


# Congress and the Corps CMC FY-84 Posture Statement

by General Robert H. Barrow



*In his final report on the state of the Corps, the Commandant advised Congress that "We are providing America's youth with a challenge, and they are responding. The continued support of the Congress will keep them capable and ready."*



Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee:

Once again I am gratified with the opportunity to report to you on the present and future posture of your Corps of Marines.

This represents my final report to you as Commandant of the Marine Corps. For more than 40 years, it has been my distinct privilege to wear this uniform in the service of our great Nation. I have been granted the honor, the highest honor, of sharing the title Marine with thousands of others who have proudly worn the same uniform in war and peace. During my watch, this country has endured three wars and experienced countless other occasions where Marines have acquitted themselves with unchallenged professionalism and undiminished esprit. As I look to the future, I am confident in the sure knowledge that those qualities which have always set Marines apart will remain unchallenged and undiminished.

Today, the Marine Corps is as capable and ready as we have ever been. All indicators are positive. They clearly demonstrate that the Corps is sound and thriving. The credit for this rests with the selfless men and women who have served, and are serving, to foster our heritage and preserve our legacy. However, they could not have realized their accomplishments without the confidence and support of the Nation and the Congress of the United States. Without your confidence, we could not attract and retain the superb quality of young men and women who fill our ranks today. Without your support, our capability to serve as the Nation's force in readiness would be greatly diminished. Your ef-

forts have resulted in better compensation and benefits, better equipment and, in the final analysis, a better and readier Marine Corps—a Marine Corps capable and prepared to meet the challenges of today and of tomorrow. I assure you, a more cost-effective investment in national security is not available.

The challenges to our vital national interests, and to those of our allies, will require strong maritime responses—responses which are reflective of a strategy of clear maritime superiority and which rest on the solid foundation of American and allied seapower.

American seapower can, and must continue to, meet the first challenge—the threat to our vital interests posed by global uncertainties and unrest. Virtually all of our interests abroad, including our increasing interdependence with Europe and Japan, are inextricably linked to the maritime trade routes, the sea lines of communication, and the strategic maritime choke points. If we are to maintain free access to and through the world's waterways and if we are to protect our access to allies and resources, we must be able to exercise the full range of capabilities inherent to seapower.

American seapower must be equally capable and prepared to meet the second and most ominous challenge—the challenge posed by the rapidly expanding and increasingly capable Soviet naval forces. The expanding Soviet blue water capability exacerbates the challenge of uncertainty and unrest. It increases the direct threat to our vital interests, challenges free access, and broadens the potential for direct United States-Soviet confrontation.

Credible American seapower can meet these challenges and deter mischief or aggression. Naval forces, Marines and Sailors, represent a major link in the national defense chain of deterrence. Without them, deterrence would surely fail.

The Navy/Marine Corps team, as represented by amphibious task forces, is a primary instrument of deterrence, of diplomacy, and of offensive power projection. Inherent mobility and sustainability permit amphibious forces to concentrate the requisite combat power at the times and places required and then, upon completion of the task, to move on and apply that power elsewhere. The ground and air power projection capabilities which are integral to the am-

phibious task force are the implements of forcible entry.

Amphibious task forces represent this Nation's most effective and enduring forcible entry capability. Our forces can seize and control strategic choke points and lodgments as well as establish and defend advanced bases. As a device for strategic distraction, amphibious task forces constitute a significant force multiplier which, by virtue of their presence alone, can divert, fragment, and constrain major enemy forces.

In employing amphibious task forces, theater commanders have at their disposal a flexible and powerful combined arms capability which can either operate independently or, in coordination with other Services and allied forces, execute joint/combined operations. I am confident you recognize that such global reach and flexibility can take maximum advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, provide maximum assurance to our allies and thereby protect our worldwide interests.

These then, are the strategic and tactical advantages associated with amphibious task forces in the application of seapower and the execution of amphibious warfare.

The Marine Corps' fundamental mission is amphibious warfare. To accomplish that mission we provide a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) of combined arms, including integral supporting air components, which serve as landing forces with the various numbered fleets. We support those fleets by exercising our capabilities to seize and defend advanced naval bases and by conducting land operations necessary to the successful prosecution of a naval campaign. Marine forces supporting the fleets are organized so they are mission capable; that is, they are task organized. Task organization of forces is a basic tenet of amphibious warfare and permits us to "tailor" our forces for a specific mission or location. By so doing, we provide hard-hitting, flexible, and mobile fighting forces which can respond rapidly and economically. In short, Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) provide a significant capability for a comparatively small investment.

However, in order to maintain our unique capabilities, an investment continues to be required. To that end, I wish to outline just what that investment will yield for you and for the Nation.


## ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMS

In order to provide a clear picture of our requirements I will detail the Marine Corps' major programs, as well as Navy programs of special interest, within the context of the amphibious assault. Forcible entry from the sea is our most unique contribution to the Nation's defense and is integral to MAGTF capabilities. The initiatives we are proposing are designed to strengthen those capabilities and to maintain our traditionally high degree of readiness and rapid response.

The amphibious assault has five distinct phases beginning with the planning phase, continuing through embarkation, rehearsal, movement to the objective, and finally, culminating with the assault. While the focus of my remarks will be directed primarily toward the assault and subsequent operations ashore, it is not my intention to minimize the importance of the four preliminary phases. To the contrary, our ability to execute a successful assault is totally dependent on our ability to get there. Getting there is, in turn, dependent upon the availability of sufficient amphibious and merchant shipping, which is where I would first invite your attention.

The Marine Corps fully supports the Department of the Navy (DON) goal of a 600-ship fleet. We recognize that implementation of a global maritime strategy requires balanced naval forces—forces capable of influencing events on the seas and of extending that influence ashore for both offensive and defensive purposes. A balanced maritime capability must provide not only the formidable air, surface, and subsurface dimensions of naval warfare but also the ground/air power-projection dimension inherent to the amphibious task force.

Relative to amphibious shipping, the DON mid-term objective is to provide sufficient ships to simultaneously lift the assault echelons (AE) of a Marine amphibious force (MAF) and a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB). This represents a change from our previous goal of adequate lift for a full MAB in addition to a MAF(AE). This change is indicative of our continuing efforts to achieve realistic lift objectives within the programmed and planned amphibious ship capabilities. To accomplish this we have scaled down the overall lift requirement by shifting a portion of the MAB's combat service support



elements—Marines, vehicles, and supplies—to an assault follow-on echelon (AFOE), which will be carried by commercial ships. Accordingly, DON has restated the requirement to reflect the capabilities necessary for the simultaneous lift of a MAF(AE) and a MAB(AE). Although this lift requirement exceeds current amphibious ships' capacities, we plan on a progressive increase in capability as the amphibious force levels improve concurrent with attainment of the 600-ship Navy in the 1990s.

