The defense of the west

Johnson, P W
Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994): Apr 1957; 41, 4;
Marine Corps Gazette & Leatherneck Magazine of the Marines
pg. 12

There is nothing like a good, honest-to-goodness, down-to-earth panic to keep things running smoothly, boost newspaper circulation and keep Senators in the headlines. Having successfully weathered the Axis air power threat, the atomic bomb fright, and the hydrogen bomb menace, American newspaper readers and radio listeners are now standing face-to-face with the biggest and most glorious panic of them all. This, needless to say, involves that old devil, IBM.

For the benefit of those who are not up-to-date on their menaces and still believe that poison gas is going to lead to the premature departure of the human family from the planet, it should be explained that the IBM is not a machine used for punching holes in cards. The newer model is a machine used for punching holes in countries.

The “ultimate weapon,” as the machine is described by Hanson W. Baldwin, is also referred to as “the weapon that will rule the earth.” In addition to this brilliant regal potential, it also “carries man and his future on its shoulders.”

Although it still is a dream on the drawing boards, its optimistic adherents have given it a future that more than compensates for its lack of a past or present. Trevor Gardner recently resigned as assistant secretary of the United States Air Force on the ground that the USAF wasn’t spending enough money for the development of the IBM. Gardner and others have argued that the outcome of the so-called IBM race will determine the future of humanity. We are told that we must either win the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile race or lose the human race.

The IBM has achieved a reputation as a decisive weapon that makes conventional air power, the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb look like impoverished relations in the family of weapons. In achieving this pre-eminent position, the new ogre has displaced, in the popular fancy, some extremely highly-regarded weapons.

Only a few years ago, air power enjoyed a universal reputation as the decisive weapon which held the margin between victory and defeat in modern warfare. The Norwegian invasion, the Battle of Britain, Crete, Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Pantelleria, Normandy and a dozen other campaigns demonstrated again and again the vital importance of air power. The United Nations forces did not at any time attempt a major amphibious invasion without first gaining control of the air. Aerial superiority was the first goal of every national on every battlefield.

Alexander P. De Seversky wrote

By Yn3 P. W. Johnson, USN

Marine Corps Gazette • April 1957

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Defensive movements are slow, but always certain—until we can more properly assess the role of the surface-to-air missile, we had better not assume that WWIII will be a “one weapon” war that strategic bombers could single-handedly win the war, and Walt Disney carried the message to millions of moviegoers in his famous film, “Victory Through Air Power.” The final collapse of Germany and Japan left a good portion of the American population with the impression that the tough Flying Fortresses, weird-looking P-38s, and invincible B-29s had played a dominant role in the achievement of victory in the world’s worst war. The leaders of the vanquished and thoroughly-battered Axis nations wholeheartedly agreed with the most partisan advocates of the air power thesis. Military conflict was reduced to a simple formula: the best air force wins the war.

This theory was not the exclusive property of the airmen. Army and Navy leaders accepted the new doctrine with surprising enthusiasm. According to England’s leading general, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, “If we lose the war in the air, we lose the whole war and lose it quickly.” The victor of El Alamein, then serving as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, stated categorically, “It is clear . . . that the dominant factor in future war will be air power.” “I consider,” he added, “that the day of the large warship on the surface of the sea is over.”

The explosion of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided additional material for the air force enthusiasts. In his book, Air Power: Key to Survival, De Seyversky neatly disposed of the Army and Navy in chapters containing quiet, non-controversial titles like "Our Own Maginot Line" and "The End of Sea Power." The ex-Czarist pilot maintained that the airplane was the primary method of delivery—the atomic bomb, so it would be the decisive weapon in any nuclear conflict.

Nevertheless, the atomic bomb began to dominate the picture in the minds of the American people. Air power tended to be slightly ignored while popular attention was focused on a new horrible weapon which would exercise such overwhelming influence over war that victory would go to those who got there “fastest with the mostest” atomic bombs, regardless of the number of aircraft involved. The new weapon was so powerful that it tortured the consciences of the very scientists who had created it. It brought fear to the hearts of millions. Books with cheerful titles like No Place to Hide and One World or None became best sellers. Bernard Baruch stepped before the newly-created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June, 1946, to give the world his country’s generous offer to share atomic information in an international society with adequate safeguards against atomic annihilation. “We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead . . . We must elect world peace or world destruction.”

