


POLARIS AND THE M



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VAdm John T. Hayward, USN
Deputy CNO (Development):
Testimony before the Subcommittee of
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NORTH FLANK

By George Fielding Eliot

A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE basic concept of American national strategy is in the making. It is a change based on dawning realization of the overwhelming advantages which, in the nuclear age, are inherent in control of the sea. From that dawnlight over the Atlantic will presently appear the first rays of the sunshine of confidence renewed, dissolving the fog of confusion and latent defeatism in which we and our friends have wandered unhappily since the first shock of realization that the Soviet Union had broken our "monopoly" of nuclear weapons.

Our present discontent arises from our instinctive realization that, as the late Gen Malin Craig wrote in his last report as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939, "time is the one military commodity which can be irrevocably lost." We have an uneasy sense — and far too many people in other parts of the world have joined us in that anxiety — that the Soviet Union may be moving into a position of commanding superiority in nuclear-armed missiles, and that we may not have time to "catch up before the Soviets will be able to destroy our capability for nuclear retaliation in one surprise holocaust. Certainly the esteemed Mr. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev has done his best to assure us of the validity of this forecast, with a bouncy confi-

dence that suggests that he believes it himself. The entire edifice of Soviet aggressive policy has this military concept — which amounts to nuclear blackmail — as its military cornerstone. Under the shield of nuclear threat, the gradual expansion of the Communist empire by peripheral enterprises and by subversion, even in the most distant parts of the world, supported by Soviet weapons, economic warfare and exported personnel, is foreshadowed. Among our allies as among the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa — some of them newly introduced to the unaccustomed responsibilities of independence — there is a growing doubt of American ability to resist the Communist colossus. This belief lies at the root of the troubles which have beset our foreign policy in recent years. We do not suffer from diminished prestige and from loss of confidence in our policies because of the U-2, or the Tokyo incident, or the Suez affair, or the alleged shortcomings of our information, or foreign aid policies, anywhere nearly as much as because of the deepening shadow of doubt of our military power and therefore of our political will (or ability) to stand up against future challenges. For the students who were the victims of the Tokyo incident, the mutual defense treaty, and the Communist leadership, the shadow of doubt

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never has a great... so completely depend... le weapons system for... support of its policies... et Union on the ballis... day. If this cornerstone... tumble, the credibility of... ety threat would vanish... As 1960 ends, the... is about to be... The inexorable... in the production of m... on systems upon which... ets of disaster base... of our coming de... Soviet Union's... We... away... tal attempt to... ret strate... m... ion of... strate...



the time-honored combination of fire and movement, with unchallengeable control of the sea as its pivotal element.

Control Factors for the '60's

During the critical decade of the 1960's, we shall find ourselves establishing and maintaining control of the sea, and using this control:

- To "take the premium out of surprise attack" by the deployment at sea of mobile nuclear weapons systems under conditions which deny the Soviet leadership any rational hope of escaping devastating retaliation should they embark upon nuclear war;

- To provide capabilities for swift, effective reaction to limited Communist initiatives in any part of the world, and for the pursuance of limited initiatives of our own devising; and

- To deny the Communist states the use of the sea for military or other purposes which threaten the security of the Free World.

In implementing this strategy, both time and geography are overwhelmingly on our side.

Geography Widens Our Lead

We have a very long lead indeed over the Soviets in the development of modern sea-weapons and techniques—notably in nuclear-powered submarines (both missile-firing and attack types), attack aircraft carrier forces, and our Navy-Marine amphibious warfare team. We have a long backlog of experience, too—indeed the Russian Navy has never fought a truly oceanic war. The flag and general officers of our Navy and Marine Corps today are men who held responsible rank in the greatest oceanic war of modern times. The Soviet Navy cannot produce one officer who has commanded at any level in any naval action of wider scope than a coastal or mine-laying operation in Baltic or Black Sea waters. This alone is an advantage for us of transcendent proportions.

