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C. N. Barclay

*Brigadier Barclay saw service in France and Mesopotamia (WWI) and, in 1919, in the Third Afghan War in India. He commanded a battalion at Dunkirk in WWII, later was a brigade commander in France. Since 1950 he has been editor of The Army Quarterly, and assistant editor of Brassey's Annual. He has written several histories (British Army units) and also these books: "The New Warfare," "Against Great Odds"; "Part-time Farmer."*



George Fielding Eliot

*Mr. Eliot has spent a lifetime in the study of war, weapons, and the works of great military authors. More, he is able to convey his convictions in simple language. He has lectured at US Naval War College, the Army's Command and General Staff College; and has appeared in Life, Look, Military Review and, of course, GAZETTE ("Polaris and the North Plank": Dec '60). He is the author of "Victory Without War—1958-61."*



BGen  
Samuel B. Griffith

*Gen Griffith, with 27 years active Marine Corps duty (he retired in 1956) holds a Ph.D. in Chinese History from Oxford University. He translated Mao Tse-tung's treatise on guerrilla warfare which GAZETTE published in 1941; also Sun Tzu's "Art of War" published in 1962. His most recent book is "Battle for Guadalcanal," one in a series of Lippincott's Famous Battles in History.*

*Since this Forum last examined the difficult and controversial question of war trends in May 1962, the situation has moved beyond such terms as the cold war or hot war or the war of ideas or of minds. It is each of these, and and more. It is definitely the new war.*

**T**HE new war is characterized by change, by explosive events tumbling pell-mell on one another with such force and such rapidity that a dozen crystal balls would be needed to answer the multitudinous questions of a single day. Politics, economics, military force—each flows into the other by the singularly insular veins that comprise the corpus of modern humanity.

The political and economic, the strategic and tactical problems of Western Europe bear slight resemblance to those of Southeast Asia or Africa. Many of the problems familiar to NATO are foreign to CENTO and SEATO. International

*Brigadier C. N. Barclay*

*George Fielding Eliot*

*BGen Samuel B. Griffith*

*Professor Michael Howard*

*BGen S. L. A. Marshall*

*Professor Peter Paret*

The  
John A. Lejeune **FORUM**

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**THE  
NEW WAR**





Professor  
Michael Howard, M.C.

*Professor Howard was with the famed Coldstream Guards in Italy and North Africa during WWI. Since 1947 he has taught history and military affairs at*

*University of London. He is the author of many articles and books including "Disengagement in Europe and The Franco-Prussian War: 1870-71" published in 1961. He is also a founder of the Institute for Strategic Studies.*



BGen  
S. L. A. Marshall

*Gen Marshall is probably the best known military author of modern war histories. In 1961 he had three books published: "Battle at Best"; "The Military History of the Korean War"; and American Heritage "History of World War I" (see Books: Dec '61). This year he begins work on a wholly new "Men Against Fire" about which he says:*

*"I have been to four or five wars since the first work and I have much more data to draw from."*



Professor  
Peter Paret

*Professor Paret served in combat intelligence in WWII with 1st Inf Regt, and saw action in New Guinea and Luzon. After graduating from the University of*

*California he took his Ph.D. at University of London. He authored "Guerrillas in the 1960s" (with John Shy) and the recently published "French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria." He teaches at the University of California.*

Communism is heading in one dialectical direction in Europe, another in Asia, another in Africa. A single change in a Middle East government may in a moment upset the careful, complicated diplomacy of a several year effort by the Kremlin or Whitehall or the State Department. And yet, such is the nature of destructive atomic power, that a diversified problem peculiar to a diversified land may quickly enmesh the world in nuclear warfare.

That some of the great powers respect this danger is evident from the disarmament conference which for several years has been variously in session in Geneva. Judged hopeless by many observers, it nonetheless produced an interesting and perhaps vital breakthrough in 1963 in the form of the test-ban treaty. A number of well-informed commentators have read into this a genuine desire for partial disarmament on the part of Russia and the West. Subsequent events have suggested that it may prove the beginning of a series of mutual accommodations which could materially reduce the danger of an atomic war—at least as long as America and Russia hold the ascendancy in weapons and the means to deliver them.

