

# DANGER ON THE

By Capt B. H. Liddell Hart



✦ WHEN NATO WAS BORN, IT WAS CONCEIVED PRIMARILY with the idea of covering the west of Europe against a Russian invasion. The main military effort has gone into building up a shield force on what is called the "Central Europe" front. Subsequently, after Greece and Turkey became members in 1952, the second concern became to build up a shield for the southern front and flank of NATO, in the Mediterranean area. By comparison, little attention has been given to NATO's northern flank, although Denmark and Norway have been members since the start. Very little has been done towards creating a shield force in this area.

This northern flank is NATO's weakest spot in Europe—in every sense. It is the weakest in actual forces available for defense, the weakest in strategical vulnerability, and the weakest in organization. Such a combination of glaring weaknesses is enough to make any realist shudder.


It carries a grave danger to the Central Europe front, which could be outflanked in this way. But the southern members of NATO in the Mediterranean would also suffer from the effects of a penetration and collapse of the northern flank. For Denmark and Norway cover the ocean outlets of Soviet Russia's large force of fast and long-range submarines, the major part of which is stationed in the Baltic and Arctic ports.

This does not necessarily mean, as is still commonly assumed by many admirals of the older school, that Russia's submarines would be used for a blockade similar to what was seen in the last two world wars—an "unlimited" sink-at-sight campaign. The very fact that such a blockade would be a vital threat—particularly to Britain, because of her dependence on seaborne supplies for feeding her population—makes it unlikely that Russia's rulers would venture to launch a campaign of this kind unless they were prepared to risk all-out war. For in that event a submarine campaign would be superfluous, since it is inherently a slow way of producing decisive results. But Russia's submarines could be used, in a more subtle way, for a "hindrance" campaign of great nuisance effect—imposing costly precautions and an exhausting strain on NATO sea-traffic, military and mercantile.

The Russian submarine forces in the Baltic are at present strategically restricted. Except by slow passage along internal waterways, they can reach the high seas

# FLANKS OF NATO

Our main NATO effort has gone into the defense of western and southern Europe, but we are weak, says the author, on the exposed flanks leading to control of the Atlantic and Middle East



## With the Baltic uncorked, all the ocean routes to western and southern Europe, even the American coast, could become happy hunting grounds for Russia's far-ranging submarines

only by passing through the very narrow straits (barely four miles wide) between Denmark and Southern Sweden—or between the Danish islands of Zealand and Funen—and then through the still narrow channels of the Kattegat and Skaggeak, between Danish Jutland and Southern Norway. In the course of the passage from the Baltic to the North Sea, they have to traverse 300 miles of restricted waters.

If this bottleneck were to be uncorked, the 90 or more submarines of Russia's Baltic Fleet would be able to get out onto the Atlantic and harass all the ocean routes to Western and Southern Europe. They could operate against any part of these routes, even off the American coast itself, or inside the Mediterranean Sea. For the possible range of action, or surface endurance, of what are now classified as medium range submarines, is from 4,000 to 8,000 miles, while that of the new "W" and "Z" classes is 12,000 miles and more.

The Baltic could be all too easily uncorked. Besides the weakness of the forces covering the Danish outlet, the defensive position there is inherently weak from a strategical point of view. That basic fact was impressed on my mind in 1933 when I visited Denmark just after Hitler came to power, and was consulted by the Danish Commander-in-Chief about the plans for the defense of Denmark against a German attack. After a survey of the strategical problem and the lines of approach, the most that seemed to me possible was a brief delaying action in the Jutland peninsula in the hope of gaining time until allied help arrived. Even that would only be possible if adequate preparations were made. It was palpably impossible to hold Zealand, the main island, where Copenhagen lies. I pointed out how easily the capital could be seized by a surprise coup from

the Baltic by seaborne and airborne forces. The planned defenses appeared so futile that I suggested it would be wiser to remove those which existed, drop their extension, and declare Copenhagen an open city.

