within a company make a point of shaking hands and formally greeting each other. They come to attention with the customary French open palms and then greet each other. It is unacceptable to not formally greet all other members of the company at the first opportunity of the day, usually during coffee in the company club or foyer prior to morning formation. Daily noon meals in garrison are also deliberate affairs. 1200 to 1400 was reserved time for garrison lunches each day. After a short speech from the regimental commander, the separate ranks then traveled to their own dining areas for lunch. The lieutenant’s eating area, formally titled the Ksar (North African term for fort), was littered with trinkets and memorabilia from old training exercises and campaigns spanning the globe. The lieutenant’s lunch is a highly structured event that includes an elected president and a tape that often discourages units from planning such events during garrison in the Marine Corps. The Foreign Legion’s emphasis on combat conditioning and endurance, as opposed to the, “Who cares if I run a 25:00 PFT, I can bench 275 pounds” mentality that is all too pervasive in the infantry community today, resulted in fit and impressive platoons. A climbing certified lieutenant took us up to a ravine in the Valluguière’s training area, secured the harnesses himself while showing his platoon, and then conducted a day-long rappelling exercise—again without undue planning difficulty. I can say confidently that event would not happen in the Marine Corps today without a significant paradigm shift in our approach to safety precautions. The Foreign Legion’s emphasis on planning creativity, austere training environments, entrusting officers to make proper safety judgments without hindering their ability to execute the training, and on combat conditioning fitness were all positive reinforcements of the proper philosophy the Marine Corps infantry must have toward training.

The final point of interest I noted was from discussion and comparison of different sources of literature on the
topic of French tactics, particularly in counterinsurgency. The Foreign Legion has a long history of counterinsurgency having fought in Indo-China and the Algerian War. MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, partially relies on source material from the French-Algerian War and French military thinkers such as David Galula. Some of the basic tenets of current and historical anecdotes of French counterinsurgency tactics remain useful to study. Similar to Jean Larteguy’s Centurions and Simon Murray’s Foreign Legion platoon staying light and mobile to force the fellagha into the hills, current French doctrine calls for implementing the “oil spot” principle, isolating the enemy from the general population and blocking them from movement and access to resources. Modern Foreign Legion units also have the advantage of having a multilingual force at all levels, particularly when it comes to operating in Francophone nations in Africa. No longer attempting to assert French sovereignty from across the Mediterranean, the Foreign Legion is well suited as a light, mobile force that can interact easily with civilians and conduct cooperative patrols and persons of interest handovers with national security forces in Francophone nations. French counterinsurgency today, according to conversations with officers at the Legion and their doctrine, does not favor heavily fortified forward operating bases and combat outposts. Instead, the Legion emphasizes patrolling that cordons entire towns and cities to force insurgents into the mountains while also conducting “close proximity” patrols to reassure but not disturb the local populace. Ultimately, Foreign Legion doctrine consists of many similarities with that of Marine Corps forces; however, the differences in counterinsurgency doctrine and extensive history conducting counterinsurgency make them an ally worth studying. While I did not have the opportunity to observe the Foreign Legion in action in Mali, I am confident from my observations that there is likely something worth learning from their actions in Africa today.

Being able to take an impartial perspective at assessing another nation’s infantry units was a rewarding exercise for me. It led me to the ultimate conclusion that most professional infantry units in the world probably have many more similarities than differences. It is the small differences though, doctrinally and culturally, that define the effectiveness of units. Do we truly adhere to and cultivate the sense of esprit de corps that the Marine Corps possesses, or simply pay it lip service on social media? Do we build the relationships on a daily basis within our units that best build pride in our Corps, or do too many talented junior NCOs sit behind computers or in the exchange without a training plan while not receiving the daily handshake their counterparts in the Foreign Legion get from their commanders? Do we truly set up our NCOs and junior Marines with the most tough and austere training possible, or does the Marine Corps’ current approach to risk mitigation improperly weigh the important factors of Marine safety and Marine training?

I present this article in order to pose the question: What differences do we value about the Marine Corps as leaders, and what do we do daily and in training to reinforce those differences?

Notes
5. Ibid.
Scenario

In a distributed operation, a reinforced Rifle Squad of Marines is on patrol in the year 2025. The 3d Squad (Rein), 1st Platoon, Company Landing Team Alpha, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion/1st Marines (1/1), 15th MEU and Belleau Wood ARG are operating in the South-Western Pacific, conducting an expeditionary advanced base operation (EABO) on a jungle archipelago against Chinese mercenaries with peer capabilities.

Firefight 2025

The point man stopped on the side of the trash infested gully, in actuality a small stream. They had been patrolling up the stream for three hours. A concealed avenue of approach, the stream was leading into the outskirts of another thatched-roof village. He smelled rotten fish and nuoc mam of the village first! At least the stream they were walking in, with its alternative use as trash pit and sewer, was deep and wide. LCpl Fisher knelt on one knee and scanned 180 degrees to the front using his old VorTex21’s 10x binoculars. He didn’t like it, something was wrong. No birds, no chickens, no dogs barking, no kids, and no locals, just stink! This all adds up to an ambush.

The squad leader moved up, “Fisher what’s the issue?” Fisher replied that he didn’t like it. The Squad Leader said the quad-copter flying ahead of them, now over the village’s dirt center, is showing nothing unusual. The UAS operator chimed in, “Yea, nothing. Nothing in the market center, no people, no animals …”

The first crack was a single AK-47 round. It must have been the signal to trigger the ambush as 4 RPGs flew over their heads and impacted 50 meters to their south. The defilade of the gully they were in saved the entire squad, but it also had them pinned down without communications—another sierra sandwich!

The squad leader, Sgt Franklin, called “Guns Up,” followed by “Infrastructure Up.” Guns up brought forward the attached machine gun team, who arrived first, as he gave them a direction to provide suppression fire. Infrastructure up brought the infrastructure Marine forward. As the infrastructure Marine arrived, Sgt Franklin’s attention turned to this junior Marine of the three-man communications and electronic warfare team (CEWT) which was now an organic fire team within the 2025 squad. This team may be the most important asymmetric enabling capability in his squad, as Sgt Franklin had realized previously, because he was operating in a distributed operation while physically separated from the platoon in what had become SOP. Third Squad was 13 kilometers and one valley away from the platoon headquarters, currently located on the next valley floor, and on the move to the Sandpiper River. Franklin told Infrastructure to fire two rounds of “hockey pucks”, one each onto the two overlooking hills to their South, Hill 118 and Hill 62. He had earlier lazed both hills with his LA-22U Laser and knew they were within range. Infrastructure took his converted old M-79 grenade launcher and breach loaded a 40-mm sized “eNodeB/Wi-Fi-7” cylinder into
the tube followed by a 40mm charging round. He fired the M-79e (enhanced) and blooped what the Marines called a communications hockey puck onto Hill 118 and followed with a second shot to Hill 62. Immediately, his comm team chief yelled over that they had re-established communications and were back in the game.

Franklin knew from previous firefights that the network was not only his lifeline but also his asymmetrical advantage to defeat the Chinese volunteers and insurgents. Franklin grabbed the joint fires observer (JFO), Corporal Pullie, and told him he wanted anything Pullie could get on the Northern ridge-line 400 meters north of their streambed. Pullie tried to get the joint tactical air controller (JTAC), GySgt Ski, who was collocated with the company commander somewhere on the island, hopefully on high ground, which was the plan. The JFO yelled, “I’m being jammed.” The organic CEWT carried an electronic warfare (EW) sensor that scanned frequencies and also converted to an in-extremis jammer.

Without being told, Infrastructure went to his antenna bag and pulled out two thick telescoping antennas and ran back down the gully 10 meters to a doglegged turn in the stream where he placed one antenna on each side of the gully 40 meters apart and reeled out the cable directly in the curve’s defile. The EW Marine of the CEWT was plugging the cables into the tactical electronic warfare targeting (TEWT) box; within twenty seconds, they had DF’ed (direction found) the Chinese jammer and had solid grid coordinates. The grid coordinates were passed to the JFO and squad leader. The squad leader told the JFO to continue to work up his nine-line digital CAS brief for the RPG location, their biggest immediate threat, in order to pass it via a burst transmission which he knew from the active threat eXercise (ATX) at Twenty-nine Palms added by the Tactical Exercise and Evaluation Control Group, which his squad had been thru last year—was worth its training time in gold. It also validated to the Marines of the squad the extra weight and increased training of putting up with the new organic CEWT team now part of his squad. They had countered the jamming and shut it down in fewer than 90 seconds, automatically earning the instant respect that combat competence brings within a squad of Marines. The squad leader now understood why the Commandant had made the institutional decision to embed EW capabilities at squad, platoon, company, and battalion at the cost of riflemen. Meanwhile, the JFO had passed the request for fire and his location. At eleven minutes into the firefight and nine minutes after the network had been enabled by the hockey puck re-establishing communication within the self-forming, self-healing 5G LTE network, the flight of two AH-1Z Vipers was on station and carrying a wall to wall load of the laser guided rockets of the APKWS-II’s (Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System). With the arrival of the flight and their employment, the firefight was virtually over. The squad’s JFO, under the networked-in supervision of the remote JTAC, had passed the nine-line to the Vipers who peppered the ridgeline with the 2.75-inch rockets, which were precision weapons with the applicate of the APWKS. The fight was over! The

Franklin knew from previous firefights that the network was not only his lifeline but also his asymmetrical advantage to defeat the Chinese volunteers and insurgents.
Chinese volunteers and indigenous force dispersed in multiple directions. The squad noted the jamming cave for future efforts and moved on to continue with their designated mission to meet with the village elders.

The squad goes on the move again and continued to the village center as the village elders and dogs re-emerged out of nowhere. After an uneventful hour long dialog with village elders, the squad moved two kilometers to a hill that overlooked the village in the center of the small valley and called for their pre-arranged extract. Twenty-four minutes later, a flight of 2 MV-22s emerged flying low up the valley from the south. One took the high covering position and covered with its organic guns and rockets while Dash-2 came into the LZ and picked up the squad. After one mid-air refueling from another MV-22 with an internal gas bag, the squad was deposited back on the Belleau Wood.

**Hot Wash and De-Brief**

The squad moved off the flight deck immediately to turn in ammunition and proceeded directly to the company debriefing spaces. Each Marine received two ice-cold beers as the company intelligence chief began his debrief where the Marines provided insights into what they observed during the patrol. The assistant squad leader was compiling their patrol route from the insert LZ to extract LZ on his patrol tablet while getting coordinates from both the JFO on his fire missions and Infrastructure on where they put up the tactical hot spots. The assistant squad leader's report would be added to the company intelligence chief’s debrief. Then, the squad leader led a hot wash-up discussion which dissected the firefight—the good, the bad, and the ugly. The good was they took no causalities, gained fire superiority, and shut down and dispersed the Chinese mercenaries. The bad was they were out of communications for a period of time in the streambed until they established the tactical hot spot. The ugly was they were surprised. The Squad Leader was not pleased and asked for recommendations from his squad.

As they discussed the ambush, there was a clear agreement they had two deficiencies. First, their very limited line of sight surveillance ring on the terrain they worked. Second, the valley-to-valley communications with higher echelons, which was both their lifeline and their asymmetrical advantage, was extremely limited due to the disconnected, intermittent, and latency communications environment coupled with their desire to protect their electronic signature to avoid detection. Sgt Franklin wanted concrete recommendations he and the assistant squad leader could make to the “Old Man” in the formal battalion de-brief that evening. What the squad came up with was not new, but Franklin wanted to document and make his point since they had been surprised and ambushed. For surveillance, he wanted two quad-copters per patrol and his UAS operator assured him he could run both simultaneously. That would double the coverage area of surveillance and let one quad run in front of them while the second took a higher orbit and covered the flanking valley ridge lines. It also gave them a backup. Franklin had been in the Corps long enough to understand why the master sergeant always said, “It takes two to get one.” The communication team and LCpl Infrastructure had ideas to insure network availability. He told them to write them up and provide a diagram that he could use tonight. Sgt Franklin knew the 5G LTE, 3 Tier (squad local net, platoon area net, and company high net) network, each worked independently and together based on geography. He would bring Sgt ‘Sparks’ with him tonight and let him explain the new ideas. The first idea was to simply bring three or four additional Wi-Fi hockey pucks to establish the “on call” tactical hot spot. They had only brought three H-Pucks, per their SOP, and used all three in today’s ambush. The recommendation was to change to six pucks and distribute the added weight among the patrol members. The second was to experiment by putting a hot spot hockey puck in the quad-copter even if it meant duct taping it to the belly. The theory, which had been talked about for years (or as long as the squad could remember), was to extend the communications reach by using the quad-copter as communications relay. They wanted that option on patrol to be able to slap in an H-puck and launch the quad from their position. Their request was for battalion to get permission from the ship for time and airspace off the ship’s fantail to launch
and recover the quad-copter with duct tape hot spot and determine feasibility of transmitting to another ship and determining what communications range they could get from what altitude as well as learn and refine their concept.

The Squad Leader was optimistic as he and the assistant squad leader headed to "officers' country" for the battalion de-brief. He knew the Old Man had fought in Afghanistan as a young corporal and later captain, and that he understood no comm zones in valley floors will become kill zones. Now that they were in the Pacific jungles in stream beds, he felt that the battalion commander would understand and support both recommendations for squad innovations. After they had proved and incorporated those innovations into their squad and battalion’s SOPs, Sgt Franklin thought he might even write it up and try for that cash award from "officers' country" for the battalion commander to establish his own local, low detect hot spot network. This was done by the Infrastructure Marine shooting two hockey pucks from his M-79E up to the adjacent hills that flanked the creek. The hockey pucks could be set for 6-, 12- or 24-hours duration, had a timed disablement, and an additional on command self-destruct capability. The Wi-Fi enablers were line-of-sight to a gateway bridge carried in Infrastructure’s backpack that had direct capable option to radio's/LTE or Wi-Fi Bridge.

Innovation. What enabled the local communication and bridging to external communications was the tactical infrastructure deployed by the squad leader to establish his own local, low detect hot spot network. This was done by the Infrastructure Marine shooting two hockey pucks from his M-79E up to the adjacent hills that flanked the creek. The hockey pucks could be set for 6-, 12- or 24-hours duration, had a timed disablement, and an additional on command self-destruct capability. The Wi-Fi enablers were line-of-sight to a gateway bridge carried in Infrastructure’s backpack that had direct capable option to radio's/LTE or Wi-Fi Bridge.

Lesson Learned. To receive supporting arms and to coordinate internally, a squad operating in a distributed EABO must have communications. In the civilian world we assume and forget the annual billion dollar infrastructure investment made by the large cell phone carriers. In a firefight, without civilian infrastructure, this 2025 squad had its own tactical hot spot.

Battalion Commander. At the end of the de-brief, the battalion commander concurred with Sgt Franklin and issued instructions to his S-3 and S-6 to immediately incorporate the two recommendations into the battalions tactics, techniques, and procedures. He then ordered Sgt Franklin to prepare a PME class for all squad leaders, SNCOs, and officers to receive prior to future distributed operations. The sergeant major authorized an additional beer ration for the 3d Squad!

**2018 Squad Composition:** Twelve Marines consisting of 3 three-man fire teams and a three Marine headquarters team composed of squad leader, assistant squad leader/JFO, and UAS/systems operator.

**2021 Squad:** Fifteen Marines: Twelve-man 2018 squad plus organic three-Marine CEWT (one SatComm/radio operator; EW/TEWT operator; and one network Infrastructure operator).

**The 2025 Firefight Squad (Rein):** 1/0 2021 squad of fifteen plus attachments of a two man machine gun team, two-man 60 mortar team, and two Navy corpsmen.

The squad knew they had been detected somewhere along their five-hour patrol.

**Communications Summary**

The communications within the squad (squad member to squad member) was via wave hopping and forming line of sight low frequency squad net. Control of the line of sight UAS was a dedicated narrow beam low detect frequency. External operational communications was a combination of 5G LTE bridged over from squad net to external operational level via bridge to MUOS SatComm radio transceiver system.

Innovation. What enabled the local communication and bridging to external communications was the tactical infrastructure deployed by the squad leader to establish his own local, low detect hot spot network. This was done by the Infrastructure Marine shooting two hockey pucks from his M-79E up to the adjacent hills that flanked the creek. The hockey pucks could be set for 6-, 12- or 24-hours duration, had a timed disablement, and an additional on command self-destruct capability. The Wi-Fi enablers were line-of-sight to a gateway bridge carried in Infrastructure’s backpack that had direct capable option to radio's/LTE or Wi-Fi Bridge.

Lesson Learned. To receive supporting arms and to coordinate internally, a squad operating in a distributed EABO must have communications. In the civilian world we assume and forget the annual billion dollar infrastructure investment made by the large cell phone carriers. In a firefight, without civilian infrastructure, this 2025 squad had its own tactical hot spot.

Battalion Commander. At the end of the de-brief, the battalion commander concurred with Sgt Franklin and issued instructions to his S-3 and S-6 to immediately incorporate the two recommendations into the battalions tactics, techniques, and procedures. He then ordered Sgt Franklin to prepare a PME class for all squad leaders, SNCOs, and officers to receive prior to future distributed operations. The sergeant major authorized an additional beer ration for the 3d Squad!

and determine feasibility of transmitting to another ship and determining what communications range they could get from what altitude as well as learn and refine their concept.

The Squad Leader was optimistic as he and the assistant squad leader headed to “officers’ country” for the battalion de-brief. He knew the Old Man had fought in Afghanistan as a young corporal and later captain, and that he understood no comm zones in valley floors will become kill zones. Now that they were in the Pacific jungles in stream beds, he felt that the battalion commander would understand and support both recommendations for squad innovations. After they had proved and incorporated those innovations into their squad and battalion’s SOPs, Sgt Franklin thought he might even write it up and try for that cash award from “officers’ country” for the battalion commander to establish his own local, low detect hot spot network. This was done by the Infrastructure Marine shooting two hockey pucks from his M-79E up to the adjacent hills that flanked the creek. The hockey pucks could be set for 6-, 12- or 24-hours duration, had a timed disablement, and an additional on command self-destruct capability. The Wi-Fi enablers were line-of-sight to a gateway bridge carried in Infrastructure’s backpack that had direct capable option to radio's/LTE or Wi-Fi Bridge.