These, then, are all factors in the unparalleled challenge that the new war offers to the old world. To examine something of its nature is the purpose of this month's Forum. Accordingly, we ask the experts:

1. *Has the new war changed or is it likely to change America's present international aims?*

**By Brigadier C. N. Barclay**

Let me first try to define America's basic international aims in order of priority:

a) *The preservation of world peace.* At present by means of the nuclear deterrent; in the distant future through disarmament, or arms control.

b) *The containment of Communism.* America does this in Europe by means of her major contribution to NATO; in Southeast Asia by widespread deployment of her military and economic forces; in the Americas by her paternal interest in the smaller countries and by her willingness to invoke the Monroe Doctrine—if necessary backed by force as in Cuba.

c) *The preservation of stable conditions in the uncommitted countries.* This is attempted mostly through economic aid, advice and technical assistance.

Of these aims the first is overwhelmingly the most important, and in implementing it the US herself is very much the predominant Western

partner. The implementation of b) is shared with her Allies—Britain in particular—and c) with her Allies and the United Nations Organization.

The state of world affairs that you term “the new war” will not so much change these present aims, in my opinion, as it will change Allied and American efforts to attain them.


### By Professor Peter Paret

Does the term “the new war” really suit the present? Or is it rather an expression of frustration because the great crises of the past years haven’t led to more satisfactory settlements? Certainly we are going through trying times; in many ways they are more complex than was the situation of the late fifties. For one thing, the opposing camps have become more obviously fragmented. The Communist countries no longer form a united front, neither do the Democracies—though the conflict between the two ideologies continues, and cuts across and complicates the political fragmentation. Besides, there are grave problems that have nothing to do with either democratic or communist beliefs, even though the Western and Communist powers certainly try to influence and exploit them—think of the Indonesian threat to Malaysia, for instance.

In this present bewildering environment, America’s overall international aim has not changed in the past two years, but its basic terms have become clearer: to achieve relative stability in a world that is no longer dominated or even potentially dominated by one or two major powers. Economic and military force as well as political action must play a part, but the aim is essentially political—and this is true no less in an immediately pressing crisis than in the long term. In the foreseeable future America’s aim emphatically cannot be the destruction of Communist regimes throughout the world, nor can it strive to replace military dictatorships by liberal regimes, say in South America. In most parts of the world today democracy is a revolutionary ideology; but the United States is not a revolutionary country. By and large we are committed to maintaining the political status quo, and we naturally support regimes in power even if they may offend our democratic ideals. In what is essentially a contest of political—not ideological—interests, this country should continue to be sufficiently flexible to support foreign governments and systems of all kinds—including, where necessary, the left as well as the right.

### By Professor Michael Howard

I can not accept the description of the existing international situation as “the new war.” There may be conflicts between nations which fall short of violence: indeed there usually are. In the bi-



polar world of the past fifteen years these struggles have been waged with an intensity and concentration which has earned them the name of “the cold war.” But with the stabilization of the military balance, the continued development of the communist world as national and domestic interests have adulterated ideological ambitions, and the emergence of a third world to whose problems the nostrums neither of communism nor of liberal democracy provide any ready answer, the world has returned to a very much more normal condition of multiple tensions balancing one another: a state once optimistically described by the British statesman, George Canning, as “every nation for itself again and God for us all.” There is today a condition of international anarchy which is unpleasant and dangerous; but it is not war.

In such a world it is evident even to a foreigner that America’s first objective must be the protection of the way of life of her own people. This does not mean a policy of isolation. No nation, as no man, is an island entire of itself. The well-being of the American people must ultimately depend on the international community in which they live, and on the extent to which they can influence the nature of that community. But that influence can only operate within very narrow limits among other powers whose outlook and aspirations are bound to be, in every sense, foreign. Of course the Americans must make constant compromises. They have got to get along with governments dominated not only by military juntas but even by communists. They must accept that in most countries of the world the notion of “democratic rule” is either meaningless or means something entirely different to anything so understood in the United States. More than this, they must understand that the American pattern is probably a quite unrealistic one to which to expect other nations to aim. They can hope for friendly relations with other nations only if they respect differences in national tradition and practice, and appreciate the difficulty, and the unwisdom, of changing these from outside.

