

DISCUSSION ON MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE.

Further discussion on Colonel Fuller's interesting argument for the establishment of a War College for the Marine Corps is invited for the subsequent issues of the GAZETTE. His reference to the un-correlated information and experience of successive expeditionary forces should commend itself to the serious consideration of both the line and staff of the Corps. Whether the medium for its diffusion throughout the Corps will be best secured by the establishment of the War College advocated by Colonel Fuller, or by some other medium, he has certainly advanced a question that has been uppermost in the Corps for several years. If the discussion leads to a satisfactory solution of this problem a great service will be rendered to the Corps.

BRIGADIER GEN. CHARLES H. LAUCHHEIMER, U. S. MARINE CORPS.

I am in full accord with the views of Colonel Fuller that the present scope of the duties of officers of the Marine Corps is such that higher education of a strictly military character is necessary, but I do not concur with him as to the procedure which should be followed to secure the consummation of the so much desired result.

I do not agree with Colonel Fuller's statement to the effect that our sphere of action and the tasks given us are sufficiently different from those assigned either the Army or the Navy to require an educational training which cannot be obtained at either or both of their war colleges, and being of such opinion and for other reasons hereinafter stated, I do not see the necessity for a Marine Corps war college.

A Marine Corps war college *per se* is not necessary, for, in the first place, the scope of the Naval War College can be easily so amplified as to provide a curriculum which will give to the marine officers who may be ordered there the benefit of a higher education pertaining to their own profession, and in the second place, and more especially, the establishment of such an institution would create a condition which would be at variance with the expressed policy of Headquarters to act in cooperation and close affiliation

with the Navy, of which we are a part and with which the major part of our duty is performed.

In view of the fact that our service is principally with the Navy there can be no doubt that our line of thought should be as nearly as possible the same as that of the Navy. If we have a separate college of our own, we are very liable to train our officers along lines of thought which will be at variance with those taught the Naval officers at the Naval War College, and therefore, when the two forces act together, instead of there being a unity of thought, there will be such a diversity of ideas on important matters of strategy and tactics as to very materially jeopardize, if not defeat, the success of the enterprise.

The problems which confront the Navy in time of emergency are varied and intricate, and the Naval War College has as its *raison d'être* the determining of the best solution of such problems and the promulgation of such knowledge to the officers of that branch of the service. Therefore, as the Marine Corps is almost always called upon to cooperate with the Navy at such times, and in order that it may give the most efficient cooperation and render the most effective assistance, it is of the utmost importance that its officers be thoroughly familiar with the lines along which the problem or problems will be worked out by the Navy.

Although the Marine Corps ordinarily serves with the Navy, it may, by order of the President, be detached for service with the Army, and therefore, the reasons given above for the necessity of Marine officers being familiar with the Navy methods apply to the Army methods also.

Marine officers attending the Army and Navy war colleges obtain an insight into the Army and Navy methods of procedure, respectively, which is believed to be of the utmost importance to the Marine Corps, and which cannot be obtained in any other way, and if we had a war college of our own and our officers did not attend the course at the other colleges, both of these important factors would be lost to us.

In course of time, and I hope in the very near future, there will be in the Marine Corps a school similar to the Army School of the Line, and which will be an extension of our present Advance Base School. This can be accomplished by adding to the curriculum of that school a theoretical course covering the subjects in which Colonel Fuller thinks our officers need special training. I believe that

the scope of such a school could be made sufficiently broad to afford the officers of the Marine Corps an education in the fundamental branches which are pertinent to the successful performance of the duties of our profession, leaving to the Navy and Army war colleges, as a post graduate course, the study of the larger problems which bear equally upon the performance of the duties of a marine officer as they do upon both army and navy officers.

LIEUT. COL. JOHN H. RUSSELL, U. S. MARINE CORPS.

The suggestion advanced by Colonel Ben H. Fuller for the establishment of a War College for the Marine Corps is most interesting and merits careful consideration.

A college is an institution incorporated for the purposes of study and instruction in the higher branches of Knowledge.

The curriculum of a War College embraces the study and instruction in the higher branches of Military Administration and the Art of War (Operations).

Considering the intimate association of the Marine Corps with the Navy, and the fact that its Main Mission is and always will be closely linked with the Mission of the Navy, the establishment of a separate war college appears to the writer to be too much of a departure from the well defined road along which the Marine Corps *must* travel.

The Naval War College is the Marine Corps War College. It is there that we obtain our conception of war; it is there that the Master Work that we must strive to accomplish is outlined for us.