The facts of geography also urge us toward a sea-based strategy. One of the most notable geographic facts about the Soviet Union is its severely limited access to open water. (See map next page) Of its four widely separated maritime frontiers, unrestricted all-year access to oceanic

areas is available chiefly from the bases of the Murmansk-Severomorsk complex on the Arctic Ocean, through stormy seas lying between the variable southern limits of the Arctic pack-ice and the northern shores of Europe. The exits of the Baltic and Black Seas are in the hands of states of the North Atlantic Alliance. In the Far East, the exits of the Sea of Japan are controlled by Japan and South Korea, backed by the U. S. 7th Fleet, while weather and ice conditions limit the use of the Soviet bases on the Sea of Okhotsk. Only at Petropavlovsk, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, does the Soviet Union have a continental base



facing the open Pacific—a base that is ice-bound part of the year and further handicapped by having no land supply route.

Well Gearing for Shift

There is little comparison between this situation and the magnificent sea-frontiers of North America, Western Europe, and Australia, with their numerous island and peninsular outposts, their well-equipped naval bases in direct contact with industrial resources, and their command of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and of connecting waters such as Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas and the Panama Canal.

Little of this is really new. The factual basis of our advantages at sea is well known, almost taken for granted. In all logic, the very existence of these advantages should long ago have made them the basis of our national strategy. But fundamental decisions of this sort are not quickly or easily reached by our decision-making processes. Perhaps


that is just as well; indeed the fact that we are as well prepared as we are for a gradual shift in the direction of a sea-based mobile strategy is a tribute to the instinctive wisdom which has preserved the means for the expression and implementation of diverse opinions within our defense establishment. It is to this that we owe the very substantial lead which we now possess over the Soviet Union in the development of sea-based weapons systems.

An Answer to Red Missile Threats

Much that has been accomplished toward that achievement has passed almost unnoticed by the general public and been given scant attention in the press. Knowledgeable members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress have been stirring for several years with rising appreciation of the virtues of a mobile strategy, and an instinctive distrust of planting fixed targets for enemy nuclear missiles in our homeland—as attentive scanning of the pertinent hearings and reports reveals very clearly. So the money has been made available, and now these years of hard work, patience, and devotion are at last bearing visible fruit.

The logic of marrying nuclear striking power to sea-based mobility will be far more persuasive to public opinion when it is represented by power in being rather than by promises in blueprints. Once that logic is widely accepted as the decisive answer to the Soviet missile threat, the ultimate logic of control of the sea, with all its far-reaching consequences, becomes irresistible.

Control of the sea is, of course, a relative term—both in space and in degree. No naval force that could conceivably be created by the US, or any other power or combination of powers, could possibly exercise day-to-day control of all the seas of the world, covering 70% of the globe's surface. The best that can be done is to possess the capability of establishing zones of control, relative to a given opponent, wherever strategic circumstances may require. Even within the limits of such zones, control of the surface, the air above the surface, and the depths beneath it cannot be total; again, the best that can be done is to establish conditions under which friendly forces



A notable geographic fact about the Soviet Union is its limited access to open water.

can operate effectively, with acceptable risks, while enemy forces can operate, if at all, only under severe handicaps and at maximum risk. A known capability of establishing such conditions in a given sea-area may very well have a deterrent effect on the opposing side as to the possible use of that area in war, and therefore bring into question the development of weapons systems intended to operate there or which must pass that way to reach their operational objectives.

If, therefore, our seapower is to be a credible deterrent upon Soviet actions—either as to launching nuclear

war or as to embarking upon limited ventures—we must firmly establish in the minds of the Soviet leadership our capabilities for exercising control of the seas in areas where we would have to operate in war, and of denying the Soviets any prospect of being able either to interfere seriously with such control, or of using the sea elsewhere for counter-moves or diversionary operations.

The calendar years 1961 and 1962 seem likely to be a period of critical importance in this respect—a period in which a new concept of national strategy takes tangible form and acquires stature at home and abroad.

There are several reasons for this:

- Our first Polaris-armed submarines will be at sea, with a due proportion deployed on their patrol stations. During 1961-1962 the total number will rise from two submarines (32 missiles) to at least nine (144 missiles).