Thus America’s aims must always be political ones. They will embrace military and economic factors and use military and economic tools. It is perhaps open to question whether, in the formulation and execution of those aims, the Department of State at present enjoys the preponderance of influence which it should. One good ambassador may do more for American interests

than millions of dollars spent on economic or military aid.

### By BGen Samuel B. Griffith

The term, "the new war," unfortunately does not suitably convey either the complexity or the essentially dynamic quality of the existing international situation. One may, perhaps, more accurately describe our era as that of "permanent revolution" in which "the ever whirling wheel of change" spins from day to day with a constantly fluctuating and unpredictable velocity.

If America is to achieve such basic and valid aims as world peace and relative world stability, those at her controls must not attempt to stop the ineluctable motion of this "wheel," which would produce a shattering catastrophe, but to control its speed of rotation. This cannot be accomplished by the thoughtless expedient of jamming a crowbar between the spokes. In my opinion intelligent accommodation—if you wish, call it negotiation backed by unmistakable force—is our only real answer.

2. *Is our present overall military strategy in consonance with these aims?*

### By Professor Peter Paret

Our present overall military strategy appears to be in accord with our basic aim. Its purpose is understood to be the attainment of as favorable a basis for political action as possible.

It is, however, handicapped by some unsolved problems, the most serious of which concerns the nature of our relations with Western Europe.

Politically and militarily Europe no longer is what it was ten years ago; we recognize the fact, but our plans and policies have not yet come to terms with it. For example, the administration has been urging our allies to fulfill their NATO commitments; in the past two years, however, there has been pressure for a buildup in European conventional strength that would exceed the NATO goals. This new aim was most clearly voiced in Mr. McNamara's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 30 January 1963, in which he expressed the hope that eventually it would be possible to defend Europe with conventional forces even against an all-out non-nuclear Soviet attack. More recently, in his talk to the Economic Club of New York, the Secretary of Defense admitted that Soviet aggression on such a scale "would mean a war about the future of Europe and, as a consequence, the future of the US and the USSR. In the face of threats of that magnitude, our nuclear superiority remains highly relevant to deterrence." But he went on to say that "neither we nor our Allies can find

the detonation of (nuclear) weapons—and their inevitable bilateral exchange—an easy first choice. At the lower end of the spectrum, therefore, we also need a strong and ready conventional force."

Certainly the strengthening of our conventional posture in Europe is desirable; but this new aim appears militarily and economically unrealistic, as well as politically dangerous. There are a number of obvious arguments against the possibility of two large non-nuclear forces fighting in Europe—Mr. McNamara himself alluded to the likelihood of escalation. A sizable conventional buildup would certainly provoke and possibly frighten the Russians who, of course, could increase their conventional forces far more easily than can NATO.

Nor are the Europeans persuaded by our shift in strategic thinking. Its economic and political costs would be high: in France they would render further progress on the independent deterrent extremely difficult, and Europe in general would certainly become more dependent on American leadership. Perhaps such dependence is not undesirable from our point of view, but it is out of step with the growing strength of Europe, and her increasing desire for a more meaningful partnership—one in which ultimate responsibilities are more truly shared.

In forging a non-nuclear "sword" to be wielded under the shield of nuclear deterrence, the competence of the military professionals is not open to serious challenge. Thanks to their competence and dedication, we enjoy truly enormous advantages over our Communist opponents in the global use of non-nuclear military power—advantages which are proportionately much greater than the superiority we have developed in nuclear force. Geographically, we and our friends are ideally located to maintain control of the sea and the above-sea air space. We have the best-developed amphibious striking forces in the world. We have both sea-based and shore-based air forces of great range and versatility; our attack carrier forces are the world's only true sea-control weapons systems. We have a versatile and well-equipped army. Our sealift and airlift capabilities have a global radius of action.

