Action at Oxford

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

Situation

You are the executive officer of Company L (Lima), 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. You are operating in rolling, wooded terrain. Vehicles move best on the roads, not at all in the woods, the battalion is presently on the defensive, currently in reserve, your company is moving northeast via Oxford to conduct a relief in place with Company K (Kilo) at the forward edge of the battle area about 8 kilometers north of Oxford. Your coinpany is mounted on assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) and is further reinforced with a Dragon section, a TOW squad, and a heavy machinegun section (one M2 .50 caliber, one Mk19) on HMMWVs. Upon arrival the tank platoon currently supporting Kilo will be attached to your company. The company commander and first sergeant have already gone to Kilo’s position by helicopter to see the terrain and coordinate the relief. You are responsible for moving the company up to the forward edge of the battle area. The company gunny and the machinegun vehicles have driven ahead as an advance party.

The company commander calls you by radio to report that Kilo is coming under increasing pressure to the front from enemy probes. He frags you to move the company as quickly as possible into a blocking position at a designated location several kilometers to the rear of Kilo (5 kilometers north of Oxford) and to prepare for a rearward passage of lines rather than a relief in place. He says the tanks will meet you at that position and will come up on the company tactical net. You are about a mile west of Oxford. The forward observer tells you that somebody is calling for fire east of Oxford using your company call sign. Simultaneously, the gunny comes up on the tactical net with the following report:

Checkpoint 21. Enemy force at least company strength closing on Oxford from the east inside two clicks. I count five PT-76 followed by at least that many BTR-60. Looks like more coming. No sign of friendlies to east. Two BRDMs approaching South Oxford from east; will reach high ground in about two or three mikes. I have not been spotted.

What now, Lieutenant?

Requirement

Things are happening fast. In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue instructions to your subordinates. In an additional 2 minutes, decide what reports to make and to whom. Provide an overlay of your solution and a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #93-12, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

Quote to Ponder

The Small Unit Leader

On the maneuver warfare battlefield, NCOs must make decisions based on tactics, not just rigidly applied techniques. . . . “[they] must learn to cut to the heart of the situation, recognize its decisive elements, and base [their] course of action on these.”

-Capt Daniel J. O’Donohue

Defending Narrow Pass

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

This scenario is the reverse of TDG #91-3, “The Attack on Narrow Pass,” which appeared in MCG, Mar91 and met with controversial response. In that scenario you were a platoon commander assigned the mission of guarding the advancing battalion’s left flank. In the course of events, the battalion struck strong enemy forces defending Narrow Pass while no immediate threat developed on the left flank. Readers were strongly divided between maintaining the flank guard mission despite the lack of a threat there and taking the initiative to help the battalion. Do you think deciding how you would handle the situation if you were in the enemy’s shoes could affect your response to the original scenario?

The Situation

You are the commander of Company H, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. You are reinforced with two heavy machinegun squads (each squad consisting of an M2HB caliber .50 machinegun and a Mk19 automatic 40mm grenade launcher), a tank platoon, a section of Dragons (attached to your platoons), and enough trucks to carry your company. The enemy has landed a helicopterborne force at Sanctuary City to the north, which friendly forces have surrounded. The enemy is attacking north with ground forces to link up with its helicopterborne force, whose situation is becoming desperate. Your mission is to halt or delay the enemy relief attack for as long as possible in the vicinity of Narrow Pass. The terrain south of Sanctuary Ridge is generally rugged and undeveloped with thick vegetation and severe relief. The enemy consists of infantry with a limited numbers of tanks.

You have decided to defend Narrow Pass and the spurs to either side with 1st Platoon reinforced with the heavy machineguns. You send 2d Platoon forward as an outpost in the vicinity of the dry gully to the south, with plans to withdraw it through Narrow Pass. The heavy machineguns from the ridge can support your outpost with overhead fires even at night (because you have used field-expedient depression stops on the machineguns). You hold western Narrow Pass with a rifle squad from 3d Platoon reinforced with M60 machineguns. The tank platoon and the rest of 3d Platoon are in reserve north of the ridge, under the command of the tank platoon leader. Your trucks are located north of the ridge.

