A Message From the Deputy Commandant for Information

The Marine Corps is in a constant “fight for information.” Winning this fight today and every day gives us a lethal advantage in the next battle, the next war. Information and combat power are inextricably linked. Whether it is to ensure trust in the firing solution data for the next fire mission, achieve decision advantage through all domain reconnaissance, or gain access to key maritime terrain through a partner that trusts our reputational narrative, the fight for information is real, consequential, and never ends. Winning this fight requires talented Marines with a bias for action and a willingness to execute their duties to the highest professional standard. This is exactly what I have seen since serving as the Deputy Commandant for Information.

I am extremely proud of the insight, imagination, and innovation of our Marines as they take full advantage of Force Design concepts. For example, Marines from the Gulf of Finland to the first island chain are engaging in the fight for information by conducting all domain reconnaissance. This concept of Force Design directly supports the combatant commander and realizes a key aspect of Joint All Domain Command and Control. I have personally seen these Marines in action. They are not waiting for “textbook” instruction or solutions. They are smart, empowered, and focused on solving problems and mitigating challenges through an innovative spirit. We can all learn from their unconstrained view of opportunity, their technical savvy, and deep understanding of the digital environment in which they grew up. These Marines understand how fast technology changes and how a good idea today may not be so next year. Unleashed, they can help us solve numerous information challenges ranging from battlefield command and control, to targeting, to laying out phase maintenance schedules for complex aircraft. Marines today understand the power of information and how to fuse and correlate it to generate outcomes.

The office of the Deputy Commandant for Information is focused on providing the capabilities and authorities needed to make Marines successful. The essence of our approach is readiness. Using the Commandant’s guidance, we need to be “ready for what, with what, when?” Should a theater security cooperation event unexpectedly turn into a crisis, the “kit” our Marines require must move seamlessly from one to the other. We must not rely on a “digital iron mountain” of server stack farms and equipment. Instead, we must engage with the minimum information required to accomplish the mission, while minimizing logistics requirements and signatures. In such an environment, Marines require the right information capabilities based on the conditions of placement and access. This includes capabilities and methods from edge computation and storage to a lean “apps” approach through a ubiquitous transport-enabled cloud environment.

I have had the distinct privilege to work across many different parts of our MAGTF—from aviation to C4 to intelligence to cyber. It has kept me humble trying to maintain pace with our aggressive and innovative Marines. What I have learned is they have a disdain for the status quo. They always want to move forward. Force Design provides the opportunity to be innovative and to fully support our National Defense Strategy through our warfighting ethos. Semper Fidelis!

Semper Fi,

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Matthew G. Glavy
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Information

Giving “Laser Focus” New Meaning

The Marine Corps is unprepared for the newest tactic of civil unrest events

>>Capt Deavenport is an Intelligence Officer currently serving as an Olmsted Scholar in Bangkok, Thailand.

When adversaries combine commercially available products with a little ingenuity, they can create new attack pathways that are difficult to counteract. Over the last decade, anti-government protestors around the world have done exactly that during large-scale civil unrest events. In Hong Kong, protestors used traffic cones and leaf blowers to counter the effects of tear-gas canisters. In Portland, OR, protestors used umbrellas to hide their collective faces from surveillance cameras. In Beirut, Lebanon, and Nantes, France, protestors used tennis rackets and hockey sticks to hit tear-gas canisters back at police. Perhaps the most concerning new tactic, however, is protestors using hundreds of laser pointers simultaneously to blind and disrupt law enforcement officers and government security personnel.

Given its effectiveness against law enforcement in places like Egypt, Chile, Hong Kong, Iraq, and the United States, the use of laser pointers as a form of non-violent resistance has been shared widely on the world’s social media platforms. A practical assessment indicates that the tactic will likely be a feature of future civil unrest events in countries around the world. As an expeditionary force-in-readiness that often operates in environments of civil unrest, the Marine Corps should be concerned about this emerging tactic for the risk it poses to our forces. As it stands, Marines are neither equipped nor trained to operate in this emerging threat environment. The Marine Corps has an obligation to address this problem at the Service level.

Understanding the Threat
Lasers were once considered to be little more than science-fiction, popularized by multimedia franchises like Star Wars and 007. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration narrowed the delta between fiction and reality when they considered using lasers as part of a broader ballistic missile defense platform, though researchers concluded that the technology was still decades away from military use. Today, great powers around the world are studying the potential applications of laser technology in modern directed energy weapons. Across the national security and defense community, the discourse on laser technology remains a subject of intrigue for its numerous potential applications.

