

Department of the Navy 1992 Posture Statement

A Report by
The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett, III,
Secretary of the Navy,
Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations, and
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., United States Marine Corps,
Commandant of the Marine Corps
on the Posture and the Fiscal Year 1993 Budget
of the United States Navy and
The United States Marine Corps

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INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is our pleasure to appear today to review the posture of the Department of the Navy. You may recall that in the past, separate reports were submitted to you by the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We have departed from that practice this year by providing a unified statement incorporating the combined vision of the Department's civilian and military leadership. This move reflects our conviction that America's naval power requirements in the post-Cold War world increasingly call for closely coordinated Navy and Marine Corps policies. It also reflects our determination to provide quality naval forces for this Nation in a way that responsibly shares national resources with other urgent budget priorities.

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet empire have offered the United States an historic opportunity to reshape its strategy and military forces. The risk of global superpower confrontation has virtually disappeared; the types of conflict in which the United States might become involved in the future are likely to be regional, sudden, and widely dispersed. The President's National Security Strategy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy underscore this fact and emphasize the fundamental requirement for forces that are positioned forward for rapid response to crises. The

Base Force concept that evolves from and is organized around the National Military Strategy seeks to protect enduring American interests, both political and economic without reliance on the large-scale forward basing of United States forces that characterized the last forty years.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have already begun adapting to this changed world; they have begun a careful, deliberate effort both to reduce and restructure their forces. They will continue, however, to be the strongest naval forces in the world, and they will do so by concentrating their resources on force quality and readiness—even over force structure.

That's because the Nation must be able to rely on a ready, expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps in both peace and war. As in the past, preserving stability and restraining the emergence of aggressive regional powers in areas of importance to the United States will remain key United States national security objectives. The Nation will continue to need forces with a flexible mix of power projection capabilities, self-sufficiency in logistics and self-defense, and the capability to operate effectively with other United States and allied military services. These expeditionary forces must be available on short notice to protect United States interests abroad with minimum reliance on foreign bases or access agreements. Finally, the forces which the United States retains in strength should be those which have the greatest utility for both peacetime

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and wartime missions.

Expeditionary, combat-ready naval forces are likely to be held principally responsible for a wide range of post-Cold War national security missions and objectives. No other nation's permission is required for United States naval forces to operate in international waters. No nation has the power to prevent United States naval forces from establishing and maintaining local control of any littoral area when needed. The Navy and the Marine Corps have the ability to dominate anywhere at sea, to project influence far inland, and to intervene ashore whenever called on to protect United States interests.

A key point in today's strategic environment is that naval forces are above all else enabling components of our nation's joint, multi-service military strategy. Forward-positioned Navy and Marine Corps forces can respond quickly to regional crises; once there, they are often the "wedge" which opens the way for full-scale joint military or humanitarian operations.

America has, at the moment, the highest quality Navy and Marine Corps in history, thanks to the will, foresight, and investment of the American people. The goal of the Department of the Navy is, above all, to preserve that essential quality-even as the Navy and Marine Corps re-size and reorganize themselves to meet tomorrow's strategic requirements. The Department's leaders have proceeded on the principle that United States naval forces cannot be considered in isolation. They exist to serve the National Military Strategy, which in turn supports the Nation's bedrock interests and objectives. They should be part of a menu of capabilities that America's unified military commanders can use to organize joint and combined operational task forces whenever necessary. The Navy and Marine Corps objective, in short, is to provide-at an affordable cost-those essential capabilities that naval forces are uniquely able to contribute in support of the Nation's security. America's national strategy can only succeed if United States naval forces are ready, capable, and potent.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

New and Enduring Challenges

America's security agenda was dominated for over four decades by the specter of a hostile and powerful communist empire. The United States met that challenge successfully; and in the last three years, the nation has seen the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the liberation of eastern Europe, the bankruptcy of communist ideology worldwide, and the end of the Soviet Union itself.

The end of the Cold War has offered the United States, its allies, and its former adversaries an historic opportunity to reshape their national priorities and build new, constructive relationships. But, at the same time, the end of the Cold War has created new security challenges, and left other strategic realities unchanged.

The old geopolitical landscape—dominated by a hostile superpower with global military capabilities—provided a predictable and tangible focal point for United States defense planning. That focus is gone, and the new landscape is characterized by much more diverse concerns, among them:

- the proliferation of non-conventional weapons and associated delivery systems among regional powers:
- the intensification of historic conflicts between ethnic, religious, and political groups in key regions of the world;
- the continuing need—in a multipolar, economically interdependent world—to maintain freedom of the seas and safe

and the disappearance of the Soviet empire have offered the United States an historic opportunity to reshape its strategy and military forces.

seaborne commerce;

- demographic pressures associated with overpopulation, refugee crises, and unmet economic aspirations;
- the struggle to improve the human condition throughout the world, especially in lesser developed countries;
- drug trafficking and related problems;
 and
- the international community's expectation that the United States will continue to provide stable, positive, and visible leadership in an uncertain and unpredictable world.

Many of these concerns demand the application of traditional naval and expeditionary capabilities which require little or no obtrusive foreign basing; which can be inserted and withdrawn with relative ease; which are self-sustaining and combat ready; which are mobile, positioned forward, and immediately responsive; and which can provide a wide range of military options from mere presence up to—and over—the threshold of total war.

Indeed, the ability of forward-deployed naval forces to respond quickly to all types of overseas crises has been called upon in over 200 separate situations since World War II; and peacetime American governments have required naval forces to support national objectives and defend United States interests around the globe since be-

fore 1812.

The Navy and the Marine Corps are especially at home in today's fluid, multipolar environment. Although the United States will continue to support its traditional alliances in Europe and the Far East, the National Security Strategy is shifting from an emphasis on fixed forward defense against a continental superpower to flexible forward positioning of forces designed to shape and influence overseas regional events.

Regional cooperation in military security exercises, in peacekeeping forces, and in formally chartered coalition naval forces will come to be an increasingly important part of United States military operations. Many of those operations will take place within traditional alliances, although burdens will be more and more equitably shared among those partners. Other multinational naval operations will be of a less traditional, ad hoc nature, reflecting the rise of powerful regional and transregional threats and contingencies.

The Navy and Marine Corps are shaping their forces and doctrines to emphasize the unique, inherent capabilities that they can contribute to the National Command Authorities. We stress here the word "contribute," for DESERT STORM proved decisively that a commander in chief must be able to select from among all the military tools at his disposal, and he must be able to rely on those tools to complement one another in joint, cooperative operations. furthermore, the likelihood that post-Cold War international crises will affect the interests of more than one country increases the importance of coalition operations with allied and friendly nations.

In any event, there must be no doubt about American superiority at sea in the minds of friends or potential adversaries. The United States must maintain naval forces of sufficient size and capability to meet the Nation's needs, to inspire confidence among United States allies, and to discourage or defeat future threats to regional peace and freedom of the seas.

Foundations Of National Strategy

Navy and Marine Corps strategic planning seeks to maintain balanced naval capabilities for the defense of national interests and objectives against a range of possible threats. They intend to do so, furthermore, in the most economic way possible without compromising the effectiveness of America's naval forces.

The President's National Security Strategy of the United States defines our national interests and articulates the underpinnings of the post-Cold War national strategy. The four foundations of this strategy are expanded upon in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy and have direct application to naval forces:

NAVY IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

TOTAL NAVY PERSONNEL (USNR)

104,708

170 SHIPS

- 8 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
 2 BATTLESHIPS
 5 SSNs
 19 CRUISERS
 40 DESTROYERS/FRIGATES
- 40 DESTROYERS/FRIGATES
 35 AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
 4 MIW SHIPS
- 57 SEALIFT/COMBAT LOGISTICS/SUPPORT SHIPS

71 FIXED-WING SQUADRONS AND 23 ROTARY WING SQUADRONS

Figure 1

MARINES IN DESERT STORM

MARINES IN THEATER (USMCR)

90,200

- 24 MANEUVER BNS, 9 ARTILLERY BNS, 2 RECONNAISSANCE BNS, 2 ASSAULT AMPHIBIAN BNS
 - 300 TANKS
 - 250 ARTILLERY PIECES
 - 1000 AAVS AND LAVS
- 17 FIXED-WING SQUADRONS AND 14 ROTARY-WING SQUADRONS
 - 200 FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
 - 300 HELICOPTERS

Figure 2

• Forward Presence. The visible presence of United States military forces in regions vital to national interests is key to averting crises, preventing wars, and demonstrating American participation in global affairs. United States forces deployed overseas show American commitment, lend weight to its alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a rapid crisisresponse capability. They also provide a means of friendly, nation-to-nation contact and promote United States influence and access. Naval forces have long been a natural means of forward presence, and they will become even more important in that role as the Nation reduces the number of its permanent overseas bases.