As I look ahead, I am encouraged by the prospects. Amphibious shipbuilding programs are on track and directed towards revitalizing our amphibious capability. This represents an opportunity to truly modernize a large portion of the amphibious force. The first two ships of the LSD-41 Class are on the building ways. The Navy currently plans to build at least 10 LSD-41s, and the

*"Amphibious shipbuilding programs are on track. . . . The first two ships of the LSD-41 class are on the building ways."*

total result may be 13 to 17. The LHD-1 Class—essentially an LHA altered to allow transport, launch, and recovery of both fixed and rotary wing aircraft—is in the contract design stage. The Navy is requesting funds in the fiscal year (FY) 1984 budget to build the first LHD. Both the LSD-41 and LHD-1 Class ships will have the capability to carry the landing craft, air cushion (LCAC).

Finally, and although still in the conceptual stage, the Navy is taking a hard look at increasing the cargo carrying capacity of future amphibious and support ships. Concepts ranging from an LSD-41 variant to a new attack cargo ship are being studied.

Perhaps the most innovative strategic mobility initiatives we are sponsoring are those associated with the pre-positioning concept. Our pre-positioning programs, both land and maritime, provide new dimensions in the Nation's capability to rapidly deploy and sustain Marine combined-arms teams on a global basis. They represent mobility enhancements which serve as prescriptions for the rapid employment of credible, sustainable forces into permissive environments. These programs are designed to complement, not replace, our forcible entry capability, which remains the backbone of power projection. In time of crisis, Marines would be airlifted to a contingency area for link-up with pre-positioned supplies and equipment and to subsequently form for combat.

The maritime pre-positioning ships (MPS) program will provide forward deployed, floating depots of equipment and supplies to support three brigade-sized MAGTFs. In the near


term, the Marine Corps has placed equipment and supplies for one brigade-sized MAGTF aboard Military Sealift Command chartered vessels. This near-term capability will remain on-station until replaced by the third of the more mature MPS task groups.


MPS task groups will be comprised of specially designed and outfitted vessels termed T-AKX. They will expand our current capability by providing a self-load and off-load system for pierside and in-stream cargo discharge. The MPS concept is particularly naval in character and will provide an independently employable force of combined arms which will be capable of stand-alone operations. This concept provides a wide range of flexible alternatives which make it suitable for:

- preemptive presence,
- reinforcement of an amphibious assault beachhead, other U.S. forces, and/or allies,
- surge support of U.S. forces,
- deterrence and peacekeeping, and
- humanitarian assistance.

Our maritime initiatives are currently tailored to support the deterrence mission within the Southwest Asia region; however, at the same time they retain the flexibility for employment on a global basis.

Concurrently, programming continues for the land pre-positioning of equipment and supplies for a MAB in Norway. As a strategic mobility initiative designed to reduce force closure times to NATO's northern flank, this program has drawn significantly favorable political interest, particularly from the Norwegian Government. Your support to complete this program will signal U.S.





*"We are committed to our ultimate goal of an all-V/STOL light attack force."*

commitment and resolve within the region and will afford the National Command Authorities (NCA) an additional option for committing Marine forces quickly. A United States/Norwegian storage agreement was signed on 6 October 1982, and initial deliveries of supplies and equipment commenced in November 1982.

Concern for the Nation's ability to move forces rapidly has been central in Marine Corps planning to reach the crisis area expeditiously, ready, and equipped for the mission assigned. Through such mobility enhancement initiatives, we remain in the forefront, poised and prepared to rapidly implement actions in support of our national interests.

Turning now to the assault phase, I'll continue by discussing the very critical period that precedes the landing of the landing force. During this period, it is essential that we initiate the process that will lead to our gaining relative combat superiority over the defenders. Prior to landing Marines in assault waves, the only fire support means available are naval gunfire and aircraft. Both are critically important. The integration of their supporting fires is vital to our success during the early stages of the assault.

Naval gunfire provides readily available, all-weather, direct and indirect fire support and is the primary means of that support before artillery and tanks are established ashore. Currently, our naval guns are deficient in size and number and are considered inadequate for all but selected scenarios. Our current naval gunfire capability rests solely on 5-inch guns with conventional ammunition. This capability is adequate for soft targets within range, but these weapons possess limited range and lethality. It is imperative, then, that our naval gunfire be sufficient to provide efficient and effective support to the landing force. The 155mm vertical-loading gun would go a long way in providing such support. Additionally,

the 5-inch and 155mm semiactive, laser-guided projectile (SAL-GP), in conjunction with the Seafire targeting system, can do much to alleviate the problem.

The reactivation of the Iowa Class battleships will be a major improvement in the area of naval gunfire support as major caliber guns are reintroduced to the fleet. At a cost significantly lower than new construction for a lesser ship, the USS *New Jersey*, for example, provides massive firepower capabilities. I strongly support the reactivation of the remaining three Iowa Class battleships.

Aviation initiatives directly related to gaining and maintaining relative combat superiority, as well as air superiority, rest with the AV-8B and F/A-18 programs.

Last year I stated that the AV-8B was vital to Marine aviation's modernization program. It continues to be so today. Because of your strong support, the 32 aircraft requested in FY-84 will continue the march toward a 1985 initial operating capability (IOC). At present, four full-scale development aircraft are in flight testing with impressive results. We are committed to our ultimate goal of an all-V/STOL light attack force, and are convinced that it will provide us the most flexible, responsive, and effective close air support capability in existence.

The first three F/A-18 Marine fighter attack squadrons are standing-up at MCAS El Toro, California. The Marine Corps strongly supports the F/A-18 program as a replacement for the aging F-4s in our 12 active fighter/attack squadrons. The capabilities of this superior aircraft allow us to meet the fighter requirements of the modern battlefield as well as provide reinforcement for our attack squadrons when the situation dictates.

During the critical movement from ship to shore, whether in the helicop-

terborne or surface assault echelons, we require maximum use of supporting arms and maximum speed and efficiency in execution of this vital phase of the amphibious assault. Having discussed the supporting arms aspects, I'll turn to those programs designed to enhance the manner in which we execute the assault.


