Dull Garrison Chronicles Part V: Company Assault R

By Carl F. Kusch

Situation

The CO, 26th MEU was ordered to assault and secure Dull Garrison Island Airfield #2 so it can be used by follow-on forces arriving from the United States. The airfield is only being defended by one of the enemy’s small battalions (400 men). The battalion headquarters and one rifle company appear to be located in the village of Al Joblin. The airfield itself (ATF Obj 1) is being defended by a second rifle company. The enemy’s third rifle company is located near the bridge spanning the North River, which is virtually dry at this time of the year. Three antiaircraft positions have been identified and are depicted on the accompanying map.

The battalion CO assigned Company E the main effort and directed it to land by CRRC over Red Beach at L-5 hours, move covertly toward Airfield #2, the antiaircraft artillery (AAA) site south of the field and secure the airfield (ATF Obj 1), advancing no further than the designated limit of advance (LOA). Company F would land over Blue Beach at L-hour, destroy the AAA site to the north and assault to secure Al Joblin (LF Obj 1) and the AAA site to the west. The light armored infantry (LAI) platoon will follow in trace of Company F and seize the bridge over North River. Four M777A2 155mm howitzers will be in position south of South Creek by L-hour.

Requirement

You are the CO, Company E. Prepare the order you would issue your subordinates to carry out your mission. Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions to the Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game 11-16R, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, or by email at [email protected]. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

Dull Garrison Chronicles Part IV: Take the Airfield R

By Carl F. Kusch

Situation

As the commanding officer BLT 2/8 (part of 26th MEU), you and your command are feeling pretty good about yourselves after Company G was able to rescue the American Ambassador. The general situation, however, has deteriorated further. The forces of BAD invaded Dull Island and are threatening to overrun the Marine garrison, which has suffered heavy casualties and is now fighting for survival on the outskirts of Al Habib. Furthermore, it would appear that BAD is already reinforcing and fortifying its defense of Dull Garrison Island even while it is attempting to eliminate the Marine stronghold.

The loss of Dull Garrison Island would be devastating to the American effort since access to other possible staging areas has eroded through the neglect of reciprocal defense treaties. Therefore, the National Command Authority has no choice but to order the immediate seizure of that vital island staging area.

It has been decided that the initial attack on Dull Garrison Island will occur at the island’s Airfield #2 in order to (a) relieve pressure on the beleaguered Marine garrison; (b) cut off the airfield through which BAD is bringing in supplies and reinforcements; and (c) provide an entry point for the U.S. forces that will continue the attack and secure the entire island.

In defense of Dull Garrison Island, the enemy has mustered a full division spearheaded by elite Guards and filled out with regular infantry spread throughout the entire island. Fortunately, other than a few antiaircraft batteries, the division’s heavy equipment has not yet caught up with it. Airfield #2 is thought to be defended by a small battalion (400 men) of regular infantry along with three antiaircraft emplacements. (See map.)

Available to provide close air support (CAS) are the MEU’s eight Harriers and eight Cobras. A carrier battle group (CBG) will support the landing from a distance but will be engaged primarily in air superiority and CBG and amphibious task force (ATF) defensive missions. Once the airfield secured, elements of the 82d Airborne Division will be airlifted directly into it (by parachute if necessary). The initial elements are to assist the MEU in strengthening and expanding its foothold. The division will eventually assume the mission of securing the rest of the island. Finally, you are ordered to minimize collateral civilian damage. In support of this effort, the BLT’s specific missions are to:

• Secure Dull Garrison Island Airfield #2 (ATF Obj I) ensuring that the three antiaircraft emplacements are destroyed. The airlift of stateside forces is scheduled to begin a mere six hours after the commencement of the assault.

• Secure the village of Al Joblin (LF OBJ 1) in order to destroy the enemy headquarters and combat units located there as well as to prevent any reinforcement of the airfield.

• Seize the bridge over North River (LF Obj 2) in order to block any reaction the enemy may attempt as well as to facilitate future operations ashore.

Because of unfavorable beach conditions, the only suitable landing site for an amphibious assault is located at the mouth of North River, which is dry at this time of year. It is felt that the LCACs and AAVs will have no difficulty in overcoming any sandbars that may be located in this area. Beachmasters, however, will have to determine if an alternate landing point will have to be offset slightly for the LCUs, LCM-8s, and general offload. There are two LCACs and two LCUs aboard the LHA and one LCAC and one LCU aboard the LPD. Company E retains possession of the combat rigid raiding craft. Furthermore, there are only enough helicopters available to lift either one reinforced rifle company or the 105mm platoon of the battery at a time. The BLT is tasked organized aboard ship as follows:

  • LHA BLT 2/8 Headquarters (-) (rein)
  • Company G
  • Artillery Battery (4xl05mm+4xl55mm)
  • Engineer Platoon (-)
  • TOW section
  • 3d Squad, Dragon Platoon
  • LPD
  • Company E
  • Weapons Company (-)
  • 2d Squad, Engineer Platoon
  • Platoon LAI
  • (4xLAV+2xLAV-AT+lxLAV-M)
  • IST
  • Company F
  • AAV Platoon
  • 1 Javelin Squad, Anti-Armor Platoon
  • 1st Squad, Engineer Platoon

Requirement

As the BLT commander, briefly discuss your plans for accomplishing your mission to include your task organization for the assault, your sequencing of units ashore, and the broad missions you assign your subordinates. Include an overlay, which indicates the landing zones you intend to use, additional BLT objectives that you may designate, and your general scheme of maneuver. Submit your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game #92-6, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

Adding Information-Related Capabilities

By LtCol Michael L Fitts

MCDP 1, Warfighting defines maneuver warfare as a “warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the adversary’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions to create a turbulent and deteriorating situation with which the adversary cannot cope.”1 To accomplish this task:

Commanders employ complementary capabilities [known as the maneuver warfare tactic of combined arms] such that, to counter one, the adversary becomes more vulnerable and is placed in a no-win situation.2

This overwhelming complement of maneuver and fires is defined and applied through the MAGTF. Most, if not all, fully embrace this warfighting ethos; however, it is argued that far too often planners underutilize the full complement of resources available to them, particularly in information-related capabilities (IRC). Capable of both lethal and non-lethal effects, the employment of IRCs integrated with surface and aviation fires coupled with maneuver offers commanders additive ways to shatter the adversary’s cohesion and rapid deterioration in the belief of a no-win situation.

The MAGTF commander applies the critical tenets of maneuver warfare that view the adversary as a system of mental, moral, and physical forces; recognizes and leverages the chaotic uncertainty of conflict through decentralized operations; and that warfare is a competition in time relative to the decision-making process.3 Specifically, the commander applies maneuver coupled with the integration of lethal and non-lethal fires to obtain an operational advantage. The commander focuses the MAGTF’s capacities against the adversary to induce cognitive dissonance, thereby eroding the adversary’s timely decision making and thus allowing the MAGTF commander to seize initiative and tempo and exploit asymmetric gaps to obliterate the adversary’s source of moral and physical strength.

This concept reverberates that conflict is not attrition-based but cognitive in nature demonstrated by the measurable display of behavior; that an operation’s design should not be directed at the mere attrition of an adversary’s combat power but at his will with the expressed intent to inflict cognitive change resulting in the capitulation of his will, manifested by his behavior, leading to the obtainment of the desired commander’s objectives. The application of integrated lethal and non-lethal fires in maneuver warfare:

  • Makes the adversary more predictable by physically destroying his capabilities and limiting his options.
  • Surprises the adversary, causing him to pause or withdraw to reassess the situation.
  • Creates a loss of will or physical ability for the adversary to continue.
  • Ensures some portion of the MAGTF can always be in the offense, denying the adversary the initiative.
  • Influences adversary actions and populace behavior through non-lethal means.
  • Counters the adversary’s ability to use the information environment to attack the MAGTF’s decision making.4

To ignore the overwhelming thematic that integrated fires’ express purpose is to induce cognitive effects is ill-advised and negates the true intention of maneuver warfare and the application of combined arms. This is not to infer the effects of lethal fires have no merit; on the contrary. The application of lethal fires creates disproportional results through psychological effects.

However, an often-overlooked application of integrated fires is the employment of IRCs to generate lethal and non-lethal effects that complement both maneuver and traditional means of lethal fires. Traditional IRCs include military deception, operational security, electronic warfare, military information support operations, and cyberspace operations. Other capabilities that doctrinally are considered IRCs that impact the informational environment or share common interfaces in the effect of the same include information assurance, physical attack, combat camera, counterintelligence, public affairs, civil-military operations, and defense support to public diplomacy or key leader engagement. These IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment.

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three inter related dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are known as physical, informational, and cognitive. The physical dimension is composed of command and control systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. The informational dimension specifies where and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information.6

The MAGTF (means) employs IRCs (ways) to affect the physical and informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making or the cognitive dimension.7

Planning for the employment of IRCs is known as information operations (IO). IO is defined as:

… the integration, coordination, and synchronization of all actions taken in the informational environment to affect a relevant decision maker in order to create an operational advantage for the commander.8

IO is not a discrete, standalone capability, but is [planning for] the integrated, coordinated, and synchronized operational application of all IRCs, both organic and non-organic, to affect decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries; thereby, creating an operational advantage.9

IO should not be referred to as a capability. This infers ownership of IRCs or IO as a capability enabled to produce effects, and this is simply not true. IO is a deliberate planning effort that horizontally and vertically deconflicts, synchronizes, and orchestrates the consistent application of discrete, standalone IRC capabilities to deliver an operational advantage for the commander.

Responsible for orchestrating the unified effort and economic delivery of lethal and non-lethal fires through the employment of the MAGTF’s IRCs, the IO center or cell (dependent on the level of the MAGTF) rightfully falls within the G-3 (operations), force fires coordination cell or fires and effects coordination cell (FECC).10 The IO cell’s placement is deliberate in order to facilitate the common forum for the integration of surface- and aviation-based lethal fires and the lethal and non-lethal fires from IRCs. Further, the IO cell’s inherent placement within the G-3 FECC facilitates collaborative deliberate planning and active participation in targeting boards and working groups which ensures the necessary integration during detailed execution planning and enables unit command and control centers to pursue integration during execution. The IO cell’s members, both officer and enlisted IO planners, must be an integral part of the entire planning process to provide the MAGTF commander with expanded means and methods.11

It is critical that at all levels of the MAGTF that IO is recognized as a:

… natural extension and evolution of the Marine Corps’ combined arms mind-set and maneuverist tradition of taking the initiative in both the physical and cognitive dimensions.12

It is argued that today, IO and the employment of IRCs are still grossly misunderstood and underutilized. Despite strong doctrinal advocacy, IO is often lumped in as a discrete capability expected to “control the narrative” or “win hearts and minds.” IO, the deliberate planning for the integrated employment of IRCs, is a critical combat multiplier that, when fully incorporated into an expanded operational planning mindset, supports the MAGTF commander’s operational requirements.

IO, whether applied in shaping the operational environment to deter conflict or in enabling decisive maneuver, must be recognized as an essential enabling activity that facilitates development of an operational advantage for the Commander.13

Expeditionary Warfare Training Group–Atlantic (EWTGLANT) offers the USMC’s only formal instruction on IO. For more information regarding either of the FMOS-producing courses offered at EWGTLANT, please visit its public website located at http://www.public.navy.mil.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, War fighting, (Washington, DC: 1997), 73.