- The number of other nuclear-powered submarines with the Fleet will rise to a total of 24 (22 attack, 1 reconnaissance, 1 guided-missile) by the end of 1962. We have done our homework with prototypes; now we start cashing in.

- The nucleus of our first nuclear-powered attack carrier task

group (*Enterprise, Long Beach, Bainbridge*) will also be at sea by the end of 1962. Attack carrier capability will be significantly extended by the commissioning of *Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation*, in 1961, and by deliveries of new aircraft.

● During this period, also, the number of ships armed with surface-to-air missiles will rise to 50: 11 cruisers, 20 frigates, 19 destroyers (besides the two new carriers last named). This marks a very significant rise indeed in the anti-air and anti-submarine defense of carrier task forces, as well as of ASW groups and amphibious forces.

● There will be much wider distribution to the Fleet of new anti-submarine gear which is now just becoming operational.

● Amphibious capabilities will be improved by the commissioning of the third of the new LPDs and the first amphibious assault ship (LPH) to be built as such.

Thus the power, the reach, and the sustained operating capability of the Navy will be markedly increased across the board.

Most important of all will be the deployment of *Polaris* at sea; for from this will follow not only a rising deterrent capability, but growing recognition of the requirements of our nuclear-age seapower strategy as a whole.

This is directly associated with the need for demonstrating our capability of establishing zones of sea-control where they are needed, and of denying them to the enemy.

For the purposes of this discussion, certain assumptions will be predicated for the period under examination (1961-1962):

● The cold war confrontation will continue, with no nuclear war and no large-scale limited conflicts;

● The range of the deployed *Polaris* missiles will be limited to 1200 nautical miles;

● The Soviet Navy will not have operational nuclear-powered submarines in significant numbers.

The first of these, of course, is pure guesswork; the other two seem justified by available information.

If we are to get any real deterrence out of *Polaris*, the submarines on station must be assigned cruising areas within reach of sensitive targets in the Soviet Union. These


cruising areas should be, ideally, in waters where we or our Allies normally exercise control of the surface and the air above it: i.e., waters where overt Soviet air and surface anti-submarine reconnaissance is not to be expected.

When designated targets cannot be reached from such waters, or can be taken under fire only at extreme range (with consequent disadvantages and uncertainties) the missile submarine may have to use evasion and concealment to operate in enemy-controlled or disputed sea areas.

Without trying to second-guess the target-designators, let us consider a list of *conceivable* Soviet targets and the areas from which a 1200-mile *Polaris* could reach them:

Target and Its Characteristics

- Moscow—Capital; communications; industry
- Leningrad—Naval base; ship and submarine yards
- Gorky—Principal submarine-building yards
- Sverdlovsk—Major heavy industry; missiles



- Stalino—Major heavy industry
 - Magnitogorsk—Major heavy industry
 - Aral Sea region—Missile experimental center
 - Murmansk-Severomorsk—Naval base Northern Fleet
 - Baku—Oil production; industry; submarine training
 - Novosibirsk—Major heavy industry
- Now let us consider the sea-areas from which these targets can be attacked by missiles with a range of 1200 nautical miles:

Target and Attack Areas

- Moscow—Norwegian Sea; off North Cape.
- Leningrad—Norwegian Sea; off North Cape.
- Gorky—Norwegian Sea; off North Cape.
- Sverdlovsk—Off North Cape (x); *Barents Sea*
- Stalino—Eastern Mediterranean

Magnitogorsk—Barents Sea.
Aral Sea region—North end of Persian Gulf (x).

Murmansk-Severomorsk—*Norwegian Sea*; Atlantic Ocean outside barrier; Arctic ice area.

Baku—Eastern Mediterranean; *Persian Gulf*.


Novosibirsk—Kara Sea, close in (x).

Italicized attack area is closest to target. (x) Extreme range.

