Meeting at ‘The Mounds’

This TDG should look familiar. Its scenario is essentially the same as the one encountered in TDG #97-1 for which three solutions are given on the preceding pages. There is one major difference however-this time you are the enemy. How does having read pages 83-85-having looked at three alternate ways your opponent might see the situationinfluence your decision? Does it help you to have “worn your opponent’s shoes” for a few minutes? Is “wearing his shoes” part of what is meant by orienting on the enemy?

Situation

You are a squad leader in Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. The company is making a movement to contact, moving south toward Liberty. The company’s mission is to locate and destroy any sizable enemy forces en route. The company commander has made it clear that the march objective is merely a reference point for the direction of movement; the true objective is the enemy. You are fighting an aggressive infantry force that when assembled usually either pushes rapidly ahead to bypass your positions or calls in supporting fires and attacks them.

Your platoon is the advance guard, and your squad has the point. Your lieutenant has given you the following instructions:

I’m relying on you to develop the situation to the best of your ability whenever you make contact. If you can overpower the enemy yourself, fine. If it’s a sizable enemy force, my intent is for you to develop the situation advantageously for the rest of the company. Try to maneuver to fix the enemy so they can’t escape and so the CO can bring the rest of the company to bear. I’ll support you with the other two squads.

Your squad is in a wedge formation with 1st Fire Team on the left, 2d Fire Team in the center leading, and 3d Fire Team on the right. An attached machinegun squad is located with you behind 2d Fire Team. The platoon commander is about 200 meters behind you, and the rest of the platoon is about 300-400 meters back.

Your squad is moving through an area known as The Mounds, generally following a road that winds its way toward Liberty. The terrain is unusual and you have Marines on both sides of the road alert for possible contact. As 2d Fire Team crests one of the mounds, you see the Marines drop quickly to the prone position and begin firing. You crawl forward to the crest and can see an enemy force firing from a stream bed about 300 meters south. Another position soon opens up from a mound to the left front. You estimate the total enemy strength so far at about platoon strength. You notice that 1st Fire Team has also taken up firing positions on a mound to your left. 3d Fire Team and the machineguns are in defilade to your right rear. Supporting arms begins exploding on the road about 200 meters to your rear. What do you do, Sergeant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 2 minutes, issue any orders you would give. Once this is done, describe any additional action you would take and provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision.

Meeting at the ‘Mounds’–The platoon commander

This scenario is the continuation of TDG #97-3, “Meeting at `The Mounds,’ only this time you are the platoon commander instead of the squad leader. The scenario is based on the author’s solution to TDG #97-3, which appears on page 91.

Situation

You are a platoon commander in company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. The company is making a movement to contact, moving south toward Liberty with the mission of locating and destroying any sizable enemy forces en route. The company commander has said he “wants to bag a big one.” The march objective is merely a reference point for the direction of movement; the true objective is the enemy. You are fighting infantry forces that use maneuver and fires aggressively. Your platoon is the advance guard. 1 st Squad, led by your most experienced and reliable squad leader, has the point. You are about 200 meters back, followed by 2d and 3d Squads.

1st Squad has entered an area known as The Mounds. The sudden sound of small arms and machinegun fire up ahead tells you that 1st Squad has made contact. Just then, artillery starts impacting around you. You move through the barrage and notice that 2d Squad has managed to follow you, but 3d Squad has not. You come across a fire team engaging the enemy from one of the mounds and another fire team and machinegun squad doing the same from a mound to the right. The fire team leader points out two enemy positions to the south, which you estimate to have a total strength of at least a platoon. You immediately call for fire on the enemy positions (shifting from your current position, which is a preplanned target). The fire team leader says: “The squad leader and the 3d Fire Team are checking out the left flank.”

“How long ago did he leave?” you ask.

“Less than 5 minutes.”