For people outside of the defense establishment, however, laser technology is most commonly associated with a simple office presentation tool. The laser pointer is a seemingly innocuous device that became affordable, ubiquitous, and commercially available in the 1990s. Today, consumers can purchase a new, high-powered laser pointer online for less than $30. Aside from the warning in the fine print to “avoid direct eye exposure,” these devices are sold to the general public with very few legal restrictions. Not surprisingly, the disruptive use of laser pointers is a growing issue.

In the United States, the most common incidents of laser disruptions are reported by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In 2020 alone, the FAA reported 6,852 laser incidents targeting commercial aircraft in the United States, 20 of which resulted in unspecified injuries to pilots or aircrews.1 In 2021, the number of reported incidents swelled to 8,550 incidents, 46 of which resulted in injuries. While it is a federal crime to aim a laser at an aircraft in the United States, the FAA laser incident reports suggest that the law has done little to mitigate the practice. In many cases, individuals may not realize the damage that a $30 device can cause. The data points listed above represent cases in which laser pointers disrupted the operations of commercial airlines, but they represent only isolated incidents, absent any coordination or concentrated effects. What happens when laser pointers are used as objects of resistance on a larger scale?

Since 2013, civilian protestors around the world have embraced laser pointers as useful tools for non-violent resistance, particularly in the context of anti-government protests. In places like Egypt, Chile, Hong Kong, Iraq, and the United States, protestors used hundreds of laser pointers in a coordinated fashion to confuse police officers, scramble facial recognition cameras, and deter people from taking photos amid periods of anti-government unrest.In one viral video from 2019, a crowd of protestors in Santiago, Chile, appeared to “shoot down” a police quadcopter by concentrating their lasers against the remote aircraft. When used against people, like police officers or government security forces, laser pointers can cause both temporary and irreversible damage to the eyes. Such is the nature of truly devastating threats: they are non-threatening enough to not be taken seriously but dangerous enough to do real harm.

There is evidence to suggest that lasers could revolutionize protesting around the world because they offer several advantages for protestors in the modern era.First, laser pointers are affordable and widely available. When protesters gathered in Cairo, Egypt, in 2013 to celebrate the overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi, street vendors reportedly sold laser pointers to protestors “just for fun,” apparently not yet aware of the dangerous potential that exists when many laser pointers are used together.4 In Hong Kong, laser pointers were distributed en masse for protection against police amidst widespread anti-government protests. Second, laser pointers can disrupt (or seriously harm) law enforcement personnel with the blinding effects of concentrated light. However, protestors see lasers as a novel tool for non-violent resistance because they present a relatively low risk to physical objects, at least compared to rocks, broken glass, or firearms. Third, in the age of artificial intelligence and facial recognition cameras, lasers can also protect the identities of the protestors in the crowd. When a single laser hits a camera lens, it drastically shifts the exposure and effectively washes out the image, making identification of protestors in a crowd almost impossible. Ultimately, the mass use of laser pointers offers an accessible and effective tool for protestors around the world to resist government crackdowns in a way that is generally perceived as non-violent while also offering some protection against surveillance cameras and facial recognition technology.

The available data on the disruptive use of laser pointers highlights some useful patterns to better characterize the threat. First, among the various laser pointers that are commercially available, the 532-nanometer green laser is the most widely used device in recent protests around the world. The green laser, compared to colors like red, purple, or blue, is the most visible to the human eye and is therefore the most preferred type. Indeed, the FAA data cited earlier indicates that more than 88 percent of the reported laser incidents involved green lasers. Additionally, we know that the power output for commercially available lasers can range from a meager 5 milli-watts (mW) all the way up to 1,000 mW.5 Consider this excerpt from the American Academy of Opthalmology:

If a laser with less than five milliwatts of output power is directed at someone’s eye, that person can blink or turn away without suffering an eye injury. However, the natural protective mechanisms of the eye—such as the blink reflex—are ineffective against lasers with output power greater than five milliwatts, and severe retinal damage may occur, even after momentary exposure.6

Green laser pointers are inexpensive, prolific, and can be sold at power outputs that are empirically dangerous to the human eye.

Second, the advent of digital mobilization suggests that protestors in future civil unrest events will integrate the tactics and technologies from other protestors around the world. A 2020 article in the New York Times entitled, “Why Protest Tactics Spread Like Memes,” offers several examples to reinforce this point.In Hong Kong during 2019, video showed protestors racing to place orange traffic cones over tear gas canisters to keep the smoke from spreading; in Minneapolis, MN, nine months later, protestors did the same thing. In Hong Kong during 2019, protestors used leafblowers to disperse tear gas; in Portland, OR, a year later, protestors did the same thing. There are several more examples, but they all lead to the same conclusion. The widespread use of social media, coupled with digital mobilization, means that successful civil unrest tactics will spread and increase in scale.