Innovation. What enabled the local communication and bridging to external communications was the tactical infrastructure deployed by the squad leader to establish his own local, low detect hot spot network. This was done by the Infrastructure Marine shooting two hockey pucks from his M-79E up to the adjacent hills that flanked the creek. The hockey pucks could be set for 6-, 12- or 24-hours duration, had a timed disablement, and an additional on command self-destruct capability. The Wi-Fi enablers were line-of-sight to a gateway bridge carried in Infrastructure’s backpack that had direct capable option to radio's/LTE or Wi-Fi Bridge.

Lesson Learned. To receive supporting arms and to coordinate internally, a squad operating in a distributed EABO must have communications. In the civilian world we assume and forget the annual billion dollar infrastructure investment made by the large cell phone carriers. In a firefight, without civilian infrastructure, this 2025 squad had its own tactical hot spot.

Battalion Commander. At the end of the de-brief, the battalion commander concurred with Sgt Franklin and issued instructions to his S-3 and S-6 to immediately incorporate the two recommendations into the battalions tactics, techniques, and procedures. He then ordered Sgt Franklin to prepare a PME class for all squad leaders, SNCOs, and officers to receive prior to future distributed operations. The sergeant major authorized an additional beer ration for the 3d Squad!
On the morning 18 July 2002, 28 Spanish Commandos of the elite Grupo de Operaciones Especiales III inserted by 4 Eurocopter Cougar helicopters of the Spanish Army and stormed the islet of Perejil. They quickly captured the Moroccan occupying force of six Moroccan naval cadets before triumphantly raising the Spanish flag. Perejil Island, only 37 acres in size just off the mainland of Morocco, was well within Morocco’s territorial waters but had been a Spanish possession since 1580. Later in the day, having secured the island, troops of the Spanish Legion landed and replaced the commandos. The Legionnaires fortified the island to repel any potential Moroccan counter-attack. Morocco, presented with a fait accompli, announced to the world that the Spanish “invasion” amounted to a “declaration of war.”

Perejil Island is a small island located 250 meters off the coast of Morocco. It is known in Spanish as Isla de Perejil, or Parsley Island, and is mainly used by local Moroccan shepherds to graze livestock. The island is fairly barren except for the wild parsley growing on the island, hence the name. Originally occupied in 1415 by Portugal (when King John I also took Ceuta from the disintegrating Marinid Berber dynasty), the island came under the control of Spain in 1580 during the reign of Philip I of Portugal—also known as Philip II of Spain—under the Iberian Union. When the Union split in 1640, Perejil Island and Ceuta remained under Spanish sovereignty, while the majority of Morocco remained under Saadi Sultanate control (the Saadians were successors to the Wattasids, who had defeated the Marinids, and were Moroccan Arabs claiming descent from the Hejaz). The Saadi were vassals, albeit very loosely, of the distant Ottoman Empire (the Ottomans were themselves enmeshed in the “revolts and revivals” period, which lasted from 1566 to 1683, and essentially let Morocco make its own way against the Spanish and Portuguese); however, they ruled mainly interior Morocco, leaving the Spanish enclaves alone. This policy was also maintained by the succeeding Alaouite dynasty, which came to power in 1666 and remains in power to this day.

In the 1890s, Europe again intruded into Morocco with the French and Spanish landing numerous troops and establishing protectorates over Alaouite Moroccan territory before claiming them as colonies a decade later. Northern Morocco and the Western Sahara was controlled by Spain, while France controlled the rest of Morocco. These regions remained under colonial control until Morocco, still under the Alaouite dynasty, regained its independence in 1956. However, Spain continued to retain control of several enclaves, including Perejil Island. This presumably set the stage for a future action against Spain by the Moroccans.

On 11 July 2002, a squad of frontier guards from the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces (a paramilitary force from the Ministry of Interior that can supplement the national Gendarmerie, the Army, or—more usually—the Moroccan Customs and the Brigade of Forests and Water as firefighters) called...
mokhaznis, equipped with small arms, two flags, and a radio, landed on Perejil Island. This was the first amphibious landing conducted on “European soil” since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (Operation YILDIZ ATMA-4, in English Operation STAR DROP-4). The mokhaznis, usually colloquially called mroud (Berber for a type of grasshopper) by Moroccans, raised the red and green flag of Morocco over the island, set up camp, and scanned the horizon for any Spanish reaction force. Meanwhile, the Moroccan people were not informed of the event, and the King was unavailable for comment. Senior Moroccan officials, in response to Spanish protests about the landing, stated that Morocco had no intention of removing the “frontier guards” from the island. To support this, Morocco stated they needed the island to aid in monitoring illegal immigration and that the island was located well within Moroccan territorial waters.

The news was greeted with outrage by the Spanish people, who likened it to the Falklands War (the Spanish did not call that conflict by the Argentinian name but always used the British term of the “Falklands”). The Spanish government rejected the premise that the occupation of Perejil was to monitor illegal immigration and sent three patrol boats to the island that were then confronted by two Moroccan fishing boats “protecting” the island. Other Moroccan naval vessels were “coincidentally” conducting maneuvers nearby as well. Neither side was apparently willing to yield, and the stage was set—if pursued by both—for war.

International reactions to this debacle were mixed. In the European Union, every member nation except for France and Portugal denounced Morocco’s actions, issuing a “statement of regret” for the situation but in support of Spain. France and Portugal stated that Spain should recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Perejil Island. In the Arab league, every member supported Morocco except for Algeria, which reaffirmed their recognition of Spanish sovereignty over the Exclaves of Ceuta, Melilla, and most specifically, Perejil Island.

After receiving protests from the Spanish government, Morocco rapidly replaced the original mokhaznis with naval cadets to set up a permanent base on the island. Spanish officers from the Guardia Civil police force arrived on a small patrol boat a few days after the Moroccan occupation but were “persuaded” to leave at gunpoint. This incident combined with the “naval force” guarding the island indicated that Morocco clearly had no intention of leaving Perejil. Spanish radio stations were being overwhelmed by callers demanding the invaders be driven back to the Moroccan mainland. Clearly, the Spanish people demanded that Spain act—and act they did.
The Spanish response after the initial rebuff was swift. First, Spanish forces reinforced the other enclaves they controlled in Africa, Ceuta, and Melilla to deter any further Moroccan aggression. Spain dispatched patrol boats and other naval craft to observe the island and monitor all Moroccan military activities in the area. Then, on the morning of 18 July, Spain launched Operation ROMEO-SIERRA, a helicopter-borne assault on Perejil Island. The operation was executed in less than an hour, resulting in a bloodless victory for Spanish forces, the Moroccan garrison captured, and the island returned to Spanish control. The prisoners were then transferred via helicopter to Ceuta and kept in the headquarters of the Guardia Civil. Later that same day, the Spanish commandos were replaced by the Spanish Legion who fortified the island and remained to garrison the island against any further Moroccan aggression.

Morocco announced its outrage, demanding the Spanish leave Perejil Island immediately and accusing Spain of declaring war on Morocco. Spain refused to withdraw, stating that Perejil Island was an integral part of Spain. With war threatening, talks were begun between the two nations with the United States mediating. Morocco eventually agreed to return to the status quo that existed before the events of 11 July, namely Spanish control of Perejil Island. Subsequently, the Spanish Legionnaires occupying Perejil Island were withdrawn.

This little-known episode, fortunately bloodless, does give pause for reflection. First, why did Morocco employ Ministry of Interior forces to seize the island only to then replace them with naval cadets? Why did Morocco use fishing boats, presumably lightly armed as they deterred the initial Spanish patrol boat response, instead of real naval combatants (which they had)? It almost seemed as if Morocco wanted to have its forces defeated on the island, assuming Spain would respond with overwhelming military force. Is it possible that Morocco was playing a deeper game, one in which it instigated a situation in which Spanish Commandoes killed naval cadets (“children” would be the outraged cry), resulting in a global moral condemnation that would force Spain to hand over Perejil Island? Fortunately, the highly-disciplined Spanish troops averted that situation, so we will never know.

Currently, the island is again deserted but remains under Spanish control...
This is a work of historical fiction. The date is 25 April 2039, and the location is Quantico, VA. The 41st Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen McDermott, has invited Gen O.P. Smith, the historic leader in the battle of the Pacific and iconic mind who successfully executed a fighting withdraw from the Chosin Reservoir with First Marine Division, to speak to the students in Quantico. This is a speech given to the students of Command and Staff and the War College by Gen O.P. Smith, tying historic principles to the modern battlefield.

“Good morning Marines, Sailors, soldiers, airmen, allies, and partners. I want to thank General McDermott for bestowing this privilege to allow me, for the first time in fact, to share my experiences with you in an attempt to bridge past to present as well as marry tried and tested principles with the rapidly evolving battlefield. As one of the few Marine generals to face the Chinese on the battlefield, it seems some of my lessons learned are still applicable today with the current National Defense Strategy.

I’ve spent the past two weeks around Washington, receiving numerous briefs and reviewing policy and concepts from some of the most senior members of the DOD down to the most junior Sailors and Marines within our ranks. Many things have changed over a century, but the same principles that made our Corps great during my time in uniform remain intact today. What I intend to provide today is a glimpse into my experiences in the Pacific and Korea to try and correlate those experiences to better equip you for what you may face tomorrow. Although things have dramatically changed with regard to training, technology, budgeting, and equipment, our Corps has withstood cyclical turbulence—preserving the sacrosanct ideals which are the backbone of our Corps both on and off the battlefield.

The next 30 or so minutes will address the good as well as the bad. Any great organization confronts the latter more than the former. This will not be a sea story of times long ago where I reflect on my time in uniform; rather, after my recent briefing, three topics have emerged as actionable items for all levels within our Corps to keep it the most lethal fighting force in the DOD.

After I review these three points, I was asked by Gen McDermott to field questions, and I greatly look forward to the dialogue which is to follow. Without further ado, let’s begin.

Communications
Throughout the past few weeks, I have received numerous briefs from the DOD and was astonished at the tech-
technology given to the youngest Marines on the battlefield. I was given a tour of the watch facility at the Pentagon and was told many other operational control centers have similar technologies. I was in awe at the amount of televisions on the walls. In my day, a family was lucky to have one television, something I did not imagine to be so applicable today in a watch center, but something that seems very useful.

This increased flow of information to the highest levels of command must greatly enhance the common operational picture, something I am envious of. During the island hopping campaign in the Pacific, as the Assistant Division Commander, I am reminded of a time when LtCol Puller—name may ring a bell to most of you here—went ashore during an amphibious landing where I was unable to contact him because some communications equipment was destroyed during the landing. I had successfully established communications with 5th and 7th Marines, but 1st Marines to the north only sent fragmentary news.

This did not concern me as I knew LtCol Puller was a talented warfighter, and I had spent time with each of the regimental commanders before going ashore to review the plan. Each commander ensured me they understood the commander’s intent and would be able to execute despite our severely degraded communications. A clearly articulated commander’s intent will always serve you well—simple and executable down to the lowest levels. Two questions to reflect upon: First, are we as leaders comfortable with being uncomfortable with the lack of information flow that will ultimately arise from a combat environment? Second, are our Marines trained well enough to succeed over a period of days or weeks without guidance from higher?

Lack of communications wasn’t an isolated event as I experienced the same problem while in Korea as the commander of 1st Marine Division. Between the severe cold, wintry storms, distance, and terrain, the battlefield wreaked havoc on our communications Marines. This wasn’t a division-specific problem either; other units from X Corps, under the command of MG Edward Almond, USA, were dispersed up to one hundred miles with little to no communications at times. This is not only a Marine Corps problem, but one that faced our adversaries as well.

Through the vast darkness, when they launched most of their offensive attacks, the bugle calls cut through the howling winds and reduced visibility that our Marines endured. Our signal communication was not up to standard. For example, it took more than two days to receive instructions from higher-level units. Rapid changes of the enemy’s situation and the slow motion of our signal communications caused us to lose our opportunities in combat and rendered the instructions of the higher-level units ineffective. While it appears the Marine Corps has taken steps to remediate the lack of information flow, I must caution that an overcorrection is equally debilitating. When speaking with some of the junior Marines, they articulated a requirement for information to higher headquarters which would impede their progress on the battlefield and during training.

A lack of information is equally as dangerous as an overflow of information. Commanders at every level must distinguish what required information must be shared to higher headquarters, while higher headquarters must distinguish what is an actual requirement from subordinate elements. This is just as important in garrison as it is in combat. We must all be cognizant of the requirements we set for our subordinates as well as the second and third order effects these requirements have on their daily operations and ability to succeed. We must take into account the habits we perpetuate in garrison which would ultimately transfer to a combat environment. Are these the habits we want to bestow to our units to enable them to fight and win?

Communications between ground units was important, but during our time in Korea, our communications had to bridge the gap between air-to-ground as well. The concept you call the “MAGTF,” didn’t exist during my time, but it seems as great an acronym as any to capture the abilities of a Marine unit. For the first time on the battlefield, Marine aviation supported the men on the ground with great success. My counterpart as the wing commander was an indispensable ally in our fight on the ground, and those heroic souls of the sky provided the requisite support, sup-
plies, ordnance, and casualty evacuation through some of the most tumultuous of weather conditions. I guess looking back on it, the Marines in Korea gave birth to the MAGTF concept which still thrives today.

Technology has taken this communications between air-to-ground units to the next level, which I applaud but warily approach because of signature management. Our counter-signals intelligence was always behind in accurately tracking the Chinese forces because of their lack of emissions. I never thought a cymbal had any place on the battlefield, but when used by the approaching enemy, it not only commanded instant action by the Chinese forces but evoked a psychological factor on some of the men over time. We must think something as simple and effective as a musical instrument commanding men on the battlefield seems worth looking at for the future with respect to noise signature.

Naval Shipping and Gunfire

Our Service was born a sea-based organization from our inception, and I am glad to see our ties with the Navy remain strong today. Gen McDermott gave me the great honor to dine with him and the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Stewart: a thinker and true warrior in the art of the sea. ADM Stewart inquired about my biggest concerns as a commander, and two factors came to mind which were directly correlated to our Navy at the time of my service.

First, when I left my post as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps to take over as 1st Marine Division Commander, I arrived in San Diego, CA, with no notice that the 1st Marine Division had been ordered to Korea. My chief of staff rang me late in the evening at the hotel to inform me the division would depart in a matter of days. From that notification, we turned to and not only started recruiting Marines by driving troop transport trucks up and down the streets of Camp Pendleton look for volunteers but also through working side-by-side with military and civilian workers to expedite shipping our vehicles, equipment, and Marines across the Pacific Ocean. Some words of wisdom: a talented Marine can talk tactics, but an expert will always speak logistics.

The division lacked shipping and heavily depended on commercial support; however, we ran into friction when the city of San Diego banned military vehicles from utilizing civilian roadways to get to the port. As Marines, we found a way, but this was not without the help of our Navy brothers-in-arms. The logistics support provided by military and commercial vessels seems to be an ongoing dialogue today and must remain so because our effectiveness as Marines hinges upon this. A lack of adequate shipping, both commercial and military, will only delay our ability to mass fire
power and close with and destroy an enemy force. The Marine Corps will remain the first to fight, and shipping is a critical enabler.

The second piece to naval shipping is armament and fire power. During the battles I saw from ship-to-shore, both in the Pacific and Korean peninsula, we depended greatly on the firepower brought to bear on our adversaries by naval gunfire. The integration of Marine aviation and naval gunfire seems to have made leaps and bounds in progress to support the warrior on the ground. I ask that you continue to look for unique and innovative ways to arm, not only naval ships, but implement weapons systems on ships that historically were viewed as troop transport. I was briefed this week that the Marine Corps has launched artillery from the sea. I would pay good money to see that firsthand. We must continue to find innovative ways to arm naval ships.

Two points must remain in the forefront of your planning when weaponizing the naval fleet: First, with a fanatical enemy, the main job still has to be done by the infantry. Second, there is nothing which will pave the way so infantry may walk unmolested—this includes moving by sea lanes from port to port. Our new National Defense Strategy talks about the different layers of fighting forces, and it seems only natural you will be required in a future conflict to fight ship-to-shore as we did then, but this time against a much more capable and developed peer adversary.

Education

I was given the gift of education throughout my life and career as a Marine. I was the benefactor of being the first Marine to graduate from France’s “Ecole de Guerre,” a two-year school of war games and training. A very difficult course to navigate as I imagine “Ecole de Guerre,” a two-year school hinges upon them.

I mentioned earlier I was driving cross-country with my family and arrived in San Diego when the call came in that the 1st Marine Division would go to Korea to fight a determined and capable enemy. I did not have time to study because my time needed to be spent with my staff and Marines to ensure we had what was required for the upcoming battle. My mind was consumed with requirements, equipment, manpower, and very little time remained to study an enemy we would soon meet in hand-to-hand combat. My preparation was done earlier for a battle I never knew I would fight. What does that mean for all of you?

Every second counts. From the minute you wake up in the morning until your head hits the pillow at night, we—as leaders—can always be learning. I mentioned to Gen McDermott that providing time back to the individual Marine is a prerequisite to ensure we have the thinkers on the battlefield to ensure our success. I was surprised at the amount of training you all must do on an annual basis that does not directly correlate to warfighting. Perhaps Gen McDermott could consolidate these requirements in the future. I was also very pleased to see the Commandant’s Reading List bolstering self-paced study, providing a starting point for all Marines of every rank.

I do not envy the tasks that lay ahead for you; in fact, your tasks are infinitely more challenging than the tasks I faced with my Marines almost a century ago. What I can tell you is the technology and principles we so greatly depended upon are as applicable today as they were then, regardless of the advances made since. The Marine Corps no longer requires linear thinkers, but exponential. The pace at which information flows and the global landscape shifts moves at an alarming rate which requires the most prepared warriors our Corps has ever produced. I find it no coincidence the adversary I met almost a century ago just south of the Yalu River is the same one you must prepare to meet tomorrow.

Thank you all for your time, your service, and God bless the United States and the Marine Corps. Gen McDermott, I will turn it over for you to start the questions.”

