




Permutations



✚ THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF WAR THERE HAVE BEEN three forms of the offensive: the physical, the economic, and the psychological. The simplest example is the siege of a walled city; it can be carried either by batter and storm, or starved into surrender by blockade, or its garrison subverted by fostering treachery within its walls. Which of these forms is likely to prove the most profitable depends on a variety of circumstances, and to diagnose the dominant one is the first all-important problem in war.

It is not my intention to delve into ancient history, in which innumerable examples of all three forms abound. Instead it is to restrict my analysis to the wars of the present century, to unmask the forms which dominated them, and then to equate my deductions with the circumstances which govern international conflict today.

At the close of the last century, when the General Staffs were thinking in terms of rifles and cannon, battle-ships and cruisers, a Warsaw banker, by birth a Jew and by name I. S. Bloch, examined the problem of future warfare in an elaborate six-volume work entitled *The War of the Future in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations*. His thesis was that, all the world over, the General Staffs were sailing on the wrong tack, and that the war they were preparing for would founder on the rocks of their failure to relate it to the circumstances which would govern it.

WWIII is on, Gen Fuller declares, but its dominant form is economic and psychological rather than physical, as has been the case in all major wars of the 20th Century—contrary to orthodox opinion. Failure to understand this fact, he says (and reiterates in a special interview on Page 26), can lead only to repetition of the “appalling mistakes” we made in WWI and WWII.

of War

By MajGen J. F. C. Fuller

“What is the use,” he said, “of talking about the past when you are dealing with an altogether new set of considerations. . . The outward and visible sign of the end of war was the introduction of the magazine rifle. . . The soldier by natural evolution has so perfected the mechanism of slaughter that he has practically secured his own extinction. . . At first there will be increased slaughter—increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. . . The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest . . . will become a kind of stalemate in which, neither army being willing to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to each other, threatening the other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. . . That is the future of war—not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the whole social organization. . . Everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a great war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to the soldier as his rifle. . . All wars will of necessity partake of the character of siege operations . . . soldiers may fight as they please; the ultimate decision is in the hand of famine. . . The soldier is going down and the economist is going up.”

Written as this was in the late '90s of the last century, it is a remarkable forecast of WWI. Before that, weight was given to Bloch's contention in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, in which the magazine rifle, machine-





gun, and recently introduced quick-firing field gun were put to the test.

Two of that war's outstanding lessons were that frontal attacks were suicidal, and that to survive on the battlefield the soldier had to entrench. More significant, although the Japanese won every battle on land and at sea, the psychological impact of the war on Russia's inner, or home, front led to a revolutionary upheaval. This, coupled with its impact on Japan's economy, which reduced her to near bankruptcy, brought the war to an end. In other words, psychological and economic factors dominated the physical. Nevertheless, these cardinal lessons were ignored by the General Staffs, and were left over for WWI again to verify.

Blockade Did It

In that stupendous conflict the dominant instrument of victory was not the military might of the British Empire, France, and the United States, but as Gen Ludendorff, Chief of the German General Staff, declared: "The strangling hunger blockade and the enemy's propaganda." The latter he likened to "a moral blockade."

As Bloch had predicted, famine—the fruits of the economic attack—was the decisive factor. Lack of food and raw materials—the economic foundations of all strategy and tactics—and not the superabundance of the enemy's munitions, brought the Central Powers to collapse.

It was the blockade that created the fertile soil in which the seeds of the psychological attack were sown. It so completely undermined the moral foundations of the German army in Russia that Lenin, with no army to speak of at his command, set out to convert what he called "the imperialist war" into a series of civil wars. Although he failed in his endeavor, his subversive ac-

tivities among the German troops were so successful that Gen Hoffman, the German CinC in Russia, declared: "Our victorious army on the Eastern Front became rotten with Bolshevism. We got to a point when we did not dare to transfer certain of our eastern divisions to the West." And the German prisoners, released by the Russians after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, were found to be so effectively indoctrinated with revolutionary ideas that on their arrival in Germany they had to be confined "in political quarantine camps."

Like so many prophets, Bloch was the slave of an over-mastering idea. Although he foresaw what a magazine rifle war would entail, he failed to realize that its very deadliness would bring into being what I have called the "Constant Tactical Factor": that every improvement of weapon-power in the past has eventually been met by a counter-improvement, which has either modified its effectiveness or cancelled it out.