· Crisis Response. History suggests the futility of attempting to predict exactly when, where, and how any potential foreign threat will challenge our national interests; but it also compels the Nation's leaders to assume that some threat will arise somewhere—possibly on very short notice. The military planner's tasks are to assess which potential adversaries could reasonably pose a threat and to prepare to react effectively. As a fundamentally peaceful nation with a defensive security strategy, the United States must be able to respond to crises as they occur, with the goal of deterring conflicts or-if necessary-resolving them by force. Naval forces, because of their forward positioning and expeditionary nature, have frequently been the first called to respond to national security crises. In joint and coalition operations such as DESERT STORM, naval units often serve as "enabling forces," providing the initial response and securing beachheads and sea lanes for the sequenced deployment of heavier forces.

 Strategic Deterrence and Defense. Despite recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives, a great number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons exist which could be used to threaten or coerce the United States or its allies. The problem is complicated by the increasing number of governments which have obtained advanced warhead and missile technology. Among the requirements for deterring an adversary's use of such weapons are modern, survivable strategic nuclear forces; a spectrum of response options; and the capability to hold a potential foe's offensive systems at risk. Submarine-based strategic nuclear missiles are becoming responsible for an increasing share of those responsibilities.

• Reconstitution. Reconstitution is the Nation's hedge against the possible future emergence of a new global threat. For naval forces, reconstitution includes the ability to activate contingency war reserve equipment, to mobilize new and reserve manpower, to re-expand the military industrial base, and to bring shelved technological innovations quickly into operation.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1991: MEETING NEW CHALLENGES

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

When the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in August 1990, United States naval power projection forces on routine forward-presence deployment were on the scene.

Navy and Marine Corps aviation forces—including two aircraft carriers with their air wings of self-sustaining, carrier-based strike aircraft—arrived in the region and were ready for sustained, high intensity combat some 72 hours before any other force deployments from the United States began. (Figure 1 & 2)

The first fully operational mechanized ground combat forces in the Persian Gulf region were the Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. By August 15 they were unloading a 30 day supply of combat

equipment and supplies from a Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadron that had sortied early in the crisis from Diego Garcia. In its first "real world" test, the Maritime Prepositioning Force concept met—and exceeded—the expectations set for it nearly a decade ago.

Seapower played an essential role in the United Nations-sanctioned effort to liberate Kuwait and disarm Irag. Naval interdiction forces virtually shut down Iraqi seaborne commerce in a United Nationsmandated ship intercept operation that continues today. Naval forces also guaranteed regional sea control, enabling the unopposed deployment by ships of heavy United States land-based forces. Amphibious forces deployed off the coast of Kuwait-along with aircraft and missile attacks from the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf-obliged the Iraqi military to disperse its forces and defend multiple fronts. In joint combat operations with Army, Air Force, and coalition units, Navy and Marine Corps forces conducted carrier and land-based air strikes: launched Tomahawk cruise missiles from surface ships and submarines; and conducted a combined arms offensive against Iraqi armored and infantry elements. The First Marine Expeditionary Force sweep through Kuwait to Kuwait City is a matter of well-known public record.

The Department of the Navy learned many lessons from its DESERT STORM experience. This year's budget reflects those insights as part of our ongoing efforts to improve key warfighting capabilities. Shallow-water mines showed that low technology and low-cost threats can play a key role in future warfare. We were also reminded of the importance of sealift to our ability to move large numbers of troops and supplies to areas of conflict. These forces must be ready, responsive, and reliable.

But the experience of the Navy and Ma-

A MARITIME COALITION A LONG HISTORY OF ILS, NAVY EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDLY NATIONS PROVIDED. THE FOUNDATION FOR THE MARITIME INTERDICTION FORCE WHICH WAS SO EFFECTIVE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM IN THE TWO YEARS LEADING UP TO HOSTILITIES WITH IRAO ALONE THE US NAVY HAD CONDUCTED BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES WITH OVER 50 COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD, OF THE 18 NAVIES THAT EVENTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE INTERDICTION FEFORT IN THE RED SEA AND PERSIAN GUIF 16 HAD PARTICIPATED IN EXERCISES WITH THE U.S. NAVY WITHIN THE LAST TWO YEARS. AUGUST 89 - AUGUST 90 AUGUST 90 - AUGUST 91 86 BILATERAL EXERCISES 65 BILATERAL EXERCISES 24 MULTI-LATERAL EXERCISES 24 MULTI-LATERAL EXERCISES OVER 50 COUNTRIES DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 18 NAVIES PARTICIPATED 16 NAVIES EXERCISE WITH USN

Figure 3

rine Corps in DESERT STORM also validated a number of seapower concepts. The forward presence of combat-ready, self-contained naval forces in and around the Persian Gulf area allowed for prompt, forceful United States military reaction to Iraq's aggression. These forces reassured American allies in the area, possibly deterred an expanded Iraqi offensive into Saudi Arabia, and provided the means to secure an allied beachhead if deterrence had failed. (Figure 3)

DESERT STORM also validated the Navy and Marine Corps' heavy emphasis in recent years on constant, realistic training in joint, combined-arms combat. Their investment in advanced battlefield technology, innovative tactics, and combat readiness paid enormous dividends in lives saved and missions accomplished. The reserve components of the Navy and Marine Corps Total Force structures significantly augmented naval combat and support capabilities in theater; indeed, the reserves demonstrated outstanding and inspiring leadership, organization, morale, and readiness.

Most importantly, the extraordinary performance of all America's Sailors and Marines validated the Department's continuing resolve to provide them with the best available training, leadership, and quality of life.

Crisis And Contingency Responses

DESERT STORM was by no means the only crisis to which naval forces were called to respond in 1991. Capitalizing on their distinct naval capabilities, the Navy and Marine Corps conducted a variety of "real world" operations around the globe:

· Liberia. From July 1990 until January

1991, Navy and Marine Corps units involved in Operation SHARP EDGE provided security for the United States Embassy and evacuated over 2,400 civilians from Liberia during that country's violent insurrection. A Navy-commanded Joint Task Force (JTF) demonstrated the capability to establish a presence quickly, re-

and DESERT STORM were dramatic examples of the way in which expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps units can quickly establish a combat-ready presence—both at sea and ashore—paving the way for (or 'enabling') the introduction of heavier assets. 99

main on station for an extended period, and react to changing conditions ashore on little or no notice.


- Somalia. Amphibious forces temporarily diverted from DESERT STORM executed a dramatic, long-range rescue of 260 American civilians and other non-combatants from civil-war torn Somalia. Code-named EASTERN EXIT, this operation was accomplished in less than three days over a distance of some 2,000 miles.
- Iraq. Naval forces in the Mediterranean provided humanitarian, logistic, and milita-

ry security support to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq's Kurdish region. The embarked MEU(SOC) served as the lead, and initally self-sustained, enabling force to provide first, security, and later, logistics support to those in need. Working with Army, Air Force, and allied units, Navy and Marine Corps forces assisted more than 500,000 Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq and southern Turkey.

