Maneuver Warfare Collection – Page 21 – Marine Corps Association

Stick With Maneuver

Letter to the Editor

by Capt Francis G. Hoffman, USMCR The series of three articles by LtCol Gary W. Anderson on enemy-oriented operations (MCG, Apr, Jun, Aug89) demonstrate a common but erroneous perception of

LAI: Light Armored Cavalry

Winner of the 1989 Marine Corps Gazette Professional Writing Award for AWS Students

Although light armored infantry (LAI) battalions have been fielded and operational for sometime, LAI doctrine and employment continue to be debated. In the LAI concept, the Marine Corps has recognized the need for independent mobility operations in support of Marine tactical maneuver. This concept

“A Marine For All Seasons”?

Maneuver warfare versus low-intensity conflict

Many Marines have a grasp on the basic ideas expressed by the Commandant; however, very few understand how this can be effectively accomplished. This is the crux of my criticism of the two articles. Each article has a mistaken "sight-picture" of the objective; each article has a faulty "focus of

PME Workshop Held

William Lind, Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), Dr. Stephen Canby, and West German Gen Hasso von Uslar-Gleichen were among the guest speakers on hand for the week-long event. Each gave presentations on their respective areas of expertise-Lind on maneuver warfare, Boyd on "Patterns of Conflict," Canby on

More MILES

Letter to the Editor

by Maj Richard A. Hobbs, Jr. Capt Walters is on the mark with his comments (MCG, Apr89) about the need for realistic training and the use of MILES (Multiple Integrated

M1A1s and the Corps

Letter to the Editor

by 1stLt George R. Copeland Maj Gunzelman, (MCG, Jun89) sounds a vital warning to the ground combat element (GCE) commander of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). Employing armor assels

The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare

Cowinner 1989 Bevan G. Cass Award

When the Army Air Force first struggled with the difficult question of how to best employ its airpower, it was fortunate to have an influential and visionary leader to give it guidance. As the Marine Corps now ponders a similar question, it unfortunately is receiving its advice from a "Billy"

Airpower on the Maneuver Battlefield

2d Place, 1989 MCG Professional Writing Award

The final task is to concentrate superior combat power at the decisive time and place. When the squadron commander decides to concentrate his combat power, he will employ a strike force of four or more aircraft Directed by the TAC(A), this strike force is assigned the mission of halting the advance

Implementing Enemy Oriented Operations

This is the third article in a series describing a concept of enemy-oriented operations that the author has been testing with 3d Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalion in recent force-on-force exercises.

In antiquity, the Byzantines came closest to institutionalizing enemy-oriented operations. They ruthlessly analyzed their own vulnerabilities while assessing those of the enemy. Their R-E cycle began with thorough campaign planning and was modified by actual field experience. The mechanisms they

Understanding Survivability

I strongly agree with Mr. William S. Lind's article, "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation" (MCG, May89). It is time we started thinking of better ways to integrate close air support (CAS) onto a battlefield that is dirty with smoke and cluttered with vehicles. It is at the point of contact, with

Enemy-Oriented Operations, What Makes Them Hard?

Military Theory

In the previous article in this series (MCG, Apr89) the concept of enemyoriented operations was introduced. The heart of the concept is the R-E cycle of recognizing and exploiting enemy weaknesses, mistakes, and vulnerabilities. The best commanders throughout history have proven adept at