The forecast and advice were regarded as unduly pessimistic by ardently patriotic Danes. Moreover, their optimistic view was shared, as late as March 1940, by members of the British Government, who argued that it would be strategically advantageous to take an offensive lead in this quarter, bringing Denmark and Norway into the war. Churchill was the foremost advocate of taking the initiative there and starting such a move. But when the threat provoked Hitler to forestall it, at the beginning of April 1940, the key points of Denmark were captured by surprise within a few hours, and resistance immediately collapsed. The keypoints of Norway were captured almost as quickly. Although part of the disjointed Norwegian forces held out long enough for British and French help to arrive on the scene, the rest of the country was overrun and occupied within a few weeks.

It would hardly be more difficult now for the Russians to repeat Hitler's coup. Only an 80-mile stretch of flat country lies between the Russian mechanized forces poised near Lubeck in Germany and the Southern border of the Jutland peninsula. Moreover, the sea approaches to the Sound, the strait between Zealand and Sweden, are just as accessible to the Russian naval forces as they were to the German in 1940. Russia also has much larger airborne forces than Germany had then. These could be used to seize by surprise both Zealand and Jutland.

For a seaborne attack, like that of the Germans in 1940, the Russian Baltic Fleet has available eight powerful modern cruisers and some 40 destroyers, apart from numerous smaller craft, as well as its 90 submarines. The Western forces for the defense of the bottleneck are much weaker. The Danish Navy consists of only two destroyers, six frigates, and four submarines. Most of this small force is obsolescent. The Norwegian Navy comprises six destroyers, ten frigates, and eight submarines, while the new German Navy will before long have twelve, six and twelve respectively. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these small Navies could effectively intervene in time to meet a sudden seaborne attack on the Danish islands that bar the exit from the Baltic.

Denmark has an army so small that its available forces are barely the equivalent of one division. Even these forces are not in the state of instant readiness for action that is needed to counter a surprise stroke. For such a stroke, Russia has available some ten airborne divisions and sufficient air transport to carry two of them



Norwegian infantrymen—facing a hopeless task

Norway's land forces are no larger than Denmark's—equivalent to one division. They would have little chance of withstanding a Russian airborne pounce upon the south coast of Norway, bordering the Skaggerak outlet from the Baltic. Moreover, that strip, although the most important strategically, is only a small fraction of the immense coastline that Norway has to defend. This line is 1,600 miles long from its junction with Sweden in the Skaggerak to its northern extremity facing Russia's Arctic base in Murmansk. Despite the ruggedness of the country its defense with such small forces would be an almost helpless task against the strength that the Russians could deploy. The seizure of the northern stretch of Norway would ease the way for Russia's submarines to get into the Atlantic from their Arctic bases, while the seizure of ports on the Atlantic coast of Norway would enable them to operate more effectively against the NATO supply routes.

When account is taken of the vulnerability of NATO's northern flank, and the present defenselessness of Denmark and Norway, it is astonishing that so little attention should be given to the risks in this quarter. Complacency about the prospect and the problem is hard to understand.

In the past it has been too readily assumed that any Russian move into Danish or Norwegian territory would automatically produce nuclear retaliation against Russia by the NATO striking forces, and that this counter-threat is sufficient to deter any such move. But with the development of mutual nuclear power, and of long-range missile means of delivery, this becomes very questionable. If the Russians, on some convenient pretext, were to make a sudden pounce to occupy such points, and then immediately offer to negotiate a settlement on the basis of "free passage" rights to warm waters, would the major Western powers actually venture to bring on a suicidal all-out war with nuclear weapons rather than negotiate? No area so easily lends itself to, and invites, this kind of "24-hour pounce" as does the Scandinavian stretch on the northern flank of NATO, especially in its present state of acute weakness.

As Denmark and Norway are so reluctant to have troops from other NATO countries stationed on their

### Red mobility—only 80 miles to Jutland Peninsula

in a single lift. Moreover, her advanced striking force in East German territory comprises 20 mechanized divisions. Part of these divisions could be used for an overland thrust into Jutland, while the rest warded off the intervention of NATO's Northern Army Group—which is numerically weaker, and less fully mechanized.

The difficulty of effective resistance is increased because responsibility for the defense of the Baltic bottleneck is separated from the main "Central Europe" front, although it covers the immediate flank of this front. The responsibility is entrusted, along with that of Norway's far-stretching territory, to "Headquarters, Allied Forces, Northern Europe." But in this high-sounding command the actual forces are tiny compared with those in the other NATO commands. The land forces of Denmark and Norway are under separate sub-commands.