2d Squad leader has joined you and points out movement in a small wood between two mounds to your left front, very close to one of the enemy positions. You check your watch and are surprised to see that it has only been 12 minutes since the engagement started. Fire has settled to a sustained rate. You search to the left but see no sign of the 1st Squad leader or the men he took with him. You look behind you and see no sign of 3d Squad through the artillery fire. Your radioman reports: “The CO’s on the hook asking for an update.” What do you do, Lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue any orders you would give and make any requests or reports. Once this is done, provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-5, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Contact at the Han Lu River Bridge

Situation

You are the commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. Your battalion is attacking north to secure a bridgehead across the Han Lu River for the regiment’s attack into the enemy’s rear areas. There are two bridges in the battalion’s zone, and it is the battalion commander’s aim to secure both bridges to give the regiment more flexibility in choosing its axis of advance. Company B has been tasked with seizing the bridge about 6 miles to the east and is the battalion’s main effort. You are the supporting attack and have been tasked with seizing the bridge to your front. Company C is in reserve to the rear of Bravo.

The S-2 believes that the remnants of an enemy mechanized battalion may be defending the areas north of the river. The enemy is experienced and well equipped with surplus Warsaw Pact weapons and vehicles. However, the force you are facing has been significantly worn down after several days of severe fighting. It is 1420, and the weather is clear. The terrain is wooded and consists of gently rolling hills. The woods are not thick and allow passage of vehicles, although the going is difficult.

Your company is mounted on AAVs. You are moving in a wedge formation with lst Platoon on the left, 2d Platoon in the lead, 3d Platoon on the right, and your Headquarters Section tucked in the middle. You have attached one machinegun squad and two assault teams to each platoon. Your Mortar Section is moving with the Headquarters Section.

You send 2d Platoon forward to get eyes on the bridge. The platoon commander radios that he is dismounting and moving to the forward tree line to observe the bridge. A few minutes later he reports:

Bridge is intact. Roadblock on the south side of the bridge. Dug-in positions in tree line across river on both sides of the road. Estimate platoon size position. I have not been seen. Am continuing to . . .

His radio transmission is interrupted by the chatter of machinegun fire. Beginning with one gun, it rapidly escalates. Moments later, the platoon commander reports again:

Am receiving heavy machinegun fire from tree line across the river. They are vehicle mounted and well dugin. Cannot identify vehicles clearly. Have three casualties and am pulling back to the tracks.

As his transmission ends, you hear and see light mortars begin to impact in the vicinity of 2d Platoon. What now, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue any orders you would give and make any requests or reports. Once this is done, provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-6, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps Units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, 0ct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Clash at Timpan-ni

You are a rifle company commander in 3d Marines. You are operating in rugged, broken terrain spotted with sparse vegetation and small lakes. Line of sight is rarely more than a kilometer. Vehicle movement is restricted to the roads and tracks, although the vegetation and small hills are generally not a problem for infantry. The enemy is a tough infantry force reinforced with tank and mechanized support.

The division is advancing north on two axes, 3d Marines on the left. Your company is deployed to guard the regiment’s left flank. You have been reinforced with a tank platoon, an assault amphibious vehicle platoon, a TOW section, and a Dragon section (which you have distributed throughout the rifle platoons). As the regiment advances, your mission is to “Attack north toward Timpanni, the village at the Rte. 110-306 intersection, in order to provide early warning and protect the regiment against enemy forces advancing from the west.” Rte. 110 is a 2-lane paved road; Rte. 306 is a gravel road; they are the only improved roads in the area, although the freezing temperatures have kept the unimproved routes trafficable for heavy vehicles. Bad weather has grounded the planned Cobra support, so you put temporary observation posts (OPs) on the neighboring hills as you advance along Rte. 110 (although it slows your rate of movement). You reach the objective, the hamlet of Timpan-ni, without incident and report in. 1st and 2d Platoons deploy west. The section of Cobras (callsign “Slappy”) checks in, and you send it to reconnoiter west along 306. The tank platoon is located with you at the intersection. The TOW section takes up an overwatch position on Hill 323. 3d Platoon bringing up the rear is still on Rte. 110. On his own initiative, the platoon commander has put an OP on Hill 305, which reports “8 T-62s and 10 BMPs heading east in column toward 110 about 3 clicks southwest Timpan-ni.” Just then, Slappy reports “nothing on 306, but enemy mech, at least 20 combat vehicles, to the south, moving east about 4 kilometers southwest of the intersection. They have fired an SA-7 at us. Breaking off.” From your location at the hamlet you can see artillery begin to impact on Hill 305. What now, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, decide what you will do by issuing any orders, reports, or requests. Then provide a sketch and a brief explanation of your decision. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-9, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

