


General P. X. Kelley Commandant of the Marine Corps

Statement on Posture, Plans, and Programs for Fiscal Years 1988 through 1992



**The Marine
Combat Team**

I INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

As the 28th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, this is my fourth and final report to you on the posture of the Marine Corps. On 30 June 1987, I will retire from active duty, having completed 37 continuous years of military service as a Marine.

During my extensive travels throughout the Marine Corps, which always include numerous discussions with Marines of all ranks, one common theme stands out. That is the firm conviction that our readiness to go to war today is the highest it has been in our peacetime history. Knowing Marines as I do, if they believe that their Corps is ready, then it is ready! In this regard, however, much of the credit for today's readiness belongs to a long line of our distinguished forebears, including my predecessors. They have provided the current generation of Marines with the cornerstones, not the least of which is an enviable reputation for courage on the battlefield, upon which we have built our Nation's force-in-readiness. They held high and passed a torch that burns brightly with history and tradition, and I salute them!

For all of our dealings with the Congress during the past three and one-half years, I have emphasized to all Marines the importance of two words—honesty and integrity—regardless of the consequences. We have an obligation to the citizens of this great Country to ensure that each and every dollar of public funds that has been authorized and appropriated by the Congress for the Marine Corps is spent to optimize our combat capabilities. We do not tolerate waste, fraud, or abuse. These words are alien to responsible Marines!

The Marine Corps of today is a quality force—quality people—quality equipment—quality training—and quality standards in the way we take care of our Marines and their precious loved ones. But we should never rest on our laurels. We must always look toward the future with innovation and imagination.

In the history of warfare, Marine air-ground task forces are unique. In one military Service we bring together on the battlefield the ground, air, combat service support, and command elements necessary to fight and win. We organize, train, and exercise in peace as we will fight in war.

As can be seen from the foregoing, I

am, by nature, an optimist when it comes to the Marine Corps. With that said, however, I am also a realist, and, as such, I do have several significant concerns about the future. These include the implementation of certain provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the potential effects of reduced defense funding. These concerns are contained in Section IV, and I urge their reading.

Let me now provide you with the state of the Corps.

II STATE OF THE CORPS

The Marine Corps, in concert with the Navy, provides this Nation with the capability to project sustainable power across the waters into distant regions of the world. We are America's premier force-in-readiness, capable of fighting across the entire spectrum of conflict (Figure II-1). Our highest probability of employment, however, remains as an instrument of foreign policy—our traditional role during periods of undeclared war. By our peacetime presence, the naval Services can bolster deterrence, support diplomacy, or counter encroachment. The range

and mobility of forward-deployed naval forces, moving unrestricted on the open sea lanes, provide an effective crisis response. Since World War II, naval forces have participated in approximately 80 percent of these crises in which the United States has been involved. The versatility of Marine Corps forces is further demonstrated by their ability to participate in naval campaigns and those which support the continental campaign during general war.

Our effectiveness is the result of three basic factors: our organization for combat; our ability to project power—rapidly and decisively; and the esprit of our Marines.

We stand ready to deploy expeditionary forces that are organized from existing combat-ready units. These task-organized entities, generically referred to as Marine air-ground task forces, consist of aviation combat, ground combat, and combat service support elements that are formed under a single command element. This unity of command at the tactical level allows the commander absolute control of his subordinate elements, which is vital for success in combat.

Our strategically positioned air-ground




Figure II-1




Figure II-2
Marine Air-Ground Task
Force Locations Around
the World

Figure II-3
Rapid Response/Global
Capability




Figure II-4
Artist's Concept of
Equipment Storage Site


teams are located as indicated in Figure II-2. These locations enhance worldwide response using a variety of transportation assets.

Funding in recent years has enabled us to buy the ships and equipment needed to reduce the time required to project power. Our increased capabilities are the result of a number of programs that came to fruition within the past few years. A Headquarters Marine Corps' publication, *Concepts and Issues* which should be available during March 1987, reviews some of these programs and provides a detailed look at how we are programming resources for the future.

The most significant development in strategic mobility has been the maritime pre-positioning ships (MPS) program. A Marine amphibious brigade can be flown to an objective area to marry-up at a secure site with equipment that has been pre-positioned, thus reducing the closure time as depicted in Figure II-3. The normal operating areas of the three MPS squadrons are indicated on the map by the smallest of the concentric circles. The larger circles represent maximum closure times of 7 and 14 days, respectively.

