Sales Office Gazette
In response to LtGen Robert B. Neller’s letter commenting on “The Attritionist Letters” (MCG, Junll), let me quote MajGen Mike Myatt, who commanded 1st MarDiv during Operation DESERT STORM, “Maneuver warfare is not centralized decisionmaking and decentralized execution. It is centralized vision and decentralized decisionmaking.”
My name is (former) Capt Dan Brendel. As of 1 June my active service as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps has ended. As I shut this chapter of my life, I thought it would be appropriate to offer some parting thoughts that might be of some value to my fellow officers who remain in the proverbial fight.
The Marine Corps is a pretty great institution, as far as institutions go. I’m grateful for the lessons it taught me. That being said, there are a host of areas I think need some serious improvement, so much so that they were a primary factor in my deciding to leave. Foremost among them is leadership development. During my 6 years of service I became wholly convinced that Marines in general are neither as decisive nor as autonomous as they could and should be. There are plenty of Rowans who can carry a message to Garcia, but not nearly as many who will. Why? In my opinion, for all its rhetoric to the contrary, the Marine Corps as a whole does a bang up job of deterring decisiveness, initiative, and ingenuity. This isn’t just a problem. It’s a gargantuan problem. It threatens the very heart of maneuver warfare. And it’s our fault as officers.
Before I continue, let me make two things clear. First, I write with genuine concern not contempt. If I didn’t care, I wouldn’t have written anything other than my name on my checkout sheet. But no individual or organization is above reproach. We should not be so institutionally narcissistic to think the Corps is somehow the exception to the rule. Second, I would love to think everything I write about here goes without saying, given that we have all read Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, at some point. But that has not been my experience – at all. For all the endless talk about this tired subject, nothing changes; it’s all lip service.
Now let me tell a true story for anyone sitting on the fence about whether or not there is indeed a problem. When I checked into the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, in 2008, I attended the 2-week Series Commander Course. This course teaches incoming officers the intricacies of the recruit training environment. One morning my class went to observe the Crucible, the recruits’ final field exercise. I was standing off to the side watching a few drill instructors prepare their recruits to begin a hike. The recruits were wearing reflective belts in accordance with a depot regulation requiring them to do so until 0800. One of the drill instructors, a sergeant, wanted to know if he should enhance safety by having the recruits continue to wear their reflective belts past 0800, given that it was overcast and dim. He asked his senior drill instructor, a staff sergeant in charge of the platoon’s recruits and junior drill instructors. The staff sergeant shrugged, turned to me, and asked what I wanted him to do.
What do I want you to do? You’re a staff sergeant, a drill instructor, a senior drill instructor. This is a pretty trivial decision. What I want is for you to decide something and to march. I hate that you think you have to ask just because I have shiny stuff on my collar. Quite frankly, that scares me. This instance set the tone for the remainder of my tour.
Somebody reading this is thinking, “Well, that’s the drill field, not the real Marine Corps. That doesn’t happen with my Marines during real missions.” Really .^No duty station exists in a vacuum. I could enumerate many more “real” illustrative stories from my own combat experiences. But if the story above doesn’t convince you there’s a problem, I doubt any will. Trust me. There’s a problem.
Its root is our organizational preoccupation with control. Our leadership culture centers on achieving compliance. But consider for a moment that the most successful organizations in the private sector are moving away from the outmoded managerial technology that says managers think, workers tighten screws, and that’s just the way it is. That style worked for Henry Ford, when each guy on the assembly line only needed to know his one simple part. Tight control over workers meant screws were turned faster and more cars were produced. But today, the market is far more complicated, and blueprints change at digital speed. Workers today need to think quickly and across hierarchical and functional divides. Empirical psychology tells us that tight control is detrimental to this sort of creative work. (Read Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us, by Daniel Pink, Riverhead Hardcover, 2009.) And so creativity is replacing compliance as the primary aim of leadership in industry. But the Corps holds out. There is no threat of extinction from competing entities that have found a better way of doing business, so the impetus to change is reduced. That isn’t good news for our Marines in the context of fourthgeneration warfare. Like modern business, this type of warfare is increasingly complex and fluid, meaning it demands increasingly creative and autonomous people to engage in it. What follows are some interrelated practical thoughts regarding what Marine officers can do to better produce 21st century warriors.
Be More Deliberate About Developing Cognitive Skills
Don’t reduce leadership to a series of checklists. The Marine Corps has plenty of checklists for annual training, training and readiness events, etc. To a point, I understand their value, and I’m a huge proponent. Indeed, it is inadvisable to focus on cognitive skills without first securing a foundation of rote ability. However, it is essential that we, at some point, move beyond that. The reason is simple. Checklist training habituates checklist dependence. But we don’t need walking, talking manuals. We need artistic leaders – Gen Lees and Capt Kirks. More accurately, in the modern era of distributed operations, we need Sgt Lees and CpI Kirks. We need leaders who are practiced in creative problem solving, not regurgitation; practiced in inventing step Q without first checking off steps A through P; practiced’m audacity. It should be a truism to say we can’t expect our Marines to become practiced without actually allowing them to practice. But it’s not.
So let them practice. Offer minimal direction – on purpose. Next time you write a letter of instruction, consider sparing your Marines the five pages of coordinating instructions. Tell them to get a message to Garcia, and then shut up. Create situations where your Marines must actively design solutions and not simply apply the steps you or some manual has already given them. Do it often. Do it with all of your Marines, even the junior ones – especially the junior ones. If you think a staff sergeant, as a rule, will magically become a wellspring of creativity and initiative after 7-ish years of being told exactly what to do, I think you are mistaken. (There are indeed great Marines who shine despite the constraints. Imagine how much better they would be under fewer constraints.) Marines need to understand they can and must be thinkers and frontier shapers, not merely coal shovelers in the “Big Scarlet and Gold Machine.” Then perhaps they will leap at pressing the attack without any inkling of being driven or dragged. If you do it right, the less you tell people what to do, the less you’ll have to.
Demand Initiative and Autonomy
These things shouldn’t be icing on the leadership cake. A staff sergeant once submitted his Marine reported on worksheet (MROW) to me late and without any professional military education listed. When the college courses he was taking didn’t show up on his fitness report, he complained to me about it. I told him too bad. Had he ever heard of the Performance Evaluation System Manual, which explains how MROWs work? Yes, because I told him about it in his initial counseling. Had he ever read it? No. So whose fault was it that I didn’t know about his college courses? Some of my fellow company grades thought I set the Marine up for failure by not giving him a soup-to-nuts class about MROWs and not riding him to get it into me complete and on time. I disagree. He’s a staff sergeant. He knows how to read and how to look up an order. Why didn’t he? Probably because he had grown accustomed to his reporting seniors doing the legwork for him – filling in his Section C from scratch, tracking him down to find out his duty station preferences, etc. That became the norm for him. So did I set him up for failure, or did the reporting seniors before me? If he is unable to learn something simple about fitness reports without a captain spoonfeeding it to him, why do I want him to get a great fitness report and become a gunnery sergeant? I’m not just talking about fitness reports here. It’s your job to create an environment that affords Marines the enduring opportunity to fish, not to condition them to having someone else bait and cast their hooks.
Unplug Yourself
In the age of AN/PRC-119s, Blackberries, and Microsoft Outlook, you can be down in everyone’s weeds. But why? Maybe that decreases mistakes in the short term, but it impedes real learning in the long run. Think about the movie Master and Commander. Ships’ captains back in the day sailed with commander’s intent and then had to be creative and decisive because the admiral couldn’t e-mail them 50 times a day. Do you think everyone in al- Qaeda gets e-mailed 50 times a day? Ii you create an environment of centralization for your corporals, guess what’s going to happen when they become staff sergeants? Ten to one, they’re going to ask some random first lieutenant whether or not they should wear reflective belts. Don’t let your Marines become accustomed to remaining static unless you approve their dynamism. Don’t hover. I’m not suggesting you take yourself away from the decisive point, take the S out of BAMCIS (begin planning, arrange reconnaissance, make reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, supervise), or dismiss safety. But if you are always around, then your subordinate leaders aren’t really in charge. What’s going to happen when the wag bag hits the fan, and you aren’t there, and they actually are in charge? Are they going to take charge, or are they going to fumble over the radio to ask the command post what to do? Let them lead. Let them fall down, especially during training. Show me an organization in which junior leaders never fail because their seniors are calling or approving all the shots; I will show you an organization that plateaus at mediocrity because it doesn’t pay the price to let its junior leaders grow.
Learn How To Conduct Training
Do you know what the Navy Marine Corps 3500.XXseries is without consulting Google? Can you talk intelligently about the systems approach to training? Probably not. Company grade officers and SNCOs across the board are terrible at planning and executing training. (As a lieutenant, I certainly was, and so were my peers.) The reason is that we too often define training as an event rather than a process. A brief isn’t training. A “familiarization fire” isn’t training. Yet this is usually exactly what our training looks like. These events lack any meaningful feedback, evaluation, and remediation. This is unfortunate, since real training hasn’t occurred until these phases take place. Officers on the whole don’t really grasp that. Leaders should learn how to conduct standards-based training better. Keep in mind that, when it comes to higher level cognitive functions, the standard is the effect, not the method. Don’t get wrapped around the axle about one way to skin a cat. If I could do only one thing over again, I would make greater haste to learn how to conduct training properly.