In WWI the answers to the magazine rifle and machinegun, which were responsible for the prolonged stalemate, were the tank and lethal gas. The one cancelled out the bullet, and the other the rifleman whether in the open or in a trench. Had either of the two belligerent coalitions possessed one or both of these new weapons at the outbreak of hostilities, chances are that the physical attack would have dominated, and the economic and psychological would have played very subordinate parts.

Changed Situation in WWII

In character, WWII was very different from WWI. In 1914, to all intents and purposes, the belligerents were firmly united nations whose peoples loyally supported their respective governments. But since then a

Hitler learned more from Germany's defeat in WWI than the victors did, Gen Fuller says, and first set out to shore up his economic defenses by establishing a "Lebensraum" (living space) in Eastern Europe which would preclude blockade.

series of violent revolutions had upheaved Europe, and because they profoundly modified political relations, they as profoundly changed the character of war. By 1939, and particularly in those countries in which revolutionary governments had been established, there existed extensive reactionary inner fronts. In many other countries Communist, Fascist, and National Socialist movements had taken root. These fruits and movements enabled an enemy who cooperated with them to attack his antagonist internally by fomenting revolutions or counter-revolutions—as important an operation in the psychological struggle as the overthrow of the enemy's armies is in the physical struggle.

In the technical field changes were even more startling. Since time immemorial the motive power of armies had been muscular, but with the adoption of the internal combustion engine during WWI it had become increasingly more mechanical. For purposes of transport and supply the truck ousted the horse-drawn wagon, the tank was invented, and the airplane was enormously developed. Nevertheless, all these adaptations of mechanical power had remained in what may be called the auxiliary stage—that is, they were looked upon solely as adjuncts to the traditional fighting forces.

Had WWI lasted another year, what was as yet seen by a few would have become apparent to the many—namely, because tank and airplane had added so vastly to military mobility, startling new tactics, which would radically influence the art of war, could be developed. By neutralizing the bullet, the tank added a hitherto unattainable security to superficial movements. By transcending the battlefield and converting the skies into a universal road, the airplane added a new dimension to war. Both favored the offensive.

Out of these possibilities two tactical schools of thought arose. The theories propounded by both were based on the concept of substituting a more rapid and effective process of disorganizing and demoralizing the enemy's fighting forces than could be attained by the traditional battle.

While the tank theorists proposed by means of powerful armored forces to disrupt the enemy's front and attack, capture, or disperse the combat headquarters in rear of it, the aircraft theorists proposed to avoid the enemy's fighting forces altogether, and by means of squadrons of bomber aircraft to attack his civil population and industries.

Different Objectives

The aim of the one was to deprive the enemy fighting forces of their command, and thereby reduce them to a panic-stricken rabble; the aim of the other was to deprive the enemy government of popular support and means to continue the war, and thereby overthrow it by revolution.

As is common throughout military history, the vanquished learned more from their defeat than the victors did from their victory. When, in 1933, Hitler rose to power, determined as he was to free Germany from the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles, he paid careful attention to the political and technical changes since 1914.

To strengthen Germany strategically, he decided to bring all German minorities which bordered on her frontiers within the Reich. And, in order to make the Reich economically proof against another blockade, he determined to establish a *Lebensraum* (living space) in Eastern Europe—that is, occupy Poland and a large slice of Western Russia, including the Ukraine, the largest and richest minority province. As this was likely to lead to a general European war in which Germany would again be faced with two hostile fronts, it was incumbent on Hitler to create an army so mobile that it could rapidly defeat its enemy on one front before it turned toward the other. The one thing he wished to avoid was a prolonged war like the last one, which eventually drew in the United States.

Mechanization Appealed to Hitler

In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had written that in the next war "motorization will make its appearance in an overwhelming and decisive form." He had a passion for high speed motor cars, express motorways (*Reichsautobahnen*), and aircraft; therefore, warfare based on high mobility instinctively appealed to him. Both the German Air Force and Army were organized to develop it; but the main task of the former was to cooperate with the latter and not to act independently. Further, Hitler was a firm believer in the psychological offensive, which paid him hand over fist in his annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. He declared: "The lessons of revolution, these are the secret of the new strategy. . . . To me all means will be right. . . . My motto is: Destroy the enemy by all and any means."

While Hitler built his army in accordance with the theories of the British tank tactical school, the policy

of France and the United Kingdom was to maintain the *status quo* under the aegis of the League of Nations. They had nothing to gain from another war, and as their peoples were pacific so also were their governments. Their military ideas were purely defensive in character; France would shelter behind her Maginot Line and Britain behind the English Channel—the solid and liquid forms of the same concept. Their tactical theory was that the first phase of WWI would repeat itself; therefore, there would be ample time for a blockade of Germany to become effective. Added to this, the British Air Force theorists held that the key to victory should be sought in air attacks on the German industrial centers and civil populations. This was called “strategic bombing.”