As an update, MPS Squadron 3 achieved full operational capability on 30 September 1986. The homeport

Figure II-5
Locations of Exercises/
Operations Conducted
by USMC Deployed
Forces



for MPS Squadron 1 in the Eastern Atlantic is still being negotiated. MPS Squadron 2 is homeported at Diego Garcia, and MPS-3 is homeported at Guam/Tinian.

As new equipment and deployment concepts were introduced in the 1970s, greater reliance was of necessity placed upon the helicopter to satisfy emergency heavy-lift requirements. The introduction of the MPS concept implicitly fostered an increased need for heavy-lift helicopters to transport equipment and supplies in sufficient levels to sustain the airlifted ground force, and has provided renewed justification for a self-deployable CH-53E.

Another pre-positioning measure that will enhance our responsiveness is the

Norway land pre-positioning program. The underground storage site is depicted in Figure II-4. It consists of selected equipment and supplies for a Marine amphibious brigade that could be committed to help secure NATO's northern flank. Our response time, as a result of this program, will be reduced from weeks to days.

The Marine Corps has not only dedicated itself to solving the problem of how to get our forces to a crisis region but, more importantly, on concepts for employment. It is the sensitive transition from the deployment to the employment phase that requires constant training and demanding exercises to test our readiness. Global operational and exercise deployments are shown in Figure II-5.





Figure II-6
Officer Student
Participating in Training



Our training is the key to our success. And simply put, it makes us 'Marines' and enables us to perform our missions. Our introductory training is the genesis of the Marine spirit. Our Marines are led by officers who receive their initial training at The Basic School (Figure II-6), then specialized training in their various military occupational fields. Selected officers attend formal military schools within the Marine Corps and other Services at appropriate times throughout their careers. For our recruits, we seek to produce Marines who are committed to the service of their country, as well as young people who will be better citizens.

Beyond the recruit phase, we have developed a comprehensive system of training that is designed to achieve an effective combined-arms combat team on the battlefield.

The focus of our training is on the




Figure II-7
Tank-Infantry Team in
Combined-Arms Exercise

Marine rifleman, the man on the ground who must physically seize the objective. In order to increase the combined efforts of small infantry units, we have established a School of Infantry that provides formal skill progression training for our infantry squad leaders and platoon sergeants. Eight hundred staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are scheduled to attend this training during 1987. This training will help bridge the experience gap for these Marines and consequently be of great value to their platoons and squads. It is the effective, small unit that serves as the building block for our forces.

On the aviation side, our Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Train-

ing Program (WTPP) aids effective air support for the ground forces. This program trains selected aircrews throughout the Marine Corps in the most current threat tactics and weapons systems as well as refines the use of our own. Upon return to the Fleet Marine Forces, these aircrews share their knowledge with their squadrons.

Our combined-arms training culminates at the Marine Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA. Here we conduct live-fire combined-arms training. Units are able to employ their weapons systems and equipment, and test logistical systems in an intense operational scenario. This realistic simulation of combat provides Marines the opportunity to perform in a battlefield environment (Figure II-7).

While world events are everchanging, our missions remain constant. The means with which we execute our missions, therefore, must be regularly assessed and revised to ensure that we are able to counter the threat. We have, therefore, sought to upgrade our weapons and equipment relative to this threat.

The ongoing modernization of the weapons within the Marine divisions, both Active and Reserve, is designed to counter and overcome the increasing range and lethality of the Soviet Union's weapons systems. The progress of this modernization is displayed in Figure II-8.

Modernization also includes a number of aviation programs that are designed to enhance air support for our

		83	84	85	86	87	88	89
MK19 40mm Machine Gun	ACT							
	RES							
Shoulder Launched Multi-purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW)	ACT							
	RES							
9mm Pistol	ACT							
	RES							
M16A2 Rifle	ACT							
	RES							
TOW 2	ACT							
	RES							
M60E3 Machine Gun	ACT							
	RES							
M198 Howitzer	ACT							
	RES							
AT4	ACT							
	RES							
181 Mortar	ACT							
	RES							
Dragon PIP (Product Improvement Program)	ACT							
	RES							
Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW)	ACT							
	RES							
XM4 Carbine	ACT							
	RES							

Figure II-8
Weapons Modernization

ground forces. Major programs are detailed in Figure II-9.

The Marine Corps attack helicopter force continues to fulfill a variety of supporting roles for the Marine air-ground team as it bridges the gap between the capabilities of other air and ground components. For the Marine Corps, this vital link is fulfilled by the AH-1J, AH-1T, and AH-1W attack helicopters.