Although the atomic bomb apparently had the power to destroy the world, a number of doubting Thomases decided to make sure by developing a new ultimate weapon that was even more ultimate than the last one. The hydrogen bomb was on the way. Newspaper circulation increased. The hydrogen bomb “race” was to determine whether or not the Soviet Union would dominate the world.

Harrison Brown, former assistant director of the plutonium project at Oak Ridge, stated: “We have the possibility of constructing a weapon which is, let us say, of the order of a thousand times the destructiveness of the Hiroshima bomb, or thereabouts.”

Similar views were expressed by other atomic experts. There seemed to be no limit to the destructive potential of the H bomb. “How big it is will depend only upon the amount of heavy hydrogen which you carry in a plane or in any other device.
Yeoman Johnson has been in the Navy since October 1955. Recently promoted to 3d Class, he is aboard the USS Hanna (DE 449) operating with CORTRON 9 out of San Diego. Prior to entering the Navy he was graduated from the Univ of Oregon and the Univ of Arizona College of Law. He was motivated to enter the Marine Corps Association Essay Contest "by a desire to stimulate discussion on matters which I believe to be of decisive importance to the military security of Western civilization."

which you may use to deliver the bomb." So said Hans Bethe, wartime director of theoretical physics at the Los Alamos Laboratories. There was a renewed agitation for a ban upon nuclear weapons. Winston Churchill expressed the prevailing sentiment when he warned that mankind was peering over the rim of Hell.

Many people were worried about the H bomb, but they soon discovered that they were wasting their time as they learned that an H bomb delivered by the IBM machine is much, more devastating than an H bomb dropped by a mere Boeing B-52 intercontinental jet bomber. Humanity was off to the races again. Only the H race has been shoved aside in favor of the more exciting IBM race. A different theory of one-weapon warfare has taken hold of the popular imagination.

During the various spontaneous publicity campaigns launched on behalf of the various ultimate weapons that would win wars singlehandedly, the Army and Navy and Marine Corps have been quietly eased over to the sidelines. If strategic air power, the H bomb, or the supersonic IBM machine will control the margin between victory and defeat, the infantry divisions, aircraft carriers and amphibious assault teams become significant only as auxiliary forces for supply and occupation. The typical postwar theory of military combat regards the Navy as a glorified ferry service and the Army and Marines as a bunch of guys in radiation-proof zootsuits who march across the bodies of their atomized opponents and plant the flag on the top of a pile of debris once known as the enemy capital.

Maybe they are right. No one can say with any degree of certainty that any particular theory as to the future of warfare is correct or incorrect. The course of warfare never could be, and cannot now be, determined in advance. New weapons will be developed that will completely revolutionize the relations between weapons and tactics. The high-priority weapon of today may clutter up the junk heaps of tomorrow. Who could have predicted that the tactics of the Civil War at sea would change so fast that the wooden war vessels of 1861 would be helpless in 1863? What good were all of the crystal-ball speculations as to the probable course of military operations in World War II, in view of the total ignorance as to the existence of that amazing weapon, radar, that would dominate operations in every theater? A single discovery blotted out a million words on the subject of the future of warfare.

In view of the tremendous influence of new weapons and theories upon the outcome of military operations, it should be emphasized that any observations upon the validity of the one-weapon war concept, or of any other military theory, must be made with full knowledge that there may be, and probably are, highly secret weapons in existence today that will demonstrate the total inadequacy of some of those observations. The man who attempts to plot the future course of military tactics is like the blind man in a dark room at midnight, hunting for a black cat that isn’t there. He can only state various probabilities based upon the inadequate information available to him. Even the great genius Einstein wouldn’t predict the type of weapons that would be used in World War III, although he volunteered the information that World War IV would be fought with clubs.

With these reservations in mind, a few observations may be made upon the probability of international conflict being reduced to a one-weapon proposition. First-hand information not being readily available, it will be necessary and extremely desirable to rely heavily upon the statements of scientific and military experts concerning the performance characteristics of various weapons.

Since all of the decisive weapon theories are based upon delivery by air, the defense, if any, must cope with the 2 major means of aerial attack, the airplane and the IBM.

There is a great deal of evidence that indicates that the first of these, the offensive airplane, has more than met its match and is doomed to follow the dodo bird into peaceful oblivion. While defensive fighters may play a major role in aerial operations, it may become impossible to maintain their offensive counterparts over enemy positions or ships.