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCWP 3-43.3, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires, (Washington, DC: 2011), 1.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13 (JP 3-13), Information Operations, (Washington, DC: 2012), ix.

7. Ibid.

8. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCWP 3-40.4, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations, (Washington, DC: 2013), 1.

9. Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I), Marine Corps Operating Concept for Information Operations, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2013), 1.

10. MCWP 3-43.3.

11. Ibid.

12. DC, CD&I.

13. Ibid., 4.

Russian Reflections and Military Renaissance

By LtCol A.M. Del Gaudio

Our former Commandant rendered these words in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July prior to being confirmed as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The words are instructive for many reasons. They not only challenge current thought about the global security environment, but also resonate within Marine history, calling to mind the legacy of then-Capt James C. Breckenridge who took up his post as Naval Attaché in Petrograd and began a lifelong study of the problem of Russia in military and international affairs. Thousands of Marines have walked the halls of Breckinridge Hall at Quantico, knowing only the great leader for whom the building is named was an instrumental part of the first intellectual renaissance of the Corps in the 1920s and 30s, giving the Corps amphibious operations and the Small Wars Manual, (Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 1940). Gen Breckinridge was also a visionary Marine leader who understood Russia and the role it sought to take on the world stage. His legacy is well worth the attention of the present generation of Marine officers who face another Russian problem, “post-Cold War,” but rooted in a longer tradition.

Breckinridge’s many writings for the Marine Corps Gazette, as well as his personal writings contained in the Gray Research Center, allow us to gain a new perspective on Russia. The point of departure for the present work is Breckinridge’s own understanding of Russia. He watched the Czar’s empire go through the tremendous changes of the 1917 revolution while he served as the Naval Attaché to Petrograd. This basis of knowledge not only forms the backdrop for a review of another intellectual renaissance of the Marine Corps in the 1980s and 1990s under Gen Alfred E. Gray, but also grounds our understanding of the present era of Russian relations with the West. Having already learned from Russia twice before, can we do so once again? We examine the Russian actions of 2014 through the lens of General of the Army, Valeri Gerasimov, the Chief of the Russian General Staff. His article, “The Value of Scientific Prediction,” has wrongly been called a “doctrine” based on a western desire to mirror image, lessening significance while hoping to improve understanding.2 The Marine Corps, like the U.S. military at large, needs to regain a focus on Russian affairs. It must also develop a vision of the future informed by a deeper understanding of the past. In the present instance, Breckinridge lights the way.

The First Military-Intellectual Renaissance: Breckinridge on a Russian War of Ideas

In the years immediately following the First World War, Breckinridge wrote extensively about his experiences as the Naval Attaché to Petrograd. In reflection on his experiences in Russia, he thought America largely misunderstood Russia and her people. This led Western societies to underestimate Russian thought. In “Russia, Leading up to Present Conditions,” an unpublished report written shortly after the October 1917 Revolution, Breckinridge framed the historic revolution against the character of Russian society and the void of power in the Baltic region following the First World War.3 Pointing to the chaotic environment of the revolution, Breckinridge observed,

Three influences began to manifest themselves; one was the criminal element, which since the abolition of law and police had grown to imposing proportions; another was the arrival of internationalists and opportunists of every degree of mental instability or crookedness, and the last was German propaganda, which left no stone unturned in assisting the other two, for the greater the chaos in Russia the less chance would there be of reestablishing the old east front, which since the collapse of the [German] government was no longer a fighting factor.4

Ideas influenced action, the action in turn influenced ideas in an environment of chaos brought on by revolution. The chaos brought about by military defeat facilitated the introduction of disruptive new ideas, themselves aimed at military as much as political effects. War had expanded to the realm of ideology, terror, and crime.

Between 1927 and 1928, Breckinridge wrote a three-part series of articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette, entitled, “A Russian Background.” The purpose of this series was to provide readers with a general understanding of events occurring in the Soviet Union in light of Russia’s turbulent history. Breckinridge used S.F. Platonov’s History of Russia to frame his thoughts and work.5 Ten years after writing “Russia, Leading up to Present Conditions,” Breckinridge opened the first part of “A Russian Background” with the words:

The history of human development runs true to itself all over the world, the chief differences seeming to lie in the degree of education possessed by the people and, hence, in the methods they pursue, whether by vote or bayonet.6

What Breckinridge observed in this quote, he treated in his discussion of trends from Russian history. Russia, while a culture rich in heritage and traditions, never experienced an Enlightenment in the same sense as other European countries had done centuries before. Breckinridge correctly posited in the conclusion of his work what would become painfully obvious for the next 63 years: “[T]he real renaissance (for Russia) was not born until February, 1917.”7 In the wake of the revolution, Soviet Russia under the red banner of “scientific communism” was deeply exploring a future methodology for the conduct of war at the Frunze Academy. Great debates during this interwar era gave birth to Soviet operational art, the term itself having been bequeathed by Czarist Russian officers.

Like German officers of the post-World War I era, officers of the Red Army debated the merits of a strategy of annihilation versus one of attrition, both terms having been borrowed from the writing of the German military historian, Hans Delbrück.8 Each school of thought drew on the experiences of officers from the Russo-Japanese War, First World War, and Russian Civil War of 1918–1920. All were also influenced by the writings of Marx and Lenin.

The debate came to a head in 1926 at the Frunze Academy.9 Championing the school of annihilation was Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky. A deep and critical thinker, Tukhachevsky authored several works during the interwar period supporting the strategy of annihilation or destruction.10 An equally deep thinker was the chief proponent of the school of attrition, Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin. In Strategy, Svechin appears to have been the first to use the phrase “operation art,” found in a series of lectures from 1923–24 at the Frunze Academy.11 Both Tukhachevsky and Svechin would fall in Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s, and their work would not become widely known, even in Soviet circles, until after Stalin’s death.

The Second Military-Intellectual Renaissance: Arms and Ideas in Operational Art

It would take until the 1970s–80s before Soviet work would become known to Americans, mainly due to its incorporation into the doctrine of AirLand Battle by the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. The new work drew on translations made available by the U.S. Air Force in the 1970s.12 Driven by a sense of urgency, the U.S. military had launched into a new intellectual renaissance, once more studying a potential enemy to elevate its own capabilities. The chief products of the second American military-intellectual renaissance were maneuver warfare, the operational level of war, and operational art. These ideas entered into both Army and Marine Corps doctrine. A number of scholars, including participants in that Cold War development, attribute the changes to a new appreciation of Soviet interwar military theory, aided by “Sovietologists” who concentrated on the USSR’s contribution to combined arms doctrine and theory.

Drawing new ideas from its foremost rival for the future, the American military nevertheless was also learning from an enemy of a bygone era. The interwar origins of the “new” concepts were not strictly Russian but rather also German. In practical terms, many of the ideas have roots in both nations’ military traditions, being refined on the battlefields of the First World War. In the years immediately following the war, under the Rapallo Treaty of 1922, the two former enemies began collaborating in the development of cutting edge technologies and concepts.13

Many American military thinkers, still ignorant of Russian/Soviet military science in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on learning from German military art. The distinction between art and science, often convoluted, nonetheless became apparent in the German emphasis upon spontaneity and individual initiative, in contrast to the Soviet quest for a precise theory of military affairs. Scholars have debated for decades now the authenticity of German “Blitzkrieg” as operational art, but the effectiveness of initial German operations in the Second World War remains beyond dispute. In the interim, the Soviets had purged their ranks of the theorists of operational art. The hard lessons of wartime losses motivated them, belatedly, to revive their interwar doctrinal efforts.

As the U.S. Army was defending Germany with the U.S. Air Force during the Cold War, AirLand Battle was the product of attempting to understand the Soviet methodology to fight it. The United States developed its own operational art in both emulation of and competition with the Soviets.14 AirLand Battle incorporated the concept of operational art directly into Army doctrine.15 Operational art became more prevalent in the American military lexicon when GEN Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, first used the phrase in a briefing on Operation Desert Storm in 1991.16 In difference, the emphasis on “mission type orders” in maneuver warfare, as described by MCDP 1, Warfighting, has clear origins in the German tradition of Auftragstaktik.17 MCDP 1 became Marine Corps doctrine as the result of the second “Marine Corps Renaissance” from the late 1980s into the mid-1990s. Of the many reasons for the Marine Corps to base their doctrine on the German example, one was the appeal of small unit tactical actions using maneuver in place of the attrition of the Vietnam War experienced and excoriated by many Marines.18 Also featured prominently in MCDP 1, however, is the emergence of the operational level of war, intellectually connecting Marine Corps Warfighting to the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine of the early 1980s. In the process of adapting their doctrine to the Soviet threat, U.S. military thinkers absorbed many of the same concepts and terminology but took the adversary’s doctrine to a new level while imbuing it with the flexibility and initiative inherent in maneuver warfare.

It was ideas again in the spirit of Breckinridge that brought the necessary change. Warfighting as a philosophy complemented the logic of war being treated as both an art and science. Drawing on a wide range of sources from Clausewitz and system theory to Sun Tzu, the new doctrinal publication articulated and advocated initiative for the lowest level to fight through the point of friction. Although not directly influenced by Soviet methods, maneuver warfare eventually merged with Army doctrine in AirLand Battle, in what some have called “a Hegelian synthesis.”19

By striving to learn how to deconstruct the Soviet style of fighting, the U.S. military came to reshape its own doctrine in large part along similar lines, though with key differences due to very different strengths and weaknesses, including geography and manpower. A generation later, we now must once more undertake a similar effort. The days of massive East-West confrontation on the continent of Europe faded with the end of the Cold War. Current constraints on the U.S. military portend the need for a very different response to Russia. As in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, moreover, the U.S. military comes at the problem from a prolonged involvement in counterinsurgency and “nation building.” Like Breckinridge, and the Army’s TRADOC, the Western defense enterprise today must learn the current Russian methodology for war while reflecting on how best to adapt itself.


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A New Military-Intellectual Renaissance? Learning From Current Russian Methodology

In March 2014, Russian troops appeared in Crimea with the intention of securing the Peninsula for the Russian Federation. Almost immediately, Europe and the world were inconveniently confronted by renewed Russian aggression. Interest in the Russian methodology of military thought spiked as military professionals sought to “frame the problem,” leading to the search for the latest Russian “doctrine.” The Russian move into Crimea along with actions of Ukrainian separatists in the east of the Ukraine backed by Russia were foreshadowed by General of the Army Valeri Gerasimov in his January 2013 speech before the Russian Academy of Military Science, entitled, “The Value of Scientific Prediction.”20 Gerasimov has broadly explored Soviet and Russian innovations throughout history to inform his thoughts but specifically examined recent Western conflicts to determine their patterns.

