Strategic Competition and Stand-in Forces

A novel view for tactical units

“The current T&E [Training & Education] system is not preparing the Marine Corps for the future operating environment.”

—Training and Education 2030

The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that we are exiting a time of strategic atrophy.1 The DOD, including the United States Special Operations Command, is shifting toward emphasizing near-peer adversaries, in which we are faced with new and unique strategic problems not present during the Global War on Terrorism. As such, the Marine Corps is also rapidly evolving and transforming—using such critical documents as the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations, Training and Education, Talent Management 2030, and Stand-in Forces (SIF) as guiding features to enable our transformation to meet the challenges posed by our strategic enemies.2

As stated in A Concept for Stand-in Forces, SIF: (1) “reassure the Nation and our allies and partners,” (2) “win the all-domain reconnaissance battle,” (3) “win the all-domain counter-reconnaissance battle, and (4) “intentionally disrupt adversary plans.”3 Specifically, for this article, SIF “disrupt an adversary’s plans at every point on the competition continuum.”4 While individual Marines, tactical units, or the Marine Corps are not tasked with creating strategy, the truth is that we do not expect mere tactical-level results with the SIF concept during times of competition, crisis, and conflict. Rather, we expect impacts on the operational and (preferably) the strategic level of war by our SIF units.

However, while we desire and hope for enduring strategic-level results of our SIF, we as an entity generally do not educate our tactical-level Marines on the strategic level of war or strategic competition. As stated in Training and Education 2030, “As we prepare for the future fight, we need Marines who possess the intellectual ability to out-think their adversaries,” and “the most important warfighting advantage we have is the mental and physical endurance of our Marines, and their ability to make better decisions under pressure than our adversaries.”5 Therefore, the purpose of this article is to describe and illustrate strategic competition in a novel manner for our SIF units. As stated in A Concept for Stand-in Forces (ref), “SIF also practice ‘integrated deterrence,’ which means they coordinate their activities with the joint force, interagency, and allied and partnered nations to achieve greater results than could be gained by acting alone.”6 Thus, by arming SIF with knowledge and a conceptual model on strategic competition in outside declared theaters of active armed conflicts (ODTAAC), tactical units have the potential to facilitate strategic objects to a greater extent in ODTAAC environments.

Strategic Environment
Former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, noted that gray-area conflicts are the most likely and most difficult challenges for democracies to face.7 In 2023—with the compression of the three levels of war, in which the tactical individual is closer to the strategic level of war—tactical warfighters must recognize that gray-zone conflicts must be understood as cohesive organized campaigns that typically apply non-military measures to achieve political goals over several years to decades while remaining below the threshold of war. These campaigns are suited for the educated and trained Marine(s) due to our history in small wars (i.e., Banana Wars, combined action platoons, etc). Additionally, history clearly demonstrates that foreign militaries who are seen as a liberation force and not an occupation force, such as a surge of conventional forces, have a higher likelihood of strategic success. Regarding gray-zone conflicts, Mazaar states that gray-zone conflicts are “a pattern of state rivalry that can substitute for traditional military aggression, and which can pose serious challenges to U.S. strategy.”8

As stated by Jeffrey Record, “the United States has become a victim of its conventional military success.”9 According to Colin Gray, the U.S. war machine can be defined as: (1) apolitical, (2) astrategic, (3) ahistorical, (4), problem-solving, optimistic, (5) culturally ignorant, (6) technologically dependent, (7), firepower focused, (8), large scale, (9), profoundly regular, (10) impatient, (11), logistically excellent, and (12) sensitive to casualties.10 The 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America states, “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model … Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit.”11 Our strategic adversaries have studied our history and analyzed our strengths and weaknesses and are conducting active measures to domestically and internationally weaken the United States to achieve their national objectives.

According to Kilcullen, Chinese military strategists developed a simultaneous dual-pronged strategy; one of economic and political engagement.12 This dual-pronged strategy is in combination with their acceleration of their military competencies. This development appears to be in line with the concepts put forth in Unrestricted Warfare written by the Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare provides numerous examples of how non-conventional methods can be used against the United States to achieve political goals in a form of hybrid warfare.13 As stated by Hassett,

the U.S. military is insufficiently postured, trained, and resourced through doctrinal publication guidance to counter current and emerging hybrid threats in the future. Hybrid warfare will continue to serve as an effective operational concept for adversary state and non-state actors in the future.14

Thus, education and understanding are paramount for SIF during times of competition.