The most recent introduction of the AH-1W (Figure II-10) provides a unique opportunity to not only modernize the attack helicopter force with a most capable aircraft, but to standardize the force as well. Our request for 34 additional AH-1Ws in FY88/89 represents those aircraft required to sustain our

force levels to the mid-1990s and, equally important, equip the attack helicopter training squadron with the same aircraft assigned to our operating forces. This will effectively eliminate redundancy in aircrew and maintenance personnel training, provide aircraft uniformity among the Active Force, eliminate existing shortfalls in the Reserve Force, and reduce logistical overhead.

The existing light attack force comprised of the AV-8A/C and A-4M is gradually being modernized by the AV-8B, a second generation V/STOL attack aircraft.

In January 1987, the first AV-8B detachment deployed aboard amphibious shipping. As an integral part of

the deployed Marine amphibious unit, the AV-8B (Figure II-11) will blend its unique close air support capabilities with other embarked aviation units in support of forward deployed Marine forces. In this manner, the AV-8B best fulfills its promise of rapid and responsive close air support and expands the range of supporting arms alternatives available to the air-ground commander.

The Marine Corps' 12 fighter/attack squadrons continue modernization from the venerable F-4 to the impressively flexible and reliable F/A-18 (Figure II-12). The F/A-18 introduction has been extraordinarily impressive and characterized by high reliability rates, low attrition, and performance un-

Figure II-9
Aviation Modernization

	<u>Replaces</u>	<u>Initial Operational Capability</u>	<u>Mission</u>
F/A-18	F-4 OA-4 RF-4 TA-4	1981	Air-to-air/Air-to-ground Air-to-ground/Supporting Arms Control Reconnaissance Tactical Air Control
AV-8B	AV-8A AV-8C A-4M	1985	Air-to-ground
A-6F	A-6E	1993	All Weather Attack Deep Interdiction
EA-6B	EA-6A	1977	Electronic Warfare
MV-22	CH-46E	1991	Assault Support: Troop Transport
CH-53E	CH-53A CH-53D	1981	Assault Support: Heavy Cargo Lift
AH-1W	AH-1J/T	1986	Anti-Armor Armed Escort Fire Support Supporting Arms Control Reconnaissance
OV-10D	OV-10A	1981	Supporting Arms Control
TAOM	AN/TYQ-2 AN/TYQ-3A	1991	Anti-Air Warfare Control
IDASC	AN/TSQ-122	1987	Close Air Support Control Assault Support Control
ATACC		1992	Aviation Combat Element Command/Control




Figure II-10
AH-1W




Figure II-11
AV-8B
Harrier




Figure II-12
F/A-18s

matched in its versatility and effectiveness.

As we steadily increase our F/A-18 presence within the United States, the F/A-18 is likewise being deployed to support our overseas commitments. This past spring, two Marine F/A-18 squadrons returned from an extended deployment aboard the USS *Coral Sea* and participation in the Gulf of Sidra operations.

While aircraft modernization has progressed at a steady pace, many factors have precluded an all encompassing approach. Indeed, aircraft modernization must often adopt a prudent course and a more deliberate pace to avoid unnecessary force turbulence and a commensurate drop in readiness. The impending challenge posed by potential adversaries often demands modifications to existing equipment. As circumstances arise that require improvement of existing equipment to enhance safety, reliability, and maintainability, we are often compelled to adopt a more modest approach in the form of modification to ensure the original capability is preserved. My caution, today, is to avoid the historical tendency to impose severe reductions in these less visible, but significantly important, aircraft modification programs.

A comprehensive modernization effort has focused on the maintenance of a secure and reliable command and control system vital to fully integrating and capitalizing on the combined capabilities of the air-ground team. Exploiting modern technology imposes challenges, but is essential if command and control systems are to remain abreast of advancing technology and potential adversary capabilities. Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM) replaces an archaic system that is over 20 years old with a survivable, responsive, and accurate system that fully integrates the total anti-air potential of the Marine air-ground task force. The TAOM program, as a joint-Service venture with the Air Force, promotes interoperability and reduces unit cost.

Improved Direct Air Support Center (IDASC) was born out of a pressing need to replace equipment near obsolescence and logistically unsupportable in order to preserve the ability to integrate the supporting arms we now possess. The Advanced Tactical Air Command Center (ATAACC) is intended to replace equipment of 1950's technology and retain for the air com-

mander the ability to judiciously employ aviation assets. Finally, a variety of decoys and modification efforts ensure equipment survivability in the increasingly demanding electronic warfare environment.

Ongoing modernization must extend to facilities, too. The average age of our buildings is 32 years. Our combined-arms force improvements need the concomitant modernized maintenance for operational facilities to realize the most effective use of these new weapons systems. These modernization efforts are progressing well, and we will continue to make headway in this vital supporting program. As in all

areas, we must be able to control our forces and wisely employ all of our assets.