As long ago as 1945, Gen H. H. Arnold stated that strategic bombing may be made "impracticable" by "improved antiaircraft defenses." This remarkable statement—an amazing statement in the year of the great Army-Navy aerial conquest of Japan—was made by a man who had achieved world-wide fame as the builder of the greatest air force on
The commanding general of a force regarded by many as the strongest military instrument of all time took his thoughts away from the aerial battering of Germany and Japan and looked into the future to foresee a time when his beloved superbombers would be smashed into junk, not by defensive fighters which his contemporaries regarded as the only reasonable defense against aerial assault, but by "improved antiaircraft defenses." Some of his bombardiers, having repeatedly penetrated the toughest AA defenses Axis ingenuity could devise, must have laughed at their General's seemingly-fantastic statement. It was as if Nelson had come back from Trafalgar muttering about the approaching doom of sea power. It was too ridiculous to be true.

Subsequent developments, however, indicated that the father of the Air Force, as usual, knew what he was talking about. In 1952, the Army revealed a new weapon, possibly the most significant military development of the postwar decade.

The "improved antiaircraft defense" was named "Nike," after the Greek goddess of victory. Its amazing ability to knock down all types of aircraft, including supersonic jet fighters, makes it one of the most valuable weapons in the American military arsenal. The Defense Department credits the Nike with the ability to attack all planes with "the altitude and the speed and the maneuvering qualities that we have any reason to expect to encounter." Army Chief of Staff Gen Maxwell B. Taylor is equally optimistic: "...this weapon can operate effectively against any presently operational aircraft regardless of height and speed. Moreover, we have anticipated the capabilities of higher-performance aircraft; an improved Nike, the Nike B, will be more than capable of dealing with such aircraft when they become operational." Adm Louis Denfield, then Chief of Naval Operations, presumably was thinking of defense as well as offense when he called the Guided Missile "the basic naval weapon of the future."

The Nike and its sister weapons in the family of "steel-feathered firebirds" that will confront any future aggressor, will probably raise a defensive fire barrier over the sea as well as over land targets. The modern aircraft carrier, "with guided missiles carrying companions, will offer a formidable defense against any weapons now on the drawing boards or even on the horizon."

According to Secretary of the Navy Thomas, "Any enemy who launches an attack against a modern carrier task force with its mobility, aircraft, new missiles and other equipment, will be attacking the toughest target in the world. . . ."

The deadly new "bullets with brains" haven't been accepted by everyone as a satisfactory solution to the aerial defense problem. However, it is significant that most of the criticism comes from the Air Force, which has more than a passing interest in the matter, because it is rapidly headed for extinction as an offensive weapon if the Nike has the performance characteristics attributed to it by the men who have seen it in action. An additional explanation for the somewhat partisan attitude of the airmen lies in their not unreasonable desire to control the major weapons used in aerial defense of land areas. Since it would be rather outrageous for them to seize control of a weapon developed exclusively by the Army, they would prefer to throw the weight of their influence behind a different missile which they could claim as their own.

Whatever the cause of the criticism, the Nike has been strongly attacked by Air Force leaders. They charge that a plane can outmaneuver it, although it was revealed, in the early days of the development of the Nike, that "enemy planes can dive, climb, bank, sideslip or turn tail, but the Army's new weapon still will knock them out of the skies." The newer models of the Nike are reputed to be far superior to the old, and most authorities agree that any good homing missile will follow the path of a maneuvering opponent and destroy it.

It also is claimed that the Nike failed to live up to expectations in a 1956 test demonstration that was supposed to prove its reliability and silence the critics: "The results were — at best — debatable. In one shot at a 500 mph aerial drone target, Nike registered a direct hit. In other shots the Army said Nike scored shrapnel hits, claimed 'kills' in each case. One Nike suffered an electronic brain storm and blew itself up." (Time magazine.) The results of Billy Mitchell's attack on the German battleships Ostfriesland also were "debatable," but the battlefleas went down. So did the Nike's drone target. A missile system that will send its projectiles into shrapnel range 7 times in 8 attempts is good enough to knock any air force out of the skies. As long ago as 1949, the United States was using homing missiles with proximity fuses. A direct hit is not required. This is particularly true where atomic antiaircraft warheads are employed, although the conventional AA burst should be sufficient, since the missile does not explode until it is within lethal range. It might be added that the "electronic brain storm," while interesting, is not particularly significant, because the defense won't be shattered by a few malfunctions in a huge mass of airborne missiles. The few missiles that miss probably won't be missed.

