




Department of the Navy 1994 Posture Statement

Excerpts From A Report by
The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy,
Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations, and
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., United States Marine Corps,
Commandant of the Marine Corps
on the Posture and the Fiscal Year 1995 Budget of
The United States Navy and
The United States Marine Corps



REVOLUTION IN NAVAL AFFAIRS

The last time the nation faced as much change in the world as we do today was the late 1940s when, after World War II, our national security system was completely overhauled to meet the Soviet threat. The Naval Service changed then, too, when the Department of the Navy was unified with the other services in the Department of Defense. This previous revolution in naval affairs was at times fractious, due in part to the fact that much of the change was forced from without.

Today, once again, there is a revolution in the Department of the Navy. This time though it is a self initiated renewal. Our own new thinking about what we provide the nation in this time of changing global responsibilities and challenges to our national interests has led to a reorientation of traditional naval functions and missions. Some of this new thinking includes the way we integrate Navy-Marine Corps forces, active and reserve, in joint warfighting. Other thoughts include the peacetime functions of the Naval Service—how naval forces promote national security and interests through forward presence and crisis response. The end product of these ideas, this new thinking, is our program for a more efficient Naval Service that meets the challenges and opportunities for the U.S. inherent in a changing world.

NEW THINKING

Coherent doctrine is essential to link broad strategic guidance to the way we build, train, and operate our forces. We are significantly strengthening the development of doctrine in the Navy and Marine Corps.

Naval Doctrine Command: The Department

established the Naval Doctrine Command in March 1993 in Norfolk, Virginia. Expected to have a broad impact on the future of our naval forces, the Naval Doctrine Command is responsible for translating the strategic vision of ...*From the Sea* into doctrine. Its primary mission is to develop naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine; provide a coordinated Navy-Marine Corps voice in joint and combined doctrine development; and address naval and joint doctrine with respect to training, education, operations, exercises, and war games.

Composed of Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard personnel, Naval Doctrine Command has made remarkable progress in developing cogent doctrinal guidance for employing our forces in littoral warfare. Its first publication, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*, is scheduled for Fleet-wide dissemination in 1994.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS): The naval white paper ... *From the Sea* highlights our new recognition of the advantages of operational maneuver. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* is the naval equivalent of maneuver warfare. Implicit in this concept is the ability to apply power projection and sustainable forcible entry from forces which are operating unseen over the horizon. As we look to the future it is clear that maneuver from the sea provides a warfighting edge that is particularly applicable to the types of missions we now envision for naval forces.

Our doctrinal planning and budget request seek to exploit heretofore unavailable improvements in technology to maximize our lethality and ability to maneuver and operate from the sea. In effect, we intend to use maneuver to pit our strengths against the weaknesses of any potential foe. We are asking for

Command, Control, and Surveillance

The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to structure command and control capabilities to promote efficient joint and combined operations as part of an overarching command, control, and communications architecture that can adapt from sea to shore. We will also exploit the unique contributions which Naval Forces bring to littoral operations.

Our surveillance efforts will continue to emphasize exploitation of space and electronic warfare/intelligence systems to provide commanders with immediate information, while denying and/or managing the data available to our enemies.

Battlespace Dominance

Battlespace dominance means that we can maintain access from the sea to permit the effective entry of equipment and resupply. This dominance implies that Naval Forces can bring to bear decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and in the air. We must use the full range of U.S., coalition and space-based assets to achieve dominance in space as well.

Naval Forces must also have the capability to deny access to a regional adversary, interdict the adversary's movement of supplies by sea, and control the local seas and air. For the Naval Service, then, dominating the battlespace means ensuring effective transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and from sea to land and back, to accomplish the full range of potential missions. This is the essence of naval adaptability and flexibility which are the keys to contingency response. *Battlespace dominance is the heart of naval warfare.*

Power Projection

Naval Forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of littoral areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive power at the time and location of their choosing under any weather conditions, day or night. *Power projection requires mobility, flexibility, and technology to mass strength against weakness.*

Force Sustainment

America's influence depends on its ability to sustain military operations around the globe. The military options available can be extended indefinitely because sea-based forces can remain on station as long as required. Naval forces encompass the full range of logistics support that is the critical element of any military operation. *Forward logistics, prepositioning, and strategic sealift, coupled with strategic airlift, are the keys to force sustainment.*

funds which will allow us to develop and field revolutionary advances in speed, mobility, communications, and navigation. Application of new technologies like improved Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, tilt-rotor aircraft, cooperative engagement, air-cushioned landing and advanced amphibious assault vehicles, emerging satellite communication capabilities, and enhancements to navigation systems will allow us to choose the time and place of any action and thus significantly increase the warfighting options available to Joint Task Force Commanders.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea calls for the creation of task-organized, combined arms, standing forces that provide a wide range of capabilities. These new capabilities open the way for innovative thinking about how we employ Navy and Marine Expeditionary Forces. Careful development of maneuver capabilities will clearly increase the utility of the Naval Service to influence events on land. For example, it will provide the means for Marine Expeditionary Forces to land across 80 per cent of the world's coastlines and permit power projection from well over the horizon. Naval Expeditionary Forces, centered on carrier battle groups and amphibious ready

groups, with embarked Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, will train and deploy together, ensuring a robust capability to conduct expeditionary operations. These forces and others enable battlespace dominance and seamless projection of power from the sea.

In addition to *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, Marine forces will be employed under two additional operational concepts—Other Expeditionary Operations (OEO) and Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA). Other Expeditionary Operations are naval expeditionary operations conducted independent of major campaigns—peacekeeping, disaster relief, security operations, mobile training teams, and non-combatant evacuations. SOA are those campaigns in which Marine Air-Ground Task Forces fight not as naval forces, but for extended periods as land forces. Marine forces in this type of campaign are best suited for operations on a theater's seaward flank to take advantage of the sea's maneuver space and also sea based assets like the Amphibious Ready Group and Maritime Prepositioning Ships.

Naval Expeditionary Forces: Naval Expeditionary Forces are central to employing the doctrine and programs described in ...From the Sea, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Naval

Warfare, Force 2001, and Marine Corps Concepts and Issues. U.S. naval forces have performed expeditionary duties for hundreds of years — from our earliest wars against Barbary pirates right up through Operations Desert Storm and Restore Hope.

Expeditionary implies a commitment to forces designed to conduct sustained forward operations and respond swiftly to whatever task is at hand. The Naval Expeditionary Force concept facilitates a dynamic, task oriented, building block approach to force building and Fleet operations; one that has significant implications about how we train and operate in the future. We are restructuring our deployed forces to match requirements to actual need. We now can and do tailor overseas forces for the specific circumstances we expect to encounter. Doing so allows us to take advantage of the inherent flexibility and logistic autonomy of seaborne forces, to bring a diverse range of capabilities to bear on specific world events.

Command and Control Warfare (C2W): The Naval Service is a full partner in the Joint Staff's *CAI for the Warrior* initiative and is pursuing other initiatives that will enhance our ability to dominate the information battle. We call these efforts Command and Control Warfare—or information warfare. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps are active participants in the development of emerging technologies for the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), the replacement for the aging World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

Coherent information management is the foundation of modern warfare. By increasing our capability to attack an enemy's battle management architecture we are significantly increasing the effectiveness of the complete range of joint warfighting. In particular, by exploiting space and electronic warfare, we degrade and eliminate enemy command and control, thus improving our ability to conduct operations at sea as well as *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*.