Command and control are essential to coordinating the efforts of a combined-arms force. These functions facilitate the integration of fire and maneuver, but also maximize the capabilities of a synergistic Marine air-ground task force. Systems that are being developed and produced to support this effort are shown in Figure II-13.

The Total Force concept is rounded out by our Reserve Forces. Many of our exercises include Selected Marine Corps Reserves (SMCR) in order to

enhance the readiness of our Reserve component and are in consonance with the anticipated employment role of the Marine Corps Reserve. The Reserve Total Force contributions to structure, manpower, and organizations are depicted in Figures II-14 and II-15.

While we have allocated significant resources for the long list of modernization programs I have just covered, we have not neglected the most important component of the Marine Corps—Marines and their families.

Today's Marines remain superb. The young men and women who volunteer to become Marines are the best

Position Location Reporting System (PLRS)	■ Provides automatic, accurate, real-time relative location identification of friendly forces, and limited burst communications capability
Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS)	■ Provides automation for the integration of supporting arms with the ground combat element scheme of maneuver
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS)	■ Provides man-transportable, space-based precise radio navigation location and exact timing information anywhere in the world
Tactical Combat Operations System (TCO)	■ Provides automated support to Marine Air-Ground Task Force commander and element commanders in formulating, coordinating, and disseminating combat plans and tactical information
Unit Level Circuit Switch (ULCS)	■ Provides fast, secure, automatic digital switching of both voice and data using fiber optic transmission cables and multichannel radio links. Also provides for interoperability with other service switches
Satellite Communications (SATCOM)	■ Provides long-haul, terrain-independent communications between the MAGTF commander, his element commanders, and adjacent/higher commanders during all phases of land, tactical air, and amphibious operations ranging from single Service crisis intervention to joint Service combat

Figure II-13
Command, Control, and
Communications
Enhancements

Structure

Divisions

1 Res 3 Active


Wings

1 Res 3 Active

FSSG's

1 Res 3 Active

Manpower



Percent of Recruits




Figure II-14
Reserve Program

Figure II-16
High School Graduates




Figure II-17
USMC FY86
Enlistment Attainment




Figure II-15
Total Force Contributions


ever. As illustrated in Figures II-16 and II-17, the Corps is attracting some of the brightest young people in our history. Over 97 percent of them are high school graduates and 99.8 percent scored in the upper 3 categories of the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

For now, as these numbers depict, the quality is still out there. The hard work of a dedicated recruiting force (Figure II-18) has kept qualified young people coming in our direction. We cannot rest on our laurels, however. Recruiting and maintaining the vol-

Figure II-18
Two Prospective Marines
Talk with Our Recruiters



Figure II-19
Interior of a BEQ Room



unter force of the late 1980s and early 1990s will present our recruiters with their toughest challenge yet. The declining military age population, their lack of propensity to enlist, and youth employment prospects indicate that the mission will only get rougher.

The morale and esprit of our Marines are outstanding. This is caused, in part, by our quality-of-life programs. Most of this is just plain, old-fashioned leadership. It embodies the principle "taking care of your own" through the provision of material and service programs that enhance individual well-being and have a positive effect on the attitudes of Marines and family members. The goal of these programs is to positively influence the self-esteem of our Marines so they realize who they are and what they do is important. We seek quality-of-life improvements in both on-duty and off-duty environments.

We seek to provide Marines with adequate working conditions ranging from heated work spaces in a motor pool to the best possible training facilities for the development of their field skills. From an off-duty perspective, quality-of-life means adequate housing that provides for the needs of a Marine and his or her family. Housing should be suitable for the Marine's relative position within the military society and American society as a whole. Services must be complete and responsive to the needs of the family. These essential housing needs are being satisfied as we continue to program about one-third of our military construction funds to build bachelor housing and related facilities.

Figure II-19 is a photo of a bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ) room. We have 78,140 adequate living spaces for bachelor personnel, up from 59,700 in FY84; however, we still have a large deficit. Our target date for eliminating deficiencies is the mid-1990s.

In a similar manner, the quality of family housing has been greatly improved. About 8,500 of the Marine Corps' 21,000 units of family housing have been renovated under the whole-house rehabilitation program, with another 4,500 units programmed for renovation in the next 5 years.

Figures II-20 and II-21 illustrate the dramatic before and after transformation in a typical whole-house rehabilitation.