About 2030, 2d Platoon reports contact with a sizable enemy infantry force moving north toward Narrow Bridge. The platoon commander reports the enemy to be “at least battalion strength. I can hear a few mech vehicles, but I don’t see any yet.” About the same time, one of your listening posts (LPs) gets handled roughly by an enemy platoon in the vicinity of Checkpoint 37. The LP breaks contact and flees back to western Narrow Pass.

2d Platoon is involved in a pretty good skirmish near the bridge, dishing out better than it’s getting. Your heavy machineguns are having an effect. Suddenly, your heavy machinegun position on the spur immediately west of Narrow Pass comes under accurate machinegun fire from the southwest. Meanwhile, 2d Platoon reports a significant enemy force attacking its left (east) flank. The squad at western Narrow Pass is trying to regain contact with the enemy patrol, but as of yet has not succeeded.

What do you do?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes provide instructions to your units in the form of the fragmentary order you would issue. Include plans for the use of supporting arms. Then give a brief explanation of your rationale. Send your solution, typed doubled spaced, to the Marine Corps Gazette, Tactical Decision Game #93-11, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

NEO From Instablia

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

Situation

You are the operations officer of 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, or 26th MEU(SOC), organized as follows:

* A command element (CE).

* The ground combat element (GCE) consists of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines reinforced with an M198 artillery battery, a tank platoon, an assault amphibian platoon with 10 AAVP7s (enough to carry one reinforced rifle company), a reconnaissance platoon, and a combat engineer detachment.

* The aviation combat element (ACE) consists of HMM-365 reinforced, deploying with 4 CH-53ES, 12 CH-46s, 4 AH-1W Cobras, and 4 UH-1N Hueys.

* The MEU Service Support Group (MSSG-26).

The MEU is afloat on a routine deployment. Suddenly, in the nearby Third World country of Instablia a disaffected military faction launches a violent coup attempt. The Inslablian President escapes capture but is believed to be in hiding in the countryside near Instablia City. Random violence and looting break out in the streets. AntiU.S. sentiment grows. A Canadian attempt to evacuate by air fails when Inslablian military forces intern the aircraft and halt the evacuees en route to the airport; Instablian forces open fire; the Canadians flee to the American University, suffering half a dozen casualties. The U.S. Ambassador, his staff, and numerous Americans and foreign nationals are for all intents and purposes besieged in the U.S. and Mexican Embassies. A handful of Marine security guards plus contract security forces of questionable utility protect the personnel at the U.S. Embassy; there are no security personnel at the university; and the security situation at the Mexican Embassy is unclear. To this point there have been no actual military or mob actions directed at the embassies or the university, but the situation is described as “increasingly volatile.”

Those Instablian military forces that have not openly declared support for the coup are of questionable reliability and loyalty. These elements consist of an infantry battalion at the lnstablia garrison, four Hip-C attack/transport helicopters at the military annex of the airport, a platoon of motorized infantry with two S-60 antiaircraft guns at Lighthouse Point, and six gunboats (with .50 caliber machineguns) operating from the waterfront.

The U.S. Ambassador has asked the State Department to arrange for the prompt evacuation of 101 persons from the U.S. Embassy, 68 from the Mexican Embassy (including 18 Americans), and 150 from the American University campus. Rules of engagement state that U.S. forces may fire only when fired upon. The situation has not yet reached critical mass, but the Ambassador estimates that evacuation will be necessary within the next 24 hours. Your amphibious ready group (ARG) is currently about 1,000 nautical miles from the objective area. The commanding officer instructs you to develop an evacuation plan based on the following assumptions:

* Given the volatility of the current situation and the MEU’s location, the initial launch of forces may have to take place from as far as 400 nautical miles from lnstablia City.

* Due to this range only the CH-53s will be available for the first phase of the evacuation and that one or more aerial refuelings may be required en route.

* Because the ARG will continue to steam toward the objective area, the CH-46s will be available for employment within 18 hours (at the most) of the launch of the first wave of CH-53s.