It then becomes the duty of the Marine Corps to establish an educational system and such educational institutions that will enable it to perfect the work as outlined by the Naval War College.

The Marine Corps now has, in theory, if not in being, an Advance Base School, and it is believed that when this institution re-opens and a study is made of the theoretical as well as the practical side of Advance Base Work, a special course for field officers will soon develop.

Such a course of instruction would naturally cover practically all of the requirements enumerated by Colonel Fuller except that of a Doctrine applicable to small wars. Regarding this latter requirement the writer, from a study of operations abroad during the present war, is strongly opposed to the enunciation of any Doctrine for

the Marine Corps other than one applicable to a great war and the fulfilling of our Main Mission.

COLONEL DION WILLIAMS, U. S. MARINE CORPS.

Having carefully read Colonel Fuller's article upon the higher education of the officers of the Marine Corps, it is with a shock of surprise that I note the opinion therein expressed that the marine is neither a soldier nor a sailor, as for many years I have held with Kipling's view:

'Now his work begins Gawd knows when and his work is never through;

'E isn't one o' the reg'lar line, nor 'e isn't one of the crew,

'E's a kind of a gidly harumfrodite—

Soldier and sailor too!

There isn't a job on the top o' the earth the beggar don't know nor do—

You can leave him at night on a bald man's 'ead to paddle 'is own canoe,

'E's a sort of a bloomin' cosmopolouse—

Soldier and sailor too!"

But, be that as it may, it must be realized that the *raison d'être* for the existence of the Marine Corps is as an integral part of the naval establishment, and that the occasional detached duty with the Army is only incidental and has usually resulted in the past from an insufficiency in the numbers of men authorized for the Army.

During peace times, that is when we are not engaged in any great war, the expeditionary duty performed by the Marine Corps in the unstable small countries to the southward, and in the West Indies, is an important branch of government work but it remains distinctly *naval* work, since the naval vessels furnish the first reserve and in many cases act as moveable forts to support the landing forces of marines.

The great mission of the Marine Corps today is to act as an Advanced Base force for the shore defense of the bases for the Fleet that must be seized in the theatre of operations and rapidly placed in a state of preparedness to meet the attacks of the enemy.

To perform this duty well in the time of the country's need requires careful preparatory training and education. This training is distinctly naval in its character and demands a thorough under-

standing of the problems of strategy and tactics as they apply to the Navy. The studies that make for such an understanding are best made at the Naval War College, and it most desirable that every officer in the Marine Corps should at some time in his career in the service take the course of study and work there provided.

The study of the problems of strategy and tactics as applied to strictly land warfare is now provided for at the Army War College, and here marine officers are welcome.

To duplicate these two courses at a strictly Marine Corps College would not only entail a useless expenditure of the government's money but it would result in segregation of interest and effort rather than in the great desideratum—coordination.

During the past year the General Board, the great advisory organization of the Navy Department, has on more than one occasion recommended that the Marine Corps be maintained at a strength equal to twenty per centum of the authorized strength of the Navy, and in accordance therewith the last congressional appropriation act gave a corresponding increase in the Marine Corps.

This clearly shows that the Navy wants the marine and wants him for naval duties. To perform these duties well requires him to be more than a land soldier; he must know the life of the sea, the fighting habits of the sailor, what the sailor can do and how he may be expected to do it; and there is but one way to learn all of this—by daily lessons aboard the ships of the battle line.

Hence, if the marine is to act well his part in the drama of naval warfare and hold the base for the protection of the oil and coal and other supplies of the battleship fleet in the face of the determined attacks of an aggressive enemy, he must receive the essential part of his training and education in the Navy, that is, aboard the ships and in the schools of the Navy. For only thus can he arrive at the firm conviction that the Marine Corps is but an integral part of the greater navy with strictly naval duties to perform.

And if the marine learns this lesson well and is helped to learn it by active cooperation with the other integral parts of the greater navy, he will be ready "to do his bit" when, on some distant isle surrounded by the raiding ships of the enemy or on the bleak hills overlooking an enemy's harbor and hard pressed by the shore forces of a brave and persistent foe, he holds the rough line of defenses that guard the fuel, ammunition and food, and the sick and wounded of his country's fleet.

LIEUT. COL. GEORGE C. THORPE, U. S. MARINE CORPS.

Colonel Fuller says: "The Army and Navy each has its War College; why not the Marine Corps?"