Notes


2. Frozen Chosin.

3. Ibid.
The memory of remarkable leadership is forever etched in the annals of history by the deeds of great men and women whom, with fastidious preparation and wisdom, seized a moment in history at the intersection of opportunity and duty. Henry Clay, declared by The New York Times as a man “too great to be president,” is the quintessential example of this enduring leadership. Clay’s unbridled devotion to the United States throughout his more than fifty years in public service and five unsuccessful attempts at the presidency was admired by all Americans of his era, including President Abraham Lincoln. Despite never befriending his political idol, Lincoln fortuitously eulogized him as a young lawyer in 1852. Of Clay’s mystic, Lincoln stated, “The spell—the long-enduring spell—with which the souls of men were bound to him, is a miracle.” Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William Seward, best summarized Clay’s demeanor when he recalled how his “conversation, his gesture, his very look, was persuasive, seductive, irresistible.”

Tangible results of leadership are only eclipsed by the routinely intangible qualities of transforming leadership described by Burns in his landmark book, Leadership. Indeed, Clay’s reputation as a man of impeccable integrity and tireless labor converted many followers and contemporaries into moral agents, resulting in unprecedented household familiarity with his dauntless patriotic deeds. The ironclad leadership qualities espoused by Clay are resident within many other great American leaders. Presidents John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Harry Truman; ADMs William Halsey, Chester Nimitz, and George Dewey; and Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee are prime examples of celebrated leaders who are prominent signposts on the journey to reaching transformational leadership. Steadfast intellectual endeavors and practical application of theorized leadership strategies shape a firm, but pliable, leadership philosophy defined by three axioms that can help influence the next generation of military officers with a strong interest in leadership development.

In Marcus Cicero’s timeless classic, On a Life Well Spent, the legendary Roman orator and author beautifully defended the prospect of old age and introduced the first axiom vital in leadership development: virtue. Famously, Cicero stated,
The best Armour of Old Age is a well spent Life preceeding it; a Life employed in the Pursuit of useful Knowledge, in honourable Actions and the Practice of Virtue ... a Conscience bearing Witness that our life was well spent, together with the Remembrance of past good Actions, yields an unspeakable Comfort to the Soul. 10

Indeed, living in a virtuous manner is something officers are expected to aspire toward. Although certainly not as scholarly as the previously mentioned work, Frank Sinatra’s 1969 hit song, My Way, is a good colloquial description of this understanding of a successful life. Woven into the fabric of the song is the notion of living one’s life in a worthy manner.

The implicit notion of a dignified life suggested in Sinatra’s My Way summons reference to behavioral integrity. Defined by Tony Simons, behavioral integrity is the perceived pattern of alignment between an actor’s words and deeds ... In other words, behavioral integrity is the extent to which [followers] perceive that their [leaders] tend to represent themselves and their motivating values. 11

This second axiom is inherent to a successful leadership philosophy—leading by example—and is synonymous with behavioral integrity which, upon reflection, is critical in leadership development.

The third axiom that is imperative in leadership development is a blend of three elements taken from three stalwarts of leadership theory: the influence component of Rost’s definition of leadership; 12 the morally contagious leadership outcome espoused by transforming leadership but which is tempered by the more achievable concept of transformational leadership; 13 and the incentive-based element of transactional leadership. 14 In other words, leadership is an influential relationship between leaders and followers that may, or may not, reach morally replicated outcomes among followers but is generally the result of a mutually understood transactional relationship that exists in the leader-follower relationship.

Combining the three axioms of leadership development yields a definition of leadership that grows from a product of effective intuitive practices into a philosophy that is rooted in the research of leadership scholars and philosophers:

Leadership is a consequence of virtuous duty obligations and unfaltering behavioral integrity that inspirationally transforms followers from mutually understood transactional roles into intrinsically motivated agents of moral accomplishment.

Virtuous duty obligations are clearly evident in the history of the United States and the world. Henry Clay is one example of a citizen-soldier who virtuously served the American citizenry out of a sense of duty. Other examples abound; Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, Marquis de Lafayette, and Abraham Lincoln are world-renowned examples of leaders who leveraged leadership mandates to inspirationally transform followers into morally accomplished agents of change.

Likewise, military officers have a profound influence on those they lead and through whom they impart personally attainable qualities of character and leadership. Officers have a duty obligation to present followers with a leadership model that promotes unfaltering behavioral integrity through virtuous intentions. Modeling the way and championing a sense of pride in morally intrinsic values of leadership will produce leaders and followers who view singular reliance upon transactional leadership in which the “I say, you do” mentality is viewed as a feeble approach to leadership. Leading by example to inspire followers into agents of moral accomplishment may include the risk of physical harm and career immobility when holding firm to principles of right and wrong; however, it is critical to achieving excellence and reaching transformational leadership. To that end, officers should study scholastically celebrated leadership models and associated literature.

Introduced by Bolman and Deal, the four-frame approach—structural, symbolic, human resources, political—is important for newly commissioned officers to consider because this approach is closely related to situational leadership and path-goal theory described by Northouse. 15 Since, human personalities are a function of behavior and environment, leadership interactions and teachable moments may vary remarkably between Sailors or Marines of the same division or platoon and demand officers treat all followers with equal respect. 16 Situational imperatives often dictate a multi-pronged, dynamic approach.
Recently resurfacing from the clutches of academic criticism, trait theory is a solid foundation for leadership development. Many leadership philosophers and researchers identified by Northouse have proven that leaders generally vary from followers in terms of “intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity and sociability.” An under-educated officer may discount the potential of a Sailor or Marine who does not demonstrate one or all of these traits. However, Thomas best describes a modern application of trait theory when he states:

Leadership is largely about maximizing inherent talents and then combining those talents with experience and education. By applying this combination of inherent traits and developed abilities in accordance with a foundation of values, we all have the opportunity to fulfill our potential as effective leaders.

Adopting this outlook will help junior officers develop subordinates of diverse backgrounds through empathy and strong emotional intelligence.

The integration of proven leadership concepts into a personal leadership philosophy is important to grow and mature as a leader. Like education, leadership is a life-long endeavor that continually challenges our character and is the result of experiential learning. Officers with established leadership philosophies should remain cognizant of the ever-changing environments in which they work and realize that previous approaches to leadership may eventually necessitate change. One way to avoid stagnant growth and development as a leader is through fastidious intellectual activity and critical reflection on past great leaders such as Henry Clay. Ultimately, military officers who are serious about the scholarship of leadership development will gain pride in knowing, those who spend their Time in improving others in Knowledge, and teaching the nobler Arts, when their natural Strength of Body fails them, are intituled [entitled] to our highest Regard and Esteem.

For what is a man, what has he got, if not for himself, then he has naught, to say the things he truly feels, and not the words of one who kneels, the record shows I took the blows, and did it my way.

—Frank Sinatra

Notes
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
14. Leadership.
17. Leadership: Theory and Practice.
18. Ibid.
19. “Bet You Never Heard of this Leadership Trait.”
20. On a Life Well Spent.
On 31 March 2017, instructors from The Basic School (TBS) and Infantry Officer Course participated in a series of table-top wargames in the Vandegrift Conference Room. The event was facilitated by LtCol Timothy Powledge from the Naval War College and Maj Jake Clayton from Advanced Infantry Training Battalion-West. The purpose was to introduce table-top wargaming to the TBS instructor staff in order to apply maneuver warfare concepts and tactical planning methods in a time competitive, decision-forcing exercise against a thinking enemy.

The Game

Po River Valley is a turn-based wargame designed by Dr. Nick Murray from the Naval War College that simulates a campaign from the Napoleonic Wars in southern Italy from 1796 to 1797. Players act as generals fighting for either Austria, France, or the Piedmont. One particular iteration of the Po River Valley game requires 3-4 players and lasts between 30-120 minutes. Players can choose from multiple scenarios for any given iteration of the game; each scenario offering unique objectives and constraints. Players command armies of various sizes, capabilities, and strategic alliances or rivalries. Some players are the sole commander for their nation-state, while others employ their forces cooperatively with other players. During each turn, players constantly make decisions based on initiative (who strikes first), weather, supply routes, road conditions, and battlefield capabilities related to combined arms, siege tactics, supply trains, and reconnaissance.

The Vandegrift room was divided between four tables with four separate game boards. TBS played three games. Upon the conclusion of each game, participants rotated their national allegiance, role, and opponents. At the conclusion of the event, each participant had both played alone and cooperatively.

Event Summary

The event lasted from 0730-1700 with a 30-minute break for lunch. The day was divided between an event introduction, a review of the board game’s rules, three iterations of game play, and a debrief. LtCol Powledge introduced table-top wargaming as a “lost method” in an officer’s training. Wargaming demands time-competitive decision-making against an opposing force while under the influence of battlefield dynamics—all essential for the cultivation of judgment and effective decision making. He framed the event as both a training opportunity and a mirror to evaluate individual tactical planning and decision-making capabilities.

An hour of rules and gameplay review followed. At 1000, the facilitators supervised a “beta” game. The focus of the beta game was to solidify gameplay, develop hands on understanding, and work through game mechanics.
end of the beta game, players grasped the concepts, understood the restraints and constraints of the game, and were prepared for competitive gameplay.

Two competitive games were conducted between 1100 and 1700. Games lasted 90 minutes and were preceded by 25 minutes of dedicated tactical planning time and after-action review (AAR) discussions internal to each table upon completion of play. The first scenario pitted the invading French against a small Piedmont army and a larger Austrian force. Piedmont and Austria had the choice to strike an alliance—increasing the likelihood of repelling the French—or act independently. France had significant advantages in material, command and control, and initiative but risked overextension and the compromise of supply routes. Any clear advantages based upon initial force layout were muted by the decisions of each player. Of the four tables, each outcome was distinct to the commanders (players). For the final game, all participants rotated tables and nation-states. The four tables were reduced to three. Each game had a sole French commander defending against (three) Austrian armies invading south through the Italian Alps.

LtCol Powledge wrapped up the event with a 45 minute AAR/debrief. The ensuing discussion focused entirely on battlefield dynamics and opposing wills. It was a discussion about decision making with little reference to the mechanics of gameplay.

Player Feedback

None of the twelve participants had experience with wargames prior to this event. Each participant left recognizing that, as a tool to enhance decision making, wargaming is superior to tactical decision games, sand table exercises, and decision forcing case studies. Below is selected feedback from individual AARs which reflect trends across all participants:

• “Table-Top wargaming is the most engaging method for developing decision-making.”
• “The wargame was much better [than tactical decision games, case studies, sand table exercises]. Fighting another human being in real-time is what makes this type of training so much more effective.”
• “The opposing will—playing across the table from a thinking enemy—enhanced the experience. Executing in an uncertain competitive environment develops tactical planning and decision-making experiences.”
• “This event was eye-opening.”
• “The fluidity of the wargame and interconnectedness of events forces players to push their planning horizon farther than in any other method or technique I have been exposed to.”
• “[The] event served as an opportunity to test the effectiveness of my tactical planning process and determine areas of my analysis and planning I may be more deficient in than I thought.”
• “[The game] allowed me to see that my tactical planning process has become very intuitive but that is not necessarily a good thing. I need to continue to challenge myself with these situations and improve how I approach [the planning/DM process].”
• “Based on the limited resource requirements to actually execute this event, there is no excuse not to incorporate it into any institution or unit that purports to develop tac planning process and DM [decision-making] ability.”
• “The added consideration of enemy response to my actions/decision added a heretofore little addressed aspect of decision-making in my professional development.”

Players assessing and discussing their next move. (Photo provided by author.)
• “One of the most effective methods [to develop decision making] because it provides a thinking opponent, provides a problem to be solved, gives immediate feedback WRT [with respect to] plan, and after the fact I was finding myself evaluating my SOM [scheme of maneuver], asking ‘what if?’ and going through the other COAs I had in my mind. No other method accomplishes these things.”

• “Playing across from another live, thinking human being over a board changes the emotional salience of winning and losing. Competition takes on an entirely different psychological frame.”

• “A welcome and rare opportunity for me as an instructor to turn the map around, attempt to predict how a couple of ‘enemy’ captains will fight me, and see immediately where I am wrong and where I am right.”

• “The risk of public failure (in front of my peers) added a valuable layer to every decision that is lacking most other realms of my day-to-day work.”

• “I learned a lot about myself—moments where I was completely ‘internal’ in deep focus on a problem, moments where I agonized in uncertainty, or felt comfortable taking risks, etc.”

• “I look at this like high altitude training for elite endurance athletes or mountaineers. We should be training high and living high wherever possible to acclimatize. In high altitude, oxygen is limited. Combat is our high-altitude environment. Time and information are limited. We must force ourselves to perform and make decisions there despite uncertainty and an opposing will.”

• “The game not only created an environment that isolated the relevant factors in tactical planning in a time condensed situation, but it allowed the player to experience the external and internal factors presented when facing an opponent.”

• “This event highlighted some shortfalls I have with orienting on the entire problem.”

• “Gives instructors an opportunity to put their own skills to the test rather than only evaluate students. Should be a PME event for bullpen instructors.”

• “This event highlighted how woefully inadequate my skillful application of tac planning was. After three years as a Bullpen, Staff Platoon Commander, and Infantry Officer Course instructor, the components of tac planning are second nature. However, I found that after my planning time was up I had applied nothing from it and had allowed myself to become swamped by the uncertainty, making me miss several key factors that I would criticize a student for any day of the week.”

• “The wargame was able to bring the doctrine contained within MDCP 1 [Warfighting] and MCDP 1-3 [Tactics] to life [and] to a greater extent than anything I had yet experienced in training. The nature of war was omnipresent. As a player, I experienced uncertainty, friction, fluidity, complexity, disorder, and the human dimension by playing against a thinking opponent(s). The science of war was brought forth in the constraints and restraints of the game rules, the game mechanics, and the forces the player commanded that were grounded in the realism of the late 18th century. The art of war was present as it was the player’s responsibility to achieve a decision within the constraints of the scenario. Being cunning, deceptive, bold, and creative while exercising sound judgment were critical components to the eventual outcome. Additionally, the maneuver warfare concepts of orienting on the enemy, COG [center of gravity] and CV [critical vulnerability] analysis, combined arms, surfaces and gaps, main effort, and determining an overall intent to your assigned mission were all present. I found as the player that when I ignored the tents of maneuver warfare, I struggled to find success and when I applied them success was with reach.”

The success of the 31 March wargame hinged upon each participants willingness to commit to the experience. Preparation yielded distinct advantages. Experience as an instructor seemed to matter very little. Understanding of maneuver warfare concepts such as center of gravity/critical vulnerability, main effort, and battlefield dynamics enhanced the decision-making cycle of players. Those who understood how to “attack the enemy’s strategy” rather than clash game pieces were more adept at imposing their will.

**Recommendations**

- The Basic School should incorporate wargaming as an instructor development tool. Instruction will be enhanced if assistant instructors, SPCs, and IOC instructors are regularly engaging in decision-making exercises. Experiencing battlefield dynamics and an opposing will positively impacts an instructor’s approach to instructing and evaluating student officers.
- TBS has an established relationship with LtCol Powledge at the Naval War College, and he has expressed the willingness to return for subsequent wargame events. TBS should schedule another event as early as possible to maintain momentum.
- TBS should purchase multiple copies of the Po River Valley Wargame and look to incorporate wargame events as PME and for formal instructor development. If TBS had possessed a copy of this game, it would be played now.
- TBS should explore other wargaming opportunities and resources in the National Capitol Region.

>Authors’ Note: Participants in the Po River Wargame included: Capt Tweedy 0302 (IEP), Capt Berg 0302 (Warfighting Instructor), Capt Bird 0302 (Warfighting Instructor), Capt Anderson 0302 (Warfighting Instructor), Capt Mortenson 0302 (IOC), Capt Glida 0302 (IOC), Capt Nolan 0302 (IOC), Capt Albano 0302 (IOC), Capt Long 0302 (IOC), Capt Kasmer 0302 (IOC Deputy Director), Capt Milroy 0302 (IOC), Major Holland 0302 (WFIC CO), Capt Toomey 0302 (Warfighting Instructor)

**Observer only.**

The Basic School and Advanced Infantry Training Battalion-West purchased multiple copies of Po River Valley in the spring of 2017 for use as instructor development tools.
Memoir ‘44
After-action report/review
by 2ndLt Jonathan Scott

Participants
Over 30 Marines played Memoir ‘44, including squad leaders, team leaders, and platoon sergeants.

The Game
Memoir ‘44 is a turn-based board game designed by Richard Borg and published by Days of Wonder, Inc. In the game, players act as German, American, British, or French commanders during historic World War II battles, all of which are set in 1944. The game features sixteen scenarios, including D-Day, Pegasus Bridge, and Toulon, each with unique terrain, distribution of forces, obstacles, and missions. The game board is divided into thirds—left, middle, and right—that dictate the movement of pieces on the board. Players are dealt a predetermined number of cards that allow the execution of offensive and defensive actions such as probing attacks, close air support, and indirect fire. These cards are often limited to certain units or areas of the board, forcing players to make decisions on the utilization of limited resources. Once players maneuver within range of their opponent, they can engage with any combination of infantry, armor, or artillery attacks. Battles are resolved by rolling dice, with the number of dice the attacker can roll—and thus his combat power—decided by terrain, weapons systems, and range from target. Players win the game by accumulating a predetermined number of medals, which are earned by destroying enemy units and securing key terrain and objectives.

Application
In between garrison training blocks, a proctor—in this case platoon leadership—facilitated practice games for squad leaders. During the practice games, players could ask questions as they learned, and the proctor guided conversations around decision making and tactics. At the end of each game, the proctor led a guided discussion over principles such as concentration and distribution of fire, massing forces, use of cover and terrain, tactical tasks, attrition versus maneuver warfare, combined arms, and flexible planning. The players explained their decision-making processes and how they changed based on the continuously updating enemy situation. Once squad leaders showed an understanding of how to play and debrief, they led a similar process with team leaders and junior Marines. During this process, roughly twenty Marines were given brief instructions of the game with four Marines conducting...
a practice game observed by the others. Each game concluded with a guided discussion led by the proctor and squad leader. During this time, players shared their decision-making process while the spectating Marines shared their perspective. This process was replicated multiple times through the work week in intervals of two hours. Each iteration, lasting roughly 30 minutes, was impromptu and conducted as time became available.