NEW ROLES

We are reassessing the utility of all our forces for littoral and expeditionary warfare. Some, like Perry class frigates and 688 class attack submarines have significant service life remaining; however, we have chosen to decommission some of them early in order to recapitalize. Others clearly remain applicable to the new security era—for example, carriers which can be tailored to the new dangers we face. Still others have inherent characteristics that meet the needs of littoral operations, like attack submarines with stealth and long range cruise missiles, and our Marine Expeditionary Forces, who we expect will use the MV-22 and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), which continue to be necessary for power projection ashore. In some cases, the growing dangers of the littoral environment require advanced technologies, such as the capabilities of our new Aegis destroyers and strike fighter aircraft. All of our plans also seek to link the strengths of our Reserves more

OUR VISION

by The Honorable John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy

My first few months as Secretary of the Navy have confirmed and strengthened my conviction that we are in the midst of an era of revolutionary technological and geopolitical change. Arguably, there has not been a time since the end of World War II when so many changes have taken place so quickly. Recognizing this, I feel it is most important that I write a personal preface to our detailed annual Posture Statement. I want to highlight how the Department has adapted to changes and to show our goals in light of them.

It is apparent that the threat of global war has passed. Facing us now are dangers that were little understood even just a few years ago, but which have become increasingly clear as we look at the new world laid in front of us. President Clinton, Secretary Aspin, and now Secretary Perry have defined the current security environment as one that holds four principal dangers: (1) weapons of mass destruction, (2) threats to democracy in the former communist world, (3) regional conflict and (4) economic insecurity.

What follows is the Department of the Navy's response to these dangers and to the dramatic changes in our world—a response which we have reflected in our budget. Much work has already been done developing a new strategic vision and reorganizing headquarters staffs and assessment processes to focus on this strategy. I'm proud of what's happening in the Department and proud of the team of uniformed and civilian leaders who are making our new set of priorities a reality.

My thrust as Secretary of the Navy has been to build and improve on this work and to ensure that it is put in place so that the nation can reap the benefits. In accomplishing this task, I have set down four principal areas for the Department of the Navy to focus on: personnel, readiness, efficiency and technology. These will guide us as we ensure our naval forces have the right personnel, are right-sized and recapitalized for the future, and are ready to perform their missions.

MISSIONS

Two Navy-Marine Corps missions have now become especially salient. The first calls for the Navy and Marine Corps to be able to project military power from the sea to land, to deal with war-fighting in regions of the world that are far from the United States. The second calls for the Navy-Marine Corps to be ever present overseas to demonstrate United States will and to perform a variety of functions short of warfare. These functions include crisis response, deterrence of others' use of force, evacuation of non-combatants and the

close cooperation with active forces to create a more efficient Total Force.

Reserve Integration

The Department of the Navy has been highly successful in integrating its Reserve and Active Forces into a capable Total Force package—a package which functions as a single, cohesive team. A robust, accessible, and flexible Navy and Marine Corps Reserve is essential to mission success and provides an efficient way to leverage scarce resources. We have learned how to use our Reserve forces more effectively—assigning them increasingly relevant day-to-day responsibilities, upgrading their warfighting capabilities and recasting them from simply a mobilization asset to both a mobilization and direct contributory support asset. In conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), the Department is conducting a comprehensive review of

reserve roles and functions which will examine the present force mix and explore other methods for using the reserves in the future. We are also using a Total Force Seminar Wargame series to study improvements in reserve accessibility and enhanced missions.

Naval Reserve: Examples abound of our greater attention to Naval Reserve forces. We are in the process of shifting our first aircraft carrier to the Naval Reserve Force—USS *John F. Kennedy*. This operational reserve carrier will provide a readily available surge capability, as well as unique training opportunities for our active and reserve forces. Our Reserve mine countermeasures capabilities are far better than they were in the past due to the delivery of new Avenger and Osprey mine countermeasures ships. We are proceeding with our plans to convert the amphibious assault ship USS *Inchon* into a Mine Countermeasures Support (MCS) ship. We have moved our most mod-

ern P-3C upgrade III aircraft into the Reserve. And we are shifting newer, more capable gas turbine powered guided missile frigates into the Naval Reserve Force.

Additionally, the Naval Reserve is providing robust support of Navy medicine, Naval Intelligence headquarters and field activities, providing increased adversary and electronic warfare support, Combat Search and Rescue, and an expanded airborne logistics capability. The Navy has paid particular attention to improving Reserve capabilities for joint operations across a complete range of contingencies from counterdrug operations, to humanitarian aid, to the promotion of other national objectives.

A notable example of our efforts to improve Total Force integration has been the shift of both active and reserve SEABEES into the Fleet operational chain of command. This partnership facilitated an increase in SEABEES provision of humanitarian aid and protection. Near continuous forward presence best facilitates accomplishing these functions, all of which can be accomplished without infringing on the sovereignty of any other nation.

The first of these missions has been articulated in the Navy Department's new strategic concept, *...From the Sea*, and has been reinforced by the Department of Defense *Bottom-Up Review*. *...From the Sea*, developed within the Navy Department by both uniformed and civilian leaders, advances far-reaching conceptual and operational changes in the way the Department functions. Most significantly, in *...From the Sea* we have acknowledged that we must find ways to further integrate the Navy and Marine Corps.

The second mission—establishing "presence"—has been less well articulated. It is, however, powerfully important and yet more central to the day-to-day operation of the Navy-Marine Corps in the immediate past and, probably, in the immediate future. Further, I believe it is central to maintaining regional, economic and political stability, and for prevention of conflict. To better illuminate what is involved, I have asked the Department's military and civilian staffs to undertake a detailed, continuing assessment of our joint forward presence capability. This assessment will help us shape our policy and budgetary decisions and ensure the most effective forward presence posture we, in concert with the Army and Air Force, can provide.

The Navy and Marine Corps have always been positioned in forward regions of the world. For half a century, the purpose of that forward presence was to be prepared for global conflict. In contrast, the world today is one of regional threats; a world in which we must be prepared to conduct battles of uncertain proportions, region by region. Yet, in this new environment, forward presence is equally important. This is especially true at a time when, as we reduce our permanent overseas basing, our Army and Air Force reposition to the United States. Therefore, our Navy and Marine Corps are providing an even greater proportion of our nation's forward presence. Clearly, it is expensive to provide and maintain the ships, aircraft and Marines necessary to remain forward deployed around the globe. However, I am firmly convinced this expenditure serves important national interests. Secretary Perry has reaffirmed this conviction in the *Bottom-Up Review*, calling for naval forces shaped and sized not only for two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC), but also for forward presence.

