Maneuver Warfare Collection – Page 17 – Marine Corps Association

Regression

by William S. Lind Congratulations on the July issue. A number of articles showed a growing and deepening understanding of maneuver warfare, including those by Col Gary W. Anderson, Capt

Operational Maneuver From the Sea…Making It Work

If the Navy-Marine Corps concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea is to bear fruit. Marine and Navy doctrine must reconcile both Services' views of what constitutes a "main effort" and when it can be shifted to another unit.

What we have introduced is the concept that within the NEF commander's main effort, we will have two other main efforts: one is the CATF (as the NEF's main effort); the other is the CLF (as the CATF's main effort). While the commander of the NEF always remains in overall command, considerable

Revise FMFM 1, Warfighting

As FMFM 1 was written prior to Joint Pub 1 and " . . . From the Sea," has it become outdated?

To fulfill a mission responsibly, evidence of military judgment must be made tangible. Estimates are the means a priori to show the results of judgments, and a number of techniques have been developed to prove and improve estimates and resulting plans. We all can agree that comparison of objective

Dysfunctional Doctrine: The Marine Corps and FMFM 1, Warfighting

This author also believes that Marine doctrine as outlined in FMFM 1 is inadequate and needs to be revised.

If it is to maintain its battlefield edge into the next century, the Corps needs something it currently does not have. It needs a pragmatic warfighting doctrine-a doctrine written by a group of Marines of diverse operational backgrounds in close consultation with the operating forces and

The Last 300 Yards

Although maneuver warfare seeks to bypass resistance and collapse enemy defenses, frontal attacks remain one of the most likely and demanding requirements facing Marines in frontline units. The Corps cannot afford to ignore the tactics of closing the final 300 yards.

Initiating Indirect Fires: Indirect fires are an important component of the combined arms effect called for in FMFM 1. This combined arms effect, however, is much more responsive when achieved with organic weapons. At the lowest level, the bursting power of the hand grenade complements the direct

On the Verge of a New Era: The Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare

The fight to institutionalize maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps has been long and hard. This author believes that the fight is almost over.

Presciently, [William S. Lind]'s article used as an example a future war in which Marines were employed to assist Saudi Arabian forces in thwarting an Iraqi invasion. Lind's maneuver warfare thinking was based on the "Boyd Theory," the work of Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret). The Boyd Theory proposed the

Leadership for a More Educated Corps

If maneuver warfare is to work, we must change leadership techniques as well as tactics.

With its emphasis on mission orders, maneuver warfare demands Marines who can be innovative, creative, and flexible-Marines who can exercise initiative in fast-moving, fluid situations without the benefit of orders. This need is clearly identified in FMFM 1.

Maneuver Warfare Theory

Letter to the Editor

by Capt Michael R. Ramos I read with interest LtCol Lauer’s article. “The Theory of Maneuver in USMC Doctrine and Force Structure” (MCG, Apr93), which challenges the Corps’ reliance on

The NCO and Maneuver Warfare

If the Marine Corps is to institutionalize maneuver warfare and realize the full potential of its new doctrine, it must empower its NCOs and develop their tactical expertise.

We believed that for the NCOs to train their Marines, they had to become unquestioned experts in techniques and procedures, battle drills, and tactics. They needed to understand completely our warfighting doctrine and what their role was in it. To reach these goals, we established a program at the

Commander’s Intent Defined

In a move to standardize and clarify a key concept of maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps University has issued guidelines on commander's intent.

One of these new concepts was that of commander's intent. While most Marines have heard of this concept, it is extremely rare to find two individuals with the same perspective as to what commander's intent really is. Any student of maneuver doctrine will agree that to be successful in this style of

The Decline of the Mission/The Rise of Intent

Step 2: You have received your mission from your commander's order. Many commanders typically zoom in from this point and begin developing their schemes of maneuver. Remember that METT-TSL components are all subject to instantaneous change: developing your scheme by focusing only on the mission