For the present, my number one priority is the Southern California area where I hope to alleviate, if not eliminate, the housing shortage. We are also exploring alternatives to the traditional approaches to military construction of family housing, such as contractor-built/ government - leased housing. One such project for 200 housing units has already been approved and awarded for our base at Twentynine Palms. We plan to have our Marines living in these houses by the fall of 1987. We are also building additional spaces at several existing mobile home parks as well as building new parks on some installations. Meanwhile, our base housing referral offices continually survey the local housing market so they can advise newly arrived Marines about adequate and affordable housing in the area.

The services we seek to provide are those that compensate for the difficulties

and demands of military service. Marines and their families have come to regard their exchanges and commissaries as an integral part of Service life. The significant savings achieved by our patrons have become a key part of our total compensation package. I am, therefore, committed to providing quality goods and services at the lowest prices consistent with our regulations. A photo of the MCB Camp Lejeune, NC, exchange is at Figure II-22.

We ask a lot of our Marines today, including frequent separation from their families, but it comes with the profession. A recent DOD survey of military personnel found that 66 percent of the officers and 63 percent of the enlisted Marines spent more than 30 days away from their families during the preceding year. It is our duty, therefore, to provide the institutional support to accommodate this facet of Service life.

One of our most successful institutional supports is the Family Service Center (FSC). We now have 19 FSCs providing quality personal services, deployment materials, and support programs, which greatly enhance our ability to prepare Marines and their families for recurring deployments and separations. Last year, a significantly smaller number of Marines returned prematurely from deployments and overseas assignments because of family problems. The excellent screening and predeployment programs offered by the FSCs contributed greatly to increased readiness and savings in scarce travel funds. The centers have provided needed assistance to over 144,000 clients this past year. One of the cen-



Figure II-20
Before Renovation
Ribout Village, MCRD
Parris Island

After Renovation




Figure II-21
Kitchen—Before Renovation

Kitchen—After Renovation





Figure II-22



Percent




Figure II-23
MCRD San Diego Family Service Center

Figure II-24
Trends in Drug Use
Past 30 Days, (1980-1985)

ters is shown at Figure II-23. Additionally, the Navy Relief Ombudsman Program assists Marines and their families.

Adjunct to the FSCs is one of our most innovative and valuable programs—the Employment Resource Center (ERC). We now have opened 12 ERCs that are providing services to hundreds of spouses, and to separating or retiring Marines every week. Offering career counseling, job referral, workshops, and other services, four more ERCs will open during 1987 to

complete the implementation of the program at our major bases and stations.

Another facet of quality-of-life is an environment free of drugs. Marines are entitled to such an environment, and my goal has been to provide it. Great progress has been made in this area (Figure II-24). This 1985 DOD worldwide survey shows a continuing decline in drug use within the Marine Corps. Drug- or alcohol-dependent Marines are being identified, treated, and, in most cases, restored to full

duty. Those not responding to treatment are processed for separation. During FY86, 1,233 Marines received formal, residential treatment and returned to productive duty.

The achievements we have made in the quality-of-life of our Marines are truly impressive. During a recent leave I had the opportunity to evaluate the progress of our quality-of-life programs. I took a ride around Camp Lejeune in an unmarked car. It was a drive down memory lane; one during which I compared the Camp Lejeune



Marine Couple Shopping
at an Exchange

of 1951, when I arrived as a young lieutenant, with the Camp Lejeune of today. Frankly, there is no comparison. The troops now live in air-conditioned barracks, most in two- and three-man rooms, and some of the finest fitness centers are readily available for their use and usually are filled to capacity. The family quarters are air-conditioned and well-maintained with superb recreational facilities nearby. There is a new temporary lodging facility, a new hospital, a completely renovated post exchange, and the troops have decent working facilities. That's the way it should be. If you're going to ask young Americans to lay down their lives for their Country, then we should treat them as first-class citizens.

III A FUTURE OF INNOVATION

In the future, the challenges to this Nation's security will go beyond the threat posed by a superpower. They will also include an increasingly volatile Third World. The militarization of these Nations often provides terrorists with the means to directly threaten U.S. interests. On a globe that is three-fourths water, there still is no way a significant number of U.S. ground forces can be committed against the Nation's enemies on a hostile shore other than through use of the sea. Consequently, we must ensure that power projection for this Nation is always feasible through the application of technology in tomorrow's amphibious operation. It is this operation that we refer to as the "over-the-horizon concept." We will be able to begin the assault from over 200 miles offshore.

In combat the more powerful assailant has not always prevailed. More often the ingredients of victory have been initiative and resourcefulness. These qualities have been part of the Marine way of life. The prodigious contributions of the Marine Corps to modern warfare have been far out of proportion for such a small Service. Marine officers developed the highly specialized amphibious assault two decades before World War II. Because of their foresight, America was able to project thousands of men onto hostile shores in WW II and Korea. From the amphibious assault grew such innovations as the amphibious assault tractor. Our development of the helicopter, which had its roots in the Pitcairn autogiro used in the 1930s, has enabled this Nation to conduct vertical

assaults. Other developments, such as close air support and the employment of vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, are largely the results of Marine efforts to better apply technology for victory on the battlefield.