New investment decisions are alone not sufficient to adapt to new missions. New operational concepts are also needed. We are improving our own ability to adjust deployed naval forces for new threats as well as maintain forward presence through innovative inter-operability with the Army, Air Force, and our allies. In the Atlantic, we are employing joint task forces in new and creative ways to meet the challenges of the new security environment. In the Pacific, a new

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policy of cooperative engagement has allowed us to operate in productive and exciting new ways with our allies and other nations. Jointness provides the most efficient way to bring military power to almost any crisis in the future. It is the way to get the greatest capability for a limited amount of defense resources.

As a result of the *Bottom-Up Review*, President Clinton determined our joint armed forces must be able to handle two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts. As we look at potential conflict and crisis areas in the future, it is our judgment that the littoral will be where those crises and conflicts will most likely occur. A 200-mile range from the ocean areas in which we are present gives us access to 85 per cent of strategic targets and cities on the globe.

We have participated closely in dialogue within the Department of Defense and have come to understand the critical contributions the Navy and Marine Corps make to the two MRC scenario. In particular, it is clearly recognized the Navy and Marine Corps provide a special capability for enabling the insertion of heavier forces when a region is threatened. The high-technology weapons we are developing for the future will allow us to establish air defense, conduct maneuver from the sea with our Navy-Marine Corps Team, and provide cover during insertion of the Army and Air Force at a time and place of our choosing. Our ability to insert naval forces and enable our sister services, the heavy land and air forces, to be put in place is of extreme importance in addressing two MRCs.

With regard to tactical air capability, the *Bottom-Up Review* acknowledges that the Navy sortie generation rate in the first two to three weeks of a conflict is of profound importance in preparing the arrival of our sister services. We have undertaken several new approaches to increase the numbers of sorties from our carriers. The great value of having an aircraft carrier in international waters, where there are no sovereignty constraints, is undisputed. We are developing the capability to bring additional pilots on board a carrier and, if necessary, to fly additional aircraft to our carriers to improve the sortie generation rate. This flexibility is extremely important early in a conflict. Our twelve carriers are of significant value not only for this capability, but also as a potential airfield for other forces. We are conducting joint exercises around the world to improve these capabilities. We believe that twelve carriers are extremely important for our national military strategy and national warfighting strategy as well as forward presence.

We are developing new approaches to Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Regional Air Defense, and ship to shore power projection. Our Theater Ballistic Missile Defense plan will use Aegis surface combatants for lower-tier and upper-tier missile intercept missions, a capability that is also part of the National Missile Defense technology program. All our plans will be developed in strict compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. These layered defens-

es will provide air defenses that can intercept theater ballistic missiles, high performance aircraft, and cruise missiles launched by an enemy, possibly hundreds of miles away. Our sea to shore power projection is enhanced by such standoff weapons systems as: Tomahawk, Standoff Land Attack Missile, and the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile. These systems will allow us to strike from our ships and aircraft at targets hundreds of miles distant with great precision. Employing the concept of *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* the Marine Corps with MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles will establish a beachhead to further project power ashore.

RIGHT-SIZE AND RECAPITALIZE

From these two missions, forward presence and power projection for MRC requirements, we have developed a plan for a "right-sized" Navy-Marine Corps of about 330 ships and 174,000 Marines. This force is affordable and will provide the capability needed to carry out the directives of the National Command Authorities with minimum risk to the lives of our personnel. It is critical that we apply disciplined business principles and techniques in downsizing to a newly restructured Navy and Marine Corps.

There are three principal thrusts of our new business approach. Our first priority is to shape our forces so they are properly configured to perform our new roles and missions. This means they must be right-sized not only in total number, but also in the right kinds of ships, tactical aircraft and other systems which are procured, and that the right types of Sailors and Marines are enlisted, trained and retained to perform our missions. Having developed a blue-print for a Navy-Marine Corps Team to meet forward presence and MRC requirements, my second thrust is to "recapitalize" that team — to ensure the naval forces of the future are as strong as the naval forces of today. In reducing our force structure to about 330 ships, 11 carrier air wings and fewer Marines, we are shedding excess infrastructure no longer required to support this smaller force, and we are seeking to improve our cost-effectiveness through enhanced efficiency, consolidation, joint procurement and improved processes resulting from implementation of a Total Quality Leadership (TQL) approach. In this regard, I am focusing on our need not only to maintain our naval forces, but also to upgrade them with high-technology equipment and training, and more importantly, to replace them year-by-year much as a large business would replace its capital investment year-by-year. Recapitalization is a new concept for the Department of the Navy, one that requires discipline and courage. Recapitalization provides combat-readiness for the future. This concept is inherent in our FY 1995 program and budget submission and can be seen across all of our major program lines; surface ships, carriers, submarines, amphibious ships, aircraft and Ma-

efficiency and resulted in a savings of over \$10 million in repair and maintenance projects this past year.

Marine Corps Reserve: The Marine Corps Reserve Component has been integrated into the Total Force and has been reformulated based on the Marine Corps Reserve Force Structure Plan (also known as USMCR 2001). Upon activation, this plan provides Selected Marine Corps Reserve units to augment and reinforce Active Component warfighting capabilities. Our success at achieving wholesale integration of Active/Reserve Components was well documented in Operation Desert Storm.

We are establishing a Marine Corps Reserve information network to enhance communication and coordination between our geographically dispersed Reserve sites. This plan rapidly activates selected Marine Corps reserve units when necessary to augment and reinforce

Active Component warfighting capabilities. As demonstrated in Desert Storm, Marine Reserve units after activation are virtually indistinguishable from active units. When activated, members of our Individual Ready Reserve are integrated into active Marine structure to bring Marine levels to 100 per cent and provide a depth of experience in differing specialties from the civilian community, further sharpening combat readiness. We continue to refine command, control, and administration of reserve units and personnel through innovative training, real-world crisis assistance, and efficiencies resulting from increased use of automated information systems, consistent with the *Defense Planning Guidance*.

The Marine Corps Reserve is also increasing its emphasis on joint and combined training, using simulators purchased through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation. We are conducting joint training

with other services and combined reserve exercises with the United Kingdom. Our Reserve Component members participate individually and in units to assist resolution of national and international crises such as the passenger train wreck near Mobile, Alabama, Operation Restore Hope, and joint counterdrug operations.

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Amphibious Ships

Early retirements and block obsolescence will sharply reduce the total number of amphibious ships. In FY 1994, thirty nine amphibious ships comprise the inventory. During FY 1995-99 we expect to receive 4 LSD-49s and 3 LHDs while decommissioning 3 LPHs and 4 LSTs. Current recapitalization plans project a future amphibious ship force structure composed of LHA/LHDs, LSD-41/49s, and the new LXs.

rine weapons and equipment. We must relentlessly sustain our recapitalization if we are to continue to provide the combat ready and capable naval forces our country requires.

The Posture Statement provided here describes not just our wishes but our actions in this regard. We have already made disciplined vertical cuts: we are phasing out A-6, P-3A and P-3B type aircraft, FF-1052 class frigates, most of our nuclear cruisers, CG-16/27 class cruisers, the 594 and 637 class attack submarines and all pre-Trident class ballistic missile submarines. Marine Corps active duty reductions include: 45 percent of our artillery, 29 percent of Marine tactical aviation, and 50 percent of our tank battalions. The Base Realignment And Closure Commission (BRAC-93) addressed our infrastructure by closing or realigning twenty percent (20%) of our installations. This allows us to match force structure with support assets and liberates resources to support recapitalization. Additional downsizing and right-sizing our infrastructure will remain necessary to allow us to recapitalize that infrastructure, to maintain it at peak efficiency, to retain and improve its quality for the good of our people, and to replace it year by year as a commitment to the long-term readiness of our forces.