Taken together, we know three fundamental things about this emerging threat: protestors are most likely to use 520-nm green lasers, the power output of a single laser can range anywhere from 5-1,000 mW, and protestors are likely to use this technology in civil unrest zones around the world because of digital mobilization. This data alone is sufficient to mount a response to this threat. A single laser can cause blurry vision or permanent blindness, but the mobilization of hundreds, or even thousands, of lasers could effectively neutralize a ground force, particularly one without the appropriate personal protective equipment and training. Surely then, the Marine Corps is well-prepared to meet this threat—right?

Herein lies the problem: the Marine Corps’ standard-issue, authorized eyewear offers no laser eye protection. None. The current standard-issue glasses feature 2.4-millimeter polycarbonate lenses for ballistic protection, 100 percent ultraviolet protection, and fog-prevention treatment for those steamy Camp Lejeune field exercises. However, they offer zero protection against laser devices in any wavelength. In fact, the Marine Corps’ governing document on laser safety programs, Marine Corps Order 5104.1C, fails to even mention laser protective equipment or training for forward-deployed forces.8 The current eyewear arguably met the minimum eye protection requirements of battlefields a decade ago, but the threat landscape has meaningfully changed.

Bear in mind that the Marine Corps, compared to its adjacent services, is perhaps the most likely to operate during civil unrest events on foreign soil. Consider, for example, the missions assigned to the MEU. Among other things, the MEU is assigned the mission essential tasks of performing non-combatant evacuation operations, airfield seizure operations, humanitarian assistance, and stability operations. All these missions virtually ensure close contact with host-nation civilians amid varying degrees of civil unrest. The evacuation of Kabul in August of 2021 is just one example. It is a matter of when, not if, Marines will operate against protestors armed with laser pointers.

The other services acknowledged this threat years ago. In 2018, the Air Force signed a nearly $200 million contract to provide laser eye protection for their pilots and air crews. The Army issued a pre-solicitation for next-generation eye protection and the Coast Guard subsequently initiated a joint research project for low-cost laser eye-protection glasses.

Recommendations
To mitigate this threat, the Marine Corps must first purchase enhanced eye protection for threat laser devices in both combat and training situations. This eyewear should provide sufficient protection to prevent permanent eye damage and temporary effects (glare, flash blindness, etc.) from laser devices while minimizing visual acuity degradation. It is worth mentioning that the Marine Corps’ current eyewear supplier already produces a laser protective lens that blocks 99 percent of 532-nanometer green lasers. This piece of gear, or a similar model, should be fielded to Marine forces across the air-ground task force at the soonest opportunity.

Second, the Marine Corps must develop and integrate training modules to prepare Marines for the new tactics used by modern protestors. The San Francisco Police Department recently surveyed their patrol officers and asked how they would respond to the hypothetical use of laser pointers during protests.Some officers said they considered laser pointers to be non-threatening distractions, while others said they viewed lasers as dangerous weapons and would respond with force. Without any standardization in terms of training and equipment, it is not at all surprising that the responses among San Francisco police officers were inconsistent.

If the same question were posed to our Marines, I expect that we would get the same results: inconsistency and subjectivity. If Marines were sent to reinforce an embassy in a given hotspot today and protestors gathered at the gates with 532-nanometer green laser pointers, would Marines simply dismiss it (not likely), react with non-lethal force, or react with lethal force? No Marine on the ground or in the air should have to make this decision absent any training or guidance, much less without the proper protective equipment. Wherever possible, the Marine Corps has an obligation to reduce uncertainty, subjectivity, and inconsistency through realistic and threat-informed training.

From my perspective, the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Operations Training Group structure is the best vector to provide this training for pre-deployment forces. The Expeditionary Operations Training Group already provides tailored, pre-deployment training packages to prepare units for the requirements of the respective geographic combatant commands. Once Marines are equipped appropriately, it would take only minor revisions to the Expeditionary Operations Training Group training framework to provide a basic introduction to modern laser pointer tactics, protective equipment, and mitigation techniques.

In the context of the world’s dynamic and ambitious threats, it is easy to dismiss the laser pointer as little more than an office presentation tool, but its emerging applications will almost certainly challenge future Marines. Now is a fitting time for the organization to make a clear-eyed assessment of its standard issue protective eyewear and associated training to meet the shifting threat landscape.


Notes

1. Federal Aviation Administration, “Laser Incidents,” Federal Aviation Administration, November 23, 2021, https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/lasers/laws.

2. Alan Taylor, “The Lasers of Discontent,” The Atlantic, November 23, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2019/11/photos-lasers-discontent/602263.