Strategic Competition
The principal reason for this article is to describe strategic competition in a novel way in hopes of facilitating strategic impacts in ODTAAC environments by tactical units, primarily SIF units. The terms great-power competition and strategic competition have come to be buzzwords in the U.S. military. While these words are thrown around constantly, few can define great-power competition and even fewer can define strategic competition, despite these words dominating military leaders’ meetings, plans, and actions. As stated by Miller et al., “Competition now permeates nearly every contemporary U.S. strategic document.”15 Miller et al. define competition as “the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, leverage, and advantage necessary to secure their respective interests.”16 Additionally, Miller et al. define influence, leverage, and advantage as being “the power to cause an effect in indirect or intangible ways,” “the application of influence gained or created to achieve an effect or exploit an opportunity,” and “the superiority of position or condition,” respectively.17 Using the framework by Miller et al., the author visually displays strategic competition using Figures 1, 2, and 3.

At the bottom of Figures 1–3, the reader can see that at the base are the competing interests of the United States (blue) and the competing interests of an adversary (red). Miller et al. define interests as “things or concepts that a nation values—those things which states seek to protect or achieve concerning each other.”18 No matter what the United States positively performs when contending in strategic competition, the adversary’s interest will likely not go away. While the number of resources put into the targeted competition in a specific region will vary with the level of interests, it is important to note that the adversary’s general interests will remain a constant over the years; thus, patience and the emphasis on playing the long game must occur in strategic competition.

We must be cautious not to default to competition as being negative or problematic, especially tactical SIF units. Rather, tactical SIF operators should look at competition as an opportunity: “Competition provides opportunities to achieve outcomes before war, ensure favorable conditions for escalation, and gain advantage in the event of conflict. By building influence with allies, partners, and other actors is critical to producing opportunities in competition.”19

In Figure 1 (strategic competition- balanced), influence for both nation-states is depicted as equal. Advantage (represented via a triangle) acts as a fulcrum in the diagram, and for Figure 1 on the previous page, the advantage is also equal between the competing nations. It is important to note that a fulcrum simply provides the pivot point for a lever. Based on where the fulcrum is placed, will directly determine the amount of leverage, (synonymous with force and power), that a device can create. Advantage in strategic competition “is comprised of physical or virtual aspects (e.g., technology, geographic access, resources, and arsenal inventories) as well as more nebulous, cognitive elements (e.g., initiative, momentum, and skill).”20 Like many fulcrums, the advantage for the United States or its competitors can vary with time due to several variables.

Lastly, Figure 1 displays leverage via a lever for the strategic competition diagram. In strategic competition, leverage is facilitated by a “deep understanding of other actors and the strategic environment to increase the likelihood and scope of success.”21 Using the proposed strategic competition model (Figures 1–3), leverage is directly affected by both the advantage and influence of a nation.

In Figure 2 (strategic competition- negative), the reader can see that the United States’ interests (blue arrow) are directly being confronted by a strategic adversary’s interests (red arrow). However, Figure 2 shows the United States losing in strategic competition below the threshold of war. In Figure 2, the adversary has greater influence and supreme advantage, thus increasing the possible leverage in the situation and beating the United States in competition. An example of Figure 2 could be China pressuring a government of an underdeveloped nation (i.e., influence) by using their economy to build infrastructure in said nation (i.e., advantage), to minimize the U.S. influence and access in a country (leverage). By minimizing the U.S. influence in a country, China increases its global reach, resource allocation, strategic depth, and strategic encirclement. Unfortunately, Figure 2 appears to be the norm in many countries in the world due to the loss of influence by the United States as well as a shift in the advantage and leverage. Simply put, Figure 2 shows the enemy imposing their will on our Nation during strategic competition.

“Stand-in forces disrupt an adversary’s plans at every point on the competition continuum.”

—A Concept for Stand-in Forces

In Figure 3 (strategic competition-neutral), the reader can once more see that the United States’ interests (blue arrow) are directly being confronted by a strategic adversary’s interests (red arrow). Again, it must be emphasized that competing interests are to be expected as the new normal for the foreseeable future for tactical SIF units being deployed to ODTAAC environments, (which is preferred to either crisis or conflict).