The third part of our business approach stresses evaluating and buying systems with our sister services as a means of maximizing scarce resources and fostering jointness. For example, we canceled the medium range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program in order to buy the Army short-range UAV. We began purchasing sensor-fused weapons, specifically an important anti-armor air-launched weapons system developed by the Air Force. This revolutionary thrust to purchase many more systems with our sister services is a critical element of a new form of defense management and is implicit in our program and budget.

This new approach to managing our Navy-Marine Corps Team has led to important organizational changes. The warfare sponsors in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations have been co-located with resource and assessment directors and made a part of the team in developing cross-platform, joint approaches to naval problems. That team includes senior Marines on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. To foster a new approach to future functional problems, we have put a new process in place to assess Navy-Marine Corps capabilities to meet required missions. Seven principal assessment areas have been established. These are: forward presence, joint strike warfare, joint littoral warfare, joint surveillance, space and electronic warfare/intelligence, strategic deterrence, and strategic sealift and its protection. Similarly, the Marine Corps recently revised its Combat Development Process and organization which now parallels, supports, and complements the new assessments.

The LX program (recently named LPD-17) is designed to replace four current ship classes (LPD, LSD, LKA, LST). Starting LPD-17 in FY 1996 as scheduled, and attaining a big-deck ARG capability, are critical elements to meeting our nation's future amphibious operational requirements in the littoral areas of the world.

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)

The proven utility of this multi-role proven national asset is well established in this new security era. Whether employed as an over-the-horizon deterrent, or as a supporting infrastructure during large-scale humanitarian assistance operations like Somalia, or as one of our most substantial deployment options to get us to a fight in a major regional conflict like Desert Storm, our MPF brigades reflect the Marine Corps vision—a balanced, sustainable, multi-role, middleweight, combined arms cri-

sis response team. The National Command Authorities will then have at their disposal 50,000 Marines, 350 tactical aircraft and helicopters, 90 tanks, 30 days of sustainment with a capability of individual ship, squadron, or force employment to deliver on-scene humanitarian assistance or a fully combat-ready Marine Expeditionary Force.

Expeditionary Warfare

The *Bottom Up Review* determined that an end strength of 174,000 Marines in the active component and 42,000 Marines in the reserve component is appropriate to provide the kind of power projection capabilities required for naval operations in the world's littorals. Approximately 67 per cent of Marine Corps funds are dedicated to recruiting, training and paying our Marines. The remaining funds are programmed for the readiness and training of our operating forces, maintenance of our bases

PEOPLE . . . THE BOTTOM LINE

As a former Naval Officer, I am convinced that people truly are the key to our present and future readiness. When I took the position of Secretary of the Navy, President Clinton told me he had entrusted to me the finest Naval Service in our history based on the quality of personnel. My visits to the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force absolutely reinforce this view. Our Navy and Marine Corps men and women deserve the best possible treatment as we right-size. We are continuing our plan to reduce Navy manpower by almost 90,000 active and reserve, men and women, through the remainder of this decade while holding Marine Corps levels at 216,000 women and men, active and reserve. Civilian manpower will be reduced by more than 30,000 men and women. We must manage this right-sizing with great sensitivity and a determination to keep faith with our people. If we fail, and if we lose the trust and confidence of our people; no matter what management plans and programs we put into place, no matter what mission we have, our bottom line combat readiness in the long term and the short term will decrease and our capabilities as naval forces will be reduced. Therefore, our greatest effort must be to ensure that our men and women are properly motivated, trained, compensated, and rewarded as we go through these revolutionary times. This will require smart leadership skills, disciplined management, and considerable sensitivity on the part of our civilian and military leaders.

As we right-size, we have launched several significant initiatives that capitalize on the capabilities of our Navy and Marine Corps reservists. We have committed to integrate them even more closely with our active forces. For example, while right-sizing reserve air wings, we have committed an aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy, to be the reserve aircraft carrier for the one remaining consolidated Navy and Marine Corps reserve air wing. That new capability is a significant departure from any commitment to the Reserves made in the past. This carrier will be used to train our Reserves for exercises and possibly even for short-term deployments. In the event of crisis or conflict it will function as a ready, capable resource to augment active forces. Maintaining this reserve aircraft carrier is not without cost, but it is worth the expenditure because it takes maximum advantage of the talents and experience of our reserve forces. This allows us to reduce the number of air wings while maintaining the number of carriers.

On the active duty side, I have stressed the need to avoid involuntary separations as we right-size. I have joined the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in affirming our commitment to maintain peacetime Optempo/Perstempo rates at a level that preserves the morale and long term readiness of our people. We must continue to honor our commitment to our people concerning a deployment rotation cycle and operational tempo that maintains their effectiveness. Medical care; Morale, Welfare and

and stations, and careful procurement expenditures for the modernization and recapitalization of equipment. We continue development of the MV-22 and aggressive research and testing of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. With the support of Congress we intend to achieve Initial Operating Capability at the beginning of the 21st century for these two revolutionary power projection systems.

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PERSONNEL

Civilian Personnel

By the end of FY 1995, the Department's civilian end strength will be nearly 50,000 less than FY 1993 levels consistent with the Vice President's *National Performance Review*. Reductions are being carefully planned to minimize the number of involuntary separations, assist employees with transition to private sector employment, and achieve a balanced work

Recreation programs; child care; and family services are also important and we must not lose our focus in these areas.

We have undertaken a zero-based training and education review as the first step in establishing a more efficient and effective way of doing both individual and unit training. We have identified considerable efficiencies in this first review and will continue to use our best management skills to develop additional ones as we go through follow-on budget cycles.

The leadership of this Department is especially committed to addressing a number of important social, moral, ethical and leadership issues in the years ahead. With regard to sexual harassment, gender and racial discrimination, hazing, cheating and lying, the gulf between our theory and our practice can be bridged only by true leadership. I firmly believe this is a readiness issue, since to retain our junior Marines and Sailors, we must be able to provide them the kind of ethical environment where they can live and work with confidence and trust between subordinates and superiors. Otherwise, there can be none of the special esprit or bonding that we consider essential to the teamwork required for combat. And there would be little confidence by the American people in the rightness of our actions. Without trust and confidence, there cannot be an effective military for America. The trust required for effective leadership requires a standard of behavior and the development of personal character that are in some aspects unique, but, ultimately, in keeping with the highest moral code of society—not the average, . . . not the common denominator—but the highest. I am currently working with the rest of the military and civilian leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps to reemphasize our core values—Honor, Courage, and Commitment—and other concepts of moral behavior within our leadership training programs. This training will be career-long and service-wide. In my view, it is not something new at all; it is a return to a traditional goal and a significant part of maintaining our readiness. We have history, our tradition, and the military doctrine that affirm the values of personal integrity and sacrifice in service to others. We now have to use the system we have in order to build the trust and ensure the honesty we need to make those values real and relevant at all levels in our organization.