Moreover, effective support in emergency is hindered by the unwillingness of these two countries to allow other NATO forces to be stationed there, or bases established there, before an emergency occurs—in order to avoid provoking Russia. Such reluctance is understandable in the circumstances but it reduces their membership in NATO to the point of absurdity. Unless they are willing to accept the presence of NATO reinforcements, ready in reserve on the spot, it would be more sensible to revert to neutrality in line with Sweden. Their present attitude tends to combine provocation with temptation, which proved a fatal combination in the case of Poland 20 years ago.



**B. H. Liddell Hart** continues his assessment of our current strategic situation. In this fourth article for the Gazette on the West's military position he takes a clear, hard look at defense capabilities as they are embodied in NATO. Earlier articles were "Small Atomics . . . A Big Problem" (Dec '59), "Gas or Atoms" (Jan '60), and "Marines and Strategy" (Jul '60). These four articles appear in Capt Liddell Hart's latest book, "Deterrent or Defense," published 25Aug60 by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. \$4.95

soil, the best answer to the danger of such a surprise stroke would be a "floating fire brigade"—an amphibious force, based on the harbors in northern Germany or those in the North British islands, which could throw a strong and well-organized reinforcement of Marines ashore at short notice.

Besides Berlin and the Baltic there are other exposed outpost positions, on the flanks of NATO, which would be almost as difficult to defend. It would be wise to reckon with the possibility that they may become targets of Soviet politico-military strategy.

### Combustibility in the Middle East

The most obvious of these precarious positions is Persia, whose territory forms the gateway to the rest of the Middle East. In recent years the situation in Persia has become better and firmer—on the surface, at any rate. Unhappily, conditions of instability and combustibility have spread, particularly to the west and southwest parts of the Middle East. This has naturally prompted intervention—direct or indirect—by outside powers. It has also offered opportunity to insidious trouble-making for political and strategical advantage.


Renewed Soviet pressure on Persia was ominously foreshadowed in 1959, when the Soviet government made a vehement public complaint that the Shah's government was pursuing a "double-dealing" policy which could have "grave consequences." This note stated that the Persians had made proposals for a treaty of friendship and non-aggression, but then had suddenly broken off negotiations under American pressure, while arranging a new military pact with the United States.

There is a long background to the present situation, and it is very important to see this in perspective. It has been a prolonged sequence of pull and counter-pull, with Persia as the rope in a veiled tug of war.

Thirteen years ago the Shah took a bold step, and a big risk, by clearing out the Communist puppet government in the frontier province of Azerbaijan. He also suppressed the left wing Tudeh party in Persia, which was a potential Soviet "fifth column." To the world's surprise, Stalin swallowed this double rebuff and took no open counter-action. But in 1950 the Shah's prime minister, General Razmara, was assassinated, and a wave of extreme "nationalism" brought Dr. Mussadek into power. The Communists and fellow-travellers cooperated with this Nationalist party, and fostered its clamor for taking over the British-owned oilfields. Under this cloak, their own influence revived and spread.

When the British were squeezed out, the Americans came to take an increasing hand in Persian affairs. Their military mission had already, several years earlier, been given exclusive rights to guide the organization and training of the Persian Army. Behind the scenes they now backed a counter-move by the Shah's supporters, particularly the Army leaders. In 1953 a military-royalist coup overthrew Mussadek's government and restored the Shah's power.

Then, in 1955, the Shah's government joined in the Baghdad Pact—the military alliance of Turkey, Iraq, Persia, Pakistan, and Britain—for joint defense of the Middle East. The Shah's desire for such a guarantee played an important part in producing this pact, and in overcoming the doubt felt in the West about its mili-



What could the United States do if Russia moved into Persia on the pretext of the 1927 treaty?

tary value and political wisdom—doubts based on the provocative effect of such a military alliance on Russia's southern border, and the tempting effect of its strategic weakness. The Shah's initiative was prompted by reports that British strategists were planning a defense of the Middle East along the line of the mountain chain covering the northern and western frontiers of Iraq, which implied abandonment of any attempt to defend Persia.