Another objection to the Nike is the fact that its boosters occasionally fall off at the wrong times and batter up some civilian residential areas. While this is unfortunate, the dropping of a few enemy atomic or hydrogen bombs in the area also can prove to be irritating. The fire department is not to be abashed because it gets the floors wet. Anyone who would propose abolition of the Nike on the ground that it damages ourselves ought to be transferred to the lunatic asylum to share a cell with the character who proposed painting tremendous Hirohito faces on the roofs of essential war industries to prevent aerial attacks by the
Emperor-worshipping Japanese.

The Air Force also claims that the Nike does not fit into its own radar defense network. This is a minor flaw which can be remedied, if necessary.

A more rational objection is the claim that the radar system guiding the Nike can be confused or jammed. There are 8 major antiradar techniques — the use of decoys, employment of devices like Window, and physical jamming.

Decoys should not be particularly effective against the Nike. One decoy can account for one Nike. After the decoys are eliminated, the defender can send up more missiles and knock down the planes. Since the decoy must approximate the speed and size characteristics of its mother plane, there is a definite limit to the number that each attacker can carry. In addition, the heavy decoys might cut down the speed and armament characteristics of the attacker, making it more vulnerable to defensive aircraft employing air-to-air homing missiles.

Antiradar devices like Window, Chaff and Rope were very effective against German and Japanese radar during the war, although Allied scientists were quite skeptical as to its ability to hamper the superior microwave radar used by the Western Powers. Window was tinfoil cut into strips and dropped by Allied bombers to cause radar reflections that would blind the enemy radar sets. German radar operators began to believe that the Flying Fortress, which could do just about everything else, was now reproducing itself as they saw one image become 2 and then spread into dozens, cluttering up the entire radar screen. Nazi radar became "as impotent as a long-distance movie camera in a blizzard."

Although it seems probable that modern electronics systems can overcome the difficulties presented by Window, its threat to the defense may be the reason for the development of surface-to-air missiles which shoot higher than the enemy bomber and attack from above, where Window would not interfere with a radar-homing mechanism (although Window might be dropped from enemy parachutes shot above the mother plane).

One drawback in the employment of devices like Window is their lack of speed. They either fall vertically or drift along with the wind. The enemy formation would soon leave it far behind, where it would not affect radar directed from the target area. Although a few lead planes might be sent ahead to drop Window near the target, it is likely that they would be shot down before arriving at the unloading point.

A more significant objection is that Window, Chaff and similar devices must be cut at the particular length which makes them resonant at the frequency of the particular radar set involved. The frequency of all of the enemy radar sets must be known in advance. Although the information that has been released to the public on this extremely important subject is very sketchy, it appears that the defense has the advantage in this phase of warfare.

The use of radar jamming was effective during WWII, but definite problems are created in a postwar world of electronics experts and homing missiles. Jamming must be on the same channel that is used by the radar set being jammed. It can be avoided by changing channels. Thus the enemy bomber fleet must be prepared to jam every channel that is in existence.

Another difficulty is the fact that the defense knows which channels will be jammed. Jamming is useless unless it involves the particular channels being employed by the defense. Consequently, the defense, knowing which channels will be jammed, can send up missiles which "home" on the jamming radar signal. Once the jammers are destroyed, additional missiles can be sent up to take care of the payload customers. Jamming does not appear to be the answer to the Nike.

The possible use of antimissile missiles to protect the bomber was discounted by one of the nation's top military scientists, Donald A. Quarles, former head of research and development for the Armed Forces: "The attempt to counter Nike with a missile that would intercept Nike before Nike could make its kill is a proposition that I'm quite sure we aren't up against."

The most valid objection to the Nike is concerned with its short range. It is argued that an enemy plane can launch deadly air-to-ground homing missiles from a point outside of the operational radius of the winged terror. While this is a reasonable argument, assuming that the bomber-launched missiles are too small for effective radar detection (an unlikely assumption — the course of enemy mortar shells was plotted by radar during WWII), it should be remembered that the aerial defense of the nation is not dependent solely upon the Nike. The Air Force has already adopted the Navy Talos, which apparently is superior to the Nike. There is no magic law that holds that a Nike-type missile with a range of 500 or 1,000 miles cannot be developed, if it is not already in

Marine Corps Gazette • April 1957

Perhaps the surface Navy is not as obsolete as some think
existence. The modern history of warfare teaches us that every major weapon will undergo tremendous improvements before it retires from the scene.