Player Feedback
After playing, Marines completed a questionnaire regarding their experience. Only two Marines reported experience playing a tabletop wargame, while the remainder had no prior experience. Highlights of their feedback include:
- “Being that there are consequences that you see and knowing that you could lose against an actual opponent makes you pay more attention to your decision-making process.”
- “You had to think through problems that you haven’t thought of.”
- “Playing against a person caused me to think more of, ‘if I was him, what would I do?’”
- “This is very helpful because it opens your mind and eyes on what damage you can cause the enemy and what they can do. Viewing the enemy’s point of view was very helpful.”
- “So that guys understand how crucial any decision made can affect the battlefield.”
- “It made me really think about every decision I made and how that decision would affect my next two or three moves after.”
- “[The game] gives you a better understanding of why certain historical battles were won and how having the different advantages affects unit in combat.”
- “It makes you more involved, and I feel like it really shows the individual thinking process.”
- “The fact of distributing forces and taking into consideration of holding out and figuring out the enemy’s capabilities.”
- “I feel like it definitely would be a very useful training aid in evaluating individual’s tactical thinking process.”
- “It added that more realistic factor to it because we are both trained in the field and going up against someone with advanced schooling. ... You can pick their brain while evolving your tactics.”
- “This process was replicated multiple times through the work week in intervals of two hours. Each iteration, lasting roughly 30 minutes, was impromptu and conducted as time became available.”
- “Playing against another Marine caused me to take the game more seriously, we both have the same knowledge of 0311 tactics.”

Conclusion
Wargames provide leaders with a unique opportunity to apply doctrinal concepts to a tactile experience. The implementation of wargames is cost effective and requires minimal time or resources. By placing Marines in a competitive environment, proctors can observe Marines making real time decisions against a thinking enemy. Players with flexible plans, aggressive moves, and clear understanding of their mission proved to be more successful at playing. Memoir ‘44 facilitates critical thinking, discussions of tactics, and numerous opportunities for PME and leadership development. Placing this resource in the hands of squad leaders will pay dividends in the development of small units across the force.

Recommendations
- 2d Bn, 2d Marines should incorporate table-top wargames to complement education and training.
- 2d Bn, 2d Marines should host a wargame event for all Officers, SNCOs, and squad leaders in order to train the trainers in the implementation of wargames.
- 2d Bn, 2d Marines should purchase multiple copies of Memoir ‘44 and expansions to provide the companies a resource to train Marines.
Table-top wargames, implemented by company and platoon leadership, should target the squad level and below to facilitate small unit training and education.

Leaders should use the scenarios provided by Memoir ‘44 to be a gateway to historical case studies and professional military education.

While these recommendations are for 2d Bn, 2d Marines, ground combat units should consider investing in Memoir ‘44 as a means of training unit leaders.

Using Memoir ‘44 can prove to be a gateway to wider historical case studies. (Photo provided by Capt Matthew D. Tweedy.)

2020 MARINE CORPS HERITAGE FOUNDATION ANNUAL AWARDS

Have you taken an outstanding photograph, written an insightful article, or produced an impactful documentary that advances the understanding of Marine Corps values? Marines and civilians are welcome to submit their own entries or the distinguished work of others. Winners will be awarded at the Foundation’s Annual Awards Dinner held at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in late spring.

Submission Categories
- Journalism
- Photography
- The Arts
- Exhibits

Submission Period
November 15, 2019 to January 15, 2020

Learn more at MARINEHERITAGE.ORG/AWARDS
A New, Old Kind of PME

Another vehicle for education of the fighting force

by 1stLt Walker D. Mills

Just over 50 years ago, a young captain named Francis West was tasked with compiling a timely series of short, factual narratives of small unit action, stories which would have lessons learned as an essential part. The stories would have to be both highly readable and historically accurate.¹

His report went straight to MajGen William R. Collins, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, III Marine Amphibious Force. Entitled Small Unit Action in Vietnam: Summer 1966, the final report was so well-written that Arno Press published it for commercial distribution shortly after it was finished in 1967. It became a best seller. Capt Francis West, better known as “Bing,” has continued to write several books about the combat he experienced as a participant and an observer on the front line over the next half century, including The Village, No True Glory, and One Million Steps. These books should be on the shelves of every Marine.

The success of Small Unit Action in Vietnam was twofold. First, it was readable. West was able to narrate nine combat actions in only 139 pages. The language was easy to understand, seeded with ample dialogue, and contained plenty of hand drawn maps and photos. Any Marine could read it, most in a single sitting. Each vignette was only 10–20 pages long, an appropriate length to read on a trip to the head or while waiting for the deuce and a half. Second, the content was current and relevant. West recounted squad- and platoon-level combat actions. He created portraits of individual leaders.

>1stLt Mills is forward deployed as a Rifle Platoon Commander with 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. 1stLt Mills is currently pursuing a master’s degree in International Relations and Contemporary War at King’s College London.

Marines need to be able to think critically. (Photo by Cpl Alexandra Amor Santosarambu.)
and men whose small unit actions influenced the events described. Occasionally, West narrated tactical failure at the small unit level or mistakes made by the leadership—this is acceptable, in fact, it is essential. Marines read about their contemporary environment, enemies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures they faced or used themselves.

**Small Unit Action** was not a revolutionary publication. During the Second World War and in the period immediately after, the Military Intelligence Service published the monthly *Intelligence Bulletin*, which was designed “primarily for the use of junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for the dissemination to them of the latest information received from Military Intelligence sources.” The contents included both friendly and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures, description of combat actions, and new weapons systems.

**Tactical Trends** was also published by the Military Intelligence Service on a bi-weekly basis and was later discontinued in June 1945. It was “derived from official sources” and consisted principally of extracts from reports by American military personnel and observers in the field. Broken down by branch and combat arm, *Tactical Trends* focused on ground combat.

**Infantry in Battle**, a voluminous publication for Army unit leaders first published in 1934, was “designed to give the peace-trained officer something of the viewpoint of the veteran.” This was a goal inline with *Tactical Trends* and the *Intelligence Bulletin*, albeit with a different, more comprehensive approach.

These were publications created to improve the situational awareness of the troops. They were successful because they had an extremely short observation-publication cycle to facilitate mass circulation, allowing for maximum readership. Discontinued shortly after the war, they are a great example of what a publication for the small unit leader looks like.

Today, the Marine Corps needs to develop a periodical publication similar to **Small Unit Action**, **Tactical Trends**, and *Intelligence Bulletin*. The goal is threefold: to give junior leadership accurate and current depiction of combat so they are not informed primarily by movies and video games, provide a ready supply of training scenarios to implement at the small unit level, and a professional military education source they enjoy and seek out. Most of the available current publications are inappropriate for squad leaders and platoon commanders because they are too analytical for abstraction and full of jargon or focused at higher echelons. To be useful, accounts of combat need to be as unfiltered as possible. Battalion- and regimental-level after-action reviews rarely deal with issues below the company level. Analyses by the Marine Corps Intelligence Agency, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, and the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group are also too far from the raw product to be of much value to a squad leader. Publications that come out months or years after the conflicts they describe are not always as helpful to an NCO who wants to train his Marines for the most current threats. Our Marines do not need outside agencies to help them understand small unit tactics; we need to provide them the reports in a usable manner and then let them think critically about it themselves.

Ideally, the new publication should be published monthly, or quarterly at the very least, and distributed in both print and digital forms as widely as possible with a copy in the inbox of every infantry leader at the company level and below and a stack of copies in every command post. We can supplement print issues with an online publication. To be ready to “fight tonight,” our leaders need to know what to prepare for and the timeliness of their knowledge is critical. The writing needs to be simple and plain, readable at the high school level, include dialogue, and be free of jargon. It should include as many pictures and drawings as necessary to supplement the writing. The content exists already, it just needs to be compiled and edited.

Current operations in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq should be the focus, but it would include our shaping, security cooperation, and humanitarian operations worldwide. We can interview our brothers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force for descriptions of their current experiences. We can work with Special Operations Command, enhancing our publication and working in line with the recent guidance to “improve institutional and operational cooperation” issued by the Commandant. By also soliciting submissions from our NATO allies and partners around the globe, we can also bring together a collection of diverse combat experiences ranging from a platoon outside Luhansk, a squad in Marawi, a company in Sangin, or a
MARSOC detachment in Africa. The content must be as raw as possible, excluding only what is necessary to meet operational security requirements and protect friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures. Real names would be used as much as possible, and glorification of combat or tidying up of the narrative will not be tolerated.

This “For Official Use Only” publication can be created and sustained with minimal resources. The project could be started at the division or MEF level or even lower, managed by a small section with a few Marines from the infantry company level on a B-billet tour at either the School of Infantry or the Infantry Officer Course. West was able to create Small Unit Action by himself with only his camera, notebooks, and tape recorder. In the beginning, the section needs to conduct combat observations and collect combat reports themselves to create a baseline for the publication. However, once established, the Marine or Marines’ role will shift to editing, archiving, and solicitation. Units will begin to recognize the value of the publication and submit their own vignettes that only require editing, compilation, and distribution.

Resistance to this new kind of professional military education could perhaps come on several fronts. Marines more familiar with the Leatherneck and the Marine Corps Gazette might ask why those publications cannot meet this need. These magazines provide an invaluable resource for our Corps but cover a myriad of topics and require a subscription for the print or online versions. Also, many parts of combat, especially in the lesser known battlegrounds our Nation finds itself engaged, are classified or, at a minimum, classified as “For Official Use Only” because of the units, tactics, and technology involved. Thus, even if we tried to put the accounts in a publication like Leatherneck or the Gazette, we would be fighting a constant battle to ensure the details were unclassified while publishing as much detail as possible without putting our forces at risk.

“Keep your Marines informed” is one of our eleven leadership principles. As officers, the necessity for “tough, realistic training” is drilled into us at The Basic School and the Infantry Officer Course. A periodical targeted at our NCOs and junior officers that is filled with clear, concise depictions of contemporary combat keeps our Marines aware of the evolving nature of combat around the globe and gives them another tool to help them train and prepare their Marines to fight. We are nearing a time when there will be no more combat veterans in infantry companies besides the company gunnery sergeant. This is not something to fear in and of itself. But we need to recognize these changes in the makeup of our force and adjust our training and professional military education appropriately. The creation of this periodical will help address this gap by providing another vehicle for our corporals, sergeants, and lieutenants to understand combat and small unit action.

Notes
In U.S. military academic circles, it is commonplace to study the feats of 20th century German contributions to tactics and combined arms warfare; however, this fixation with the accomplishments of “dead Germans” is misplaced. While perhaps overly simplistic, the reality is the Germans lost the two major wars of the 20th century, suffered the death of millions of their soldiers and civilians, and lost their sovereignty for approximately 44 years following World War II. In essence, U.S. military academics focus an inordinate amount of time on losers, which is akin to studying the 1990s-era New York Knicks instead of the Chicago Bulls. Meanwhile, the United States and NATO allies, after nearly 100 years of almost continuous conflict with the Russian Empire, are still confounded by Russian military practices, doctrine, and contributions to modern maneuver warfare. This article argues that U.S. PME academies should place a higher emphasis on examining Russian military accomplishments and contributions to military doctrine to better understand a relevant and formidable adversary. Furthermore, the examination of Russian contributions should be greater than that of German contributions for many reasons; however, none are more important than the fact that while Germany was utterly destroyed over 70 years ago, Russia proved geopolitically victorious in the 20th century and is a regional hegemon that continues to win significant strategic exchanges with the West.

German Contributions

Before proceeding, it is important to understand widely accepted German contributions to modern Western military doctrine. Firstly, in the early 20th century, the German military was the first to develop the contemporary idea of mission command—the concept that subordinate commanders should accomplish their objective in line with their higher commander’s intent, thus providing tactical commanders the ability to maneuver more rapidly than their micromanaged adversaries. This concept was codified in MCDP 1, Warfighting, in 1989. Secondly, the German Blitzkrieg, at the onset of World War II, massed mechanized assaults, at decisive points and were augmented with tactical air support from the Luftwaffe to cre-
ate a rapidly maneuverable combined arms force. Employing these tactics, the German military devastated Poland and France in less than two months, respectively. However, it is important to remember despite these accomplishments, Germany also found itself mired in attrition-based trench warfare in World War I and ultimately emerged as a defeated nation. Furthermore, recall that Germany executed the Blitzkrieg against vastly outmatched Polish Forces simultaneously besieged by a Soviet invasion. In France, the Germans succeeded against a socioeconomically unstable nation that was politically irresolute to fight another war. In other words, while Germany should be given credit for having the foresight to modernize and mechanize its forces in the 1930s, it employed these forces against frail and pacifistic adversaries in Europe. When the Germans finally met fully mobilized British, American, and Russian forces in 1943, they lost all of their territory and were destroyed as a nation state in less than two years. Moreover, the German experience in Russia can be prudently described as one of the most disastrous military endeavors in history. While many apologists claim tactical- and operational-level commanders were hindered by an increasingly unhinged Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s mismanagement of his armed forces paled in comparison to Josef Stalin’s terrible treatment of his military forces. Clausewitz, you say? Recall that while educated in modern-day Germany, he spent formative years in Russia, observing their use of unconventional tactics to defeat Napoleon’s 1812 offensive. Yes, Germans formulated the modern concept of mission command and employed combined arms during two world wars; however, they failed to exploit their tactical victories for any strategic gain. To this day, Germany is a woefully circumscribed military power.

**Russian Contributions**

*MCDP 1* describes maneuver warfare as a philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

While volumes of literature have been written about the eastern theater of World War II, the Battle for Stalingrad captures the essence of the Russians’ operational ability to maneuver cognitively on land, in air, below the earth’s surface, and in cyberspace. By the end of this monumental battle, the Soviets had conducted several unexpected operational turning movements against German forces. Soviet Forces also used the city’s vast sewer systems to maneuver beneath and behind German soldiers, who were unwilling to condescend to maneuver in the sewers. Russian snipers wreaked psychological havoc on German forces.

... Russia seems politically and economically fragile ...

Also, Soviet radio operators jammed, interfered, or intercepted a significant quantity of German radio transmissions during the battle. This battle represents a turning point in World War II, a decisive shift of operational expertise from Germany to Russia and the modern genesis of Russia as an operational and strategic powerhouse in military affairs.

Following World War II, and despite incessant economic mismanagement by political leaders, the Russian military occupied all of Eastern Europe, waged viscerally effective regional and global information warfare, and fielded armies unmatched by Western powers. While mindful of the Russian failure in Afghanistan, fast forward to the 21st century and we see a resurgent Russia that continues to confound western leaders. Its conduct of irregular and information warfare in Georgia was highly effective in using social media to target military forces and denying its opponent’s ability to conduct basic command and control with denial of service attacks on information technology networks.

As we speak, Russia, although spending one-tenth of what the U.S. spends on defense, occupies vast portions of Georgia and Ukraine, while western forces are helpless to counter its efforts. Russia is currently promoting the militarization of the Artic, exploiting Syria’s civil war for strategic gain, and surreptitiously violating the integrity of national elections in several nations. Ultimately, the Russian military and political apparatus is extremely effective at operational maneuver in all domains, especially while conducting irregular warfare and cyberwarfare operations. Meanwhile, American military scholars and future leaders continue to study the Blitzkrieg that Germans conducted against the Polish military 70 years ago.

**Solutions: Understanding Our Adversary**

From an outside perspective, Russia seems politically and economically fragile; nevertheless, the 2017 *National Security Strategy* still described Russia as a near-peer adversary—one of four in the world. Additionally, top-level political and military leaders opine that Russia presents the single greatest threat to the United States today. The Russians have a long and rich history of military conquest spanning a millennium. The fact that Russia suffered so many, oftentimes self-induced, disasters during the 20th century and still emerged as a regional hegemon with global influence is all the more reason to study its tactical and operational military feats more seriously. While the Germans galvanized tactical brilliance, the Russians exploited German contributions and created the modern concept of operational-level maneuver and the “deep fight.” Because of their operational approach toward achieving strategic ends, Russia completely vanquished German forces in World War II, helped turn the tide of the Korean War against the United States, facilitated a strategic defeat of the United States in Vietnam, operationally seized portions of Georgia and Ukraine, and still actively exploits the Syrian civil war and seriously threatens European sovereignty to this day.

Effective immediately, resident PME curriculums should begin examining 20th century Russian military ac...
accomplishments, theory, and doctrine. A good place to start is the body of Russian military theorists purged by Stalin in the 1930s. They are the intellectuals who synthesized an operational approach to war. A case study of the Battle for Stalingrad presents an opportunity to examine Russian maneuver warfare as the country fully mobilized in World War II and exploited all possible avenues to operationally shock the Germans. Russian efforts against the United States in the Korean and Vietnam War present an early case study of unconventional warfare. Russian successes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria all present relevant examples of their successful implementation of conventional and unconventional operations to achieve strategic aims.

Conclusion

Every day spent focusing on “dead Germans” is one more day that could be better used to study “dead Russians” and Russians who are still alive and achieving operational victories. While early 20th century Germans provided novel building blocks for tactical excellence, they utterly failed to gain any strategic victories from their efforts. Meanwhile, the Russians present a force that predates Germany, have a long and illustrious military history, crushed German forces in World War II, built substantially upon basic German military tenets, codified operational maneuver, continue to gain geopolitical momentum, and will likely pose a formidable challenge to the United States and its allies for the foreseeable future. American military professionals must divest themselves of an incessant fixation on western, namely European, military accomplishments over the past two centuries and focus more on existential adversaries—adversaries that match or overmatch western forces in many warfighting domains. Failing to do so will continue to cultivate leaders unfamiliar with the most significant modern threats to the United States.

Notes


5. Marine Corps University, Theory and Nature of War, (Quantico, VA).


The Marine Corps is devoted to its history. Classes of the history and legends of the Marine Corps are taught to those aspiring to be Marines during recruit training and Officer Candidate School. The Marine Corps celebrates its birthday every year with a ceremony and ball. In the Making Marines Gallery at the National Museum of the Marine Corps, a panel puts a twist on the Corps’ hoary, “Every Marine a Rifleman,” shibboleth and declares, “Every Marine a Historian,” as it describes the classes taught at recruit training.