Operation DEEP STRIKE

You are the commanding officer of Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) DEEP STRIKE, consisting primarily of two light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions, a detachment of UH-1 and AH-1 helicopters with ground support, and a mobile combat service support detachment (MCSSD) consisting mainly of refuelers. You have been deployed to the war-torn and drought-plagued African country of Kushmahdi as one of the leading elements of a joint task force (JTF). Relief organizations have been operating in Kushmahdi for several months, ministering to the star ing and displaced population. Military forces from the neighboring country of Tsanu freely make incursions deep into Kushmahdi and have lately begun raiding relief centers at Yummy, Middleville, Stumpz and Barstool with increasing frequency. Of these, Stumpz is the most important. Relief convoys bound for Stumpz out of Waterside are postponed. While Tsanu has one of the most capable militaries in the region, intelligence estimates conclude it lacks the command and control to conduct coordinated, large-scale operations.

The initial JTF plan calls for the deliberate deployment throughout the country from Waterside as forces arrive at the port and airfield there, but the frequency of attacks against the relief centers necessitates immediate action. SPMAGTF DEEP STRIKE is instructed to strike quickly to secure the relief centers, sweep Tsanu forces from the country, and establish a screen line along the border at the Odaroloc River in support of a Military Exclusion Zone sanctioned bv the U.N. Your task force will be supported by carrier aviation and will be sustained entirely by a combination of in-theater foraging and aerial logistics.

On D-day, Company C from 7th Marines and Company D, 1st LAR arrive by strategic airlift at Middleville. 1st and 3d LAR battalions arrive at Waterside by sealift and airlift and immediately advance inland. On D+l, 3d LAR secures Barstool, 1st LAR relieves Stumpz, and Company D, 1st LAR drives Tsanu forces out of Yummy. By late D+3, Ist and 3d LAR have advanced to the border to monitor crossing sites along the Odaroloc, augmented by stealth reconnaissance and sensors. 3d LAR is in the north, 1st LAR(-) in the center, and Company D, 1st LAR and C/1/7 in the south. The Tsanu Government immediately protests the establishment of the Military Exclusion Zone, which it describes as a provocation. By D+5, as more U.S. forces are arriving at Waterside, intelligence reports describe an unprecedented massing of Tsanuan forces near the border. On D+6, at first light, an enemy force estimated to be battalion strength attacks D Company, 1st LAR in the vicinity of Yummy. Another probes 1st LAR’s positions near Pooker, while a mechanized/motorized force of at least one battalion breaks through at Cheery, heading west along the heavily populated Highway 10 corridor. Satellite imagery shows that the enemy column is moving about 25-30 miles per hour.

You are instructed to deal with the problem. An allied tank company located at Waterside is placed under your operational control. What is your plan?

Requirement

In a time limit of 20 minutes, provide your solution in the form of a concept of operations, tasks for subordinate units, and any other pertinent planning guidance. Then provide a sketch and an explanation of your plan. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-10, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703640-0823.

Clash at Timpan-ni, Part II

This scenario is the continuation of Tactical Decision Game #97-9, “Clash at Timpan-ni,” based on the author’s solution to that situation as presented on p. 91 of this issue. In the scenario, you are a rifle company commander in 3d Marines. You have been reinforced with a tank platoon, an assault amphibious vehicle platoon, a TOW Section, and a Dragon Section that is now distributed throughout your platoons. You are operating in rugged, broken terrain spotted uith sparse vegetation and small lakes. Line-ofsight is rarely more than a kilometer. Vehicle movement is restricted to the roads and tracks, although the vegetation and small hills are generally not a problem for infantry.

Guarding the regiment’s left flank as it advances north, you meet what appears to be an enemy company or battalion of tanks and mechanized infantry southwest of Timpan-ni. You decide to seize the initiative and develop the situation by launching the Tank Platoon on a reconnaissance-inforce southwest from the village while 2d Platoon overwatches. Your initial main effort, however, is 3d Platoon, which you instruct to deploy “south of Hill 305 to block enemy movement east toward 110.” 3d Platoon’s observation post (OP) on Hill 305 is supposed to call for immediate suppression fires and come up on the company tactical net to keep you advised of the developing situation. You hear the call for fire on the conduct of fire net, but you cannot raise the OP on the tactical net. Your forward air controller tells you that a close air support mission is about a half hour away.