The Soviet government loudly protested against Persia's step in signing the Baghdad Pact, as a breach of its longstanding neutrality treaty with Russia. But it abstained, once again, from following up its warning by any direct action. Instead, it resorted to indirect counter-moves. The first of these was the arms deal with Egypt, which helped to develop a paralyzing distraction in the rear of the newly built northward-facing alliance—the "northern shield" as the Americans call it, or the "American spearhead" as the Russians regard it.

Nasser's subsequent activities in extending his sway, and undermining British influence in the neighboring countries, were most effective in serving Krushchev's disruptive purpose. That has been the result, too, of all anti-Western ferment. As has been aptly remarked: "Communism has adopted the language of Arab nationalism as its own."

**Revolt in Iraq Upset Pact**


Then, in July 1958, came the military revolution in Iraq, headed by General Kassem. This automatically disjointed the central link in the Baghdad Pact alliance. The US government, which had hitherto held back from full entry into the Pact, immediately reacted by pledging itself to defend the remaining Middle East members: Persia, Pakistan, and Turkey. It thus committed itself more definitely and deeply than ever before.

The formulation of a contract was not so quick, but by December was approaching completion. The Soviet government then sought to check it by a fresh warning to Persia that it regarded such an arrangement as "an immediate danger" to the Soviet Union. It stiffly reminded Persia that the Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921, amplified by that of 1927, gave it the right in case of such danger "to send its army into Persia in order to take the necessary military steps in its own defense."

Anxiety about this warning, and dissatisfaction with the initial American proposals, may have led the Shah's government to make its undercover bid early in 1959 for a fresh treaty with Russia, as a reinsurance. The way it broke off negotiations may have been due to the Russians asking too much, or to the Americans promising more.

But the crucial question remains: what could the Americans do if Russia moved troops into Persia on the pretext of the 1927 treaty?

Persia has a natural defensive shield in her mountainous northern frontier, facing Russia. The successive mountain chains that lie behind it form a series





Two lines of defense: natural barricades . . .



. . . tough fighting men. Neither could stop the Reds

of barrier positions which provide the basis for a prolonged defense in depth. But the effective value of such barriers depends on having forces strong enough to hold them firmly. They are not in themselves more than a momentary obstacle to mechanized forces. That was made clear in 1941 when the German panzer forces swept through the mountainous Balkans in a few days, overrunning the Yugoslav and Greek armies. Yet these were numerically large armies, composed of tough troops. The way they were so quickly pulverized showed that toughness is not enough, when up-to-date arms and equipment are lacking.

It is all too plain that the Persian Army is weak in all respects, compared with either of those armies. It numbers about 120,000 men, and a nominal 13 small-scale divisions. In recent years a small amount of relatively modern equipment has been provided from American and other sources, and American officers have helped with instructional guidance. But only four or five of these small divisions can be reckoned effective, and even in these the amount of modern arms and equipment is inadequate. Although three are called "armored divisions," their tanks are of obsolescent types. Worse still there is a scarcity of anti-tank guns. The pay of the troops is very low, and discontent on this score has made many of the soldiers and junior officers susceptible to Communist propaganda. Even if the solidity of the army could be relied on, it would be a very small force to cover the 700-mile stretch of Persia's northern frontier—250 miles to the west of the Caspian Sea and 450 miles to the east—as well as the 400 miles of her eastern frontier facing Afghanistan.

Under such conditions the best chance of putting a brake on a Russian invasion, apart from nuclear weapons, lies in well-placed demolitions on the roads through the mountains. But an extreme network of demolitions requires not only much skill but large resources—both of which are dubious quantities in this area. It is not

surprising that some of Persia's own officers, surveying the problem of defense, should have remarked that the Russians would probably overrun the country within a week unless outside help arrived in the first few days, and on a big scale.

A Russian advance into the Middle East would most likely come through Persian Azerbaijan and could be continued into Iraq over the passes leading to Rowanduz and Kirkut. That is the shortest route, since it has little more than 100 miles of Persian territory to traverse before crossing the Iraq frontier. The Russians might use airborne troops to open the way and keep it open.

#### Afghans Equipped With Russian Arms

But we have also to reckon with the possibility of an outflanking thrust into Persia from the area east of the Caspian sea, by the Russians or by the Afghans, who have been well equipped with Russian material. If they quickly overrun Persia they might invade Iraq from other points along the 600-mile stretch of frontier between Rowanduz and the Persian Gulf. That is an immense stretch to cover, even though most of it is mountainous. Iraq, south and west of the frontier, is a wonderful arena for the maneuver of armored forces. An invader might pour in streams of them, once he had secured the mountain passage ways.