Even more important, all our rather extensive experience of warfare in this century has had to do with the projection of power outward from our continental base in North America across and over its flanking oceans, including the seizure of advance bases and more recently the increased use of floating bases, and the associated logistic requirements. The USSR and Red China have had no comparable experience in long-range warfare, if we except the clandestine Soviet build-up in Cuba which has not been an unequivocal success.

What we require now is not so much more power, or more kinds of non-nuclear weapons,

but rather the acceptance of a basic concept of how to use mobile non-nuclear power most effectively as an instrument of policy. Most Americans have no realization of our advantages in this respect. Also, we still suffer from a worrisome anxiety lest any use of force should "escalate" into all-out nuclear warfare. No merely military advantages will be of service to us unless they are understood, accepted and put to use by our political leadership, in an atmosphere of public approval.

Here the nature of our global mobile forces should be kept in mind.

Mobility, in the military sense, is not mere motion, but purposeful motion which permits arrival in time to accomplish a military purpose before effective counter-action can be taken by the opponent. We need a concept which thinks in terms of timely accomplishment, not in terms, for example, of helping somebody else to fight a long-drawn-out wearisome counter-guerrilla campaign on a piecemeal basis. That is exactly the type of military operation to which the Communists would like us to confine our attention. Why not? They are better at the semi-political forms of conflict than we are. Our application of power in counter-guerrilla operations might be better directed toward cutting off sources of outside support to the guerrillas, and *thereafter* providing such help as may be needed to friendly indigenous forces, in the systematic destruction of the guerrilla force. These things we are equipped to do. We can do them better and more thoroughly if we take early decisions and act on them promptly, rather than hesitate and hope the bad trouble will fold up and go away. And we should use all our elements of technical superiority—not, for instance, shying away from the application of psycho-chemical agents because somebody will raise the cry of "poison gas." Better a victory gained with a minimum of bloodshed and no heritage of enduring hatred.

Let's keep in mind that doing what the enemy least wants you to do is a good idea—if you can find out what that is. Right now we have plenty of evidence that what the Communists least want is effective and timely US armed intervention at global trouble spots where they are seeking, in the words of one of our most talented diplomats, "to disrupt and destroy and seek profit amidst the ruins." The frantic reactions of their propaganda networks whenever we show any sign of such action are obvious. The Soviets have derived a good deal of what might be called reverse-action deterrence simply from the widespread notion among Americans and other free peoples that *any* use of force may bring on nuclear war. That the Soviets have no intention of inviting nuclear destruction of all that they have built in Russia since 1917 for the sake of Zanzibar or Indonesia—or Comrade Fidel for that matter—is be-



side the point as long as *we* are restrained by these worries. As for the Red Chinese, this very Soviet hesitance to use Soviet "nukes" to reply to local US military actions is one of the principal causes of the current "split": the Chinese call this attitude a cowardly betrayal of the revolution.

A soundly based strategy for applying non-nuclear military power as an instrument of US policy is not too difficult to formulate, considering the advantages which are ours on a silver platter. The real difficulty will be to gain popular understanding and acceptance, and political implementation.

In this process and considering our type of government, the limitations of the military professions are obvious. But if more thought is devoted to the problem, one helpful result might be increased readiness when the next emergency comes along.

#### By Professor Michael Howard

The sophistication of the international scene has created problems for those military thinkers who based their plans on the assumption that they had to prepare only for one kind of war against one foreordained adversary. Yet the dangerous inadequacy of such an idea has been apparent for a very long time—at least since the disastrous Schlieffen Plan of 1914.

As international affairs become more complex, it grows all the more important to have a flexible military instrument to meet all eventualities. The prime need is for forces attuned to the desired political objective; but it must also be borne in mind that the political objectives which can be attained by force are few, and may get fewer.