- Bangladesh. The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its associated naval amphibious group were on their way home from Desert Storm in May when they were diverted to provide desperately needed assistance to 1.7 million people of Bangladesh following devastating floods in that country. A Marine-commanded, multi-service JTF used hovercraft, helicopters, and airplanes to deliver over 2,000 tons of food, fuel, medicine, and equipment. The Bangladesh people gave this operation its name: SEA ANGEL.
- Philippines. In Operation FIERY VIGIL, forward-deployed naval forces formed another JTF to provide emergency services, clean-up assistance, and evacuation support following the June eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines. An aircraft carrier embarked Marine helicopters and, together with an MPS ship, helped support and evacuate over 17,000 people.
- · Haiti. Following the coup in Haiti in September of last year, Navy and Marine Corps units, working closely with the United States Coast Guard, came to the aid of refugees fleeing that impoverished nation. This was the most comprehensive relief effort since the Haitian and Cuban boatlifts of 1980. Three separate Marinecommanded JTFs were formed, with forces from every branch of the armed services. The Coast Guard, with Navy support, assumed primary responsibility for picking up refugees at sea and transporting them to the United States Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Once there, Navy and Marine Corps forces housed and provided the necessary security for over 11,000 refugees.

Multi-National Exercises

Friendly and cooperative ties with naval services of other countries have long been a source of diplomatic and operational benefit. The ease with which coalition units were able to operate with one another in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a result of many years of regular multi-national exercises. 1991 was no exception. Navy ships and Marine Corps units participated in 288 exercises involving 60 countries around the world. As navies become smaller and international security interests become more integrated, such exercises are



likely to become even more important. (Figure 4)

Ongoing Commitments

Many of the Sailors and Marines who returned from DESERT STORM barely had time to repack their sea bags before they were underway again, meeting the Nation's continuing peacetime requirement for naval forces that are forward-deployed and ready to respond immediately to emergencies abroad. The Persian Gulf region, for example, is still a potential flash point, and the United States has an aircraft carrier battle group and a Marine Expeditionary Unit on station there, in addition to the ships and aircraft conducting intercept operations in support of the United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq.

Elsewhere in the world, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to conduct forward presence operations, but they have revised operating concepts and battle group compositions to reflect post-Cold War strategic realities. Yet the naval services still continue to provide forward presence with units that are ready to deter aggression, bolster regional allies, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and meet military threats-whenever they should arise-to American interests and citizens around the world. In the last year, Navy ships made port calls in 73 countries and Marines conducted operations in 46 countries. Currently 20 to 25 percent of our operational naval forces are deployed—30 to 35 percent counting ships training at sea near their home ports and Marines deployed for training away from their home bases.

Counter-Drug Operations

Another continuing operation that naval forces support is the Nation's war on drugs. Naval personnel work with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and provide pre-deployment training for DEA agents at Quantico, Virginia. The Navy and Marine Corps maintain counter-drug billets with the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the United States Coast Guard; the United States Customs Service the Department of State; the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and the United States Attorney's Office. (Figure 5)

Naval forces conduct counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and in the waters off of California, but they have also participated in training deployments to Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, and Guatemala and have provided training support in riverine operations to Colombia. Naval operational support includes the temporary

loan of weapons and equipment to law enforcement activities to enhance their counter-drug efforts.


Counter-drug support is also provided to the Commander-in-Chief, Forces Command (CinCFor) Joint Task Force (JTF-6) for United States operations in the form of ground surveillance, Remotely Piloted Vehicle aerial reconnaissance operations, engineer support operations, and sensor operations along the United States southwest border.

NAVAL FORCES: ADAPTING TO A CHANGED WORLD

The Department of the Navy's objective is to guarantee those essential capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps are uniquely able to contribute in support of the new National Security Strategy. Two of the most important of these are expeditionary capabilities (for providing presence and projecting power in regional crisis areas) and enabling capabilities (to help secure access for the sequenced employment of heavier United States and allied forces). The Navy and Marine Corps will by no means ignore other traditional seapower capabilities, but in the new security environment they recognize that these are the areas on which they must carefully focus their planning, training, and resources.

Expeditionary Forces and Forward Naval Presence

The presence of United States naval forces around the world—an historic symbol of American commitment to peace—will be a continuing reminder of the potential costs of aggression to would-be adversaries. The difference in the 1990s and beyond



Marine Corps Gazette & April 1992

MARINE CORPS CRISIS ACTION MODULES

- CRISIS ACTION MODULES (CAMS) CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT ENHANCEMENT OF MARINE FORCE CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIVENESS
 - THESE CAPABILITIES, MODULES OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT, ARE DESIGNED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE CINCS FOR
 FLEXIBLE FORCE OPTIONS FOR USE IN DELIBERATE OR CRISIS PLANNING BY:
 - . INTEGRATING WITH JOINT ADAPTIVE PLANNING
 - SUPPORTING THE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)
 - CAMS ARE ORGANIZED TO MAKE MARINE FORCES AVAILABLE VIA ANY COMBINATION OF DEPLOYMENT MEANS:
 - AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
 - AIR-DEPLOYED FORCES
 - SELF-DEPLOYING FORCES
 - FORCES ASSOCIATED WITH PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT
 - THE INTEGRATION OF THE CAMS CONCEPT WITH THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR MPS PROGRAM ILLUSTRATE ONE WAY IN WHICH THESE "BUILDING BLOCKS" PROVIDE CINCS OPTIONS FOR DEPLOYING AND EMPLOYING A SEQUENTIAL FLOW OF EDUCES.

MPF MEU (1,400) 1 MPS MPF MEB (LIC) (10,200) 2 MPS MPF MEB 16,500) MPSRON

Figure 6

will be that naval forces will not concentrate on their ability to wage a global war at sea against a superpower adversary, but rather on their inherent ability to project American expeditionary power in regional crises

Expeditionary forces are those which are mobile, immediately responsive, self-sustaining, and ready at any time to meet the requirements of unified commanders for a wide variety of military and humanitarian operations, including:

- · disaster relief,
- · nation-building,
- · non-combatant evacuation operations,
- protection of United States citizens and property overseas,
- anti-terrorist actions,
- special operations,
- · limited strikes, and
- · full-scale, joint combat operations.

Forward-deployed naval forces are combat-ready and sustainable anywhere in the world by virtue of a responsive and highly evolved logistics system. Deployed units are continuously served by fleet oilers and supply ships that deliver fuel, ammunition, spare parts, food, and medical supplies to expeditionary forces even while they are underway.

As the United States reduces the number of its permanently based overseas military forces, the visible proof of continuing United States interest in important world regions will increasingly depend on the presence of such deployed, politically flexible naval forces. In certain critical regions such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Western Pacific, forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps units will bear principal and continuous on-scene responsibility for:

 deterring aggression against United States interests;

- protecting peaceful development, political stability, and economic ties;
- demonstrating visible support for United States allies;
- developing operational relationships

are shaping their forces and doctrines to emphasize the unique, inherent capabilities that they can contribute to the National Command Authorities. . . . The difference in the 1990s and beyond will be that naval forces will . . . concentrate on their inherent ability to project American expeditionary power in regional crises.

with allied military services through multi-national exercises; and

• providing an expeditionary power-projection response when crises ignite.

Expeditionary Marine Forces

For over 200 years the Navy and the Marine Corps have complemented and supported each other as the components of America's naval forces. Together they provide the Nation's critical and unmatched ability to conduct combined-arms sea, air, and ground operations. The unique value of expeditionary Marine forces lies in their ability to conduct day-to-day presence op-

erations and project influence while maintaining the ability to bring significant and sustainable combat power to bear ashore from the sea at the time and place of our Nation's choosing.

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) provide an extraordinarily flexible range of national options. These capabilities reside in sea-based Marines, in the forward-based Marine Expeditionary Force in the Western Pacific, and in the prepositioned equipment and supplies aboard three strategically located MPS squadrons.

Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable—or MEU(SOCs)—are MAGTFs most commonly embarked on amphibious ships. They are specially trained, equipped, and organized to conduct an expanded range of sea-based expeditionary missions and have proven their effectiveness often in "real world" crises and contingencies. They are general purpose naval expeditionary forces with the capability to conduct selected maritime special operations.

Another vital and unique capability inherent in the Marine Corps is the air component of the MAGTF. Marine tactical aviation represents a tightly integrated and immediately responsive component of Naval Aviation's ability to fight and win, Marine tactical air squadrons provide to the MAGTF the equivalent of precision longrange artillery, along with close air support, battlefield reconnaissance, and local air superiority. They are uniquely trained, organized, and equipped to conduct combined-arms operations from expeditionary airfields close to the battlefield or from Navy ships at sea. This flexibility provides a continuum of air support options for integrated offensive or defensive air operations and sea control which can be rapidly and continuously tailored to meet the requirements of complex, shifting scenarios.

