Archives: Gazette Magazines

by Capt John F. Schmitt

The following is an example of a tactical decision game like those in use at the Marine Corps University as a tool for developing military judgment and decisionmaking ability. The basic idea behind these deceptively simple games is to create a hypothetical battlefield dilemma of some sort and require the players to develop a solution under pressure of a time limit. The games work best in groups up to about a dozen, where Marines can argue the merits of various plans. The games are designed to teach students how to think rather than what to think, the rationale being that since each battlefield situation is unique it is futile to try to provide the right answer in advance for every conceivable situation. In fact, as in war, there are no absolute right or wrong answers. As long as a solution reflects the tenets of maneuver warfare, it is the “right” answer.

The Situation

You are the commanding officer, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. Your battalion consists of two rifle companies on foot, one rifle company in trucks, a tank company (minus), and a TOW section on HMMWVs.

Friendly forces hold the bridge and the riverline. (You believe the river to be unfordable.) Reconnaissance elements are operating north of the river. Tomorrow morning the division begins a major offensive north across the river, with the division’s main effort in 6th Marines’ zone. Your battalion will spearhead the regiment’s attack.

You are to occupy the assembly area shown on the map west of Hamlet in preparation for the morning attack across the river commencing at 0400. You are moving north toward the assembly area as shown. At 2000, your surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon, which is forward reconnoitering the route, reports enemy infantry occupying your assembly area in strength and continuing to reinforce. The size of these enemy units is unknown but estimated to be at least a company. Further, the STA platoon commander reports he has just met a reconnaissance team that was operating north of the river but has been forced south across the river under fire. The reconnaissance team leader reports there is no sign of friendly forces holding the riverline or the bridge and that enemy infantry with some light vehicles has been moving across the bridge for at least 30 minutes. This is all the information the STA and reconnaissance Marines can tell you.

As the battalion commander, what will you do?

Requirement

Within a five-minute time limit, give your solution in the form of the fragmentary order you would issue to your subordinates-to include the intent behind your plan-and support it with an overlay sketch. Then give a brief (200 words or less) explanation of the reasons behind your decision, the key considerations that led you to choose your course of action. Since there is no school solution to a problem like this, the emphasis is not so much on the course you take as in the reasons behind that course. Send your solution without delay to the Marine Corps Gazette, care of Tactical Decision Games, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico. VA 22134. My solution and one or two others chosen by the editor will be published in the June issue.

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

Marines are coming to recognize the value of tactical decision games (TDGs) as a tool for teaching better decisionmaking. The key to a valuable learning experience is a well-designed scenario, one that poses a challenging problem and describes a realistically complex and uncertain tactical situation in clear, concise terms. I have learned the hard way that as simple as the games appear-after all, they are nothing more than a sketch map and a couple paragraphs of textthey can be surprisingly difficult to design. Based on having written over 30 TDGs for the Gazette, I offer the following suggestions for designing effective TDGs.

The TDG as a Story

Think of the TDG as a short action story-like something out of a Tom Clancy or Harold Coyle novel or, even better, out of one of the Horatio Hornblower novels by C.S. Forester. Set the stage, introduce the characters (in this case friendly and enemy units), add more and more events and information (some of it confusing), and build to a suspenseful climax. But instead of telling how the story turns out, stop right at the climactic moment and require the player to finish the story. Make the player describe how the protagonist (i.e., commander) gets out of the predicament you put him in. As with an action story, the idea is to create a tense and risky situation requiring resolution, one that illustrates some significant tactical concept, technique, or insight.

A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words

I draw a sketch of the scenario before I try to write the text. People tend to think in terms of images rather than in text, and I find that the scenario develops in my mind faster and more clearly when I work from a drawing rather than from a written description. I try to fill in as much of the detail as possible before I start writing: I fill in the terrain and vegetation; I place friendly and enemy forces on the map; I work out scale, time-distance factors, and spatial relationships, capturing as much of the situation as possible on the map. Only then do I start to write, and the written scenario is a simple matter of describing what already exists on the map.

Format of the TDG

When it comes to writing the scenario, I generally use the following format:

* Start by telling the players who they are so that when they read or hear the scenario they know what point of view to take. Then tell them what assets they have. For example: “You are the commander of Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. In addition to your organic assets, you have a Dragon section and a tank platoon attached.”

* Next, describe the general situation: the terrain, weather, time of day, type of enemy, overall mission and intent of friendly forces, etc. It is helpful to provide a general orientation so the player can quickly get his or her bearings, e.g., “The enemy is generally attacking from east to west.”

* Describe from general to specific. For example, if the TDG is a battalion problem, describe the division’s situation, then the regiment’s, then the battalion’s. Describe the general enemy capabilities and activities, then describe specific enemy units.

* As specific events occur, describe them chronologically. The last thing you describe should be the event that puts the finishing touches on the dilemma. It should be the trigger event-the thing which makes it clear that a decision must be made.

Types of TDGs

From a design perspective, there are two basic types of TDGs:

* “Here’s your mission.” You provide the situational factors including enemy size, disposition, and activities; own dispositions; terrain; weather; etc. You assign a basic mission, like attack or defense. The object of the game is for the player to come up with a plan to accomplish the mission. This is the simpler type of TDG and it can be valuable for exercising the ability to estimate the situation or understand the tactical implications of terrain. The second TDG ever to appear in the Gazette, TDG #90-2 “Attack on Knob Hill” (May90), is a good example of this type of scenario. In that simple scenario, the player was a platoon commander assigned the mission of attacking Knob Hill in order to destroy an enemy force there.