With examples such as American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO operations against Libya, and the Arab Spring, Gerasimov discerned a pattern in the Western use of military operations as a tactic or technique in the attempt to control chaos. Gerasimov explains,

In recent conflicts have emerged a new means of military action that cannot be considered purely something of military means. As an example, operations in Libya saw the use of a no fly zone, sea blockade, and wide use of private contractors in close cooperation with armed groups of opposition. We should admit if we clearly understand the essence of traditional military actions as conducted by our regular armed forces, our knowledge of asymmetrical forms and means of battle is superficial. Coming from this reality, the role of military science should be increased and it should develop a common new theory for the above mentioned actions.21

Chaos, however, could be employed as a military system as part of a strategy when used in conjunction with other systems such as law, politics, economics, and culture (see Figure 1). In essence, Gerasimov demonstrated it is far easier to instill chaos, pulling the appropriate “system levers” when required, than to control it as in the western model of the last 14 years in counterinsurgency operations. What Gerasimov said about Russian views of war in “The Value of Scientific Prediction” were certainly not new, whether in Russia or the West. Like the Cold War, Western understanding of the Russian character and their conduct of war had been forgotten. Breckinridge had said it first: Soviet methods flourished in chaos and drew strength from the circumstances created by socio-political and military crisis.

Looking back to Breckinridge’s work nearly 100 years ago, we see a Marine who instructed his Service and the wider public on Russia while preparing to lead an interwar intellectual renewal in the Marine Corps. The lessons acted on during that broad awakening served the Marine Corps in good stead in the coming conflicts. In similar fashion, the reading of Soviet doctrine in the late Cold War helped the West bring that long-running confrontation to a successful end, with the material and intellectual efforts undertaken to renew the military in the 1980s helping to avert the need for war. As the security environment of Europe continues to demonstrate to the world, failing to understand Russia now could find the United States and her allies miscalculating Russian intentions at a critical time now or in the future and therefore facing an unacceptable fait accompli.

The next military renaissance must likewise stay ahead of the next crisis. Being “formed, trained and equipped” is not good enough to prepare for the unknown future of an increasingly turbulent world. Developing institutional intellect and the ability to deal with a peer competitor has not been the American way of war for some time. It begins with remembering we must first understand the environment to interact and change. To cope with the challenges we have been presented with today and tomorrow requires study and intellectual honesty about the unknown, while having the courage to change. In doing so, we reduce our chances of miscalculation because we made an effort to learn from Russia. As Gerasimov’s thoughts demonstrate, the Russians learned from observing us, just as Breckinridge learned from observing them. The next intellectual renaissance for the Marine Corps must be born of the will to change and to innovate as we have always done. The Breckinridge legacy points the way forward.

Notes

1. Gen Joseph F. Dunford testimony as nominee for CJCS to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 July 2015. See: https://www.washingtonpost.com.

2. General of Army Valeri Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. See: http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632 for original article, “The Value of Scientific Prediction,” translated and edited by LtCol A.M. Del Gaudio.

3. J.C. Breckinridge, “Russia, Leading up to Present Conditions,” (Quantico, VA: USMC Archives J.C. Breckinridge, Gray Research Center, Box 16, Folder 26).

4. Ibid, 6.

5. S.F. Platonov would have been known to Breckinridge as he was a well-known Russian scholar of history in Petrograd until his retirement in 1916. See: S.F. Platonov, History of Russia, (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company 1928), VI.

6. J.C. Breckinridge, “A Russian Background: Part I,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: December 1927), 229.

7. Breckinridge, Part III, 124.

8. See: Hans Delbrück, The Dawn of Modern Warfare, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1990).

9. Jacob Kipp, The Operational Art, Development in the Theories of War, edited by B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 69.

10. For more on Tukhachevsky’s writings, see: M.N. Tukhachevsky’s Selected Works, 1928–1937, (Moscow, USSR: State Publishers, 1964).

11. Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992), as well as Jacob Kipp, The Operational Art, Development in the Theories of War, 61.

12. In the 1970s, in an effort to better understand the Soviet threat, the United States Air Force translated selected Soviet works to better understand Soviet thinking. For the Soviet/Russian conception of operational art in English, see: V. YE. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, (Moscow, USSR: State Publishers, 1972).

13. “In 1922 the German-Soviet rapprochement was complete with the Rapollo Treaty, which established diplomatic and trade links between the two nations.” See: James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 170.

14. Scholar and author COL David M. Glantz, USA(Ret) was the former founder and Director of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office who was charged with examining Soviet Military development in the 1980s.

15. Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC Pam 525-5, Military Operations: Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).

16. Svechin, 23.

17. Chapter 4 of MCDP 1, Warfighting, examines maneuver warfare and mission tactics or mission type orders. See: Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 20 June 1997), 71 and 87.

18. In the late 1970s and 80s, the Battelle Corporation conducted several conferences, interviews, and exercises with former German general officers from the Second World War. Amongst the exercises conducted were the participation of German general officers in a Marine command post exercise at 1stMarDiv.

19. Kenneth F. McKenzie, The Event Horizon: The Marine Corps and the Dialectic of Maneuver Warfare and AirLand Battle, (Washington, DC: 1992). See: http://www.globalsecurity.org.

20. General of Army Valeri Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. See: http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632 for original article, “The Value of Scientific Prediction,” translated and edited by LtCol A.M. Del Gaudio.

21. Ibid, 2.

22. Ibid. A translation from the original Russian chart.

Dull Garrison Chronicles, Part III: Last Stand R

By Carl F. Kusch

Situation

This is a continuation of TDG 08-16R. The enemy is continuing to press its assault of Dull Garrison Island. Against overwhelming odds and in the face of heavy casualties, the fight is not going well for our provisional battalion, which has begun to consolidate its survivors into a single perimeter here at Al Habib—a relatively large town and the regional communications and transportation center for this part of the island. The enemy’s main body is still many kilometers to the north but getting closer. Eventually, the enemy’s main attack is expected to come from that direction.

The battalion commander’s plan is to shrink the perimeter and fight a defensive battle within the town itself. The final stand will be a tight “shoulder-to-shoulder” position located at the very heart of Al Habib where the battalion command post (CP) is currently positioned. The 1st Company is deployed on the outskirts of the town and will constitute the northeastern section of the battalion’s perimeter with the 2d Company on the northwestern outskirts. Both will meet in the middle and refuse their outboard flanks. Meanwhile, 3d Company will continue to delay and frustrate the enemy’s main body in order to give the battalion as much time as possible to make these final arrangements. 3d Company will ultimately constitute the entire southern sector of the battalion’s perimeter once they fall back into town.

The 2d Special Infantry Company is currently deployed with its 1st and 3d Platoons positioned facing north and 2d Platoon facing west on the company’s left flank. You are Sgt J.H. Quick, the acting platoon leader for the 2d Platoon. Your platoon sector is shown on the accompanying map. Between being deployed from the States understrength and with the casualties you have sustained in the recent fighting, your platoon is down to 20 Marines, many of whom are walking wounded like yourself.

Although the company’s attachments from the battalion are located with 3d Platoon, you have been assigned one machine gun squad (two M240G guns) and one SMAW squad (two launchers) from Weapons Platoon.

Since 3d Company is doing such a tremendous job delaying the enemy, your company commander (Lt S.D. Butler, who was your original platoon leader until an enemy mortar attack hit the company CP a couple days ago) feels that he has a little extra time and has called his acting platoon leaders and remaining SNCOs together to discuss the tactical alternatives before he issues his final instructions.

Requirement

In a time limit of five minutes, complete your suggestions for the company commander. Include an overlay sketch indicating the recommended positions for your platoon and provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 07-16R, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or by email at [email protected]. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

Warfighting 3.0

By Maj Ian T Brown

In February, I was privileged to attend the Force Development–25 Innovation Symposium. In two exciting days of lectures and workshops, everything from refining Expeditionary Force 21 to mobile 3D printers to autonomous nanobots building their own autonomous drones was scrutinized with pioneering eyes. Yet curiously absent from this soup-to-nuts assessment of all things Marine Corps was one item: Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting. Why? If we are serious about institutional innovation, how can we ignore the engine that drives everything else?

About now, I can hear accusations running from presumptuousness to heresy. Since 1989, Warfighting has been the muse guiding combat operations from DESERT STORM to ENDURING FREEDOM. Much in the Marine Corps has changed, but Warfighting remains our northern star. Gen Alfred M. Gray, among our most innovative commandants, lent it the full weight of his office. Brilliant thinkers like John Boyd provided its intellectual foundations. John Schmitt, a master of analysis and synthesis, wrote it. Do I think I could do better?

I don’t claim to be John Boyd or Gen Gray. But—risking even greater presumption—I think they’d acknowledge the value, in principle, of giving their work a fresh look. Boyd did not believe in closed systems or “final” theories, observing that if you stuck with Clausewitz as your theoretical model, your mind hadn’t moved beyond 1832.1 Almost as soon as Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 was published, Boyd called Schmitt and outlined ways to improve it.2 Indeed, thinking that Warfighting hasn’t changed since its inception is mistaken. In 1997, Gen Charles Krulak enlisted Schmitt and Boyd to revise it extensively. In MCDP 1 (Warfighting version 2.0), Krulak’s thoughts on doctrinal evolution were clear:

Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself.3

In less than a decade, Warfighting was published and then revised. Yet two decades later, it remains untouched. In that timeframe, the Marine Corps has been transformed by the Information Age, fought two major wars, and now faces a geopolitical landscape utterly unlike that of the late 20th century. It is a world where materiel revolutions are no longer exclusively ours, leaving thought as the last realm open to exploitation.4 And yet, to paraphrase Boyd, our institutional philosophy hasn’t moved beyond 1997. I suspect sages like Krulak and Boyd would agree that reassessing Warfighting is a tad overdue.

In that spirit, I humbly offer some ideas for refining certain aspects of MCDP 1. My list is not comprehensive, nor do I argue that it is always right. Rather, I hope to generate thought and discussion as part of our institutional recommitment to innovation. If everything is on the table, our warfighting philosophy should not escape scrutiny.

Methodology

My suggestions follow the chapter structure within MCDP 1. I’m not offering wholesale replacement of text but will instead bring up major themes as points of departure for discussion. I cover only Chapters 2 through 4; Chapter 1 remains a brilliant synthesis of war’s nature, and I would not dare tinker with it. Finally, I’m approaching the manual from the framework outlined by Dr. Charles Oliviero in his model of “war-centered military theory.”5 This model differentiates between “philosophy,” “theory,” “strategy,” and “TTP” (tactics, techniques, and procedures), which are often misunderstood and erroneously interchanged. Per his model,

… philosophies are the underlying sets of beliefs upon which a society, including its armed forces, bases all that it does. Theories are compilations of principles and premises to aid in understanding.6


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Both Gens Gray and Krulak described Warfighting as a philosophy, with the publication defining that philosophy and teasing it out into “Marine Corps theory.” Capstone doctrine should operate at those levels, and some of my offered amendments remove aspects of the manual that go below them.

Chapter 2 – The Theory of War

“Levels of War.”7While Warfighting hints at the Information Age impact on compressing levels of war, the evidence of two decades of conflict demands that we reassess both the levels and degree of compression. Warfighting illustrates that the traditional levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—sometimes overlap, with small unit tactical decisions having strategic effects.8 It also notes that above military strategy lies the level of national strategy;9 omitting further discussion of national strategy implies that such lofty goals are of little interest to the frontline warrior. If the last 20 years taught us anything, it is that the Information Age has flattened the levels of war such that one is almost indistinguishable from the other; that there are higher levels that the frontline warrior must comprehend; and that our “strategic corporal’s” actions can directly impact the Nation’s highest goals. This flattening is depicted in Figure 1, a model adopted from the works of John Boyd and Emile Simpson.10

From the abuses at Abu Ghraib to the Madrid train bombings, it is clearly no longer sufficient to say that tactical actions have “strategic” effects; rather, in the seconds required to upload a picture or video to the Internet, the repercussions of tactical actions are catapulted to the top level of national leadership and radically alter national goals.