The Marine Corps also provides carefully tailored force packages for use by a unified commander. Referred to as "crisis action modules," these force packages are an important part of joint campaign planning. This "building block" approach meets the need for adaptive planning within the joint planning system.

Naval Forces as Enabling Forces

In an era of regional conflicts, short-fused contingencies, and declining defense spending, properly deployed joint and combined forces provide the means to generate the greatest combat capability in the shortest time. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to optimize joint capabilities in a number of ways.

One of the most important contributions of naval forces to joint, multi-service strategy lies in the role they play as "enabling" forces. Because naval forces are forward-deployed, have independent striking pow-

er, can remain on station for long periods, and can act as a Joint Task Force component or headquarters, they are frequently called upon to lead the early stages of Unit-

ed States joint crisis response.

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were dramatic examples of the way in which expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps units can quickly establish a combat-ready presence-both at sea and ashorepaving the way for (or "enabling") the introduction of heavier assets. United States carrier-based strike and fighter aircraft, attack submarines, and surface combatant ships quickly established complete sea and air superiority over the shipping routes to and from the Persian Gulf region, and the Marines landed the first fully operational mechanized ground combat forces in theater. With port and airfield facilities and access routes secured, the United States and its allies were able to conduct an unopposed sealift of heavy forces to the region.

This type of joint, "sequenced" military operation—with naval forces providing the initial response and enabling the employment of heavier forces—will likely characterize similar conflicts in the future.

Joint and Combined Interoperability

Joint operations, however, mean more than simply enabled, sequenced military deployment. The Navy and Marine Corps are improving other joint capabilities as well, with the object of enhancing the Nation's ability to capitalize on the synergistic effect of complementary forces operating together.

For example, the Department of the Navy's joint board with the Air Force provides an executive-level forum for promoting interoperability and cooperation between the two military departments and has resulted in the merger of three service weapons programs into two joint programs: the Joint Direct Attack Munitions Program and Joint Standoff Weapon Program.

The Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces are adapting policy, training, exercises, and operations to enhance joint capabilities. Navy and Marine Corps service component commanders in the Atlantic and Pacific regions are working with their unified commanders and with Air Force tactical commanders to develop standard operating procedures for Joint Task Forces and to refine Joint Force Air Component Commander responsibilities in the coordination of joint air operations.

Marine expeditionary headquarters are becoming more interoperable as well. The two Fleet Marine Force headquarters are able to establish a Service component headquarters to support either unified commanders with a geographic area of responsibility or a JTF. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) command elements will continue to provide the capability to func-

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AMENDED FY 1992/1993 BIENNIAL BUDGET APPROPRIATION SUMMARY

(In Millions of Dollars)

TOTAL, DON	100,378.6	89,290.0	84,753.2
NATIONAL DEFENSE SEALIFT FUND	_		1,201.4
NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND	238.7		_
FAMILY HOUSING, NAVY (OPERATIONS)	694.4	703.7	696.2
FAMILY HOUSING, NAVY (CONSTRUCTION)	175.0	198.4	321.1
MILCON, NAVAL RESERVE	80.3	23.9	37.8
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, NAVY	1,158.3	863.6	838.8
EVALUATION, NAVY	7,989.4	8,549.9	8,517.8
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND			
PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS	1,155.7	1,037.4	588.5
OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY	5.721.6	6,306,5	5,868.8
SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY	7,374.3	6,463.8	5,319.5
WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, NAVY	6,433.8	4,415.0	3,719.0
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY	8,591.0	7,153,3	6,653.7
O & M. MARINE CORPS RESERVE	84.7	91.7	74.7
O & M. NAVY RESERVE	1,016.7	877.5	852.7
O & M. MARINE CORPS	3,225.2	2,110.4	1,646.5
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY	28,162.9	22,674.8	20,588.5
RESERVE PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS	285.7	348.9	337.7
RESERVE PERSONNEL, NAVY	1,606.1	1,714.6	1,627.3
MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS	6.374.8	6,083.6	6,104.9
MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY	20,010.1	19.673.0	19,758.4
	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY_1993

Figure 7

tion as a JTF headquarters. In addition, interoperability is a key standard by which the Marine Corps is measuring all of its program initiatives. The Marine Tactical Command and Control System is just one example.

In addition to joint planning and opera-

6... naval forces will focus on the challenges of littoral and shallow-water operations . . . Naval force structure will be prioritized in favor of a ship mix optimized to project power ashore in regional crises. . . . 99

tions among United States services, combined operations with allied and friendly nations offer a number of mutual benefits, including:

- the opportunity to share the burden of maintaining presence in important regions of the world;
- enhanced familiarity with operating procedures, doctrine, and hardware of current and future coalition and alliance

partners; and

improved relations and international stability.

Peacetime combined operations include training exercises, personnel exchanges, counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities, and humanitarian and environmental efforts. When conflicts arise, United States naval forces are uniquely capable of contributing to multinational peacekeeping efforts by protecting or interdicting sea and air traffic; by providing a powerful, self-sustaining means of enforcing international sanctions; or by directly assisting allies and friendly countries with power projection and sea control forces.

Future Force Structure

The shift in emphasis from open-ocean, global warfare against a superpower adversary to regional crisis response means optimizing platform capabilities and acquisition strategies accordingly. For example, naval forces will focus on the challenges of littoral and shallow-water operations where anti-submarine warfare, counter-mine warfare, and near-land/over-land anti-air warfare pose special technical problems. Navy force structure will be prioritized in favor of a ship mix optimized to project power ashore in regional crises in support of the national strategy.

The Nation's shrinking overseas base structure means that naval forces must stress even more their inherent ability to

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sustain themselves far from home with dedicated supply lines and logistic support ships and aircraft.

The long development time and life span of capital-intensive warships and aircraft require foresighted planning; ships that are just entering the fleet today will still be in service 30 to 50 years from now. Many of the airplanes that Navy and Marine Corps pilots will need a decade from now are already on the assembly line. Fundamental changes in the naval force structure cannot happen overnight. Careful and prudent long-range planning was the key to the military's ability to succeed in DESERT STORM—just as it will be the key to America's ability to succeed in a DESERT STORM 10 or 20 years from now. (Figure 7)

New force structure planning must be complemented by changes in operational doctrine. For example, naval commanders in the Mediterranean are adjusting the composition of their task forces. Their new Maritime Action Groups are compensating for reduced overall force levels by capitalizing on the firepower of surface ships and submarines equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, and by exploiting the power projection capabilities of multi-purpose amphibious assault ships. These flexible and responsive forces have succeeded in stretching the increasingly limited availability of naval assets.

The Department of the Navy has established clear priorities in its budgeting strategy as it balances it obligation to meet future force structure requirements against its responsibility to be frugal with the Nation's resources. The principal focus of the Department's budget will be on the readiness of the Nation's naval forces—that is, their ability at any moment to wage prompt and sustained military operations at sea or ashore wherever they may be required.

Readiness encompasses everything needed to support the daily operations of our ships, battalions, and squadrons—including fuel, spare parts, maintenance, training, ordnance, and infrastructure. It also includes

6 Today's Navy and Marine Corps personnel are ambitious, committed to excellence, well-trained, and willing to sacrifice. They are among the finest young men and women in America, and they deserve rewarding career opportunities and adequate pay and benefits.

personnel issues such as pay, medical services, quality of life, family support, and the recruitment of top-quality men and women. To neglect readiness is to create a "hollow force" that is recognized by friends and adversaries alike as dangerously ineffective.

Although readiness is its first spending priority, the Department of the Navy must also support procurement for long-term replacement of weapons and platforms, as well as ongoing modernization initiatives for maintaining technological superiority. The Navy and Marine Corps will invest in modernization only when the additional cost will produce a significant and necessary enhancement of warfighting capability. They will also seek to achieve savings by matching sustainability goals—i.e., the inventories of on-hand warfighting supplies and ammunition—to the levels required for regional contingencies.

