



# 21st Century Dreikampf: Challenges for Maneuver Warfare

Maneuverist Paper No. 16

by Marinus

***“In the whole range of human activities, war most resembles a game of cards.”<sup>1</sup>***

**—Carl von Clausewitz**

***“If you can’t spot the sucker in your first half hour at the table, then you are the sucker.”<sup>2</sup>***

**—Mike McDermott  
in the 1998 film Rounders**

**M**aneuverist No. 2 (*MCG*, Oct20) discussed the *Zweikampf* (“two-struggle”) as the essential dynamic of war per *MCDP 1, Warfighting*. Maneuverist No. 6 (*MCG*, Feb21) proposed the *Dreikampf*, or “three-struggle,” in which a population pursues interests independent of either of the main belligerents, as sufficiently different to qualify as an altogether other class of war. This paper explores the implications of the *Dreikampf*

more deeply. Key to understanding the *Dreikampf* is that segments of the population are not interested in defeating the other two sides militarily but are merely interested in the freedom of action to pursue those independent interests.<sup>3</sup> How should we understand this and how might this understanding inform what we should do about it?

We acknowledged that the population in a *Dreikampf* likely will consist of numerous factions rather than a singular entity. We suggest that segments of the population will tend to bond together in common purpose when it is expedient to do so and will tend to act independently when it is not. We have argued that the shift from a “two-body problem” to a “three-body problem,” as in classical physics, increases the complexity of the challenge exponentially—to the point that it becomes relatively unsolvable when taken as a whole. This begs the question of whether the conflict is solvable in parts or pieces. Asking such a question illuminates the difficulties in reconciling strategy with tactics in such situations. Here, we aim to explain why this happens and what challenges *Dreikampf* poses for maneuver warfare theory reflected in current Marine Corps doctrine. It is appropriate to consider what doctrinal changes might be in order to address future challenges given the benefit of two decades of experience with 21st-century *Dreikampf* in Afghanistan and Iraq.

## The Population as Many-Sided

The joint doctrinal notion of the population as the center

*Understanding the “three-sided struggle” is key to the modern application of maneuver warfare. (Photo by LCpl Samantha Barajas.)*

of gravity in counterinsurgency operations at least suggests a single entity as a source of power.<sup>4</sup> Others, however, have been sensitive to the idea of the population as fragmented.<sup>5</sup> The notion of the population as a complex polyglot of interests leading to organized violence is in fact a pre-modern phenomenon:

In fact, before the Peace of Westphalia, many different entities waged wars. Families waged wars, as did clans and tribes. Ethnic groups and races waged war. Religions and cultures waged war. So did business enterprises and gangs. These wars were often many-sided, not two-sided, and alliances shifted constantly. Not only did many different entities wage war, they used many different means. Often, when war came, whoever was fighting would hire mercenaries, both on land and at sea. In other cases, such as tribal war, the “army” was any male old enough, but not too old, to carry a weapon ... In addition to campaigns and battles, war was waged by bribery, assassination, treachery, betrayal, even dynastic marriage. The lines between “civilian” and “military,” and between crime and war, were hazy or non-existent. Many societies knew little internal order or peace; bands of men with weapons, when not hired out for wars, simply took whatever they wanted from anyone too weak to resist them. Here, the past is prologue.<sup>6</sup>

It is difficult to “operationalize” a military solution because conflict in such environments is not merely a military problem but fundamentally a political, social, and cultural one.<sup>7</sup> The military operational approach should be considered merely “satisficing”<sup>8</sup>—that is, applying local responses that will not necessarily solve the core problems leading to popular violence but will instead reduce the level of violence applied against friendly forces and neutral noncombatants until other, non-military pressures can be brought effectively to bear.