3. Jeremiah Kim, “Lasers: The Future of Protests,” Harvard Political Review, March 19, 2020, https://harvardpolitics.com/lasers.

4. “Egypt crisis: Why are Cairo Protesters Using Laser Pens?” BBC News, July 4, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-23178484.

5. Big Lasers, “Differences in Laser Pointer Output Powers,” Big Lasers, March 11, 2013, https://biglasers.com/blog/2013/03/11/differences-in-laser-pointer-output-powers.

6. Ari Soglin, “Is Your Laser Pointer Dangerous Enough to Cause Eye Injury?” American Academy of Opthalmology, June 22, 2018, https://www.aao.org/eye-health/news/laser-pointer-eye-injury.

7. Tracy Ma et al., “Why Protest Tactics Spread Like Memes,” New York Times, July 31, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/style/viral-protest-videos.html.

8. Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 5104.1C, “Navy Laser Hazards Control Program,” (Washington, DC: May 2008).

9. “Lasers: The Future of Protests.”

Radio Communications at Duffer’s Island

Lessons from three dreams

>LtCol Haycock is an 8061 Acquisition Professional serving as the Program Management Team Lead for Terrestrial Collection and Human Intelligence programs at Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, VA.

My name is Capt Alfonzo, but everyone usually just calls me “Captain A” for short. I command Alpha Company, 1/1 Mar. It is my first month in command having recently arrived on a ship deployed in the vast ocean east of Guam. I admit I have little experience in expeditionary advanced base operations, especially command and control by radio communications, but my Marines are mature, well-led, and well-trained. I am going to tell you the story of how I learned thirteen principles of radio communications during our assault on Duffer’s Island.

It was a cool pre-dawn hour when the reconnaissance element radioed back to the embarked battalion that we will meet minimal resistance when we assault the airstrip the following night. The objective was to clear and occupy an austere airfield named Via Saltu on tiny Duffer’s Island, located twenty miles off the coast of the allied Grey Republic. The Grey Republic, as we all know, was narrowly resisting outright domination by the treacherous Democratic Federation of Reds. The end state of our company landing team’s mission was to establish a temporary fueling and rearming point for our valiant Blue Nation pilots on Duffer’s Island as part of a surge of air superiority toward the landing force’s final objective during this stage of the campaign. By the end of the following day, Company Landing Team A owned Via Saltu Airfield, and the landing force established a forward arming and refueling point (FARP). But first, we flew by means of two flights of four Ospreys each to a clearing three miles south of Via Saltu airfield. Because I had 24 hours to prepare for my first company landing team assault, I gave initial guidance to the company operations officer to continue with preparations and then slept in hopes of drawing from my subconscious an approach to radio communications that would help us be successful in the coming operation.

First Dream
As the sun crested the jutting slopes of nearby jungle hilltops, the shadow receded in favor of jagged light, illuminating the landing zone (LZ) now certainly clear for landing. Through the night, the reconnaissance element had scoured the LZ and its surroundings. There were no threats or observers of any kind, human or otherwise. No flights of aircraft of any type were observed near the island. It appeared the landing would be entirely unopposed.

However, as the first four aircraft landed at the clearing, an enemy missile struck the first Osprey. Its destruction was sudden and catastrophic. None of the sixteen passengers and crew survived. As the other missiles struck the landing zone, a second aircraft with the remainder of 1st Platoon was also hit creating a mass casualty problem for the rest of the landing force. When 2nd Platoon landed in the third and fourth Ospreys, they were faced with competing requirements to evacuate the kill zone, establish a defensive perimeter, and provide aid to the wounded. Missiles kept pounding the LZ, one after the other, killing or wounding 42 out of 64 members of the landing force’s lead element. When the eight-missile barrage ended, Lt Secundus from 2nd Platoon took stock of the situation. With downed aircraft, mass casualties, an unseen enemy, and less than a quarter of its strength, the company landing team was, for the time being, combat ineffective.

Being short two aircraft, the remainder of the company landing team was delayed by several hours in reinforcing Lt Secundus’ isolated platoon—time in which the Red force was able to position its naval forces near the island and actively deny Blue force entry into its air and sea space. Without reinforcements, 2nd Platoon would have to evade or defend against the Red force alone for an indefinite amount of time.

I was bewildered as to how the enemy could have known the exact grid location on which the Osprey was going to land. The recon element observed no enemy spotters or other intelligence collectors in the area. The grid location was only briefed to the pilot by the recon element fifteen minutes earlier when the aircraft checked in to make its approach. After talking with the surviving pilots when they returned from the day’s flying, they reported that they attempted to use encrypted comms on their primary net, but it was not working like it did the previous week. They had switched to an emergency radio frequency—one that was unencrypted for safety reasons.