The Navy's LCAC program represents a revolutionary breakthrough in ship-to-shore movement. Current projections envision a force of about 100 of these advanced surface craft. The first six LCACs are under contract and the first LCAC base, at Camp Pendleton, Calif., is under design in preparation for the craft's delivery in 1986. The LCAC provides a quantum advance in amphibious capability by reducing our vulnerability and increasing our speed and flexibility. Its speed of over 40 knots and its 60-ton payload also provide us with a unique tactical opportunity for surprise landings from over the horizon onto widely separated beaches. LCACs will make the enemy's ability to defend far more difficult and vastly increase our flexibility and speed in the assault.

Assault amphibious vehicles, the workhorses of the amphibious surface assault, serve to further reduce our vulnerability during the critical ship-to-shore movement and improve our mobility on the battlefield. The assault amphibious vehicle service life extension program (SLEP) is intended to extend the utility of the LVT-7s into the 1990s. In addition to an extensive rebuild effort, the SLEP will add many new systems and components. Among these will be a new engine, nonintegral fuel tank, and all-electric weapons station. The first Marine unit to be equipped with the new LVT7A1s will be operational in FY-84.

The landing vehicle tracked (experimental) (LVTX) is under development as a follow-on for the LVT7A1. The LVTX will provide increased firepower, improved armor, and a lower silhouette.

To enhance our execution during the helicopterborne assault and to improve our maneuverability during subsequent operations ashore, our aviation community is also pursuing a number of modernization initiatives.

As I reported last year, our declining inventory of medium lift assault helicopters is of great concern to me. Due to the effects of inadequate performance and peacetime attrition, the aging CH-46 and CH-53A/D force



## INFANTRY ENHANCEMENTS

### SMALLER—FIREPOWER INTENSIVE

- PERSONNEL—BATTALION FROM 913 TO 822 (FY-83 to FY-85)
- FIREPOWER UP 25%

### IMPROVED SMALL ARMS

- .50 CAL MG-8 PER BATTALION; PROCUREMENT FY-82 to FY-83 (IOC FY-83)
- SHOULDER-LAUNCHED MULTIPURPOSE ASSAULT WEAPON (SMAW)—18 PER BATTALION; PROCUREMENT FY-83 to FY-88 (IOC FY-84)
- SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPON (SAW)—54 PER BATTALION; PROCUREMENT FY-82 to FY-87 (IOC FY-84)
- M-16 PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (PIP); PROCUREMENT FY-82 to FY-87 (IOC FY-84)
- 9MM PISTOL; PROCUREMENT FY-84 to FY-87 (IOC FY-85)
- MK19 40MM GRENADE LAUNCHER—12 PER INFANTRY BATTALION; PROCUREMENT FY-82 to FY-87 (IOC FY-84)

### MORTAR ENHANCEMENTS

- MEDIUM—PROCUREMENT FY-85 to FY-87 (IOC TBD)
- 60MM—PROCUREMENT COMPLETE (IOC FY-82)

Figure 1

lacks adequate capabilities to meet our assault lift requirements. JVX meets the need for a 250-knot assault transport that is self-deployable worldwide, reducing some of the demand for strategic air and sea lift. The urgent need for JVX stems from the requirement for modern replacements for the current force as well as to avert the critical lift shortfall that would occur if JVX were not introduced in 1991. JVX capabilities will complement those of the LCAC and LVTX. Capable of lifting 24 Marines up to 200 nautical miles, JVX will provide increased stand-off for naval and landing forces, the ability to rapidly penetrate deep into enemy rear areas or to bypass adverse terrain, weather, or threats. Thus, JVX offers a quantum increase in strategic and tactical mobility. R&D funds requested in FY-84 will lead to delivery of the first JVX in 1991.

Presently we have two squadrons of CH-53E helicopters operational. This aircraft can lift 32,000 pounds, which is more than any other helicopter in the free world. The FY-84 procurement profile supports the immediate goal of three squadrons which, in conjunction with the five squadrons operating the CH-53A/D,

will minimally meet the current heavy lift requirements. However, the ongoing introduction of the M198 howitzer and subsequent fielding of the light armored vehicle (LAV) will require additional CH-53Es.

As the lead elements of Marines move across the beach and into the helicopter landing zones, the assaulting infantry battalions will be capable of striking with increased firepower as a result of the introduction of new weapons systems—and they will do so with fewer personnel. Their weapons will include the improved M16A2 rifle, the squad automatic weapon, the shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon, the lightweight company mortar system, and an improved medium mortar. The first of these smaller, firepower intensive battalions was organized in October 1982, with an additional 14 battalions to be restructured during 1983. Nine more infantry battalions will be reorganized in 1984, and the final three battalions will realize this increase in firepower in 1985. (Figure 1 refers.)

Having established our assault elements ashore, it is then necessary to secure our positions on the beaches and within the helicopter landing zones and to commence expanding

those positions prior to the thrust for deeper objectives. The most critical threat to our ability to successfully maintain and expand that initial foothold is enemy armor action. Realizing that, and in appreciation of the magnitude of opposing armor and mechanized capabilities, we are sponsoring certain programs to further increase our firepower. Our infantry battalions will engage and defeat enemy fighting vehicles with the Mk19 heavy machinegun. New light antiarmor weapons are undergoing joint Army and Marine Corps evaluation. In addition, our medium antiarmor assets, Dragons, will be increased from 24 to 32 per battalion. Half of these new Dragons will be equipped with a night sighting capability beginning in 1985.

To provide a heavy antiarmor capability for the assault elements, a new TOW platoon with 24 launchers will be added to each infantry regiment. This will effectively double our heavy antiarmor assets within the division. The new TOW II with a 6-inch warhead, extended range, and electrical optic countermeasures will be fielded in FY-84. Half of the TOW launchers will also have a night sighting capability by FY-85.

As the assault waves of infantry clear the beach, heavier landing craft will bring ashore another important antiarmor weapon, the tank. The M60A1, our main battle tank, will end its service life in the early 1990s; however, efforts are underway to either upgrade our present assets or to replace them with tanks providing enhanced antiarmor capabilities.