In Figure 3, the reader can see that the outcome of the strategic competition is neutral despite the advantage being held by the adversary and the influence being supreme for the United States. Regarding strategic competition, this is a recommended view of how a tactical SIF unit can be ideally employed in an ODTAAC deployment. An example of Figure 3 could be China having the advantage due to their building of infrastructure in an underdeveloped nation using their economic instrument of national power, while the United States has greater influence, perhaps through a shared history; a strong, mutually benefiting relationship; and military training exchange programs.

Application and Recommendations
“SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential adversary.”22 As stated by Hassett, “great power strategic competition does not inherently imply strictly conventional forms of warfare.”23 Regarding the application of tactical SIF units, it must be emphasized that military contribution should not be the bid for success, but rather the full coordinated implementation of the United States’ instrument of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, economy, financial, intelligence, legality/ law enforcement, and technology).

This article prescribed a simple concept for understanding strategic competition. It must be emphasized that over a six-month deployment or a two-to-three-year tour of duty as a SIF unit, it is significantly easier for a SIF unit to impede our Nation’s leverage, influence, and advantage through negative and exploitable actions and information via our adversaries. Thus, we must recognize that preserving and methodically improving (over long-term sustainment) our leverage, influence, and advantage is of the utmost importance.

During competition, a SIF unit has the unique ability to measure our Nation’s influence, leverage, and advantage as on-the-ground sensors by providing on-the-ground truth. What might be perceived by national and strategic leaders as an effective campaign, operation, or situation, in all reality could be missing the mark for the targeted population. Thus, SIF units must be educated and trained accordingly. I offer four simple recommendations that the Marine Corps can and should start implementing to empower and enhance SIF units, which has been similarly suggested for SOF operating in ODTAAC environments.24

“Not the fortress, but the army that we send into the field secures our position of power in the world.”

—Gen Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke

Although training must focus on and emphasize the most dangerous situation, education should span competition, crisis, and conflict; especially considering the preferred situation is competition. While Training and Education 2030states, “Ultimately, every Marine is responsible for their own learning,”25 (in which the author agrees) we as leaders in the Marine Corps must recognize it is imperative to educate our Marines by providing the optimal resources and direction. To facilitate the SIF concept, our tactical-level professional military education should incorporate the concepts of strategy.

However, more importantly, tactical SIF commanders and leaders must develop their unit professional military education specific to the region their SIF unit will deploy using the concept of the strategic lens. The strategic lens (which has been updated from its original concept by including language), which includes geography, culture, history, language, religion, governmental systems, education, and economics, is of the utmost importance for SIF units.26 As stated,

The ‘strategic lens,’ like most lens, can be viewed from different angles. Regarding the ‘strategic lens,’ tactical SOF units must view the lens through the host nation, the relevant population, the belligerents, the strategic competitors, the United States, etc. By only viewing the ‘strategic lens’ through the viewpoint of the United States, the tactical SOF unit promotes the negative stereotype of the United States as being culturally unaware, ahistorical, and arrogant.27

Miller et al state, “To make informed assessments about degrees of influence, one must develop a better understanding of populations, interest groups, governance, grievances, and other strategic issues.”28

2. Integrate with SOF
SOF has unique authorities and permissions that our SIF units will not possess. Additionally, SOF usually has access and placement that conventional forces do not have. A gap for SOF will always be capacity since a SOF principle is that you cannot mass produce SOF. However, SIF embedding with SOF is mutually beneficial in several ways.

First, SIF provides added capacity for SOF units, especially regarding foreign internal defense (training of the host nation forces). The author truly believes that a highly proficient machinegunner or mortarman, for example, should out cycle the average SOF operator on said weapons systems because these Marines are tasked with being the true subject-matter experts, while the SOF operator is tasked with a high number of varying skills.29 Thus, through this integration, our combined forces can increase the total number of partnered forces trained. Second, via this collaboration, we can also increase dispersed operations across the area of operations because the mixture of SOF and SIF can cover more units. It must be noted that dispersed military operations are being called for by our current guiding documents.