Unprecedented Military Feat

From start to finish, the two new tactical theories so completely dominated the offensive operations of the war that the value of the psychological attack was eclipsed, while the value of the blockade was largely discounted by the ability of the Germans to live off their conquests. The tank theory, when put into practice, became known as *blitzkrieg* (lightning-war). Poland was conquered in 27 days, Holland in 5, Belgium in 17, France in 38, Yugoslavia in 12, and Greece in 17. Never since the days of Genghis Khan had such extensive and rapid conquests been made. It was a feat of arms unparalleled in modern history.

When France fell, only the English Channel stood between Hitler and the complete subjugation of Western Europe; but since he was in no way prepared to invade England, to compel her government to accept a negotiated peace, he put the second theory—that of strategic bombing—into force. When it resulted in a costly fiasco, he abandoned his objective in the West and set out to win his *Lebensraum* in Russia.

His problem now became one of time. By the summer of 1941 he was aware that President Roosevelt was actively preparing to bring the United States into the war; the passing of the Lend-Lease Bill by Congress on March 11 had made this a certainty. Could he defeat Russia before the United States intervened?

The answer depended on the correct choice of what Clausewitz called “the center of gravity” of the enemy’s military power, by which he meant the weakest link in his harness. Reference to Clausewitz would have told him where it lay. Russia, he had written, can only be subdued “by effect of internal dissension”—that is, by revolution fomented by psychological attack. How to effect this should have been clearly apparent to Hitler.

Between 1929 and 1938 Stalin’s brutal collectivization of the lands of the minority peoples, the Ukrainians, White Russians, etc., in which some 10 million people had been shot, transported, and starved to death, had so antagonized them that all Hitler needed to have done was cross the Russian frontier as a liberator and

terminate collectivization. This would not only have won over to him the minorities—in Western Russia alone they numbered over 40 million people—but it would also have dissolved Stalin’s armies, which were largely recruited from non-Russian collectivized serfs (actually, in 1941, over two million Ukrainian, etc., soldiers deserted to the Germans). The renegade Russian Gen Vlasov told Himmler that this was why Stalin dreaded a German invasion, and why he did not believe that Hitler would be so foolish as to conduct the war “with arms alone.”

Instead of relying on the revolutionary strategy he had boasted of, and which had paid him so high a dividend before the war, and in spite of what Dr. Goebbels records in his *Diaries*, that the Ukrainians looked upon Hitler as the “Saviour of Europe,” Hitler’s brutal nature overmastered him and sealed his doom. Instead of assuming the role of liberator, he proclaimed that all the inhabitants of the USSR were *Untermenschen* (sub-humans). He set out to enslave and exterminate them, and thereby drove the minorities into Stalin’s arms. “By rousing the Russian people to a Napoleonic fervour,” writes Erich Kern in his *Dance of Death*, “we enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve a political consolidation beyond their wildest dreams and provided their cause with the halo of a patriotic war.”

After the war, a German officer asked an American journalist: “Do you know where we lost the war in Russia?” “In Stalingrad,” was the prompt reply. “No,” said the officer, “we lost it long before that—in Kiev, when we hoisted the swastika instead of the Ukrainian flag!”

Chamberlain’s Psychological Approach

Very different was the policy of the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. On the day following his government’s declaration of war he opened a psychological offensive on Hitler. In a broadcast to the German people he said: “In this war we are not fighting against you, the German people, for whom we have no bitter feeling, but against a tyrannous and foresworn régime.” He contacted members of the anti-Hitler opposition in Switzerland, and propitiated the German people by declaring in the House of Commons: “Whatever be the length to which others might go, the Government will never resort to blackguardly attacks on women and other civilians for purposes of mere terrorism.”

When, on May 10, 1940, Mr. Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, he forthwith scrapped the psychological offensive. On the following day he instructed his Bomber Command to bomb the ancient university city of Freiburg in Breisgau in order to demoralize its inhabitants. This was the psychological attack in reverse. Few things were more likely to damp down opposition to Hitler than the indiscriminate slaughter of the German civil population. Better be alive under a dic-



But the Fuhrer failed to understand the psychological side of his war when he invaded the Ukraine in the role of "conqueror" rather than "liberator."

tator than dead under a liberator was the moral. Throughout the war it was disregarded by Churchill and the strategic bombing enthusiasts.