Study of this table indicates that several of these tentative targets (and others in their general vicinity) can best be reached by *Polaris* missiles from the Norwegian Sea and from the Arctic reaches between North Cape and Spitsbergen. Penetration of the Barents Sea and even of the Kara Sea is necessary in a few cases. Targets which can best be reached from the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf add up to something less in apparent deterrent weight than those which can be attacked from northern waters. It should be added that several of the latter (Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky) can be reached also from the Skaggerak and the North Sea; but waters where so great a density and diversity of traffic is normally encountered may be considered undesirable for the cold-war deployment of *Polaris* submarines.

Thus the Norwegian Sea and at least the western approaches to the Barents Sea become sea-areas of enhanced interest to us. They also become sea-areas of enhanced interest to the Soviet Union.

The almost pathological reaction of the Soviet leadership to the presence of American fixed air and missile bases near their land frontiers does not suggest that they are likely to accept calmly the presence of American sea-based nuclear weapons near their sea frontiers. They will seek diligently for effective countermeasures, both physical and psychological. As against our land bases, they have already created a very substantial armament of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, capable of taking most of our fixed overseas bases under surprise attack. It is for this reason, among others, that we are seeking relative immunity for our deterrent weapons against ballistic missile surprise by making use of the mobility and concealment enjoyed by sea-based systems.



We would, however, be guilty of seriously under-rating Soviet capabilities if we imagine that all we have to do is to send our Polaris-armed submarines to sea and depend thereafter solely on their qualities of evasion and concealment for their continued security against attack. These are valuable qualities indeed, but we can hardly afford to allow the Soviets to find comfort in an undisturbed and unthreatened search for the right counter-measures. The result of that would be a gradual erosion of the Polaris deterrent factor as the diligent Soviet technologists acquired more and more infor-

mation and developed more and better ASW systems, while the Soviet leaders began to comfort themselves with the happy assurance that all they would have to do is to locate and track X number of submarines, all alone and unsupported in waters where the Soviets can control the surface of the sea and the air above it without let or hindrance.

The Soviets have, of course, seen the Polaris threat coming for several years. The nature of some of their counter-measures is fairly apparent by this time. They include:

- Intensive development of their ASW capabilities. ASW was once

the orphan child of the Soviet Navy, since there was little reason to suppose that our torpedo-armed submarines would be any special threat to a country which, in war, would not be particularly dependent on sea-borne traffic. Submarines armed with 1200-mile ballistic missiles are something else again. Their ASW teams are, however, short-legged, as they have no carriers and must depend for their air element on shore-based planes. Destroyers, patrol craft and conventionally-powered submarines they have in plenty, and they can be counted on to make maximum use of mines—their best-

developed naval capability—wherever conditions permit.

- Increased interest—almost feverish, from some accounts, during the last year or two—in amphibious warfare. This suggests that they may be thinking of limited operations to extend their base system in northern waters by establishing themselves in such places as northern Norway, Iceland, or the western coast of Spitsbergen. This would greatly extend the scope of their ASW teams and mincraft, and would give them increased capabilities for contesting the control of the Norwegian Sea.

- Widespread covert activities by merchant ships, fishing vessels and submarines. Reconnaissance and hydrographic exploration may be the current missions of these elements, but readiness to carry out amphibious or mine-laying missions without warning cannot be ruled out. For example, the constant presence of large numbers of Soviet fishing craft off the Lofoten Islands, on the northwest coast of Norway, brings clearly into view what might happen if, one day, such an “innocent” fishing fleet might suddenly disgorge a load of 150 or 200 fully-armed Soviet soldiers per smack on the Norwegian coast. The highly competent job of mine-laying done in the harbor of Wonsan, Korea, by harmless-looking North Korean sampans, also ostensibly engaged in fishing, is another reminder of the possibilities; more recent nudges come from the cutting of the Atlantic cable off Newfoundland by a Soviet trawler, and from the presence of other Soviet trawlers off Long Island during the recent sea-trials of USS *George Washington*, our first Polaris submarine. The increase during the last year or so of unidentified submarine contacts in widely separated locations suggests that the Soviets may have embarked on a deliberate policy of keeping an increasing proportion of their long-range submarines constantly far out at sea, so they could produce a sudden concentration of offensive force without warning. They are of course well aware that any massive sortie of submarines from Murmansk toward the North Atlantic would be detected, and be a tip-off of offensive intentions.