The Nike hasn’t been tested against some of the latest Air Force fighters. There is an excellent reason for this. Donald Quarles says that “we don’t want to sacrifice planes for such purposes.” The men who developed and tested the Nike know what he is talking about.

The Nike is generally considered to be dependent upon the use of radar. However, the success of enemy radar jamming, confusing and decoying techniques will not necessarily emasculate the ground-to-air missile. Other homing devices can be used to guide the missile unerringly to its helpless target.

“Homing devices have been developed which respond to acoustic or electronic waves emanating from the target and include devices which react to noise of all kinds — e.g., from engine or wings... An alternative method is the use of instrumentation which is receptive to infrared radiation emitted by the engine exhaust.” — Development of the Guided Missile, K. W. Gatland.

“Certain devices have also been made which are super-sensitive to heat radiations, and others have the uncanny ability to distinguish light differences either between the target and the sky or between the target and land or water areas surrounding it. Installed in the nose of a missile, these, too, can bring it to an objective without any other outside control assistance. One of these heat-seeking units, so sensitive it could detect the warmth of a human body a quarter of a mile away, was developed at the close of the last war.” — Guided Missiles: Rockets and Torpedoes, Frank Ross.

Missiles can home on a target through heat-seeking, light-seeking, radar, acoustic, magnetic, or infrared methods. The proximity fuse could be used to detonate the missile when it came within effective range, so that a direct hit would not be necessary. Even if the proximity fuse radar was nullified by the enemy, an analogous method could be employed, e.g., mechanism set to explode when a certain temperature or sound intensity or brightness is registered.

Suppose that the ground radar could be confused, so that the defenders wouldn’t know in which direction to head the missiles. American scientists have developed air-to-air homing missiles which promise to be just as valuable, if not more valuable. These amazing missiles are effective up to 10 miles from the launching aircraft. It appears that the aerial battles of the future, if there are any, will be mutual mass suicide affairs with homing missiles taking a deadly toll of both sides. The chance that antimissile missiles will be employed is unlikely. What device could intercept the Navy’s air-to-airsupersonic Sidewinder, “a 5-inch missile with brains?” It also is possible that decoys could be used with satisfactory results, but there are so many different types of homing missiles that the decoy would have to be almost as fast, large, hot, bright, magnetic and noisy as the mother plane in order to lure the brainy bullets away from the real objective. It is obvious that the defensive aircraft can send out the little missiles faster than the enemy can send out cumbersome decoys. This defensive activity is expensive, but aerial defense always is expensive, and well worth the cost. Germany’s WWII antiaircraft gunners averaged 50,000 shells for every enemy plane shot down. The English found it expensive to dump depth charges all day long around anchored ships in order to keep Mussolini’s bomb-carrying frogmen away, but they considered the effort necessary and worthwhile. In a nuclear war, wasting money will save money.

Although the weight of the missiles may tend to reduce the speed of the defensive fighter, this would not be equal to the attacker’s handicap involving bombload and additional fuel requirements. The defender will continue to be faster than the attacker.

With ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles in full production, it appears that the wartime commander of the world’s greatest air force, Gen. Arnold, had some advance information when he wrote, “We must bear in mind that air power itself can become obsolete.”

It is said that naval airmen visiting one of the Navy’s guided missile warships are shown a little box in which they may deposit their wings, since they won’t be needing them any more.

Indeed, it is possible that offensive aircraft will become so useless that aircraft carriers will be left with the sole task of providing defensive fighter protection on the rare occasions when that is necessary. The battle might return as the king of the seas, giving the much-ridiculed battleship admirals a chance for the last laugh on the air-minded naval leaders who have practically relegated the battlewagon to the naval counterpart of the glue factory.

While it is apparent that the guided missile has the upper hand over the bomber, there has been much comment as to its impotency as an answer to the IBM. The Nike obviously is not the answer, because its range is inadequate, but there have been statements that indicate that better missiles can stop the IBM. According to the wartime chief of Britain’s antiaircraft defenses, Gen. Pile, “the controlled projectile in defense will deal as surely with a rocket flying at 4,000 mph as it will with a jet bomber flying at 700 mph.” Gen. Arnold made a similar
prediction in 1945, long before the tremendous potentials of the anti-aircraft guided missile were realized over the testing grounds.