Check Your Motives and Have a Voice
“Yes men” are in no way inspiring. They dowse boldness in their organizations. Hopefully you aren’t the presents under the Christmas tree, but high fitness report ranking isn’t a legitimate objective. Kudos if you get an end of tour award, but you should neither shoot for nor expect one. Good for you if you retire after 20, but that isn’t your mission. During my pumps to Iraq, I especially felt I spent more time fighting my own institution’s “wait to be told” and “check in the box” mentality than I did fighting any enemy. (I don’t say that with an air of superiority. Truly. I was by no means God’s gift to the Marine Corps. I made plenty oí significant mistakes and poor judgment calls. But what I’m talking about goes beyond mistakes.) This is a common misgiving among many junior officers I have met. Every time something trickled down that just didn’t make sense, the almost universal reaction up and down the chain was seemingly blind compliance, even though everyone admitted it didn’t make sense. I’m not positive, but the only reason I can figure is that no one wanted to risk an otherwise imminent award, promotion, or retirement by making waves. And that’s not okay. What do you think happens to a Marine’s boldness and bias for action when that’s what he sees from his officers?
I dug in my heels over a lot of things in my time. In hindsight, I was often too belligerent and public. And I wasn’t always right, either. As I have matured, I have come to better appreciate the wisdom in King Solomon’s admonition that there is “a time to be silent and a time to speak.” Sometimes silence is prudent, but not unendingly. There is a time to speak. I remain convinced that, in the end, a bold word is better than cautious silence. That’s part of audacious leadership. That’s how things change for the better. Why don’t we want that from ourselves and from our Marines? Now I’m not advocating mutiny or open dissention. I understand unity of command and that orders are orders. But I also understand that a rubber stamp from Staples costs a lot less than an officer’s salary. Don’t ever hesitate to say or do what you think or know is right because you are afraid of what it might do to your career. Be tactful, close the door behind you, and choose your battles wisely, sure. But choose battles.
Rounds complete. I hope you have not gotten mired in the yeah-buts and what-ifs, but have instead applied your own common sense. I hope you agree there is an immediate need for change in our leadership culture. The onus falls first on the officer corps. We need inventive, not prescriptive, leaders. All Marines have the intrinsic potential to be such leaders. But they don’t come prepackaged; they have to be conditioned in a better environment. I hope you take these things to heart when you lead your Marines. They deserve the finest.
A wise man once opined that what you see depends on where you sit. In the past few months the Gazette pages have been the location of an interesting debate that centers on the predeployment training program (PTP), certification of operations officers and, depending on how you look at it, necessary guidance to or lack of autonomy of subordinates. The catalyst for this debate has been “The Attritionist Letters”; the response to them, such as Col William F. Mullen’s June 2011 article, “Attritionist Letter (#10): A Response”; my editorials in this years February and May editions; and an exchange of letters initiated by Maj Peter J. Munson’s letter in the April issue. In June LtGen Robert B. Neller penned a response to Maj Munson.
The central point of the debate is whether the PTP and top-down planning and guidance run counter to the maneuver warfare doctrine that we espouse. The debate continues in this issue with a letter from Capt J. P. Steinfels. His letter is an interesting and articulate airing of the issue that many junior officers see as lack of special trust and confidence in subordinate leaders.
Both LtGen Neller and Col Mullen make an articulate case for the importance of a structured training program that provides commanders with the tools and resources they require to prepare their units for combat. F. Scott Fitzgerald once wrote, “The test of a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in the mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless, but be determined to make them otherwise.” All of the Marines who have engaged in the debate have a first-rate intelligence. The answer may be a synthesis of both ideas. I don’t think there is a formula for the right amount of top-down planning and decentralized execution in training. I do know that the Corps is sending mixed signals to the deck plate by extolling maneuver warfare as our operating theory and then being extremely directive in training and garrison. The balance is somewhere in the middle, but it will take a policy-by-policy review to determine where lies the sweet spot. There is, however, a negative spillover of well-intended policies.
For just one example, consider the young corporal or sergeant in Afghanistan. A tremendous amount of faith and confidence is placed in that young NCO in combat. Return to home station though and he is treated quite differently. Think of the dichotomy of being completely trusted in combat but not being allowed to go on liberty until you sign your liberty pledge and sit through the vehicle safety lecture and the other unimaginative and boring training requirements that your commander has to report that you completed. Even a first-rate intelligence cannot hold those two disparate standards in his mind and be able to synthesize them into a coherent whole.
What the “Young Turks” are saying is that the message they are receiving will have an unintended consequence in combat when we are so directional in garrison. They fear we are developing Marines with a preference for direction rather than a bias for action. The other unintended consequence could be the failure to retain our best and brightest. Next month we have an article from a recently separated Marine who articulates what he saw as the disparity in what the Corps says and how it really operates. One man’s opinion for sure, but it certainly will provide food for thought.
John Keenan
In 331 B.C. on the plains of Arbela, near present-day Mosul, Iraq, a contingent of Macedonian cavalry led by Alexander the Great changed the course of history by shattering the ranks of a numerically superior Persian force commanded by Darius III. The subsequent disintegration of the previously unbeaten Persian Army paved the way for the Macedonian king to subjugate the vast expanses of the Persian Empire. To military historians, strategists, and practitioners of warfare alike, the significance of this epochal battle exists within Alexanders generalship and tactical skill. However, unknown to most students of modern warfare is the influence this single engagement had on the evolution in the study and conduct of warfare.
Our present-day security challenges are framed within the context of four environments – irregular, disruptive, catastrophic, and traditional warfare. (See Figure 1 .) Each of these environments presents distinct problems, unique circumstances, and differing solution sets. Our current maneuver warfare doctrine provides the foundation for developing a sound strategy to defeat an adversary operating within any of the four previously stated environments. As such, the purpose of this article is to study the contributions of three 20th century military strategists to the evolution of modern warfare and the development and continued relevance of maneuver warfare with respect to the most likely challenge, irregular warfare (IW).
Marine Corps Doctrine
Current U.S. Marine Corps doctrine as articulated in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, advocates maneuver warfare:
A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.1
Maneuver warfare acknowledges the chaotic, uncertain nature of warfare and espouses the need to operate within this realm. Implicit in uncertainty is the understanding that conditions are rarely permanent and, more than likely, are temporary in nature, whereby adaptability is critical to success. Additionally, this warfighting philosophy views the enemy as a system – a system, which if its cohesion is shattered then panic and paralysis will ensue and will ultimately result in the enemy no longer possessing the ability to resist.
Origins of Maneuver Warfare
The U. S Marine Corps’ adaptation of the maneuver warfare philosophy occurred with the inception of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting, in 1989. This publication provided the foundation for the Marine Corps’ current warfighting philosophy. In addition, Bill Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook, published in 1985, served as a catalyst in catapulting the tenets of maneuver warfare to the war fighters of the day. Notwithstanding the contributions of Mr. Lind and other modern-day military theorists in the development of FMFM 1 and MCDP 1, three noted military strategists are responsible for the genesis of maneuver warfare and its underlying assumptions – J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, and John Boyd.
As mentioned previously, MCDP 1 states, “The aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system.”2 It further asserts that maneuver warfare‘s “ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.”3 The notion that the enemy is analogous to a system is largely a 20th century perspective. One of the earliest proponents of this belief was the renowned British military strategist and historian J.F.C. Fuller.
During World War I, as the chief general staff officer of the British Tank Corps, Fuller was instrumental in the development of armor tactics devised to break the stalemate of the static, attrition-type trench warfare along the Western front. After the Allies’ limited success at the Battle of Cambria in 1917 in which massed tank formations achieved only local tactical gains, Fuller set about designing a scheme to exploit the advantages of a mobile massed armored force against less mobile entrenched infantry units. As a result, Fuller formulated “Plan 1919.” Regarded as the seminal document with respect to tank warfare by armor enthusiasts, in actuality, Fuller’s plan was more of a concept than a detailed strategy. “Plan 1919” focused on a force capable of rapid movement, the ability to deliver a decisive blow, and the capacity to withstand an equally devastating riposte from the enemy; the desired end state being the disruption of the enemy’s ability to organize a coordinated counterattack. Accordingly, destroying the enemy’s command and control structure was essential to the success of the operation.
In “Plan 1919” Fuller mused that in the attainment of the strategic objective, which he stated as “the destruction of the enemy’s fighting strength,” two methods existed, “wearing it down (dissipating it)” or “rendering it inoperative (unhinging it).”4 He further elaborated that, unlike traditional attrition warfare, it was less costly and more effective to unhinge the enemy forces than it was to dissipate those forces. In order to unhinge the enemy, Fuller asserted that the attacker must destroy the enemy’s command to effect the disorganization of its forces.5 Fuller succinctly stated this in the following:
As our present theory is to destroy personnel so should our new theory be to destroy command, not after the enemy’s personnel has been disorganized, but before it has been attacked, so that it may be found in a state of complete disorganization when attacked.6
Paradoxically, he argued that the greater the number of reserves massed by the enemy, the greater the success as the objective was to paralyze the enemy by disrupting his ability to command and coordinate subordinate units regardless of their size. Fuller aptly referred to this concept as “brain warfare.”