In the past, the Navy and Marine Corps have provided assignments for women throughout our support establishment ashore and afloat. More recently, some Navy enlisted recruit training companies at our Orlando Recruit Training Center have been fully gender integrated with satisfactory results. Now, this past year's legislation to change the law that excluded women from particular categories of combat assignment, such as combatant ships and aircraft, has expanded opportunities for women with operational forces. Today, the best qualified Sailors and Marines, regardless of gender, can serve in such assignments. Accordingly, we have developed plans for altering many class-

es of ships to facilitate integration. While we have included women in many different meaningful missions over the years, our intent here is to have women serving in every job except those involving direct combat—something we owe women and men as we attempt to get the best possible people into the right jobs to serve our Navy-Marine Corps and our country. I am committed to continuing this initiative as we right-size.

The application of Total Quality Leadership (TQL) concepts and methods is a long term priority of this Department. It was put in place in the uniformed Navy by Admiral Kelso's initiative on his arrival as Chief of Naval Operations and by General Mundy when he became Commandant. It has allowed us to focus on our systems and processes to deliver the highest quality product with reduced costs and increased productivity. The Department of the Navy has been at the forefront of the quality movement in the Federal government. TQL is a leadership approach which enables the Department to understand and improve all its systems through scientific methods and the involvement of all our people. Results are seen not only in reduced costs, but in improved readiness and communication, as well as in the commitment to the overall goals of the Department.

CONCLUSION

The Department of the Navy has undertaken revolutionary changes in this last year which have put in place a new organization, process and structure. The results are a Navy-Marine Corps Team focused on a new strategic vision, . . . *From the Sea*, and a budget and program which fully implement new concepts developed as part of the *Bottom-Up Review*. As full participants in the *Bottom-Up Review* we developed the concepts of recapitalization, right-sizing, and new technologies. We took aggressive positions on force structure and infrastructure reductions to meet fiscal limits set for the Department. As a result, there are risks involved in successfully executing our program. Any factor which upsets the balance inherent in the Department's program threatens our ability to recapitalize the Fleet, thus jeopardizing tomorrow's readiness. If our follow-up to infrastructure reduction, vertical force cuts and right-sizing of personnel strength is properly executed, we believe our new disciplined approach to doing business, to management, and to our concern for people will provide the nation with combat ready naval forces which are necessary for forward presence, regional stability, crisis response, and war prevention. These forces will be efficient, relevant, and second to none. It is my great honor to be the Secretary of the Navy. I look forward to translating these concepts into practice.



force. Our efforts include the use of congressionally approved separation incentives such as separation payments to eligible employees who elect to resign or retire, and outplacement subsidy payments to other Federal Agencies which offset a portion of relocation costs incurred in hiring an eligible Department of the Navy employee. We plan to continue seeking funds available under the Joint Training Partnership Act to provide retraining, relocation, and transition assistance for affected eligible employees. Transition centers will continue to be established and staffed to provide counseling on available transition benefits, entitlements, and private sector employment opportunities. Eligible employees will receive hiring preference for certain contractor jobs and registration in the DOD Priority Placement Program and the Defense Outplacement Referral System.

Joint Officer Management

The Department consistently has made progress in meeting the joint qualification requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Joint education has grown from about 300 officers per year in 1987 to over 500 last year. In 1987, joint officer promotion rates averaged about 28 per cent. Today that average has grown dramatically and is approximately 71 per cent. Starting this year, we expect 75 to 95 officers a year to be designated Joint Service Officers. However, despite these dramatic gains one area needs special mention—many of the officers in our nuclear community will not have had the opportunity to complete a joint duty tour prior to receiving their primary consideration for promotion to Rear Admiral. This is because a substantial portion of them must serve in critical reactor safety billets which compete with joint duty assignments.

Additionally, officers selected to serve as Commanding Officers of nuclear aircraft carriers must complete an eight year training and career progression that often precludes them from joint assignment until after they reach flag eligibility. Retaining the current exemption of joint duty requirements prior to flag selection for nuclear trained officers is essential to ensure competitive fairness for these top quality officers.

Women In The Naval Service

In November 1993, Congress rescinded the statutory restrictions of Title 10, section 6015 and opened exciting new career opportunities for female personnel. Today, there are over 55,000 women serving in the Department—up from about 9000 in 1972. Over 13,000 of these women serve at sea or are attached to aviation squadrons. These numbers will grow in the coming years. We are com-

mitted to moving ahead and advancing the opportunities available for women. Habitability modifications have begun on three nuclear powered aircraft carriers, our most modern surface combatants, and our newest amphibious warships. We also expect to introduce women into carrier air squadrons and naval construction battalions. Additionally, we expect that the reserve aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy and mine countermeasure command ship USS Inchon will be opened to women in FY 1995 and FY 1996, respectively. Our plans call for opening an additional aircraft carrier, four surface combatants, and two new amphibious assault ships (LSDs) to women annually. By FY 1996, we also expect to open two large deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHDs) per year. Working with the Congress through the required notification process, our intent is for the first several hundred women to report to combatants later this year. For the Marine Corps, the legislative relief opens specialties in 33 of 36 occupation fields to women — all fields but those involving assignment to direct ground combat units. Women Marines will deploy aboard ships consistent with their assignments.

* * *

MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps also remains ready and capable of executing the full range of assigned missions and tasks. Readiness, which is being maintained at the expense of modernization and support establishment improvements, was a central concern in the recently completed Program Review for Fiscal Years 1995 through 1999. Readiness programs encompass operating forces, base operations, training and exercises, the Maritime Prepositioning Forces, and depot maintenance. We are continuing to focus on providing full quality support to the Fleet Marine Force with highly trained, quality personnel; well-maintained equipment; and adequate levels of supply. Even though the requested funding for readiness for FY 1995 should maintain current levels, we have concerns that the present balance could be easily upset by unprogrammed commitments, and that the backlogs of maintenance and repair will continue to grow.

While the overall quality, morale, and personnel and training readiness of the Marine Corps remains high, we are seeing indications of eroding material readiness in certain areas as budgetary constraints and competing fiscal requirements force hard choices. In most units, maintaining the highest state of material readiness is simply not possible at this time. While Marine aviation material readiness trends are in general positive as shown, (i.e. approximately 80% of all Marine aircraft are mission capable), for the first time in over a decade, overall ground equipment readiness (i.e. combat ready) has fallen slightly below 90 per cent. The substantial backlogs at ground equipment

depot repair facilities, \$216.1 million in FY 1994 and \$360.5 million in FY 1995, resulting from Operation Desert Shield/Storm, will make it difficult to reverse this trend. At the same time, the backlog of maintenance and repair aboard our bases and stations, grew from 624.5 million in FY 1994 to \$758.7 million in FY 1995 and continues to rise, while available funding continues to decrease.