Perhaps the Red force had been observing our Ospreys with electronic warfare systems and had noticed the same single frequency used for every flight. Because they could detect the strength of the signal, but not the information it carried, they likely deduced that it was our encrypted assault support intra-flight net. Listening from anywhere in the battlespace within a couple of hundred miles of the aircraft, it is easy for the enemy to hop on its own radios and transmit noise on that same frequency. Perhaps the enemy has purpose-built jammers somewhere in the region, or even a spacecraft in low orbit, that can transmit so much noise on that frequency that the Osprey’s intra-flight radio net was effectively jammed, forcing the pilots to find a different net to operate on for today’s mission.

Perhaps there was a signals intelligence aircraft somewhere in the airspace or signals intelligence collector on the ground of a nearby island that was able to listen to the secondary radio net; the unencrypted, single frequency radio transmissions between the recon element and the pilot, or between the pilots, when the grid location of the LZ was stated: “in the clear.” With a modern networked radio relay, the grid location was given from the enemy’s intelligence collectors directly to the fire control system of the Red force’s missile battery, and the command was given for launch. The five or six minutes of flight time from the missile battery’s location was short enough to catch the lead Osprey before its wheels had even contacted the clear LZ.

As I woke from this first dream, the following three fundamental rules about radio communications came to my mind:

  • Rule number 1: Any radio net that relies on a single frequency for long periods of time is susceptible to simple jamming, also known as narrowband jamming. Use radio nets that hop between multiple frequencies whenever possible. Think SINCGARS and HAVEQUICK.
  • Rule number 2: Always encrypt your voice communications. In the contested environment, only communicate in the clear those things you intend on being heard by the enemy.
  • Rule number 3: If you must resort to the use of an unencrypted radio net, establish a set of brevity codes that helps you communicate without being understood by the enemy.

Second Dream
The situation and mission of the company landing team’s insertion onto the island of Via Saltu airfield by two flights of four Ospreys each remains the same. However, I was compelled to ensure the lessons of the first dream were enacted in the planning and execution of the current dream. I called to make certain that the aircraft carrying my company into the assault had been prepared with sufficient radio communications to evade such early enemy detection and interception. The assault flight lead, Capt Alex Franklyn Larson, assured me that they now had four encrypted frequency hopping nets to communicate both internally and with the recon element guiding them to the LZ. This way, they would be resilient to simple jamming by the enemy. We also agreed to a list of brevity codes to communicate in an emergency over unencrypted nets. The execution checklist for the mission also incorporated these brevity codes. With a short rehearsal, we were able to practice saying “Chevrolet” instead of “LZ is clear for landing” or “Plymouth” instead of “landing force has reached the objective” and other such codes.

As the Ospreys approached the island, the recon element provided the ten-digit grid over an encrypted frequency hopping net and both were confident the enemy Red force had not jammed or intercepted these coordinates. When the first flight of Osprey’s arrived in the LZ, the Marines of 1st and 2nd Platoons landed safely and unopposed according to their planned and rehearsed actions on the objective. While awaiting the second flight of Ospreys that would carry 3d Platoon and other enablers, like engineers, aviation ground support, and stinger missile gunners, Lt Primus of 1st Platoon established a company command post at the top of the nearest hill to get the best radio communications with the company landing team platoons, the battalion, and the MAGTF. They used standard foot-mobile radios such as the PRC-117G VHF and UHF radio and PRC-150 HF radio. They were also practiced in digital communications such as KILSWITCH and tactical chat over wideband radio capabilities like adaptive networking wideband waveform (ANW2). Almost every radio antenna was vertical to make sure that the radio propagation patterns could provide radio coverage to the whole area in 360 degrees (known simply as omnidirectional) and powered to the highest setting so they could reach as far away as possible. They also had access to standard UHF SATCOM to come up on the battalion command net. Finally, they also had commercial satellite telephones and friendly force trackers such as the Shout Nano.

Over the next two hours, Lt Primus did well to establish security, radio back to the company and battalion of the situation, and make other decisions vital to the continuation of the mission. Just as the second flight of Ospreys landed bringing myself and 3d Platoon to the LZ, there was a horrific explosion in the direction of the company command post. After talking continuously by radio to the local area and to higher over the last two hours, Lt Primus and his radio operator were fatally wounded by a missile strike. Recognizing the need to relocate the command post to another location, I took charge of the company and established a new company command post 800 meters away, where the radios could be placed at the top of a different piece of high terrain, according to the unit SOP. After all, we fight like we train.