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***When we cannot figure out what causes someone to shoot at us, we tell ourselves it is sufficient to recognize that they are a threat and must be neutralized.***

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For those of us who have not spent significant time operating on the ground “outside the berm” in these kinds of conflicts, the natural inclination is to think of people shooting at us as the bad guys in an oversimplified us-versus-them *Zweikampf* paradigm. We can easily label the shooters as “insurgents” or “anti-government forces,” even when such characterizations are not accurate. But it can be easier to treat them that way given military and physical security missions and mindsets. When all you have got is a hammer, you see anybody shooting at you as a nail.<sup>9</sup> Metin Gurcan, a Turkish special forces officer, writes that this tendency leads to:

oversimplifying the incidents into a game with three players in the insurgency—and the habit of getting rid of every

detail—[that] may lead to unintended consequences (the primary of which is the underestimation of all other dynamics in the game). ... [A]ll Afghan politics in rural areas is local, and in many incidents at the local level, COIN forces are the subject of the game rather than being the object. ... It was the actors of the local politics that shaped the environment and aptly made use of the fight between the insurgents and COIN forces. ... In many incidents, the fight has been, thus, among the actors in the local politics, which means it was not a fight between the insurgents and the COIN forces as we read and watch it in the media.<sup>10</sup>

Gurcan’s book is filled with personal anecdotes illustrating how these tribal rural and Muslim perceptions within the population came into play in the Afghanistan war. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine argues that we must understand the causes of the conflict. True, but that does not do justice to the nuanced complexity. Gurcan agrees but makes the more nuanced point that “an accurate analysis of who is exploiting whom and for what purposes carries utmost importance when addressing an incident.”<sup>11</sup> For U.S. forces, this is easier said than done given our status as foreigners (with a strong tendency to mirror-image) and our troop-rotation policies. When we cannot figure out what causes someone to shoot at us, we tell ourselves it is sufficient to recognize that they are a threat and must be neutralized. Thus, we naturally pursue this end through tactical actions devoid of strategic context or reason—which leads to bad tactics.<sup>12</sup>

### **Population Goals Are Local, But Not Always Political**

Not all organized violence in war has political goals—even in the local sense. As Martin van Creveld suggested in 1991, the violence of war itself may very well be an end, not just a means to an end. He opines that even the risk of death will not likely deter those seeking the pleasure of the fight as its own reward.<sup>13</sup> As we now understand, self-radicalized jihadists are even willing to fail in their terrorist acts—resulting in their arrest or deaths—as an act of personal redemption, a demonstration of their individual religious faith and devotion.<sup>14</sup>

But there is more to it than even this. In insurgencies and civil war, public safety institutions are usually weak or even completely ineffective; this condition gives license for individuals, families, clans, tribes, and other groups to pursue armed coercive methods for any number of purposes outside those of the insurgency/rebellion.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, those caught up in such violence can be ignorant of the causes each side fights for, to the point of even being unable to identify what the causes of the overall conflict are.<sup>16</sup> This is not merely a 21st-century phenomenon, as Stathis Kalyvas describes in his magisterial book, *The Logic of Civil War*, with its treatments of insurgencies and civil wars ranging from the American Revolutionary War to the Iraq War as of 2005. This has always been true in human history.

Unfortunately, this kind of micro-detail in understanding the human element in *Dreikampf* cannot help but get lost beyond the platoon and company commanders who daily come into contact with the local situation—if even they

understand it.<sup>17</sup> Gurcan laments that the reporting generated in Afghanistan was usually framed in terms of the overall strategic or operational concerns, with little flavor for what was really happening in tactical incidents beyond the quantifiable facts on the ground.<sup>18</sup> This should be no surprise given mid-twentieth century and later American preferences for detailed quantification of observables in an irregular warfare operating environment, washing out what detailed insights exists through generalized trend analysis that cannot help but skew overall understanding. This is to be expected, given that the audiences for such analyses usually are senior military officers and government civilians with little time to absorb a dizzying variety of local nuances, even if given to them.<sup>19</sup>