* “Now what?” In this type of TDG, the scenario provides all of the above, plus more. Picking up where the former type of TDG leaves off, the scenario explains that as you begin to execute your plan some unforeseen event occurs that changes the whole scenario. The object now becomes to react to the new situation in a way that is consistent with the higher commander’s intent. One way to create a “Now what?” TDG is to create a “Here’s your mission” TDG, solve it yourself, and then create a new problem by having something go wrong with the execution of the solution. The first TDG ever to appear in the Gazette, TDG #90-1 “Enemy Over the Bridge” (Apr90), is a good example of this type of scenario. In that scenario, the player was a battalion commander ordered to move into an assembly area in preparation for an attack across a river the following morning. But as the scenario develops the player learns that a sizable enemy force occupies his assembly area and that the friendly forces supposedly holding the bridge are nowhere to be found.

Potential Sources for TDGs

* History. Pick one of your favorite battles involving one of your favorite commanders. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History by R. Ernest and Trevor Dupuy is a good place to go for ideas. Military atlases are also helpful. Modernize the weapons and organization. Adjust the scale if necessary (in general, dispersion and engagement ranges have increased through history). Caveat: Don’t fall into the trap of thinking that the way the battle turned out historically is the “right” solution. Making only a few “minor” changeslike modernizing weapons-can alter the whole dynamic of the problem.

* Own experiences in exercises or operations. The above caveat applies. Even minor changes to the scenario may change the original situation in fundamental ways, so don’t get hooked on actual results. For example, TDG #94-3 “Picket Duty” (Mar94) was based on an actual experience, but in drawing it up I unintentionally changed the terrain in a way that altered the whole problem.

* Create a dilemma; start out with a basic problem. For example: “How would you react if you were engaged with a large enemy force to your front and another appeared on the flank?” Then fill in the situational factors: terrain, vegetation, size and type of units, etc.

Start with a basic mission. For example: “What sorts of situations is a company acting as the advance guard for a movement to contact likely to encounter?” Again, fill in the situational factors. (This can be an especially useful technique for working through contingencies or immediate-action drills in preparation for an upcoming mission.)

* Random engagement. Start with any piece of terrain, real or imaginary, and throw the forces in randomly. Have the enemy force appear from one or more directions and have the friendly force appear from another. Or have one of the forces stationary. Assign plausible missions to both sides (but don’t tell the player what the enemy’s mission is) and fill in the other situational factors.

Fog and Friction

Clausewitz said that friction distinguishes real war from war on paper. In order to be good, a TDG must be realistic. In order to be realistic, it must have fog and friction built into it.

The TDG should have a healthy dose of uncertainty. Don’t give the player perfect intelligence. There are two basic \vays to create uncertainty. The first is through a lack of information. Just leave some of it out. For example, you get a report of contact, but you don’t know the size or type of the enemy force. The second is through ambiguity-making some information unclear, inconclusive, or even contradictory. (A technique I sometimes use is to have the map and text disagree slightly.) Either way, the results are the same. The player \vill have to make certain assumptions in order to develop an estimate of the situation based on incomplete information.

The TDG should incorporate friction in the form of things not going as planned or expected. A good TDG should usually provide a good example of Murphy’s Law at work-units get lost or show up late (or early), communication breaks down, the enemy does something unexpected, etc.

Characteristics of a Good TDG

In addition to fog and friction, a good TDG exhibits these qualities:

* Interesting. This is the most important quality. Like a good action story, the TDG should get the reader engrossed in the dilemma. The best TDGs cause a momentary sense of dread, as the player thinks: “How do I get out of this one?”

* Challenging. The TDG should pose a significant predicament. It should force a tough decision. This is not the same thing as merely creating a situation in which the player faces overwhelming odds. A squad coming face to face with an enemy division might be in a tough situation, but the decision of what to do-get out of there-is probably pretty obvious. In a good TDG, the decision should be challenging.

* Plausible. The players ought to recognize that the situation could realistically happen, or else the game will lack credibility. This is not to say that situations should only be “doctrinal,” predictable, or probable. War is full of nondoctrinal, unforeseeable, and improbable events. The key is to make those events believable. Time and space factors must be reasonable and relate realistically to conditions of weather, terrain, and visibility.

* Proper amount of detail. The scenario should have enough information for the players to act but not so much information that the game becomes unrealistic or laborious. If the player has to spend too much time and effort just getting read into the situation, he will lose interest. The trick is to describe a difficult situation in simple terms. A good rule of thumb for length is two double-spaced pages.

* Proper type of detail. This means that the information provided should relate to the level of the game. For example, a squad TDG requires a map with microterrain (folds in the ground, small clumps of woods, fences, individual buildings, etc.) and a scale in hundreds of meters (or less). By comparison, a division TDG should show main avenues of approach, major obstacles and major geographical features (ridge lines, rivers, urban areas, etc.), and should have a scale in tens of kilometers or more. For a battalion TDG, show companies and battalion-level attachments on the map. These are the “moving pieces” that concern the battalion commander. For a platoon TDG, show squads, etc.

* Allowance for multiple interpretations and solutions. Normally there should not be only one reasonable way to solve the TDG. There may be one proper course to take, but there should be several possible ways to go about it. The idea is to give players a chance to exercise creativity. This also means that the map should have enough surrounding terrain for “outside the box” solutions. If the map is too narrowly bounded it may restrict players’ options.