Most importantly, any decisions on future force reductions must carefully balance cost against risk. The Nation must achieve a consensus on what capabilities it wishes to retain, and it must understand that—all else being equal—the ability of naval forces to influence events, to defend overseas interests, and to respond to regional crises may deteriorate too quickly if forces are reduced below those levels prescribed in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Base Force.

The post-Cold War naval strategy of expeditionary power projection has called for a fundamentally new look at the Navy and Marine Corps future force structures. The Department of the Navy has begun that look in its Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE). The NFCPE-involving top naval leaders and the staffs of the Secretary, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps-is studying the expected role of naval forces in national policy over the next 20 years and will establish a comprehensive plan for fulfilling that role. The NFCPE is expected to be completed later this year. (Figure 8)

THE CRITICAL ELEMENTS

Personnel

Today's Navy and Marine Corps personnel are ambitious, committed to excellence, well-trained, and willing to sacrifice. They are among the finest young men and women in America, and they deserve rewarding career opportunities and adequate pay and benefits. No single factor is more important to the readiness of naval forces than the quality of life of Navy and Marine Corps people and their families. Quality medical, religious, and legal services; family and bachelor housing; morale/welfare/ recreation services; family support; and child care are all crucial to the well-being-and hence the readiness-of United States Sailors and Marines.

As they get smaller, both the Navy and Marine Corps will match personnel reductions to reductions in the numbers of ships, aircraft squadrons, and battalions. Both services will strive to retain high-quality, experienced personnel; maintain advancement opportunities; improve the quality of training; and reduce overall manpower costs.

The Navy and Marine Corps have developed a carefully structured plan to bring down the numbers of active duty personnel with minimum disruption to their professional and personal lives. Begun over a year ago, the plan relies on reduced recruiting, normal attrition, higher retention standards, and incentives for early retirement in specified career fields. These reductions were underway during Operation DESERT STORM, and reservists were relied on to

POST-COLD WAR FORCE STRUCTURE

	1988	1993	1995
STRATEGIC FORCES			
SSBNs	37	24	23
COMBATANT FORCES			[
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	15	13	12
ATTACK SUBMARINES	100	90	89
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS	63	58	53
SURFACE COMBATANTS	217	143	152
PATROL COMBATANTS	6	6	6
MINE WARFARE	4	15	15
COMBAT LOGISTICS	58	54	51
SUPPORT FORCES			
SUPPORT SHIPS	66	58	50
TOTAL	566	461	451

- AIRCRAFT CARRIER TOTALS INCLUDE CVNs/CVs IN MAINTENANCE, BUT EXCLUDE THE TRAINING CARRIER (AVT).
- ATTACK SUBMARINE TOTALS INCLUDE TWO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CONFIGURED SSNs.
- SURFACE COMBATANT TOTALS EXCLUDE EIGHT INNOVATIVE NAVAL RESERVE CONCEPT FFT-1052 CLASS SHIPS.

Figure 8

augment areas of temporary shortfall. Consequently, the Navy and Marine Corps will endeavor to reduce military personnel without necessarily resorting to reductions in force. Only a small number of officers and senior enlisted personnel with over twenty years of active service will by affected by involuntary retirements. The Department will be able to maintain this policy as long as reductions are held to current drawdown rates.

Even as the Navy and Marine Corps downsize, however, they must still retain proven professionals. Retention is now at an all-time high, with many of the best people choosing to pursue a military career. The Navy and Marine Corps will reduce overall numbers of personnel primarily through attrition, retention controls, and reduced accessions. Reenlistments will be more competitive. Personnel in ratings that are over-manned will have the opportunity to reenlist if they have the right qualifications and are willing to re-train into skills that are not adequately manned. Additionally, Sailors and Marines who transition to civilian life will receive financial planning, employment, transition, and relocation assistance.


Smaller, more technology-oriented forces of the future will require that both the Navy and Marine Corps continue investing in high-quality recruits. To meet recruiting goals, the naval services must maintain a solid corps of recruiters and provide resources for recruiting and advertising, including national advertising funds.

Training and education will be critical in the 1990s. Well-trained professionals provide a valuable payoff in a fiscally constrained environment. As the nature and technology of military operations change, the professionalism of our Sailors and Marines remains the ultimate force multiplier.

Remaining inequities in pay and compensation need to be corrected. Military pay raises have consistently lagged behind the wage growth of the private sector. The Department of the Navy strongly endorses the 3.7 percent pay raise contained in the budget.

Reservists and retirees are an important part of the Department of the Navy's total force. Not only are they available for recall to active duty, they also frequently serve as volunteers in the support net for naval commands and communities. The Department will continue to ensure that its retirees receive the rights, benefits, and privileges to which their faithful service entitles them.

Civilians are strategically placed in our planning and support establishment so that more Sailors and Marines are available to serve in the operating forces. The performance of this supporting establishment during the past months has clearly



demonstrated the skill and professionalism of the Department of the Navy's civilian force. (Figure 9)

Research and Development (R&D)

A robust science and technology program is one of our key hedges against an uncertain future. The Department of the Navy's R&D

66 The Navy and Marine Corps will perform their missions better, faster, and with minimum waste by removing from the system impediments to the flow of resources, materiel, decisions, and information.

The Department is going about this process improvement in a systematic, top-to-bottom way that it has called 'Total Quality Leadership,' or TQL. 99

focus will remain on high payoff areas such as technologies that enhance power projection, command and control systems, and night-fighting capabilities.

Basic research programs that support the Navy and Marine Corps include programs in ocean sciences, advanced materials, information sciences, and other related fields.

The Department of the Navy has increased R&D emphasis on mine countermeasures, shallow water anti-submarine warfare, ship self-defense, and human fac-

tors related to tactical decisionmaking under stress. Other exploratory development programs include advanced materials and the application of high-performance computers to Navy and Marine Corps problems.

The Department of the Navy is encouraging direct industry involvement in advanced technology demonstration opportunities. It is also encouraging industry-Navy partnerships and is instituting cooperative exchange educational programs for naval engineers and their industry counterparts.

Acquisition

The Navy and Marine Corps will stress capabilities while balancing affordability, cost effectiveness, and efficiency in all new development programs. The Department of the Navy is streamlining its acquisition process to the greatest extent feasible.

A systems engineering approach, a commitment to total quality, and a more effective use of cost and performance analysis will reduce risk and ensure that investments are wisely made. Certain commercial technologies can be adapted to military use to bring state-of-the-art systems to our fighting forces rapidly and at a lower cost. This concept has been highly successful in the computer and communications fields. Further work is required to adjust acquisition regulations for better exploitation of this technology. The Department has also expanded Product Improvement Programs and has defined modifications to existing platforms which will generate the greatest improvement at the lowest cost.

To sharpen the acquisition work force, the Department of the Navy has taken an important step forward by appointing a Director of Acquisition Career Management

who is responsible for attracting, selecting, developing, and retaining a highly qualified work force capable of performing current and future DON acquisition functions.

Finally, the Department is consolidating Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) engineering and fleet support activities. This consolidation strengthens RDT&E management, provides substantial opportunities for cost savings, eliminates duplication of effort, and provides support for further consolidation efforts.

Industrial Base

Lower defense spending will significantly affect the size and structure of the industrial base as well as our department acquisition policies and practices. For the most part, the Department of the Navy will depend on individual companies to shift between defense and commercial production as required. In industries where the Navy and Marine Corps are the only or the predominant customer, essential production capabilities must be maintained for national security. The future composition of the defense industrial base will depend on actual spending levels, the financial strength of defense-related firms, the level of these firms' diversification, and their commitment to continue as defense suppliers. Clearly, the defense industrial base will shrink as companies respond to government budget actions.

Total Quality Leadership

The Department of the Navy's leaders are committed to the idea that an effective naval force for America's future depends not only on "downsizing" and "restructuring" but also on changing fundamentally the way it does business. The Department has aggressively adopted the principle—proven by other cutting-edge public and private organizations—that one of the best ways to improve its product is to improve its processes. The Navy and Marine Corps will perform their missions better, faster, and with minimum waste by removing from the system impediments to the flow of resources, materiel, decisions, and information.