Tank Platoon’s attack takes the enemy initially by surprise, although because of the terrain the tank platoon commander can rarely bring more than two tanks to bear at a time. Still, your tanks knock out several T-62s, and your Cobra Section (“Slappy”) also accounts for several combat vehicles. There is no further word from the OP on Hill 305, and your artillery forward observer (FO) takes over control of the fire mission. 1st Platoon, your reserve, reports it is assembled at Timpan-ni with the TOW Section and ready for action.

3d Platoon reports it is in position south of Hill 305 as instructed and has engaged the enemy: “We caught them in the flank as they went past.” This does not sound right to you, so you ask Slappy what he can see. He reports that enemy vehicles have crossed Rte. 110 heading east with no sign of resistance. Slappy engages the column, which he reports to consist of 15-20 vehicles. After a confusing conversation, you are finally able to ascertain that 3d Platoon is not blocking the enemy’s eastward movement toward Rte. 110 but is sitting astride Rte. 110 west of Hill 328 and that some “five or six” enemy vehicles have crossed Rte. 110 to its south. The 3d Platoon commander now reports enemy dismounted probes to either flank.

Meanwhile, the Tank Platoon has continued to make steady progress and has accounted for four more enemy combat vehicles. The enemy’s T62s are hastily falling back, and now your platoon commander reports dismounted infantry to both sides of the trail. “I could use some infantry support,” he reports. What’ll it be, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 2 minutes, decide what you will do by issuing any orders, reports or requests. Then provide a sketch and a brief explanation of your decision. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-11, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703640-0823. US MC For more detailed information on the structire of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Clash at Timpan-ni Reversed

This scenario is roughly the reverse of Tactical Decision Game #979, “Clash at Timpan-ni, the solutions to which were published in MCG, Nov97. Does having seen the situation through the enemy’s eyes influence your decision?

Situation

You are a rifle company commander in 1st Marines. You are operating in rugged, broken terrain spotted with sparse vegetation. Line of sight is rarely more than a kilometer. Vehicle movement is restricted to the roads and tracks, although the vegetation and small hills are generally not a problem for infantry. The enemy is a tough infantry force reinforced with tank and mechanized support.

Intelligence indicates that the enemy is beginning to advance north in division strength; his main axis seems to follow the Jho Valley east of Rte. 110. Your regiment has been tasked to infiltrate south and then east generally along Rte. 306 in order to launch a spoiling attack into the enemy’s left flank. As the lead company of the advance guard battalion, you have been instructed to avoid detection as long as possible but to develop the situation quickly and aggressively once detected. You have been reinforced with a tank platoon, assault amphibious vehicle platoon (AAV), TOW section, and Dragon section (which you have distributed throughout the rifle platoons). Rte. 110 is a two-lane paved road; Rte. 306 is a gravel road; they are the only improved roads in the area, although the freezing temperatures have kept the unimproved routes trafficable for heavy vehicles.

Bad weather seems to have grounded the planned Cobra support, so you advance cautiously, staying off the main road to avoid detection. As you approach Checkpoint 84, the fork intersection west of Rte. 110, your forward air controller (FAC) tells you your Cobra section (“Trapper”) is airborne and will be on station within 10 minutes. You tell him to put Trapper on the company tac net. Then battalion halts you with an urgent message. You are put in touch with a reconnaissance team located near Hill 328B (you had no idea it was operating in the area) which reports:

An enemy mech company passed us about 20 mikes ago, heading north on 110 toward Timpan-ni. Estimate about 15 tracks, 5 tanks, 8-10 light vehicles. At present, we can only see the rear element, a mech platoon that is now halted off the road east of Hill 305.

You ask if the team has called for fire on the enemy column and the team leader reports that he has submitted several requests but received no fire missions. Just then, you hear .50 caliber fire up ahead. Simultaneously, a pair of enemy attack helicopters passes overhead from north to south. A Stinger shot sends them ducking for cover. They were visible for several seconds, and you wonder how much they were able to see. Your 1st Platoon then reports it has chased an enemy observation post off of Hill 305 and is sending a squad to investigate. The reconnaissance team now reports: “Something’s happening. That mech platoon’s coming to life.” Artillery starts to impact in the woods to your north. What now, captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, decide what you do by issuing any orders, reports or requests. Then provide a sketch and a brief explanation of your decision. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-12, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-6161.