* The MEU can be in position to commit surfaceborne forces by AAV or landing craft, if needed, within 24 hours of the initial launch.

* The environment will likely be in the words of the ambassador, “extremely nonpermissive. At the first sign of military force expect all hell to break loose.”

* Instablian military forces will likely attempt to interfere with the evacuation and at some point it may become necessary to engage Instablian forces in combat in order to conduct the evacuation.

* Four AV-8B Harriers and two KC-130 refuelers assigned to the MEU will be available by fly-in deployment (from a nearby friendly country) to support all phases of the operation.

For planning purposes, your CH53s can carry 30 passengers each; your CH-46S. 15; and your AAVs, 25. The U.S. Embassy has landing zone space for three CH-53s or six CH-46s and the Mexican Embassy space for one CH-53 or two CH-46s. There is unlimited space for helicopters at the University. The size of your helicopter waves is not limited by ship deck space.

Requirement

Develop your evacuation plan. It is not necessary to write a complete operations order, but describe your concept of operations, tasks or phases, contingency plans, and coordinating instructions. Provide a sketch of your plan and a brief explanation. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG 93-10, P. O. Box 1775, Quantico. VA 22134.

Driving for la porta

By Capt Duffy W. White and 1stLt Peter L. Vanderloo

Situation

You are the company commander of Company B, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, (Light Armored). Your company consists of three platoons, each of four LAV-25S, your own LAV-25, your executive officer’s LAV-C2, a section of four LAV-ATs, an attached section of four ATs from Company C. and your company combat trains of a LAVR. three LAV-Ls, and two HMMWVs. A squad of engineers also has been attached. Additionally, you have the platoon of eight LAV-Mortars, equipped with 81mm mortars, in direct support of your company.

1st Marine Division has been conducting a penetration to the south, having moved 35 miles in the last 2 days. The division is moving rapidly to seize the combat service support facility at La Porta and deny the enemy its ability to sustain combat activity against the division. The attack would also effectively cut the enemy force into two separate elements. The 5th Marine Regiment is the main effort of the division’s aggressive attack, and your company is the main effort of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Light Armored). The main division thrust is pushing south along a thrust line on the Route 5 corridor. The Route 5 corridor passes through the Negra and Bianca Hills, which are slow-go terrain for your LAVs.

The enemy appears to be acting without a unified plan, but they are stubbornly defending hastily established battle positions. They appear to be elements of piecemeal reserves hurriedly thrown info battle.

You are presently at a forward assembly area, having just begun to conduct a hasty service station resupply. As you prepare to continue the movement southward against the confused, isolated but tenacious enemy forces, you receive the following fragmentary order from the battalion commander:

Two BMPs and one lank have been sighted in the vicinity of the Negra and Blanca Hills, on the principal axis of advance. Route 5 (an improved-surface road). Unmanned aerial vehicles also have identified a hasty surface-laid minefield to the west of Blanca Hill along Route 10 (an unimproved road).

At 1000, Company B conducts an area reconnaissance of the Negra and Blanca Hills area to determine the best route for the quick advance of the Division’s follow-on echelon. My intent is to identify enemy dispositions, destroy them within capabilities, or fix, bypass, and hand them over to one of the companies in reserve. You will have a section of two Cobra AHIW helicopters in direct support of your company, since you are beyond artillery range.

Requirement

It is presently 0900. Prepare the fragmentary order you would issue to your company and attachments. Provide a sketch and a brief explanation of your plan. Submit this order and explanation to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #93-9. P. O. Box 1775. Quantico. VA 22134.

The Attack on Schmitt Pass

Capt Eric M. Walters

The scenario for this game is the same as TDG #93-7, only it is seen this time from the enemy’s point of view-i.e., with the roles reversed. The games stand alone and can be played in any order, but both should be played. The idea behind doing TDGs in this fashion is to show the importance of understanding your enemy’s capabilities when formulating your own plans.