* A reasonable time limit. A strict time limit for coming up with a solution is an important way of introducing an element of stress to the exercise. But the imposed time limit should be consistent with the scenario. For example, these is no reason to require a solution in 5 minutes when according to the scenario the operation will not commence for several hours. Ideally, the time limit should come right out of the scenario. For example, the enemy advance guard will crest a hill in about 10 minutes and discover our entire battalion, and so the player has less than that much time to make a decision. (Using the half-rule, 5 minutes would be a good time limit in this case.)

* Accuracy. TDGs (and particularly solutions) should reflect accurate knowledge offeree structure, weapons characteristics, and weapons employment concepts.

Start With a Problem, Not With a Solution

It is usually better to start with a question or problem and to allow the players to create solutions than it is to start \vith a specific solution and to work backwards to create a scenario to support it. In the latter case, the scenario usually turns out to be obvious and contrivedalmost like a leading question for which there is one obvious “right” answer.

Other Design Hints

* Reverse scenarios. After you have designed a TDG, create another one by using the same scenario from the enemy point of view. I have found that this technique can be extremely useful in getting players to try to “get inside the enemy’s head.”

* Tilt the terrain. Use the same basic scenario, but tilt the map 90 degrees and see how the dynamics of the scenario change.

* Continuations. After you have designed a TDG, take one solution and apply it to the scenario to create the next problem: “Okay, you started to execute your plan and then this happened. Now what do you do?” Sometimes it can be instructional to play out a battle through several moves.

* Change some variables. Try changing the scenario from daylight to darkness, from foot infantry to mech, from desert to forest. Change the enemy force from a platoon to a company. Change some of the time-distance factors and see how that changes the dynamics of the problem.

* Special operations. Special operations, like hostage rescues, etc., generally require a lot of very detailed planning information and are consequently difficult to design. This is not to say that it can’t be done; it usually requires a more detailed scenario (and can run the risk of becoming difficult for the player to get into). The same is true to a lesser extent for any deliberate operation. In my experience, TDGs are best suited for hasty situations. For deliberate situations, a conventional planning exercise may be better.

* TDGs seem to work best from the platoon to the battalion level. At lower levels, scenarios and maps tend to require much more detail. (In fact, at the small-unit level a map view may not even be appropriate at all. Since small-unit leaders often do not use maps, a panoramic view of the terrain seen from ground level may be more appropriate-but harder to do.) At higher levels, decision cycles tend to be longer and the scenario often must describe a situation developing over a longer period of time with more factors to consider. Again, this is not to say that TDGs below platoon level and above battalion level will not work; they may just require a little more care in setting up the scenario properly.

Conclusion

There are many ways to design a good TDG-probably as many techniques as there are designers. The best approach I can suggest is trial and errorjust take a crack at it and figure out what works. In my experience it won’t be time wasted. The thought process in trying to design a TDG is as valuable a learning experience as playing one.

by 1stLt Michael A. Hanson

Situation 

You are a Squad Leader in Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment. Your squad is conducting a patrol moving north, parallel to a road situated on a berm about one and a half meters above ground. The terrain surrounding the berm is flat with multiple scattered rock piles about one meter tall. Your squad takes fire from a light machine gun across the road about 100 meters ahead. As you instinctively lunge for cover, you see an enemy infantry squad maneuvering toward you from behind the berm on the opposite side of the road. They begin throwing hand grenades across the road at your Marines. The first few explode far enough away that none of your Marines are hit, but the grenades are getting closer. You hear enemy voices.

You have a thirteen Marine rifle squad with a standard complement of M203 grenades, M67 fragmentation grenades, and one AT4 Rocket. What do you do?

Requirements

What commands do you give your squad in your frag order?

Provide a sketch depicting the actions you expect your fire teams to take as a result of your frag order.

Submit your solution by email to [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 01-19, Box 1775, Quantico, VA, 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

^{>Author’s Note: This scenario is adapted from one described in Colder Than Hell: A Marine Rifle Company At Chosin Reservoir, by Joseph Owen. It has been updated to reflect current rifle squad table of organization and equipment. The terrain has also been modified for simplicity.}

by Team 1, H&S Bn

Situation

You are the CO, 1st Bn, 6th Marines, 4th Marine Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, American Expeditionary Forces. Your battalion is currently located to the southeast of Lucy-de-Bocage. During the Battle of Château-Thierry on 6 June 1918, the 4th Marine Brigade seized Hill 142 and the town of Bouresches and established a foothold in the southern portion of Belleau Wood. The clearing of Belleau Wood is now essential in preventing harassing fire and in ensuring the overall security of the Paris-Metz highway—the main Allied line of communication. With outcropping boulders, dense foliage, and steep, rolling terrain, Belleau Wood offers the perfect defensive position and is currently occupied by the German Army with elements of the 461st Infantry Regiment, 237th Division in the north and the 40th Fusiliers Regiment, 28th Division in the south. Operations conducted by Marines from 6 through 9 June have shown that the Germans are armed with heavy and light machine guns and are well supported with artillery fires. German artillery units have been known to utilize chemical munitions. The enemy has regimental-sized elements to the north and east of Belleau Wood that can make a movement to reinforce during the night.