Additionally, excellent progress is being made in air-deliverable weapons which provide outstanding accuracy against armor and other high-value targets anticipated on the modern battlefield. For our fixed-



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## ANTIARMOR ENHANCEMENTS

- TUBE-LAUNCHED, OPTICALLY-TRACKED, WIRE-GUIDED MISSILE (TOW)
  - 144 TOW/DIVISION—PROCUREMENT FY-80 TO FY-86 (IOC FY-82)
  - PHASE I PROCUREMENT COMPLETE FY 81—5" WARHEAD AND EXTENDED RANGE TO 3750M (IOC FY-81)
  - PHASE II PROCUREMENT BEGAN FY 80—6" WARHEAD, EXTENDED RANGE AND ELECTRICAL OPTICAL COUNTERMEASURES (EOCM) (IOC FY-83)
  - NIGHT SIGHTS, 72/DIVISION—PROCUREMENT FY 80-86 (IOC FY-82)
- DRAGON • 8 ADDITIONAL/BATTALION, TOTAL 32 (IOC FY-83)
- TANKS
  - M60A1, END OF SERVICE LIFE EARLY 1990s
  - REPLACE OR UPGRADE
  - ENHANCED ANTIARMOR CAPABILITY
- AIR DELIVERED • MODERN ARMOR THREAT NECESSITATES AIR DELIVERED ANTIARMOR WEAPONS WHICH OFFER INCREASED AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY AND TARGET LETHALITY
  - NEAR-TERM, STATE-OF-THE-ART, ANTIARMOR WEAPONS BEING PURSUED FOR BOTH FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS
    - LASER MAVERICK-FIXED WING PGM (IOC FY-85)
    - HELLFIRE-HELICOPTER PGM (IOC FY-85)
    - GATOR-AREA/AREA DENIAL WEAPON (IOC FY-85)
    - 25MM MULTIPURPOSE GUN FOR THE AV-8B (IOC FY-85)
- LIGHT ANTITANK WEAPONS • CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE WITH ARMY IN LAW EVALUATION PROGRAM
  - INTERESTED IN MOST COST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM THAT MEETS USMC REQUIREMENT

Figure 2

wing aircraft, recent Laser Maverick tests have been a total success, and we are anticipating an initial operating capability in March 1985. The 25mm multipurpose cannon for the AV-8B also increases our antiarmor capabilities while the Gator mine provides an area denial capability which is essential in a highly mobile, armor-intensive situation. Hellfire has been selected as the primary precision-guided munition for use by our attack helicopters; procurement begins in FY-84. (Figure 2 refers).

The AH-1T attack helicopter adds another dimension to our antiarmor capability. However, due to necessary resource allocations, the 22 AH-1T procurement, previously scheduled during FY-84, has been deferred for 1 year. A procurement schedule of at least 22 aircraft for FY-85, with commensurate advance procurement in FY-84, is essential.

As the beachhead is sufficiently cleared to allow for the landing and emplacement of additional supporting arms, our artillery is brought

ashore. In keeping with our proven doctrine of totally integrating our combined-arms effort, our artillery units will be strengthened by programs designed to enhance their effectiveness in general and, in particular, their antiarmor/mechanized capabilities. Introduction of the M198 155mm howitzer as our primary direct support artillery weapon significantly increases the lethality, range, and accuracy of our artillery units. Accuracy and lethality will be further improved by combining Copperhead precision-guided projectiles with the Modular Universal Laser Equipment. Additional 155mm self-propelled artillery will be added to the force, not only increasing the numbers of artillery pieces available but also providing additional mobility to support the fast-moving aspects of the battlefield of the future and furthering our antiarmor/mechanized capabilities. (Figure 3 refers).

A second, and equally critical, threat to our successful establishment of Marines ashore is the enemy's air

attack capabilities. The steady expansion of Soviet attack capabilities, illustrated by weapons systems such as the HIND-D and MIG-27, demands improved air defense protection for our frontline Marines as well as our vital rear area installations. These requirements are being addressed as quickly and economically as possible through the acquisition of IHAWK systems and Stinger missiles.

In order to integrate these offensive and defensive systems into a cohesive, responsive, and lethal fire support team, we must possess the means to control and coordinate their diverse capabilities. MAGTFs are organized, equipped, and trained to operate in a totally-integrated combined-arms structure, thus providing our commanders the capacity to control all elements of the team including ground combat, aviation, and logistics. To that end, unique command, control, communications, and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) capabilities are required. The following programs for C<sup>3</sup>I systems will satisfy that requirement:


The Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) is designed to provide commanders and equipped units with instantaneous friendly position and navigation information. PLRS will interface with the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS), a real-time processing system that will be available in FY-88 to provide commanders selective automated assistance to efficiently employ supporting arms at all echelons of the MAGTF. Our Tactical Air Operations Center-1985 (TAOC-85) is a modular, state-of-the-art, real-time air control system that will manage airspace and coordinate and control both interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. This system will also serve as the initial host platform for the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). JTIDS, when fully implemented in this and other follow-on systems, will provide a high-capacity, secure, jam-resistant data distribution capability for the real-time exchange of tactical information within the Marine Corps and with other United States and NATO forces.

Recent events validate my comments of last year regarding the great strides being made in our Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities program. Marine air-ground task forces throughout the world, some of which have only limited organic reconnaissance capabilities, are now re-

## ARTILLERY ENHANCEMENTS

- CONVERSION TO M-198
  - NEW IMPROVED STRUCTURE TRANSITION FOR FY 83-85, PROCUREMENT FY-79 TO FY-82 (IOC FY-82)
  - 105MM HOWITZER REDUCTION OF 138, 155MM HOWITZER INCREASE OF 168
- ADDITIONAL 155MM (SP)
  - INCREASE OF 30 TUBES—3 BATTERIES BY FY-86, TOTAL 5 BATTERIES BY FY-89
- ADDITION OF TARGET ACQUISITION BATTERY
  - ONE EACH IN FY-85, 87, and 88
- PRECISION GUIDED PROJECTILES
  - MODULAR UNIVERSAL LASER EQUIPMENT (MULE) PROCUREMENT FY-82 to FY-85 (IOC FY-84)
  - COPPERHEAD-(IOC FY-85)
- FAMILY OF SCATTERABLE MINES (FASCAM)
  - AREA DENIAL ARTILLERY MUNITION (ADAM) (IOC FY 82), ANTIPERSONNEL MINES AND REMOTE ANTIARMOR MINE (RAAM) ANTITANK MINES—PROCUREMENT FY-81 (IOC FY-81 (IOC FY-83)
- ARTILLERY COMPUTER SYSTEM
  - PROCUREMENT FY-85 (IOC FY-85)

Figure 3



ceiving national intelligence systems support on a regular and continuing basis. The value of national collectors, in combination with theater and organic systems, was highlighted by the vital and effective intelligence support provided to our Marines deployed to Beirut, Lebanon. Finally, we have a clearly defined requirement to improve our tactical intelligence capabilities. Congress has recognized our deficiencies, and those of the other Services, and has taken steps to ensure the resources are made available to correct them. The status of the Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System offers proof. The heart of the system, the Intelligence Analysis Center, is now in procurement and a 1985 IOC is assured. The full field deployment of the Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System will significantly enhance our ability to support tactical commanders. Our all-source imagery processor will allow the commander to receive and process in near real time (within seconds) multisource imagery from national as well as his own tactical imagery sensors. Additionally, we are in the process of upgrading and enhancing our Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Systems to improve our tactical and strategic intelligence collection capabilities.