Yet the consequences of this flattening are not wholly negative. In the Information Age, a handful of strategic corporals may achieve strategic or national goals that were once only accomplished by large armies or the combined resources of multiple Federal agencies. The key lies in both the strategic corporal and national leadership recognizing this new dynamic and understanding what responsibilities each owes the other. This will be discussed further in the “grand ideal.”

“Styles of Warfare.”

Styles in warfare can be described by their place on a spectrum of attrition and maneuver. Warfare by attrition pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower. On the other end of the spectrum is warfare by maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on.11

Were it ever possible to argue that “attrition versus maneuver” covered the full gamut of warfare “styles”—a tenuous argument, as labeling the style maneuver caused unnecessary confusion at the outset, and our maneuver warfare is less about dimensional movement and “more about how a commander interprets battlespace and then applies combat power to achieve a desired outcome”12—it is surely no longer possible today. The examples provided in MCDP 1 unintentionally demonstrate the narrow scope of such a spectrum: with the exception of the Combined Action Program in Vietnam, all feature conventional uniformed force-on-uniformed-force combat under a formal declaration of hostilities.13 That is not the world we live in now.

Conventional, irregular, asymmetric, catastrophic—the list of modern warfare styles could fill this magazine and still be incomplete. Nor is warfare restricted to the use of military force, as two Chinese officers pointed out at the turn of the century. Cyber war, trade war, ecological war, and a host of other methods can fall under the rubric of styles; thus contemporary war includes “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”14 Today’s warfare is “beyond limits,”15 but unlike the total war of World War II, war “beyond limits” combines “ten thousand methods” to achieve one goal. It merges national, international, and non-state organizations; cross-domain solutions; and military and non-military means.16 It leverages the strategic corporal (or hacker, or aid worker) to give tactical acts national-level effects.17 It is a “street fight,” with each side fighting for its own reasons and by its own rules.18 It recognizes that “the struggle for victory will take place on a battlefield beyond the battlefield.”19 Today’s style is Russia hacking the State Department email system or sending “little green men” into Crimea and the Ukraine; it is China hacking records in the Office of Personnel Management and militarizing the South China Sea under the guise of “land reclamation;” it is Iran hacking into the computer system of a New York state dam and using American hostages to further its nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions; it is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) using the Internet to radicalize and advise lone wolves in the conduct of complex terrorist attacks without requiring that the radicalized travel to ISIS-held territory for training. Today’s style is ten thousand styles, only a few of which cross into the domain of traditional military force.

Determining which style we’re to face, and thus what style we should use to counter, comes through our orientation in preparing for war. But before moving on, let me point out one additional and uncomfortable attribute amongst these styles: the United States cannot assume materiel supremacy in any of them. Indeed, nations like China have poured resources into developing parity and/or superiority in other styles specifically to negate our conventional military supremacy (often the only style America worries about).20 Some might counter that the American military accepts the implications of materiel parity and retains supremacy in the quality of its individual warriors. Yet, given the global availability of genetic, robotic, and nanotechnology, we can’t even assume that we’ll have the edge in “building a better soldier.” Should America someday field warriors with physical and cognitive enhancements, our adversaries will likely be capable of fielding “enhanced” soldiers as well.21 With a level playing field in physical and mental factors, one realm remains open for exploitation in achieving superiority: the moral. This realm lies beyond nukes and neurons; its intangibility means it cannot be hacked, spliced, or enhanced with nanobots. But it can be manipulated, and the “ten thousand combinations” of styles enable this. Thus, the Marine Corps should aim to fight in the realm of moral warfare, and I elaborate on this in Chapter 4. First, however, we will explore two complementary elements that should be included in a modern theory of war: a theory of deception and the “grand ideal” or strategic narrative.

“Surprise and Boldness.”22 MCDP 1 suborns deception as one element of many in the category of surprise, with surprise itself a mere sub-element of generating combat power. Looking at today’s adversaries and today’s world—in which combat power is merely one card of many played in warfare “beyond limits”—I believe this relationship is dangerously inverted. “Warfare is the Way of deception … [one] gains victory through the unorthodox [ch’i],” as war’s first master stated 3,000 years ago.23 How did we lose sight of this? Any theory of war should include a theory of deception, of the “unorthodox;” yet the American military traditionally employs deception on an ad hoc basis, tossed aside when no longer needed. This is not the case among our adversaries today, all of whom ingrain deception into their own philosophical and theoretical frameworks.

With Sun Tzu, I have already touched on China; since the mid-1980s, Chinese defense thinkers have shown renewed interest in their nation’s classical military writings as they seek unorthodox ways to counter American military superiority.24 Aside from the instances of hacking and corporate espionage that we’re aware of, Chinese institutional deception rises high enough to obfuscate their real levels of defense spending.25

Radical Islam has its own deception modality—taqiyya— grounded in Shari’a law and derived from Muhammad’s assertion after the Battle of the Trench that “war is deceit.”26 Taqiyya is a complex concept—it was originally developed in Shi’ite communities to avoid persecution by Sunni Muslims—but its definition now encompasses any active deceit used by the faithful to gain advantage over non-believers. As all schools of Islamic jurisprudence have validated it, Sunni radicals like Osama bin Laden have no compunction using taqiyya in their operations against the West.27 Yet Iran (appropriately, as the theological home of taqiyya) has raised the concept to high art in its international dealings. Taqiyya, kitman, khod’eh, taarof, and a host of other concepts related to deception and disinformation enjoy long usage in Persian Islamic thought, justifying everything from financing terrorist operations abroad to masking the extent of the Iranian nuclear program at home.28

But Russia has arguably the most refined theory of deception. For decades, Russia practiced what is popularly known in the West as maskirovka, or “concealment.” This is a poor translation of the term, and a tribute to Russia’s employment of deception that maskirovka remains misunderstood. Its definition has evolved significantly since first employed, and today it is a subset of the broader Russian concept of voennaya khitrost, or “military cunning/stratagem.”29 As with taqiyya, voennaya khitrost covers not only passive measures but active steps taken to cloud and bend an enemy’s perceptions. Most importantly, Russia has long viewed deception as a critical combat support activity to be taught to leadership cadres from military schools to the Defense Ministry and integrated into planning from the tactical to the grand strategic levels.30 Russia’s recent Crimean and Ukranian expeditions bring the power of its deception operations into stark clarity.31

Today, we face adversaries for whom deception is not an “oh, by the way” function but a key component of the philosophies each uses to achieve its national goals. Across decades, China, Russia, and Iran have developed deception modalities that are entrenched in their culture, practiced in a whole-of-state approach, and integrated within their militaries at all levels. Their approach is not merely passive, seeking to hide their own capability. Take Russia in the Ukraine: Russia so corrupted and corroded the information flowing into their adversaries’ decision-making apparatus that both the Ukraine and European Union actively contributed to Russia’s own ends. Such unconscious collaboration goes well beyond making an adversary “act in a manner prejudicial to his own interests.”32 We must elevate deception to the same level in our warfighting theory. While the whole-of-state approach requires buy-in beyond the Marine Corps, there is no reason we can’t implement a whole-of-institution approach on our own. The Information Age offers myriad new opportunities to deceive an adversary across the five domains and in his own mind. I offer some suggestions for this in the conclusion.

Looking at deception, one sees that it preys upon negative factors—menace, uncertainty, mistrust—in order to “pump-up friction … to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation” within an enemy.33 While deception may degrade or spoof some of the enemy’s physical systems, its greatest impact lies in corroding the enemy’s “spiritual” systems, his moral cohesion. The obverse of this negative, enemy-focused moral attack is the positive, self-focused moral amplifier Boyd labeled the “grand ideal.” This concept integrates the positive moral factors of insight, initiative, adaptability, and harmony into a “unifying vision … used to attract the uncommitted as well as pump-up friendly resolve.”34 Whereas deception seeks to corrode and corrupt an enemy’s moral cohesion, the grand ideal engenders friendly cohesion, acting as a spiritual anchor while allowing one to adapt and thrive to changing circumstances. The Nation’s leaders generate this positive vision, using it to “surface courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make [sic] possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.”35

An esoteric concept, Emile Simpson recently laid out a more pragmatic application of Boyd’s ideal which Simpson labels the “strategic narrative.” One’s grand ideal or narrative comes down to an explanation of actions crafted to persuade people of something, and which is tailored to an audience.36 In modern conflict with flattened levels of war and a global stage connected by digital communications, this narrative must be customized for each audience—friendly, enemy, and indifferent—while internalized for execution by all players from the national leadership down to the strategic corporal. Figure 2 shows this model, illustrating how the narrative is modified for audiences at lower levels of war while remaining nested in the larger ideal.37

As with Boyd, the power of Simpson’s narrative comes from several components: a permanently aspirational moral component, or ethos; historical association, drawn from and tailored to the experiences of each audience; and confidence in one’s vision, values, and intentions.38

Simpson adds a crucial component to this narrative absent from Boyd’s construct: a feedback mechanism from the strategic corporal to the Nation’s leadership. The grand ideal is our Nation’s “desire;” and while it is well and good to push that desire down to the tactical level—ensuring that the least of the warfighter’s activities supports the national goal—national leadership needs a way to determine whether those desires are feasible when the rubber meets the road. War is a brutal judge of whether an idea works; leadership must be open to the realistic “possibility” assessment delivered up from the idea’s implementation at the tactical level (see Figure 1). Ideal and real must communicate with each other through all levels of war, with players at each level feeding into this cycle and keeping the gap between desire and possibility as small as possible.39

While the power of the grand ideal was understood in past conflicts—especially those driven by ideologies40—our recent operations applied it imperfectly. Its importance makes it central to preparing for war, which will be discussed next.

Chapter 3 – Preparing for War

In a book operating at the level of philosophy and theory, Chapter 3’s content feels out of place. Discussions on force planning and personnel management, while important, do not rise to either level; they are more suited to an appendix or different manual altogether. Instead, I’d offer that at the theoretical level, the key concept in preparing for war is orientation: on our enemy, but also—perhaps more importantly—on ourselves. MCDP 1’s Chapter 4 includes a brief discussion of orientation, but I believe it’s worthy of a chapter all its own.

The second “O” in his observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop, John Boyd first defined orientation in Organic Design for Command and Control:

Orientation is an interactive process of many sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections that is shaped by and shapes the interplay of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences and unfolding circumstances.41

In The Essence of Winning and Losing, Boyd offered his only graphic representation of the concept (see Figure 3), which makes clear the criticality of orientation to the OODA process.42

Of the five “key statements” in the brief, distilling the most important concepts from Boyd’s 30 years of research, three deal with orientation.43 Could I “foot stomp” on paper, it would be here: orientation, with its inputs, outputs, and processes, was Boyd’s cornerstone for victory or defeat. On its surface, it does not seem a novel concept—Sun Tzu arguably captured its tenets thousands of years ago44—but Boyd’s was an understanding and implementation of orientation without parallel.