* * *

JOINT LITTORAL WARFARE

Today, since no nation can challenge our ability to control the seas, we have concentrated our planning on winning the contest for control of the land and sea areas of the littoral. Joint littoral warfare is defined as the use of joint and allied forces, in concert with naval forces, to influence, deter, contain, or defeat a regional power through the projection of mar-

“The Department of the Navy has programmed amphibious lift for 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) equivalents. . . . With the scheduled decommissioning of the remaining LSTs and LKAs during FY 1994 and FY 1995, we will temporarily dip below 2.0 MEBs lift in the vehicle square footage category.”

itime power. The area of control necessary to support joint littoral operations will be dictated by the actual tactical situation faced but generally extends from the shore to open ocean, and inland from the shore over that area that can be supported and controlled directly from the sea.

Joint littoral warfare has an inherently greater emphasis on fighting over land than over open ocean. This fact drives a significantly greater need for seamless warfighting with other services and less emphasis on isolated naval missions. During the Cold War, we worried about coordination between the services. Under our new vision of the future, we seek to achieve full tactical integration.

Maritime Prepositioning Force

Employment of the three Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) squadrons during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm decisively demonstrated the utility of these expeditionary assets to the Nation. Coupled with fly-in Marines, MPF provided the first substantial ground defense capability in theater and the margin of deterrence that discouraged Iraqis from continuing into Saudi Arabia. Further, MPF squadrons provided sustainment for U.S. Army units in the first month of Operation Desert Shield.

MPF assets were most recently used in Somalia to support the humanitarian relief and security missions of Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope. Somalia's infrastructure proved extremely limited and required exten-

sive engineering efforts to enable additional forces and equipment to arrive. During that initial 50-day build-up period, Marine MPF assets provided required logistics support for all United Nations forces ashore. The three current MPF squadrons, composed of a total of 13 ships, provide our Nation a geo-strategically positioned capability and are consistent with *...From the Sea*, providing a unique capability in joint littoral operations.

Amphibious Lift

Naval amphibious forces remain the nation's only self-sustainable forcible entry capability. These forces will enable further introduction of military forces when required. To transport, provide presence, and deploy highly capable Marine Expeditionary Forces effectively, the Department is modernizing and tailoring its amphibious forces to provide an over

the horizon launch capability in support of the Naval Service's strategic vision, *...From the Sea*. The capability of 11 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) meets forward presence requirements. Vital to this capability is the continued modernization of the Navy's amphibious shipping. The Department of the Navy has programmed amphibious lift for 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) equivalents, in accordance with *Defense Planning Guidance*. With the scheduled decommissioning of the remaining LSTs and LKAs during FY 1994 and FY 1995, we will temporarily dip below 2.0 MEBs lift in the vehicle square footage category.

It is our assessment that a short term degradation is an acceptable risk pending the introduction of the new LPD-17 (LX) class which will incorporate the capabilities currently provided by the aging LPD, LKA, LST, and LSD-36 class amphibious ships. The LPD-17 procurement is programmed to begin in FY 96 with first delivery in FY 2002, and it is critical that this program not be delayed. In addition to LPD-17, the Department continues to plan for a seventh LHD.

MV-22

Effective application of *Operational Maneuver From The Sea* requires the capability to project forces deep inland from positions over the horizon. To realize this capability, which will vastly complicate an opponent's defensive problem and will substantially reduce friendly losses, we must replace the existing fleet of slow, aging medium lift helicopters, many of which are older than the pilots flying them. We expect to replace the CH-46 fleet with the MV-22 Medium Lift Alternative, which will serve as the backbone of the Marine Corps' assault support force well into the 21st century. This aircraft will provide a quantum improvement in mobility and tactical flexibility, complementing the revolutionary technology incorporated in the Advanced Amphibious

CMC Oral Testimony

by Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

The following remarks were made by the Commandant on 24 February 1994 when he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee to present the Navy Department Posture Statement and testify in behalf of the FY95 Budget.

This is the third time I've appeared before you since becoming Commandant. On each of my previous appearances, I focused on the criticality of maintaining your Corps of Marines at a size adequate to continue to meet the operational requirements called for by the CinCs. Requirements that have not slackened one bit since victory was declared in the Cold War, or since we began the process of drawing down our Armed Forces 5 years ago.

In my first testimony before you, I expressed my conviction that there was nothing I could see on our future national security horizon that was going to diminish the need for the capabilities brought by Marines—not just in wartime—but equally important, on a day-to-day basis during peacetime. My message to you 2 years later is unchanged.

In stressing the need for an adequate size, I pointed out that at that time, on a day-to-day basis, about 22,000 Marines—just under one-fifth of the total operating forces of the Corps—were deployed overseas, unaccompanied, away from home bases and from their families, for periods of 6 months, or longer. As I speak to you today—after the Corps has been reduced by 22,000—there are 24,000 Marines at sea or on foreign shore. The end of the cold War notwithstanding, the operating tempo for Marines has not diminished, and at present, has even picked up a couple of percentage points.

Today, however, I'm able to make a positive report to you relative to the strength of the Corps. In his bottom-up review of future force structure requirements, President Clinton has established a strength for the Corps that will enable us to continue to meet operational requirements like those I've described—albeit at a continuing high operating tempo. The important point is that the size decided upon is not just a "salami-slice" reduction across all Services; rather, it is based on a bottom-up analysis of the balance of Service capabilities believed to be required for the future. The end-strength defined by The Bottom-Up Review—174,000 Marines—is consistent with the general strength level which you in the Congress have also supported, and for which the Corps is tremendously grateful.

In addition to the operational capabilities I've discussed heretofore, this strength will enable us to begin to smooth out the tremendous turmoil for our people that has been associated with the past few years' drawdown. A clear career focus on the future, the end of selective early retirements, increased reenlistments, and stable officer retention are all factors that will contribute dramatically to the health, wellness, and effectiveness of the Corps.

Let me focus for a moment in a broader context on the two rather unusual terms I just used—health and wellness. In terms of its

strength, the Corps will be healthy—and capable of meeting the continuing requirements on it. However, the wellness of the Corps is going to need some tending. With the end-strength assigned us by both the Administration and the Congress, the Corps will have been reduced in size by 13 percent from our peak level in 1987. However, the funding provided directly to support the Corps has been reduced by almost 30 percent in terms of real growth in the same time frame. Clearly, our force reduction and fiscal reductions are mismatched.

In executing the current, FY94 operating budget, the Corps is sustaining, but not much more, our procurement account is 50 percent what it was in FY93 and 40 percent of what it was the year before. Our operations and maintenance account in FY94 is smaller than in FY93. This means that we are managing to sustain operations but that our ability to maintain readiness is on the margin and trending downward. We are not able to maintain fully the programs that support our people, or that maintain our equipment and facilities commensurate with the hard use to which we are putting them today. We cannot continue this trend, or the Corps your forbearers in these halls inscribed in law as the "force-in-readiness" will be anything but that.

The President's FY95 budget before you takes a small step—\$140—toward rectifying the critical deficiencies of the budget currently in execution. The Corps will be able to sustain operations again in FY95, but the longer term wellness of the Corps in terms of critical people-support programs, equipment modernization, and maintenance and repair of our equipment and real property will require further steps to achieve and maintain the modern, ready, force capabilities envisioned in The Bottom-Up Review and mandated by our new Department of the Navy doctrinal concepts in "... From the Sea". We have a strong team at this table, and I'm confident that you're going to see continuing emphasis on the readiness of the Corps as we go forward in the coming years.