Again, this TDG places more emphasis on the rationale behind quick decisionmaking. Readers are still asked to formulate their initial concept within a strict time limit. But instead of providing a capsule explanation as has been customary, readers must provide what would be their commander’s estimate and commander’s intent, had they the time to write comprehensive ones. Such an exercise best demonstrates the power of a commander’s estimate and commander’s intent as the best explanation for orders. They should be verbally issued whenever possible. (For discussion of commander’s intent see MCG, Apr93 pp. 50-53, 74-81.)

Situation

You are the commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. Your regiment has been on the go for weeks, successfully slicing through consecutive enemy defenses. Your battalion now has the mission of seizing Schilling Ridge and Schmitt Pass from the east so that the rest of your regiment can continue on and seize the vital Kusch River crossings to the west. Your men are dog tired but motivated to go on by the string of victories your battalion has so far enjoyed despite its losses. The enemy has been on the run constantly, never quite having enough time to build a robust defense before it is punctured or bypassed.

Company A is now the forward security element of the battalion, which has lagged behind. Instead of waiting for it to close up, you kept your four platoons moving. You are fortunate that you still have experienced commanders for three of them. 1stLt Baumann has 1st Platoon, Sgt Weising has 2d Platoon-these are your two best leaders-and Sgt Fischer has 3d Platoon. Your company is armed with six machineguns (two have tripods), only one battered 60mm mortar tube, and roughly one light antiarmor weapon per man.

In your last communication with battalion, the commanding officer told you that an enemy platoon-sized unit was in the vicinity of Schmitt Pass. He also ordered you to take the village of Chappell, which lies at the east opening of the pass. He wants to use this town as an attack position to drive through the pass as soon as the rest of the battalion arrives there. Other intelligence indicated that small enemy infantry units that could conceivably reinforce this position are in the vicinity. Last, friendly artillery and air are tied up elsewhere and are not available.

When you approached within a mile of the pass, you and your platoon commanders conducted a leaders’ reconnaissance (see sketch below). There appeared to be sonic movement on the heights; glitters indicated some kind of light crew-served weapons-you imagined a machinegun or two. The Chappell Forest obscured your view of the town. No other enemy was visible-you sensed that the enemy had recently arrived in the area. Your platoon commanders now await their orders-what do you tell them?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, develop a concept of operations for the attack. Subsequently, write a summary of the verbal orders you would issue to your platoon commanders. Instead of providing an explanation as has been customary with previous TDGs, compose the detailed commander’s estimate and commander’s intent you would also issue had you been given the time to do so. Be sure it clearly provides the rationale for your order summary. Include a sketch of your plan. Submit your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #93-8. P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

The Defense of Schmitt Pass

Capt Eric M. Walters

This particular tactical decision game (TDG)-unlike all its predecessors-puts more emphasis on the rationale behind quick decisionmaking. Readers are still asked to formulate their initial concept within a strict time limit. But instead of providing a capsule explanation as has been customary, readers must provide what would be their commander’s estimate and commander’s intent, had they the time to write comprehensive ones. Such an exercise best demonstrates the power of the commander’s estimate and commander’s intent as the best explanation for orders: they should be verbally issued whenever possible.

Situation

You are the platoon commander of 1st Platoon. Company F. Battalion Landing Team 2/4. Your battalion has just been ordered to defend a 16-kilometer wide zone to prevent the enemy from seizing bridges and fords over the Kusch River. located 10 kilometers to the west of Schilling Ridge. This ridge runs north-south through the battalion zone and is traversed by two passes 11 kilometers apart. Company F is assigned to conduct an economy of force operation defending the two widely separated passes against an enemy thrust from the east while the remainder of the battalion maneuvers to counterattack an exposed flank. The company commander, 1stLt Oakley, assigns one platoon to each pass, retaining a large company reserve to reinforce one of them once the enemy axis of advance is determined. No artillery or air is available.

The enemy finished reorganizing during the night and is reported to be advancing. At 0800 an enemy infantry company was observed moving west towards the ridgeline; its parent battalion is estimated to be not far behind. Battalion S-2 has told your company commander that the lead enemy infantry company will be at nearly full strength-four platoons reinforced with machineguns and RPG-18s. Fortunately, no enemy artillery or air is expected.