Counter-insurgency operations are a case in point. The vast apparatus at present being devoted to them fills me with alarm. Guerrilla wars are battles for the hearts and minds of a people. The British experience has shown, over more than a century, that a small number of political officers who know and love the country to which they are accredited and who can operate inconspicuously within it will always achieve more than the most massive overt military support. It is more important to discover and train such men and trust them with a wide measure of discretion than to establish a cumbersome civil-military agency for the same purpose. The more

American officers can live abroad, learning not only the languages but the minds of their neighbors, the greater their effectiveness will be.

American strategy *vis-à-vis* her Allies also presents complex problems, but I believe that at present people are worrying about them far too much. The British and French determination to maintain independent nuclear forces springs from psychological and political causes too deep to be touched by any elaborate "command and control" structures. They do not affect the credibility of the Western deterrent so long as American troops remain in Europe; and if American troops were ever to leave Europe they would have considerable significance. The Chinese question is another example: why should French recognition of Communist China cause any more trouble than did British recognition fifteen years ago? Many Europeans today believe that it is the American attitude towards China which presents the greatest problem, not the French.

It is in any case by no means impossible that during the next decade the political evolution of Eastern Europe, including Eastern Germany, may change the entire Central European situation so radically that the military structure of the whole Western alliance will have to be very thoroughly reconsidered. NATO was created to meet a particular problem, which may be ultimately resolved by political means. There is nothing sacred or immutable about it. It may in fact prove considerably easier to make NATO unnecessary than it will be to make it effective.

#### By BGen S. L. A. Marshall

From my perspective, the main task vital to American security in the years immediately ahead is the preservation in strength of the Atlantic alliance. NATO is the linchpin of our whole endeavor to hold the line for peace by preserving free world unity amid the illusions of detente, the plague of little wars which will continue to spread because of upstart opportunism, and the resurgence of an anti-military spirit in our own midst.

This side of the Iron Curtain, the main threat to the future of NATO does not reside in the indifference of our European partners, or in the unilateral excursions taken by President de Gaulle, but in our own contractions. I refer first to the dismantlement of the American LOC through France and the wiping out of the 15 000-man DP service corps, requisite to rear area operations in West Germany. These false economies deny credibility to the fighting posture of US 7th Army to the dismay of our allies, as to the certification of de Gaulle's doubts.

I refer second to the wishful thought variously circulated that nuclear armament, and the al-

leged stalemating thereof, has out-moded all defensive alliances. One might as well suggest that it has made every rifleman obsolete. But when such an idea is put forward by such a respected thinker as Walter Lippman, who also sees the whole of Europe verging into a happy family reunion, millions read and believe as with any vision of utopia.

Heavy-handed cutbacks in our spending for defense are to be anticipated in the period ahead. No government may justify maintaining military costs upward when by its own reading the immediate armed threat to the national security is subsiding. Moreover, a current in public opinion, unreasonably adverse to the military as a profession, and hence to large spending for armaments, is being generated through an increasingly popular and grotesque caricaturing of high command in books and movies. But if cut we must, better that the loss be taken in the strategic reserve of the interior than that NATO forces be further de-vitalized. Nowhere else but in our European commitment do we risk losing all around, while the strategic justification for the maintaining of two divisions more or less in the ready forces on this continent remains obscure.

Throughout the summer, the logic of the problem in Southeast Asia favored a limited, but direct, commitment of US forces to fight Communist guerrillas in South Viet-Nam, not to go adventuring against the enemy in the north, but to clear lines of communication and help secure home base, thereby restoring confidence to the Viet-Nam Army. But it could not be done, no less because it was politically unthinkable in an election year, than because of the "never again" planners in the Pentagon who still gloom about Korea and eschew any involvement which even faintly resembles that one.

While I am by no means sure that we, any more than the French, possess the patience and the craft to fight successful counter-insurgency wars, and while I doubt that the tactical patterns which we have sponsored in tutoring the Viet Nam Army are the most suitable (since they do not capitalize that Army's three great advantages, superior firepower, numbers and defensive protection), it seems reasonably clear that on present lines we cannot win. In Southeast Asia we should either risk much more, or we should prepare to lose all.