Action at Oxford

Situation

You are the executive officer of Company L (Lima), 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. You are operating in rolling, wooded terrain. Vehicles move best on the roads, not at all in the woods, the battalion is presently on the defensive, currently in reserve, your company is moving northeast via Oxford to conduct a relief in place with Company K (Kilo) at the forward edge of the battle area about 8 kilometers north of Oxford. Your coinpany is mounted on assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) and is further reinforced with a Dragon section, a TOW squad, and a heavy machinegun section (one M2 .50 caliber, one Mk19) on HMMWVs. Upon arrival the tank platoon currently supporting Kilo will be attached to your company. The company commander and first sergeant have already gone to Kilo’s position by helicopter to see the terrain and coordinate the relief. You are responsible for moving the company up to the forward edge of the battle area. The company gunny and the machinegun vehicles have driven ahead as an advance party.

The company commander calls you by radio to report that Kilo is coming under increasing pressure to the front from enemy probes. He frags you to move the company as quickly as possible into a blocking position at a designated location several kilometers to the rear of Kilo (5 kilometers north of Oxford) and to prepare for a rearward passage of lines rather than a relief in place. He says the tanks will meet you at that position and will come up on the company tactical net. You are about a mile west of Oxford. The forward observer tells you that somebody is calling for fire east of Oxford using your company call sign. Simultaneously, the gunny comes up on the tactical net with the following report:

Checkpoint 21. Enemy force at least company strength closing on Oxford from the east inside two clicks. I count five PT-76 followed by at least that many BTR-60. Looks like more coming. No sign of friendlies to east. Two BRDMs approaching South Oxford from east; will reach high ground in about two or three mikes. I have not been spotted.

What now, Lieutenant?

Requirement

Things are happening fast. In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue instructions to your subordinates. In an additional 2 minutes, decide what reports to make and to whom. Provide an overlay of your solution and a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #93-12, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

Quote to Ponder

The Small Unit Leader

On the maneuver warfare battlefield, NCOs must make decisions based on tactics, not just rigidly applied techniques. . . . “[they] must learn to cut to the heart of the situation, recognize its decisive elements, and base [their] course of action on these.”

-Capt Daniel J. O’Donohue

The Best Laid Plans

This game is a continuation of Solution A, TDG #92-11.

The orders reached all of the major subordinate elements of the battalion by 2200. By 2400, the company commanders, as well as the leaders of the TOW Section and 81mm Mortar Platoon, had reported to the command post to tell the commander that their units were on the march.

Around 0200, however, the commander began to receive reports that things were going wrong. The rubber boats in the staging area turned out to be missing critical parts. Precious time was lost “mixing and matching” to make complete boats. By 0400, only four boats had reached Alpha Company. None had been delivered to Charlie Company.

At 0430, the enemy let loose with what could only be described as a hurricane bombardment. Artillery shells, machinegun bullets, and even recoilless rifle shells fell like rain. Those elements of the battalion who were dug in suffered little from this fire. Bravo Company, on the other hand, was caught in the open. Although the forwardmost boat carriers were less than 600 meters from the crossing points, delivery of additional boats was out of the question.

At 0500, the American bombardment began. Despite a ferocity which rivaled that of the enemy shelling, it brought little relief. Indeed, just before H-hour, the battalion commander found that he could no longer leave the shelter of his hastily dug command post.

It is now 0615. The attack was scheduled for 0530, but was not launched. You are the battalion commander-what are your orders?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, give the orders you would pass to your subordinates. Provide a sketch of your plan, any guidance for supporting arms, and a brief explanation of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #93-1, P. O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

Spartans at the Bridge

Situation

The division is deep in Spartan territory in a wilderness of thick forests and muddy roads. You are fighting a numerically superior force of a fanatical Spartan Army. It is November. There is no snow yet, but the evening temperatures dip below freezing.

You are the commander of an infantry platoon that has been reduced to half-strength. Your platoon is still organized into three squads, two of six men each, Schnurrbart’s and Dorn’s, and one of seven, under Kruger. You and the radio operator bring your total strength to 21. Kruger speaks Spartan. Your platoon is armed and equipped as a modern Marine rifle platoon: the men wear deuce gear but carry no packs. You have no corpsman, no machineguns, and no other attachments. You have no food. You have a PRC-77 radio and a few grenades but no missiles or demolitions.