One may ask why orientation deserves such emphasis; after all, it sounds suspiciously like “problem framing” or “mission analysis.” It is much more than that: as it functions primarily in the moral realm, it remains our and our potential adversary’s last arena for achieving superiority. “Genetic heritage”—the physical makeup of one’s body and mind—can be enhanced; knowledge is vastly more accessible both individually and collectively in the Information Age.45 What’s left is how well we understand and exploit orientation. We orient with our own filters, as does our enemy; we need to identify those filters. By knowing them, we can corrupt them, which is the goal of moral warfare. In assessing our adversary’s orientation, we learn his style of war. We must also realize that we need more than one orientation. To avoid predictability to our enemies and ensure adaptability to future threats, we require a “repertoire of orientation patterns,” and people with a wide variety of backgrounds and experience so that we have even more filters available for application.46

Finally, to fully exploit orientation in future warfare, we need another filter in the mix: the grand ideal/strategic narrative outlined above. In moral warfare, that is the filter which guides, however subtly, each action across every level of war. It is a constant in the analysis and synthesis that transitions orientation to decision. This turns orientation into the “supra-orientation” that Boyd believed was the foundation for success in moral warfare (see Figure 4).47

Chapter 4 – The Conduct of War

Let me caveat that I do not propose discarding maneuver warfare. It remains a valuable operational construct for our conventional forces. But moral warfare subsumes maneuver warfare in itself while layering on additional concepts. These concepts seek to employ unorthodox (or Sun Tzu’s ch’i) forces and use conventional forces in unorthodox ways.48

Two examples from today’s preeminent practitioner of moral warfare highlight its possibilities:

[Russia] paralyzes the target state’s functions by all means necessary to implement “deep penetration.” In this regard, the Ukrainian intelligence apparatus, and probably high political echelons too, was so systematically penetrated by several Russian intelligence agencies … that although the Ukrainian General Staff warned Kiev about “unusual Russian activity in Crimea” in January 2014, this was completely ignored.49

The campaign’s success can be measured by the fact that in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered. Instead of relying on a mass deployment of tanks and artillery, the Crimean campaign deployed less than 10,000 assault troops—mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos—against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel. In addition, the heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR-80 armored personnel carrier.50

The remarkable thing about the second example is the parallel between the Russian units employed and the Marine Corps’ current force structure. To wit: we are already positioned to do this. We just need a few more ch’i elements—most of which currently exist in some form—to fulfill moral warfare’s promise.

Boyd outlined the factors and aims that a nation using moral warfare would direct at its adversary.51 He did not otherwise provide a theoretical construct for its execution; fortunately, one may be found in a highly-developed Russian theory, which the Kremlin is increasingly adept at exercising. This is the concept of “reflexive control,” which combines orientation and deception into a ruthless form of moral warfare.

Reflexive control mirrors maneuver warfare in that it interferes with the enemy’s decision-making process. It is a means of conveying to … an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.52

It targets both human/mental and computer-based decision-making processors. A brief summary shows how it brings orientation and deception into play:

‘Reflexive control’ occurs when the controlling organ conveys (to the objective system) motives and reasons that cause it to reach the desired decision … the nature of which is maintained in strict secrecy. The decision itself is made independently. A ‘reflex’ itself involves the specific process of imitating the enemy’s reasoning or imitating the enemy’s possible behavior and causes him to make a decision unfavorable to himself.

In fact, the enemy comes up with a decision based on the idea of the situation which he has formed, to include the disposition of our troops and installations and the command element’s intentions known to him. Such an idea is shaped above all by intelligence and other factors, which rest on a stable set of concepts, knowledge, ideas and, finally, experience. This set usually is called the ‘filter,’ which helps a commander separate necessary from useless information, true data from false and so on. [emphasis added]

The chief task of reflexive control is to locate the weak link of the filter and exploit it.53

Described here is a theory directed expressly against the enemy’s orientation, complete with a similar characterization of the filters from Boyd’s model. Reflexive control clogs, corrupts, and corrodes the information going into those filters to manipulate the enemy on the moral plane. It depends on levels of deception so profound that every input to an adversary’s OODA loop is distorted, closing the loop to everything but that which we choose to feed into it. It implements the destructive and constructive sides of Boyd’s moral warfare by attacking enemy linkages and isolating his components (destructive) and feeding deception into his loop at all points to build a false picture (creative), thus driving what limited actions the enemy takes toward our own ends. We may even want to keep some or all of the enemy’s linkages intact to better corrupt them, to feed into his confusion and uncertainty, and keep his loop closed (see Figure 5).

Such control demands a truly perceptive and comprehensive understanding of the enemy’s orientation, to “see” through his filters as he would.54 We must know the thought processes of his soldiers and politicians, from privates through top commanders; we must

… be aware of his military doctrine, how leaders are taught to use the services and branches, historical precedents, the nation’s principles for using men and equipment during operations.55

As I stated, this does not replace maneuver warfare. We should still strive to operate at a faster relative tempo than our enemy, keeping our decision-making process intact and dynamic while disrupting his own. But in applying our supra-orientation to the enemy, we may discover that “[seeking] to shatter” his cohesion, or making him realize that he “cannot cope” with the situation,56 are not ideal goals. Maybe the enemy does not need to be shattered or paralyzed in toto. By using deception and the ten thousand combinations of warfare beyond limits, we can inject menace, uncertainty, and mistrust into his decision-making system across all levels of war and allow his feedback loops to magnify their effects over time.57 If, by so doing, we can degrade his system’s cohesion and adaptability—and keep it degraded—the end result may suit us equally well as shattering him, with fewer resources expended.

Conversely, some adversaries never admit that they “cannot cope;” the Japanese forces of World War II and hardcore Islamists today come to mind. An enemy maneuvered into not coping may also suddenly decide that he can cope again:

… to call an enemy defeated because he has accepted the likelihood of actual physical defeat while his forces are largely intact may prove short-lived if he changes his mind.58

By poisoning the enemy’s orientation so that he cannot respond effectively, and by corroding his cohesion and adaptability, I really don’t care whether he refuses to despair or despairs and then changes his mind. Finally, perhaps we want to let the enemy think he is coping: by clouding and corrupting his inputs, the enemy will simply be coping with a situation detached from reality. By so closing his loop, he may truly believe he is coping until the bitter end.

In doing these negative things to the enemy, let’s not forget the positive aspect of moral warfare that works simultaneously to bolster our moral advantage. As we feed our adversaries friction, fog, and fear, the grand ideal inculcates in our troops and countrymen moral supremacy, motivates our allies, and further undercuts our adversary by its contrast. We adapt this ideal to each level of war as it travels down from the national leadership to the strategic corporal, adjusting it when necessary as its results travel back upward. We tell our story loudly through every venue, and across all levels of war; our enemy’s narrative cannot get out, and is incoherent and unhinged from reality if it does.

Conclusion

The above may imply that the Marine Corps must undertake significant restructuring to employ this type of warfare. This is not so, as our MAGTF is already scalable up or down and contains the cheng (“orthodox”) force embedded within. We stand a mobile, rapid response force well-versed in maneuver warfare tempo and exploiting decision loops; we have the foundation upon which to build a ch’i structure. This structure requires more robust cyber, information, and propaganda arms to cloud and corrupt the enemy’s orientation. We have great capabilities for this in our agencies at home; we need the authority to borrow them, make them expeditionary, and employ them without extra interference from above the MAGTF commander. And we have a compelling argument—duty, even—to request such resources and authority be given the MAGTF. We are America’s first responders, and in a flattened world where the levels of war are virtually coexistent, that first responder may be the only chance for a decisive response.

We must also look at how we can use our orthodox forces in unorthodox ways, “beyond limits.” Imagine a MAGTF whose forcible entry did not risk expensive stealth aircraft in negotiating an integrated air defense system or expose ships to antiaccess/area denial missile systems, but instead could shut down a power grid; spoof local social media accounts; jam satellites; snarl ground and air traffic patterns; ignite forest fires to tie up military assets; reprogram valve sequences for oil, natural gas, and water pipelines to disrupt distribution; delete or alter military equipment maintenance records; or crash financial networks before inserting “little green men” of its own to sow further confusion and mayhem. Pushing this forward to the MAGTF vice sheltering it in the continental United States is critical should an adversary attempt—which they will—to cut or degrade our own global connectivity. Putting ch’i assets with the MAGTF lets us bring moral warfare to the enemy regardless of how he affects our other global linkages.

But before we can do this, we must be willing to look hard at our basic philosophy of conflict. As I said at the outset, such an assessment is necessary if, as an institution, we mean to walk the walk on innovation. Per Gen Krulak, we cannot allow ourselves to stagnate; thus, in adjusting our Corps to the world in which we live, not even Warfighting is sacrosanct. Today’s world, with its flattened levels of war, interconnectivity, and information saturation, is primed for moral warfare. We must understand it and be ready to operate within it.

Notes

1. John R. Boyd, “Discourse on Winning and Losing,” lecture to USMC Command and Staff College, 25 April 1989, tape 1, side 1 (8 audio cassettes/8 compact discs), Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

2. John F. Schmitt, interview by LtCol Sean Callahan, 21 February 2013, transcript, Oral and Video History Section, History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1997), Forward.

4. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America, (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002), 94.

5. Dr. Charles Oliviero, The Complex Web of Western Military Theory: A New Model for the Investigation of Western Military Theory, (Doctoral dissertation, Royal Military College of Canada, 2006), 30. This dissertation is a draft of a larger book on military theory currently in revision by Dr. Oliviero. This author is grateful for Dr. Oliviero’s permission to cite his work in this article.

6. Ibid., 16.

7. Warfighting, 28–32.

8. Ibid., 31–32.

9. Ibid., 28.

10. John R. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” in A Discourse on Winning and Losing, (unpublished manuscript, 1987), 141; Emile Simpson, War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics, (London: Hurst and Company, 2012), 91–109.

11. Warfighting, 36–37.

12. LtCol Michael D. Wyly, “Those Confusing Ms,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: September 1983): 30; Oliviero, 252.

13. Warfighting, 37–39.

14. Liang and Xiangsui, xxi–xxii, 38–43.

15. Ibid., 155.

16. Ibid., 155–168.

17. Ibid., 168–171.

18. Simpson, 35.

19. Liang and Xiangsui, 153.

20. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015), 134–155.

21. Maj Michael Regner, Human Performance Commoditization and Future War: The Requirement for a Dominant Spirituality, (Future War Paper, School of Advanced Warfighting, 2016), 3–5. Disclaimer: the opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the School of Advanced Warfighting or any other Governmental agency. The author is grateful for Maj Regner’s permission to cite his work.

22. Warfighting, 42–44.

23. Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 158, 165.

24. Ralph D. Sawyer, The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 328–329; Pillsbury, 11, 50.

25. Pillsbury, 141.

26. Raymond Ibrahim, “How Taqiyya Alters Islam’s Rules of War,” Middle East Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 3–6.