The existing war colleges deal primarily in Strategy, Grand Tactics and Policy. Minor tactics is, by the Army, left to the Army Service Schools. Since the Navy has no institution corresponding to the Leavenworth Schools, the Naval War College and the Fleet in concert make minor tactical deductions. To make the distinction clear, let us define these divisions of labor. Von Clausewitz says that "tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat," while "strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the war." (See *On War*—Carl von Clausewitz, Vol. I., Bk. II., p. 85.) If this definition is correct, Strategy involves the use of all the fighting forces of the nation: Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and strategic decisions indicate the manner of co-ordinating the employment of these three branches to attain the object of the war. Therefore, there can be, strictly speaking, no army strategy or navy strategy; these branches, acting separately, are interested only in tactical and logistical problems. With this view of tactics a difficulty arises in handling large army forces or naval forces, when dispositions are made outside of the actual field of battle, such as the occupation of towns or localities essential to the maintenance of communications in order to assure victory in the projected battle. Such dispositions, not being an immediate part of the battle, do not come under the precise definition of tactics; on the other hand, as they are not questions involving the employment of all the forces, naval and military, they are not strictly strategical. Tactics is, therefore, divided into Grand Tactics and Minor Tactics, the latter having reference to employments in battle, the former to the larger maneuver problems of either the army or the navy.

The division of the labor of fighting, and the theory of the employment of such divisions, make up the science of war.

Now the classical division of such labor is that between the land and the sea. These two claim jurisdiction even over the sub-surface and super-surface of their respective areas, i. e., the army employs sapping and aerial service over the land; the navy submarines and aerial service over the sea.

The Marine Corps is the connecting link between the Army and the Navy. It serves the Navy in a military and quasi-military way,

as it should serve the army in a quasi-naval way. Specifically, Marines do duty aboard ship and at navy yards, assist in manning guns, boats, etc. Its most important duty with the navy is its so-called advance base service. The Marine Corps serves the Army as the mobile advance guard for overseas expeditions, in which it is assisted by the Navy.

In order that the Marine Corps may work with the best understanding with these two services, it should be indoctrinated from both; it should have representatives in naval educational institutions to imbibe naval doctrine and disseminate it to the Marine Corps; it should also have representatives in army educational institutions to acquire and distribute army doctrine. Then, marines serving with the Navy will think as the Navy thinks, and officers commanding units that may be detailed with the Army will naturally employ the same methods of making tactical dispositions as the co-operating army employ, thus obtaining harmony of action and cohesion. This uniformity of education will percolate so that there will be uniformity of action in every grade, even to the private's technique of guard duty.

This indicates the conclusion that Colonel Fuller's proposed Marine Corps College should not be to the Marine Corps exactly what the existing colleges are, respectively, to the Army and Navy. Marine officers must continue to attend such existing colleges in order to maintain the connecting link between the education of the three branches.

But there should be a Marine Corps College. It should be an applicatory college dealing with Marine Corps specialties. In the interest of economy of effort, such college should cover the whole field of the marine officer's applicatory education, i. e., it should absorb the existing Marine Officers' School, and undertake several new departments. One of the most important of the latter is suggested in the following paragraph quoted from Colonel Fuller:

"There is, in the Marine Corps, a vast amount of uncorrelated information and experience on the subjects of expeditionary service and advance base work, but this is not available to those who have not actually been engaged in those affairs."

A tentative outline of the curriculum of the Marine Corps College might be as follows:

I. Military Science department:

- (1) Differentiation between strategy, tactics, logistics.
 - (2) Place of the Marine Corps in Strategic scheme.
 - (3) Military History ; study of classical campaigns.
- II. Department of Military Art :
- (1) Tactical problems looking to normal service with army in the field.
 - (2) Minor land operations peculiar to Marine Corps employment, such as recent West Indian affairs.
 - (3) Tactics of the advanced base.
- III. Cartological Department :
- (1) Map making and reading.
 - (2) Photography.
- IV. Field Engineering.
- V. Mines and Torpedoes.
- VI. Ordnance and Gunnery.
- VII. Law :
- (1) International Law.
 - (2) Naval and Military Law.
 - (a) Procedure.
 - (b) Law of Evidence.
 - (c) Criminal Law and Criminology.
- VIII. Administration.
- (1) Organization.
 - (2) Tactical staff.
 - (3) Logistical staff.
- IX. Physics and Chemistry :
- (1) Chemical processes.
 - (2) Physics.
 - (a) Electricity.
 - (b) Optics.