Once we have solidified our positions on the beaches and within the landing ones, we are prepared to move inland to seize control of landing force objectives and consolidate the force beachhead. On the modern battlefield such a thrust requires a high degree of mobility. Tactical mobility provides the means to rapidly close with and destroy the enemy and to logistically support Marines in a highly mobile environment. There are two ground acquisition programs

intended to improve our battlefield mobility in addition to those programs related to the LVT7A1 which I have previously discussed.

First, a new dimension will be added to the battlefield in FY-83 with the activation of the first light armored vehicle company. This unit is the forerunner of a highly mobile, fire-power intensive maneuver element which is going to be added to the Marine division and which will be unique because of its integrated combined-arms capability. These maneuver elements will be formed around a family of eight mission-role vehicles, all built on a common chassis. The light armored vehicles in these units will not only be strategically transportable but, when the situation dictates, helicopters will be able to move them deep into the enemy's rear area to seize key objectives.

Second, the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) is a new multifunctional vehicle which will streamline maintenance, training, and logistic support. Functionally, it will serve as a weapons platform, a communications vehicle, and a multipurpose logistics carrier. Perhaps most significant are the cost efficiencies offered by this new family of vehicles. HMMWV will replace seven types of motor transport vehicles currently in the inventory and, by doing so, will virtually halve that inventory (26,000 current vehicles will be replaced by 14,000 HMMWVs) while simultaneously increasing tactical mobility. (Figure 4 refers.)

Finally, during the fight to consolidate the force beachhead and those subsequent operations ashore

necessary for the accomplishment of a given mission, we must be capable of sustaining our combat power. Once deployed, our Marines must be able to stay and fight. Sustainability, in combination with weapons systems and people, is a necessary ingredient of our force projection capability.

Marine Corps requirements to lift the war-fighting equipment and supplies of the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) have grown with the overall growth of our MAGTF's combat power which, in turn, has been necessarily increased to counter the growing threat of the modern battlefield. With the growth in the assault echelon limited by the availability of amphibious shipping, the AFOE has had to accommodate a larger share of this expansion. Increasing lift requirements for the AFOE have, unfortunately, coincided with a decrease in the numbers of those ships (breakbulk, self-sustaining) which have traditionally been utilized to lift that echelon. As the U.S. merchant fleet is moving toward greater numbers of container ships, which are not self-sustaining, we are moving to similarly configure our logistic pipeline to capitalize on this trend. In that regard, the Navy is planning to acquire auxiliary crane ships (TACS) for in-stream offload of the newer ships. The challenge posed by the expanded AFOE lies in the coordination required to get a significant number of different types of merchant ships at the appropriate ports in time to embark and sail in short order. The satisfactory solution to this entire equation will require a strong Merchant Marine and our continued coordination with the Military

## MOBILITY ENHANCEMENTS

LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE (LAV)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LIGHT WEIGHT, FLEXIBLE, AGILE, FIGHTING VEHICLE</li> <li>• FIREPOWER INTENSIVE ORGANIZATION</li> <li>• HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE</li> <li>• ENHANCED STRATEGIC TRANSPORTABILITY</li> </ul>
HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE (HMMWV)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ENHANCED TOW CARRIER</li> <li>• WEAPONS PLATFORM FOR MK19 40MM MG</li> <li>• REPLACES 8 MT VEHICLES IN MARINE DIVISION</li> <li>• REPLACES ALL COMMUNICATIONS VEHICLES</li> <li>• 26,000 CURRENT MARINE CORPS VEHICLES REPLACED BY ABOUT 14,000 HMMWVs (IOC FY-85)</li> </ul>
LANDING VEHICLE TRACKED (LVT7A1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PRODUCTION PROGRAM BEGAN 1982</li> <li>• EXTENDS USE UNTIL 1990s</li> <li>• NEW ENGINE, NONINTEGRAL FUEL TANK, ALL-ELECTRIC WEAPONS STATION</li> <li>• 329 NEW LVTs FOR MPS</li> </ul>
LANDING VEHICLE TRACKED (EXPERIMENTAL) (LVTX)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FOLLOW-ON TO LVT7A1 (IOC EARLY 1990s)</li> <li>• INCREASED FIREPOWER, IMPROVED ARMOR, LOWER SILHOUETTE</li> </ul>

Figure 4

Sealift Command and the Navy.

The momentum of our combat service support enhancement program, initiated during September 1981 through modernization programs, acquisition of new equipment, and manpower and management initiatives, continues on a steady course. Fleet Marine Force commanders activated 10 cadred units in FY-82 and will activate 5 more in FY-83 to restore the full spectrum of functional combat service support capabilities we require. The activations include the areas of rations, landing support operations, fuel, bridge, engineer, and maintenance support—all of which are vital to sustaining the landing force ashore.

Implementation of the Marine Corps' Field Logistics System (FLS) continues to be of vital necessity for our sustainability and survivability on today's battlefield. Through FLS, we have begun to replace obsolete equipment while simultaneously improving combat service support. Full implementation is anticipated by FY-90.

The FLS in combination with the Navy Amphibious Logistics System forms the Navy/Marine Corps Amphibious Logistics Support Ashore program and will result in equipment savings due to compatibility of equipment and repair parts support, increased use of commercial items, decreased training requirements, and improved effectiveness. FLS is designed around international dimensional standards in order to be able to use all modes of transportation, especially the container-capable merchant fleet.

This system, combined with the aforementioned combat service support enhancement initiatives, represents significant improvements which will provide the Marine Corps with a new dimension in logistics support capabilities and will considerably enhance our Fleet Marine Force sustainability and combat readiness posture.