Last night, your battalion withdrew 27 kilometers to the west to consolidate a regimental blocking position. Your platoon was to be the last to move out, with orders to deceive the enemy about the withdrawal and conceal the battalion’s movement. It didn’t work. During the night, large enemy formations bypassed your positions, leaving you cut off behind the advancing enemy’s lines. Now your only option is to move west, through the enemy lines, to rejoin your battalion.

Your platoon has moved west through the forest all day. Long after dark, you halt the unit just short of a dirt road. As the platoon rests, you and Schnurrbart, one of your squadleaders, leave on a leader’s recon.

When you return, you brief the platoon, “There’s a dirt road. The road leads to the bridge we’ve got to use to get across the river. By the bridge are three houses, and there are Spartan troops in the houses. We are not sure how many there are. The houses are log huts, one-story, with smoke coming from the first and second huts nearest the bridge. The Spartans must be either guarding the bridge or passing through as a column.”

Schnurrbart adds. “There are fresh tracks on the road, three horse-drawn wagons, and some footprints, so it can’t be too large a force. The wagons are covered with canvas. They are parked between the houses and the woods. The doors of the houses face the river. The windows on the back side face the woods. The third house from the bridge has the shutters drawn. The only sight of life is a single guard on the bridge. He seems inattentive. His rifle is slung across his back.”

It is now almost dawn. What are your orders to the platoon?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes give the orders you would pass to your subordinates. Provide a sketch of your plan and a brief explanation of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #93-4. P. O. Box 1775, Quantico. VA 22134.

Encounter at Effingham

You are the commander of 1st Battalion, 24th Marines. Division has been attacking steadily north against weakening enemy resistance; your regiment has been advancing rapidly on North-South Highway, and 4th Marines are making only slightly less progress on a parallel axis to the west. After battering the enemy at the Battle of Blue Hills, regiment was reluctantly forced to halt for replenishment During one of the few breaks in the weather, aviation has reported enemy remnants streaming north through Effingham into the Big Valley. The regimental commander is anxious to resume the attack. You share his view that the enemy made his last stand at Blue Hills and is now broken and ripe for pursuit and final destruction. The colonel gives you the following instructions:

1st Battalion will pursue north immediately to reestablish contact and lock horns with the fleeing enemy. Relentless pressure is what we need. Do not let him catch his breath. Do not gel bogged down by pockets of resistance, but keep going. Commit everything you’ve got. The rest of the regiment will be 24 hours behind you to mop up and take over when you get winded.

The weather is wet, cold, and continuously overcast. The terrain is rugged and undulating, broken by small woods. Large vehicular formations are generally restricted to the roads; even then, movement is hampered by the weather. Your battalion, which has already received its organic TOW section (8 TOWs mounted on HMMWVs), has a tank company (11 M60A1s) attached and an artillery battery in direct support. In compliance with the colonel’s orders, you move out quickly to the north and reach Cutout Pass without making contact.

The leading elements of Company A. debauching from Esses Pass on the two-lane North-South Highway, report an enemy force to their front: ragtag and ill-equipped, it is clearly the force you have been pursuing, but battalion strength or greater and apparently reassembled and preparing to make a stand. Company B is in Effingham proper, and has pushed platoons out to either flank. The tank company and TOWs are on the highway south of Effingham. The combat train is negotiating the narrow Cutout Pass, and Company C is south of the pass on the highway. You send your Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Platoon west on Gravel Road to Lower Valley Vista Point to make visual contact with 4th Marines as instructed. Your first hint of trouble is a fire mission from STA on the conduct of fire net describing a target as “tanks and troops on the road-battalion strength.” Immediately, you receive the following urgent message from STA on BN TAC 1: Tanks-tanks-tanks; I count 20-25 T72s-I say again T-72s-with BTR-60s, heading cast on Gravel Road approaching Vista Point-one click west. The valley is full of armor and troops. Infantry on the flanks moving through the woods-cannot make out number-estimate battalion easy. Taking automatic fire-must withdraw.

Meanwhile. Company A reports:

Light resistance from enemy patrols at the northern entrance to Esses Pass. Continuing to advance.

What are your orders, sir?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, prepare the fragmentary orders you would issue to your subordinates, including the intent of your plan and any instructions for the use of supporting arms. Provide an overlay and a brief explanation for your plan. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #93-5. P. O. Box 1775. Quantico. VA 22134