Let me end this overview by saying that in spite of the concerns I have expressed heretofore relative to the health and wellness of the Corps in the near-years, Marines are still out doing what you expect them to do, in the manner in which you have always expected them to do it. 8,000 Marines are embarked in amphibious ships with our navy shipmates in 4 different geographic locations around the world. 50,000 more are ready to expand any one of those small forward-operating forces immediately by joining the instantly responsive Maritime Prepositioning Force ships that carry all the equipment, ammunition, and sustainability needed for 30 days of operation. This ability to come "... From the Sea: as part of America's Naval power will become even more useful to the nation as we close some 800 military installations overseas and withdraw the majority of our forward-based forces back to the United States.

My bottom line is: your 911 force remains ready—as in the past—to answer the nation's calls; however, on a lighter note—but one not too far from reality—we would be hard pressed to accept any collect calls!

The Corps is deeply appreciative of your consideration of our request for five percent of the total monies requested by the President for Defense in FY95—16 percent of that requested by the Department of the Navy. I look forward to your questions.



Assault Vehicle and permitting unprecedented maneuver by amphibious forces. The MV-22 is the Department's highest aviation priority for the Marine Corps.

Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)

The AAAV will provide the Marine Corps with its primary means of amphibious surface assault. Currently in the Concept Exploration and Definition Phase of the acquisition process, it is a companion to the MV-22 with-

in the *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* concept. It is a critical component of future naval power projection. The AAAV is designed for high speed transit ashore from vessels standing well out to sea, but will also permit embarked troops to maneuver deep inland in a single, seamless stroke against the depth of the enemy's defenses. As it replaces the 30 year old LVTP-7, the AAAV will provide the Marine Corps with one of the most versatile, capable weapons systems in the world, and will materially enhance the Naval Service's ability to

project decisive combat power ashore.

Close Air Support

The new security environment allows us to devote relatively less attention to Fleet Air Defense and more attention to Close Air Support. Our aircraft modernization program, including AV-8B remanufacture, AH-1W mid-life upgrade, F/A-18, and F-14 upgrade will enhance our ability to conduct Close Air Support. Operational commanders are exploring various ways to increase the amount of training dedi-

APPROPRIATION SUMMARY FY 1993-1995

*Department Of The Navy
FY 1995 Budget Summary By Appropriation
(in Millions of Dollars)*

	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995
Military Personnel, Navy	19,349.5	18,350.4	17,581.0
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	5,904.2	5,772.3	5,778.6
Reserve Personnel, Navy	1,655.8	1,555.8	1,392.4
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	340.3	350.9	353.9
Operation and Maintenance, Navy	21,248.0	20,142.0	21,227.2
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps	1,968.8	1,857.7	1,918.4
Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve	864.3	763.1	827.8
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve	79.6	83.1	81.5
Aircraft Procurement, Navy	5,391.1	5,565.1	4,786.3
Weapons Procurement, Navy	3,629.8	2,975.6	2,400.0
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy	5,807.9	4,133.8	5,585.4
Other Procurement, Navy	5,217.4	2,983.0	3,319.4
Procurement, Marine Corps	823.1	440.2	554.6
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy	8,867.5	8,301.3	8,934.7
Military Construction, Navy	339.3	681.6	320.5
Military Construction, Navy Reserve	15.4	20.6	2.4
Family Housing, Navy and Marine Corps	1,044.5	1,142.3	1,082.9
National Defense Sealift Fund	2,463.5	1,540.8	608.6
Base Closure and Realignment	—	789.0	1,827.3
Payment to Kaho'olawe Island	—	60.0	—
	85,010.0	77,508.6	78,582.9

Note: This table summarizes the Department of the Navy (DON) estimates by appropriation for the FY 1995 Budget Submission. The total direct program estimates of \$77.5 billion in FY 1994 represent a steep drop from the FY 1993 program. The FY 1995 request increases slightly to \$78.6 billion. In real terms, after normalizing for price escalation, the DON budget decreases 10.9% in FY 1994 and 0.7% in FY 1995.

cated to Close Air Support. We are also upgrading our Command and Control architecture to improve coordination of air support with forces ashore.

Expeditionary Air Support

Essential to the sustainment of our expeditionary assets are both the Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program (MALSP) and the Expeditionary Airfield 2000 (EAF 2000). MALSP is a structured but flexible method of organizing, deploying, and employing Marine aviation logistics capability. Incorporation of the International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) has improved the responsiveness of MALSP with the capability to accommodate the timely re-ordering of aircraft parts from anywhere in the world. The EAF 2000 program provides the means to construct an airfield at an austere site with a 3800 foot runway, associated taxi-ways, arresting gear, lighting, and parking for 72 tactical aircraft. An EAF 2000 can be constructed and operating within days.

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)

As Operation Desert Storm clearly demonstrated, the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) poses increasing danger to the national security of the United States and our allies. This is true whether these missiles carry crude, conventional warheads to demoralize populations or governments, or whether they have the greater destructive capacity made

possible by arming them with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The Navy Department is aggressively pursuing improved capabilities for countering this threat. Our sea-based initiative seeks to build on the proven technology of our Aegis surface combatant force. In the near future, Aegis cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroyers will provide a somewhat limited, but nonetheless highly mobile and credible TBMD capability. When Aegis SPY-1 radar software improvements are combined with improvements to the Standard Missile, these ships can provide endo-atmospheric (lower tier) defense against incoming ballistic missiles. The Department of Defense is also requesting funding to continue development of a more capable theater wide (upper tier) defense. This upper tier capability would permit a highly mobile theater, rather than area, defense.

We are also looking at a more limited near term TBMD upgrade for the Marine Corps. This program consists of improving the TPS-59 radar for ballistic missile cueing, improving the ability to broadcast cueing to other forces via JTIDS, and upgrading Hawk missile capabilities.

To augment these capabilities and provide over the horizon early warning, we have embarked on a joint program with the Army to develop and field Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS). JTAGS vans will allow in-theater processing of space based warning data, greatly enhancing the abilities of active theater

defenses.

Regardless of their individual components, our systems will seek inter-operability with those under development by our service counterparts to maximize their synergy, and will be developed in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty provisions.

Cooperative Engagement

Cooperative Engagement is a system that will significantly enhance capabilities in Joint Theater Air and Self Defense missions against reduced signature cruise and theater ballistic missiles by combining tracks from dispersed force sensors into a real time, accurate, fire control quality Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) picture shared force wide. Cooperative Engagement's high data rate and real time exchange of fire control sensor data will greatly expand our mission effectiveness in the littoral.

Combat Identification

Congestion in littoral war zones combined with the complexities of the sea, air, land, and space interface increases the difficulty of identifying and sorting the dispositions of friendly, neutral, and hostile forces. Doing so has become increasingly critical as weapon lethality has increased and target engagement response times have decreased. Enhancements to the current Position Location Reporting System and increased fielding of the Global Positioning System have provided greater capability for the positive identification of friendly ground forces. The Department of the Navy has the lead for the Department of Defense's Cooperative Aircraft Identification program and is also coordinating with the Army on the Battlefield Identification program. Future emphasis will be placed on joint combat identification doctrine and systems that can be used without broadcasting the location of friendly forces to enemy surveillance.