On the other hand, most of the IBM articles of today claim that, instead of being a supersonic white elephant that may out-dodo the dodo bird by becoming extinct before it is born, the big missile actually will be unstoppable. "Imagine," says Hanson W. Baldwin, "trying to hit an artillery shell in mid-flight with another artillery shell." He does not mention the possibility of the defenders detecting this oversized artillery shell with radar, plotting its path in advance, and sending up an atomic-warhead guided missile to meet it somewhere along that path and give it the worst beating any IBM machine ever saw.

While wartime radar was ineffective over 250 miles, the limitation was imposed by the curvature of the earth, not by any range limitation in the radar set. If enemy planes had been flying high enough they would have been detected over 250 miles away. However, since the IBM is supposed to reach tremendous heights, the curvature of the earth will not interfere with the defender's radar. When not hampered by the curvature of the planet, radar can reach any height that is required.

The Army Engineers bounced a radar signal off the moon shortly after the end of WWII.

Nevertheless, the tremendous speed of the IBM is listed as a possible means of escaping interception. It is expected to have a speed of from 12,000 to 16,000 miles per hour, completing its intercontinental journey in less than 30 minutes. Those who remember the delays in radar operation in the last global conflict feel that 15 or 20 minutes is not a sufficient period of time for a radar-directed defense to come to grips with an attacker. However, they do not realize that the system can be made completely automatic with the human element entirely eliminated. An antiaircraft missile can be automatically released as soon as the IBM is detected and its course predicted. This operation could take place without the intervention of human hands. The defenders could sleep through the battle. Speed? The speed of electronics is the speed of light — 186,000 miles per second.

Those who say that there can be no defense against the IBM are ignoring military history. Every mechanical weapon undergoes tremendous improvements before it finally is discarded from the arsenal of useful weapons. The surface-to-air missile is in its infancy. Its earliest models could knock down the best aircraft of its day. What will it be like when it is improved to a state 2 or 3 or perhaps 10 times as effective as its early models? How does John Ericsson’s Monitor compare with the USS Missouri? How effective was the Confederate submersible Hunley, which took 5 crews to a watery grave and committed suicide on its only successful mission, in comparison with the atomic-powered Nautilus? What would the armored warriors of 1956 think about the mobile “cisterns” that frightened the Germans at Cambrai? The antiaircraft missile also is slated for great improvements in range and accuracy. It would be a strange thing indeed if the men who invented the incredible proximity fuse, counter-mortar radar, the 6-jet B-52, and the hydrogen bomb, could not extend the ground-to-air missile’s range sufficiently to enable it to knock down the IBM.

It is possible, of course, that they won’t. It also is possible that undisclosed weapons, such as improved antiradar devices, will leave the Air Force in its dominant role. For example, there is some talk of using a special type of reflector which will return radar waves at the wrong speed. There also is a possibility of absorbing radar waves, leaving the operator in the dark. Other possibilities may arise.

However, until we are fairly certain that WWII, if it comes, will be a one-weapon war, we had better recognize the continuing importance of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps in the defense of the West.

**Salt Is in the Sea**

*Back in Boot Camp* in 1945 after having received a lecture in military courtesy, my buddy and I took a short stroll. We came up behind two Naval dentists and unable to think of the appropriate remark to accompany a salute in this situation, such as, "By your leave, Sir," my companion greeted them with a "Coming alongside, Sir."

*1stLt R. D. Flint*

**Hot Line**

*One day*, during the defensive stage of the Korean conflict, the Division Commander was inspecting the Main Line of Resistance. The party had stopped near an 81mm mortar OP from which the General was conducting a visual reconnaissance. As he was peering through the BC scope, the EE-8 rang and, being closest, the General answered it with a brisk "Wizard 6." There was an uncomprehending silence until finally, obviously unaware of the significance of this title, a gruff voice snapped back, "Wizard 6, my ———, this is the Gunny at the outpost — lemme talk to Dolan." With complete aplomb, the General turned and asked, "Is Dolan here?" A very uneasy Pfc Dolan completed the conversation.

*Maj W. A. Butcher*

*(The Gazette will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.