27. Ibid., 3–13.

28. Dr. Andrew Campbell, “Iran’s Nuclear Deception: Taqiyya and Kitman (Part I),” National Observer 67, (Summer 2006), 8–25; Idem., “Iran and Deception Modalities: The Reach of Taqiyya, Kitman, Khod’eh, and Taarof,National Observer 70, (Spring 2006), 25–48. Kitman is the justified concealment of the full truth by telling only a part or fraction of the truth. Khod’eh is defined as “trickery,” taarof as “indirection or expediency.”

29. Christopher D. Jones, “Soviet military doctrine as strategic deception: An offensive military strategy for defense of the socialist fatherland,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 16, no. 3 (September 2003), 33, 45, 47; Richard J. Heuer, Jr., “Soviet Organization and Doctrine for Strategic Deception,” in Soviet Strategic Deception, eds. Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 42–43; Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology Through Toughness, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), 107–117, 383–386.

30. Thomas, 116; Heuer, 43; Notra Trulock III, “The Role of Deception in Soviet Military Planning,” Soviet Strategic Deception, eds. Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 280–282.

31. Lucy Ash, “How Russia outfoxes its enemies,” BBC News Magazine, accessed 24 February 2016 at http://www.bbc.com; Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, “Putin Ushers in a New Era of Global Geopolitics,” Institute for the Study of War, last updated 27 September 2015, accessed 24 February 2016 at http://www.understandingwar.org; Maria Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, last updated 17 September 2015, accessed 24 February 2016 at http://understandingwar.org; Can Kasapoglu, “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control,” NATO Defense College, last updated 25 November 2015, accessed 24 February 2016 at http://www.ndc.nato.int; Julian Lindley-French, “NATO: Countering Strategic Maskirovka,Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, last updated May 2015, accessed 24 February 2016 at https://cloudfront.net.

32. Warfighting, 43–44.

33. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, 125.

34. Ibid., 143–144.

35. Ibid., 125, 143

36. Simpson, 179–188.

37. Ibid., 182.

38. Ibid., 207–226.

39. Ibid., 117–128. This is also hinted at in Liang and Xiangsui, 185.

40. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, II, (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 89; David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 300; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 29, 195–196; David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 71–72, 76–92.

41. Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 193.

42. John Boyd, “The Essence of Winning and Losing,” Defense and the National Interest, last updated 6 December 2007, accessed 24 February 2016 at http://pogoarchives.org, 4.

43. Ibid., 2.

44. Sun Tzu, 157.

45. Regner, 3–5; Maj Paul Tremblay, Jr., Shaping and Adapting: Unlocking the power of Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop, (Master of Military Studies paper, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2015), 11. Disclaimer: the opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Marine Corps Command and Staff College or any other Governmental agency.

46. Frans P. B. Osinga, “The Enemy as a Complex Adaptive System: John Boyd and Airpower in the Postmodern Era,” in Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd, ed. John Andreas Olsen, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 80.

47. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, 143.

48. Sawyer, 67.

49. Kasapoglu, 3–4.

50. Ibid., 6–7.

51. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, 125, 136.

52. Thomas, 118; see also Clifford Reid, “Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning,” in Soviet Strategic Deception, eds. Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 294–295; Snegovaya, 10.

53. Thomas, 123.

54. Ibid., 125; Reid, 295; Snegovaya, 10.

55. Thomas, 134.

56. Warfighting, 73.

57. Osinga, “The Enemy as a Complex Adaptive System,” 77, 81.

58. Simpson, 185.

The Warfighting Skills Program

By LtCol Gregory A Thiele

There is great news for those interested in understanding or teaching others about the changes in warfare that have taken place in the last 350 years. The Warfighting Skills Program has been scanned and posted online. The Warfighting Skills Program was a correspondence course offered by the Marine Corps Institute to junior officers in the late 1990s. It did an excellent job of teaching maneuver warfare concepts. It also provided students with the historical background necessary to understand maneuver warfare so that they could continue their personal education plan in a meaningful way.

Understanding of maneuver warfare and its integral concepts has sunk to an abysmal level in the last few years. Professional military education has come to be nearly a contradiction in terms. The lack of serious thought and discussion about military affairs within the military is extremely troubling. The Warfighting Skills Program is a first step to addressing these conditions.

The Warfighting Skills Program consists of five books. The first book, Tactical Fundamentals, provides a basic understanding of maneuver warfare. The second book, Small Unit Tactical Problems, requires students to provide solutions to a variety of tactical decision games (TDGs) that will test and deepen their understanding of maneuver warfare. Book three, Combat Techniques, discusses techniques useful for a maneuver warfare force as well as how to develop future techniques because techniques must evolve as the enemy adapts. Book four, Marine Corps Leadership, addresses leadership principles appropriate for a maneuver warfare force. Book five, Combined Arms, teaches the student the appropriate manner to employ combined arms in support of maneuver warfare.

This course is particularly well adapted to teaching young NCOs about maneuver warfare. There are a number of small unit TDGs and discussion questions included in the course.

The Marine Corps discontinued the requirement for Marines to complete the Warfighting Skills Program some years ago. Since then, the books have gone out of print and are exceedingly difficult to find. Fortunately, they have each been scanned and can now be found online. Those wishing to download copies should visit www.themaneuverist.org. The Warfighting Skills Program can be found in its own folder under the “Resources” tab. Those desiring access to the site must create a user identification and password, but there is far more information on maneuver warfare on the site than just the Warfighting Skills Program; www.themaneuverist.org may be the most comprehensive site for maneuver warfare resources available on the Internet.

Young leaders and those interested in military affairs once again have access to the Warfighting Skills Program. This is a significant opportunity and one not to be missed for those seeking to improve their own or other Marines’ understanding of maneuver warfare.

Military Ethics

By Maj Dennis W Katolin

The DOD does not have a comprehensive approach toward ethics. While many leaders place emphasis on the subject, they do not have a simple and comprehensive approach toward defining ethics. In light of this shortfall, the following article is designed to provide a tool for leaders to link ethical conduct with the Marine Corps’ success across the range of military operations.

With a basic definition for ethics (adherence of one’s actions to their values), one can address military ethics and how they are valuable to the Marine Corps. Military ethics focuses on the qualities that are valuable to a military organization. These qualities become a unit’s values, and military ethics are the application of those values through action.

Ethics and Trust

Trust is defined as reliance on the integrity, strength, and ability of a person or organization. Ethics is the foundation of facilitating trust. Our actions (good or bad) communicate our true intentions and speak to what is (or is not) valuable to us. Consequently, a person’s actions will show others if he truly believes in his values. If someone is behaving ethically, he is communicating that he believes in certain values and will allow those values to drive his actions. This is often referred to as “character.”

When a Marine demonstrates his strength of character, others will gravitate toward him because the consistency of his ethical action makes him reliable. Reliability is the fundamental component of trust.

Trust and Maneuver Warfare

Warfighting states that “Maneuver Warfare is the warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions.”1 Cohesion is critical to this philosophy. Without it, an organization’s will to fight will erode, leaving it unable to cope with the deteriorating situations in which war places us. Our warfighting philosophy is centrally focused on cohesion. It is critical to any unit’s ability to succeed in war.

Sustaining The Transformation states that

cohesion is the intense bonding of Marines and units that results in absolute trust. It is characterized by the subordination of self and an intuitive understanding of the collective actions of the unit and of the importance of teamwork, resulting in increased combat power.2

The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy focuses on the destruction of the enemy’s cohesion, not the enemy itself. This emphasizes the value of cohesion as a potential source of strength for our unit. To facilitate cohesion, Marines must become trustworthy; they must be consistent performers whose actions are reliably driven through institutional values. A clear understanding of values and morals compels a person’s ethics; ethics make a person reliable and trustworthy to others; and this facilitates cooperation, which provides the cohesion. Cohesion leads to success in war. (See Figure 1.)

Military organizations require strong teamwork, unit cohesion, and loyalty. These qualities are at a premium on the battlefield, given the complexities, friction, and danger that are inherent in war. One source of friction and uncertainty are other Marines. Uncertainty in the unit’s ability to perform, to adhere to guidance, or to be obedient to orders deteriorates trust, thus minimizing cooperation and, ultimately, compromising our cohesion.

Marines can minimize such uncertainty by serving as “known goods.” Ethical adherence to our core values of honor, courage, and commitment will facilitate trust and cohesion. The stronger our cohesion, the less likely the enemy will be able to destroy it, minimizing their ability to use maneuver warfare against us.

Trust, stemming from ethical conduct, is the most important element of unit cohesion. By demonstrating ethical conduct, a Marine earns the trust of others. When a Marine shows he is trustworthy, he becomes a source of reliability, minimizing the impacts of friction.

 

Ethical Leaders and Followers

The understanding of vertical cohesion requires that both senior and subordinate alike are trustworthy and cooperate with each other so they can facilitate a unit’s cohesion. To become an ethical leader, one must strive to uphold the Marine Corps’ leadership traits. These traits are the values of a leader. Consequently, ethical leaders must use the values in JJDIDTIEBUCKLE (judgment, justice, dependability, integrity, decisiveness, tact, initiative, endurance, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, enthusiasm) to help shape their actions, consistently aligning them with our core values. In doing so, a leader will become trustworthy and inspire others to follow him. Being ethical allows unit leaders to cooperate with good followers and achieve unit cohesion. (See Figure 2.)

While being an ethical leader is challenging, it is made easier by the fact that the Marine Corps has clearly defined these traits and educates all its leaders on what they are and how to achieve them.

It is a common misconception that leadership is more important than followership. This is often the result of an overemphasis that we have placed on leadership in our history. While many Marines are leaders, all Marines are followers. Without followership, vertical cohesion cannot be achieved, and a unit will fail.

Consequently, a Marine must strive to be an ethical follower. This means he must be someone who can complement his organization’s leadership to facilitate cooperation. In order to be an ethical follower, one must adhere to values that help him complement his leader.

What are the values of an ethical follower? They are the exact same as those of a leader. The only difference between a leader and a follower is the moral lens of how he applies those traits. Just as a leader uses bearing, integrity, and loyalty to become reliable and trustworthy to his followers, a follower must show bearing, integrity, and loyalty to be reliable and trustworthy to his leaders.

The difference between an ethical leader and a follower is not what his values are but how he applies them to achieve unit cohesion. The moral lens determines if he is doing so.

Ethics and the Nature of War

War is the violent clash of wills to achieve a political end. By its nature, warfare is painful, difficult, dangerous, and stressful. These characteristics cause a military force’s power to erode. The ability to think, move, and communicate become more and more challenging as war progresses, resulting in a culminating point. The concept of culmination is often applied to physical and mental capability, where someone either physically can no longer move, or mentally cannot concentrate, focus, or even think.

Just as war can cause someone to culminate physically or mentally, it can also cause a Marine to culminate morally. In the extreme environments of war, a person will begin to see that adherence to one’s values may come at a cost, which will exacerbate the elements of friction.

The elements of fatigue, hunger, or sleep deprivation naturally make a person long for rest, food, and normal comforts. When these qualities in warfare become extreme, a person may become desperate to end them. This begins a tendency for someone to “go internal” and focus on his own discomfort.

Ethics can be perceived as a meta-motivation, which is to say that we can afford to be motivated by values because our basic physiological needs are met. But when the physiological needs of food, water, clothing, and shelter are absent, people naturally focus their efforts toward fulfilling those needs.

