

SPECIAL REPORT

Quadrennial Defense Review Implementation

by Gen Charles C. Krulak

The following is the Commandant's report on the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review and its potential impact on the Corps.

1. On 7 November 1996, the Department of Defense began the Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR. The purpose of the QDR was to develop a balanced defense program that met the requirement of strategy, both near and long term, within projected resources. As such, the QDR addressed all aspects of our defense program: strategy, force structure, readiness, modernization programs, defense infrastructure, intelligence, and human resources. Yesterday, 19 May 1997, the Secretary of Defense formally announced the results of the QDR, which establish the broad outlines of his multiyear, departmental blueprint that will be implemented, evaluated, and refined over the course of his tenure.

2. I would therefore like to do three things in this message. First, I would like to personally and publicly thank the hundreds of dedicated Marines and civilians who directly participated in the Marine Corps' effort supporting this mammoth undertaking. They spent, literally, thousands of man-hours analyzing positions, writing point papers, responding to data calls, participating in war games, and preparing the leadership of the Corps to tell the Marine Corps story and articulate our positions. Second, I would like to thank the MarFors [Marine Forces], to include MarForRes [Marine Forces Reserve], and the entire Supporting Establishment, for their indirect, but absolutely critical, contributions to our QDR efforts. By responding to crises around the globe in such a magnificent fashion, demonstrating Marine Corps capabilities in joint exercises, conducting CapExs [capabilities exercises], and hosting fact-finding

delegations, they backed up operationally what we were saying in Washington. Finally, I would like to report to you the results of the QDR, which stand as testimony to the Marine Corps' outstanding effort. The clear fact is that, in many respects, the QDR revalidated our statutory role as the Nation's force-in-readiness, and approved our current programs and plans for the future.

3. The QDR should not be viewed as a single event. As the third departmental review conducted since the end of the Cold War, it was simply a continuation of the national "demobilization" planning that has occurred since the successful end of a long, albeit largely "cold" world war. This demobilization helps to explain why the Marine Corps fared so well in the two previous reviews, and fared so well in the QDR. As all Marines know, the Marine Corps was never a Cold War, Soviet-oriented force. In keeping with our legislated role, we were used—as we continue to be used today—to respond worldwide to a variety of threats to our national interests.

4. Moreover, the QDR reaffirmed that the world in which we now live requires a Marine Corps more than ever. Consider that during the Cold War, Marines were called upon to protect our Nation's interests on an average of once every 15 weeks. Since 1990, Marines have responded to this call on average once every 5 weeks—an increase in taskings by a factor of three. As a result, the enduring requirement for a ready force, capable of simultaneous air and ground action, and possessing unimpeded access to potential trouble spots around the world, be-

came readily apparent during the QDR. And the "force of choice" to accomplish this requirement remains the United States Marine Corps—now and in the future.

5. As a result, Marine Corps force reductions identified in the QDR are relatively modest. I fully support the Secretary's decision to more effectively balance the department's priorities to support the new military strategy of shaping the current environment, responding to threats, and preparing now for an uncertain future. The 6,400 total Active, Reserve, and civilian personnel cuts which he assigned the Marine Corps are consistent with the National Military Strategy, and can be phased in over the future years' defense program—however difficult they may appear to be.

6. The following paragraphs outline our plan where these manpower savings will be realized. To verify and refine our baseline plan, I intend to conduct a thorough total force structure review, to include both Active and Reserve Components, to ensure that we are making the most prudent, supportable, and affordable reductions in support of the Secretary's plan.

7. *Active Component.* The QDR reaffirmed that Marine operating forces are fully committed in support of our National Military Strategy. I therefore recommended to the Secretary that our mandated cuts include no "trigger pullers," and he concurred. This recommendation was made to ensure that any reductions would not impact optempo [operational tempo]. However, I believe modest manning reduc-

tions from the Marine Corps security forces, Marine Support Battalion, and training overhead can be achieved.

A. Marine Corps security force (MCSF) reorganization:

(1) Along with the previously planned deactivations of the Marine Barracks in Japan and the Marine Corps security force companies at Roosevelt Roads, Yorktown, and North Island, we will deactivate other MCSF companies as feasible. The refueling/defueling platoon at Bangor, WA, will also be deactivated; that mission will be assumed by FAST [Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team] platoons deploying out of Norfolk, VA.