The Department is going about this process improvement in a systematic, top-to-bottom way that it has called "Total Quality Leadership," or TQL. It has already begun to implement TQL in several shore commands with dramatic, positive results. As just one example, the Ships Parts Control Center in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania greatly enhanced its support to the fleet between 1988 and 1992 while achieving personnel, non-labor, and direct overtime cost reductions of 2I, 85, and 82 percent respectively. Ultimately, the TQL methods of continuous process improvement will reach all Navy and Marine Corps operational and support units at every level of command.

USN/USMC AIRCRAFT PRIMARY AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZATION (PAA)

	FY 90	FY-91	FY-93
NAVY			
ACTIVE			1
FIXED WING	2796	2640	2482
ROTARY	715	728	702
TOTAL	3511	3368	3184
RESERVE			
FIXED WING	318	287	280
ROTARY	67	60	42
TOTAL	385	347	322
MARINE CORPS			
ACTIVE		ľ	
FIXED WING	566	575	535
ROTARY	571	555	566
TOTAL	1137	1130	1101
RESERVE	-		
FIXED WING	123	106	117
ROTARY	86	84	88
TOTAL	209	190	205

Figure 10

NAVAL FORCES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Surface Warfare Programs

The Navy is planning a smaller yet highly capable surface force designed to carry out a full range of regional crisis response and warfighting missions. The increased use of naval forces for crisis response and regional contingencies means more emphasis on the ability of surface combatants to project power through the use of distributive firepower—that is, the ability to strike targets far inland with cruise missiles from a number of different Navy platforms.

The inherent mobility and sustainability of amphibious forces provide the capability to move to a crisis area and support a broad range of national objectives. . . . The Navy and Marine Corps are planning a new class of amphibious ship. the LX. . . . 99

The Navy is decommissioning several classes of ships, including the Iowa class battleships and the Charles F. Adams and Coontz class guided-missile destroyers. Additionally, the Knox class frigates are also being decommissioned, with the exception of eight of these ships which have been

redesignated as training frigates.

The Navy is planning to purchase fewer new ships in the coming years than it did during most of the last decade, but those new ships will have systems and capabilities that will take the Fleet confidently in the next century.

The 27-ship Ticonderoga class of Aegis cruisers is nearing the end of its production, with the last ship of the class scheduled for commissioning in February 1994.

The DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer program recently completed a major milestone with the July 1991 commissioning of USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), the first of 17 guided missile destroyers currently under contract. Early sea trials indicate that she is meeting expectations in all areas. Five of these ships were authorized in Fiscal Year 1992. The budget includes four ships for Fiscal Year 1993. The Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) includes three in Fiscal Year 1994 and four in each of the remaining years.

In Fight of changing requirements and decreased spending levels, the Navy commissioned the Destroyer Variant (DDV) Study Group to examine less costly alternatives to the current DDG-51 design. As a direct result of this effort, the Flight II DDG-51s, scheduled to begin construction in Fiscal Year 1994, will incorporate several modifications which will reduce costs and emphasize combat capabilities needed for regional conflict.

The inherent mobility and sustainability of amphibious forces provide the capability to move to a crisis area and support a

broad range of national objectives. Shortly after the year 2000, several classes of amphibious ships will reach the end of their service lives. By the year 2007, nearly 80 percent of today's amphibious ships are programmed to retire. The Navy and Marine Corps are planning a new class of amphibious ship, the LX, to replace these aging ships.

Long-range plans include procurement of LHD-6, which is important to support the Navy and Marine Corps foward deployment and crisis response capabilities. The Department of the Navy is taking advantage of the existing production line to

The Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) aircraft for the CH-46 is the Marine Corps' number one acquisition priority. Current CH-46 airframes are experiencing mounting technical difficulties that affect readiness and combat effectiveness.

acquire LHDs at the lowest possible cost. In summary, the shipbuilding budget for Fiscal Year 1993 includes four Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class guided missile destroyers, two coastal minehunters (MHC), and one oceanographic ship conversion. (Figure 10)

Aviation Programs

The aircraft carrier provides a globally employable air base that fully supports the operation of a wide range of tactical and support aircraft. With a nominal service life of 45 years, these versatile ships are capable of operating all current and future tactical aircraft, along with full logistics, maintenance, and munitions support. Seabased tactical aircraft can react quickly and operate at extended range from their mobile sea base. They can establish air superiority over vital areas on land and sea.

Marine tactical aviation provides vital air-to-ground support to expeditionary forces. It is uniquely trained, organized, and equipped for deployment on aircraft carriers or from austere forward operating bases, including rapidly constructed expeditionary airfields.

The Department of the Navy will retain the striking power of its aircraft carriers by adopting innovative concepts of operations and restructuring the embarked air wings. Battle groups will also take advantage of distributive firepower by integrating cruise missiles with carrier strike planning.

By 1995, the Nation will have reduced its

aircraft carrier force level to a total of 12. plus a training carrier. The number of air wings will be reduced by 1993 to 11 active and two reserve air wings. The air wings embarked on these ships will continue to be the centerpiece of naval power projection and will be a top Navy acquisition and modernization priority for the foreseeable future. The carrier air wing composition will change over time as the Navy and Marine Corps phase in new multi-mission aircraft with an emphasis on power projection capabilities. The core of this air wing will be 60 offensive air-to-air or air-toground aircraft. The initial composition of this air wing will incude F-14, F/A-18, and A-6 aircraft. The Navy's long-term goal is to "neck down" to two types of aircraft, the F/A-18E/F and the A-X.

F/A-18s presently coming off the production line have enhanced night fighting capabilities, including navigation Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) and night vision devices. The F/A-18E/F will build upon a combat-proven design, providing additional endurance, payload, and growth capability. It will assume the over-land and over-water air superiority mission and improve the air wing's strike capability. The combat-proven F/A-18D will replace all Marine RF-4B, A-6E, OA-4, and TA-4 aircraft in the inventory. The Department is considering ways to maintain the AV-8B aircraft inventory, which will otherwise fall short of requirements by the end of the decade.

The A-X will begin replacing our aging A-6 aircraft after the turn of the century and will significantly upgrade the Navy's all-weather strike capability. This joint Navy/Air Force program will incorporate stealth technology to provide a high-performance, survivable aircraft for the next century. A-X R&D begins this year with the goal of developing an aircraft with the required performance at an affordable cost.

The Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) aircraft for the CH-46 is the Marine Corps' number one acquisition priority. Current CH-46 airframes are experiencing mounting technical difficulties that affect readiness and combat effectiveness. The MLR options under consideration represent significant improvements in terms of tactical mobility, range, speed, and survivability which are required on today's battlefield.

Modernization of the attack (AH-1) and heavy lift (CH-53E) helicopter fleet is successfully moving forward.

The Navy's P-3C maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) provide long-endurance surface surveillance for the fleet and the ability to counter both nuclear and diesel-electric submarines. Despite a significant reduction in the number of active and reserve P-3 squadrons, the Navy anticipates that the retirement of large numbers of aging airframes

will mean a shortfall of aircraft to support remaining squadrons by the end of the century. The Department of the Navy will undertake efforts this year to address this issue.

Submarine Programs

As part of the Navy's response to global changes, procurement of the Seawolf (SSN-21) class nuclear-powered attack submarine has been cancelled. The lead ship is now under construction and will be completed. The Navy is currently studying how to preserve the essential capabilities required to build and maintain nuclear-powered submarines.

The United States must maintain the capability to conduct strike warfare, littoral anti-submarine warfare, mining, and special operations with its submarine force. By combining stealth, endurance, and agility in a single platform, the submarine is well-suited for an ambiguous and rapidly changing security environment. Submarines have low manning requirements, low operating costs, use proven technologies,

66 For a global ready response capability and forward presence, the Nation needs a tailored force with at least enough amphibious ships to lift the assault echelons of two and one-half brigade-size units. This allows the Navy and Marine Corps to meet current requirements for forward deployed forces and still provide sufficient surge capability to assemble a brigade-size amphibious assault force in either the Atlantic or Pacific. 9 9

and have demonstrated an ability to maintain a consistently high tempo of operations. Accordingly, the Navy is looking at options for a new, less costly attack submarine that could provide these capabilities.