On 9 June at 1830, you receive Field Order 3 from BG James Harbord, CG, 4th Marine Brigade. Your battalion has been tasked with clearing the southern portion of Belleau Wood to the limit of advance. Upon taking the objective, you are to link up with 2d Bn, 5th Marines to the west in Bois de Champillon and 3d Bn, 5th Marines to the east, in Bouresches. You have the 1st Bn, 15th Field Artillery Regiment in general support of your maneuver that can range all objectives within Belleau Wood.

Requirement

It is H-10; prepare a course of action graphic and narrative; identify and task your main effort and supporting efforts. Additionally, include a reconnaissance and fires plan.

Issues for Consideration

• 1. What is the enemy’s composition, disposition, and strength within the southern portion of Belleau Wood?
• 2. How can an integrated fires plan shape the battlespace?
• 3. How can you utilize maneuver or deception to avoid attacking the enemy’s main strength?

Instructions

Quickly formulate your plans and issue your orders. Provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solution to [email protected] or Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 07-18, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

 

^{>Members of Team 1 are found on p. 18.}

By Bradley J. Meyer

Situation

You are the commander of the 4th Marine Brigade, 2nd U.S. Division. It is early on 9 June 1918. Your mission, assigned by the commander of the 2nd Division, is to “clear Belleau Wood on 11 June 1918.” This is a matter of particular importance to higher echelons of command, as the majority of the American public thinks that the Marines have already cleared Belleau Wood.

Probably because of the level of attention focused on Belleau Wood worldwide, the French have agreed to support your attack with quite a large amount of artillery fire, namely 50 batteries worth. They are also prepared to fire off a large amount of ammunition, namely 6,000 rounds of 155mm shells and 28,000 rounds of 75mm shells. You may set the targets and priorities for this fire however you think would best support your attack.

On 6 June, two of your battalions attacked the wood, which was believed, at the time, to be unoccupied. 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (3/6) ran into a strongly posted German line a couple of hundred yards from the southern edge of the wood. Machine guns with intersecting fields of fire prevented any further progress, even though 3/6 took over 40 percent casualties. There were many large boulders along the German line; the Germans, in many cases, posted their machine guns behind the boulders, thereby securing protection from fire from the front while firing the machine guns at an angle to the front. These arcs of fire intersected. No rifle grenades were available during these attacks, a fact that the Marines have bitterly complained about. It was noted during this fight that there were several relatively covered routes into the southern edge of the woods, working off the gully that runs between Lucy-le-Bocage and Bouresches.

3d Battalion, 5th Marines also attacked on 6 June, across a wheat field. (See map.) They received heavy fire on their left flank from behind a knoll on the western side of the wood, Hill 169, and also from the tree line directly to their front and right flank. Only the company of 3/5 farthest to the right, the 47th, made it into the woods relatively intact. That was because a small ridgeline protected them to some extent from the fire coming from the left. Survivors of the 47th also reported abandoning their original formation, four rows of skirmishers spaced five yards apart with rifles at high port, in favor of “spreading out in the wheat and taking the old formations we had used so many times in the cane fields of Santo Domingo.”

You have available for the attack two infantry battalions, 2/5 (75 percent strength), under Maj Frederick Wise, and 1/6, under Maj John Hughes (“Johnny the Hard”). Also available is the 6th Machine-Gun Battalion (four companies, each with sixteen heavy machine guns (Hotchkiss, Model 1914), led by Maj Edward Cole. The attack on Belleau Wood, while of great importance, is part of a larger Allied counteroffensive against the German offensive originating at the Aisne River. The rest of your Brigade is required to hold Hill 142 and the village of Bouresches, localities gained in the 6 June attacks.

Currently all American units have been pulled out of the woods, with the exception of the 80th Company of 3/6, located in the extreme southwest corner of the Wood (northeast of Lucy-le-Bocage). This has been done to give free rein to the action of the artillery. There is no detailed information on German dispositions, but it may be assumed they hold the wood in approximately regimental strength. Because of the small size of the battlefield and the amount of time available, the attack units can approach the wood from any direction south of the Lucy-Bouresches road or west of the Lucy-Torcy road.

Requirement

BG Harbord, what are your orders?

Instructions

Quickly formulate your plans and issue your orders. Provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solution by email to [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 06-18, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

By the Staff, Marine Corps Gazette

This TDG is a continuation of the scenario that began with TDG 02-17 in the February 2017 edition. For additional information on the current situation, refer to TDGs 02-18 and 03-18: “The Routine Patrol,” Parts I and II, in the February and March 2018 editions respectively.

Situation

You are the platoon commander of Second Platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Since your 3d squad is conducting a day security patrol, the remainder of your reinforced platoon is currently “standing by” on a plus-fifteen-minute alert as the Company’s quick reaction force (QRF). This means your company commander expects you be able to depart friendly lines with your force in fifteen minutes or less from the time support is requested.

In addition to your two remaining squads, you are reinforced with one machine-gun section (two M240B machine guns), one JTAC-trained Marine, and a Corpsman. The QRF also includes two squads of MUGA Commandos and two Commando “anti-tank/assault teams” of two men each, armed with Type 69 rocket propelled grenade launchers and a mix of anti-personnel and anti-armor rounds. All close air support, fire support, and medevac assets remain the same. Your communications are still limited, unencrypted VHF/UHF voice-only radios.

