The CAX Is Crucial
Letter to the Editorby Capt Paul J. Borror The enhanced Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) discussed recently (MCG, Mar89) is a tremendous opportunity for unit commanders in the maneuver battalion to train in a
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by Capt Paul J. Borror The enhanced Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) discussed recently (MCG, Mar89) is a tremendous opportunity for unit commanders in the maneuver battalion to train in a
Read Moreby BGen F.P. Henderson, USMC(Ret) In your April issue, Maj R. Scott Moore, in his deservedly prize-winning essay, refers to the “observation-orientation-decision-action cycle” and attributes it to a retired Air
Read MoreThe question then becomes what will Marine aviation have to do on this battlefield that is different from what they are doing today? First, Marine aviation must learn to think and act differently. Aviators must look past the cockpit. Aviators must not only know how to fly their aircraft tactically
Read MoreConsider another case that illustrates a more subtle air focus of efforts. As a result of the close air support it received in the previous case, 2/8 breaks through into the enemy's open depth. The ground commander commits his reserve to exploit the break-through and begins moving his whole force
Read MoreThis timely cycle of recognition and exploitation of enemy mistakes and weaknesses was possible in the years before the U.S. Civil War because the commander was generally able to view the entire battlefield or, at least, significant parts of it. The commander himself or a key subordinate was
Read MoreStill the process goes on. In this issue three more articles assess the maneuver topic. Maj R. Scott Moore (p. 24) expands maneuver warfare into the area of operational art and examines what aviation and combat service support must do if that style of warfare is to realize its full potential. LtCol
Read MoreTo fully exercise the air-ground capabilities of the MAGTF, Marines must understand the importance of the MAGTF command element. For too long, Marines have regarded the MAGTF command element as little more than a collection of coordinators and referees, whose function centered on ensuring that the
Read MoreStill the process goes on. In this issue three more articles assess the maneuver topic. Maj R. Scott Moore (p. 24) expands maneuver warfare into the area of operational art and examines what aviation and combat service support must do if that style of warfare is to realize its full potential. LtCol
Read MoreAs stated earlier, TWSEAS can accommodate MEU through MEF level exercises, including individual battalions and regiments. Note that TWSEAS training is not limited to infantiy units. In the case of combat support and CSS units wishing to use the system for in-house training, a constructive ground
Read MoreFMFM 6-0, Marine Combat Principles, could follow along the lines suggested in Capt [R. Scott Moore]'s article mentioned above; that is, the universal principles that should govern all Marine operations would be set down as the Marine Corps' doctrinal "battlefield philosophy" or "approach to combat"
Read MoreH-Hour, D-Day. The first wave of AAVs churned ashore at 0100 carrying assault elements of 1/5. Within five minutes it was joined by a second, similar wave. By H+40, 17 tanks along with Beachmaster and Landing Force Shore Party teams had landed. Self-propelled artillery would follow on the first
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