Fuller developed this theory based upon his understanding of the March 1918 German offensive characterized by the use of heavily armed small units that sought to bypass enemy strongpoints and penetrate deep behind enemy lines. Referred to as “infiltration tactics,” Fuller then combined this recent knowledge with his historical analysis of Alexander the Great’s triumph over King Darius’ Persian Army at the Battle of Arbela in 331 B.C. Numerically inferior to the Persian forces, Alexander sought to focus the attack upon Darius himself, the Persian king, leader, and ultimate director and coordinator of the enemy. Alexander’s singular “decapitation-type” strategy proved successful and effected the disintegration of the Persian Army. Ipso facto, Fuller deduced that a highly mobile, concentrated, powerful force (rapid, focused) that attacks the command and control segment of an army would cause its rapid demise.
A friend and protege of Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, expounded upon his theory of brain warfare. Liddell Hart developed a military strategy that combined both the physical and psychological aspects of warfare. In the physical realm one exploited an enemy by placing or matching strength against weakness and by doing so sought a “line of least resistance.” Liddell Hart surmised that indispensable to this approach was the element of surprise (unexpected actions) focused on the psychological sphere or “the line of least expectation.”7 Referred to as the “indirect approach,” this method of warfare sought to dislocate the enemy, both physically and psychologically; i.e., hit them where they are the weakest and when and where they least expect it.
In this method, the physical effects, such as severing the enemy’s lines of communications or disrupting his dispositions, combined with the element of surprise, accentuated the psychological effects, in which the enemy commander felt cornered. A sort of checkmate was in place, as the commander did not possess a viable option; only defeat loomed ahead. In a sense, Liddell Hart delved further into the psychology of the enemy than Fuller and thus set the stage for more incisive study.
A latter 20th century military theorist, the late Col John Boyd, USAF (Ret), built upon Fuller and Liddell Hart’s theory of the psychological and physical element of the enemy and developed what we refer to today as maneuver warfare. As a former Air Force fighter pilot and military theorist, Boyd analyzed countless military battles throughout the ages and then synthesized the many lessons from these conflicts. He combined this study with his understanding of fighter tactics to create the famous OODA loop, arguably the foundation for maneuver warfare theory.8 Boyd viewed warfare as a time-competitive event in which the successor consistently acted in a faster manner over time; i.e., created tempo until the opponent’s will to resist collapsed. Implicit in this understanding is the continuous cycle of action-reaction between adversaries, which highlights the iterative nature of war.
On the surface, Boyd’s theory appears simplistic, yet the details of how he arrived at this conclusion reveal its complexity. In his studies, Boyd believed it essential to understand the interaction of and the bonds forged between the moral-mental-physical forces governed by the nature of warfare and to direct actions to severing and isolating those connections in order to defeat the enemy’s will to resist.
The moral forces consist of the emotional or the psychological arena whereby the goal is to promote courage, confidence, and cohesion within friendly forces and concurrently to generate fear, uncertainty, and alienation within enemy forces. The mental field refers to the intellectual acuity to grasp and understand a situation and determine a suitable course of action in a timely manner. Although not explicitly described in his writings, one can presume Boyd defined physical forces as those relating to material and objectives in relation to the enemy; e.g., force ratios, terrain seized, personnel captured, etc.9 In sum, Boyd asserted that a successor’s actions must be aimed and synchronized against all three forces in order to defeat an enemy’s will to resist. Boyd cogently and unambiguously stated the relationship between the three in the following:
Unless one can penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being, and sever those interacting bonds that permit him to exist as an organic whole, as well as subvert or seize those moralmental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, one will find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to collapse adversary’s will to resist [create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation].10
He further stated:
Morally-men tally-physically isolate adversary from allies or any outside support as well as isolate elements of adversary or adversaries from one another and overwhelm them by being able to penetrate and splinter their moral-mental-physical being at any and all levels [shatter the enemy’s cohesion . . . with which the enemy cannot cope].11
As one can see, Boyd’s analysis and subsequent synthesis explicitly identifies the bond between the three forces and furthermore asserts the criticality in directing one’s actions toward them in a holistic, comprehensive manner. Moreover, implicit in Boyd’s statements is the imperative to “control” the tempo of operations. Although the current definition of maneuver warfare states “rapid . . . actions,” speed of action does not equate to success in all instances. For example, while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the execution of military offensive operations based upon the misperception that speed of action against a perceived military target without regard to the impact upon the population writ large may cause more harm than good.
Each of the three strategists viewed warfare through a prism containing the physical and psychological forces with Boyd further dissecting the psychological arena into moral and mental spheres or domains. Arguably, relative to the three strategists discussed, Boyd has engendered the greatest to the study of warfare, development, and the definition of maneuver warfare. Nonetheless, Liddell Hart’s and Fuller’s significant contributions cannot be overlooked. Whereas Boyd expertly described the need to “shatter the enemy’s cohesion” in the moral, mental, and physical spheres and the criticality in creating a “deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope,” Liddell Hart and Fuller defined the need for “rapid, focused, and unexpected actions,” albeit predominantly in the physical and psychological domains.
Maneuver Warfare and IW
So with the understanding of the evolution of maneuver warfare, how do we apply this warfighting philosophy to current operations, such as IW? The joint operating concept, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, defines IW as:
… a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.12
The Marine Corps’ Center for IW has adroitly pointed out the contrast between conventional conflict and IW in regard to Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity.13 In Clausewitz’s concept of trinitarian warfare, three forces are constantly at work – the military, the government, and the population.14 In traditional or conventional conflicts with state versus state actors, the interaction between the military and the government prevails as our efforts are focused upon defeating our opponent’s military and thus influencing or compelling their government to cease resistance. Contrastingly, in IW the critical interaction occurs between the population and the government as the support or lack of support from the relevant population is intrinsically linked to the legitimacy of the government. (See Figure 2.) Furthermore, added layers of complexity are extant in IW as compared to conventional conflicts as there are by definition a greater number of participants, such as coalition forces, host-nation security forces, other government agencies, nongovernment organizations, etc. The increased number of participants involved, coupled with the intangible qualities and characteristics of gaining or eroding population support, presents an imposing challenge to those engaged in IW.
A way to approach this complex challenge is to view the forces at play in IW through the lenses of the moralmental-physical prism expounded upon earlier. For instance, while conducting COIN operations we should strive to mo rally-ment ally- physically isolate insurgent leaders, forces, and their supporters from the population while simultaneously directing actions that strengthen the moral-mentalphysical bonds between the relevant population, the government, and security forces. More specifically, we should endeavor to enhance unity, confidence, and legitimacy between the host-nation government, population, and security forces while concurrently promoting fear, uncertainty, and alienation between the relevant population and the insurgent group and within the insurgent group (delegitimize); developing and executing a plan in a timely manner that synchronizes disparate activities associated with COIN operations; and denying the insurgents sanctuary and support from the relevant population and external sympathizers.
Within the mental sphere, plan development necessitates the coordination between multiple dissimilar and unequal entities and the synchronization of unrelated activities. To overcome this conundrum, activities are grouped into common categories, such as economic development, governance, essential services, host-nation security forces, and combat operations/civil security operations.15 Commonly referred to as logical lines of operations, these activities permit planners to orchestrate disparate actions in a holistic manner and to ensure that interrelated activities do not produce outcomes that are counter to or deleterious to the desired end state.16
When applying maneuver warfare to IW and specifically COIN operations, it is paramount to define the roles and relationship of the moralmental-physical forces at play. Understandably, the three are inextricably linked regardless of the type conflict. However, when conducting COIN operations with a goal of enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government and eroding the cause of the insurgents, all activities must be assessed based upon their ability to morally isolate the insurgents. To this end, the role of the physical force or actions taken is subordinate to and supports the role of the moral force. The primacy of moral isolation over physical destruction of an insurgent group cannot be overemphasized. Many practitioners of warfare believe that it is antithetical to subordinate physical destruction of the enemy to moral isolation; nonetheless, should we fail to do so then we may find ourselves in a protracted engagement. While the moral and physical forces are supported and supporting, the mental force functions as an enabler and facilitates the desired end state by focusing efforts and controlling tempo of operations.
The continued relevance of maneuver warfare in current and future conflicts is indisputable; however, in order to successfully confront the exigencies of modern warfare we must perform the following:
* Clearly and unambiguously define the type of conflict we are involved in using the paradoxical trinity as a starting point, whereby all participants are assessed based upon their association with or support to the government, the military, and the population.
* Analyze friendly, neutral, and adversary forces or participants using the moral-mental-physical prism in order to establish the roles and relationships between the forces at play and to direct actions to develop and strengthen bonds or to sever and isolate existing bonds.
* Apply our maneuver warfare doctrine with an emphasis on the ability to rapidly adapt to a given situation while simultaneously having the foresight to control the tempo of operations.
As the challenges of the 21st century continue to emerge, develop, and mature, so too must our solutions, for just as the nature of warfare is immutable so the conduct of warfare is constantly changing. Consequently, critical to our success is the understanding of the changing relationships between the forces at play; if not, we will be forever mired in the old think of the past and unable to adapt to the changing environments of the future.