Approximately 25 minutes ago, steady small arms fire was heard coming from the area east of the Al Mumeet Mosque, and ten minutes ago, your patrol reported in that they were taking fire from a building or buildings in the vicinity of checkpoints four and five and requested support. They have no casualties and have consolidated in covered and concealed positions in the fallow fields south of the road running east–west from checkpoint two. The patrol also reports an AUXFOR vehicle checkpoint east of checkpoint one manned by about ten “Oxfords.” These AUXFOR are clearly agitated and showing the effects of a morning’s khat use, but they remain covered and have started firing their weapons in the general direction of checkpoints four and five.

As you rapidly supervise to ensure the QRF is prepared to depart COP Ritz, your company commander directs you to link up with the patrol in the vicinity of checkpoint one, assess the situation, report back, and, on order, attack to clear the buildings between checkpoints four and five. You have five minutes remaining to complete your initial plan and issue a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to the QRF for link-up with the patrol and execution of your on-order mission.

Requirement

With a time limit of five minutes, write the FRAGO and the rationale for your solution, and also provide a graphic for your plan. Submit your solutions by email to [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 04-18, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

By the Staff, Marine Corps Gazette

Situation

You are the squad leader of 3d Squad, 2d Platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. You have been leading a day security patrol east of the company positon at COP Ritz past the Al Mumeet Mosque and southeast of several abandoned farms and fields thickly overgrown with shoulder-high sawgrass and upland cane.

After exiting the southeast corner of COP Ritz and departing friendly lines at Checkpoint One, the patrol moved past the AUXFOR (“oxfords”) vehicle checkpoint east of Checkpoint One without incident. You observed the AUXFOR sitting in the shade, chewing khat and talking. Several were talking on local cell phones.

After passing Checkpoints Two and Three, you turn northeast into the tall grass of a fallow field. After moving about 250 meters, your forward security reaches the road leading east from the mosque. You send two fire teams (-), three Marines each, to establish security on the east and west flanks of the patrol and begin sending the patrol across the road to establish far-side security.

Half of the patrol makes it across the road and starts taking steady small arms fire from somewhere north or northwest of your positon. No one is hit, but the fire does not cease as everyone takes cover. Your point and cover men report back that the fire may be coming from the buildings between Checkpoints Four and Five. The high grass provides good concealment but no cover, and you order the lead elements to break contact and move south of the road.

Despite the steady fire from the northwest, everyone makes it to cover on the low ground south of the road, and you consolidate the main body of the patrol in a tight 360-degree perimeter. You leave your flank security teams in positon.

After reporting your situation to the company, you receive the following change of mission:

Maintain contact with the anti-MUGA force in the vicinity of Checkpoints Four and Five. Link up with the Company QRF (quick reaction force), which will be approaching from the west toward Checkpoint Four. On order, support the QRF’s attack to clear the buildings between Checkpoints Four and Five by fire.

Soon after receipt of the change of mission, your west flank security team reports that it sounds as if the AUXFORs around Checkpoint One are firing their weapons in the direction of Checkpoints Four and Five.

There is no change to your patrol’s organization, and you still have ten combat-effective Marines including yourself and the following attachments for the patrol, making a total of twenty men:

• One Machine-Gun Team (one M240B 7.62 machine gun, two Marines).
• One MUGA Commando Fire Team (four Commandos with AK-47s and rifle grenades) plus one Commando Machine-Gun Team (one RPK 7.62 machine gun, two-man crew).
• One Hospitalman, 3rd Class.
• One MUGA Commando Interpreter.

Fire support remains limited to the battalion’s organic mortars and Marine rotary-wing CAS on alert +15 at the battalion FOB (forward operating base). There is one registered target at Checkpoint Seven: AB1107. The Al Mumeet Mosque is established in all aviation special instructions (SPINS) as the center of a 200m by 200m rotary-wing attack positon, “AP Snake.”

The battalion’s alert +5 section of medevac helicopters has a dedicated radio net. Response time is less than 10 minutes, and the JTF (joint task force) Level III treatment facility is 45 minutes flight time.

Your communications are limited to unencrypted, VHF and UHF, voice-only radios.

Requirement

What are your orders to the patrol?

What coordinating instructions for the QRF do you relay back to the company?

Instructions

Quickly formulate your plans and issue your orders. Provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions by email at [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 03-18, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

By the Staff, Marine Corps Gazette

Situation 

You are the squad leader of 3d Squad, 2d Platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Your squad has been ordered to conduct a day security patrol east of the company position at COP (combat outpost) Ritz. Your designated patrol route (depicted on Figure 1) will take you out past the Al Mumeet Mosque and southeast to the far side of several abandoned farms and fields thickly overgrown with shoulder-high sawgrass and upland cane. You and your Marines have been on patrol both day and night, approximately every 48 to 72 hours, ever since the company occupied COP Ritz. You and your team leaders are highly experienced in patrolling the congested area surrounding the COP and have been in more firefights than you can remember. On several occasions, you have had to call in the Company’s quick reaction force (QRF) to reinforce your patrol after making contact.

Your mission is: No later than 0900, depart friendly lines and conduct a security patrol along the designated route east of the Al Mumeet Mosque neighborhood in order to disrupt any anti-MUGA forces in the area and demonstrate a MUGA/CJTF presence. Mission has priority.

You designate your first fire team leader, LCpl Santeira, as your assistant patrol leader and LCpl Sharpe as your radio operator.

For today’s patrol, you have 10 combat effective Marines including yourself, and the following attachments for the patrol make a total of 20 men.