Now, as in 1917, our international aim is to make the world "safe for democracy," which means resisting the advance of the one opposing concept which challenges its right to survive, where so doing lies within the limits of our power. That is precisely what took us to Korea where, if we did not win, we at least stayed the advance. There was no other argument for the decision to build up the training mission in South Viet-Nam. But when we did that, we also staked

our prestige in Asia and our military credit on the outcome, thereby blocking the possibility of retreating with grace.

All that has since happened affords footing for greater boldness. We have come to better speaking terms with the Soviets, who in turn manifest deepening estrangement with their former partner, Red China. The bona fides of this seeming shift must be put to test sooner or later, or they will never be entitled to partial trust. Arms supply from Russia to Red China having been cut off since 1959, we need to know whether the restraints on both, military and political, are seeming or real. Last, we are told again and again that irregular warfare will be the Communist manner of advance in the future and that we must adapt to it to beat it down. It is not enough to set ourselves up as mentors of that which we have never experienced. Like Rifleman Dodd, we must do it.

### 3. *What has been the effect of the Geneva disarmament conference on America's overall strategy?*

**By Brigadier C. N. Barclay**


The Test Ban Treaty, which came into force in August, 1963, is in my opinion the only result of the Geneva conference of any significance.

This treaty directly influences the continuing development of nuclear weapons systems, and may thus have a modifying, although not a basic, influence on American overall strategy. Russian nuclear policy, however, for some years has been concentrating on "big bangs" of the 100 megaton variety, whereas America has been working more on smaller yield weapons. As these are more easily tested underground—which is still permitted by the treaty—it would seem that in technical development the treaty favors America. In any case if the US considers it essential to carry out further tests in the atmosphere she has only to give three months notice of her intentions—as provided in the treaty.

It appears to me that nuclear parity has produced a tacit "understanding" among the two big nuclear powers. This has decreased the likelihood of a nuclear war in the *near* future and, therefore, nuclear disarmament is no longer considered a matter of great urgency, although the Test Ban Treaty is useful in reducing the expenditure for both sides. I doubt if nuclear disarmament will be taken as seriously as it should be until some smaller and less responsible nations come into possession of nuclear weapons.

**By BGen Samuel B. Griffith**

The value of the Geneva disarmament conference, whose concrete production to date is the



Test Ban Treaty, lies in its indirect influence on our overall strategy.

The treaty was agreed to and ratified by the Soviet Union and the United States primarily because each believed that a parity position had been reached in respect to nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

This situation of "stand-off" will probably exist until it is upset by the development of accurate anti-missiles by one power or the other. In the meantime, each will attempt to refine its nuclear systems in the interests of greater security, accuracy, economy in production of components, and so on.

Again, at the next lower, or sub-nuclear level, the atomic-conventional forces at the disposal of the Soviet bloc and the western (NATO) nations appear to be in a state of relative equilibrium. In the Pacific, the deployment of US air and balanced amphibious striking forces combines with proven air-lift capacity to inhibit adventurist gestures of a conventional nature by the Chinese Communists.

Unfortunately the Chinese have embarked on military adventures of an *unconventional* nature which we have to date found difficult to counter. The Test Ban Treaty, however, by tacitly admitting nuclear parity, has caused us to begin changing our strategic and tactical profiles to meet this very real, very determined threat.

**By Professor Michael Howard**

It must be admitted that the disarmament conference at Geneva has not so far had any noticeable influence on the strategic posture of either West or East. Indeed the attempt simultaneously to maintain their military security and to negotiate effective disarmament has landed both sides in embarrassing contradictions.

If disarmament could ever be achieved either without upsetting the security which both the Soviet Union and the United States gain from the existing balance of military power, or by providing an alternative world security system, I believe that both powers would welcome it. To that extent they are sincere in their negotiations. But so far the quest seems as vain as that for the philosopher's stone, and in a multipolar world it is unlikely to grow any easier. Agreement on military stabilization is as much as we seem likely to obtain. But that is not something to be lightly dismissed.