Notes
1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DQ 1997, p. 72.
2. Ibid., p. 74.
3. Ibid.
4. Fuller, J.F. C, “Plan 1919,” Selected Readings in Military History: Evolution in Combined Arms Warfare, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985, pp. 144-145.
5. Ibid., p. 146.
6. Ibid.
7. Liddell Hart, B. H., Strategy, Second Revised Edition, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1991, p. 327.
8. The OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop is described in various works to include its progenitor, John Boyd, in his compilation of essays, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, and in detail in his final brief, The Essence of Winning and Losing. Additionally, MCDP 1 gives a brief description of the O O DA loop. However, the most thorough and comprehensive description exists in Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, by Frans P.B. Osinga, Routledge, 2006. A more concise description may be found in William Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1985.
9. Boyd, Col John, USAF(Ret), Patterns of Conflict. Boyd focuses upon the moral forces and at times blurs the distinction between both moral and mental forces; however, the definition of physical forces is missing altogether. Nonetheless, MCDP 1 clearly defines and describes the three forces and their importance in warfighting.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Department of Defense, Joint Operating Concept, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Version 2.0, Washington, DC, 17 May 2010.
13. “IW 101” brief, Marine Corps Center for IW, accessed at www.mccdc.usmc.mil/ciw.
14. Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 89.
15. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 5-3 describes in detail generic logical lines of operations to use in COIN operations.
16. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 2001 (as amended through 31 July 2010), defines lines of operations with the following:
1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective (s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s).
On 12 August 2010, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, delivered a speech at the Marine Memorial Club in San Francisco in which he challenged Marines to “define the unique mission of the Marine Corps going forward . . . .”! The Secretary made the point that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have turned the Marine Corps into a “second land army.” This metamorphosis occurred for good reasons, but the time has come to consider the Marine Corps‘ future beyond these conflicts, and in a constrained fiscal climate. The Marine Corps must also be relevant to the types of threats the Nation is likely to face in the future. Given these requirements and constraints, the Secretary has challenged the Marine Corps to rethink its role in national defense. In every challenge there is an opportunity. This is the case for the Marine Corps today. Secretary Gates’ challenge opens the door for the Marine Corps to become the Nation’s primary force for fighting fourth-generation wars (4GWs).
The Marine Corps can no longer be confident that its capability to conduct amphibious forcible entry guarantees its existence. The Marine Corps will remain responsible for maintaining a forcible entry capability in the future, but in his comments the Secretary raised the question of how much amphibious capability the Nation requires. His concern is that “anti-ship missiles with long range and high accuracy may make it necessary to debark from ships 25 or 40 or 60 or more miles at sea,” which might make an amphibious assault prohibitive in terms of cost and potential risks. In addition, large-scale amphibious assaults are only likely against a state opponent. Nonstate actors of the sort Marines are now fighting have no borders or beaches to defend. Against such enemies, amphibious landings may simply be a way for the Marine Corps to get to the fight.
The Army should have primary responsibility for fighting any state that goes to war with the United States, with the Marine Corps playing a supporting role. The U.S. Army was designed for just such a conflict; it makes little sense for the Army to redefine its role. Instead, the Marine Corps, as a smaller, more agile force, should change its role to fill the capability gap that remains. That gap is fighting 4GWs, wars against opponents who are not states.
4GWs are the most likely conflicts in the future. In an article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, “The Changing Face of War,” a group led by William S. Lind laid out a framework for thinking about war.2 4GW is the result of the state’s loss of its monopoly on war. The concept of state as the sole entity legally permitted to use violence dates from the time of the Treaty of Westphalia that ended Europe’s Thirty Year’s War in 1648. Before that time, many other entities conducted wars – business enterprises, families, tribes, religions, etc. After 350 years, the idea that many institutions or groups other than the state may conduct wars is difficult to conceive. The confusion is reflected in the terms used to describe 4GWs, such as “terrorism” or “crime,” when they are, in fact, wars.
The state arose primarily to provide security. In todays world it often fails to deliver on this promise. As a result, citizens of failing states have begun to transfer their primary loyalty away from the state that can no longer provide the security it promised, and they have bestowed this loyalty on some other entity, such as their religion, tribe, gang, or ideology. These other entities provide security and identity that was once provided by the state.
Consider the example of al-Qaeda (AQ). AQ is not a nation-state, nor does it control one. It is a transnational organization that has attempted to hijack Islam in an effort to draw recruits and claim legitimacy. As an organization without a states resources, AQ draws support from those people who feel alienated from their states. It has recruited supporters from states all over the globe. ACl conducted attacks on U.S. Embassies in Africa in the late 1990s and against the USS Cole (DDG 67) in 2000. These were clearly acts of war, but the United States treated them simply as acts of terrorism. It was not until the attacks of 1 1 September 2001 that the United States was forced to recognize the threat posed by AQ. As more states fail or have difficulty meeting the needs of their populations, 4GWs will spread. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are both examples of 4GWs.
Fourth-generation opponents will attempt to avoid the strengths of the U.S. military, especially its massive fire-power. This should come as no surprise. No sane enemy will fight in a manner that plays to its opponents strengths. The entire world knows that the U.S. military is technologically advanced (perhaps “dependent” is a better word) and can kill any target it can identify. Future 4GW adversaries will be unable to match U.S. technology and will not attempt to do so. They will attempt to draw U.S. forces into conflicts that not only minimize our advantages but also turn our strengths into disadvantages.
Many future conflicts will be fought in urban or other populated terrain as 4GW enemies attempt to make it difficult for U.S. forces to target them. In his book, The Utility of Force, British Gen Rupert Smith wrote that the conflicts of the future would be “war amongst the people.”3 Given the difficulty that U.S. forces have had in Iraq and Afghanistan in rooting out the insurgents from among the civilian population, it is likely other opponents will present us with the same problem in the future. America needs a force that specializes m “war amongst the people,” which is very different from state versus state conflict like Operation DESERT STORM.
For the Marine Corps, becoming the U.S. military’s primary force for dealing with 4GWs has several advantages. The Marine Corps and Army would have roles that would be complementary and clearly defined. The Marine Corps could get out of the business of acting as a second land army for fighting DESERT STORM-style conflicts. Marines would maintain their relevance; the types of wars most likely to occur in the future are 4GWs. The Marine Corps would be able to capitalize on some of its traditional strengths. In many respects, the Marine Corps would simply be getting back to its roots.
The Marine Corps has a long and storied history of involvement with counterinsurgency and brushfire wars. The majority of the conflicts in which Marines have found themselves have been “small wars.” In fact, the Marine Corps quite literally wrote the book on how to fight a small war.4 The Marine Corps‘ focus on conducting amphibious forcible entry is relatively new. Throughout most of the Service’s history, Marines have spent most of their time conducting missions other than amphibious forcible entry. The Marine Corps must certainly maintain an amphibious capability for the Nation, but it should no longer be the only mission that uniquely defines the Marine Corps.
For 4GWs, the Marine Corps has many essential qualities including, importantly, the high quality of its recruits and the self-discipline of its Marines. Fighting 4GWs is much more demanding than fighting conventional state-on-state wars. It requires individuals who can shift instantly from aggressiveness to self-restraint. In 4GWs, among the civilian populace, the heavy use of firepower is a recipe for defeat. Many situations will call for use of small arms only as Marines make every effort to deescalate. This is counterintuitive to someone trained that his own personal safety lies in possessing and using overwhelming firepower. In fact, it may be necessary to sustain more casualties than one inflicts in order to prevail in 4GWs. Fighting in such a complex environment requires someone with the ability to think quickly on his feet, the courage to do what is right even when it is risky, and the self-discipline to refrain from killing when it is either not necessary or counterproductive to the mission. These are qualities Marines are today demonstrating in Afghanistan.
If the Marine Corps is to become the Nations force of choice for fighting 4GWs, several major changes are necessary. The first is adopting the framework of the “four generations of modern war” as doctrine. There may be a useful analogy to recent Marine Corps history. The Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as doctrine in 1989. (Maneuver warfare defines the third generation of modern war.) Marine officers informally did much of the intellectual work for this doctrinal change. The adoption of maneuver warfare as doctrine was a tremendous political and public relations windfall for the Marine Corps. It demonstrated to the American people that the Marine Corps is a progressive and forward-thinking organization. The adoption of the four generations of modern war framework as doctrine has the potential to repeat that success.
It is also necessary to restore the intellectual climate that prevailed in the Marine Corps during Gen Alfred M. Gray’s period as Commandant. During that time, Gen Gray encouraged Marines to read, think, talk, and write about maneuvet warfare. He revitalized the Marine Corps‘ professional military education program as part of this effort. A similar intellectual effort will be necessary for the Marine Corps to come to grips with 4GW, and an intellectually open atmosphere will be required throughout the Corps.
The Marine Corps must also develop some true light infantry. The U.S. military currently has no light infantry. What is now referred to as light infantry is, in actuality, line infantry. A cursory examination of the units that currently profess to be light infantry (including Marine units) will quickly reveal that there is nothing light about them. Part of the reason that the infantry the U.S. military has used in Iraq and Afghanistan has had such difficulty is because, contrary to their appellation, they are actually line infantry.
