Maneuver Warfare Collection - Marine Corps Association

The Reconnaissance Regiment

Letter to the Editor

by Maj E.J. Robeson IV CWO-2 Lavender’s article (Mar82) advocated the creation of an additional regiment in the Marine division. This regiment would incorporate the proposed light armored vehicle [now

Defending the ‘Maneuverists’

Letter to the Editor

by LtCol M.D. Wyly Recent letters and short articles in the GAZETTE purporting to counter the concepts of maneuver warfare are going wide of the mark. The tendency has been

Maneuver Warfare Roadmap: Part II: Concepts of Employment & Tactical Applications

The general concept of employing the MAF Involves seaborne, forcible entry and a maneuver style ,of warfare ashore while seabased: Both phases must be accomplished in an innovative manner that poses a real challenge to commanders.

The second example is illustrative of situations in which major enemy elements are relatively close to the landing area. In this case, the basic concept is designed to focus on one fundamental of amphibious warfare: the shoreline is a natural and insurmountable obstacle to the enemy.

Maneuver Warfare Roadmap: Part II: Concepts of Employment & Tactical Applications

The general concept of employing the MAF Involves seaborne, forcible entry and a maneuver style ,of warfare ashore while seabased: Both phases must be accomplished in an innovative manner that poses a real challenge to commanders.

The second example is illustrative of situations in which major enemy elements are relatively close to the landing area. In this case, the basic concept is designed to focus on one fundamental of amphibious warfare: the shoreline is a natural and insurmountable obstacle to the enemy.

In Defense of Mr. Lind

Letter to the Editor

by Col Bruce G. Brown, USMC(Ret) I am not a disciple of William S. Lind nor do I agree with all that he has written on maneuver warfare. However, it

Maneuver Warfare Roadmap: Part I: Trends and Implications

Force structure trends implicit in maneuver warfare suggest that a new approach to structuring the infantry be considered.

The Marine Corps traditionally has contained a standard infantry battalion; i.e., all 27 infantry battalions are programmed to be mirror images. Fluctuations in the structure have been made across the board (three- or four-company battalions, with or without a weapons company). However, in recent

Reexamining Maneuver Warfare

Tactics

Finally, I don't see a careful consideration of the difference between strategic and tactical maneuver, nor of the relevancy of either to a Service's primary mission. The simplistic embrace of maneuver warfare leads inevitably to more mechanization as a means of tactical mobility. The effect on

Maneuver Warfare’s Complexities

Letter to the Editor

by LtCol J.R. Phaneuf, USMC(Ret) The appearance of articles by Maj Skipper and Capt Klepper relating to the logistical ramifications of maneuver warfare in the Jan82 issue was particularly encouraging.

January’s Potpourri

Letter to the Editor

by LtCol J.P. Glasgow, Jr. . . . LtCol Batcheller’s commentary on Officer Competence (Jan82) resurfaced many of the traditional complaints concerning the inequities and uncertainties of the present manpower

Comments on Maneuver Warfare

Ground tactics

Many maneuver warfare discussions place the enemy force in some type of "linear" mode. In many cases, maneuver warfare concepts can only be validated against this mode. Enemy commanders are not idiots and it is highly unlikely that, given the appropriate maneuver terrain, they will employ their

TWSEAS and Maneuver Warfare

Finally, once it is understood that TWSEAS is a painstakingly developed tool which exercises commanders and their staffs under realistic conditions, it is readily seen that it has nothing to do either with traditional attrition-minded tactics or the much-heralded maneuver warfare tactics. It is