Naval Surface Fire Support

Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) includes those capabilities needed to suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy targets that interfere with or prohibit our ability to conduct combat operations ashore. Our fire support capability currently consists of five inch naval guns on many of our surface combatants. Given our intent to conduct combat amphibious operations from over the horizon, we are aggressively examining ways to improve the range of our capabilities. A Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) is ongoing to assess options in this area. The COEA is looking at a wide range of new capabilities in gun and missile systems. Some promising areas are adaptation of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACM) for maritime use and development of new naval gun systems with extended range capabilities. We are also working to improve our ability to coordinate NSFS with Close Air Support.

Mine Warfare

The Gulf War showed that inexpensive, readily available mines will persist as a major

warfighting concern. The Department of the Navy is aggressively upgrading and modernizing the mine countermeasures force, both active and reserve. Our commitment is showing results; delivery of the new AVENGER Mine Countermeasure (MCM 1) class is nearing completion — the last of 14 authorized ships, 10 active and 4 reserve, will be commissioned this year. The first OSPREY Mine Hunting Coastal class vessel has been commissioned and the full inventory of 12 ships, 11 reserve and 1 active, will be in service by 1997. Conversion of USS *Indhon* to a Mine Countermeasures Support ship (MCS) in the reserve force, scheduled for completion by 1996, is on track. This ship will provide command, control, communications and logistic support to air and surface mine countermeasures operations. Our New Attack Submarine (NSSL) planning will incorporate several design initiatives that improve our countermine posture. In addition, we are exploring innovative utilization of Air Cushioned Landing Craft (LCAC) in countermine warfare (called MCACs).

An aggressive Navy and Marine Corps research and development effort is underway to improve our ability to find and neutralize mines in the shallow water zone, in the surf and on the shore. We call this our Shallow Water Mine Countermeasure (SWMCM) program. Improved reconnaissance, detection and avoidance of mines are near term goals, with in-surf clearance the ultimate aim of this initiative. Concurrently, we are also integrating mine countermeasures training into all amphibious exercises.

Several other countermine warfare initiatives include the establishment of a dedicated Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at our new facility in Ingleside, Texas; reorganization of our operational command structure to place all mine warfare forces under a single commander, and concurrent stand-up of a Program Executive Office for all mine warfare procurement actions. We fully recognize that continued improvement in this area is vital to mission success. Under Public Law 102-190, we will report annually to Congress on our mine warfare posture.

Ship Self-Defense (SSD): One of the highest priorities in the Department is to strengthen significantly our SSD capabilities. Our programs will fully integrate ship, force and other service sensors in order to achieve 24 hour, extended range, three dimensional coverage; improve early detection and cumulative information hand-off about hostile targets; strengthen single ship and multi-unit tactics including full integration of joint systems in order to enhance rapid response, and where needed, develop new capabilities (both hard and soft kill).

For example, we are improving our PHALANX close-in weapon system, procuring the Rolling Airframe Missile, and developing the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile. Additionally, we are pursuing a new soft kill capability with an

active off-board countermeasures system called Nulka. A SSD system will integrate these defensive weapons as well as interface with our planned Cooperative Engagement capability. In related areas, we are moving ahead with plans to purchase a mix of improved integrated air to surface weapon systems for the SH-60 helicopter (Penguin and Hellfire anti-ship missiles) and improved electronic surveillance capabilities which will extend significantly ship self defense capabilities against surface, subsurface and air threats.

Shallow Water Anti-Submarine (ASW) Initiatives

Shallow water ASW initiatives are also a priority in our budget request. We continue to improve acoustic and non-acoustic ASW technologies necessary to counter a diesel submarine threat. Development of the Advanced Deployable System and fleet introduction of the new Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) and Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) vessels will improve our shallow water ASW capabilities. Airborne laser system development continues to show promise. Operationally, we are refining the way we use at-

“An aggressive Navy and Marine Corps research and development effort is underway to improve our ability to find and neutralize mines in the shallow water zone, in the surf and on the shore.”

tack submarines in shallow water and littoral areas. For example, closely integrated submarine support with other Naval Expeditionary capabilities, which used to be relatively uncommon, has been significantly improved and is proving highly effective. Battle Group Commanders have demonstrated rapid and flexible communications through “call ups” using the Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) system that was originally developed for our strategic submarines. This is a good example of how we have taken advantage of existing systems designed for the Cold War and applied them to emerging roles. In addition, our New Attack Submarine (NSSL) will have a significantly improved torpedo capability for shallow water ASW.

We have several new surface ship initiatives to improve our shallow water capability against diesel submarines. Foremost among the sensor improvements are digital upgrades to the SQQ-89 ASW Combat System designed to incorporate newer shallow water waveforms developed for the AN/SQS-53C Sonar. Weapons initiatives include a dynamic new concept to evolve a hybrid torpedo based on the best attributes of the MK-50, MK-46 and MK-48 ADCAP weapons systems. Additionally, we are augmenting ship survivability by pursuing the Joint US/UK Surface Ship Torpedo Defense program which includes the introduction of improved counter-torpedo decoys.

Our aviation community is developing an updated SH-60 multi-mission helicopter which

will have an Advanced Low Frequency Dipping Sonar, infrared detection capabilities, acoustic processing and an Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar capable of detecting a snorkeling diesel submarine. All data will be fully integrated onboard surface combatants via a directional two-way data link. Furthermore, we have instituted an aggressive site-specific SHAREM/AIREM program to gather detailed environmental data and provide stressing exercise opportunities in littoral areas of interest. We recognize the challenge posed by shallow water submarine threats and intend to work closely with Congress to ensure we maintain the ASW edge necessary to prevail in combat along the littoral.

FORWARD PRESENCE

In September 1993, the Secretary of the Navy directed the assessment of forward naval presence as a Joint Mission Area within the Navy Department's budget review process. The Secretary's direction stemmed from the *Bottom-Up Review* determination that unique naval force structure requirements be based upon the demands of overseas presence as well as major regional contingencies. The *Defense Planning Guidance* established the strategic linkage of overseas presence to the national security tenets of engagement, partnership, and prevention.

The goal of the forward presence assessment is to define the concept of overseas presence and its linkage to force requirements and programs. The intent is to determine, by region, specific strategic and political interests and to translate them into military objectives and supporting tasks necessary to achieve those interests. Naval forces are then derived to fulfill the military objectives and tasks. These task-derived naval forces are then validated against the original political interests with specific regard for their size, shape, and constancy of presence.

Naval presence forces—in support of our national security strategy—are engaged in operations in regions of the world where U.S. interests lie, in order to prevent dangers to those interests. Presence forces enhance these efforts through U.S. partnership with friends and allies to support both deterrence and timely initial crisis response. We must remain mindful that the ultimate purpose of naval forces is combat: to deter and defeat the enemies of the United States. Forces created to perform that role, however, can be—and have been throughout history—employed in noncombatant uses. By using an assessment approach which structures naval forces in a presence role for well-defined military objectives and tasks, the forward presence assessment ensures that forces for presence are shaped for combat.

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US  MC