The greatest difference between light and line infantry has litde to do with gear. The primary difference between light and line infantry is the mindset of each. True light infantry is far more resourceful and self-reliant than line infantry. True light infantry is habituated to operating in an austere environment far from friendly bases and logistical support. In some circumstances, light infantry can live off the country. Line infantry requires a ponderous and expensive logistical tail to sustain ir. Light infantry is used to operating cut off from other friendly units. Line infantry units are extremely uncomfortable when they are isolated from other units or are far from friendly fire support. A light infantryman has an ambush mentality and is always seeking to exploit opportunities to discomfit the enemy. The mindset of a light infantryman is that of a hunter stalking his prey, not that of a football player attempting to push the opponent’s defensive line down the field.
There is no “one size fits all” force. Light infantry, line infantry, armored, mechanized, or motorized forces all have strengths and weaknesses. The weaknesses of line infantry have been cruelly exposed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other than a few kinetic operations, the limitations of heavy armored formations have also been demonstrated; it is difficult to interact with the populace from behind several tons of armor. Light infantry would have limited usefulness during mobile warfare in open terrain (think World War II in North Africa). Such a fight would place a light infantry force at a mobility disadvantage and, most likely, at a firepower disadvantage as well. Light infantry, however, is well suited to warfare in close terrain. Light infantry is extremely valuable in 4GWs because it can move faster and farther on its feet than can most opponents.
Transitioning to a primarily light infantry force would have the added advantage of making the Marine Corps cheap again. The Marine Corps still provides the greatest “bang for the buck” of any U.S. Service, but given the unsustainable amounts of money spent on U.S. national defense (more than the rest of the world combined), this is not saying a lot. Light infantry costs less while still providing a powerful capability. Before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines had a culture of doing more with less, of which they were quite proud. In this sense, transitioning to a fight infantry force would allow the Marine Corps to recapture a valuable element of its institutional culture and of its political appeal.
In fact, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is already concerned about the sustainability of current Marine Corps forces. He recently began a program to investigate ways in which the Marine Corps could reduce the amount of energy that it uses as well as cut the amount of waste produced. The goal of the program is to reduce the logistical requirements of units in the field so that there is less need to risk Marines‘ lives conducting frequent resupply operations. A force consisting of true light infantry will use less energy, require fewer resupply convoys, and ultimately save the taxpayers money.
Reorganizing many of the Marine Corps‘ combat units into light infantry will require rethinking and reorganizing the rest of the Marine Corps as well. For example, logisticians will have to consider how to resupply units that are spread out all over the battlefield, even though their requirements for resupply will be drastically reduced. Communicators will have to ensure that units have the radios necessary to talk over great distances, although fight infantry should be trained to operate even when they have no communications with higher headquarters. Fire support agencies will have to examine their organization and equipment to determine the best manner in which to provide on-call fires appropriate to a 4GW environment. Similarly, Marine Corps aviation will have to reconsider its role and the aircraft: it uses. It will no longer be enough to simply drop bombs based on a nine-line brief; the Marine on the ground will likely be more interested in what the pilot can see, as opposed to what he can destroy. All of these issues, and many more, will have to be addressed if the Marine Corps is to embrace the light infantry concept as a way to becoming the force of choice for fighting 4GWs.
The great American military theorist, CoI John Boyd, USAF(Ret), was widely quoted as saying that the proper way to build a force is, “People, ideas and hardware, in that order.” The Marine Corps already has a large number of high-quality people as a basis upon which to begin the transition to a 4GW mission, although there will be a need to retrain to the light infantry concept. What remains of this trinity is to flesh out the supporting concepts and, lastly, purchase any equipment that is necessary.
As was the case with maneuver warfare, Marines, working informally, have already done some of the intellectual work necessary to transition the Marine Corps to 4GW. Much of the Marine Corps‘ current doctrine is ideally suited to 4GW.5 4GW requires maneuver warfare, since firepower alienates the population. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfìgbting, also calls for a decentralized philosophy of command and control; 4GWs can be fought in no other way. Doctrinal manuals on 4GW have already been written. They are ready for adoption. Students from the Expeditionary Warfare School’s Advanced Warfighting Seminar wrote them. The series includes two manuals that describe the fight infantry concept and how it differs from current line infantry.6
Some Marines may see Secretary Gates’ words as a challenge to their budget, pet program, or “rice bowl.” It is none of these things. There can be little doubt that in the last decade the Marine Corps, as a Service, has become a second land army. There were good reasons for this, and it was probably unavoidable. Now the Secretary of Defense has offered the Marine Corps an opportunity to rediscover and reclaim its soul, an opportunity to find its way forward again. Such opportunities come along only once in a generation, if that frequently. The Marine Corps must take advantage of this tremendous opportunity to do what is right for the Marine Corps and, more importandy, for the Nation.
Notes
1. Secretary Gates’ comments cited in this artide may be accessed at http://www.defense.gov/ transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4672.
2. Lind, William S., Keith Nightengale, John E Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazerte, October 1989, pp. 22-26.
3. Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007, p. xiii.
4. Headquarters Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, Washington, DC, 1940.
5. When referring to doctrine, me author is referring only to the Marine Corps doctrinal publication series.
6. For those with a common access card interested in learning more about 4GW or about the light infantry concept, go to http://www.mcu. usmc.mil/Pages/EWS.aspx and click on the “EWS PKI Website” link at the bottom of the page. Next click on the “Advanced Warfighting Seminar” link on the left side, and then dick on “Manuals.” This site contains a great deal of information regarding these subjects and more. Of particular note is Fleet Marine Force Manual IA, Fourth-Generation War, which describes 4GW in great detail, and a book of 4GW tactical decision games.
In “Embrace Maneuver Warfare: A rebuttal” [MCG, JunlO), Maj Jason W. Heuer writes a counterargument to my February 2010 article, “Embrace Maneuver Warfare: The DS section.” He adds to the debate on the subject; however, much of his counterargument is incorrect.
Maj Heuer alleges that the details of the joint tactical airstrike request (JTAR) application process prohibit the assignment of aircraft to direct support (DS), but this is not the case. Requesting units demonstrate evidence of proper mission planning by the written detail in the JTAR request. The air tasking order (ATO) cell should require the same kind of detailed planning and analysis for a DS section JTAR request as the ATO cell would for any other air support request.
The author argues that watch officers can immediately answer requests for air support and reallocate assets from low-priority missions to higher priority missions. But what about transferring air support from low-priority missions to other lowpriority but strategically important counted nsurgency (COIN) missions? Is a direct air support center (DASC) officer likely to reapportion a mixed section of H-Is that is providing convoy escort and divert them to ferry two Afghan villagers whose child has broken his arm? This seems unlikely. The decision not to divert aircraft reflects a risk-averse aviation culture that restricts creative thinking and problem solving. Unless the MAGTF commanders guidance is so minutely detailed that it identifies and ranks every contingency, the DASC officer will likely never decide to divert the assets to another low-priority mission.
Maj Heuer additionally writes that a section in DS will not support the MAGTF commanders aviation scheme of maneuver and that the DS section does not keep with Marine Corps doctrine. This is patently untrue. Our doctrine, Marine Corps Warfìghting Publication 3-2, Aviation Operations, defines and allows for aviation in DS. The ATO cell must still assign aircraft according to their capability, DS or not. To say that the aviation combat elements (ACE s) flexibility is reduced through a DS section request instead of matching a capability to a mission, and that the crew supplied would not be the best choice for the specific mission, implies two fallacies – first, that our Marine ground brethren cannot tell Marine aircraft apart, and second, that the Marine Corps does not have properly trained aircrews.
Maj Heuer maintains that DS neglects one of the tenets of maneuver warfare – unity of command. Unity of command is a Clausewitzian principle of war and not a tenet of maneuver warfare. The squadron commander retains command over squadron aircrew and airframes, whereas the battalion landing team commander has tactical control of the aircraft during the JTAR. The author also incorrectly states that the DS section role puts the ACE commander in a subordinate relationship to the ground combat element commander. Just like the MEU, the squadron commander is already in a supporting-supported relationship with the battalion commander. Squadron commanders routinely fly and lead their crews in combat. Both the lieutenant colonel squadron commander and the lieutenant colonel battalion commander work for the MAGTF commander, with all parties supporting a designated mission commander for specific missions. Unity of command remains constant throughout, and there is no confusion about who commands the pilots or the infantrymen.
What is missing from Maj Heuer’s argument is a tie into maneuver warfare. How do we speed the flow of information and push decisionmaking down to the lowest level? Do we allow our air and ground forces to use creative thinking to solve our problems using everything in our repertoire? The ideas and experience of junior officers on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan led to new COIN doctrine and tfie authoring of a new joint COIN field manual. Where is our contribution from the air wing? Regardless of the form it takes, there is clearly a need for more flexible and imaginative use of aviation assets in the current and future COIN fights.
As an instructor at the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Warfare School, I have heard numerous senior officers express their concern to the students that Marine leaders at every level have either lost or never acquired training management skills. Such statements have been repeated frequently enough that the problem seems to be real. It needs to be discussed and solved.