A few months later Churchill declared: "The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory. We must therefore develop the power to carry an ever-increasing volume of explosives to Germany, so as to pulverize the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depend."

This was what may be called "blockade on inner lines;" not the cutting off of supplies from outside, but the destruction of the means to use them on the inside. There was nothing unstrategic in this, as long as the targets selected were within the power of the British Force, and later on the American Air Force also, to destroy them. But at no time before the advent of the atomic bomb was bombing sufficiently destructive to bring the war to a rapid end unless it was directed and concentrated against the most vital targets.

Where was the center of gravity of German war energy to be found? In her synthetic oil plants and coalfields. Without fuel she could not continue to wage war; without coal she would be completely paralyzed. And although coalfields are difficult to destroy by air attack, all that is needed to paralyze them is to keep the railways leading to and from them under bombardment—that is, to attack transportation.

Yet, what do we see? Until the summer of 1944 British and American bombing attacks were mainly directed against German industrial centers and cities, and both, according to *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, were costly failures. Not until Normandy was about to be invaded did strategic bombing become truly strategic. Then it was concentrated against German transportation and synthetic oil plants, with the result that in four to five months Germany's economy collapsed.


The same error was made in the Pacific theater of war. From the first the position of Japan was one of extreme strategic fragility, because her economic potential was approximately only 10 percent that of the United States. Because she depended on Manchuria and Korea for the bulk of her raw materials and much of her foodstuffs, which had to cross the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, her merchant navy was her strategic center of gravity. This was realized by the American Navy, and the attack on Japanese shipping became the main task of its submarines. Out of the total of 8,900,000 tons of Japanese shipping sunk 54.7 percent is attributed to submarines.

According to the *U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey*, when, after the battle of Leyte Gulf long-range bomber attack on the Japanese homeland from the Mariana Islands became practicable, had it been directed against Japan's extremely vulnerable railroad network, it would have greatly extended and cumulated the effects of the shipping attacks already made. "The Survey believes," we read, "that such an attack . . . had it been well-planned in advance, might have been initiated in August 1944. . . . The Survey has estimated that the force requirements to effect complete interdiction of the railroad system would have been 650 B-29 visual sorties carrying 5,200 tons of high explosive bombs." Instead, as in the case of Germany, the main targets selected were urban and industrial areas, and 146,900 tons were dropped on them without bringing Japan to heel.

A-Bombs Unnecessary?

Granted that the Survey's estimate is no more than 50 percent correct, there can be little doubt that early in 1945, if not before, Japan's economy would have collapsed, and there would have been no need to drop the two atomic bombs which ended the war. Even as things stood in the spring of 1945, Japan's economy had by then been so ruined that, had the future of the emperor not been in doubt, unconditional surrender would have been accepted by the Japanese government.

Although, throughout the period under discussion, the physical offensive—that is, the clash between fighting forces—predominates, the importance of the economic and psychological offenses becomes more and more apparent. The reason is that we live in an age in which economics dominates civilization from every angle, and in an age in which their repercussions on social life lead to profound psychological disturbances.



In wartime they do not oust the physical attack, they supplement it, and their effectiveness is derived from ability to strike physically, or to threaten to do so. They are additional and essential arrows in the quiver of war.

The economic transformation of the present age is the dividend of the Industrial Revolution of the preceding 200 years. Before its advent nations were self-sufficient, and normally the economic attack played a subsidiary role. Since its advent nations have become increasingly less so, with the result that it has increasingly played a primary part. In the 18th century the Industrial Revolution set out at a quiet walk; in the 19th it broke into a trot and then into a canter. Today it is in a furious gallop with the bit between its teeth.

The New Technology

We live in an age of fantastic scientific discoveries and inventions, of fantastic economic changes; in brief, of fantastic materialism. And, as far as war is concerned, the most fantastic offspring of the Industrial Revolution is the atomic bomb and its twin, the hydrogen bomb. These are the circumstances in which war is conditioned today. What of the future?

When on the first day of the Potsdam Conference—July 17, 1945—President Truman and Mr. Churchill were informed that the final test of the atomic bomb had proved an unqualified success, they forthwith decided to use it against Japan. Of this decision the latter has written: "Now all the nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was the vision—fair and bright indeed it seemed—of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks."