Resourcefulness is demonstrated in our acquisition of weapons and equipment. The objective in this area has been to put effective systems into the hands of our Marines with the minimum amount of research and development time. The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW), currently in our inventory, serves as an example of our acquisition process. In searching for a "bunker-buster," we bought a system off the commercial market and made minor modifications to it. We incorporated an Israeli rocket, a British Enfield rifle barrel, and a commercial spotting scope to develop the present system. The imaginative thinking of our Marines provided us with an effective weapon in the shortest time possible at minimum cost.

I would also like to emphasize that the successful application of technology is not limited to the acquisition of new weapons and equipment. It also means the continual evolution of tactics and operations to accommodate the changes of technology. This is happening in our combat operations and can be witnessed in our exercises. As an example of these efforts, we are presently using the existing technologies to achieve an even closer relationship between our ground and aviation forces to improve close air support. Our expeditionary Marine air command and control system provides us the ca-

pability to deploy an automated tactical air operations center anywhere in the world to link together our air and ground forces and to link with systems from the other Services, such as an AWACS aircraft, an Aegis cruiser, or an Army air defense unit.

This will reduce the amount of time required to provide Marine close air support as well as increase the synergistic effect of our forces. In this ability, we are unique!

Fundamental to our Nation's ability to project power in the future is amphibious shipping. Amphibious ships enable us to seize beachheads. The Navy's planned ship construction for FY88 procures the third Wasp-class LHD (Figure III-1)—the keystone of our lift program—and the first of the cargo variants of the Whidbey Island class LSDs. The Navy will authorize two more LHDs and four more LSD-41 cargo variants in the next five years. We are making progress toward meeting our lift objectives.

In viewing our responsibilities to the Nation, we recognize that our missions remain the same. The over-the-horizon concept will enable us to land where the enemy is not and build a formidable combat power.

Pivotal to the concept of over-the-horizon operations is the continued, timely development and procurement of the MV-22 Osprey. Not since the helicopter, has a single aviation initiative promised as profound an effect on future operations of your Marines. The range, speed, and payload of the MV-22 far surpass present day capabilities and offer the battlefield commander extraordinary alternatives in





Figure III-1
USS Wasp LHD 1

Figure III-2
Amphibious Strike Capability



every conceivable operation. When an amphibious task force is 24 hours off an enemy's coast, it can conduct an amphibious assault anywhere along a coastline equal in distance to the distance from New York City to Cape Canaveral (Figure III-2).

Consequently, our ability to conduct an amphibious assault at any point along a broad coast makes it increasingly difficult for an enemy to defend. While strategic mobility is inherent in any amphibious operation, we are significantly enhancing our tactical mobility so that our forces can land faster than our enemy can respond. The most impressive improvement in mobility will be made by the MV-22 Osprey (Figure III-3). The increased capability of this remarkable aircraft will completely change our thinking with regard to amphibious operations.

The Osprey will be able to launch from 200 miles out. The range of this aircraft will require an enemy to not only defend a longer coastline but also in much greater depth and breadth, thereby depleting his resources and permitting his defeat in detail. As the key to Marine employment in the 1990s, the Osprey remains the Marine Corps' highest priority.

The technology of the landing craft air-cushion (LCAC) (Figure III-4) will make the operation almost independent of a coast's hydrography and will provide access to almost 70 percent of the world's coastline as compared to 18 percent today. Using the LCAC, 60-ton loads can be carried from over-the-horizon. The speed of this craft is in excess of 40 knots and provides our force with not only improved mobility but also to some degree, greater security. The faster moving force is always the harder to hit.




Figure III-3
MV-22 Osprey




Figure III-4
Landing Craft Air Cushion



Figure III-5
Amphibious Training

The use of the LCAC has become a reality for our forces, and the first operational LCAC unit, Assault Craft Unit Five, has been activated at Camp Pendleton, CA. The LCAC is a Navy ship construction program in which we have actively participated. We are most grateful to our sister Service for the efforts in this area, and this program is only further evidence that the Marine Corps' future is tied to the Navy's.