Of course, the concept of “Every Marine a Rifleman” does not suggest all Marines carry rifles, it means all Marines are trained in basic marksmanship as well as infantry tactics and techniques, and they must complete annual rifle marksmanship qualifications. Similarly, “Every Marine a Historian” should go beyond merely providing Marines with a list of books to read; they should also develop the skills and tools required to evaluate and comprehend historical works. The intent is not to create professional historians but rather to improve basic historical literacy. To understand history, Marines must have a basic understanding of historiography because “when you study ‘historiography’ you do not study the events of the past directly, but the changing interpretations of those events in the works of individual historians.”

The first question that historiography asks is the same question Marines need to ask when looking at any given historical work: What is history? At first it may seem obvious—history is the story of mankind’s past. Why then do we bother, beyond mere entertainment value, to study history; additionally, how is history different from legend, mythology, or fiction?

Primarily, the difference lies in the methodology and intent. Historians base their interpretations on carefully collected historical facts with the intent to illuminate the past, not invent it. Thucydides—whose work on the Peloponnesian War is one of the oldest histories—stated,

>On the whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted may, I believe, be safely relied on. Assuredly they will not be disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggerations of his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are attractive at truth’s expense; the subjects they treat of being out of reach of evidence, and time having robbed most of them of historical value by enthroning them in the region of legend.

In other words, Thucydides claims he neither based his work on legend nor did he employ poetic license; rather, he based his work on the facts as he could best ascertain them.

This is the basic form of the historical method; as Herodotus of Halicarnassus—the Father of History—wrote, “I am bound to tell what I am told, but not in every case to believe it.” Historians examine a great many sources, compare them to each other, and then from these they tease the truth or come as close as they can to it. Thucydides explained in more detail:

With reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labor from the want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by different eyewitnesses, arising sometimes from

>Historiography, noun
1 a: the writing of history; b: the principles, theory, and history of historical writing.
2: the product of historical writing.
imperfect memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the other. The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but I shall be content if it is judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it. My history has been composed to be an everlasting possession, not the showpiece of an hour.5

Historians classify sources as secondary and primary. Secondary sources are histories themselves, they do not purport to be current with the event; they analyze and interpret historical data. These are often used to place a work in context by providing background. Primary sources have direct knowledge of the event, unfiltered by others. These can be contemporary documents, memoirs, oral history interviews, newspaper interviews, photographs, or even archaeological finds.6 Moreover, the viewpoint and limits of the source must be considered. For example, Col Gregory Boyington’s memoir, Baa Baa Black Sheep, presents his view of World War II, but it was published a decade after the war ended. It is only one man’s viewpoint; a more complete understanding of Marine Fighter Squadron 214’s war comes from comparing his memoir with interviews and memoirs from the rest of his squadron and commanders, as well as the official records produced during the war itself.7

Drawing conclusions from these facts is the primary task of the historian, and historians differ over how they should do this, whether they should accept the past on its own terms or judge it according to present values and mores. One of the pioneers of modern critical history, Leopold von Ranke, famously rejected the idea that history’s job is to judge the past, stating, “History has had assigned to it the office of judging the past...”8

The study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice. The next question is why do Marines study history? Most famous military thinkers have espoused the need for professional soldiers to study the past. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, “The study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”9

Gen James N. Mattis laid it out more plainly in an email defending the value of intense reading to Marine officers: “By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men.”10

Indeed, when he founded the Marine Corps University, Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr., said, “History should be used to teach officers military judgment, not to make academic historians or simply teach facts.”11

Gray, Mahan, and Mattis make a sound plea for studying military history as a practical measure to learn lessons from history. The wisdom of such an approach is apparent on its face, but less apparent are the dangers of studying history, which are quite real—especially for the unwary. History lends itself to trite sayings and shibboleths which in turn lead to dogmatic thinking and rote, uncritical analysis; the only antidote for these is careful, critical study. For example, many have heard that those who do not study history are doomed to repeat it. But history cannot repeat itself as each event is unique, springing from individuals and specific conditions; therefore, the study of history cannot prevent mistakes. As Dr. Geoffrey Megargee explains, “To look back at one historical development and try to draw specific policy conclusions from it is misguided. Such an approach is a leap of faith; it depends on the belief that the historical account is absolutely accurate, and that present circumstances mirror the past exactly.”12

Moreover, there is a natural tendency for historians to divide and categorize history into different subfields or categories. While understandable, these are essentially false: “There is no military history, political history, social history, African American history, Scots Irish American history, or Women’s history. While those are useful categories for use in studying ourselves through specific lenses, and for planning conferences, they are, when all is said and done, all history and should be taught as such.”13

Excessive focus on subfields of historical study creates artificial barriers, compartmentalizing historical thought limiting context, and resulting in reduce productive study of history.

Thucydides, Greek general and historian. (Marble bust J. Paul Getty Museum.)

as articulated in What is History? by Edward Hallett Carr, history is “a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the past and present.”9

In other words, historians should accept the past on its own terms and judge it as well, constantly reconsidering their conclusions about the past.
Leaving the broader dangers of using history behind, the history of the Marine Corps specifically has been told in ways that require careful study by the reader. In his seminal work, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, Allan R. Millet presented an essay on his sources that adroitly summarizes works on Marine Corps history to date:

For more than a hundred years, the writing of Marine Corps history has been shaped by internal organizational interest, political controversy, and a perceived public interest in the Corps, the last normally coinciding with the heroics of Marines in wartime. Like most of the writing on military institutions, Marine Corps histories have improved in their scholarly quality, but reflect a bias toward operational narratives and a distaste for either external relationships or internal difficulties. Marine Corps historical writing, which has been largely dominated by Marine enthusiasts in and out of uniform, has had a distinct utilitarian quality, that is, to build loyalty and dedication on the part of serving Marines, create public sympathy and support, present Corps’ perspectives on policy issues past and present, and honor the service of former Marines. These characteristics are not unique to the Corps.15

Not every work telling a story from the past is a history, which is based on interpretations of facts from multiple sources. It is important to know when one is reading history and when one is reading something else. Many works look like a history but actually fit more readily into other disciplines, such as political science or journalism. More commonly, memoirs or autobiographies are mistaken for history; rather, they serve rather as sources that historians work from. Such first-person accounts have value, but the reader should understand their provenance and intent and not accept them as history.

The Commandant’s Professional Reading List, for example, includes memoirs, biographies, polemics, military fiction, and histories. The easiest way to distinguish between these works is to take them at their word. In First to Fight, LtGen Victor H. Krulak tells the reader bluntly that his book is “a series of simple vignettes, part history, part legend, and part opinion.”16 Do not stretch a work beyond its author’s intent. Other works make the task more difficult, as the author intentionally or unintentionally leaves the book’s category unclear. For example, Bing West’s The Wrong War superficially has the look of a history, describing the war in Afghanistan; however, the methodology and intent makes it clear it is a journalistic polemic, advocating policy for the Afghan conflict. It is well worth reading, but not as a history.17

Earlier, the danger of subdividing history into different fields was mentioned. For our purposes, these topical subdivisions remain useful; when you have identified that a given work lies within one of these categories, it helps to identify the viewpoint of the author and provides useful information for analyzing the work. Beyond topical fields (i.e., French, Nineteenth, military, women’s, or labor histories), however, histories also can be divided by the author’s analytical method and focus. Some historians view history as objective while acknowledging that the sources, and the historians themselves, are inherently biased and thus subjective. They argue the historian’s duty is to strive to be objective while acknowledging bias. Others view this as an impossible task, arguing that history is inherently subjective and that historians have no duty to objectivity. Some go so far as to argue that historians should be activists, writing histories that support their cause. Not all activist historians openly acknowledge their subjectivity, indeed many reject the label, claiming to be objective while presenting a subjective historical viewpoint. The history’s structure is also important for evaluating the reliability and value of
the text. Is it a narrative, tracing the development of the story within a conventional, chronological framework? Or is it thematic, covering different concepts in a non-chronological manner? Is the topic institutional or cultural? Or, if it is a military history, is it operational?

Historians whose work shares an analytical method and focus, as well as structure, are generally grouped into schools of historical thought. Identifying which school of thought a particular work falls into is a useful shorthand for evaluating a work.

Examining a small sample of various schools of historical thought illustrates how an author’s identification with these schools aids the reader’s understanding. Marxist historians posit that all history is economically driven; the most rigid Marxist historians present a deterministic view of history that explains the past and predicts the future. They write from a relativist, often activist, point of view. People’s history is a school that generally looks at history from below, attempting to give voice to the voiceless. Because it seeks to examine the history of those who left relatively little in the historical record, people’s history is seldom narrative driven and usually focuses on cultural and institutional topics. Military history tends toward the “great man” historical school of thought. Often considered old-fashioned and rejected by modern scholars, it focuses attention on the decisions and actions of a few influential individuals and focuses on a narrative view. The French Annales school focused on long-term change and social history rather than political themes. It made great use of quantification and geographic evidence to examine history from different directions. Recognizing when a given work falls under these schools helps the reader correct for the biases and viewpoints each brings to history.

The sub-category of military history can be further divided into differing types. Since at least 1979, Allan Millett has categorized military history into five distinct types. Since most of the history a Marine will read in his career is military history, learning to recognize these five types is an important part of historical literacy:

- Inspirational.
- Nationalistic.
- Antiquarian/hobby.
- Military utilitarian.
- Civilian utilitarian.18

Inspirational military histories are designed to highlight military virtues, especially heroism, and for specific military units. Many biographies and unit histories fall into this category. The Lineage and Honors and Commemorative Naming programs, run by the Marine Corps History Division’s Historical Reference Branch, fall under this category in addition to many of the exhibits and programs at the National Museum of the Marine Corps. Most of what is taught in the history classes at Recruit Training and Officer Candidates School fits neatly in this type as well. General Sir William Francis Patrick Napier, who wrote a massive history of the Peninsular War (1808–14), believed all military history should fall within this category:

It is the business of the historian … to bring the exploits of the hero into broad daylight … The multitude must be told where to stop and wonder and to make them do so, the historian must have recourse to all the power of words.19

Nationalistic military history is very similar to inspirational but is focused on patriotic or nationalistic themes rather than individual or unit heroism. Perhaps the most widely known example of this type of history is Winston S. Churchill’s multivolume magnum opus, The Second World War, which further proves that nationalistic military history can be quite eloquently written.20 Other examples include Hans Delbrück’s History of the Art of War (1920) or R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy’s Military Heritage of America (1956). In the last century, much of the history taught in American high schools fell within this type.

Antiquarian military history is focused on historical minutia, such as uniform details or weapon statistics. This type of military history is concerned with the color of a man’s jackboots or the type of rivets used on a Panzer VI Tiger tank, but less concerned with the whys and wherefores of warfare and its causes. Model builders, war gamers, and reenactors are typically considered antiquarians and are often the primary target audience of museums and authors for specialist publishers. The works produced by enthusiastic antiquarians far exceeds the output of other types of military historians; the massive amount of data they accumulate is a great boon for historians producing other types of military history.

Military utilitarian histories are usually written by and for professional militaries to educate policy makers and military officers. The primary function of the Marine Corps History Division or the U.S. Army Center of Military History, for example, is to produce military utilitarian histories. The Army’s famous Green Books and the Corps’ Red Books produced on World War II represent these types of history.21 This style is most often narrative, operational history that establishes the basic facts and chronology of an event. The key point is facts not models. Though most government historians are trained professionals, these programs are closely associated with military officers who are usually devoted to one type of military doctrine or another. Government historians have to be particularly vigilant against institutional forces that strive to fit historical events into preferred doctrinal models.

Gen Edwin Simmons often used a bull’s-eye diagram to explain the intended audience for History Division’s work. Replace “Marine Corps” with...
with “military” and this diagram also neatly illustrates the intended audience of military utilitarian history works.

Many academic historians view all official history (the most common form of military utilitarian history) as inherently biased, activist history. Concerning this, BGen Edwin H. Simmons, who led the Marine Corps History Division for more than two decades, once said:

I frequently use the word ‘advocacy’ and that sometimes puts the academic person’s teeth on edge. My point is that anyone working for the Marine Corps Historical Program should believe in the Marine Corps. By the same token, anyone working for the Army, Navy, or Air Force historical programs should be advocates of their respective services. Advocacy does not mean bias, prejudice, or distortion. An advocate can still write objective history. I would indeed argue that official history can be more accurate and objective than that of an independent scholar. The independent scholar is able to first form his hypothesis or premise and then marshal his facts selectively to support that hypothesis or premise. We are not permitted this degree of latitude. We must tell the whole story as best and as completely as we can.23

Civilian utilitarian is the final type, which is defined as academic military history written to help the educated citizen understand war and conflict. It is studied by civilian academics for the same reasons any other historical field is studied—to illuminate our understanding of mankind. John Keegan’s The Face of Battle is one example, as is Gerhard L. Weinberg’s A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (1994). Many of these works examine military institutions, including Millett’s Semper Fidelis and Aaron B. O’Connell’s Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps (2012).

All of these types of history can merge into one another; for example, when a work that is military utilitarian in overall intent includes a sidebar that is clearly antiquarian or inspirational. Furthermore, the same historian can produce during their lifetime works of different types.

The Marine Corps determined long ago that Marines must study military history, their own most especially, in order to function more efficiently and effectively. It is not enough to simply read history books, they must be educated readers, understanding the fundamentals of historical method and able to identify different schools of historical thought, as outlined above. By attaining this basic historical literacy and understanding historiography, Marines will get the most out of their historical studies.

Notes
5. The Peloponnesian War.
6. But always consider photographs with caution. Photographs provide an illusion of objective reality, but they are in truth composed and filtered recordings of the past. A photograph often obscures as much about an event as it reveals.
22. The term official history refers to a work of history that is sponsored, authorized, or endorsed by its subject. For example, Marine Corps History Division, as a function of higher headquarters, writes and publishes the official history of the U.S. Marine Corps.
As the post-Cold War international order continues to weaken under the pressure presented by an increasingly competitive and multipolar world, the United States finds itself at a strategic, inflective point. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis publicly released a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January 2018. Directed by Congress, the NDS replaced the former Quadrennial Defense Review. Unlike previous Quadrennial Defense Review reports, the 2018 NDS was published as a classified document with a releasable version distributed for public consumption. A threat-based strategy, the NDS frames the current and near-future strategic and operational environment, identifies the central problem, recognizes methods and means to address this central problem, provides risk mitigation guidance, and delivers direction to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services relating to joint force readiness, modernization, and force management.

Defense strategy is the linkage between operational capabilities and political objectives. Aligning with the National Security Strategy, the NDS defines the central problem as erosion of the United States’ “competitive military advantage” within key regions generated from the rise of China and the re-emergence of Russia. Return of great power competition—likely to evolve along a nonlinear, reciprocal projection—will continue to transform the strategic landscape.

The NDS articulates the central challenge as the altering of balance of power within key regions created by the rise of China over the past decade and the re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin. Competitive actions of China and Russia challenge the post-World War II international order, causing it to wane. Although not mirror image threats, both China and Russia are activity employing grand strategies designed to exploit opportunities along the continuum of cooperation, competition, and conflict. This “new great game” is broadly defined by Russia and China’s desire to seek right-of-entry and influence, control of strategically important geographical areas, and access to critical resources. Operations conducted below the level of armed conflict, exploiting a blend of competitive actions, challenge the American traditional view of war and peace, becoming the “new normal.”

Secretary Mattis’ concept of “expanding the competitive space” is a maneuverist approach to compete and win within the space this great power competition takes place. Temporally, expanding the competitive space incorporates activities across the continuum...
To enable and assist with expanding the competitive space, the 2018 NDS elevates the importance on increasing and deepening interoperability with allies and partners. Extending global reach with a strong network of allies and partners will provide access, capabilities, and capacity while increasing legitimacy.

The central logic of the NDS is that a more lethal, capable, and modernized joint force that is supported by a healthy network of allies and partners will enable the United States to establish a favorable balance of power: “Compete, deter, and win.” This modernized force, supported by a network of allies and partners, will provide a credible and conventional deterrence. In coordination with and support of other elements of national power, the joint force provides an escalation lever.

A sense of urgency for significant change runs through the language of the NDS. The intent is to prioritize and focus DOD on the question, “ready for what?” The “what” being high-end, contested domains warfighting against peer competitors. Shifting focus toward China and Russia while maintaining attention on rogue states Iran and North Korea, the NDS articulates a desired end-state, establishes prioritization, and sets a way forward.

To transition strategy into execution, the Secretary’s Fiscal Year 20-24 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) provided specific programmatic guidance as well as detailed implementation direction to DOD enterprise. The Deputy Secretary of Defense assumed the role as the lead change agent for implementation. What does this mean for the Marine Corps? Programmatically, a shift to procuring next generation capabilities which can be employed and effectively operate as an inside force will be prioritized. Sustainment and divestment decisions concerning legacy capabilities will need to be made. Training, education, and the doctrine guiding how we deploy and fight will need to adapt. Posture and deployment cycle planning will very likely require adjustment.

Importantly, the NDS addresses the requirement to transform professional military education to produce future leaders skills and intuition required to meet rapidly emerging 21st century challenges. Secondly, and linked to modernization, the NDS correctly identifies the need to enable and enhance a culture of innovation within DOD so material and non-material solutions are generated and acquired at the speed of relevance.

Bridging the strategic to the operational, the NDS postulates a new way to dynamically deploy the joint force. From a global perspective, new ways are intended to optimally manage and integrate joint resources, operations, and forward posture. The 2018 NDS introduces two new operational concepts: Dynamic Force Employment and Global Operating Model (GOM). Presently, both concepts require further development and refinement by the Joint Staff. The GOM consists of four joint force employment layers: contact, blunt, surge, and homeland. Integrating globally, the GOM is envisioned as a new design for posturing and employ-
ing combat power. Activities intended to expand the competitive space will be employed within the contact layer. As a global, forward deployed, naval expeditionary force, Marine Corps capabilities align well with intended operational and tactical actions envisioned within the contact, blunt, and surge layers. MEUs and Special Purpose MAGTFs complement the contact layer concept by providing flexible deterrence and response options while building situational awareness, conducting influence and shaping operations, and maturing relationships with allies and partners on a daily basis.

The 2018 NDS establishes the intent to inject prioritization and a sense of urgency within the DOD, shifting focus to rapidly closing joint force warfighting gaps. This will have programmatic, force development, and force management implications.