### Dissolving Linkage Between Strategy and Tactics

The result of this is a decoupling of strategy from tactics and tactics from strategy in practice—regardless of the campaigns and operations intended to link them—when operating in a *Dreikampf* environment.<sup>20</sup> In Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategic framework assumptions regarding the legitimacy of the Baghdad and Kabul governments did not seem useful when dealing with people who either hated those in power or did not even recognize any sort of national or provincial government, no matter who occupied the government buildings in the capital city.<sup>21</sup> Far more pressing local issues governed how these people acted (and reacted). On the other hand, one senior Army officer lamented that the primacy of tactics at the boots-on-the-ground level seemed disconnected from strategic guidance and considerations, writing that “in the American Army’s new way of war, tactics—that is, carrying out of the ‘way’—has utterly eclipsed strategy” in counterinsurgency.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, it seemed like it had to, since strategy often had little to no practical relevance to what was happening to those executing it.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, tactics could often be applied with no governing strategic rationale, as one officer described occurring in the Pech Valley in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup>

Brett A. Friedman, in his latest book, argues why the operational level of war as a construct offers little help to connect strategy to tactics in these circumstances and others.<sup>25</sup> He summarizes earlier authors in observing that tactics in practice reflect linear problem-solving, whereas strategy requires a nonlinear approach, and there’s no logical space for the operational level to bridge these two very different things.<sup>26</sup> Either operational art takes a linear approach, basically using the same logic as tactics but on a larger scale, or it mirrors the nonlinear nature of strategy, which makes it part of strategy itself.<sup>27</sup> We disagree with this assertion, as our theory of war contends that war is chaotic and nonlinear in general, whether dealing with strategy, operational art, or tactics.<sup>28</sup> But we readily concede that other Services, joint commands, and other DOD and external organizations may not see war the same way; this may contribute to the problem of strategy disconnected from tactics.

In *Dreikampf*, the self-inflicted pressure to turn a local “three-body problem” into a more understandable “two-body problem” inaccurately oversimplifies the environment to better

fit linear problem-solving approaches. According to Friedman, this perspective is echoed by military leaders planning and conducting campaigns and operations, rubbing against the complications of nonlinear strategic complexity but choosing to ignore them. Given local chaos falling outside the simplistic us-versus-them mental model in coping with tactical problems, generalizing this in an accurate way in campaigns and operations to adequately inform strategy in a timely manner is very difficult. Because operational commanders fall back on Gurcan’s oversimplified paradigm in observing and analyzing what is going on—albeit across a larger area over longer periods of time—local nuance is usually lost in the aggregate. If operational art is supposed to assist in thinking about who, what, where, and when to fight, as well as to refuse to fight, wearing such cognitive blinders in planning and executing campaigns and operations is unhelpful at best and completely misleading at its absolute worst.<sup>29</sup>

Indeed, in a *Dreikampf*, what does it mean to tactically defeat the enemy when some of those who oppose us today might not tomorrow? Might they oppose us next week over a totally different issue? What about those working with us who employ us as violent proxies to achieve their own individualistic goals or eagerly solicit and receive our financial resources and material aid for the benefit of their family, clan, or tribe and no one else? The consequences of picking the wrong fight—whether in the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong people, or fighting in the wrong way—can lead others not initially predisposed to work against us to subsequently do so.<sup>30</sup> Despite our American proclivities to wash political considerations out of tactical decision making, this is anathema to the logic of *Dreikampf* and ultimately counterproductive.

We began this article with two quotes about playing cards. If war is a lot like playing a card game as Clausewitz suggests, a *Dreikampf* conflict requires us to ask ourselves a number of questions: How many players are sitting at the table? How many different types of games are the participants playing with the same decks of cards? Poker? If so, what kind? Or bridge? Rummy? Hearts? Or Spades? Are they changing from one type of game to another in-between and maybe even during a hand or a round of play? And maybe most important, are we the sucker at the table? And how can we know all this ahead of time so that we can take effective action? Is it even possible to know this ahead of time?