(2) Marine Corps security force cadre, located at over 70 installations, will not be replaced once currently assigned Marines rotate from their assignments. Their mission of providing installation weapons and security training will be assumed by mobile training teams deployed from MCSF Battalion.

(3) Working in conjunction with the Navy, we will disestablish the 11 permanent ships' detachments assigned to the active carrier fleet. When deployed carriers require force protection augmentation, we will provide support using deployed platoons from a new FAST company to be formed from the structure and manning saved from the permanent detachment deactivations.

(4) These actions retain the MCSF companies where valid requirements remain—at Bangor, Kings Bay, Patuxent River, Rota, Naples, London, and Bahrain. They also provide both on-call weapons and security training for naval installations and necessary force protection for deployed carriers, but allow us to perform both missions more efficiently. The detailed plan of action and milestones for the MCSF reorganization, as well as the exact numbers of personnel involved, will be published by separate message after thorough staffing.

B. We plan to take a 10 percent cut in the Marine Support Battalion.

C. Finally, MCCDC [Marine Corps Combat Development Command] has embarked on a wide-ranging effort to reduce the number of man years associated with our training

pipeline. These manpower savings will be applied to the overall personnel reduction target we must meet.

D. I want to reiterate that these reductions are just a first step. A soon-to-be-announced force structure review will examine elements of the Active Component to determine if further savings are possible, and these savings will be applied to increase the manning of our operating forces.

8. *Reserve Component.* As you know, we took only modest Reserve Component strength cuts during the base force reduction, and none during the Bottom Up Review. Unfortunately, to meet QDR mandated cost savings, we can no longer avoid cuts in the Reserve force. I fully appreciate the unprecedented mission depth, operational flexibility, and sustainability provided by MarForRes. Therefore, I intend to approach these reductions in a measured, deliberate fashion to ensure that we retain the core combat, combat support, and combat service support provided by the Marine Corps Reserve. As part of our total force structure review, I will soon announce the formation of a Reserve force structure working group, headed by a Reserve general officer, with representatives from the three MarFors, MCRSC [Marine Corps Reserve Support Command], MCCDC, and HQMC [Headquarters Marine Corps]. Their mandate will be to recommend to me, based on the evolving national military strategy as well as our vision for the future, the proposed reductions in the numbers of active duty Marines in support of Reserves, Active Reserves, individual mobilization augmentees, and Selected Marine Corps Reserve positions. The exact number and character of the Reserve Component reduction will be determined by the outcome of both Active and Reserve force structure reviews. My intent is to ensure we continue to have America's finest total force.

9. *Civilian Marines.* We plan to further reduce our already lean civilian infrastructure. We intend to work with our base and station commanders to make these reductions in the most fair and appropriate manner.

10. To get to the force and capabilities I believe the Nation needs in its Corps

of Marines—to meet the anticipated threats of the next century—we must generate the money necessary to conduct experiments and to develop the technology required. I believe that savings such as those generated in this QDR effort will help enable us to recapitalize the Marine Corps and allow us to invest in our future.

11. *Programs.* Our acquisition programs survived the QDR in great shape. This result is a tribute to both our overall concept based requirements process, and the solid operational promise of Operational Maneuver From the Sea. The lightweight 155mm howitzer, advanced amphibious assault vehicle, and joint strike fighter remain on schedule with no program changes. Two changes in the MV-22 program are now planned. First, recognizing the urgent need to replace the Marine Corps' aging fleet of Vietnam era helicopters, the Secretary decided to accelerate MV-22 procurement to a long-term rate of 30 aircraft per year in 2004. This accelerated buy will allow us to replace the aging CH-46 in a more timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. Second, based on the MV-22's superior capability relative to the CH-46 helicopter it will replace, the department will reduce the MV-22 program objective from 425 aircraft to 360. The new objective of 360 Ospreys also reflects the benefits of this "leap-ahead" aircraft's increased reliability and maintainability.

12. In summary, and in many ways, the Quadrennial Defense Review revalidated the Marine Corps as the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness. Several separate studies to include the Marine Corps' force structure planning group effort, the Bottom Up Review, and now the QDR essentially all came to the same conclusion, that the Nation requires "a versatile expeditionary force-in-readiness . . . a force to be most ready when the Nation is least ready." With your hard work, dedication, and commitment, it shall always be so.

13. *Semper Fidelis.*



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