**Implications**

At this current inflection point, hard questions must be asked. National resources are finite, the United States’ fiscal burden is daunting, and prioritization is a must. Innovation at the speed of relevance is essential. Deep questions will need to be asked at the institutional level. Is the Corps ready for the high-end warfighting, regardless if it is against a peer competitor or proxy employing peer-competitor capabilities? Are the right capabilities, force design, and warfighting doctrine in place? As Marines, maneuver warfare is our warfighting philosophy—our mindset. However, do we know how we will deploy into and fight within a contested environment? The MOC states no. The time to avoid cognitive bias is now.

The intent for the remainder of this article is to generate intuitive-level reflection, spark critical thinking and debate, and accelerate innovation. Marine leaders should ask: Are we innovating? Are we thinking about future threats? Will we have the right leaders, doctrine, and material capabilities to overmatch opponents within all domains? In leveraging warfighting functions, along with training and education, force design, force structure, force posture, and innovation, the following section provides questions to initiate a broader discussion.

**Command and control (C2)**. Will the future C2 architecture possess network resilience to defend against peer cyber, jamming, and electronic warfare threats? Will the C2 network “plug and play” with higher joint and coalition networks? Will the Navy-Marine Corps network grids be integrated? Will bandwidth meet need? Will amphibious shipping C2 capabilities meet the demand requirements of multi-domain battle? How will signature control be managed? Are component headquarters designed and structured to support multi-domain operations?

**Maneuver**. Will the MAGTF deployment and employment strategy of the past meet the demands of today and the future? How will we deploy and fight the MAGTF within a contested domain environment? How will the MAGTF employ manned-unmanned teams to create situational understanding asymmetry to enable tactical engagement overmatch? Is naval integration on a track to enable seamless maneuver and warfighting at and from the sea?

**Fires**. Does Marine Corps Force 2025 optimize the MAGTF to fight effectively within the information domain? Are the current target development processes optimized to seamlessly converge effects, kinetic and non-kinetic, across all domains? Will future MAGTF long-range, precision fires enable the joint force to overmatch peer long-range, anti-access/aerial denial capabilities?

**Intelligence**. Will there be sufficient, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity and capabilities? Will fussed information be disseminated down through the battalion to the squad level to enable time critical targeting? Will indications and warnings distribution remain pace with hypervelocity weapons?

**Logistics**. How will the supporting logistics enterprise sustain a force operating inside integrated anti-access/aerial denial environments? Will the enterprise be able to support distributed operations over extended distances? Does current doctrine address combat refit and replacement? Will the medical enterprise capacity be robust enough to meet for high-end warfighting requirements?

**Force protection**. Has sufficient capability and capacity to defend against long-range, hypervelocity, and precision weapons been programmed? What new means of deception and decoying can be employed to complicate our adversary’s understanding and targeting solutions? Will programmed air, surface, and ground mobility platforms be survivable?

**Information**. What role will the MEF information group play within the larger interagency, joint, and coalition effort? What does it mean to maneuver within the electronic spectrum?

**Training and education**. Are training requirements and annual plans designed to meet high-end warfighting needs?
challenges? If yes, how often is training taking place? Are MEF/MEB headquarters operationally ready to deploy on short notice to command and control a MAGTF fighting against a peer? Is the education system focused on building future leaders with the knowledge required to meet future challenges while remaining warfighting subject matter experts?

Force design, structure, and posture. Is the current MEF force structure optimized to enable rapid, effective, and efficient deployment of combat creditable MAGTFs? Relative to the Indo-Pacific-Asia region, is the MAGTF the ideal force design? What is the most optimal and sustainable Service end strength? Is the current Marine Corps global posture designed to address future threats?

Innovation. Is the Corps innovating as the speed of relevance? How will the likely convergence of artificial intelligence, autonomy, advanced manufacturing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, and many other technological advances may likely generate disruptive changes to the character of warfare. Ultimately, trends indicate continued instability, competition, and the likelihood of nation-state armed conflict. As the force-in-readiness, MAGTFs of today and tomorrow must possess capabilities that address primary threats while remaining flexible and adaptable to meet the unpredictable and the unknowns.

Conclusion

The NDS shifts the DOD away from low-end stability operations and directs the DOD to identify cost effective ways and means to address challenges presented within regions where vital national interests are not at risk. Fur-
It is time for the MAGTF to die. The MAGTF is one of many novel ideas that came out of the World War II peace dividend and our mythic legacy of amphibious operations. It remains not only because of its continued utility but as a result of the institutional difficulty inherent to reshaping it in any real sense. The purpose of this article is to discuss why the MAGTF in its current state must either evolve or die in order to support the threats we will face for the remainder of the 21st century. In short, the Marine Corps needs to think beyond the existing structural boundaries imposed by the MAGTF, and we need to do it now.

Defining the Challenge

The ostensible strength of the MAGTF model is its flexibility to task organize, limited only by (physical) systems interoperability, command and control (C2) fluidity, time, and space. Or, as MCDP 1 succinctly states:

[MAGTFs] have no standard structure, but rather are constituted as appropriate for the specific situation. The MAGTF provides a single commander a combined arms force that can be tailored to the situation faced. As the situation changes, it may of course be necessary to restructure the MAGTF.

The real problem with this definition is not the inherent descriptive latitude it offers, rather, it is the overarching institutional caveat that bounds it. If you look back one sentence on the same page:

For operations and training, Marine forces will be formed into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs are task organizations consisting of ground, aviation, combat service support, and command elements.

Still, later in the text, MCDP 1 reminds us, “In general, the organization for combat should also be the organization for training.” Consequently, our own doctrine is telling us to operate as MAGTFs both in garrison and at war while simultaneously stating that it is not the MAGTF that matters but the situation at hand. Rather than embrace this doctrinal sound of one hand clapping, and despite the gravity well of institutional habit and structure pulling us away, common sense tells us the situation should be what guides our methodology. When faced with such a choice between institutional routine and ideally posturing toward future threats, we need to choose the latter and not the former—our doctrine gives no signs and indicators of sacred cows.

The Marine Corps needs to be realistic not only about the battles we expect to fight but also the battles we have fought and are currently fighting. The 2016 Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC), envisioning the Corps of 2025, describes a suite of threats we need not wait until 2025 to see because we are already fighting them today. Non-state and quasi-state threats continue to proliferate across all domains, yet we continue to apply a cognitive model—the MAGTF—that is bounded by only three of them: land, sea, and air.

Critical thinking supposes that if our current model is inadequate, we...
may need a new model. There are perhaps two main ways to approach this. First, we can do what we are doing now, which is to glacially change the existing MAGTF with a sprinkling of information warfare here, a drone or two there, become more fluid and dynamic, using tables of organization and equipment not as answers to operational dilemmas but as points of creative departure for agile-thinking commanders. In the future, this will need to happen not at the current MAGTF speed of hours, days, and weeks but at the machine speed of seconds, minutes, and hours.

There are some intriguing conceptual approaches available to help us in this effort, to include “mosaic warfare,” recently proposed by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). Mosaic warfare proposes a model for rapid and complex task organization and C2 that occurs at machine speed or what might easily be described as “high fidelity maneuver warfare.” Effectively, it is a methodology that addresses the 2025 “future” articulated in the MOC: a future we ironically are already living in.* Or to quote Tom Burns, director at DARPA’s Strategic Technology Office, the goal [of mosaic warfare] is to fight as a network to create a chain of effects—or, more accurately because these effects are not linear, “effects webs”—to deter and defeat adversaries across multiple scales of conflict intensity.7

While DARPA’s concept for mosaic warfare is well-suited to work with the MAGTF as it exists, it may be even more ideal for whatever may come next. If we are looking for the solution to the world described by the MOC, then we need to take such external ideas as seriously as we might take our own.

Mosaic warfare is clearly as aspirational a concept as a world without a MAGTF, but it presents a compelling intellectual model because it is not at all that dissimilar from our core doctrine of maneuver warfare; it is, to paraphrase Generals Alfred M. Gray and Charles C. Krulak, a “philosophy” and a “way of thinking,” respectively. Put more succinctly, mosaic warfare is a prescient methodology by which we might shuffle the complex burden of the future battlespace on our enemies—a burden that a creaky MAGTF may not be able to handle in the future.

While it is a fair assessment that the MAGTF provides an exceptional suite of capabilities to execute a host of missions, it is currently inhibited by the speed at which these capabilities can be brought to bear, the pace at which we can command and control them, the degree to which they can integrate, and our traditional parochialism in offering them to the joint force. Bringing the MAGTF to a future fight might be like a kid bringing toy dinosaurs to a friend’s sandbox and finding out they are playing with toy soldiers. (The scenario may work, but it will take some effort, time, and creativity—maybe too much for a “friend” to wait for.) We need less exquisite, less expensive, and more universal “pieces,” enabling us to build our future forces not from the a MAGTF model kit but from a metaphorical mosaic pile of Lego bricks.

Machine Speed Maneuver and Frederick’s Mules

The greatest challenge to high fidelity maneuver warfare is not our physical systems but our lithified perception of command and control. On this, we can learn a great deal from the opponents we have faced in the last few years. Violent extremist organizations (ISIS in particular) have proven to be unexpectedly worthy adversaries, often characterized less by convention and more by unfiltered innovation. Their command and feedback models shift and reconsolidate rapidly at the tactical and operational level, employing a model more akin to

---

*The methodology of “mosaic warfare” posits a force that can internally reorganize and reconstitute itself so quickly that an enemy is outpaced by such surprise and flexibility. Our current model for MAGTF employment relies heavily on expensive, exquisite systems to leverage effects on the enemy. These “puzzle pieces” are often limited in their interoperability, and largely incapable of being mixed and matched in a way that matches the more mosaic effects produced by our adversaries.
special operations forces than conventional troops. While the Marine Corps is rightfully constrained by its Title 10 authorities—having clear lateral limits in this regard—the advent of next generation digital technologies can help bridge this gap. Before we start embracing the right technology, we must embrace the right methodology. The Oprah audience approach of “everyone gets a drone swarm” rightly aims to put innovation in the hands of every junior Marine but, if divorced from a more institutional approach to our philosophy, it risks placing another unused item in the rifleman’s pack. Corps-wide investments in “beeps and squeaks” will make us only as lethal as our Marines are, and in an age where sergeants and lieutenants could become mini-MAGTF commanders, we owe it to the Corps to make better sergeants and lieutenants. Commensurate with any technological investment in our Marines and the commensurate training for these technologies, we need to invest in the education of our junior leaders in preparation for the increased cognitive loads and authoritative weight that will accompany greater, “high fidelity” lethality. Reliance on the status quo will not take us the full distance—or as Frederick the Great once opined:

Thought … the faculty of combining ideas, is what distinguishes man from beasts of burden. A mule, though he should have made ten campaigns … would not have improved in his tactics. And to the shame of humanity it must be confessed that, with respect to this kind of indolent stupidity, many old officers are not superior to such a mule.  

Societally, we face a technological cascade that is already transforming the character of the wars we fight. Our non-state adversaries have already benefited from this and have transformed the way they man, equip, and train their forces. Should peer and near-peer adversaries follow suit, we may find ourselves on the steep side of the innovation curve and on the wrong side of history—all while research has shown our officers are not getting any more intelligent. Giving our Marines baskets of new technology without buckets of more education is to assume they are much like “Frederick’s Mules.”

**Conclusion: Educating for a Revolution**

The all-domain task force is clearly an aspirational concept, as is that of a mosaic Marine force that can achieve warfighting dominance across all domains simultaneously while reshaping itself in realtime. The greatest limit to their realization is our own lack of imagination and the magnetic attraction we often have to things that have been done before, as we choose to walk in the beaten tracks of a mule. There are momentous challenges to tearing down the MAGTF and rebuilding something new, but they are not impossible unless we as Marines decide they are impossible. The world described by the MOC should already cause us to think far outside of the MAGTF paradigm because it certainly sounds like a world that is going to break that paradigm. Perhaps we are too limited by our own perspective to be revolutionary, or as the Japanese idiom says, we do not have the luxury of making evolutionary choices about our warfighting methods when the world demands of us a revolutionary approach. The MAGTF way of thinking needs to die, Frederick’s mules need to be turned to glue, and the frog needs to swim in the ocean so the philosophies of high-fidelity maneuver that brought the MAGTF to life in the first place can thrive anew.

---

**The all-domain task force is clearly an aspirational concept…**

“The frog in the well cannot comprehend the ocean.” It is an uncomfortable metaphor, but the world can look a lot like a well from the inside of a MAGTF. The innovations that will pave the way for future Marine commands—machine-augmented decision making, persistent sensors, digitally enhanced battlespace awareness, wearable command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence suites and beyond—either already exist or will be within the Marine Corps’ grasp in a matter of years. They will be within our enemies’ hands, if they are not already, within that same time frame or earlier.

---

**Notes**


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


7. Ibid.

8. MCDP 1, Warfighting.


Standardization is the unsung value of military thinking. There is a palpable feeling that anything and everything is run better, smoother even, if there is a standardized process. Deviation from the process breeds unfamiliar results, slows the decision-making process, and compounds the effects of the “fog of war.”

The proven results of standardization are evident when one looks at such systems as the American education system in which national standardized tests have significantly improved the quality of education among children, reflected in America’s worldwide educational standing. With such an effective system based on the improvement of the individual, it only makes sense to integrate standardization to greater degrees into the monolithic military bureaucratic system.

While standardization does exist in many fashions throughout the Marine Corps already, it must be fully realized and integrated into day-to-day operations. Even standard practices, codified in checklists and SOPs, are often ignored in lieu of the status quo. This is reasonable especially considering how double checking all procedures against the millions of pages of reference materials (be it orders, directives, instructions, policies, regulations, etc.) wastes needless time. However, the benefits from standardization far outweigh the current system of allowing junior officers and NCOs the latitude to make subjective decisions. With a standard format for every conceivable practice, we effectively eliminate redundancy and diminish the amount of time spent on time-consuming tasks.

Awards, for example, can be processed quicker and without delay (just check the list to ensure every wicket is hit without subjective reasoning) rather than the inordinate number of “award boards” left to debate grammar and determine if the Marine actually deserves the award, ultimately resulting in Marines receiving awards months after they execute a permanent change of station or even expiration of active service. Similarly, fitness reports currently have a series of metrics; they still provide a space to “paint a word picture.” These Section I comments have little to do with the standard measuring system currently in place with the grading scale. In fact, when the Section I comments and grades do not seem to match up, the grading takes precedence. Then why bother with Section I at all? By removing subjectivity from award and fitness reports, we no longer harm Marines because an officer “don’t write too good.”

Arguably, the greatest advantage of standardization is that we can hold Marines accountable to that standard, which is undeniably the correct way. There is no room for creative thought or deviations. More accurately, the standard—as the most efficient and cost-effective means—requires no capitulation on over-spending or time management. Sure, there are many ways to complete the same task (and we pay lip service to that idea), but the standard way is...
simple, and it works. Trying to disavow Marines from a “checklist mentality” is ridiculous because the checklist encompasses ideas the inexperienced Marine does not think to take into consideration. Consequently, the mistakes the Marine might have made are avoided, and the subsequent cost of righting the wrong can be better utilized elsewhere.

Additionally, when Marines rigidly adhere to the standard, it allows the higher ups to exercise better command and control. We have already begun utilizing this mindset in regard to exercises and wargames. Every year, exercise problems are the same, and the actual execution of the exercise just serves to reinforce the standard procedure. Inconsistencies and problems that deviate from the standard are willed away to provide a good-looking picture to the commander so that they might have their endstate: victory.

In maneuver warfare, there is talk about the smallest unit leader (the corporal) taking the initiative to make decisions that can, in our modern age of media and immediate connectivity, have ramifications at the strategic levels; and talk is where this concept stops. Do we really trust that nineteen-year-old who is not responsible enough to buy liquor (but was caught with such libations thus proving he does not make the correct decisions when unsupervised) to make a decision affecting national strategy? Of course not! It is merely sufficient to say we do.

At this juncture, some who disagree with my statements might bring up the necessity of non-standardization in operations such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief or counterinsurgency (COIN). Such operations are characterized by their fluid battlespaces and unique terrain (human and physical); to impose a standard would be preposterous. But of course we can apply a standard! In fact, we already treat COIN within a standard; we just change the words from the conventional warfare context to fit our COIN doctrine. COIN’s center of gravity and critical vulnerability is the population. To exploit the center of gravity, we hit the critical vulnerability by winning the hearts and minds of the people. What wins hearts and minds? Freedom and security. To bring freedom and security, we must embolden local leaders by helping finance their freedom of (insert appropriate freedom) and provide security through giving the indigenous people jobs as the military, police, or constabulary force.

We normally begin COIN with a show of force. (Photo by LCpl Israel Chincio.)

History demonstrates how utilizing this standard creates a strong military in such countries as Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Any such failures (such as the collapse of the South Vietnamese Army) only highlights that it was a lack of personal conviction on the part of the natives to take freedom and security seriously. The basic premise behind our reasoning is functionally sound. Rather than re-assess our current standards of COIN, we need to do a better job of inculcating small unit leaders to the standard processes guiding the Marine Corps developed through the thousands of after-action reports produced following every deployment.

The standard process for COIN is as follows. First, we must begin with a show of force. Since COIN usually occurs in third world countries, seeing such technology brought to the scene of turmoil will shock the natives into a fear-induced stupor; only the most fanatical native would dare to stand against such might. After our show of force, we systematically root out the enemy through the destruction of their safe havens. Safe haven destruction accomplishes two important tasks. Again, it shows the complete superiority we possess in technology, proving to the people the benefits of freedom. It also demonstrates to the people that we bring security. At this point, we begin addressing the people’s needs. The basic necessities, security, and a solid government will need to be set up. Building roads, creating schools, and digging wells will help secure the favorable attitudes of the populace since it will supply their basic needs.

In conjunction with providing freedom and security, the onus to train
the native forces will fall upon the military. Since most servicemembers have had years of training on cultural developments and an anthropological understanding of interdependence of economic, political, and social structures, working to build a native force in the image of the United States military should be easy. The biggest hurdle to overcome is the fact that many of the native forces do not go through an indoctrination process such as boot camp. However, since they live brutal, lawless lives in a third world country, inducing them to work in support of freedom and security will always be effective (and a little extra cash does not hurt as well).