3. Educate the Joint Force
As the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, and Stand-in Forces continue to be enacted, we need to ensure the Joint Force (JF) understands our capabilities, limitations, and the opportunities we bring to the JF.30 As Marines, we must recognize that self-promotion isolated within our community is flawed. Thus, education on our capabilities to the JF via engagements, exchanges, liaison, etc. to increase our presence inside the weapon engagement zone as SIF is necessary.

4. Increased Communication Among All Relevant Players
As stated in previous works on SOF in ODTAAC environments, there are many strategic factors that tactical SOF units cannot impact. However, tactical SOF units can promote positive communication between all the relevant players up, down, and laterally within the chain of command. Regarding communication, lateral or higher units in the chain of command may possess permissions, capabilities, and intelligence that is needed for a SOF unit. Similarly, a SOF unit may possess permissions, capabilities, and intelligence needed by others.31

While written about tactical SOF units, this is equally as true for Marine Corps SIF units of action. To elicit operational and strategic effects in strategic competition via SIF, we have to communicate to the relevant players (i.e., joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial) our missions, locations, capabilities, initiatives, opportunities, and the ground truth. Our SIF units doing great tactical actions that do not lead to operational or strategic effects is not what our Nation needs and is not in line with the SIF operating concept. Using Figures 1–3, our tactical SIF units-of-actions will not have the ability to directly utilize strategic leverage (i.e., exploit strategic opportunities) and must rely on the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and commercial communities; however, our SIF can have greater effects on influence and advantage. Therefore, our SIF units must rely on others, such as politicians and strategic leaders to utilize and apply leverage. Thus, six questions our SIF units should ask are: Does this hurt our national influence? How do we increase our national influence? Does this hurt our national advantage? How do we increase our national advantage? Does this lessen opportunities for national leverage? How can we create opportunities for national leverage?

“Create purpose-built forces … Aggregating specialized units with base elements creates a tailored multi-domain force in order to provide maximum relevant combat power (RCP) on demand.”

—Force Design 2030

Conclusion
During the 2018 House Armed Services Committee, Gen Raymond stated that “SOF is uniquely capable of effectively competing below the level of traditional armed conflict and across the spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force.”32 While Gen Raymond was referring to SOF, the author believes SIF can also contribute in this manner. While both SOF and conventional forces should prepare for absolute conflict, we must also train, educate, and equip our SIF units on and for strategic competition illustrated via Figures 1–3. Of the U.S. military conventional-tactical units, tactical SIF units must thrive in competition.

“Forces that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable.”

—Force Design 2030

Notes

1. Jim Mattis, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: 2017).

2. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019); Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020); Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations 2d Edition, (Washington, DC: 2023); Gen David H. Berger, Training and Education 2030, (Washington, DC: 2023); Gen David H. Berger, Talent Management 2030, (Washington, DC: 2021); and Gen David H. Berger, A Concept for Stand-in Forces, (Washington, DC: 2021).

3. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

4. Ibid.

5. Training and Education 2030.

6. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

7. Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007).

8. Michael Mazar, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, 2015).

9. Beating Goliath.

10. Colin S. Gray, The American War of War. Critique and Implications. Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

11. National Defense Strategy.

12. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

13. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Battleboro: Echo Point Books & Media, 1999).

14. Patrick S. Hasset, “The Hybrid Warfare Vulnerability,” Marine Corps Gazette 105, No. 5 (2021).

15. Joe Miller, Monte Erfourth, Jeremiah Monk, and Ryan Oliver, “Harnessing David and Goliath: Orthodoxy, Asymmetry, and Competition,” Small Wars Journal, February 7, 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/harnessing-david-and-goliath-orthodoxy-asymmetry-and-competition.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

23. “The Hybrid Warfare Vulnerability.”

24. Jeremy Carter, “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts: Guiding Features for Enduring Strategic Effects,” (thesis, American Military University, 2021).

25. Training and Education 2030.

26. “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts.”

27. Ibid.

28. “Harnessing David and Goliath.”

29. Jeremy Carter and Thomas Ochoa, “The Relationship Between Enlisted and Officers- Part 1: The T-Shape Philosophy,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, No. 7, (2023).

30. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance; Force Design 2030; and A Concept for Stand-in Forces.

31. “Strategic Effects by Tactical Special Operations Units in Outside Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflicts.”

32. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 115th Congress, (2018) (statement of Raymond Thomas).

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