- A constant barrage of threats and propaganda, with the plain object of disrupting the western alliance system by playing on the fears and anxieties of the peoples concerned, and imbuing them with doubts as to the reliability of American power as a deterrent of Soviet aggression. None of this is aimless. An immediate Soviet objective appears to be to frighten host countries into restricting the operational use of our overseas bases, as exemplified by Soviet threats at the time of the U-2 affair and after the shooting down in July 1960 of an American RB-47 over the Barents Sea. Another significant move was Khrushchev's declaration that Austrian neutrality would be considered violated if US missiles fired from Italy passed over Austrian territory. One has only to consider the geographical position of Sweden in connection with possible Polaris firing positions to see how this Soviet definition of neutrality could be applied in the hope of producing Swedish anti-Polaris



protests. Meanwhile the loud noises of Mr. K. regarding Soviet intent to support the Castro revolution in Cuba against American “imperialism” are doubtless meant, among other purposes, to impress all listeners with the length of the Soviet arm and Soviet willingness to challenge the US right in its own backyard.

If we are to have an effective sea-based deterrent force we must do more than merely deploy our Polaris submarines in the proper places. The next two years are likely to be a trial period in more senses than one. During those years the Norwegian Sea and adjacent waters will almost surely be a crucial maritime area. We must establish a capability for exercising control of those waters and of denying them to the enemy—always in those relative terms in which control of the sea can alone be seriously considered.

It must be made clear, not only to the Soviets but to our friends and

our own folks at home, that we are maintaining a constant position of readiness in the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, from which we can swiftly and effectively develop whatever type of operation circumstances may require in and beyond the Norwegian Sea.

The instrument of this posture of readiness seems certain to be the Second Fleet; it is surely not mere coincidence that has caused this Fleet to be raised to full operational status as of July 1, 1960, with continuous command over all Atlantic Fleet ships suitable for operation with attack carrier forces and not undergoing overhaul or otherwise assigned. Its commander wears a NATO hat also, as commander under SACLANT of the Striking Fleet Atlantic, which essentially is the Second Fleet plus a British carrier strike group. It should, however, be noted that coordination with and support of the Polaris submarines is not a NATO responsibility in time of peace.

Suppose the mission of the Second Fleet—as a US force under CINCLANT command but with full recognition of its SACLANT responsibilities—is defined as including:

- Establishment of a capability for immediate reaction against any Soviet military enterprise—amphibious, mine-laying, ASW or whatever—in the Norwegian or Greenland Seas or the western approaches to the Barents Sea: including specific task force operations and exercises in these waters on occasion;

- Maximum possible protection and support of Polaris submarines deployed in northern waters;

- Cooperation according to plan with ASW forces engaged in containing or observing Soviet submarine activities;

- Establishment of a capability for all-out offensive operations in and beyond the Norwegian Sea, including use of carrier task forces for nuclear attack against designated targets—coordinated with Polaris operations according to the established target assignments.

Fulfillment of this mission would seem to require the continual presence in the northeastern Atlantic Ocean of a task force built around at least two attack carriers, with all necessary supporting elements in-

cluding an amphibious group (with an FMF component) and an ASW group.

But the north flank cannot be the only responsibility of the Second Fleet. It must also be capable of quickly supporting the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, or of meeting emergencies which may arise in, say, the Caribbean or the South Atlantic—as we are reminded while these words are being written by what is happening in Cuba and the Congo. Thus too much of the Second Fleet's strength cannot be permanently deployed in the northeastern Atlantic if a position of full readiness to meet any emergency within the scope of Atlantic Command's responsibility is to be maintained.

The Heart of the Fleet

Clearly the Commander Second Fleet needs two task forces—one for the northeastern Atlantic with primary responsibility for the mission above described, but available for emergency needs elsewhere; the other to remain more centrally located where it can be ready either to reinforce the north flank or perform any other required mission.