Paradoxically, one of the primary reasons for this decline in training management skills is the predeployment training plan (PTP). The PTP attempts to set out in detail the training requirements for units deploying to Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring FREEDOM (OEF). Commanders no longer can determine what training to conduct; they simply must determine how best to meet the requirements of the PTP. As a result, leaders at ail levels are no longer required to be proficient trainers. Those who bemoan the fact that our training management skills have atrophied miss the point. This is not a training management problem; it is a policy problem.
Everyone has heard the old adage that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. It may seem cynical, but it is often true. People occasionally make well-intended decisions, particularly short-term decisions, that lead them away from their true and proper course. The Marine Corps appears to be on the edge of just such a calamity with respect to the impact of the PTP upon our philosophy of leadership.
Given the challenges that they face in the current operating environment, there is no doubt that the PTP was intended to help commanders and their units prepare for deployments. The pace of deployments has been extremely fast for most units in the Operating Forces. Many units still do not receive the 2:1 ratio of dwell to deployed time that is the Commandant’s goal. This places a great deal of stress on units attempting to prepare for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. There is simply not a lot of time to prepare. Most units have 7 to 1 1 months between deployments. These challenges are compounded by a myriad of other issues, such as late personnel fills and insufficient gear sets for training. Such challenges led to the perceived need to create and institutionalize a standardized training plan for units deploying to OIF and OEF. This decision has not come without consequences. The PTP has had a negative overall impact upon the ability of our leaders to conduct training.
The PTP prescribed the training requirements that units had to complete in order to be prepared to deploy. It included individual and unit annual training requirements, theater-specific training, and a mandated Service-level exercise to certify the unit’s readiness for deployment. The PTP also oudined a regime of briefs and progress reports that were to be delivered to the division (or equivalent) commander. These briefs occurred at specified intervals as units progressed through the PTP. The purpose of the briefs was primarily to ensure that the subordinate unit had a plan to complete the PTP successfully and that they were making satisfactory progress along the way.
The goal of the PTP was not to reduce the role of the battalion commander in training his unit, but this has been the unintended outcome. Due to the short time between deployments, very little time exists to do anything other than the training required by the PTP. The PTP was designed to alleviate the time pressures that most units are under by ensuring that commanders know what training is required prior to deployment. But the effect has been that commanders can no longer develop their own training plans; the PTP prescribes it.
The PTP has other drawbacks as well. As a program that attempts to address the training required by a broad range of units across the MAGTF, it attempts to create a “one size fits all” regimen with many of the shortcomings such an approach entails. In fairness, most commanders would likely develop a training plan that incorporated many of the same events as those that are part of the PTP. This is beside the point. The point is that most have never been given the opportunity to try.
In actuality, the purpose of this article is not to debate the reasons the PTP was instituted or its merits (or lack thereof). The PTP serves as an example of the kind of thinking that, unfortunately, is currently dominant in the Marine Corps. Our doctrinal manuals (and, as an aside, our only true doctrine is contained in the white-covered Marine Corps doctrinal publication (MCDP) series) are excellent and extremely clear on the kind of leadership required in a maneuver warfare force. MCDP 1, VCctrßghdng, states that:
In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conduct of training – like combat – should be decentralized. Senior commanders influence training by establishing goals and standards, communicating the intent of training, and establishing a main effort for training. As a rule, they should refrain from dictating how the training will be accomplished.1
There is nothing decentralized about the PTR It is highly prescriptive in nature. Maneuver warfare requires decentralized leadership and seniors who, rather than reserving all decisions for themselves, trust their subordinates. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0, Leading Marines, further states that, “The Marine Corps has always enjoyed great success decentralizing authority to the lowest levels.”2 The PTP and the philosophy behind it flies in the face of our doctrine.
The cenrral ingrethent in the formula for maneuver warfare is trust. If we truly trust our subordinates, then we should trust them to train their units for the challenges of combat. Gen James N. Mattis was recently quoted in the Army Times as saying that, “Operations in the future will occur at the speed of trust.”3 It is not a coincidence that a Marine of Gen Mattis’ stature considers trust so vital. It is the glue that holds a maneuver warfare force together. It allows such a force to work to achieve a common goal while operating on little more than the commanders intent. The key issue is to find commanders at all levels who are trustworthy and will develop their subordinates and place their trust in them.
Tb judge by the PTP, we do not trust our battalion (and equivalent) commanders to train their units. If we did trust them, we would give them broad guidance, allow them to develop a training plan, train their units, and hold them accountable for the results. The PTP seems to have as its primary underlying assumption that many of those who are selected as commanders are incapable of devising an effective plan to train their units. As a result they must be provided with detailed guidance and be closely supervised throughout implementation. There is no doubt that no one would ever admit that such assumptions exist (incidentally, such assumptions underlie many of the Marine Corps’ other training programs), but actions always speak louder than words. The philosophy that underpins the PTP is absolutely clear. We do not trust those individuals who are placed in command to fulfill their roles properly.
According to LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr., USA(Ret), in his book, Common Sense Training, the critical individuals in terms of training are the battalion and company commanders.4 If we do not fully trust them, as it seems is the case, the answer is not to prescribe a detailed training plan so that a cardboard cutout could serve successfully as a unit commander. The proper answer is to relieve subordinates who do not possess the trust of their superiors.
There is no middle ground here. The Marine Corps either selects individuals capable of discharging the responsibilities of command, or we do not. If we do select the best, then we should trust them. If they are not the best, then perhaps our method of selecting commanders is flawed and should be changed. If we cannot find enough individuals with the capacity to command, perhaps those who are selected should spend more time in command; perhaps not everyone should have, or deserves, the opportunity to command. Regardless, some change in either our leadership philosophy or our method of selecting commanders must occur.
None of the above discussion is meant to indicate that supervision is no longer necessary or desirable. Supervision is still absolutely essential. The form and manner of supervision must change. The current model of supervision is extremely centralized and aimed at the collection of data from subordinates. This must give way to a model more appropriate to interaction between professionals who trust and respect one another. Proper supervision should take the form of the senior commander and members of the staff visiting the subordinate unit, often unannounced, to see what is going on for themselves and to determine what assistance their subordinates require to effectively train their units.
Doubtless some will charge that I have misrepresented the goals of the PTP. They would argue that the combatant commander has placed requirements on Marine Corps forces that deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan and that the PTP is simply the Corps’ mechanism to ensure that deploying units meet these requirements. It is certainly true that the Marine Corps must comply with the requirements of the combatant commander, but the prescriptive approach taken in the PTP is a clear indication of the leadership and training philosophy that underpins it. It is not necessarily the requirement that is flawed but the manner in which the requirement is being met that must concern us.
The Marine Corps is unwittingly moving toward a centralized leadership model. Leaders of character and vision must stem this tide before we have gone too far down this path to turn back. The PTP is simply one manifestation of this shift in philosophy; there are many others. Let me leave the reader with a question to ponder. If we concede that we must be able to conduct decentralized operations due to the requirements imposed upon our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, how does a centralized training methodology create such leaders?
Notes
1. Department of the Navy, MCDP 1, Vfárñghting, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 60.
2. Department of the Navy, Fleet Affatine Force Manual 1-0, Leading Marines, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 75.
3. McMichael, William H., “Mattis: Hybrid Skills a Must in Future Wars,” Army Times, accessed at hnp://www.armytirnes.com/news/ 2009/06/military_mattis_futurewar_060 1 09w.
4. Collins, Arrhur S., jr., Common Sense Training A Working Philosophy for Leaders, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1978, pp. Ò3-4.
The “Embrace Maneuver Warfare” author, Capt Andrews J. Graham (MCG, Feb 10, p. 27), calls for placing aviation assets in direct support (DS) of an infantry battalion in order to better adhere to the Marine Corps’ doctrinal employment of maneuver warfare in a counterinsurgency environment. The author believes that placing a Marine light attack helicopter squadron section in DS of a battalion will allow for better and more responsive support as the aviation assets would be collocated with the battalion. This in turn would facilitate quicker response times in a complex and fluid battle and improve face-to-face planning and the aircrew’s overall situational awareness and intelligence-gathering ability. It is clear that the author intends to enhance the combat power of the infantry battalions by increasing the options available to the battalion commander when he must rapidly decide how to act with the speed and boldness required in a dynamic tactical situation. However, I believe this proposal equates to a dismantling of the aviation request and tasking process and overlooks one of the three tenets of maneuver warfare – unity of command.
On the surface this proposal appears feasible and shows a fundamental understanding of the overall intent of maneuver warfare – breaking the enemy’s will to continue to resist by constantly presenting him with conditions to which he is unable to effectively respond. It also shows that the author understands chat our doctrine implores us to be flexible and accepting of change when presented with the opportunity to improve our warfighting capabilities. However, closer examination of the author’s argument reveals that implementation of this concept would require significant changes for employing and maintaining limited aviation assets and resources. As a response I offer three areas of Capt Graham’s proposal that were overlooked.