### Challenges to Current Marine Corps Doctrine

This last question is a good place to begin looking at our maneuver warfare doctrine to understand the kind of challenges we must face in *Dreikampf*. Certainly, maintaining an outward focus—on the so-called enemy or anybody pursuing their own interests—still matters, but grows more difficult as not only must we comprehend the military context but also the social, cultural, political/legal, economic, and related contexts as well. As *MCDP 2, Intelligence*, tells us “it may be extremely difficult to know in advance what [intelligence and information] is relevant and what is not.”<sup>31</sup> While we tend to put more attention on physical forces that threaten us, the

nature of 21st-century warfare is that practically anything can be weaponized, including information.<sup>32</sup> Traditionally, intelligence favored understanding potential and actual adversary capabilities over intent because of the difficulty in assessing the latter.<sup>33</sup> Now, intent of all possible potential adversaries must be given at least equal (and arguably more) emphasis in a *Dreikampf* environment.

Because of the diffusion and ambiguity of a polyglot array of actors in such settings, the speed of learning may seem to be most important, but if this comes at a cost in accuracy, it could lead adaptation in the wrong direction—and rapidly. It is natural to focus on how quickly we can spot threats to preempt them and neutralize them. But these must be understood in terms of larger contexts, particularly if one or more sides is “playing us for the sucker” and convincing us to engage others in a way we should not be or in creating situations in which we become the enforcement arm in a purely local vendetta that has nothing to do with supporting our goals in the wider conflict.<sup>34</sup>

Given the difficulty in spotting, understanding, and assessing physical threats without sufficient local context in these conditions, delving into moral and mental factors of combat power is essential. How to frame questions in our investigations of these factors in the *Dreikampf* environment is important. “Who is willing to fight on our side or otherwise support us?” may not be as insightful as asking, “Who is willing to die to oppose us—and why?” We have lacked conceptual methods to comprehend the interplay of human will in our assessments in the past, but there are available analytical frameworks we can now use.<sup>35</sup>

In the context of colliding moral factors, traditional notions of dominating the battlespace will likely prove counterproductive, as this will encourage others to vector our resources towards promoting their ends, possibly increasing the array of actors working against our purposes for their own individual reasons. We are perceived as one competing faction in the kaleidoscopic political landscape and must be conscious of optics and potential perceptions of others in all quarters. There will be tension between priorities in the neighborhood, in tactics, and at higher levels, to include national-level strategic leadership, corporate executives, global media, publics around the world, international organizations, and more. We cannot afford to appear a massive Goliath, lest someone search for and find the boy David to bring us down.<sup>36</sup>

Decentralization of command, intelligence, and communication will be even more necessary. The term “strategic corporal” must be backed up by essential training and education, and perhaps requires even greater maturity that an older age might bring. Intelligence and C2 communications must be shared even more widely and deeply than just to commanders and staffs—it must be readily available at the point of decision and action, wherever that may be, informing whoever is taking local matters into their own hands. Formulating commander’s intent to provide adequate guidance to effectively operate when estimates and associated plans and orders are rendered obsolete will be both more necessary and more difficult to frame and articulate.

Lastly, reconciling the strategic-to-tactical disconnect often endemic to *Dreikampf*—whatever its cause—will require tougher moral courage in decision making. When strategic guidance is incompatible with the situation on the ground, local leaders find that the buck stops here and must decide between short-term cost-versus-gain tradeoffs and long-term consequences. Too often the understandable desire to bring everybody home safely promotes a default *better to be judged by twelve than be carried by six* attitude among commanders. We need to better empower subordinates to be able to exercise more latitude and discretion than that to take risks in ambiguous and uncertain circumstances. For senior leaders, greater moral courage may be necessary at higher levels of command to exercise and defend Marine Corps maneuver warfare in *Dreikampf* environments, especially given different perceptions of the nature of war at other Service and joint tactical and operational headquarters. This will reach to the highest levels in the chain of command and within the various U.S. government agencies at the very least.

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#### Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

2. Nathan Williams, “The 105 Best Poker Quotes of All Time,” *BlackRain79 Micro Stakes Poker Strategy* (blog), (n.d.), available at <https://www.blackrain79.com>.