• One Machine-Gun Team (one M240B 7.62 machine gun, two Marines).
• One MUGA Commando fire team (four Commandos with AK-47s and rifle grenades) plus one Commando machine-gun team (one RPK 7.62 machine gun, two-man crew).
• One Hospitalman, 3rd Class.
• One MUGA Commando Interpreter.

Fire support remains limited to the battalion’s organic mortars and Marine rotary-wing CAS on alert +15 at the battalion FOB. There is one registered target at Checkpoint Seven: AB1107. The Al Mumeet Mosque is established in all Aviation Special Instructions (SPINS) as the center of a 200m by 200m rotary-wing attack position, “AP Snake.”

The battalion’s alert +5 section of medevac helicopters has a dedicated radio net. Response time is less than 10 minutes, and the JTF Level III treatment facility is 45 minutes flight time.

Your communications are limited to unencrypted, VHF and UHF, voice-only radios. You are monitoring and reporting checkpoints to mark the patrol’s progress on the company tactical net.

Requirement 1

How do you organize your patrol for movement? Where do you assign the machine-gun teams and all-around security?

The patrol exits the southeast corner of COP Ritz and departs friendly lines at Checkpoint One. You move past the AUXFOR vehicle checkpoint east of Checkpoint One without incident. You count ten “oxfords” sitting in the shade, chewing khat and talking. Several are talking on local cell phones.

The patrol continues past Checkpoints Two and Three and turns sharply northeast into the tall grass of a fallow field. In about 250 meters, your forward security reaches the road leading east from the mosque.

Requirement 2

How does your patrol treat this linear danger area? Do you sprint across, deliberately establish security before crossing, or do something else?

As half of your patrol makes it across the road, you start taking steady small-arms fire from somewhere north or northwest of your positon. No one is hit, but the fire does not cease as everyone takes cover. What do you do?

Requirement 3

Do you continue the mission along the designated patrol route, attempt to break contact and consolidate the patrol south of the road, or change the mission to locate and close with whoever is firing on the patrol? Do you do something completely different? What reports do you radio to the company?

Situation

It has been 30 days since the U.S. Mission in Al Ouadiyya and the CJTF officially partnered with the Nuzuri tribe and contracted their militia as “auxiliary forces,” or AUXFOR (pronounced “oxford” by your Marines), for the security and stability mission on the island nation. You remain the Company Commander, A Company, 1st Bn, 1st Mar, and despite a non-punitive letter of caution from your battalion commander for exaggerated reporting of enemy forces in the midst of an attack on your COP (combat outpost), you are beginning to think you may stay in command of “Red Death” for the roughly two months remaining in this deployment … if you live that long.

Your Company’s area of operations in the Al Mumeet Mosque neighborhood is still dynamic. The ubiquitous presence of Nuzuri AUXFOR patrols and checkpoints has reduced or at least forced anti-MUGA forces into the open. In other words, the enemy is more interested in attacking the “oxfords” than your Marines or the MUGA commandos attached to your company. The Nuzuri presence does nothing to demonstrate stability or rule of law in the area as groups of fighters, many as young as 12 or 13, “patrol” through this section of the city in Chinese-made pickups with crew-served weapons, and equally armed groups man random roadblocks, searching travelers and collecting a “service charge” for their work. Unlike the anti-MUGA Islamic extremists, whose preferred terror tactic was beheading, the “oxfords” employ “necklacing:” placing a car tire soaked in gasoline around the neck of a bound detainee and setting it on fire. If the captive is lucky, smoke inhalation is quick. Your Marines who have encountered the results often comment that “at least the beheadings didn’t stink so bad.” You have consistently reported these incidents, but, to date, no action has been taken or directed. You have the following forces and supporting arms available:

•  1st and 3rd Platoons, Company A 1/1: 58 effective Marines, 1 1stLt and 1 SSgt platoon commanders; 1 Hospitalman 1st Class (Independent Duty Corpsman), plus 2 Hospitalmen 3rd Class
•  2 Battalion radio operators
•  2 4-man Scout Sniper teams (2 SASR and 2 M40A5 sniper weapons)
•  1 Machine gun Section (-) (4x M240B 7.62 machine guns)
•  1 Assault Squad (2x SMAW 83mm rocket launchers)
•  1 Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) Team
•  2 Interpreters (CJTF contracted)
•  1 MUGA Commando Platoon (rein): 48 Commandos total, equipped with AK-47 rifles, rifle grenades, two RPK Machine gun Sections (8x RPK 7.62 machine guns) and their own interpreters (English, Arabic, and the Nuzuri dialect)

Fire support remains limited to the battalion’s organic mortars, and Marine rotor-wing CAS on alert +15 at the battalion FOB.

The battalion’s alert +5 section of medevac helicopters has a dedicated radio net. Response time is less than 10 minutes, and the JTF Level III treatment facility is 45 minutes flight time.

Communications remain limited to unencrypted, VHF and UHF voice-only radio, wire (analog field telephones), and couriers. The local commercial telecom enterprise (landline and cellular) is also functional although unreliable and unsecure. You have sufficient radios to maintain a company tactical radio net, one battalion tactical net, and the infantry battalion mortar net. Your JTAC team also has uncovered UHF radios to coordinate RW CAS and medevacs.

Your Company has been tasked to provide security for one of the senior U.S. officials in country and a media team. Darla Hayman, a war correspondent and on-screen personality for one of the largest worldwide news networks, and her producer and cameraman are accompanying the Honorable Grainger LaSalle, Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. Mission in Al Ouadiyya. He has a three-man personal security detail with him. LtCol Darrin Douxe, the MEB PAO; CWO3 Yvonne Shadee, the PA Chief; and two combat camera Marines are escorting the party. The group is scheduled to RON (remain overnight) at your COP.