Your mission (see map) is to defend, even if bypassed, the abandoned crossroads hamlet of Chappell at the east mouth of the Schmitt Pass in order to prevent the enemy from rapidly pushing his forces through this gap in the ridgeline. Your platoon consists of three rifle squads and an attached weapons squad with only one 60mm mortar tube and one M60 machinegun. A sniper and his spotter from the battalion scout/sniper platoon are also yours to employ. The day is clear, dry, and heating up, with no detectable wind. When you arrive at the pass at 1000, 1stLt Oakley radios that the enemy company is heading your way and is estimated to make contact between 1115 and 1145. The battalion mobile reserve is already on its way to take up its attack position several kilometers southeast of Schmitt Pass and is expected to launch the counterattack at about 1300. 1stLt Oakley quickly adds that he is saddling up the reserve platoon and expects to be on the scene sometime in the next 2 ½ to 3 hours. Your squad leaders gather next to you to receive their frag order. What do you tell them?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, develop your concept of operations for the defense. Subsequently write a summary of the verbal orders you would pass to your squad leaders. Instead of providing an explanation for your orders as has been customary with previous TDGs, write out the detailed commander’s estimate and commander’s intent you would issue if you had the time to do so. Make sure they provide a clear rationale for your orders summary. Include a sketch of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #93-7. P. O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

Author’s Note: Some readers will recognize this situation, which is drawn from Scenario II. “Defiance on Hill 30.” in the advanced squad leader game module, Paratrooper,’ published by The Avalen Hill Game Company, 4517 Harford Rd., Baltimore, MD 20214, and used with their express permission.

Luis Ridge

by Capt Bruce I. Gundmundsson

It was the kind of war that nobody, except perhaps a few grizzled veterans of the great conventional wars that had ended more than 50 years before, had ever expected America to fight. We were too civilized, the idealists had claimed. We were too interdependent, the business people argued. And even the hard-headed military thinkers were convinced that modern weapons had made all but the briefest wars impossible.

The impossibility of the current conflict was little comfort to the men on the ground. They were not entirely aware that the wonder weapons, stockpiled over the course of years, had been spent in a matter of weeks; that frequent contact between different cultures could cause more resentment than understanding; or that history was still very much alive. What they were aware of was the hard reality of combat-of fierce fights for hills and villages whose names they could barely pronounce.

It is now the second day of a major enemy offensive. On the first day, he drove us from our prepared positions, penetrating as far as our field artillery positions and even managing to capture some of our guns. Our forward elements, many of which had been caught in the open by artillery concentrations and air attacks, are in poor shape. They are still holding some parts of the old frontline, but they were unable to prevent whole enemy battalions from moving around and behind them.

This morning, you took command of what might be called a “recently reconstituted reserve.” Consisting of the remnants of a number of infantry battalions and combat engineer companies, this force had been organized into 5 understrength rifle companies (with an average of 100 men and 6 machineguns each), a company of combat engineers (80 men with no machineguns), and a platoon of 8 heavy machineguns. With the help of a considerable artillery bombardment, you were able to attack to the south and occupy Luis Ridge by early afternoon. (The ridge, a piece of high ground that sloped gently toward the village of San Esteban, was the point at which the enemy forces had made their greatest penetration into our rear areas.) A few minutes later, your force had been driven off the ridge by an enemy counterattack.

It is now 1500. You are in positions about 500 meters north of the ridge and have just received orders (originating, you are told, from the National Command Authorities) to retake Luis Ridge. As you gather your wits about you to make a plan, you see yellowbrown specks against the green grass and bare white rock of the crest of Luis Ridge. These, you know from hard experience, are the infantrymen of an elite enemy division. Their tactics, which another generation might describe as “human wave tactics,” are crude. Their weapons-rifles, light and heavy machineguns, and the occasional mortar-are basic. Their discipline, however, is fierce and their marksmanship legendary.