This is outlined in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. The level 5 need of “self-actualization” facilitates a Marine’s ability to reflect on values and how to apply them in action. A failure to meet levels 1–4 will compromise a Marine’s ability to think on level 5 issues.3 (See Figure 3.)

It is at this point when a Marine may fail to incorporate her/his values. This occurs as s/he slowly slides down Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and begins to realize the basic need for safety is not being met. As war persists, the removal of basic needs (or perceived removal of basic needs) will tempt Marines to focus internally. When this happens, views on values shift. Values that were once the bedrock of one’s moral character have now become an unaffordable luxury. War quickly compels someone to focus on the need for survival or sense of belonging to a team. Those needs will take priority over self-actualization, which allows us to reflect on values.

Ethics and Will

Warfighting states that

one essential means to overcome friction is the will; we prevail over friction through persistent strength of mind and spirit. Human will, instilled through leadership, is the driving force of all action in war.4

With this in mind, Marines must understand what will is, how it is cultivated, and strive to develop it as much as possible.

Will is the purpose or determination to choose one’s own actions. A key principle of will is having the resolve that what one is doing is necessary or right. Consequently, a Marine’s need to think about what is right and how to put that into action is a critical component to his resolve. Ultimately, one’s understanding and belief in what is right strengthens his will.

Ethics’ inherent requirement to reflect on traits and qualities that are valuable helps Marines to internalize the importance of the institution’s values. While being able to state those values is good, the understanding of their worth is what compels a Marine to act in accordance with those values. This helps a Marine determine what the right thing to do is.

The more a Marine understands and believes in those values (and why they are important to him and his unit), the stronger his resolve will be to ensure his actions reflect those values. In short, ethics is the critical component to human will.

Ethics’ Value in War

War is an extension of both policy and politics with the application of military force. The single most important thought to understand about our theory of war is that war must serve policy. While militaries may perform tactical tasks well during combat, their actions will be useless—and possibly counterproductive—if they do not help achieve our political end.

As a result, the Marine Corps is obligated to conduct war in a manner that will achieve those ends. Military rule of law, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Geneva Convention are grounded in these principles.

The Marine Corps does not fight to simply destroy armies. Our doctrine of maneuver warfare states the opposite: that we want to erode the enemy’s will with a rapid and focused application of combat power. Though wars often compel Marines to mass destructive power when needed, the use of that power can harm our ability to support policy.

While Marines must strive to maximize combat power (both at the individual and unit level), the application of that power must fit within the guidance of policymakers. Everything from treatment of enemy prisoners of war, restrictive rules of engagement, constraints when engaging civilians, personal appearance, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures we employ all have an impact on our ability to impose the will of our political policy on the enemy.

The ethical demands of war in this context is for a Marine to honor the oath he made to obey lawful orders, even if it means less desirable outcomes in the immediate future. To do otherwise is to make tactical gains to the detriment of operational- or strategic-level goals.

Conclusion

Ethics is a critical component to our success in war. The inherent requirement for will, trust, cohesion, and cooperation in maneuver warfare compels us to understand ethics and place it at a premium. Being an ethical Marine is necessary to prevent the enemy from shattering our cohesion and facilitates the unity of command that maximizes the collective capabilities. Leaders must strive to train and educate Marines on the value of ethics in maneuver warfare and the importance of being an ethical warrior.

Notes

1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997).

2. MCRP 6-11D, Sustaining the Transformation, (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1999).

3. Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs was proposed in his 1943 paper, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” published in Psychology Review, (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association).

4. MCDP 1.

Dull Garrison Chronicles, Part II: Buy Us Some Time, Lieutenant! R

By Carl F. Kusch

Situation

This is a continuation of TDG 07-16R. You are the platoon leader for the 3d Platoon of the 3d Special Infantry Company of a provisional rifle battalion that has been deployed only recently to Dull Garrison Island in the Indian Ocean. Currently, you are located in the vicinity of the small village of Al Bandi.

The enemy is continuing its invasion of Dull Garrison Island. Against overwhelming odds and in the face of heavy casualties, the fight is not going well for your provisional rifle battalion, which has begun to consolidate into a single perimeter in the hopes that it can hold out until relieved. The 3d Company is being used to establish platoon-sized outposts across a wide front and has been instructed to trade space for time in order to give the battalion an opportunity to prepare its defensive positions.

The north-south road through Al Bandi is just one of the likely avenues of approach for the enemy’s continued advance. The enemy will be approaching from the north. Several hundred meters to the south are other fallback positions for your platoon as well as the company’s command post. The battalion’s final perimeter is located a couple kilometers to the south of those.

Your mission is to establish your first blocking position in the vicinity of Al Bandi. You are to disrupt and delay the enemy for as long as possible at this position without becoming decisively engaged. You are to fall back to your next position either when ordered to do so or when the local situation dictates. Inform the company of your withdrawal. Although most of its citizens have not yet evacuated Al Bandi, the situation has become so desperate that you have been authorized the use of its buildings as part of your position if needed. You have been assigned one machine gun squad (two M240G machine guns) and one assault squad (two SMAWs) from Weapons Platoon as well as one heavy machine gun squad (two HMMWVs, each with one .50 caliber M2 machine gun and one 40mm Mk19 machine gun) and one anti-armor squad (four AT-4 launchers) from Weapons Company. For indirect fire, the company’s 60mm and the battalion’s 81mm mortars will be available.

Requirement

In a time limit of five minutes, decide how you will deploy your platoon. Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions to the Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game 08-16R, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, or by email at [email protected]. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

Defend the Airfield, Part I* R

By Carl F. Kusch

Situation

Beginning with the fall of communism in the early 1990s, the past several years have witnessed tremendous changes throughout the world. You find yourself the commanding officer of the 1st Special Infantry Company in a provisional rifle battalion that has been formed recently and deployed (without major attachments) on a deployment for training to Dull Garrison Island in the northern region of the Indian Ocean. In part, the deployment maintains presence and replaces the more expensive regular deployment of amphibious forces. It also provides familiarization and training for potential leaders of the local defense force forming on the island.

Even before international sanctions had been lifted, the Southwest Asian nation of BAD had been secretly rebuilding its military arsenal with the intent of avenging the embarrassment suffered at the hands of the United States in 1990–91 and of accomplishing its original objectives of that period, but this time BAD has determined to do it right. You have been following the message traffic, which states that BAD has invaded its neighbor (the peace-loving nation of GOOD) and the 26th MEU with BLT 2/8 and a carrier battle group has been dispatched to the area.

You are now being told that BAD has the capability to stage limited amphibious and helicopterborne assaults using its elite Guards battalions. Furthermore, it is believed that BAD is planning an assault on the relatively large island of Dull Garrison in an effort to forestall any American effort to redevelop this island as a marshalling area. Faced with this threat, your provisional battalion is directed to deploy throughout the island and attempt to provide security until reinforcements arrive.

Your company is currently located on the southeast coast of the island in the vicinity of one of the island’s three small airfields/landing strips. Your mission is to defend the airfield so that additional forces may be introduced for the island’s defense. You have been assigned one squad each of heavy machine guns (M2 .50 caliber machine guns) and Javelins from Weapons Company. Your only indirect fire support comes from the battalion’s organic 81mm mortars. Currently, both the carrier battle group as well as the amphibious task force are too far away to provide any support.

Approximately two kilometers northeast of the airfield is the mouth of North River, the only suitable landing beach in the immediate vicinity. North River itself is extremely shallow and often dry in this arid land. You are ordered to ensure that your deployment will in no way endanger the lives or property of the good citizens living in the area.

Requirement

In a time limit of five minutes, decide how you will deploy your platoons. Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 07-16R, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or by email at [email protected]. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

*originally published in March 1992.

Are You the Next Napoleon?

In war there is no substitute for experience, no substitute for the intuitive skill that comes from repeated practice. Tactical decision games are a practice field for the tactical leader. This article explains why and how.

Think of the Great Captains of military history—Alexander, Hannibal, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Genghis Khan. We hold these men in high regard because we recognize them as military geniuses, as true masters of the art of war whose mastery of the art form clearly eclipses the mass of the merely competent. Clearly, the art of war places high demands on the intellect of military commanders, and any professional continually strives toward mastery.

The “Mystery of Mastery”

But how are such masters made? Are they born geniuses or the product of training? Napoleon’s quote makes it clear that he believed intellectual preparation was an essential factor. While natural abilities are certainly a contributing factor, psychological studies show that Napoleon was right. The pioneering work to uncover the “mystery of mastery” was done by cognitive psychologists in the 1960s and 1970s, using chess players as the subject. According to Robert J. Trotter in “The Mystery of Mastery,” Psychology Today, July 1986:

It had been assumed that the ability to think many movers ahead and consider the implications of each move was what separated the expert from the novice chess player. But in the mid 1960s, psychologist Adriaan de Groot showed that neither experts nor novices think more than a few moves ahead.

Instead:

… findings suggest that a chess master is someone who, after years of experience, can recognize as many as 100,000 meaningful board positions and make the best response to each. So instead of being a deep thinker who can see many moves ahead, the master chess player is now seen as someone with a superior ability to take in large chunks of information, recognize problem situations and respond appropriately. This explains how a chess master is able to defeat dozens of weaker players in simultaneous play. For the most part, the master relies on pattern-recognition abilities, or so-called “chess intuition,” to generate potentially good moves.

According to Robert Glaser and Michelene Chi of the University of Pittsburgh’s Learning Research and Development Center in the same Psychology Today article:

The most important principle of skill performance is that skill depends on the knowledge base. In general, the more practice one has had in some domain, the better the performance, and from all indications, this increase in expertise is due to improvements in the knowledge base.

The same principle applies to tactics—which have obvious similarities to chess—and to tacticians. And that is where tactical decision games come in.

Tactical decision games (TDGs) are a simple, fun, and effective way to improve your decision-making ability and tactical acumen to improve your mastery of the art of war. Like most skills, you can improve tactical decision-making ability through practice. The idea behind TDGs is to put you in the role of a commander facing a tactical problem, give you a limited amount of time and information, and require you to develop a plan to solve the problem. By repeatedly working through problems like these you will learn not only to make better decisions, but you will also learn to make decisions better—that is, more quickly and efficiently. You will learn to look at a situation and instantly take in its essential features, to cut right to the heart of the problem.

Coup D’oeil

In short, you will develop the skill Frederick the Great called coup d’oeil (pronounced “koo dwee”). Coup d’oeil literally means “strike of the eye,” and Frederick described it as:

The talent which great men have of conceiving in a moment all the advantages of the terrain and the use they can make of it with their army … The clever general perceives the advantages of the terrain instantly; he gains advantage from the slightest hillock, from a tiny marsh; he advances or withdraws a wing to gain superiority; he strengthens either his right or his left, moves ahead or to the rear, and profits from the merest bagatelles … Whoever has the best coup d’oeil will perceive at first glance the weak spot of the enemy and attack him there … The judgment that is exercised about the capacity of the enemy at the commencement of a battle is also called coup d’oeil. This latter is the result only of experience.