I'll turn now to an area that causes me considerable concern—medical support. Amphibious operations in a high intensity environment will involve large numbers of casualties requiring immediate treatment and surgery. Under most contingency scenarios, the bed capacities and surgical capabilities found in the amphibious task force and landing force units would be overwhelmed early in the engagement. To correct this deficiency, I consider it imperative that continued emphasis be placed on the

Navy's development of the fleet hospital program and the hospital ship program. The Navy's Rapidly Deployable Medical Facility, with a 1,000-bed capacity, is scheduled for implementation in June 1983. This is a positive start. The Navy's fleet hospital program will provide 11,250 beds configured in 250-, 500-, and 1,000-bed field hospitals to help resolve the critical shortage of in-theater medical support. The Marine Corps applauds the fleet hospital program; however, the global mission of our Corps requires the flexibility of sea-going medical support. Hospital ships, on-station with the amphibious task force, are required to deal with Marine and Navy casualties requiring immediate treatment before the beachhead is secure enough to implement a field hospital. During World War II, the Navy had 13 hospital ships. Today there are none and the need is critical.

### MANPOWER

Up to this point, I have directed my remarks to the programs and equipment that will enhance, modernize, and maintain the deployability, combat readiness, and sustainability of the Marine Corps. The program I will now discuss, manpower, is the Marine Corps. It is my number one priority.

By the end of FY-84, our manpower program calls for an end strength of 197,300—an increase of 2,700 over the FY-83 level. The requirement for additional personnel is primarily tied to the weapons and equipment modernization and enhancement programs I have previously discussed. However, not all new weapons and equipment require more Marines. As mentioned, weapons and equipment additions to the infantry structure are allowing us to reorganize into smaller infantry battalions with greater firepower. The net result of our structural and manpower changes will permit us to increase manning levels slightly throughout the active force structure. Examples of specific increases which will be generated by our FY-84 manpower program include the reactivation of certain combat service support units, the activation of a light armored vehicle unit, the reorganization of our artillery regiments, and the addition of light anti-aircraft missile batteries.


Quality personnel, in sufficient numbers, remain the key to maintaining the readiness and combat capabilities of Marine operating forces. We

continue to meet our accession requirements in both quality and quantity. Eighty-five percent of our FY-82 nonprior-service accessions were high school graduates. More than 90 percent of those individuals were in the top 3 Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) categories as measured by the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). In accordance with Congressional direction, all AFQT Category IVs are high school graduates. These recruiting accomplishments are particularly significant because they were made under the renormed ASVAB test, which corrected the tendency in previous tests to overstate an applicant's mental ability. Quality, rather than numbers, will continue to be the driving force in establishing our recruiting goals.

Our success in recruiting quality Marines in the past few years has been achieved, in part, by assigning our very best Marines to recruiting duty—one of the most demanding and difficult peacetime assignments. We are committed to this effort and intend to continue this policy. We will be similarly selective in the assignment of instructors to the recruit depots and other training establishments. I am convinced that this near-term investment in recruiting and training will result in long-term benefits to the Marine Corps. The number of Marines assigned recruiter and instructor duties meets the minimum requirements to accomplish these important tasks, and I urge your continued support for the recruiting and training overhead levels requested.

Reenlistment of proven, quality Marines is another key part of our manpower program. During FY-82, 15,051 Marines reenlisted. Our continuing emphasis on quality, the general state of the economy, and the improving national attitude toward military service have contributed to an excellent reenlistment year. A continuing concern, however, is our ability to retain Marines who have the skills needed to overcome critical shortages in various specialties or who can be retrained in those areas. The selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) program is absolutely essential to fill identified shortages with high quality Marines. To this end we have developed a capability to target bonuses to specific military occupational specialties (MOSs), rather than the more general occupational fields, giving us an exceptionally efficient and effective





ments. The necessity to restrain government pay increases during times of overall national economic difficulties is recognized, and the Marine Corps supports the Administration's economic improvement initiatives. As the economy does improve, however, I would urge that we return to our comparability goals. In the long run, Marines, and all military people, must be compensated at a rate that avoids the immensely expensive loss of experienced people that historically occurs when military compensation is permitted to fall behind that of the private sector.

"Quality of life" initiatives also directly affect retention and readiness. These initiatives embrace a wide variety of programs reflecting the Marine Corps' commitment to improving the human dimension of military service, that is, the working, living, and recreational conditions of our Marines. These programs include increased construction of improved bachelor and family housing, maintenance and training facilities and morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; continued development of Family Service Centers to assist Marines and their families; enhancement of dependent medical benefits and beneficiary awareness of the value of benefits and available services; increased educational benefits; and continued emphasis on fair treatment and equal opportunity for all Marines.

An area of particular concern to me, and one which I addressed last year, is the frequent family separations that we require of Marines in order to maintain a forward deployed posture in the Western Pacific. Our presence in Japan is necessary, but I remain convinced that it can be maintained without adding to the sacrifices we already ask our career Marines to make. Consequently, I am committed to increasing the number of Marines serving in accompanied tours on Okinawa and at Iwakuni. Over the next few years, we intend to permit career Marines in Japan to elect accompanied tours—excepting those in specially designated ground and aviation combat units that deploy on a regular basis from their home stations. We will progress deliberately, pacing the transition to available housing. I am confident that the impact of this decision on Marine families and on the retention of quality career Marines will benefit generations of Marines to come.

Civilians represent a vital and major element of our total manpower

requirements. Our FY-84 request for 21,618 civilians satisfies only minimal requirements. The civilian component permits us to more effectively man the FMF with Marines; provides continuity in the base and supporting establishments; and enhances FMF training, readiness, and sustainability.

I reported last year that we had launched a determined and concentrated campaign to eliminate the use of illegal drugs in the Corps. My policy remains plain and simple: the distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs is not tolerated in the United States Marine Corps. The welfare of the men and women in my charge is a deep commitment, embedded from my earliest days as a Marine, and I am totally committed to ridding the Corps of this threat to its well-being. The key is leadership. We have that leadership, and we are making progress.

The manpower program in the active force is doing well. Accession goals are being met by quality individuals and improved retention is allowing us to keep the quality Marines we need. Our emphasis on quality and adherence to standards is providing us with a talented, efficient, and capable force—a Marine Corps of which I am extremely proud.

#### MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Sharing fully in the total force concept, the Marine Corps Reserve provides one-third of the manpower and one-fourth of the structure available for mobilization. Our Ready Reserve, consisting of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and Individual Ready Reserve, is the primary source of this manpower. The SMCR forms the 4th Marine Division-Wing Team, balancing combat, combat service, and combat service support forces that are ready to provide the trained units and individuals needed to bring the active Fleet Marine Force to full wartime capability. Prepared to augment, reinforce, or provide a Marine air-ground task force, the SMCR rests on a solid foundation upon which we intend to build.