At this point, history demonstrates that Americans will begin to clamor against the United States’ involvement in the foreign country—investing more money, time, and military lives than is acceptable (shows of force are not cheap, in either taxpayer dollars or American lives). This clamor resonates at the highest levels, and the military becomes compelled to hastily cauterize the native forces, leaving them with enough training to handle all their countries’ issues. It is no different than if America had to be run by its military forces.

By standardizing the entirety of the Marine Corps way of life, we eliminate the need to re-develop already established procedures, increase the reaction time of units (since they know how the flow of events will go), and control recklessness. If every officer and SNCO has been schooled in the proper standards, victory should be self-assured. Proven results in combat are replicated and perpetuated in any type of environment. Plus, there is no longer room for a deficient writer the stress over things like awards and fitness reports. Everything within the Marine Corps flows as a well-oiled machine. In the words of a dead German military thinker (in obligation to the standard process of revering dead German military thinkers), “Independent thinking must take second place to a uniform solution.”

---

Note

>Author’s Note: This article is submitted on behalf of 1stLt J.J. Buckle. 1stLt Buckle is an 8006 Marine in the Fleet Marine Force, serving as a platoon commander. He wrote this article while on deployment in Afghanistan.
The Marine Corps is taking a deliberate approach to how it develops the ability to fight peer adversaries in the future. The method by which the Marine Corps is instructing maneuver warfare will lead to an attritionist mindset and a misunderstanding of the proper implementation of maneuver warfare among its future leaders. If it is properly taught and understood throughout the Corps, a new offset could be reached that adversarial peer actors cannot attain.

MCDP 1, Warfighting, currently defines maneuver warfare as

> a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. 1

This definition only describes what maneuver warfare may look like to entities observing a specific action. The definition of maneuver warfare should read as follows:

Maneuver warfare is a method of warfighting that seeks to analyze an enemy network, identify actionable focal points that are critical to the enemy, then action the focal points through a combination of speed, surprise and violence.

The embrace of MCDP 1’s definition has resulted in several second- and third-order effects regarding the Marine Corps’ quality of education on maneuver warfare. It is ingrained at all levels if commanders exercise speed, focus, and surprise against the enemy, they are exercising maneuver warfare. This misunderstanding has led to the conduction of attrition warfare. Centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities are being identified with no analysis or identification of enemy networks.

The subsequent fictional vignette is set in the year 2030, and the consequences of the Marine Corps’ shift from maneuver warfare are made evident. It demonstrates the futility of the arms race between the United States and its peer competitors—China, Russia, and Iran. Superior technology and increased force preservation, although helpful, does not necessarily serve as an asymmetric advantage. Without an indomitable national will, an attritionist will never win a war.

Vignette

Interviewer: Col Fullman, in your own words, please describe to me your opinions on how America lost the Pacific. Specifically, touch on your involvement with the failed forced entry operation, Operation FROM THE SEA (Operation FTS), into the South China Sea and the domino effect it had on the rest of the region.

Col Fullman: A large portion of policymakers in Washington and military leadership at the Pentagon believe the Chinese occupation of Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, and the Kwajalein Atoll is a direct result of the failure of Operation FTS. It does play a large role in the loss of American dominance in the Pacific Ocean; however, the decline started much earlier.

Look back to 2004 and the emergence of the IED during Operation...
Iraqi Freedom. Prior to the proliferation of the IED across the battlefield, America had executed one of the quickest, most effective displays of maneuver warfare during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Through a thorough analysis of the Iraqi Army’s network, the Marine Corps was able to conduct a swift and decisive offensive action that struck focal points and bypassed military targets of little significance.

After the Barthe Party lost power, the Iraqi Army was dismantled and no effective government structure was left. The Marine Corps no longer had a true objective besides a vague tasking to build a nation. This left the Corps with no enemy course of action to focus on and analyze. Because of the lack of focus, the Marine Corps was forced to fight an enemy who was elusive, had minimal command structure, and maintained a purely attritionist mindset. Counterinsurgency operations were conducted, and key players in the insurgent network were neutralized. What was different from past wars was the enemy’s ability to replace neutralized leadership, operate with minimal infrastructure, and have limited identifiable tactical goals.

Take an enemy who cannot be analyzed, then add the new dimension of the IED. The Marines were forced into a situation where their best hope was to kill more of the enemy than the enemy could kill of them. They had to develop superior means of force preservation and hope that the enemy’s will faded before their nation’s did, all while a new national government in Iraq attempted to get on its feet.

The “kill more enemies and preserve more friendlies” strategy did not work in Iraq; but it did set in motion the idea the war was lost because of a lack of host-nation will. Not that it didn’t succeed; to win a war, you must identify what the enemy wants and then find focal points that overlap and target them. When the Marine Corps left Iraq, it left with a new mindset: you must be able to kill the most enemies, and you must do it with the most technologically advanced gear while keeping all of your personnel alive.

Take this attritionist attitude and then apply it to America’s peer adversaries—who have the money, technology sectors, and willpower to compete with America—and you have an arms race. America would develop a new technology, and a few days, months, or years later, each peer would have a similar, or better, counter-development. The Marine Corps believed if it had a superior technology for one day, then during that day, it would have an asymmetric advantage. What it did not factor in was America was no longer the preeminent leader of the world, and anything it could produce would almost immediately be replicated. Also, if you have superpowers with similar technology going toe to toe, then the victor will be the participant that has the most firepower, manpower, and national will.

As a result of this warfighting philosophy flaw, in September 2016, the Marine Corps produced guidance that ultimately resulted in the disaster of Operation FTS. The guidance came in the form of a document called the Marine Corps Operating Concept. It explained that to win a fight, the Marine Corps must be able to fight in the five domains that had been identified at the time of publication: land, sea, air, cyber, and space. This idea—in itself—is true, but the idea of how to achieve this was flawed. It focused on the technological and doctrinal advancement of each individual domain. This guidance did great things for the Marine Corps on a face-value level; it bought new weapons, better computers, and better ships. What it failed to do was train MAGTF commanders to integrate and leverage warfighting functions across the domains and target specific critical vulnerabilities.

The Marine Corps Operating Concept also served to reinforce the marriage of the Navy and Marine Corps. It emphasized the Marine Corps would primarily fight from ships—which had always been the case. This bold focus stated, to the enemies of the Marine Corps, that the battlefield had already been chosen. All the enemy had to do was shape that battlefield to its advantage, which is exactly what it ended up doing during Operation FTS.

The final seed of disaster sown by the Marine Corps was an idea originally published in 2012 and fully ingrained into company-level leadership in 2017. It was the idea that the method paragraph in operation orders was not needed. The Marine Corps had determined, because of a lack of understanding about how to identify an enemy’s center of gravity and critical vulnerability, it would only define them without explaining how to identify and exploit them.

The Marine Corps’ removal of the method paragraph essentially ended the officer corps’ entry-level education on maneuver warfare. The method paragraph was the only portion of any units’ order where the commander justified his understanding of maneuver warfare. Without the method paragraph, the commander and his subordinate are left with only offensive forms of maneuver to rely on. The lieutenants from The Basic School’s classes of 2017 were our company commanders and most essential levels of leadership in 2025 during Operation FTS.

Interviewer: Sir, would you please expound upon how this history lesson affected the failure of Operation FTS?

Col Fullman: Yes. Since the 2000s, China focused on developing existing reefs and small islands in and around the South China Sea with the intent to influence shipping channels. The Navy and Marine Corps’ original plan was to conduct freedom of navigation patrols through the area to demonstrate they would not be challenged by the Chinese. The freedom of navigation patrols had a limited effect, at first when
the Chinese islands were merely several square acres of sand and concrete. They had no effect once the islands increased by several square miles, the largest of which was Mischief Reef. In the 1990s, it was only dry during low tide; however, by 2025, it was nearly 50 feet above sea level and 10 square kilometers.

In 2024, China moved an entire fleet of ships, to include a force that looked largely similar to a Marine Corps MEF, into the South China Sea. Initial reports indicated that the Chinese MEF and fleet were conducting a large-scale exercise to serve as a proof of concept for their ability to operate across warfighting domains. Initial reports were wrong. The Chinese did demonstrate their ability to operate across the domains by shutting down shipping corridors with their ships and submarines. They ceased air traffic with their expeditionary air element. They destroyed orbiting satellites by launching missiles into orbit with tons of metal dust instead of explosives. The dust hit international satellites at such a speed that it destroyed all of them. Yes, every one of them. However, Chinese satellites had magnets that were able to collect the dust prior to impact. Finally, Chinese cyber war elements were able to access publicly-owned shipping companies and international companies, and the Chinese implanted viruses in companies’ systems that made simple changes to serial numbers and modified financial tracking algorithms in accounting departments by one thousandth of a percent, which went unnoticed and crashed several companies.

The combination of these attacks across the warfighting domains forced America to answer hostility with lethality. In 2025, the Marine Corps stood up a task force comprised of the 31st MEU and the 15th MEU. I served as the GCE commander for the 31st MEU. In basic terms, the task force was to seize Mischief Reef and establish a forward base from which the Marine Corps could conduct future offensive missions. Operation FTS was launched. The 31st MEU loaded onto littoral combat ships—troop transport variant (LCSTV), new ships with a limited signature on radar, and headed toward the objective.

Years earlier, the National Security Agency embedded sensors into the sea floor in the South China Sea that, when activated, would rise to the surface and loiter in a certain area. These sensors would launch mini drones that could mark targets for our tomahawk missiles. Unfortunately, most of the sensors did not activate, and those that did had a very limited effect. I believe the mini drones played a part in the Chinese seeing us coming. We launched missiles at the targets we could identify and ones we had reasonable assumptions about.

The missiles were the only shaping fires our landing force had. All of our close air support platforms were caught in a battle of attrition with Chinese fighters. The LCSTVs were not able to get close to any landing points because of their captains’ reasonable fear of the Chinese’s anti-area/access denial rail-gun systems.

We disembarked the LCSTVs in rubber craft and high-speed AAVs at a range that far exceeded what the naval surface fires could provide. We knew something was wrong after about twenty minutes, when we heard several loud explosions. Apparently, the LCSTVs’ anti-radar shape worked; unfortunately, the Chinese had mined the waters with mines that would release from the sea floor when they picked up certain frequencies from propellers. In a matter of minutes, all three of our LCSTVs were sunk or sinking.

We continued on, guided in by beacons that recon placed at landing points. At around one kilometer from landing, the Chinese began to fire on our landing party with shore guns. Their initial effect was devastating. We were able to attempt to suppress with the stabilized 25mm cannons on our AAVs. While we moderately silenced the guns on the shore, we failed to notice the Chinese patrol boats that had materialized to our rear. I am certain the only reason I was not killed with the rest of the landing party was because my AAV had both a weapon and engine malfunction.

Our failed landing and destroyed task force was one of three failed forced entries that day. That was exactly what the Chinese had planned on. They had already maneuvered their fleet to seize American holdings in the Pacific prior to our landing.
to our failure. America had no forces in the region remaining to counter them.

**Operation FTS After-Action Report**
- New technology does not necessarily constitute an offset in warfare.
- Without technology that rivals that of our enemy, the Marine Corps will be at a disadvantage. The current operating environment consists of numerous peer rivals to the Marine Corps and America. The key word is “peer.” Peer meaning they have the means to match America regarding economic growth, industry, and development.
- In an operating environment where each nation has similar capabilities, new developments can expect to be replicated or surpassed by each respective actor immediately or quickly.
- In prior wars and circumstances throughout history, technological developments created an asymmetric advantage for generations. These advancements include ships, nuclear weapons, and precision guided munitions.
- America cannot develop weapons quickly enough or advanced enough for technology to set it apart in the future. The only thing that can change is a cultural shift in the Marine Corps from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare.
- Each domain needs to be housed under the umbrella of a universal domain.
- The issue the Marine Corps has with its understanding of maneuver warfare is it looks at warfighting domains in a linear way, meaning that the Corps attempts to isolate each domain—land, air, sea, space and cyber—and to superior in each individually. The Marine Corps needs to look at the enemy holistically and attempt to identify what the enemy’s most likely course of action will be. It then needs to see how the domains are being leveraged to attain that goal. Once this has been completed, the Marine Corps can do a network analysis on each domain.
- If Marine Corps understands the enemy’s network, we will not only have indirect fires to execute combined arms but also understand that attacking a component of cyber may facilitate maneuver in the air.
- We cannot allow the enemy to either choose or know the battlefield on which they will fight.
- When the Marine Corps re-devoted itself to the Navy for a fighting platform, it announced to the world the battlefield on which it would fight.
- The Marine Corps is at a critical junction in its history, similar to the 1800s when senior leadership refused to leave guard duty on ships. Had the Marine Corps not shifted from ships’ guards to primarily expeditionary duty, it would have become obsolete.
- Fighting from only ships is obsolete. The Marine Corps needs to make the tough decision and take action now and leave ships as only one of a litany of options.
- The answer may not be embracing land, sea, or air for means of forced entry. If the Marine Corps is focused on only being prepared to be expeditionary from one domain, it will fail.
- Any enemy that wants to protect its coast from the Marine Corps has already developed means to do so.
- If the Marine Corps continues to attempt to justify the sea-based entry, it will lose its chance to develop other methods for larger forces. This will lead to a strategic failure and thousands of lost lives.
- The Marine Corps needs to cultivate innovation with regard to new means of entry for large-scale units from the land, sea, air, and space.
- A lack of maneuverist, small unit leadership leads to a lack of maneuverist senior leadership.
- The Basic School’s lieutenants of today are the generals of tomorrow. If the Marine Corps fails them at entry-level training, it will start a cycle that may never be reversed. Had the leadership during Operation FTS understood how to write a method paragraph, or expected to see one from their commander, they could have seen what they were doing was pure attrition and the same tactics had been executed for the previous several decades.
- Without an indomitable national will, an attritionist will never win a war.

**Notes**

INTRODUCING
The Observation Post

Based on guidance from General James N. Mattis, USMC (Retired) we are re-establishing a department that appeared in the Gazette from 1956 to 1963. Professional debate during that interwar inflection point between the peer-on-peer war of fire and maneuver in Korea and the yet-to-come Guerilla war in Vietnam prompted creation of a feature dedicated to short articles that presented “new, constructive and often controversial ideas.” An example of a classic OP article follows on page #: "A Modest Proposal" by (then) 1st Lt A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard originally published in May 1962.

Today we will re-establish The Observation Post.

A CALL TO ACTION

“Marines, today we need you to bring your ideas to the Gazette in order to refresh Marine Corps thinking. We need the intellectual risk-takers, the ‘Mavericks’ whose critical thinking and creative problem-solving can disrupt the bureaucracy and challenge intellectual complacency. We need nonconformists and innovators whose disciplined but unregimented ideas can lead to solutions that outpace adaptive enemies and a dynamically changing world.”

- General James N. Mattis, USMC (Retired)

Submission Guidelines

Frank opinions, rebuttals to published articles, and imaginative ideas are all welcome.
Subject matter is unconstrained and may be controversial, but the article must be short.
Submit essays of 800-1000 words to mailto:gazette@mca-marines.org.
MS Word documents are preferred.
No pictures or charts.
Author biographies are limited to rank, full name and MOS.
The authors of OP articles selected for publication will receive an award of $50.00 courtesy of the donors of MCAF.
Men, before you shove off for this Birthday celebration I want to call something to your attention. You’re gonna hear a lotta fine words about the history of the Corps, old battles, honors won by fightin’ Marines who have grown grey in wars carrying our standards and wearing the emblem all over the world. Year after year, the old Corps keeps adding to its fine reputation whether it’s the result of a big battle we’ve won or just the snappy performance of a young Marine sentry at a Stateside base it’s all part of our traditions that we all pass along from year to year.

Now, much of this distinction and fine tradition is based upon one of the Corps’ special characteristics I wanna mention for a minute. That characteristic is readiness. I’m not gonna tell you about the big picture, how the Marine Corps is the Force-in-Readiness for emergency situations. Everyone knows that. I’m gonna talk about how you, the individual Marine, fit into this ready outfit. You men should be able to see much of our ability to move out to any trouble spot depends on more than just having the combat gear, the supplies and the organization ready. It also depends on every man-jack and officer being ready too.

There are many ways each of us has to keep ready: we have gotta take care of our health and fitness. Every campaign we go into always catches some people with their muscles down. From the jungles of Guadalcanal to the hills of Korea, we’ve heard and learned about the need for being in top physical shape in order to be a hard-charger. It’s too late to start getting in shape after the ‘incoming’ starts to whistle. So, as I’ve said before, keep them feet and leg muscles in shape. Watch your health habits. Stay in shape and be ready for any kind of contest. Remember we play for keeps.

Another way we all gotta keep ready is professionally. This business is getting more complicated all the time and the competition is getting rougher. We’ve recently seen that ‘rice burning’ peasants make pretty smart soldiers. So we gotta be even smarter. We have to know a lot in this business because when the chips start flying many of you will find yourselves doing jobs one or two ranks ahead of you. I mean by that, you gotta be ready to do a bigger job and to lead other men. Sometimes promotions come fast. Some of you will find yourselves wearing brass bars before you know what’s happened.

So you gotta prepare yourself, study your job, plan for the future and be ready to step up when the opportunity comes.

Much of the Corps’ readiness depends on having the gear in shape and ready to move. That goes for you too. Keep all your personal gear ship-shape and ready to pack in a few hours notice. Keep your boots in shape, your uniform ready and your field gear in condition. Have plans for disposing of your car or shipping and storing civilian clothes. You married men should have plans and written directions for your dependents concerning the handling of your property if you have to move out in a hurry.

The planning you have done for your dependents has a lot to do with the readiness of you married Marines. Do you know where your family will live? Do they know what to do about moving household effects? Do they know who to turn to in emergencies? You gotta plan all these things. Write them out. Arrange joint bank accounts, check on your allotments and insurance. Give the wife a schedule of payments for your time purchases. Square away your car payments and insurance. Don’t leave the little wife holding a fouled up financial bag.

When you have properly taken care of these personal readiness items; your physical fitness, your professional preparation, your personal gear and plans for dependents, then you will be mentally ready. You can shove off with the confidence that all is squared away on the home front and with the freedom to concentrate on handling your duties in the manner the Corps expects of you.