3. Wesley Morgan, *The Hardest Place: The American Military Adrift in Afghanistan’s Pech Valley*, (New York, NY: Random House, 2021). The author quotes a brigadier general on his seventh tour in Afghanistan in 2018: “As much as things change around the world and in Afghanistan, Kunar [Province] kind of remains the same, this mosaic of groups and alliances.” He goes on to describe the *Dreikampf* at the time: “Taliban and government troops who had long fought against each other were already quietly cooperating against their mutual enemy, the Islamic State.” The brigadier general observed: “It’s Kunar ... People and groups are going to waffle and flip-flop and trade sides and do what they need to do in the short term, but not much is going to change in the long term.”

4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5, Joint Operation Planning*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011). Paragraph 6.e.(1) on this page ends with “in an irregular warfare environment, the enemy and friendly COG will most likely be the same population.” Furthermore, one analysis finds fault with this conception and suggests a way to identify many centers of gravity in the population, diluting the COG and associated Critical Factors analysis. See Col Peter R. Mansoor (Ret.) and LtCol Mark Ulrich, “Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis,” *Military Review*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, September–October 2007).

5. Bill Lind has proposed the term *Vielkampf*, or “many struggle,” to emphasize that point. Bill Lind, “Letter to the Editor,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: July 2021).

6. William S. Lind and Gregory Thiele, (*Draft*) *FMFM-1A Fourth Generation War*, (2009), available at <https://globalguerrillas.typepad.com>. See also Michael Vlahos, “Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our

Wars,” *Military Review*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, November–December 2007).

7. Ibid.

8. Herbert A. Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment,” *Psychological Review*, (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1956): “Evidently, organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice,’ they do not, in general, ‘optimize.’”

9. *The Hardest Place*. The author writes: “But that JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] was still striking away with its drones more than five years later after his departure, now targeting a group that hadn’t even existed in Afghanistan during his deployments, seemed to him like yet another case of a hammer seeking nails to pound.”

10. Metin Gurcan, *What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? Understanding Counter-Insurgency Efforts in Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments*, (Solihull: Helion & Company Limited, 2016).

11. Ibid.

12. William F. Owen, “The Operational Level of War Does Not Exist,” *Military Operations*, (Tel Aviv: The IJ Infinity Group. Summer 2012).

13. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz*, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991).

14. Mohammed Hafez, “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (Milton Park: Taylor & Francis, 2006); and Marc Sageman, *Misunderstanding Terrorism*, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

15. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Civil War*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). An example he gives of what he terms as “expressive violence” is a victim’s observation that “They killed for killing’s sake—like mad dogs going after their prey,” citing Noga Tarnopolsky, “The Family That Disappeared,” *New Yorker*, (New York, NY: Condé Nast, November 1999). Kalyvas also makes a case for the breakdown of civil authority facilitating brutality and barbarism, “generating a culture of lawlessness and violence that can be self-sustaining.”

16. Ibid.

17. Carter Malkasian, *Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017). The author, who served as a civilian advisor to the Marine Corps in Al Anbar from 2004–2006, surmised:

For the outsider, intervening in an insurgency or a civil war is a learning experience. The imperative to work with the people demands knowledge of society, culture, politics, and history—in all their complexity. Having spent some time in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Honduras, I am impressed by how much we can never learn. The longer I study a conflict, the less I believe I know.

18. *What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?*

19. Ben Connable, *Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012). Connable compares U.S. centralized assessment methods from the Vietnam War, Iraq War, and Afghanistan War, describing data gathering and analytical pathologies in detail, offering recommendations for improvement.

20. (Draft) *FMFM-1A Fourth Generation War*.

21. *What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?* He quotes David McDowall, *The Modern History of the Kurds*, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1996): “Tribes operate on kinship ideology and territoriality, the latter includes both established villages but also more fluid ideas that no state could entertain. The fundamental reason, however, why states and tribes are incompatible lies with the whole reason of tribal hierarchy.”

22. COL Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN in the Army,” *Parameters*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Autumn 2009).