Behind Iraq, or on its rearward flanks, lie Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. None of these states has frontiers that are good for defense against invasion—though desert approaches might help to limit an invader's operational strength.

None of them has forces capable of offering serious resistance to Russian invasion of even such limited strength. Moreover, there is a serious risk that Iraq might serve as a Russian satellite or at least as a salient.

The only efficient army in the Middle East is that of Israel. In repelling the several-sided invasion from the

Arab countries in 1948, and again in its "Hundred Hours" campaign against the Egyptians in 1956, it proved its high quality. It is, clearly, the toughest fighting force in the Middle East, with leaders who are vigorous, militarily well-educated, and highly intelligent—a rare combination. But its strength and equipment are slender for meeting invasion by a Great Power such as Russia.

The Soviet Army has some 15 well-equipped, active divisions poised in the Caucasus, west of the Caspian, and a further nine or ten stationed fairly close. It could soon double that total with the aid of the three railway lines running up to the front of this strategic area. Thus it has a strength easily capable of overrunning Persia. While it might be difficult for her to maintain supplies to a force of more than 15 divisions in a prolonged advance to the Persian Gulf, such a force should amply suffice to brush aside the Persian Army and any Allied reinforcements that could be sent to its aid.

The Americans have a large military mission in Persia, but no combat formations anywhere near except the battalion of Marines with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In the Lebanon crisis of 1958 they had to be supplemented by an airborne battle group flown there from the US Seventh Army in Germany. In the US, there is a strategic reserve of four divisions, two of them airborne, but Persia might be overrun before even one of these could arrive on the scene.

The British, since Suez, are little better placed than the Americans to provide early reinforcement, and their strategic reserve is much smaller. The most they could at present send to the scene quickly is the one parachute brigade which they dispatched to Jordan in the 1958 crisis. Its dispatch to such a remote theater as Persia would be a far more difficult problem, both initially and in the maintenance of its supplies.

There is another and numerically stronger piece on the board—Turkey. She stands on the left edge, and her location used to be described as the Near East. That term is still correct, geographically and strategically.

Turkey's western frontier lies in Europe, adjoining those of Bulgaria and Greece, so that she is exposed to invasion from that quarter by the Russians and their Balkan satellites. But her eastern frontier lies in the Middle East, adjoining Persia as well as Russia's Caucasus frontier. Her flanking position in that area is of great strategic importance and influence, potentially.

Britain and France took the lead in making a treaty of mutual assistance with Turkey. That has been reinforced by America's backing, and developed by Turkey's definite incorporation in the framework of Allied defense planning. Nature has provided her land with strong barricades. These are backed by a standing army of nearly 400,000 men organized in some 25 divisions, of which about six are of armored type, although not yet fully equipped nor adequately modern. The Turks have proved tough fighters in the past, and have more recently shown that again in Korea. The Army is being modernized with American aid. It suffers from growing pains, but should be capable of holding its own in defense—which has always been its strong point.

### Turks Can't Stop Caucasus Thrust

If Turkey could stretch out an arm quickly enough to help cover her neighbor, Persia, against a Russian thrust from the Caucasus, it would make a great difference to the prospect of initial defense, the most important phase. But whether it could develop an effective counter-offensive outside its own borders is very dubious.

Russia's forces available for use there are vastly larger than those which could oppose her. Her airborne divisions form a "can-opener" for quickly forcing mountain barriers, seizing keypoints deep in rear, and spreading panic. For meeting such a blow, the armies of the Arab states are little more than a paper-screen. While Turkey is more capable of self-defense, she lies "off the edge," and could not bar the path to the Middle East oilfields.

The present land defense of the Middle East all too aptly recalls Hans Anderson's fairy-tale, *The Emperor's*



Israeli soldiers 25 miles from Suez Canal—"clearly the best fighting force in the Middle East?"



*New Clothes.* That was the story of how certain impostors, who knew human weakness, pretended to weave for an Emperor a new suit which, they alleged, had the property of being invisible to everyone who was unfit for his office. The Ministers and the Emperor did not care to admit they could not see it—until a little child exclaimed: "But the Emperor has nothing on at all."