First, the process whereby units request aviation support is not adequately covered. The current process requires that requesting units analyze their aviation requirements during the detailed planning process and integrate it into their overall concept of operations. The unit then submits to the common headquarters (e.g., MAGTF) a joint tactical airstrike request/assault support request (JTAR/ ASR) 72 hours prior to execution that requests aviation support and then has the appropriate assets assigned via the air tasking order (ATO). The necessity of submitting the JTAR/ASR 72 hours prior to execution allows for proper apportionment and allocation. The process allows headquarters future operations personnel to analyze the requests and prioritize which of the requests will be sourced by our relatively limited aviation assets. The intent is to source every request, but limited assets and the large number of requests doesn’t always make this goal a possibility. Planners will attempt to roll requests that are not sourced on the requested day to the next ATO in production. The process is intended to ensure that the use of Marine Corps aviation assets is scrutinized, the subsequent tasking of assets is based on established priorities, and effective battlefield results are achieved.
Requests must be thoroughly scrutinized in order to ensure that aviation assets currently being flown at a rate beyond their planned utilization are used in an efficient and effective manner. The author of “Embrace Maneuver Warfare” believes that this process is slow, unresponsive, and unable to react to the immediate needs of a maneuver element commander. He counters that the assignment of a section of aircraft in DS would repair this shortfall and allow for better face-to-face planning and integration in the overall scheme of maneuver. This proposal negates the need for supported units to do the essential detailed planning that results in a thorough and well-written JTAR/ ASR. In order to be able to continuously employ our valuable aviation assets and ensure that they are utilized effectively, their tasking must be supervised, planned in detail, and efficient. The detailed planning requires a requesting unit to identify a requested capability then srare a ca sfc a nd purpose, not request a specific asset for DS. The aforementioned planning expedites the ATO development process, allowing ATO development cells in future operations to allocate an asset with the requested capability, versus filling a request for DS aircraft.
When this process doesn’t match up with a rapidly evolving battlefield, there are allowances and decisions integrated in the ATO development process and execution to ensure that aviation support remains responsive to ground forces. First, allowances are made that permit supported units to submit requests for aviation support inside of 72 hours when the request is in response to a change on the battlefield or when planning assumptions and factors have changed. Second, untasked aircraft will be assigned to a strip alert status on the ATO. These strip alert aircraft allow the aviation combat element (ACE) to react to immediate requests for air support. Watch officers in the tactical air command center can immediately answer the request and respond to a dynamic situation by authorizing the launch of these assets when the situation dictates. Watch officers also have the option to divert airborne aircraft from lower priority missions to the evolving situation. The decision to divert aircraft or to launch aircraft on strip alert is executed within the parameters of the priorities assigned by the MAGTF commander and executed by the ACE commander. These allowances and decisions allow the ACE the flexibility to provide what is necessary at the point of attack when changes on the battlefield must be reacted to inside the ATO planning cycle.
Second, in addition to ensuring that aircraft are used effectively, the ATO planning process is in place to ensure that the MAGTF commander’s aviation assets are used in a way that supports his overall scheme of maneuver, objectives, and intent. Simply requesting an asset (vice a capability) when seeking the support of aircraft and subsequently granting the battalion commander tactical control of these assets doesn’t ensure that the use of aviation assets is constantly nested with the MAGTF commanders intent and tasks. Utilizing the current process ensures that the overall structure of a MAGTF and its employment is maintained in accordance with our doctrine. Further, the Marine Corps Planning Process requires that the MAGTF commander’s tasks and intents be continually nested in the planning process. The request for a capability in the JTAR/ASR is a result of this planning. If aircraft were assigned to a battalion in a DS role, I believe the ACE’s flexibility and effectiveness would be diminished by the requirement to simply supply a specific asset, vice being able to match the request for air support with the proper platform manned with a crew best trained and equipped to execute the mission. Simply assigning a section of aircraft to DS of a single battalion for an extended amount of time does not keep with doctrinal procedures and eventually denies the use of aviation assets to other maneuver battalions who desire the increased battlefield effects that a section of Marine aircraft provides. Our doctrine and the Marine air command and control system are designed to ensure that units requesting aviation support receive it in a manner that supports the MAGTF commanders priorities and that these assets are commanded and controlled in a safe, responsive, and efficient manner.
Finally, the proposal of placing aircraft in DS of a battalion commander (and potentially allowing the battalion air officer to directly task aircraft vice advising the battalion commander about methods for integrating aviation into the scheme of maneuver and doing the detailed coordination work) places the ACE commander in a subordinate relationship relative to the ground combat element (GCE) commander vice a supporting relationship. Effectively the ACE commander becomes a force provider vice a warfighter. This is a departure from the synergistic employment of the MAGTF concept, where the GCE, ACE, and logistics combat element commanders maintain a habitual relationship and constantly ensure that the tasks they assign their subordinates are nested with their higher headquarters/MAGTF commanders objectives, while still having the authority and duty to decide and act with initiative and boldness.
Capt Graham presents a solid argument in defense of his concept, but I believe further analysis reveals other issues. Our warfighting doctrine encourages us to be flexible and agile in our thoughts about, and application of, maneuver warfare concepts, but the proposed concept is too significant a departure from our MAGTF-centered employment of aviation. Use of aircraft in an extended DS role dismantles the ATO planning process, goes against the unity of command tenet of maneuver warfare, and alters the chain of command relationship between the MAGTF commander and the major subordinate elements. Our limited number of aircraft implores planners and commanders to ensure that tasking is scrutinized and the right effects are achieved on the battlefield in order to ensure that we are consistently prepared and postured to apply the effects ground commanders require at the point of attack and eventually achieve our Nation’s strategic objectives.
I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard-and one might suggest some contempt-for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting-and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.
Capt Wormwood,
After reading some of the missives that you send, I cannot help but sit down and laugh heartily at your naivete. It does not surprise me that you hear all manner of absurd ideas; there is no end of foolishness in this world. What I find laughable is that you give enough credence to the things you hear that you would actually ask me about them! I suppose I should not be terribly surprised. What else should I expect from a mere captain? In fact, perhaps I should be pleased that you are referring matters grear and small to me. That is certainly rhe role of every subordinate.
This brings me to the subject of your last letter. It is a mark of the degeneracy of these “maneuverists” that one of their number would actually state that “trust is the secret ingredient of maneuver warfare.” The arrogance of these people is stunning. If you need a “secret ingrethent” to conduct their form of warfare, what happens when it disappears? If trust between subordinates and seniors is an absolute requirement for maneuver warfare, then the maneuverists occupy an even weaker position than they know. When was the last time that you observed a relationship between senior and subordinate in which they truly trusred one another? I would wager that you have never seen ir. I certainly haven’t.
How can we trusr our subordinates? They have been trying to avoid and shirk their duties since time immemorial. Frederick the Great wanted his soldiers to be more afraid of their officers than their enemy, and with good reason. He knew they would desert if given a minute’s opportunity. Do you nor think that your lieutenants will require minute supervision? Of course they will, and not simply because they are young. They will attempt to mislead you if you do not watch them closely. This is no more than an acknowledgement of human nature.
The need for control, not trust, is a truth that the Marine Corps has long recognized. If you look beyond the rhetoric, you can see how little trust commanders have in their subordinates. It is manifest in things both small and large. Why do Marines fill out reams of paperwork before going on leave or prior to an extended liberty period? Why has the Marine Corps created a detailed predeployment training program that minutely prescribes training requirements for deploying units? The answer is obvious, although it is also obvious rhat no one will openly admit it.
Trust be damned! You cannot command and control a unit effectively based on trust! You cannot trust that your subordinates did maintenance; yoti must know. You cannot trust that your subordinates know what you want them to do; you must tell them and then ensure that it is done to your full satisfaction. I know what one of those tool maneuverists would say. I had one of them as a subordinate before T retired, and he was thick enough to attempt to discuss this issue with me. He said that “trust did not replace supervision, but that the form of supervision is différent.” He said that “in many cases, the senior would conduct unannounced visits to see what is really going on and had the right to expect total openness and honesty from his subordinates.” Can you imagine this? I was far too busy to leave my headquarters. My form of supervision was better; I had my subordinates come to my headquarters and briet me. We would sit in the conference room and they would conduct a Microsoft PowerPoint brief detailing what they had been doing. I could have them make changes or give guidance to m\ stali based upon this brief. I did exactly what everyone else did, but T had this young officer tell me that it was wrong. What did he know about exercising command? Nothing! 1 find that I am getting angry just relating the story to you now, and it happened some years ago.
Let me tell you this, Wormwood. You had better learn your place in this organization. Listen carefully and keep your mouth shut. Your superiors have been put in their positions because they are smarter than you. You would do well to remember this. I have heard maneuverists say that decisions flow up the chain of command and support flows down, but this is not the way the Marine Corps works, thank Nick. There is a reason that information flows up the chain of command and decisions flow down. It is because those who have the experience and will know best what to do in any situation are at the top.
It is quite likely that it is difficult for a mere captain to grasp all of this. If you are able to understand, you should begin to see how all of the things we have discussed in this and in past letters are interrelated. Each individual issue may not seem critical, but they arc part of a coherent and logical whole. When viewed in this manner, it is clear that the maneuverists have been defeated and that we are in charge.
If, as 1 expect, you are still confused, just shut your mouth, put your brain in neutral, and do what you’re told. No Marine who follows that order can go far wrong.
Gen Screwtape
I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard-and one might suggest some contempt-for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting-and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.