Work has already started on a new SSN design with the initiation of the Centurion study. The goal is to capitalize on, as much as possible, technology already developed for the single Seawolf. This new attack submarine will be smaller than the Seawolf, carry fewer weapons, and cost less.

Nuclear deterrence is still important to the Nation's security, despite revolutionary changes in the world. The continuing national commitment to nuclear deterrence is fully supported by the Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force,

which provides the sea-based leg of America's strategic triad. As the Navy moves to an all-Trident SSBN force, it will gradually reduce the number of SSBNs to a planned total of 18. This force will continue to be both the most survivable and the most cost-effective element of United States strategic nuclear forces.

Marine Corps Programs

As part of the Nation's overall naval force capability, expeditionary Marine forces provide unique striking power to influence events ashore; gain local superiority over potential adversaries either unilaterally or with other forces; permit simultaneous coverage of different crisis areas; defend

66 The Department of the Navy is firmly committed to providing adequate sealift for the sustained movement of United States military forces overseas. The outstanding performance of Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and United States and foreign charters was integral to the success of Operation DESERT STORM.

against and respond to sudden attack; and fight a war effectively on any scale. The Marine Corps is pursuing only those programs which, in conjunction with other services, provide the complementary capabilities to fulfill these needs.

CinC war plans require amphibious lift for the assault echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Forces—an unaffordable requirement. For a global ready response capability and forward presence, the Nation needs a tailored force with at least enough amphibious ships to lift the assault echelons of two and one-half brigade-size units. This allows the Navy and Marine Corps to meet current requirements for forward deployed forces and still provide sufficient surge capability to assemble a brigade-size amphibious assault force in either the Atlantic or Pacific. This fiscally constrained goal meets the Nation's minimum requirements.

Reflecting the impact of budget reductions, the expeditionary Marine force structure will be reduced significantly. In Fiscal Year 1992, the Marine Corps will reduce by approximately 7,000 Marines. In Fiscal Year 1993, it will reduce by another 6,100 Marines to reach an end strength of 181,900. The program continues the reduc-

tion at this same rate through Fiscal Year 1997, and the Corps has instituted a series of actions that will enable it to maintain a proper mix of grades and skills.

End strength restrictions will, however, require a significantly reduced number of units. For example, the traditional 27 infantry battalions, already reduced to 24, are projected to continue downward in the next several years to 20—16 infantry and four light armored infantry battalions.

To accommodate these reductions, Marine divisions, reduced from about 17,000 to 14,000 Marines, will be organized to have more tactical flexibility and mobility. The Marines will continue to task organize its forces depending on the scenario and mission assigned. Marine air wings will also reduce in size but retain their inherent basing and employment flexibility. Marine air command and control systems will remain interoperable with Army, Navy, Air Force, and allied systems.

Interoperability initiatives will make the Marine Corps structure better able to support a continuous build-up and sequencing of forces to respond to developing crises and contingencies.

Other expeditionary programs include a series of initiatives which will fully integrate space capabilities into Marine Corps operations and tactics through training, doctrine, and equipment development. The Marine Corps is actively participating in the development of joint space operational doctrine. Marines at the Naval Space Command are being consolidated to provide commanders in the field with a liaison team for the exploitation of space capabilities.

The Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) serves as the umbrella C³ system concept for the Marine Corps. This system, once fully developed, will integrate all the battlefield functional C³ areas such as ground maneuver, fire support coordination, aviation, intelligence, combat service support, and enhance their fusion at various Combat Operation Centers. MTACCS will be fully interoperable with the Navy, joint programs are underway with the Army and Air Force to ensure continued Marine Corps interoperability and commonality with those services.

Space and Electronic Warfare

Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) is dedicated to minimizing an opponent's use of command, control, and intelligence systems while enhancing our own capabilities. Its objective is to prevent the enemy from using his forces effectively. SEW can limit a conflict by capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of an adversary's centralized leadership.

Within the Navy, a top-down restructuring of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C³I) infrastructure has

been conducted, and a supporting investment strategy has been developed. Since a major strategic objective of this warfare area is to undermine the command and control of enemy operations, it provides a major force multiplier which makes possible the defeat of the enemy with great economy of force. Using SEW tactics, the Navy targets an opponent's C³I infrastructure in order to disrupt, neutralize, and deceive, while providing friendly forces with superior situational awareness, coordination, and unity of control.

To streamline C³I and infuse up-to-date commercial technologies, the Navy has developed the Copernicus architecture. This is not an acquisition program, but rather an approach to streamlining C³I systems while infusing cutting-edge commercial technologies. It is a "user-centered" approach to information management and comprises four components: the Global In-

66 Providing the validity of Marine Corps integrated training and exercise programs, 55 percent of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and approximately 6,300 Individual Ready Reservists were mobilized. More than 13,100 Marine reserve combat troops deployed to Southwest Asia . . . 99

formation Exchange Systems (GLOBIXS), the Tactical Data Information Exchange Systems (TADIXS), the Commanders-in-Chief Command Complexes of the various CinCs (CCCs), and the Tactical Command Centers (TCCs).

Sealift

The Department of the Navy is firmly committed to providing adequate scalift for the sustained movement of United States military forces overseas. The outstanding performance of Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and United States and foreign charters was integral to the success of Operation DESERT STORM. These ships delivered over three million tons of dry cargo and six million tons of fuel to Southwest Asia.

The Department of Defense Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) examined lift requirements through the end of the 1990s based on the need for rapid power projection from prepositioned assets or bases in the United States. It assessed inter-theater, intra-theater, and amphibious lift requirements; prepositioning; the United States

port infrastructure; and Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) capabilities. In the future, the United States will need more roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels maintained in prepositioned and reduced operating status to meet combat equipment surge requirements. Improved readiness of the RRF will be achieved through better maintenance and more frequent activations.

The results of the MRS will form the basis for a revised Navy Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan for acquiring whatever additional capacity is appropriate. The initial plan, based on the interim MRS report—which called for more large, medium-speed RO/RO ships—was provided to Congress in October 1991. The Department of the Navy is investigating a number of advances in ship design and construction, propulsion systems, and cargo handling techniques. It is working closely with the maritime industry to include more United States civilian merchant ships in the sealift role.

The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), of which the RRF is a component, is part of the United States' sealift capability. Seventy-two RRF vessels were employed in Operation DESERT STORM. Although a number of these ships did not meet their activation goals, they contributed immeasurably to the success of the sealift effort. Until additional ships are added to the inventory, there will be a significantly upgraded maintenance and readiness posture for the RRF.

The 13 ships in the MPS program are organized into three squadrons. Each MPS squadron carries thirty days' combat equipment and sustainment for a Marine brigade-sized unit. Stationed in the eastern Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific, the MPS squadrons—when married up with associated Marine forces—provide the unified CinCs with mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness.

The Department of Defense legislative program for the 102d Congress will include a proposal to create a National Defense Sealift Fund. This Navy initiative is designed to provide and maintain the necessary resources for a true national defense sealift capability. By concentrating all national sealist resources under centralized management, the fund will enhance flexibility in the execution of sealift programs and allow the application of scarce resources to the highest DOD priorities. Fund resources would be used to construct new sealist ships, acquire and convert existing ships, conduct sealift research and development, and provide for the operation and maintenance of the sealift fleet. All construction, alteration, and conversion work would be performed only in United States shipyards to help maintain America's vital shipyard industrial base as a national defense asset. Additionally, a build-and-charter feature of the fund would

augment the United States merchant manpower pool and provide additional support for United States shipyards and corporations.

Mine Warfare

The threat posed by cheap and readily available mines will persist for the foresceable future. The Navy has taken significant steps to improve the training and readiness of its mine forces and to improve their coordination at the operational level. Countering the mine threat is not merely a function of increased funding and training. The Navy must, and will, be innovative and explore a variety of tactical and technological alternatives as well.