In conducting an amphibious operation (Figure III-5), we make every effort to land on unopposed beaches. Because a defended beach is always a possibility, we are examining a number of concepts that will enhance the performance and survivability of our amphibious assault vehicles in the future. The Marine Corps will continue to adapt to the changing battlefield and the challenge of tomorrow. The future of the Marine Corps, as a capable and cost-effective force, lies in the

determined efforts of Marines. It must be recognized, however, that these objectives cannot be accomplished alone. I seek your assistance in alleviating conditions that may adversely affect the Corps.

IV CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE

As I submit this, my final report, I do so with several concerns for the future of our Marine Corps.

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

My first concern is the implementation of two key provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

I strongly urge the Congress to conduct an early and comprehensive review of Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy. I believe that if this Title is implemented, as written, it could adversely impact upon the morale and

effectiveness of our officer corps and ultimately create a new class of "Mandarins"—joint staff specialists skilled in the bureaucratic ways of higher headquarters, but who will have little opportunity for critical operational experience in the field with troops. While I do not believe that this is the intent of the Congress, it could, nevertheless, be the end result.

My second concern is Title V, Military Departments, specifically sections of Chapters 506 and 507. Subparagraph (b), Section 5042, chapter 506, states:

(b) Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, the Headquarters, Marine Corps shall—
(1) subject to subsections (c) and (d) of section 5014 of this title, prepare for such employment of the Marine Corps, and for such recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining of the Marine Corps, as will assist in the exe-

cution of any power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Commandant; (2) investigate and report upon the efficiency of the Marine Corps and its preparation to support military operations by combatant commanders; (3) prepare detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans and supervise the execution of those plans and instructions; (4) as directed by the Secretary or the Commandant, coordinate the actions of organizations of the Marine Corps; and (5) perform such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be prescribed by the Secretary.

Subparagraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2), Section 5014, Chapter 507, on the other hand, state:

(c)(1) The Office of the Secretary of the Navy shall have sole responsibility within the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Headquarters, Marine Corps, for the following functions: (A) Acquisition. (B) Auditing. (C) Comptroller (including financial management). (D) Information Management. (E) Inspector General. (F) Legislative Affairs. (G) Public Affairs. (2) The Secretary of the Navy shall establish or designate a single office or other entity within the Office of the Secretary of the Navy to conduct each function specified in paragraph (1). No office or other entity may be established or designated within the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations or the Headquarters, Marine Corps, to conduct any of the functions specified in paragraph (1). And, finally, Subparagraph (c)(4), Section 5014, Chapter 507, states:

The vesting in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy of the responsibility for the conduct of a function specified in paragraph (1) does not preclude other elements of the executive part of the Department of the Navy (including the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Headquarters, Marine Corps) from providing advice or assistance to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps or otherwise participating in that function within the executive part of the Department under the direction of the office assigned responsibility for that function in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.

From the foregoing, it should be obvious that the relationship between the Commandant of the Marine Corps' authority and responsibility is unclear. Moreover, the principal drafters of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 recognized another aspect of my concern. In their report, which accompanied the Bill, both the Senate and House Conferees stated, "... that the consolidation of functions ... will pose unique problems for the Department of the Navy because of the existence of two separate Armed Forces." And further that:

The conferees intend that the performance of these functions should fully recognize, as the Commandant considers appropriate, the particular interests of the Marine Corps and should fully enable the Commandant to represent those interests in the same manner as the other Chiefs of Service are able to represent the particular interests of their Armed Service.

These concerns were reinforced on the floor of the Senate by Senator Sam Nunn during the introduction of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, when he asked that the Congress "be alerted early on" should problems arise in this regard that may warrant changes; and by Senator John Glenn, who cautioned, "I do not want to see my future Commandant hamstrung in his ability to keep our readiness force truly ready."

If, during implementation, it becomes apparent that the integrity and viability of the Marine Corps as a separate Service is jeopardized, or that the position of Commandant suffers from an imbalance between authority

and responsibility, it is my intention to seek appropriate relief from the Congress. I know that you would expect and demand such action. The future of the Marine Corps I have served all of my adult life is far too important to our Nation for me to do otherwise.

Potential Effects of Reduced Defense Funding

Due in large measure to congressional reductions to the FY84 and subsequent Presidential budget submissions, the Marine Corps has had to make corresponding outyear program reductions. The graph at Figure IV-1 displays the cumulative effect of these outyear reductions to the five-year program that was in effect when I became Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1 July 1983. The FY85, FY86, and FY87 columns reflect the differences between the 1983 program and what was finally authorized and appropriated by Congress. The FY88 and FY89 columns reflect the differences between the 1983 program and the requests contained in the January 1987 President's budget submission. These figures show an additive five-year reduction of \$7.7 billion in total obligational authority (TOA) for the Marine Corps when compared with levels programmed in May 1983. If pay raises and entitlements, normally absorbed in the approved funding, were added, the total programmatic five-year reduction would be approximately \$9.7 billion.