Readiness of the Reserve forces has continued to improve. During FY-82, Marine Corps reservists participated with active duty Marines in joint/combined exercises in Korea, Iceland, Denmark, Germany, and the Caribbean and sharpened their skills in seven major Reserve exercises in

program. Our SRB program, in other words, is a success. From July 1980 to July 1982 the shortfall in Marines needed to man all MOSs at 85 percent of requirement, or better, was reduced approximately 40 percent. With your continuing support I am confident that even greater improvements will be made.

As with enlisted accessions, we continue to meet our annual officer procurement requirements. I am concerned, however, that because of the great improvement in retention in the past few years we will exceed the maximum promotion timing guideline given by Congress for the grade of major beginning in FY-85. Without appropriate grade relief, the promotion timing for this grade will continue to steadily increase beyond the promotion window fixed by Congress. As provided by the Congress, we are requesting through DOD a modification to the grade table established in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act which will raise the current ceiling on the number of majors that may be serving on active duty. This increase, only for the grade of major, will permit us to do two things. First we will be able to remain with the DOPMA management parameters. Second, we will be able to man a number of important billets external to the Marine Corps which support various DOD activities. Your support for this modification, which should reach you later this year as part of the substantive amendments to DOPMA, is essential and requested.

In FY-82 military compensation attained comparable levels with the private sector. In FY-83 the pay raise was capped at 4 percent, 50 percent below the level needed to maintain comparability by accepted measure-


CONUS. Of the units tested for combat skills, 90 percent were found combat ready using active force criteria. Initiatives to improve mobilization readiness were tested during the recent JCS Exercise "PROUD SABER" as well as 131 separate unit mobilization tests. Results indicate considerable improvement in our mobilization capability over previous years.

Our concerns with personnel readiness and quality are paramount. In keeping with Congressional and Defense guidance to achieve wartime strengths in the Selected Reserve, we are requesting authority for an average SMCR strength of 40,300 in FY-84. Approval will provide for planned and programmed growth. Our optimism that the SMCR could achieve wartime strengths by the middle of this decade was validated when it attained 105 percent of the planned FY-82 end-strength of 38,540, ending the year with a total paid strength of 40,461. Personnel readiness has been augmented by expansion of the full-time support (FTS) program with FTS personnel now being assigned to 17 major commands, including Headquarters Marine Corps. FTS end-strength is programmed at 801 in FY-84.

The goals of procuring, issuing, and maintaining combat standard equipment for SMCR training allowances are being met. However, the additional equipment requirements that are programmed to be held at either Albany, Ga., or Barstow, Calif., until required by mobilization are not adequate to satisfy Total Force needs. FY-83 procurement funds are being used to reduce these shortages, and assuming that programmed funding levels remain intact, equipment deficiencies will be largely resolved by FY-88.

During FY-82 a structure modernization effort was begun to align the 4th Marine Division's structure with that of its active counterparts and to increase the combat service support capability of the 4th Force Service Support Group.

The need for a modern Reserve aviation component is emphasized by the recent tasking of Reserve squadrons to prepare for contingencies previously assigned to active units. Though newer aircraft are programmed for the Reserves, aviation readiness continues to be affected by aircraft shortages, principally in KC-130 refuelers and AH-1 helicopters, as well as the problems associated with aging aircraft.



*"Programming continues for the land pre-positioning of equipment and supplies for a MAB in Norway."*

As the Marine Corps Reserve requirements to augment, reinforce, or provide a MAGTF in support of various worldwide active force contingency missions expand, our efforts to improve Reserve readiness will also expand.

### **READINESS, TRAINING, OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE**

The Marine Corps remains ready to respond to all assigned missions. Readiness has always been, and continues to be, the highest priority for Marines. Our emphasis on readiness is evident in the array of Marine air-ground task forces which are at this moment, fully combat ready and prepared for immediate contingency deployment. Forward deployed MAGTFs are the root source of our versatility, flexibility, and readiness.


A key element in the readiness equation continues to be operational performance standards. Our standards remain uncompromising; our individual Marines and combat units would acquit themselves well if required to fight today. As Marines continue to deploy and exercise in all corners of the globe, we continue to emphasize readiness for amphibious operations and subsequent combat ashore. Even before these units deploy, we evaluate their capability to accomplish their assigned missions through the rigorous Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System. This system objectively evaluates the combat readiness of all active and reserve FMF units.

A second factor is the relationship of new and improved equipment to enhanced readiness. I can report with confidence that our current equipment readiness is the best it has been for many years. Improvements in personnel, equipment, and spare parts have been substantial. However, complete fulfillment of both our readiness and sustainability requirements, in all areas, is most important.

A third factor in the readiness equation is the training of Marines. I am convinced the well-trained Marine remains the most important element for success on the battlefield. To ensure that we have the best trained Marines possible, a determined effort must continually be made to improve upon the effectiveness of our training system.

The Marine Corps' training system is designed to train individual Marines and Marine units, both Active and Reserve, for combat. To maintain our high state of readiness, we continue to emphasize mission-oriented collective training. This training brings together the individual and collective skills of Marines and is directed toward refining the FMF's capability to conduct amphibious landings and subsequent operations ashore as a part of the Navy/Marine Corps team. Our MAGTFs participate in a wide variety of mission-oriented training exercises each year. One such exercise is the combined-arms training conducted by 10 Marine battalions each year at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif. The harsh expanse of desert at Twentynine Palms provides a maneuver area sufficient to permit the full integration of our combined arms, air-ground team in realistic live fire exercises. Another example is participation by approximately 10,000 Marines each year in cold weather and mountain warfare training at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, Calif. This training center provides an ideal location to train Marines for our strategic roles in the Northern European and Western Pacific regions which have mountainous terrain and cold weather environments.

We also train regularly with our allies. This training fosters a spirit of cooperation with our allied counter-



parts and allows us to benefit from their particular expertise. Marines receive jungle training with British Royal Marines in Borneo and arctic training in Norway as well as cross-training with our friends and allies globally.

Marine Corps aviation units also participate in a wide range of collective training programs. The electronic warfare/close air support test program conducted with the other Services provides invaluable training and insight into today's high-threat environment. Ongoing participation in Air Force RED FLAG exercises provides Marine crews with a realistic air combat environment. At the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron, located at Yuma, Ariz., Marine crews from our entire aircraft community, along with personnel from other Services, learn to plan and fly in a combat scenario that demands cooperation and coordination.