Capt Wormwood,
In my last letter I discussed some of the reasoning behind why we have made such a concerted effort to eliminate such archaic concepts as “commander’s intent” and “mission tactics.” You noted that I only mentioned examples from in theater or from combat situations. How daft of me! You obviously are aware that we are aggressively pursuing this agenda on all fronts – including in garrison environments across the Corps.
For the past 20 years we attririonists have sought to banish commanders intent and mission tactics from the modus operandi of the Corps, and we have all but succeeded. For instance, in all previous predeployment training programs (PTPs), higher echelon leadership was limited to providing commander s intent and allowing mission tactics to occur as subordinate regiment, battalion, company, and platoon commanders determined specific training requirements and the methods of best accomplishing them. However, most – ii not all – current PTP is coordinated, directed, and supervised by higher echelon directives. I think that we can all agree that such templated training programs as Enhanced MOJAVE VlPER exist because subordinate unit commanders have proven themselves consistently unable to execute higher headquarters’ intent.
Marine Corps Doari nal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, dates itself by claiming that “as a rule, [senior commanders] should refrain from dictating how the training will be accomplished.”1 In no other PTP environment has the Marine Corps been able to institutionally create, maintain, and disseminate such extensive guidance via such effective media as e-mail and Microsoft PowerPoint and SharePoint systems. With these assets available today, there is simply no need to rely upon subordinate commanders to create or execute training plans. Rather, it is best to implement templated training packages rhar cover all potential situations for all units preparing for deployment. Wormwood, I must ask, does it not make your job considerably less challenging now that you have no need to schedule or execute training? Just count the Marines when they show up and ensure that your operational risk management has been submitted.
Our dear friends – those attririonists who implemented the PTP – have minimized any platoon, company, battalion, and even regiment leadership input into the PTP process. This centralized attritionist policy – while clearly executed on a daily basis across our Corps – is still not reflected in those antiquated philosophies found in MCDP J. I find it so frustrating that MCDP I still claims that “commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels.” MCDP Î goes on to claim that commanders “must ensure that higher-level demands do not deny subordinates adequate training opportunities for autonomous unit training.”2 It is almost laughable! Thankfully, these archaic pronouncements are clearly out of step with the current attritionist trends across our Corps! MCDP 1 falsely assumes that subordinate commanders are best situated to divine training shortfalls and requirements for their respective units, when in fact the PTPs offer a far superior and comprehensive solution.
Higher echelon commands have effectively relegated subordinate commanders to “managers” of their assigned personnel with limited ability to interfere with the training of their units. While skeptics decry this trend and claim that it will serve to diminish initiative and the abilities of subordinate commanders, it is a small price to pay for the creation of a MAGTF with “standardized” capabilities and the protection of our training programs from the tampering of subordinate leaders.
Wormwood, more examples of our success abound! Think of those junior Marines who are so often subject to restrictions placed upon them while deployed. Liberty cards in Okinawa, curfew restrictions imposed in Korea, and exclusion from major cities in Kuwait are specific policies directed by the highest echelons of command, not by local subordinate commanders. After all, it is far simpler to impose a regulation than it is to establish an expectation and challenge subordinates to accomplish it. Moreover, it is far more difficult to trust a subordinate than it is to impose a regulation.
Thus the practice of the Marine Corps must be to eliminate the outdated need of “trusting subordinate commanders.” While MCDP 1 might claim that “trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates” is essential, you will witness the hypocrisy of that statement.3 As I mentioned in my last letter, it is far better for a senior to eliminate all doubt and ensure that subordinate commanders execute guidance as passed rather than make false assumptions.
And Wormwood, you will concur that when units return from training exercises or a deployment and the Marines seek to set out on leave, each is required to complete a paperwork-intensive leave request. In years past, the highest echelon commands would establish their intent and allow subordinate commanders to determine unit leave policies (and thus execute mission tactics). That obviously did not work. The Marine Corps has therefore established directed leave policies (including those extensive paperwork requirements) by higher echelon commands. Skeptics will query why a MEF commander must dictate the requirements of a lance corporal desiring to take leave. The answer lies no doubt in the inability of regimental, battalion, and company commanders to competently implement the commander’s intent from higher headquarters. Thus, the most senior commanders have no choice but to dictate and institutionalize standardized procedures that restrict subordinate commanders’ use of discretion and judgment.
You can see that we are achieving success on all fronts. Soon – very soon – subordinate leaders will be relegated completely to automaton-like roles, simply executing that guidance explicitly directed by the highest command. That transformation of the Marine Corps to a completely attritionist force will provide unprecedented battlefield effectiveness for the battles we have yet to fight. Until then, I remain,
Gen Screwtape
Notes
1. MCDP I, Warfighting, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 60.
2. Ibid.. pp. 59-60.
3. Ibid., p. 58.
I have no intention of explaining now the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard – and one might suggest some contempt – for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capì Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting – and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.
My Dear Capt Wormwood,
I must admit that the tone of your last letter surprised me. The “maneuverists” may have recently celebrated the 20th anniversary since Fleet Marine Force Manual ], Warfighting, was published, but you should ask yourself, what have they truly gained? You are, perhaps, not sophisticated enough to understand, but simply publishing a book and proclaiming it doctrine doesnoca revolution make. I will attempt to enlighten you on this topic in the future; I doubt that you are capable of comprehending my meaning m a single letter. It will suffice for now to examine this thankfully “incomplete revolution” (as I long ago took to calling it) from the perspective of terminology.
In the effort against the maneuverists, we have one inestimable advantage. Let us be blunt: attrition is simply easier to understand than their “maneuver” warfare. This is one of our inherent advantages. For those who are lost and confused in the morass of maneuver warfare, attrition will seem a light in the darkness, a beacon for the wayward. We will seduce converts with our simplicity. Simplicity is essential in war. After all, “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”1 The maneuverists are fond of trotting out this quote, but they ignore its implications – in war, everything should be as simple and straightforward as it is possible to make it.
Hard experience has shown us that our subordinates cannot deal with much complexity. Take the example of the “strategic corporal.” I have often heard senior officers extol the virtues of the strategic corporal, yet the only examples they give of the impact of the strategic corporal are negative. I do not want any strategic corporals! I want corporals who do exactly what I tell them to do. There is a reason that enlisted Marines are taught “instant, willing obethence to orders” in boot camp; it is because this is their appropriate role. Please save us from Marines who “think”! They should leave the thinking to their superiors and do what they are trained to do – follow orders. We must seek to make everything as simple as possible for our subordinates, otherwise they will leave us with a mess that we must clean up and for which we will be responsible.
We have been extremely successful in dominating the way that terms used by the maneuverists are defined. I am certain that you have heard many of your instructors and superiors repeat the phrase, “words mean things.” It may be trite, hut it is also true. We must strive to dictate the meaning of key terms to the maneuverists. By doing so we can quite literally force them to discuss and understand war on our terms. 1 his is particularly true in the case of those new lieutenants seeking to understand maneuver warfare. Ir we control the lexicon that they must learn and use, they will be predisposed to accept our views. Wc will have prepared their minds properly, and they will be much more receptive to attrition warfare, all while speaking in maneuverist terms.
Let me give you an example. Take the term “shaping.” For the maneuverists, it has many meanings. Ir may connote gathering intelligence; it may mean an attempt to deceive the enemy or create uncertainty in the enemy commander’s mind. Only rarely does it mean that you are attempting to attrite the enemy’s forces. For us, however, shaping is virtually synonymous with destroying the enemy’s forces on the Field of battle. And why not? After all, this is the purpose of military force! What the maneuverists fail to understand is that anything else is simply window dressing! The fools!
Where we cannot subvert the meanings of their words, we must attempt to sow confusion. Confused officers will look for answers they can understand – clear answers that attritionists will be able to provide. Thus far we have been extremely successful in this arena. The terms “center of gravity” and “critical vulnerability” are a clear indication of this success. As many times as I have seen it, it never tails to amuse me to watch operational planning reams devolve into chaos as they attempt to determine the enemy’s center of gravity. Perhaps the greatest joke is that upon the conclusion of this intense debate, they invariably determine that the center of gravity is the enemy’s artillery or indirect fire assers! Whatever was the debate about?
We have also been aided by a number of well-intended efforts to “clarify” the concept of the center of gravity. In some cases such clarification has been to our decided advantage as it has forced the maneuverists to employ concepts that virtually force them into an attritionist approach. I find it a delightful irony that the maneuverists’ own efforts to clarify [heir terms may actually lead to their undoing!
In my last years on active duty, 1 became heartily sick of hearing maneuverists quote chapter and verse from John Boyd’s briefings about how war is fought not just at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, but also at the physical, mental, and moral levels. What nonsense! War is a physical act; all of Boyd’s mental- and moral-level mumbo jumbo is useless and unnecessary complication. Today, young officers are taught that the center of gravity must be a tangible thing, most likely an enemy unit. This forces them to focus on the “physical” level of war, which is only proper. They cannot escape it.
Perhaps this is all more than you can take in at one time. I sometimes forget that I am writing to a mere captain. Please forgive me if I have overburdened you with ideas that you cannot yet understand. When next we meet I will give you detailed instructions for the continuation of the struggle. Until then, do nothing unless I have approved it first.
Gen Screwtape
Note
1 . Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Parer, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, p. 119.