After issuing your orders to the company for the visit, you also instruct your platoon commanders and all NCOs to drill everyone in the COP on the current public affairs guidance from the CJTF.

The group arrives by MV-22 after your Marines secure an LZ and move to your position without incident. However, several teams of AUXFOR make themselves very visible as they overwatch the group’s arrival.

Shortly after their arrival, the MEB PA team takes Mr. LaSalle to the roof of the COP for his photo op. Ms. Hayman asks if she and her crew can “just wander around the outpost and talk to the Marines.”

After talking with your Marines for several hours, she also asks you “off the record” whether you think the Nuzuri AUXFOR are helping stabilize the country and if their support is worth $1.5 million cash the U.S. has paid to the tribal leadership and MUGA officials. Do you think the U.S.-led coalition should continue funding a regime that employs children as security forces?

 

Requirement A

What do you tell her? Do you continue to allow her and her team unescorted access to you Marines? If not, how do you prevent such contact?

Later that evening, LtCol Douxe shares with you that he is a Reserve officer with a lucrative career in public relations in New Orleans. Prior to leaving active duty, he was an infantry platoon commander deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in 2009. After this collegial preamble, he informs you that he will be taking the PA team on a patrol to collect footage of the Al Mumeet area. If you have any security patrols planned, he proposes combining the two patrols for added security and unity of command with him as patrol leader.

 

Requirement B

What do you do? Do you permit the PA team to patrol in your AO? If so, do you combine this effort into one of your security patrols or keep the patrols separate? If you combine the patrols, what mission and tasks do you assign them? How do you task organize this patrol? Who is the patrol leader: the PAO, one of your Marines, or do you make a different decision?

 

Instructions

Quickly formulate your plans and issue your orders. Provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solutions by email at [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 01-18, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

By Maj Roy Miner

Situation

You are the operations section for a CLB executing operations in the country of Coalinga, a hot and arid climate. Your unit is in direct support of the MEB GCE, Task Force Alpha. The GCE is starting their fifth day of their assault to seize three MEB objectives. The assault is anticipated to take 15 days. (See map.) Your primary mission at this point is to provide sustainment support for Class I (chow and water), Class III (POL), and Class V(W)(ammunition) through the assault phase of the operation. Task Force Alpha is comprised of three infantry battalions and one HQ (headquarters) company. Two of the battalions are mechanized (one with tanks, the other with AAVs). Your CLB consists of three companies: HQ Company, Transportation Services Company, and Engineer Services Company. The Transportation Services Company has two MT (motor transport) platoons currently task organized with the same number of personnel and equipment as well as a landing support platoon capable of generating six helicopter support teams as required. Each MT Platoon has 4 flatrack refueling capability trailers, 10 water sixcons, and 11 LVSRs with 4 PLS (palletized loading system) trailers. There is a sufficient amount of vehicles for security escort. Additionally, you have the ability to request two sorties of CH-53 helicopters for assault support. Prior coordination has your CLB delivering sustainment supplies to the GCE combat trains at the RRP (repair and replenishment point). The GCE combat trains then distribute supplies to the GCE maneuver units throughout their area of operations.

Based on the progress of the operations, there are no indications that this phase of the operation will end earlier or later than 15 days. The battalions of TF Alpha are executing ground combat operations along three axis of advance as depicted in the graphic. Mileage along MSRs and ASRs between the units, CSSA (combat service support area), RRP, and MEB objectives are also depicted in the graphic. 2d Battalion has reached its objective and is expected to seize it in the next three days. It is approximately 15 miles from the RRP. Their progress was met with moderate resistance. 3d Bn is advancing along its axis of advance and is currently 25 miles from the RRP. It is expected to reach its objective (20 miles away) in one day and seize it in four days. They have met with moderate to heavy resistance thus far, and they expect heavy resistance for the remainder of the operation. 1st Bn (GCE main effort) is currently 15 miles from the RRP. Its objective is still 65 miles away, and it is expected to reach and seize its objective in 10 days. They have had heavy resistance and are expected to be met with heavy resistance the remainder of the operation.

1st Bn for TF Alpha has estimated its requirements for sustainment classes of supply to be the following per day: 260 cases of MREs; 4,300 gallons of bulk potable water; 1,500 gallons of fuel; and 15 pallets of ammunition. Excluding what is on their combat trains, the battalion can organically hold up to 550 cases of MREs; 8,600 gallons of potable water; 13,300 gallons of fuel; and 30 pallets of ammunition. Their current estimated inventories after 5 days of operations in the assault is 450 cases of MREs; 4,300 gallons of potable water; 5,800 gallons of fuel; and 30 pallets of ammunition.

2d Bn for TF Alpha has estimated its requirements for sustainment classes of supply to be the following per day: 250 cases of MREs; 4,200 gallons of bulk potable water; 1,000 gallons of fuel; and 13 pallets of ammunition. Excluding what is on their combat trains, the battalion can organically hold up to 500 cases of MREs; 8,400 gallons of potable water; 4,000 gallons of fuel; and 30 pallets of ammunition. Their current estimated inventories after 5 days of operations in the assault is 500 cases of MREs; 4,800 gallons of potable water; 2,500 gallons of fuel; and 30 pallets of ammunition.