The heart of the second Fleet's sea-control capability will be its attack carrier striking groups. Existing limitations on operating strength allow six carriers (CVAs) for the Atlantic-Mediterranean area and eight for the Pacific. Allowing two for deployment to the Mediterranean and one undergoing overhaul or carrying out training exercises, this allows an average Second Fleet strength of only three CVAs: which means that one of its two task forces can have only one attack carrier. Without going into details of carrier operations, it is enough to mention the well-known carrier formula that two attack carriers working together are not just twice, but about four times as operationally efficient as a single carrier.

There is just one prospect of increasing the number of CVAs on active service during the next two years. This is to lift the operational ceiling and retain in service as attack carriers the three modernized Essex-class carriers which would otherwise be transferred to anti-submarine (CVS) configuration during 1961-1962 as the new *Kitty Hawk*,

Mr Eliot, is a noted lecturer, military analyst and author. He has lectured at well known military schools such as US Naval War College, and Command and General Staff College; written articles for US Naval Institute Proceedings, Life, Look, Army Military Review, etc.; and published his first novel, "Caleb Petten-gills, USN," in '56. Mr Eliot also writes a syndicated column, "The Military Scene" (30 daily newspapers).



Constellation and *Enterprise* join the Fleet. The Second Fleet could then have an average available strength of five CVAs—two or three in each task force, a far more desirable situation. Additional aircraft would have to be ordered to provide the extra CVAs with air groups; pending delivery of new planes, a temporary expedient might be found in using a proportion of Marine Corps squadrons aboard these carriers. This would have the additional advantage of providing more efficient air support in emergencies requiring the use of landing forces; however, it would seem to require restoration of the recent cuts in the overall strength of the 2d MAW in order not to reduce the available level of combat air power at Cherry Point below acceptable limits.

Also, if an embarked FMF component is going to be required with the Second Fleet's north flank task force—as seems desirable to provide for swift reaction against (or deterrence of) any attempt by the Soviets to expand their present rather unfavorable base situation in the critical northern area under examination—then plainly the 2d Marine Division must go back to its full complement of nine BLTs. It would certainly be wise, in addition, to try to negotiate with the Icelandic government for the return to Keflavik Air Force base of the infantry battalion of the Army recently withdrawn from that station. If this cannot be done at present, there is all the more need to have a Marine unit close at hand.

The operational concepts which will govern the activities and eventually the composition of the Second Fleet will naturally be developed through experience, including the reactions of the opponent. In the be-

ginning, for example, the normal operating area of the north flank task force may well be the northeastern Atlantic Ocean up to the anti-submarine barrier zone along the line Greenland-Iceland-Faroes-Orkneys. Task units of varied composition may operate from time to time, for specific purposes, in and even beyond the Norwegian Sea. Only time can determine whether there is sound reason for the continuous presence of US surface forces in that sea—or whether the demonstration that they can get there quickly if required will serve all practical needs.

Polaris Deployment—Its Problems

The occasion for having to face these new requirements and establish new operational capabilities now is the Polaris deployment, which may well develop into our chief reliance for deterrence of nuclear surprise attack. This in itself presents problems that are complex enough. Adm Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, said in a statement recently submitted to a Congressional committee:

"In any area of the ocean where FBM submarines operate . . . US and allied forces operating in the area must be carefully and continually coordinated. There must be defense against enemy action—including enemy submarines. The selection of operating areas must be carefully integrated with knowledge of friendly forces and intelligence of enemy forces. The system of havens and sanctuaries necessary to prevent mutual interference and insure safety is both intricate and important. . . . Further, the operational activity, on station assignment, and logistic support for these ships must


be detailed and expertly coordinated. Logistic support of the submarines, sailing routes, support in case of casualty or malfunction of equipment while in operating area and return transit are some of the considerations which . . . involve coordination with other similar ships and, as a practical matter, with all fleet elements."

In presenting this statement to the Congressmen, Adm Burke was making a case—to this writer's mind, an unchallengeable and self-evident one—for control of Polaris submarines by the naval commander whose overall responsibility includes their area of operations, instead of—as has been suggested in other quarters—by some sort of special "strategic" commander, or even by the Strategic Air Command of the Air Force. In making this case, the Admiral has however presented sufficient detail to make another point very plain indeed: the extension of naval responsibility and activity required for support of and coordination with the deterrent Polaris force cannot be just a question of local superiority; it involves control of adjacent waters, especially the approaches to Polaris operating areas.