The ground between you and the long lines of enemy riflemen is largely open. Here and there is a clump of trees, with the kind of undergrowth that results from fields that have not been cultivated for 4 years. The weather, the only aspect of your situation that might be described as pleasant, is temperate. The sun is out and a cool breeze is blowing.

What are your orders?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, prepare the fragmentary orders you would issue to your subordinates, including the intent of your plan and any instructions for the use of supporting arms. Provide an overlay and a brief explanation for your plan. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #93-6. P. O. Box 1775. Quantico, VA 22134.

Encounter at Effingham

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

You are the commander of 1st Battalion, 24th Marines. Division has been attacking steadily north against weakening enemy resistance; your regiment has been advancing rapidly on North-South Highway, and 4th Marines are making only slightly less progress on a parallel axis to the west. After battering the enemy at the Battle of Blue Hills, regiment was reluctantly forced to halt for replenishment During one of the few breaks in the weather, aviation has reported enemy remnants streaming north through Effingham into the Big Valley. The regimental commander is anxious to resume the attack. You share his view that the enemy made his last stand at Blue Hills and is now broken and ripe for pursuit and final destruction. The colonel gives you the following instructions:

1st Battalion will pursue north immediately to reestablish contact and lock horns with the fleeing enemy. Relentless pressure is what we need. Do not let him catch his breath. Do not gel bogged down by pockets of resistance, but keep going. Commit everything you’ve got. The rest of the regiment will be 24 hours behind you to mop up and take over when you get winded.

The weather is wet, cold, and continuously overcast. The terrain is rugged and undulating, broken by small woods. Large vehicular formations are generally restricted to the roads; even then, movement is hampered by the weather. Your battalion, which has already received its organic TOW section (8 TOWs mounted on HMMWVs), has a tank company (11 M60A1s) attached and an artillery battery in direct support. In compliance with the colonel’s orders, you move out quickly to the north and reach Cutout Pass without making contact.

The leading elements of Company A. debauching from Esses Pass on the two-lane North-South Highway, report an enemy force to their front: ragtag and ill-equipped, it is clearly the force you have been pursuing, but battalion strength or greater and apparently reassembled and preparing to make a stand. Company B is in Effingham proper, and has pushed platoons out to either flank. The tank company and TOWs are on the highway south of Effingham. The combat train is negotiating the narrow Cutout Pass, and Company C is south of the pass on the highway. You send your Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Platoon west on Gravel Road to Lower Valley Vista Point to make visual contact with 4th Marines as instructed. Your first hint of trouble is a fire mission from STA on the conduct of fire net describing a target as “tanks and troops on the road-battalion strength.” Immediately, you receive the following urgent message from STA on BN TAC 1: Tanks-tanks-tanks; I count 20-25 T72s-I say again T-72s-with BTR-60s, heading cast on Gravel Road approaching Vista Point-one click west. The valley is full of armor and troops. Infantry on the flanks moving through the woods-cannot make out number-estimate battalion easy. Taking automatic fire-must withdraw.

Meanwhile. Company A reports:

Light resistance from enemy patrols at the northern entrance to Esses Pass. Continuing to advance.

What are your orders, sir?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, prepare the fragmentary orders you would issue to your subordinates, including the intent of your plan and any instructions for the use of supporting arms. Provide an overlay and a brief explanation for your plan. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #93-5. P. O. Box 1775. Quantico. VA 22134

Spartans at the Bridge

by 1stLt Brendan B. McBreen

Situation

The division is deep in Spartan territory in a wilderness of thick forests and muddy roads. You are fighting a numerically superior force of a fanatical Spartan Army. It is November. There is no snow yet, but the evening temperatures dip below freezing.

You are the commander of an infantry platoon that has been reduced to half-strength. Your platoon is still organized into three squads, two of six men each, Schnurrbart’s and Dorn’s, and one of seven, under Kruger. You and the radio operator bring your total strength to 21. Kruger speaks Spartan. Your platoon is armed and equipped as a modern Marine rifle platoon: the men wear deuce gear but carry no packs. You have no corpsman, no machineguns, and no other attachments. You have no food. You have a PRC-77 radio and a few grenades but no missiles or demolitions.