*4. Are America's armed forces properly organized, equipped and trained to carry out the numerous tasks inherent in our global strategy?*

**By Brigadier C. N. Barclay**

From my knowledge of the American forces, I would say they have solved the major problems of organization and training familiar to our complicated day. In particular the US Marine Corps is the only fully integrated force of all services of any consequence in the world. This organization is thus ideal for "brush fire" operations and as a spearhead for operations of the Korean pattern.

In the field of weapons the Americans are experiencing similar difficulties to the British—and no doubt the Russians as well—in maintaining types which are simple, mobile and easy to learn and handle, and at the same time effective under all circumstances. The British have in part solved this problem by having long service personnel, and also a somewhat less sophisticated armory than the Americans. I think there is little doubt that the highly sophisticated strategic weapons systems must be in the hands of highly specialized personnel. Conventional troops need to be armed to the highest scale likely to be required; but with the ability to shed—without dislocating their organization—the heavier weapons, when employed on police or "brush fire" operations against a guerrilla type enemy. The American troops are perhaps on occasion over-equipped for such operations.

I am interested in the recent American emphasis on airlift of troops for I believe it holds big advantages for "brush fire" operations. It is not only far quicker than any other means of transport, but it is the British experience that it has a high moral influence. The sudden arrival of well disciplined, well armed men from out of the sky gives an impression of power and military "know-how" which no other form of entry into an operational theater can provide. It is sometimes forgotten, however, that air-lift must usually be quickly and efficiently supplemented by surface-lift.

**By Professor Peter Paret**

I won't go into organization except to remark that, as in the case of equipment and training, it is mutable and must adapt to changing conditions. One example occurs in counter-insurgency warfare: whether the organization to wage this most effectively should assume a more integrated military-civilian character as some experts hold, or whether one or the other must remain dominant has yet to be worked out satisfactorily. I am not sure a constant solution exists. Yet it does seem that the ramifications of counter-insur-

gency warrant extensive and direct participation of civilian agencies. The civilians involved should of course be trained in the various aspects of internal and revolutionary wars.

As for equipment, it is the business of designers and engineers to improve weapons; but there are times when we can place too much importance on their efforts. For example, whether the M-16 rifle is somewhat more effective in the jungle than the M-14 is of marginal significance—the war in Viet-Nam is not going to be won because our equipment is superior to that of the enemy. Of course we ought to exploit our special technological capabilities; but it is one of the handicaps of belonging to the most highly industrialized society on earth that we too easily slide into the belief that machines can make all the difference.

As someone earning his living from teaching in a university I can hardly argue against more extensive academic education for American officers. Such institutions as the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton and the Defense Language School at Monterey, to name only two, do excellent work in training officers in their respective fields.

Unfortunately there are limits to what formal education can achieve. Even if the professional officer can obtain competent instruction in such disciplines as contemporary history and international relations, the value of such instruction will ultimately hinge on his degree of intellectual flexibility—his willingness to keep an open mind in the changing situation which you call the new war.

Not only the military professional, but—more importantly—American society as a whole, must learn more about the world and this nation's place in it and must be willing to face honestly the sometimes painful realities of the 1960's. For our policies to be creative and effective, the American people must achieve greater political maturity. Senator Fulbright's speech last spring on foreign policy myths and the emotional reaction to it are an indication that we are making progress in this direction and at the same time show what a long way we still have to go.

**By The Editor**

In touching on some of these issues and events, the present Forum surely lends itself to critical examination. Whether one agrees with the term "the new war" (which the experts don't seem to like), it has served its purpose by invoking replies that, sometimes contradictory, sometimes controversial, should cause a discerning reader to examine his own thoughts and pursue them further.

They are momentous, multi-faceted questions that can be discussed with a profit not lessened by the fact that in the end one is discussing his own personal survival.

US & MC