3d Bn for TF Alpha has estimated its requirements for sustainment classes of supply to be the following per day: 290 cases of MREs; 4,800 gallons of bulk potable water; 3,000 gallons of fuel; and 14 pallets of ammunition. Excluding what is on their combat trains, the battalion can organically hold up to 600 cases of MREs; 9,600 gallons of potable water; 7,300 gallons of fuel; and 30 pallets of ammunition. Their current estimated inventories after 5 days of operations in the assault is 500 cases of MREs; 4,800 gallons of potable water; 5,500 gallons of fuel; and 30 pallets of ammunition.

The logistics combat trains for each battalion have consolidated in one area designated as the main RRP for the GCE, which is 60 miles away from a forward CSSA. In total, these log trains can carry 1,700 cases of MREs; 15,700 gallons of potable water; 7,900 gallons of bulk fuel; and 100 pallets of ammunition. Their current on-hand inventories are estimated to be 800 cases of MREs; 10,000 gallons of potable water; 6,000 gallons of bulk fuel; and 75 pallets of ammunition. The forward CSSA currently has 1,600 cases of MREs; 300,000 gallons of potable water; 150 pallets of ammunition; and 300,000 gallons of fuel in its inventories. The next scheduled resupply for the CSSA is 11 days from now, at which time the inventories will be maintained at 200,000 gallons of water and fuel; 40 pallets of chow; and 50 pallets of ammunition.

One scheduled resupply has already occurred two days ago, where the 1st MT Platoon topped off the GCE combat trains with 7,000 gallons of fuel; 13,000 gallons of water; 50 pallets of ammunition; and 1,300 cases of MREs.

Requirements

1) What is your assessment of the current overall logistics architecture and conditions?

2) What recommendations do you have to the battalion commander to modify the current logistics concept of operations?

3) Is there any absent information from battalion staff sections that is needed to make a recommendation to the battalion commander?

4) Are there any shortfalls, and what additional support do you think is required to sustain GCE operations?

Provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your answers. Submit your solutions by email to [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 10-17, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

by the Staff, Marine Corps Gazette

Situation

You are the 3d Platoon Commander, A Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and you have been left in charge as the senior Marine aboard COP Ritz (Combat Outpost Ritz). It has been two days since the two squatter families living in the COP took everything they could carry and left after an unannounced visit from two “cousins.” Your company commander and a team of three MUGA commandos have been outside the wire since dawn meeting with the Imam of the Al Mumeet Mosque and a local tribal leader to try to ascertain what may have prompted the sudden departure of the squatters.

Immediately after noon prayers, two VBIEDs [vehicle borne IEDs] simultaneously struck the HESCO and “Jersey” barrier obstacles across the two northern streets approaching the COP. Immediately following the detonations, several teams of four “military age males” with automatic weapons began firing and moving toward the barriers. The obstacles were undamaged by the blasts, and the VBIEDs only added burning debris to the barrier plan. Your Marines and the MUGA commandos at the COP have been well-rehearsed for this “most dangerous enemy action”—their fire covering the obstacles has been accurate and effective. The COP’s perimeter has not been penetrated, and at least 20 attackers are dead or incapacitated. Several attackers were also wearing “suicide” explosive vests and detonated on or near the obstacles. You estimate there are at least 40 more attackers in covered firing positions to the northwest who are organizing additional attempts to breach the COP’s perimeter.

You are still unable to raise the “Skipper” on the company tactical radio net. You are attempting to contact the battalion by radio and landline but are having no success. The radio traffic is broken and unreadable, and the landline is dead. The COP has four days’-worth supply of ammunition for all weapons; however, you are within one day of a critical shortage of potable water and had been expecting a resupply convoy later in the afternoon.

Your attachments and support available at the COP have not changed. Fire support is currently limited to the battalion’s organic mortars and Marine rotory-wing CAS; however, you have not been able to communicate with the battalion. You doubt you would be able to request medevac support either.

While you are trying to raise your company commander again, the first volley of three RPGs (rocket propelled grenades) hits the COP. None get through the chain-link fencing and chicken wire installed over the windows in the Ritz, but one came close to a direct hit on an east-facing top-floor window. Your 1st Squad Leader, Sgt “Blade” Edgington, reports that there are at least four RPG gunners in the four-story building northeast of the COP and that heavy small arms fire preceded the RPG volley. You get a cold, tight feeling in your gut as you realize your men are being effectively suppressed by the RPGs teams across the street while the “suicide bombers” to your north are preparing to attack. Adding to the friction, you personally observe numerous civilians, mostly women and children, in the same building as the RPG gunners and can hear them praying and crying. Your Marines are keenly observant of the need to positively identify their targets as they judiciously attempt to return fire.

The battalion radio breaks squelch and 1stLt Fonbhone, the S-4 A, is on the line. He reports his resupply convoy hit an IED about a mile outside the city with no KIA (killed in action) and one MTVR requiring tow or recovery. Somehow, he learned from the battalion that the COP was in danger of being overrun, and he has taken his four M1113 up-armored HMMWVs with two MK-19s and two “Ma Deuce .50 cals” up to the fields just south of the city. He wants to know your situation and where you want him to get the heavy guns into action.

What is your choice: do you want him the fire on the RPG gunners, the “suicide bombers,” or do you have another idea?

Requirement

Quickly formulate your plans and issue your orders. Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit you solutions by email at [email protected] or to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 08-17, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The Gazette will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.