Just as the chess master immediately sees patterns and opportunities on a chess board where others see a disarray of pieces, the tactician gifted with coup d’oeil sees patterns and opportunities on the battlefield where others see chaos and confusion. While no two battlefield situations will ever be identical, the master tactician can recognize patterns on the tactical “chess board.”

Improved Tactics

Not only will you improve your ability to make decisions quickly and effectively through TDGs, but your appreciation and mastery of tactics will improve also. An understanding of tactical theory is an important foundation for tactical mastery, but theory will only take you so far. Frankly, the basic concepts behind good tactics are not all that complex, nor are they particularly hard for the average Marine to comprehend. The difficult thing is in applying those concepts to specific tactical situations—that is where true genius and the development of coup d’oeil come in.

As coup d’oeil improves, you begin to make sense of situations that made no sense before, you begin to see patterns, and in those patterns you spot opportunities and options that previously did not exist for you. As you become more experienced, you become more comfortable with a variety of different situations. You have the opportunity to experiment with different tactical ideas without having to worry about paying the price in terms of casualties. Your tactics become more ambitious. Where before an enemy movement appeared threatening, now you see it as an opportunity to strike him in the flank. Your tactics become more advanced. Where before your tactics involved simply trying to attack your enemy, now you think of ways to get him to expose himself first. By “more advanced” I do not necessarily mean more complex. A plan does not have to be more complex to exhibit a greater understanding of tactical principles, greater flexibility, a greater appreciation for the use of terrain, a greater sense of timing, or a greater range of options. Often the simplest plans are the most inspired precisely because they are the most economical.

A valuable fringe benefit of TDGs is that you become more familiar with weapons capabilities and employment techniques, the use of control measures and map symbols, and other technical details.

Tactical Decision Games Group

I say all of this out of personal experience. I was part of a group of Marines and civilians that met at the Marine Corps University late every Thursday afternoon for a couple of years to play and develop TDGs. The makeup of the group ranged from corporals to brigadier generals, from clerks and drivers to the editor of the Marine Corps Gazette, a Marine Corps University librarian, and Command and Staff College instructors in operational art. Some members came and went, but a devoted cadre remained. Those of us who participated regularly unanimously agreed that our tactical skills had improved significantly as the result of the TDGs. Not only could we reach tactical decisions—that is, formulate plans—more quickly and efficiently, but we found we could communicate those plans more clearly and concisely to the group and in general the standard of our tactical plans was higher. Each of the members benefited from seeing how others handled the same tactical problems and from being critiqued by the others—and in the atmosphere of professional fraternity the group consciously refused to “sugar coat” the critiques. The TDGs generated serious discussions on tactical concepts and created a heightened interest in tactics in general. While we may not have developed any new Napoleons, all who participated felt much more confident of their abilities as a result of the experience.

How the Games Work

Playing a tactical decision game is very simple. Putting yourself in the role of the commander, you read (or have described to you) the situation; within an established time limit, you decide what plan to adopt and communicate that plan in the form of the orders you would issue to your unit if the situation were “for real.” You provide an overlay of your plan. Then—and this is an important part of the process—you explain the plan as a means of analyzing why you did what you did—What options did you have? What factors or considerations were foremost in your mind? On what tactical principles or concepts was your plan based? What assumptions did you make about the situation?

Drawing an overlay of your plan is an important part of the process. It is much easier to be vague in words, hiding the fact that you haven’t thought the problem all the way through, than in a diagram. Diagrams are precise. In order to be able to draw a diagram of your concept, you must have thought the concept through clearly; the overlay is a good way to ensure this. But by the same token, it is equally important to develop a verbal order as well (whether written or oral) because words are the primary means by which we communicate our plans, and we should practice using the same tools we will use in combat.

One advantage of TDGs is that just as in “real life,” there are no absolute right or wrong answers—no “schoolbook solutions.” Tactics are concerned only with what works. There are countless ways to solve any tactical problem. However, some plans reflect a truer understanding of tactical principles than others. The whole objective of TDGs is to arrive at a truer understanding of tactical principles than others. The whole objective of TDGs is to arrive at a truer understanding that eventually results in mastery.

Normally, the scenario is fairly simple and the information about it is far from complete, requiring us to make certain assumptions as the basis for decision—just as in combat. Unlike board games or their computer versions, TDGs have very few rules or mechanics to learn. In fact, there are really only two “rules:” (1) the imposed time limit and (2) the requirement to give the solution in the form of a combat order. Both are worth discussing briefly.

There are two reasons for the time limit. First, it introduces a certain amount of friction, in the form of stress, to the decision process. The idea is to give the player less time and information than he thinks he needs to formulate a good plan and yet require him to come up with one anyway. This is the reality of war and precisely one of the abilities that makes for a successful commander. Second, the game imposes a time limit because combat is time competitive. Speed relative to your opponent is essential. Not only must you make good decisions, but you must make them quickly. If not, your decision, no matter how sound, will be irrelevant because you will be too late.

The reasons for requiring the solution in the form of a combat order are also two-fold. First, communications skills improve with practice. The means that commanders use to communicate instructions to subordinates is through combat orders—either full operations orders or fragmentary orders. The ability to communicate clearly a plan involving the participation of hundreds or thousands of men and pieces of equipment in an atmosphere of fog and friction is no mean skill. A brilliant plan muddled in the issuing is a bad plan. Effective communication means not only clarity, but also forcefulness and, due to the need for speed, conciseness. It is no coincidence that so many of the great military leaders were also inspiring communicators. Second, tactics demand action, not an academic discussion of the merits of this or that scheme: Decision, not debate. “The essential thing is action,” wrote Hans von Seekt, once chief of staff of the German army. “Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself.” The third, and really meaningful, stage—execution—cannot happen without the first two stages. The TDGs printed here and in the Gazette ask players to submit explanations of their plans, but only after they have issued their orders. So the rule is: “Orders first, then discussion.”

Solitaire Play

There are a couple of ways to play the games. The first is solitaire play, working the scenarios just like you would solve a brain teaser or crossword puzzle. This is the form the TDGs take in these pages. The time commitment is usually no more than 15 minutes to a half hour. This method exercises the decision-making process but lacks certain advantages of the second method.

Group Play

The second method is to play the game in an interactive group, with one player (usually the senior or most experienced member) acting as moderator. The moderator describes the scenario to the players, answers questions (some, but not all) about the situation, enforces the time limit, selects different players to brief their plans to the group, and moderates the critique of each plan. The moderator plays devil’s advocate, introducing “What ifs” and asking “Why did you do that?” The advantages of group play are:

  • A built-in sense of pressure and competition. Players’ abilities are on display for others to see.
  • Immediate feedback. Each player gets a critique of his plan from the moderator and other players.
  • Practice giving orders. Each player must actually issue his order to the group.
  • See other solutions. Players can see how others approached the same problem, gaining insights that they can add to their own repertoire.
  • Teamwork. Especially within operating units, these group sessions can help develop intuitive understanding among members.
  • Generates discussion in tactics. As happened in the Quantico group, the TDGs become a catalyst for sharing tactical ideas. Of Scenario #9, “The Enemy Over the Bridge,” MCG, Jun 90, Cpl J. R. Murphy wrote, “I have shown your article to three other Marines, and have been involved in three heated conversations regarding the scenario and what course of action the frag order should initiate. This simple tool that you’ve published has the demonstrated ability to really turn on some minds.”

This method is ideally suited to officers’ or NCOs’ calls or professional development sessions within units. The group method works best using an overhead projector so players can project an overlay of their plan for their briefing.

Two-Sided or “Double-Blind” Play

A third, more involved, method is two-sided play. Two-sided play involves a controller and two opposing teams. The teams solve the same problem, but from opposing sides. The controller compares the two solutions and makes judgments about the result: Blue’s tanks platoon is ambushed by TOWs at the clearing; Red’s LAI company has reached the bridge with no enemy contact; a Blue rifle company has broken through Red lines in the woods with moderate casualties. The controller then separately presents each team with the updated situation—i.e., a new problem to solve. Each team “sees” only those enemy forces it has been able to locate by its own means. Now, instead of allowing the teams to develop deliberate plans, the controller requires commanders to issue fragmentary orders “on the spot;” “Alpha Company, attack north to seize the bridge in order to deny its use to the enemy.” The controller then compares the new fragmentary orders, generates another updated situation, and the game continues. After four or five turns the teams have fought out an engagement.

This version more resembles a conventional wargame than the others and takes up to a couple of hours to play. But rather than relying on movement ratings, casualty tables, and dice rolls like a board game, the two-sided TDG relies on the judgment of the controller for its results. The actual results are not as important as the fact that they create new tactical problems for the players to solve. This version works best if each team includes several players, a senior commander, and several subordinates to lead the different units.

Friction

Clausewitz wrote that “friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” TDGs are, quite literally, war on paper and so are not subject to the countless difficulties that distinguish real war. In reality, units get lost, orders get misunderstood, subordinates make bad decisions, important intelligence reports get misplaced, communications break down, and nothing happens as fast as it should. A plan that seems simple in conception can be extremely difficult in execution. A plan brilliant in conception that is impossible to execute given the circumstances is not brilliant at all, but foolish. Commanders’ responsibilities do not stop when they issue their orders, of course; they must also supervise the execution of their plans. But TDGs stop short of execution. You should keep this in mind when playing TDGs so as not to get the impression this whole business is much easier than it really is. In the group version, the moderator should serve as a “reality check” by questioning the feasibility of the various plans: “Do you really expect to make a 12-mile forced march through the woods at night?”

Solve the Problem, Don’t Critique It

In order to keep the scenarios from getting too complicated and unwieldy, the situation descriptions are intentionally short and simple. This also adds an element of the uncertainty that is present in any tactical situation. In any situation, a commander could identify countless pieces of information he wishes he had, as well as countless inconsistencies in the information he does have. Since this is so, he must make certain assumptions. Dealing with uncertainty is one of the fundamental challenges of tactical decision making. It is easy and tempting to pick apart a simplified scenario and call it unrealistic, inconsistent, or impossible. But that is simply avoiding the challenge. The fact is war is full of unrealistic, inconsistent, and apparently impossible happenings. It is important to take the scenarios on their own terms.

One captain’s response to Scenario #1, “Ambush at Dusk,” MCG, Nov 91, was not to offer a solution but to question how the unit in question got into the situation it did—probably a reasonable criticism. But in fact, the scenario was based on an actual incident in Vietnam, and a more detailed account could have explained more fully why the unit was where it was. More important, whether or not the unit should ever have gotten into that predicament in the first place, it did and Marines had to find a way out.

The person whose first response to a problem scenario is to complain, “This would never happen,” is probably the same person who has trouble dealing with unexpected situations. As with any problem, the best advice is to solve it first and then figure out how it could have happened.

In Closing

Experience is the great teacher. Unfortunately, ours is a field in which experience can cost dearly. As Field Marshal Sir William Slim wrote of taking over British forces in Burma in 1942: “Experience taught a good deal, but with the Japanese as instructors it was an expensive way of learning.” We are professionally obligated to do whatever we can to gain whatever experience we can without paying full price. That is precisely why we study past campaigns, and precisely why we should play tactical decision games.

Now, it’s time for your first mission. Good luck!

>Editor’s Note: Exert from Marine Corps Gazette’s Mastering Tactics by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR, Copyright 1994 by Marine Corps Association.