Maneuver Warfare Collection – Page 19 – Marine Corps Association

MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective

Amphibious Operations

In their recent and truly important articles, Col Rakow and Col [Wallace C. Gregson] both made several valid points for integrating amphibious doctrine into the Navy's composite warfare (CW) concept From a naval perspective the concept of blending the two doctrines is farreaching. A strong argument

Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations

The Corps'concept for over-the-horizon amphibious assaults has been formally published, but it is a dynamic document that deserves the attention of, and input from, all Marines.

In OTH operations beaches and landing zones serve only as points of entry and control measures for landing forces. The point of OTH is to get mobile, combined arms teams ashore quickly, merge them into combat formations while on the move, and drive deep into the enemy's rear. These multiple

Operational Art and Amphibious Warfare

Traditionally and by law (Title 10, U.S.C.), the United States has used amphibious forces to seize advanced naval and air bases. Considering the paucity of overseas bases, this mission is still valid, and capabilities are far greater than in the island-hopping campaigns of World War II. Today a

The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art

Gulf War Analysis

Maneuver warfare was ushered into the Marine Corps over 13 years ago by Gen A. M. Gray and Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret). It took root in the 2d Marine Division in 1981, appearing first as a maneuver warfare board made up of "Young Turks." Only two unpublished documents existed then: "Gray's Battle

Misnamed Doctrine Misleading

It probably cannot be stated more simply than in Capt John E Schmitt's article "Understanding Maneuver as the Basis For a Doctrine" (MCG, Aug90) where he states, "Maneuver derives from a very simple concept: creating and exploiting advantage. . . ."

A Perspective on DESERT STORM

The significance of the revolution in firepower is such that the Marine Corps might have been better advised to term its new 1989 style of fighting "Firepower Warfare" rather than "Maneuver Warfare." Like maneuver warfare, firepower warfare would be much more than its name implies-a matrix of

Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt This Philosophy of War?

The Marine air-ground team reaches back for several generations of Marines, but the manner in which the team functions and combines its many capabilities continues to be refined and improved.

The MAGTF has an awesome arsenal of weapons and well-trained Marines to carry out any mission. Clearly, the ACE maintains the preponderance of the MAGTF's "Sunday punch." This combat power allows the MAGTF commander to influence what will be on the battlefield 12-72 hours in the future as well as

Don’t Forget FMFM 1

Letter to the Editor

by Capt Stephen K. Bollinger, USMCR Maj Szelowski’s article “Iraq’s Defense of Kuwait and the Battle of Kursk” in the January issue of the Gazette was very interesting, informative, and

Teaching Light Infantry Tactics

While the Marine Corps considers these broader changes in teaching tactics, IOC is continuing to move ahead, teaching the tactics and techniques of light infantry. It is our belief that the future of Marine infantry is primarily as modern light infantry. Training our infantry units to the exacting

Maneuver Warfare

Letters to the Editor

by Capt Timothy D. Sullivan, USMCR It is always a pleasure to read Capt John F. Schmitt’s articles in the Gazette. His latest contribution, “Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for

Close Air Support Revisited

Doctrine, Tactics, and Technology

A quick analysis of helicopter survivability in Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama reveals the vulnerability of rotary-wing attack platforms. CAS provides flexibility to the maneuver commander, and it allows operations beyond the range of other supporting arms. Certainly during the early stages of an