23. Tom Ricks, interview by Steve Innskeep, “U.S. Strategy and Tactics Fail to Mesh in Iraq,” *NPR*, (August 2006, available at <https://www.npr.org>). As one journalist observed for this specific instance, while it made immediate tactical sense in November 2005 to clamp down on security in Haditha, Iraq, success came at the cost of 24 civilian deaths, materially undercutting strategic policy goals of getting Iraqis to side with the Americans. Ricks also questions the senior U.S. commander in Iraq for judging insurgent activity in purely military—not political—terms: in an insurgency, you should judge everything politically. Just because an insurgent attack doesn’t kill anybody doesn’t mean it’s not politically effective. If it succeeds in establishing that the insurgency is active in an area, if it sends a message of intimidation, those are things that are not necessarily going to inflict casualties but might achieve a goal of the insurgents nonetheless.

But, if the violence was between Sunnis and Shia Muslims, did that mean this was insurgents acting against the Americans? Against the Iraqi government? Or something else for some other reason?

24. *The Hardest Place*. The author recounts the impressions of an Army officer with several tours in the infamous Pech Valley:

People hiding out from the Kabul government, and hiding out from an American military that in many ways had met its match in the brutal terrain ... would always find their way to places ... their mere presence there, in a place that loomed so large for a generation of Army leaders, seemed to him as if it might magnify their importance and tip the scales toward using military tools to search for them and strike them. For as long as the soldiers, intelligence officers, and contractors charged with America’s counterterrorism missions went looking for people to kill there ... they would keep on finding them.

25. B. A. Friedman, *On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021). We also agree that the term “operational level of war” causes more cognitive and practical problems than it solves; see Marinus “Operational Art and Maneuver Warfare: Maneuverist Paper No. 14,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: November 2021).

26. We, of course, disagree that tactics poses linear problems, as we explain in “The *Zweikampf* Dynamic,” (*MCG* Oct 20) and reassert this in “Introducing the *Dreikampf*” (*MCG* Feb 21).

27. Ibid. Friedman references Alan Beyerchen in his “Clausewitz, Non-linearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” *International Security*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Winter, 1993), in the Clausewitz.com website at <https://www.clausewitz.com>. He also amalgamates arguments that the artificial insertion of an operational level between strategy and tactics causes a cognitive blockage between the two, observed by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, “Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); William F. Owen, ““The

Operational Level of War Does Not Exist,” *Military Operations*, (Tel Aviv: The IJ Infinity Group, Summer 2012); and Colin S. Gray in *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

28. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: 1997).

29. Ibid.

30. (Draft) *FMFM-1A Fourth Generation War*. The manual contains a vignette to illustrate one way how this happens, which will be instantly recognizable to those with experience in such situations.

31. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 2, Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: 1997).

32. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999). The significant passage is: “This is to say that there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon, and this requires that our understanding of weapons must have an awareness that breaks through all boundaries.”

33. Ephraim Kam, *Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). He writes: “Intelligence analysts ... are reluctant to issue warnings regarding the enemy’s intentions because

they feel that this kind of warning is risky and likely to be erroneous.” Our warfighting doctrine is silent on this matter as it argues for answers to questions on both capabilities and intentions without preference for one over the other. See also, *MCDP 2, Intelligence*.

34. *What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?* The author relates that “most players in the local politics arrange their stance according to the position of the COIN forces to be able to best exploit them both financially and politically.” He calls this “milking the cow,” where the counterinsurgency forces are the cow! For a marvelous fictional illustration, see Christopher Kolenda, *The Counterinsurgency Challenge: A Parable of Leadership and Decisionmaking in Modern Conflict*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2012).

35. Ben Connable, et al., *Will to Fight: Returning to the Human Fundamentals of War*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019); and Wayne Michael Hall, *The Power of Will in International Conflict: How to Think Critically in Complex Environments*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2019).

36. (Draft) *FMFM-1A Fourth Generation War*. The full vignette well demonstrates this awareness.



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