Needless to say, over time, these budget constraints adversely impact on force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. Protection of readiness, however, has been my primary focus.

In a manpower-intensive organization, a declining budget will also impact on our ability to man the structure necessary to support modernization.

Over the years, one of our largest investments has been in *quality* Marines. Our successful effort toward this goal has been time and resource consuming, one which cannot be easily or instantly repaired if abandoned due to fiscal constraints. Quality can compensate for fewer numbers, but only for so long. At some point, even quality will be overwhelmed by the demands placed upon it.

At the top of my list for sustaining the investment in our Marines is pay—fair compensation for dedicated and professional performance. Past




Figure IV-1
TOA Reductions to
May 83 Program

Appropriation Title	FY87	FY88	FY89
	Dollars (millions)		
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	5,446.9	5,549.0	5,534.3
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	278.3	294.7	302.6
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps	1,809.6	1,918.4	1,939.2
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve	64.2	71.4	85.2
Procurement, Marine Corps Marine Corps Stock Fund	1,465.2 0.8	1,402.4 *	1,646.5 *

***The Marine Corps Stock Fund will be merged with the Navy Stock Fund commencing in FY88.**

Figure V-1

congressional support for pay and entitlements brought about substantial improvements, achieving near comparability with the private sector through pay raises in FY81 and FY82. Since then, however, this relative comparability has diminished. Including the 3 percent pay raise for FY87, the gap between military and private sector wage levels continues to widen. I urge the Congress to address the vital issue of pay comparability as a matter of highest priority.

Access to quality health care remains a major concern of our Marines. The growing number of Marine family members continues to place additional demands on the uniformed health care system. Continued efforts to establish NAVCARE clinics, CHAMPUS reform, and realignment of primary health care providers will help alleviate this problem somewhat, but your help is needed in order to provide quality health care to Marines and their families.

We must never lose sight of the importance of quality-of-life programs that contribute to improved morale, increased retention, and, ultimately, combat readiness. Continued forward movement in this area must be maintained to avoid unnecessary personnel

losses that would result from reductions in these programs. The cost of recruiting and training new Marines in a dwindling manpower market far outweighs the relatively small amount spent on quality-of-life programs.

During times of peace there is always a very strong temptation to reduce defense expenditures. In my professional view, the level of defense spending should be dictated by the actual threat, and what is required to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world. With that said, however, I also fully understand the importance of other programs to the health and welfare of our great Nation. Today, testifying before you in my present capacity as a senior military advisor to both the President and the Congress, I must in all good conscience state my belief that deep cuts in levels of spending for defense will surely result in greatly increased risk to our national security. The Constitution, which this year is 200 years old, gives Congress the power to, "provide for the common Defence and general welfare of the United States." My expressions of concern over the potential impacts of reduced defense funding are meant to assist the Congress as it executes these awesome constitutional responsibilities.

V CONCLUSION

The security of this Nation requires continual vigilance and foresight on the part of those tasked with this responsibility. When conditions arise that may be detrimental to this security, a military leader is obligated to speak up. It is for this reason that I have made my concerns known regarding the direction of recent legislation and the possible implications for the Marine Corps. Despite these concerns, I remain optimistic because it is the exchange of professional opinions between the statesman and the professional warrior that ensures the most effective policy for our national security.

After 37 years of service as a Marine, I give you a Marine Corps that is more ready now than it has ever been in our history. It is force that is capable of being rapidly projected into distant regions of the world for the purpose of resolving conflict on foreign soil rather than our own. Its versatility enables this Nation to meet almost any challenge across the spectrum of conflict and yet provides the most cost-effective Service possible. Such achievements can only be attributed to Marines who have unselfishly given of themselves and whose efforts hold promise of even greater contributions for tomorrow.

In a world in which the distinction between war and peace will become increasingly obscure, the Marine Corps will play an even greater role in national security. Your Marine Corps will continue to meet its responsibilities by means of progressive thinking that has been characteristic throughout its history. You can be certain that the Corps is capable of meeting the demands of tomorrow's battlefield.

The proposed request (Figure V-1), like those of the past, is well-considered and austere. The Marine Corps must have your support in order to remain this Country's premier force-in-readiness.

Upon my departure this summer from the Active ranks, I will entrust to you a Corps that is truly a national asset. It is my most heartfelt desire that you remember that it is the individual Marine that must have your support. I thank you, and I am confident that you will continue to provide the backing that is so vital.

USMC

SEMPER FIDELIS!