After setting up communications at the new company command post in the new location and starting a routine of scouting patrols (each with routine radio checks and detailed situation reports), two large airplanes were spotted in the sky, both in the direction of the Grey Republic where we most expected to see the enemy. After calling over the radio to tell the scouting patrols what we saw and to lay low, a horrendous explosion obliterated the command post with fire and debris until there was nothing left but a smoking hole in the hilltop. The radio operators and the mortar section were instant casualties, and I was badly wounded. As Lt Secundus of 2nd Platoon responded and attempted to organize the company, the enemy jets came. Four hours after we landed, we were being gunned down by the enemy fighter jets making pass after pass on our position until they apparently ran out of ammunition. After sustaining 30 percent casualties and 12 hours of doing our best to prepare a deliberate defense of our position, a message came over our radio that informed us that the Red naval force had reoriented itself on Duffer’s Island and that lack of air and surface superiority would force us into isolation for the foreseeable future. We should prepare for an enemy ground assault based on our last position and that an Army airborne battalion might be able to drop in a few days. Until then, we were to maintain radio silence for our own safety.

As it turned out, our omnidirectional antennas were emitting radio signals in all directions, even toward the enemy. Because we wanted to ensure that each radio could talk with certainty, we made sure that radios were set to their highest power setting, regardless of the distance between them. Perhaps the first missile strike came as the result of enemy signals intelligence aircraft triangulating our position based on the large volume of encrypted radio communications coming from it. All it takes is two or three enemy direction-finding radios to pinpoint a friendly radio—or perhaps even just one aircraft flying around the island taking many measurements of the radio signals that reach it over a period of time. Those aircraft we spotted were probably some of the same ones triangulating our position after the first half of the company landed, and they probably also determined the actual coordinates of our radio emitters. Given the large number of encrypted radio signals across many parts of the spectrum coming from our location, the enemy probably deduced that we were a company command post of relatively high value, at least valuable enough to expend two medium-range GPS-guided missiles and to maneuver the naval force in pursuit.

As I woke from this second dream, the following three fundamental rules about radio communications came to my mind:

  • Rule number 4: Use terrain masking to prevent radio emitters from radiating toward the enemy force. If an omnidirectional antenna must be used, do not place it atop prominent terrain features where it will radiate toward the enemy.
  • Rule number 5: When able, use directionalization techniques to reduce the amount of radio signal that can go where the signal is not needed. A vertical radio antenna has a cone of silence directly above it (and below it). To avoid detection by the enemy, the enemy must be directly above the antenna. However, a horizontal radio antenna’s cone of silence is to its left and right, effectively giving it a single azimuth of radiation towards its destination and incidentally from the transmitter backward away from the intended destination. This means that an enemy signal collector could be on the left or right side and not be able to detect the presence of a radio signal. Note: Use directionalization wisely because it requires all radio operators to know their positions, azimuths to their intended targets, and often extra time to set up and tear down elaborate antennas.
  • Rule number 6: Use the minimum power setting that will allow you to talk between the two locations that matter to you. Do not let stray radio signals be strong enough to be observed by the enemy unless necessary.

Third Dream
The situation and mission of the company landing team’s insertion onto the island of Via Saltu airfield by two flights of four Ospreys each remains the same. However, I was compelled to ensure the lessons of the second dream were enacted in the planning and execution of the current dream. During this dream, after landing safely in the LZ on Duffer’s Island, Lt Primus established the tentative company command post on a piece of terrain that masked his radio transmissions from the direction of the enemy, essentially a stone wall in the hillside that blocked the directions of northeast, north, and northwest. I was briefed that Blue forces had general air superiority to the south. This hill was still elevated enough to provide radio coverage to the company and back to the battalion and the MAGTF. Consequently, the stone wall in the hillside had reflective qualities, so more radio power than usual was available to the company to the south coverage area. That means that the radio operators were all able to lower the power settings of their radios and still maintain communications.

For those forward patrols to the north that could not be reached by the command post radios oriented to the south, they were provided with a directionalized radio, either a horizontal HF skywave antenna where the direction of the radio signal is obscured by the atmospheric scattering, or with a horizontal VHF or UHF antenna aimed directionally toward intended recipients. In the latter case, enemy signals collectors had to stumble onto a particular azimuth in their flight pattern to observe any of our stray signals, and their access to observe our signals would end rapidly unless they were flying directly toward us. This also meant that before departing for their patrols, squads would have to prepare a full five-paragraph order, plan a scheme of maneuver, build terrain models, and brief their plans, both internally and externally. The company radio operators had to know where the patrols would be and when so that coverage areas could be moved over time according to the changing azimuth from the command post to the patrol.

Next, each radio operator was tasked to reduce power settings as often as able while still communicating. In summary, we were very disciplined about limiting our radios to only radiate in directions and at minimum power levels necessary for us to talk.