In sum, there seems no chance, or way, of defending Persia against invasion except by the American Air Force in the Mediterranean area and their use of tactical nuclear weapons. That would carry a heavy risk of developing into all-out nuclear war, and thus into mutual suicide. So there might well be more hesitation in taking the decision to unleash such action than there has been in giving Persia an assurance of protection. Western policy has moved fast in extending its protective embrace to the Middle East. But it has, unfortunately, moved faster and further than the strategic possibilities.

### No Polish Guarantee for Persia

The Polish Guarantee in the spring of 1939 had near-fatal consequences for all countries concerned. The consequences of a Persian Guarantee in the nuclear age could be far worse. It can only be hoped that Khrushchev will be more conscious of this basic fact than the givers of the guarantee, and that he will resist the inclination to exploit its weaknesses better than Hitler did when confronted with the combined "provocation and temptation" of the Polish Guarantee.

Khrushchev may well reckon that there is more to gain by pursuing an indirect policy and strategy of subversion than through any direct action in the Middle East by the Russian Army. For it is all too clear that he has abundant scope there for "fishing in troubled waters." A fresh turn of the revolutionary wheel could bring Communist-dominated parties into power in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere—or in Persia itself. Such governments might be prompted to call for Russian support, and protective reinforcement, in the same way that the British were called into Jordan on King Hussein's appeal and the Americans into Lebanon by President Chamoun's.

The Russians have the strongest airborne force in the world—some ten airborne divisions and sufficient

air transport probably to carry two of these in a single lift. The sudden arrival of two of these divisions in any of Middle East country, at the invitation of its government, would place the Western Powers in an extremely awkward situation.

Other danger-spots in the Middle East are the Aden Protectorate and the oil-bearing states in Southern Arabia, along the Persian Gulf, that are linked with Britain by treaty or directly under British protection. In the spring of 1958, and twice the year before, the British troops at Aden went into action to repel incursions from the Yemen, which has revived the old claim that the Aden Protectorate is part of its historic territory. In 1957, too, a British force was called in by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman to quell a dangerous revolt in his domains, after his own forces had been defeated by the Imam of Oman. The Aden situation has become more precarious since Russia has been supplying tanks, self-propelled guns, and other arms to the Yemen. Two years ago it was arranged that Russian engineers should start building a harbor on the Red Sea coast of the Yemen, for the establishment of a naval base there.

Trouble might flare up afresh any time, and we have to reckon with the possibility that the Yemenis might be prompted, on the pretext of British "aggression" to call on Russian help to "protect" them. The British in Aden would have a shock if they woke up one morning to find that Russian "volunteers" had been dropped by air behind the disputed frontier, and were manning the Russian tanks and guns already shipped to the Yemen.

The most essential, while least provocative, precaution against such emergencies would be the offshore presence, on the seas girdling this troubled area, of an amphibious force capable of putting a "fireguard" or "fire extinguisher" ashore quickly. The US Sixth Fleet, with its independence of land bases or airfields, provides such maneuverable but unprovocative aid for the eastern end of the Mediterranean—the Near East. It could be more effective still if the scale of its Marine component were increased. But there is at present no such amphibious aid available in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean for the Southern Arabia and Persian Gulf area. This is a need which the British could meet if they developed an adequate amphibious force for the purpose.

US & MC



### Don't Call Us

☛ WHEN LEATHERNECKS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION received the word that Allied Artists was producing "Beyond the Call," a movie about Marines on Saipan, and that they needed Marine extras, the ISO office was deluged with aspiring actors.

To weed out the Barrymores from the multitude of would-be stars a special phone watch was created to answer all in-coming "movie" calls. It was standard procedure to ask what acting experience the local hopeful had before he started on a useless tirade.

When one "John Wayne Marine" mentioned that he had been a sunflower in a grade school operetta, the ISO thought he had the classic. But, two days later, an NCO called and put the icing on the cake.

"What acting experience have you had, sergeant," the phone watch said.

"Well," the Hollywood hopeful replied, "I've been an acting Gunnery Sergeant for about six months now . . . how's that?"

\$15.00 to Lt C. P. Roberts