Last night, your battalion withdrew 27 kilometers to the west to consolidate a regimental blocking position. Your platoon was to be the last to move out, with orders to deceive the enemy about the withdrawal and conceal the battalion’s movement. It didn’t work. During the night, large enemy formations bypassed your positions, leaving you cut off behind the advancing enemy’s lines. Now your only option is to move west, through the enemy lines, to rejoin your battalion.

Your platoon has moved west through the forest all day. Long after dark, you halt the unit just short of a dirt road. As the platoon rests, you and Schnurrbart, one of your squadleaders, leave on a leader’s recon.

When you return, you brief the platoon, “There’s a dirt road. The road leads to the bridge we’ve got to use to get across the river. By the bridge are three houses, and there are Spartan troops in the houses. We are not sure how many there are. The houses are log huts, one-story, with smoke coming from the first and second huts nearest the bridge. The Spartans must be either guarding the bridge or passing through as a column.”

Schnurrbart adds. “There are fresh tracks on the road, three horse-drawn wagons, and some footprints, so it can’t be too large a force. The wagons are covered with canvas. They are parked between the houses and the woods. The doors of the houses face the river. The windows on the back side face the woods. The third house from the bridge has the shutters drawn. The only sight of life is a single guard on the bridge. He seems inattentive. His rifle is slung across his back.”

It is now almost dawn. What are your orders to the platoon?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes give the orders you would pass to your subordinates. Provide a sketch of your plan and a brief explanation of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette. TDG #93-4. P. O. Box 1775, Quantico. VA 22134.

Battle of the Dadmamian Swamp

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

You are the commanding officer of 4th Marines, which consists of two battalions on trucks, one battalion on assault amphibious vehicles, a tank battalion, and a reinforced light armored infantry (LAI) company. You are west of the river with the mission of holding a bridgehead until reinforcements can arrive from the east in about 72 hours from now.

An enemy unit, which consists of infantry reinforced with limited numbers of tanks, is advancing generally from the west. An enemy regiment battered your 1st Battalion 24 hours ago in an engagement west of Gumbyville, but rather than pursue has halted near Gumbyville. Your 1st Battalion has withdrawn east across the Dadmamian Creek. You hold the bridges across the creek with 2d Battalion and the LAI company. The tank battalion is in reserve near Sphericberg. Your 3d Battalion protects the southern flank near Furburg. While the first enemy regiment occupies Gumbyville, 3d Battalion reports that another enemy infantry regiment is rapidly marching on Furburg from the southwest; 3d Battalion’s security elements are beginning to fall back under pressure. What are your orders, Colonel?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, give the orders you would pass to your subordinates. Provide a sketch of your plan, any guidance for supporting arms, and a brief explanation of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #93-3, P. O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.

Counterattack at Libertyville

by SSgt Henry E. Johnson

Situation

You are the company commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. Your company consists of three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon mounted on trucks. In addition, you have a tank platoon, two squads of TOWs, and two squads of heavy machineguns on HMMWVs. For the past few days your battalion has taken a pretty good beating from an enemy regiment and has been withdrawing to the north in the face of the enemy advance. Since yesterday, you’ve outrun the majority of the enemy by several miles; however, one of his battalions still doggedly pursues you. It is estimated that this battalion consists of three line companies on trucks, a platoon of tanks, a platoon of BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles, and a platoon of infantry on BMPs, armored infantry fighting vehicles.

Your company, which has the rear guard mission, has now reached Libertyville. The battalion commander tells you that if you can stop the pursuers long enough, he is prepared to counterattack in the Libertyville area and destroy the pursuing enemy battalion before completing the retrograde.

At its current speed, the enemy battalion could arrive in Libertyville in about 1 hour. Fire support, in addition to your own organic mortars, is a battery of artillery and 81mm mortars from battalion. What’s your plan for stopping the enemy?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, develop your concept of operations and issue an order to your platoon commanders and attachments. Provide a sketch of your plan and a brief explanation. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette (TDG #93-2), P. O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.