The faculty for such a college might consist of officers, qualified by special experience of study, and of civilian specialists, as at the existing war colleges. The method of instruction should be by means of lectures, problems, and practical work. The closer the alliance between such a college and an advanced base organization, the better it would seem, since then theory could be easily connected with the most important department of our practical employment.

By means of pamphlets, or brochures, this college could disseminate principles and doctrine, and could distribute to the Corps latest acquired data of all kinds.

MAJOR HENRY C. SNYDER, U. S. MARINE CORPS.

There can be no question of the desirability of extending our system of military education. But are we ready to establish and reap full benefit from an independent Marine Corps War College? Would it not be better at this time to broaden the educational foundation upon which to build such an institution by (1) enlarging the scope of our Advance Base School; (2) reorganizing our garrison schools and prescribing a course of instruction which shall embrace certain subjects now taught at the Army Service Schools, the Marine Corps Advance Base School, and the Marine Officers' School. This reorganization should be undertaken with a view to imparting necessary military instruction to all, and lead to the selection of the best qualified officers for post graduate courses. This, in turn, should be supplemented through participation in the practical work of the Marine Officers' School on the battlefield of Gettysburg during its yearly encampment of six weeks; by subsequent detail to the Marine Corps Advance Base School; the Army School of the Line; School of Musketry; Field Artillery School, Signal Corps School, Field Officers' School, Army War College, and Navy War College. Our graduates from these schools and colleges are available as instructors. The pages of the Marine Corps GAZETTE are open to all officers for the recounting of their experiences, difficulties and short cuts to desired ends while on Advance Base and expeditionary duty, and for the publication of important lectures. Surely there can be no better medium through which to arouse and keep alive a marine officer's interest in his chosen profession.

However much we may individually need training in some of our many important specialties, as for instance, Advance Base work, there is no gainsaying the fact that we cannot embark upon and complete any one of our expeditions without a good foundation in subjects taught at one or all of the above-mentioned institutions.

While the independent work peculiar to the Marine Corps is important, it is equally important that we be prepared properly to cooperate with the Army and Navy, or afloat, as the occasion demands. In view of this should we not endeavor to increase the number of officers assigned yearly to the Army and Navy War Colleges rather than seek to establish an independent Marine Corps College?

CAPTAIN JOSEPH A. ROSSELL, U. S. MARINE CORPS.

Some time ago I read an article which set forth that the word "college" as applied to the Naval War College, was inappropriate and misleading in as much as the work carried on at that institution was not all along the lines as generally pursued in other colleges in civil life. It matters not by what title an institution is referred to, so long as the institution itself is turning out good. So a Marine College or a Marine Conference Academy, if some wish to wrangle over a title, cannot fail to do for the Corps a great amount of good. Any little backwoods hut would satisfy as a place for the work, provided the spirit of the assembled officers is correct.

We have in our peace-time history suffered much, unquestionably more from within than from without. We have been small with large tasks to perform. We are growing, it is true. So are the duties allotted us, and the slipshod methods of the past, which have pulled us through, will not suffice in our advancement. As a machine the strains of the future are to be great—very great. The question is, are we designing and building our machine to withstand the strain, whether it be sudden with all possible fury, or whether it be the slow grinding strain which crushes because the working parts do not each carry their load. Surely Colonel Fuller's institution cannot fail in improving the design and quality of the machine.

I do not understand very much of what recent writers of the Corps are talking about when they refer to a doctrine for the Corps. I hope it is a teaching which tends to remove some of the evils under which we exist, and from which we suffer, not physically, but professionally. And what are some of these evils which the proposed Marine Corps institution will knock in the head? Narrowness of mind, dwarfing development; mistrust, stifling initiative; petty jealousies, producing disgust; prejudices, mostly imaginative, and lack of that fraternal spirit which we need so badly—the helping of one another. For many small reasons we have witnessed tremendous individual efforts put forth for the accomplishment of certain tasks, and some of the ordinary, every day assignments have been made to look heroic feats when fulfilled. How easy and simple they might have been had everyone been allowed his share. And the fruit of the Marine Corps institution must have a taste for everyone or it fails.

Therefore I suggest that for the faculty of such an institution let

us go below the grade of field officer. Experience must be the basic qualification for instructors, and some of us have not had to wait for that field rank, for many experiences.