It is astonishing that Truman and Churchill did not pause to consider what the impact of the destructive use of the very source of creative energy on the future of the world would be. Like the fisherman in the *Arabian*

Nights, who hauled up the mysterious brass bottle, they unbottled the atomic-jinnee, a devil which has plagued humanity ever since, and no coaxing will persuade him to return to his bottle. July 17, 1945, was the most fateful day in human history since man discovered how to light a fire.

The physical attack had now been raised to its *n*th degree, and so far as can be seen the Constant Tactical Factor has ceased to operate. One well-directed 20-megaton missile on London would paralyze the United Kingdom; a score on the US or the USSR would reduce both to chaos, and no protective answer is in sight.

Paradox though it may appear, physical warfare in its nuclear form has eliminated itself. Instead of being a positive instrument of policy, it is a negative one. Megatons bunker megatons and are called "deterrents"; they deter their like, because their use would spell mutual suicide. Nevertheless, all other forms remain, and under cover of the threat of nuclear war they are lumped together and called "cold war," which Khrushchev euphemistically defines as "peaceful co-existence."

It is not that he fears that a nuclear war would annul the consummation of world communism, because with all Marxists he holds that it is preordained by the laws of history, but that it would delay its advent. Peaceful co-existence is a change in tactics and not in strategy; the elimination of capitalism is still the aim, and the tactical form of war Khrushchev has decided on is the economic attack. Since he declared it in February, 1956, at the Twentieth Party Congress, we live in the days of WWII.

At that Congress Khrushchev said: "Armed interference is no longer necessary, since the certainty of the victory of communism was based on the conviction that the socialist mode of production possesses decisive ad-

The failure of Allied leaders to understand the economics of WWII, the author says, resulted in senseless bombing of urban and industrial areas in both Germany and Japan. Instead, he says, we should have concentrated on transportation, oil.

vantages over the capitalist mode of production." In other words, because Khrushchev holds that capitalism is doomed through its inherent inefficiency, it is more profitable to besiege its garrison and starve it into surrender by economic competition than to assault it by military force.

At the Twenty-first Party Congress, in January, 1959, Khrushchev launched his Seven Year Plan, the aim of which is to outdistance American industrial production. Under cover of the terror induced by the threat of nuclear attack, war was put into cold storage. Armies were to give way to factories, weapons to goods, and markets were to become the battlefields of the future.

As in actual war, the economic offensive demands for its success the concentration of the means of attack—that is, the integration of the economies of the Soviet bloc of nations. This was fully explained by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress. In brief, the economies of the satellite countries are to be organized so as not to overlap the economy of the Soviet Union, and are progressively to be converted into departments of one gigantic workshop, which will constitute a common powerhouse as well as a common market. All production not absorbed by the latter will become "ammunition" wherewith to bombard the capitalist countries.

Should China be included in this economic bloc, in his *The Great Contest* Mr. Isaac Deutscher estimates that eventually a single economic entity will come into being with a common market four or five times larger than the North American, and at least twice as large as the North American and European markets combined.

The capitalist powers must realize that the challenge they are called upon to respond to is very different from the international trade rivalries of former times, the aims of which were purely economic. Today they are faced with economic warfare on military lines, and its aim is a revolutionary one: To undermine the foundations of capitalism; to create ever-increasing discontent in the capitalist countries by impoverishing them; and then to detonate that discontent into a series of revolutions by violent psychological attack.

As the situation stands today, the Western Powers are divided and are not responding to this challenge. To do so they must abandon their trade rivalries and integrate their economies, because in this age of economic wardom, rivalries between them are tantamount to economic civil war, the very thing their formidable enemy most desires.

Bloch was right in idea but not in timing—his forecast has now come true: "The soldier by natural evolution has so perfected the mechanism of slaughter that he has practically secured his own extinction." War is now too deadly to wage with profit: "The soldier is going down and the economist is going up." US & MC

A special interview with General Fuller begins on next page ▶



And That's A Lot

☛ Before dawn one morning in the spring of 1951 a runner awoke the Assistant Division Commander, BGen "Chesty" Puller, and informed him that the Chinese had broken through the front line of an ROK division on the Marines' flank. The General immediately grabbed his phone and called the CP of a Korean battalion on the MLR.

"How many Chinese are in the attack?" he asked.

"Many, many Chinese," came the reply.

Dissatisfied with that answer, Gen Puller called the ROK division headquarters and received the same answer. In disgust, he phoned the Marine liaison officer with the ROKs: "How many Chinese you got up there, Lieutenant?"

"A whole damn pot full sir."

"Thank God somebody up there can count," Puller said.

\$15.00 to Maj Norman W. Hicks