Well, men, shove off and enjoy the Birthday, but when you are reminded of the Marine Corps’ past accomplishments, remember that our great record has been made by Marines who were ‘ready’ at all times to go any place any time and do the job.
In his novel, El Club Dumas, Spanish author Arturo Perez-Reverte observes, “There are no innocent readers anymore ... To the information the author provides he’ll always add his own.” To be honest, I am not an innocent reader of Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead. During my 30 years in the Marine Corps, I served directly under Gen James N. Mattis’ command three times, always two echelons down the chain of command: for example, me at platoon, him at battalion; me at battalion, him at division; and so forth. This is also the first time I reviewed a book that I appear in, however briefly. This is relevant only in that I was close to some of the events and many of the Marines mentioned in the book, and I bring my own views to the reading. What follows is not “the rest of the story,” but my opinions of the book shaped by my personal experiences.

I also need to add that writing this review has been challenging since a minor print and television media frenzy has grown around the General’s first interviews since his resignation as Secretary of Defense. The questions and discussion in these public interviews have all seemed to focus on everything but the book. This part continues through his first combat experiences as a lieutenant colonel while commanding a battalion in Operation DESERT STORM and concludes with his command of Task Force 58, the first American and allied “brigade” into Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. This first part demonstrates the General’s grounding in personal leadership at the tactical level where personal preparation—mental, physical, and spiritual—and immediate presence in the lives of the Marines you lead are crucial to success. As a lieutenant serving as a platoon commander in his battalion, we all learned from him the moral imperatives of leadership in war—lessons many of us took into our own commands in the sequels to the so-called First Gulf War.

Further, if you expect deeply touching insights into the character of Jim Mattis the man, you will also be disappointed by the book. Likewise, if you expect a chest-thumping first-person battle narrative from “Mad Dog Mattis,” you truly do not know who the General is. However, if you expect a collection of carefully curated biographical vignettes that carry fundamental lessons on leadership, then you will be pleased with this book. Above all, this work is worth every Marine’s time to read. Call Sign Chaos will also be of particular value to all who serve in the joint force, the Defense establishment, as well as students of national defense, strategy, history, and military affairs.

The book is organized into three parts. The first, “Direct Leadership,” uncovers the General’s “origin story” from youth in Washington State through early ship-board deployments to the Western Pacific and subsequent recruiting duty. This part continues through his first combat experiences as a lieutenant colonel while commanding a battalion in Operation DESERT STORM and concludes with his command of Task Force 58, the first American and allied “brigade” into Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. This first part demonstrates the General’s grounding in personal leadership at the tactical level where personal preparation—mental, physical, and spiritual—and immediate presence in the lives of the Marines you lead are crucial to success. As a lieutenant serving as a platoon commander in his battalion, we all learned from him the moral imperatives of leadership in war—lessons many of us took into our own commands in the sequels to the so-called First Gulf War.

The second part, “Executive Leadership,” begins by following General
Mattis in combat again, covering his time in command of the First Marine Division during the initial invasion of Iraq and early stability and counter-insurgency operations through his assignments at MCCDC, I MEF, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and NATO’s Supreme Allied Command for Transformation. Among this part’s vignettes are the details of an incident that has not appeared in the official histories of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Shocking and controversial at the battle of Fallujah: “Lethality as a Metric,” is based on a personal battle rhythm, the General’s time commanding U.S. CENTCOM in 1983, only fourteen men have served as the geographic combatant commander for this complex, dynamic, and volatile area of responsibility. This period of the General’s service is probably the least relatable for even the most experienced, mature, and well-read military reader. The book does a credible job of breaking down this barrier to understanding by detailing the daily routine, or personal battle rhythm, the General demanded of himself and his staff. The sheer intellectual stamina and personal discipline required to operate at this level is a testament to the exceptional character of such leaders. Sadly, much of this section describes the friction and frustration born from failures to frame and articulate a coherent national strategy for the region.

In addition to the precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and restrictions on “boots on the ground” troop strength in Afghanistan, this period was marked by the wave of popular uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East that came to be known as the “Arab Spring.” Although heralded by some as the ushering in of liberal democracy in the Arab world, the General and others such as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates were wary about the consequences of the uprising … Democracy was not preordained to emerge from what was unfolding, I didn’t have a crystal ball but a quick glance at history reminded me that every society has its own carrying capacity for making change. I was concerned that if traditional Arab societies proved unable to assimilate sudden political change, something worse would erupt.

Throughout this dynamic time, the General travelled constantly throughout the region employing three lines of effort:

First, I reassured our traditional friends that we stood with them in defending their security against the terrorist threat. Second, I made it clear that we would not tolerate Iranian incursion violating their territorial integrity. Third, I reinforced our ambassadors’ efforts and encouraged regional leaders to be responsive to and inclusive of all their people. I saw this all as buying time for them to make reforms aligned with their societies’ carrying capacity.

The book further illustrates this point regarding “carrying capacity” for change by drawing the stark contrasts between Egypt and Syria:

To see what might have happened had the Egyptian military not acquiesced to the will of millions of Egyptians in the streets, we need only look to Syria.

Here again, the theme of strategic incoherence at the national level plays out through the period of “red lines” and inaction. The horrific civil war in Syria continues to destabilize the region and “America lives today with the consequences of emboldened adversaries and shaken allies.”

General Mattis took command of CENTCOM with two threats in mind: “stateless Sunni Islamist terrorists, and the revolutionary Shiite regime in Iran. By the end of Strategic Leadership, it was the situation with Iran that eroded the General’s trust and “traction” within the Obama administration. In December 2012, the General departed CENTCOM “a region aflame and in disarray. The lack of integrated regional strategy had left us adrift and our friends confused. We were offering no leadership or direction.”

The book closes with a section titled, “Reflections.” This section is close to a tutorial on national defense and military science. The first part, “Lethality as a Metric,” is based on a deep understanding of the unchanging nature of war and the General’s years of experience leading forces in combat:

The need for lethality must be the measuring stick against which we evaluate the efficacy of our military. By aligning the entire military enterprise
… to the goal of compounding lethali-
ity, we best deter adversaries, or … win
at the lowest cost to our troops’ lives.

Reflections’ second part is “The Art
of Leading,” which, as the title sug-
gests, provides a first person descrip-
tion of the General’s personal leader-
ship and how he drew upon the Ma-
rine Corps way of war in his own au-
thentic warfighting style. This section
expands upon two recurring themes
from throughout the book. First, is the
gratitude for the Vietnam veteran Ma-
rines who trained and mentored the
General in his formative years in the
Service. This debt is expressed repeat-
edly in the book and is best stated here:

I had been shaped and sharpened by
the rough whetstone of those veterans,
mentored by sergeants and captains
who had slogged through rice paddies
and jungles fighting a tough enemy
every foot of the way.

The second theme is, of course, the
importance of reading history and
“studying one’s craft.” His advice here
is clear, if aspirational, for many: “If
you haven’t read hundreds of books,
learning from others who went before
you, you are functionally illiterate—
you can’t coach, and you can’t lead.”

The final part of “Reflections” and
the last paragraphs of the book is “The
Need for Allies.” Perhaps added here,
for those readers who “skip to the
end,” these paragraphs are the closest
to discussing the General’s service as
the Secretary of Defense. The advice
here is broad and addressed to those
who make national policy: “History is
compelling. Nations with allies thrive
and those without wither.”

Call Sign Chaos is an important
addition to any professional military
reading list. Each section of the book
will resonate more with different read-
ers based on their own level of lead-
ership and years of service. In this
manner, the book is crafted to add
as much value for sergeants and cap-
tains and it does for colonels, senior S-
NCOs, and generals as well as elected
and appointed policy makers. Credit
must also go to co-author “Bing” West
and editor Will Murphy. This writ-
ting team has produced a thoroughly
useful handbook for leaders housed
inside an engaging and uniquely au-
thentic memoir.

---

Notes
Mifflin Harcourt, 1996).
2. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Man Who Couldn’t
Take It Anymore,” The Atlantic, (Online: Oc-
com.
The Pentagon’s Wars
reviewed by Greg McCarthy

The Pentagon’s Wars: The Military’s Undeclared War against America’s Presidents wrestles with the unsatisfying strategic environment that characterizes the post-Cold War era. The author, Mark Perry, argues that—with the exception of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Colin Powell, USA—the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) failed to provide forceful, candid advice to senior civilian leaders in the first year of the Clinton Administration, primarily on the subject of “don’t ask, don’t tell.” The book contains ten chapters, each discussing key leaders and controversies chronologically, covering 1985 to 2015. The book begins with ADM William J. Crowe and ends with GEN Martin Dempsey. The Powell Doctrine, nation building, and “leading from behind” are all aspects examined within the central argument. Most of the controversies and personalities will be familiar to Gazette readers.

Perry describes his prodigious research of more than 80 interviews with 50-plus principals spread over two years. He relies on numerous anonymous sources, Bob Woodward-style, despite the limitations this method imposes. He cites what appears to be one senior Marine repeatedly as an authority on various inner workings. Views of various personalities echo conventional wisdom: GEN Wes Clark, USA, was greatly disliked; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did little right; GEN Tommy Franks, USA, was a poor commander; and Gen Richard Myers, USAF, was weak. The author has favorites: ADM Crowe as well as Army generals Hugh Shelton, John Shalikashvili, Eric Shinseki, and Dempsey. LtGen Paul Van Riper, USMC(Ret), is the only Marine who gets the author’s unqualified favor because he creatively upended a pre-Iraq war exercise before being sidelined.

Otherwise, Marines are not spared from his indictment, receiving mostly unflattering assessments. Marine generals Carl Mundy and Peter Pace are scored for resisting homosexuals in the military and malfeasance in Iraq, respectively. Even Gen James N. Mattis is subject to some grumbling, notably for his mid-battle relief of a regimental commander in 2003. These idiosyncratic indictments vary in strength and depend on one’s acceptance of the author’s assumptions.

Perry remains incredulous regarding how the widely publicized General’s Revolt of 2006 (when retired flag officers harshly criticized the Iraq War and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld) barely made a dent in JCS deliberations or options presented to national leaders. He retells the familiar story of the stalemated Iraq War before the surge in early 2007. He finds that one task force came away evenly divided with three possible approaches: withdraw, surge, or enhance locals. To his credit, the author explores how Marine units contributed to what became the Anbar Awakening as early as 2005. A footnote admits the Marine narrative is challenged by the Army.

GEN Jack Keane, former Army Vice Chief of Staff, emerges as an original thinker in retirement, correctly concluding the Army had the manpower to support the surge and the situation required it. Against the objections of Army Chief of Staff, GEN Peter Schoomaker, and Iraq commander GEN George Casey, the author calls Keane’s success a “coup.” Perry also highlights the role of former Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA), a Marine Vietnam veteran and member of the Iraq Study Group. The group recommended a virtual withdrawal, but through his own initiative, tenacity and research (deviating from group briefs and insisting to go to the theater), Robb adamantly dissented.
The author makes numerous provocative brief statements. He speculates that President George H.W. Bush’s refusal to support the Shia uprising in the immediate aftermath of DESERT STORM in 1991 may be the pivotal event of our entire Middle East involvement, as it required a continued presence and interest. He also overstates the success of post-2011 Afghanistan. He similarly mentions in passing that Gen Ulysses Grant is the best battlefield commander in American history.

The author rightly notes that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 greatly strengthened an ambitious Chairman (Powell), but it is hard to see how “war” is regularly waged against presidents of the United States. President William J. Clinton ultimately got his Balkan deployments, President George W. Bush had his Iraq war, and President Obama obtained his Iraq withdrawal. If anything, the author seems to wish the JCS had waged more war. Yet, it is unclear what path not taken would have greatly improved matters. A more robust series of options for presidential decision making should have been presented perhaps, but imperfection and misjudgments plagued all parties. What is expected of flag officers? To what extent do military leaders bear blame for setbacks and shortcomings of the last generation? These questions remain.

Perry has produced a controversial and interesting book. He adds additional detail and background to recent controversies and tells a sad tale of strategic drift. His conclusions are unclear if not unconvincing.

**For Further Reading**

*Life after the Prophet* is a book about the controversial history of the Arab World and Islam after Prophet Muhammad’s death. Muhammad’s unwillingness to designate an heir to his position as leader of the Islamic World prompted generations of conflict over who had the rightful claim as the subsequent leader of the faith. This conflict is what divided the once unified Muslim people into the two major sects: Sunni and Shi’a.

Before becoming a prophet, Muhammad was nothing more than a common laborer and merchant in the tribal city of Mecca. This all changed when Muhammad received revelations delivered by angel Gabriel. These revelations inspired Muhammad to spread God’s word, and he built a small group of devoted followers. The ruling tribe of Mecca, the Ahmaysads, saw this as a threat and attempted to murder him. However, their attempt failed, allowing Muhammad to escape into the night.

After years of struggle and conflict, Muhammad was successful in uniting the Arab World through Islam. Islam rid the region of the existing form of tribalism and aspired to make everyone equal. While a great thing at the time, this all changed upon his death. Muhammad never designated an heir to his throne and left the choice to the Islamic community. This is where all the turmoil began as some believed his successor should be through the bloodline, whereas others believed that successors should be elected; eventually, those supporting a bloodline succession became known as Shiites and those in favor of elections became Sunnis.

The issue of succession is the principle difference between the Sunni and the Shia and is the catalyst for the division in Islam. This division destroyed the great Arab nation and was the beginning of major conflicts that continue into the present day. The consequences of the division resulted in an innumerable amount of deaths starting in the Battle of Karbala and continuing to the modern day terrorist attacks by the Islamic State.

This novel demonstrates how deeply rooted today’s modern conflicts are. They are more than just random groups of extremists or random acts of violence against other Muslims; rather, they are fueled by deep beliefs that have been present for thousands of years. It is important for modern Americans to understand this history as the United States gets increasingly involved with conflicts in the Middle East.

With our recent intervention in Syria battling the Islamic State, Islam remains a hot topic of conversation as Americans debate whether or not we should be involved. We need to understand this conflict goes back thousands of years and is unlike any previous wars. The beliefs held by these Middle Eastern people are deeply rooted and they profoundly influence their perspective and opinions. These beliefs affect us both overseas and at home. The United States, being a multicultural melting pot, is full of different people and religions. It is naive to assume these views did not come over with the people who immigrated here. Therefore, we need to comprehend these differences to further understand the world in which we live.
Editorial Policy and Writers’ Guidelines

Our basic policy is to fulfill the stated purpose of the Marine Corps Gazette by providing a forum for open discussion and a free exchange of ideas relating to the U.S. Marine Corps and military and national defense issues, particularly as they affect the Corps.

The Board of Governors of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation has given the authority to approve manuscripts for publication to the editor and the Editorial Advisory Panel. Editorial Advisory Panel members are listed on the Gazette’s masthead in each issue. The panel, which normally meets as required, represents a cross section of Marines by professional interest, experience, age, rank, and gender. The panel judges all writing contests. A simple majority rules in its decisions. Material submitted for publication is accepted or rejected based on the assessment of the editor. The Gazette welcomes material in the following categories:

• Commentary on Published Material: The best commentary can be made at the end of the article on the online version of the Gazette at https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette. Comments can also normally appear as letters (see below) 3 months after published material. BE BRIEF.

• Letters: Limit to 300 words or less and DOUBLE SPACE. Email submissions to gazette@mca-marines.org are preferred. As in most magazines, letters to the editor are an important clue as to how well or poorly ideas are being received. Letters are an excellent way to correct factual mistakes, reinforce ideas, outline opposing points of view, identify problems, and suggest factors or important considerations that have been overlooked in previous Gazette articles. The best letters are sharply focused on one or two specific points.

• Feature Articles: Normally 2,000 to 5,000 words, dealing with topics of major significance. Manuscripts should be DOUBLE SPACED. Ideas must be backed up by hard facts. Evidence must be presented to support logical conclusions. In the case of articles that criticize, constructive suggestions are sought. Footnotes are not required except for direct quotations, but a list of any source materials used is helpful. Use the Chicago Manual of Style for all citations.

• Ideas & Issues: Short articles, normally 750 to 1,500 words. This section can include the full gamut of professional topics so long as treatment of the subject is brief and concise. Again, DOUBLE SPACE all manuscripts.

• Book Reviews: Prefer 300 to 750 words and DOUBLE SPACED. Book reviews should answer the question: “This book is worth a Marine’s time to read because…” Please be sure to include the book’s author, publisher (including city), year of publication, number of pages, and the cost of the book.

Timeline: We aim to respond to your submission within 45 days; please do not query until that time has passed. If your submission is accepted for publication, please keep in mind that we schedule our line-up four to six months in advance, that we align our subject matter to specific monthly themes, and that we have limited space available. Therefore, it is not possible to provide a specific date of publication. However, we will do our best to publish your article as soon as possible, and the Senior Editor will contact you once your article is slated. If you prefer to have your article published online, please let us know upon its acceptance.

Writing Tips: The best advice is to write the way you speak, and then have someone else read your first draft for clarity. Write to a broad audience: Gazette readers are active and veteran Marines of all ranks and friends of the Corps. Start with a thesis statement, and else read your first draft for clarity. Write to a broad audience: Gazette readers are active and veteran Marines of all ranks and friends of the Corps. Start with a thesis statement, and avoid abbreviations and acronyms as much as possible.

Submissions: Authors are encouraged to email articles to gazette@mca-marines.org. Save in Microsoft Word format, DOUBLE SPACED, Times New Roman font, 12 point, and send as an attachment. Photographs and illustrations must be in high resolution TIFF, JPG, or EPS format (300dpi) and not embedded in the Word Document. Please attach photos and illustrations separately. (You may indicate in the text of the article where the illustrations are to be placed.) Include the author’s full name, mailing address, telephone number, and email addresses—both military and commercial if available. Submissions may also be sent via regular mail. Include your article saved on a CD along with a printed copy. Mail to: Marine Corps Gazette, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Please follow the same instructions for format, photographs, and contact information as above when submitting by mail. Any queries may be directed to the editorial staff by calling 800–336–0291, ext. 180.
THANK YOU, VETERANS

For 97 years, USAA has been honored to serve you, the millions of men and women who answered the call for our nation.

On Veterans Day — and every day — we thank you for your service.
WHEN SLOW AND STEADY ISN’T AN OPTION.

OSHKOSH DEFENSE® JLTV

BUILT LIGHT. BUILT RIGHT.
Never-before-achieved speed, power and protected mobility to maneuver within combat formations.