The Department of the Navy has a comprehensive Mine Warfare Plan which addresses deep and shallow-water mine countermeasures, leverages international mine countermeasures capabilities, identifies research and development issues, enhances mine avoidance, and delineates mine programs.

To streamline its forces, the Mine Warfare Command will assume operational control of all mine warfare forces, both surface and aviation. Additionally, a Navy-Marine Corps group has been working to identify effective counters to mines and obstacles in very shallow waters.

All 14 ships of the MCM-1 Avenger class will be in commission by Fiscal Year 1994, and ten ships of the MHC-51 Osprey Class have been appropriated. These ships, working together with MH-53E mine countermeasures helicopters, Explosive Ordanance Disposal units, and Navy Special Warfare units are a firm foundation for our mine countermeasures force of the future.

Operations in Kuwait provided important lessons in the area of land mine warfare. The Marine Corps augmented its organic minesweeping capability in Southwest Asia with additional mine rakes, plows, and rollers. Marine land mine warfare initiatives include combat mobility vehicles, mine detection laser technology, magnetic countermine systems, additional mine plows, distributed explosive mine neutralization systems, armored combat earth movers, and area mine clearance systems.

A COMMITMENT TO TOTAL FORCE

Naval Reserve

The Navy mobilized over 21,000 reservists in Operation Desert Storm. These men and women performed superbly and made a significant contribution to the overall military effort. While over half of the naval reservists recalled were involved in health care both at home and abroad, the Naval Reserve also provided at least 65 percent of the Navy's minesweeping, naval control of shipping, advanced base construction (Seabees), and Military Sealift Command capability. Over 90 percent of

our cargo handling in theater was provided by naval reservists. As United States troops began returning home, more than 6,700 of the naval reservists activated for Operation DESERT STORM continued to serve in the Persian Gulf, supporting the massive logistics effort needed to bring home our troops and their equipment.

As the likelihood of full mobilization decreases, the Naval Reserve is being reoriented and equipped for crisis response. In addition, naval reservists will make greater contributions to peacetime operations and contingency support. Other units—those envisioned for use in full mobilization—will be maintained in states of flexible readiness, building proficiency by hands-on support (training-in-kind) to the active force. Medical treatment, repair of the shore establishment, tactical air adversary squadrons, and electronic warfare squadrons are areas under consideration as cost-effective and innovative concepts for the Naval Reserve.

Equipment transfer and modernization continue with weapon system upgrades, acceptance of C-130 aircraft, and planned introduction of Coastal Mine Hunters (MHC). Additionally, we are continuing with the Innovative Naval Reserve initiative announced last year, and have begun the redesignation and transfer of eight Knox class frigates as FFTs.

Marine Corps Reserve

This past year, the Marine Corps Reserve celebrated its 75th anniversary. Proving the validity of Marine Corps integrated training and exercise programs, 55 percent of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and approximately 6,300 Individual Ready Reservists were mobilized. More than 13,100 Marine reserve combat troops deployed to Southwest Asia during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Marine Corps reservists not only deployed to the Gulf area, but also assumed worldwide Marine Corps commitments, Reserve Marines supported regular forces in humanitarian relief efforts after the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines and typhoonrelated destruction in Bangladesh. Reservists participated in international training exercises conducted in Japan, Korea, Honduras, and Norway. At home, reserves helped the United States Border Patrol's drug interdiction program along the United States southwestern border.

The Marine Corps has carefully designed its total force structure to make greater use of the capabilities and strengths of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. The reserves will augment and reinforce the active component in conflicts requiring sustained operations. Adjustments to the reserve force structure are planned in consonance with changes in active force structure. The Marine reserves will remain, ready, relevant, and capable.

NAVY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAM

- FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EPA DEFINED CLASS I AND CLASS II REQUIREMENTS.
- FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ANTICIPATED CLEAN AIR ACT REGULATIONS.
- MINIMIZATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATION AND DISPOSAL.
- Intensive management and control of hazardous material.
- PHASE OUT OF OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCES (CFCs AND HALONS)
- ELIMINATION OF PLASTIC WASTE DISCHARGE AT SEA.
- MANAGEMENT OF OILY WASTES.
- DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP METHODS.
- COMMUNITY RELATIONS EFFORTS

Figure 11

Medical

Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated our department's total force approach to medical support. Our hospital ships and fleet hospitals, together with 11,500 medical personnel assigned directly to the operating forces, provided the most sophisticated medical capability every deployed.

During the Persian Gulf war, medical reservists provided direct operational support to deployed Navy and Marine Corps units, augmented the active duty crews of the two deployed hospital ships, and "back filled" health care facilities in the Untek States. Fifty-two percent of all naval reservists recalled to active duty were medical personnel.

Today, Navy medical personnel are playing a major role in the implementation of the Department of Defense Coordinated Care Program, which is designed to maintain a quality health care delivery system while improving access and cost effectiveness. The goal of this program is to maximize use of military hospital and clinic capacity in coordination with local networks of preferred health care providers. These providers will deliver care under negotiated, reduced CHAMPUS costs. The Department of the Navy plans to get the most value for its health care dollars by carefully managing and exploiting the full range of available options.

The Department is emphasizing health education and related organizational, social, economic, and health care interventions designed to improve or protect the health of Sailors, Marines, and their families. The goal of the Navy Health Promotion Program is to improve and maintain the highest levels of unit readiness by concentrating on increased individual fitness and by minimizing health risks and disabilities.

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MANAGEMENT

Defense Management Report (DMR)

The Department of the Navy has made significant progress in implementing Defense Management Report (DMR) initiatives. The Department has made organizational changes and is pursuing the Department of Defense and internal Department of the Navy cost savings initiatives. Efforts to consolidate oversight, enhance accountability of Program Managers and Program Executive Officers, and reduce infrastructure costs have improved management and produced significant savings.

The Department has moved to implement 57 cost saving initiatives which focus on consolidating activities with similar functions, streamlining organizations, and reducing overhead and maintenance costs. Implementation of these cost saving initiatives is on track and will produce the planned savings goals.

As part of the DMR's continuing management improvement process, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to search for improvements and efficiencies.

Shore Facilities

The Department's system of shore bases and facilities continues to provide the full spectrum of logistic support needed by the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force. However, the age of these facilities is increasing, as is their backlog of maintenance and repairs. The Department intends to address these issues to ensure that piers, runways, and utility systems continue properly to support Navy and Marine Corps operational forces, and to ensure that our personnel support facilities provide a high quality of life for our people and their families.

Environment

The Department of the Navy environmental program has identified these objectives:

- Integrate environmental awareness into all planning, management, and operations.
- Restore past hazardous waste disposal sites and comply with ongoing environmental requirements.
- Control future environmental damage by minimizing waste and preventing oil spills or hazardous material contarrination.
- Contribute to the health of the marine environment and manage natural resources found on Navy and Marine Corps installations.
- Conduct community outreach in support of the Department of Defense and the Environment Initiative.

Significant efforts are in place to support these goals. The Navy and Marine Corps have programmed funding for compliance requirements and are designing appropriate environmental training for Department personnel. Plastic waste discharged from ships has been reduced by 70 percent, and recycling programs are reducing the solid waste sent to local landfills and incinerators. The Navy and Marine Corps have developed community relations programs for each installation undergoing hazardous waste site restoration to ensure that local communities are fully informed of all actions. The Department has established active programs on many Navy and Marine Corps installations to protect and restore wildlife habitats. It is also working with the Department of the Interior to identify all wetlands. (Figure 11)

CONCLUSION

As United States national security policy evolves, so does the Nation's naval policy. The Navy and Marine Corps are committed to providing quality naval forces with the readiness and capability to defend national interests worldwide, shape and influence global developments, and support the National Military Strategy.

The Department of the Navy is determined that naval forces in America's future will not be the dangerously inadequate "hollow forces" that have inadvertently resulted from some defense realignments in the past.

The Department is determined, furthermore, to provide those forces at a cost that is consistent with the fiscal priorities of the Nation. The Department's plan for the future of American naval forces has a carefully defined direction, and it has momentum. The United States Navy and Marine Corps will have the quality and capability to meet new and continuing challenges to the safety of the United States, its interests, and its friends.