It is quite true that when a thing has to be done it is generally done, the ways and means of success attained surprising no one, perhaps, so much as the officer himself who is the instrument. Recently I have seen drill company commanders, non-commissioned officers, and there are many officers with exactly the same idea, who set for themselves in training recruit companies here at the Port Royal Recruit Depot, a standard they called good.

It is surprising how well satisfied they are with the term. Such a standard is false. Unquestionably the same amount of time and effort would produce excellency if properly correlated. There is a vast amount of uncorrelated information and experience in the Corps at large which should be put in such a form that everyone may profit thereby. Colonel Fuller's institution will correlate all this and at the same time dispel and cast out the vast amount of correlated ignorance which now holds. Nowadays the officer who from purely selfish amusement hits upon a certain hobby which he surrounds with a certain air of mystery, soon looms up as a brilliant star, but what is his hobby to anyone but himself? Specialists we do not want, else in this job of ours we will soon have a goodly number of observers because their specialty does not in this or that emergency fit. All hands specialists, good students, deep thinkers, but specialists in the general duties, not in any one particular branch of the Marine Corps, should be the goal.

This Marine Corps institution, as I understand it, is in no wise to supplant the School of Application, nor to deal with similar work, but is to be to the Marine Corps a Staff College wherein the possible duties of the Corps are to be sought out in relation to the General Board of the Navy, and when determined upon, the best possible solution of these duties will be evolved, keeping constantly before the faculty that approved solutions are no longer to be considered the best and that when once we cease to investigate from that time on, we not only cease to advance and mark time but actually and rapidly decline.

That such an institution as Colonel Fuller suggests may soon be founded is my fond hope. That it will retire into oblivion many of our old fashioned methods and instill new blood of modern thought and skill is earnestly to be desired. Let it be founded on the *esprit*

de corps which fosters every officer to create his own instrument and do his own job without stealing the fruit of some one else less "pressy" or literary. Personal glory, self applied, soon wears off and never really shines very brilliantly. Discard the four flush and deal a Royal Straight. This old Corps of ours has the goods. Let's deliver straight from the shoulder.

COLONEL BEN H. FULLER, U. S. MARINE CORPS.

In the opinions expressed by those who commented adversely upon the proposal to establish a Marine Corps War College these principal points appear :

1. That the facilities now existent at the two War Colleges and other schools, or an amplification of them for the purpose, are sufficient for the Marine Corps.

Both the Army and the Navy have been recently largely increased in the upper grades without any corresponding increase in the capacity of the schools, consequently it seems more likely that our representation in them will be reduced rather than increased, and it does not seem probable that they will amplify their courses for the benefit of the Marine Corps.

There is no doubt that it is of benefit to the Marine Corps to have as many as possible of its officers attend the courses at the Army and Navy schools, but very few have had or will have the opportunity, and there is no reason to believe that the establishment of a Marine Corps War College will prevent the continuation of the present system of detail.

Representatives of the Army and Navy attend each other's colleges.

The argument that the Naval War College *is* the Marine Corps War College is difficult to accept.

While the acquisition of almost any form of knowledge is advantageous, of what real use is it to a marine officer to study the tactics and logistics of a great fleet, or the grand strategy involved in the control of an ocean.

It would seem better that he employ himself first in studying his own business and then, if opportunity offer, take up the other.

2. That an expansion of our present Advanced Base School course would provide adequate opportunities for study and training.

"What's in a name?" War College or Field Officers' School, it would be all the same in its results.

3. That the establishment of a Marine Corps War College would tend towards a diversity of ideas and a variance from Army and Navy methods.

Why should an intensive and well-coordinated study of our specialties, at present unprovided for, impair our existing relations with the other services?

Our methods are not Army methods anyway, and it may be that the Navy can learn something from us.

4. A more careful consideration of Kipling's verse would have probably saved one critic his "shock of surprise."

The statement that a marine is neither an *army* soldier nor a sailor fits very well with the line

"'E isn't one o' the reg'lar line, nor 'e isn't one of the crew."

The theme of this writer's criticism is that the Navy wants the marine for naval duties and that therefore the marine should confine himself to naval opportunities for education.

It appears to be a more reasonable conclusion that the Navy wants the marine for *marine* duties and that where facilities do not exist for education in those special duties they should be supplied.

I quite agree with the sentiments so poetically expressed in the concluding paragraph of this writer's article, but nevertheless, I am still of the opinion that a study of well-thought-out plans for the defense of his distant isle will make the line less rough and the hills seem less bleak, and only by ignoring actual conditions may it be said that this knowledge can be obtained on board ship or from the course at the Naval War College.