Success in any of our collective training efforts is directly related to the effective training of our individual Marines. Recruit training remains the fundamental element of our success and is the first step in a program designed to prepare the individual Marine for combat or garrison duty. It challenges our recruits—male and female—to achieve the highest standards of military skills. I believe we succeed in this effort because the challenge of recruit training comes from a series of demanding but attainable performance requirements. Since recruit training is extremely demanding, I require the highest standards from our drill instructors and accept no deviation from these standards. Recruit training continues to receive my close personal attention.

While we will continue to modernize many areas of training, I am satis-

fied that our programs remain fundamentally sound. I consider training to be a key factor in the combat readiness of the Corps and believe that a well-trained Marine is vital to the effectiveness of the Navy/Marine Corps team and the interests of our Nation.

Because of readiness and training, the Navy/Marine Corps team continues to operate as a totally integrated force currently deployed worldwide in support of national policy, demonstrating resolve to our allies, and serving as a major deterrent to potential enemies.

The III Marine Amphibious Force, forward deployed in Okinawa and Japan, provides presence in the Far East and is available for rapid reinforcement or response to the Southwest Asia (SWA) region. III MAF assets include the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), which is continuously forward deployed afloat in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The Near Term Pre-Positioned Force, with 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade equipment embarked, remains strategically staged at Diego Garcia to augment our mobility capability for rapid closure of our forces into SWA.

Located on the East Coast is II MAF which forward deploys a MAU in the Mediterranean Sea on a continuing basis and which frequently visits the Indian Ocean. Additionally, II MAF annually deploys a MAU or MAB to Northern Europe for training and joint/combined exercises, and deploys similar MAGTFs to the Caribbean.

I MAF, located on the West Coast, is tasked with the responsibility for developing plans for deployment and employment of Marine forces in SWA. Moreover, I MAF, in coordination with II MAF, provides combat elements for III MAF on a rotating basis for both deployed MAUs and Okinawa/Japan based forces through the Unit Deployment Program.

The Navy/Marine Corps team has recently exercised in a number of Mediterranean countries, in Europe, throughout the Pacific Ocean area from the Aleutian Islands to Australia, in the Caribbean Sea, and with our friends and allies in South America. This winter, Marines landed in Oman for an amphibious landing exercise and cross-training with the Omanis. These exercises amply underscore the inherent flexibility and capability, both seaborne and airborne, of Marine forces to move to, and operate in, varied geographic environments and under extreme weather conditions. In addition, Marines have participated in a variety of humanitarian assistance projects and are, as you know, currently participating as part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon.

#### FINANCIAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The financial resources allocated to support the programs and budget items discussed above (and displayed in Tables I and II) represent virtually no real growth in the aggregate over FY-83. A comparison of FY-83 and FY-84 is contained in Table I:

(\$ in millions)		
APPROPRIATION	FY 1983	FY 1984
Military Personnel Marine Corps	3,331.0	3,462.9
Reserve Personnel Marine Corps	170.9	177.3
Operation & Maintenance Marine Corps	1,469.6	1,575.9
Operation & Maintenance Marine Corps Reserve	51.1	53.6
Procurement Marine Corps	1,977.4	1,852.0
Marine Corps Stock Fund	11.8	22.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,011.8</b>	<b>7,144.0</b>

Table I

The funding requested for FY-84 finances two main goals: improved overall readiness and achievement of adequate levels of combat sustainability. The very fact that there are no "new starts" reflects these priorities. To this end, there is real growth in the operations accounts and stock fund—as I projected in my last report to you. This vital increase primarily supports the operation and maintenance of new items of equipment currently being integrated into the operating forces.

The FY-84 budget request preserves the Marine Corps' reputation for austerity. It has been scrutinized for excesses, not only within the Marine Corps, but also within the Departments of the Navy and Defense. As a result, the Marine Corps' contribution to the maintenance of peace continues to be significant while our consumption of resources remains relatively small. And, as I stated earlier, a more cost-effective investment in national security is not available.

Table II highlights the Marine Corps' FY-84 authorization requests:

#### CONCLUSION

Having detailed the present and future posture of your Corps, I wish to reemphasize both the maritime imperatives and that which constitutes the essence of the Marine Corps.



*"In the final analysis the Marine Corps is people . . . and they are responding magnificently. I see it in their faces."*

The realities of this Nation's economic system, coupled with our geopolitical position vis-a-vis the free world, dictate a requirement for unchallenged maritime strength—a strength that has its foundations in the commercial and industrial institutions of our society. A vigorous shipbuilding industry and a thriving Merchant Marine are necessary ingredients for strong naval forces and maritime superiority. These, in turn, are vital to the Nation's prosperity, our security, and the maintenance of international stability and peace.

We in the Marine Corps are encouraged that the Congress and the people of the United States support

us as we serve to deter aggression and maintain the peace. You may be assured that we will continue to be deserving of that support. You may be equally assured that the Marine Corps will continue to be faithful in fulfilling our most important obligation—the obligation of providing quality leadership to America's sons and daughters.

In the final analysis the Marine Corps is people and we, their leaders, are entrusted with their physical and moral welfare. Your leadership and support have steadfastly provided the means to recruit, train, and equip these superb men and women. Congressional wisdom and vision have fostered the conditions which permit Marine officers and noncommissioned officers, the role models, if you will, within our Marine Corps family, to continue to instill sound values and those enduring qualities of service, selfless dedication, and patriotism which our Marines will carry throughout their lives both as Marines and as citizens of our Nation.

We are providing America's youth a challenge, and they are responding magnificently. I see it in their faces; I hear it in their words; it is evident to the world in their performance. During the past year, I have visited your Marines around the globe from the Mediterranean to Japan, from Norway to Australia. I can assure you they are as capable and ready as Marines have ever been. They remain faithful to the special trust and confidence placed in them by the American people. The continued support of the Congress will keep them capable and ready. Their spirit and dedication will keep them always faithful.

That concludes my report. Thank you.

USMC

CATEGORY	(\$ in millions)		
	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985
Active Duty End-Strength	194,600	197,300	199,000
Selected Reserve Average Strength	40,245	40,300	42,500
Civilian Personnel End-Strength (USMC Portion of DON Request)	21,338	21,618 <sup>a/</sup>	21,733
Average Military Student Training Load, Active	20,204	21,105	21,185
Average Military Student Training Load, Reserve	3,070	3,223	3,223
Procurement, Marine Corps	1,997.4	1,852.0	2,172.4
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps	1,469.7	1,575.9	1,856.1
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps Reserve	51.1	53.6	58.2

<sup>a/</sup> Includes 19,962 O&MMC, 211 O&MMCR and 1,445 MCIF

Table II