It has already been pointed out that the Second Fleet, as the main offensive striking force of the Atlantic Command, cannot be wholly committed to north flank security; yet that security depends to some extent on the flexibility inherent in naval forces, so that the whole force of the Second Fleet can be made available in that sector if necessary. Sea-control in those far northern waters rests finally on sea-control in the North Atlantic Ocean as a whole. The Second Fleet represents the positive element by which that sea-control is exercised. But the challenge of hostile submarines in the North Atlantic must be countered by defensive measures of which the Anti-submarine Defense Force Atlantic (ASDEFORLANT) is the embodiment. The challenge of hostile land forces (and/or subversive activities directed toward military expansion) must be countered by readiness of the Fleet Marine Force and the Amphibious Force to react effectively. The challenge of hostile mine-laying must be countered by constantly improving our mine

counter-measure capabilities—and so on.

All these elements of seapower are interdependent. The Fleet Marine Force, for example, cannot react against a Soviet landing in a Norwegian fjord unless the Second Fleet (and ASDEFORLANT) can see that it gets there; but all the gun, missile and air power of the Second Fleet may well be unable to dislodge or destroy that Soviet landing force, once it is ashore, without the coordinated efforts of the Marines. The Mine Force cannot clear an Icelandic harbor of mines unless protected against Soviet air interference by carrier planes; but the carrier cannot use the harbor until the Mine Force has done its job. We are here using the terms of active war; in the deterrent phase, the visible ability to do all these jobs, to do everything necessary to establish and maintain sea superiority in a critical area, adds up to the highest obtainable measure of total deterrence.



Obvious deficiency in any component of this total may open an escape-hatch in the enemy's calculations and impair the validity of the whole.

It has been pointed out by military students that the German success in Norway in 1940 was in large measure due to a single British shortcoming—their failure to develop the Royal Marines into a powerful, integrated Fleet Marine Force with adequate air support. This is doubtless true; it is also doubtless true that the existence of such a force ready to intervene in Norway might have deterred the Germans from the undertaking altogether—the balance of risk against advantage was delicately poised as it was. From another viewpoint, it might have en-

abled the British to get there first; the length of time required to make ready an Army landing force was one reason the British decision on Norway hung fire so long.

Political as well as military decisions are frequently affected by the visibility of one or another pertinent circumstance. It is not a simple matter to present a well-rounded military policy in all its complexity to the attention of the American public, any more than it is a simple matter to persuade all elements of our official decision-making processes that it would be a good idea to raise the personnel level of the Marine Corps to 225,000, or to provide eight hunter-killer groups for ASDEFORLANT instead of two, or to cut back on fixed-base ballistic missiles in favor of sea-based weapons—desirable and even essential as all these suggestions may appear to those directly concerned with the relevant problems.

What is here suggested is simply that the idea of the Polaris submarine-mounted missile as a deterrent does appear to have caught the public imagination, because of its obvious advantages: (a) of relative invulnerability to surprise destruction, and (b) of not attracting hostile nuclear attack to populated home territory. As reliance on Polaris as our main nuclear deterrent increases, the measures needed to insure its safe deployment and effective operation will become more "visible" to the public eye. Since these measures, in the final analysis, lead us directly to a policy of sea-control, such a policy becomes not only intellectually arguable, but politically and financially feasible. The manifold advantages of a sea-control strategy, going far beyond the realm of nuclear deterrence (though founded upon it, will then in turn gradually become visible and will take root in the popular consciousness. Implementation of these advantages in terms of weapons, vehicles, equipment, and above all trained personnel, thus becomes virtually assured.

The next two years may well be the trial-and-error period for a new American strategy which can, in its full flowering, bring the free world out of the wilderness of uncertainty in which we now wander. US ♣ MC

Marine Corps Gazette • December 1960