As the company landing team’s patrols scouted ahead toward the Via Saltu airfield, communications were outstanding. Patrols were able to provide situation reports every 30 minutes after pausing to set up their directional antennas.

After twelve hours on the island, the scouting patrols had viewed the airfield, identified key terrain (as marked with ten-digit GPS grids), and brought back enough information to prepare for the company assault. However, problems started occurring as the mortar section chief inquired about potential targets in and around the airfield.

When asking for information from the reconnaissance and scouting patrols that had eyes on the objective, the scouting patrols were unable to report on grid coordinates of nearby terrain features. Their GPS receivers stopped working. When reporting this back to the company, it became apparent that our standard means of radio communications also stopped working. VHF frequency hopping nets were suddenly garbled and unreadable, all of them. It was a very strange phenomenon indeed—one never experienced by our radio operators in training. When resorting to various frequencies, configuration settings, and even radio types, it seemed that they would work for about fifteen minutes and then fall apart. With as much resilience as we had planned for in our radio communications, we seemed to be getting jammed across all of our communications systems. The only system that worked was UHF narrowband SATCOM radio. Through it, we received a report that the Red naval force has obtained air and surface superiority in our vicinity. At the same time we received this information, the shelling began.

The shelling was not accurate; beginning at first a few hundred meters south of the LZ on which we landed, but it was walking closer and closer to the company command post. We could only assume that they planned to barrage the whole island in preparation for a sweep and clear operation to find us. We couldn’t communicate. We were strung out over three miles of various terrain. We were isolated and unsupported. The best we could do was send runners to the last known grids of the patrols and consolidate our company to a defensible position. While the terrain provided fair cover and concealment, the loss of local air and surface superiority meant that we were going to be in a truly dire situation. Food, water, and ammunition would deplete unless resupply and reinforcements could be arranged and delivered through enemy lines. Our casualties would not be quickly evacuated if at all. Our defensive indirect fire was limited to our company mortars and grenades. Engineers were not equipped to build the defenses necessary to stop the looming enemy assault. It was a truly dire situation indeed.

After a week-long defense of the company command post, our dug-in fighting positions were void of all vegetation, thanks to incessant accurate shelling. The company, while valiant, was reduced to 25 percent effectiveness due to casualties by enemy fire and a lack of food and water. We suspected that the enemy had no reason to assault our position and risk their own personnel rooting us out. They had us surrounded and isolated.

All they had to do was wait for us to surrender or perish due to lack of water. They had won.

In those dreadful hours awaiting death or capture, I pondered how the enemy knew that we were doing something of such strategic importance that they were willing to maneuver their naval forces to a position to gain air and surface superiority. Perhaps stray signals that made their way off the island established a suspicious pattern to signals intelligence collectors. It stands to reason that a major industrialized nation like the Democratic Federation of Reds could produce a broad-spectrum jamming capability—essentially blasting radio noise on all our VHF frequencies at the same time. Then whenever we would stray from our standard frequencies and try something new, they would listen for it, locate it, and adjust their jamming to also stamp it out too. They seem to have combined air superiority—and perhaps space superiority—and electronic warfare to make possible complete information superiority. They are able to have unfettered access to information while effectively denying our own use of information. Looks like it is back to the Stone Age for us.

As I woke from this third dream, the following six fundamental rules about radio communications came to my mind:

  • Rule number 7: Do not transmit radio signals unless absolutely necessary. To radiate is to be detected, to be detected is to be targeted, and to be targeted is to be destroyed. Though we have taken measures to reduce how much of our radio signal can be observed by the enemy, we cannot control various scattering and reflections from eventually reaching enemy sensors. Unnecessary situation reports and excessive radio checks serve to provide small pieces of evidence to the enemy. The less we transmit over radios, the fewer pieces of evidence the enemy has to collect, and the longer we can delay the inevitable localization of our radios.
  • Rule number 8: While there should be no limit to transmitting radio signals in support of fires and CASEVAC, other routine radio communication should be limited to pre-arranged periods of time, also known as comm windows. When given a small, prearranged window of time to transmit on radios, small units are forced to save their information to be passed in very short bursts, perhaps two or three minutes. Should the enemy find a friendly radio frequency to observe, they will not have enough time to triangulate its position. They also will not be able to deduce the size or capability. The next time the small unit uses that frequency, they are hours and perhaps miles away. Prolonging the time it takes for the enemy’s inevitable identification of your radio traffic and subsequent deduction of your strength or intentions allows you more time to complete your mission free from harassment or interdiction.
  • Rule number 9: GPS can and will be jammed. Use encrypted GPS for positioning (and timing) information that is more resilient to enemy jamming. Also, it goes without saying, always be proficient in navigating without GPS.
  • Rule number 10: Be mindful of your radio signature and frequently change it as the situation permits. Where a mechanized infantry battalion looks much different to imagery intelligence collectors from a heavy-lift helicopter squadron, so too will they look different to signals intelligence collectors. Where one uses predominately VHF communications and the other uses predominately UHF communications, both create a radio signature useful in deducing what types of units are operating where. Do not be afraid to reverse their signatures temporarily to confuse the enemy. Note: There will be technical limitations and operational impacts in doing so. Each limitation or impact must be evaluated carefully.
  • Rule number 11: Be deceptive in your use of radio communications. When you are large and want to appear small or non-existent, exercise as much radio silence as your situation permits. However, if you want to appear large and are small, you can make a concerted effort with your forces and radio assets available to spread out across the area of operations and create an exorbitant amount of false radio traffic. Use tall antennas on high power settings to make sure the enemy can detect the presence of every radio transmission.
  • Rule number 12: Be unpredictable in how you use radio communications. Given enough time and resources, anything you transmit can be detected, jammed, and targeted by the enemy. You must exercise full use of the wide range of communications capabilities in an unpredictable way to outpace the enemy’s electronic warfare efforts. On one day, use VHF and UHF if speed is required and the terrain permits. On the next day, trade VHF assets for HF assets as the situation permits. On the next day after that, resort to satellite phones and brevity codes, or runners, or flags, or pen lasers, or field phones and cable, each as the situation may permit.
  • Rule number 13: Above all else, be brilliant at the basics. All small unit leaders must prepare their five-paragraph orders with an understanding of the commander’s intent two levels up. Use terrain models. Communicate the plan and get brief backs. Conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections. Have a robust and well-thought-out no-comm plan. Know the schemes of maneuver of all your adjacent units. Have a well-informed runner that can find other small units on the battlefield. Finally, train your people to act well in absence of clear direction and in accordance with the commander’s intent. Then trust them without micromanagement. With all these basic elements in order, most radio communications need not be used until the decisive point in battle.

As I returned to my fully conscious state and these thirteen rules of radio communications manifested solidly in my mind, I returned to the company planning spaces and endeavored to ensure that all of these rules could be applied to the coming operation.

Small-unit leaders were instructed to limit radio traffic to those absolutely necessary for fire support coordination, casualty evacuation, or to make a change to the scheme of maneuver as briefed. Small-unit leaders on patrol were further instructed to reserve all of their routine radio traffic for a single five-minute comm window every three hours, and such comm windows would be made using random assignments so that it would be difficult for a three-hour pattern to emerge for the enemy to recognize. Additionally, no comm windows were allowed to be made from locations within 800 meters of any previous one. The company command post would similarly displace as often as the situation permitted. Details of such displacements would be communicated and updated azimuths to new locations would be made for directional radios.

Next, GPS devices were provided encryption keys so they could access more resilient GPS services reserved for Blue nation military units. This did not prevent platoon commanders from ensuring that all squads had sufficient maps and compasses to navigate absent of GPS.

Then, we came up with our radio signature management plan. We decided that we would use two VHF frequency-hopping nets for our primary and alternate comms as the first flight of Ospreys arrives at the LZ. Frequency-hopping UHF nets would be reserved as contingency and emergency comms. The second flight’s spectrum signature would be reversed. When the first half of the company established a command post and started patrols, for the next eight hours, primary communication would be made by runner. No two positions were more than four miles away, and only fires, CASEVAC, and changes to the scheme of maneuver as briefed would be the only information exchange requirements so urgent that a runner would not suffice.

For the subsequent eight hours, those sparing radio communications necessary would be made by HF skywave on the pause. During the following eight hours as everyone moved into position for the upcoming airfield assault, VHF frequency hopping would be the means of radio communication. For now, ANW2 would be turned off because every radio on an ANW2 network emits a constant ping like a homing beacon searching for connections to make automatically. While this does hurt digital fires and KILSWITCH data exchange, it does prevent the enemy from locating every squad equipped with an ANW2 radio. Finally, during the assault, all units will talk primarily by UHF frequency hopping. This will be convenient because as soon as the airfield is under friendly control, the first C-130 carrying the FARP aviation ground support equipment will arrive and offload, and we will be able to report the runway clear for landing.

After communicating these procedures to the team, my only regret is that we had not practiced in training a wide range of methods of radio communications so that we would be able to adapt to changes in the comm plan as quickly as we will have to during this operation. Instead, it will have to learn and do while under the stress of a no-fail mission.

In the final eight hours before crossing the line of departure, smart packs were republished with the new, more complex communications plan, but the radio operators and squad leaders all had a good handle on the dynamic changes they would make in the coming hours. We would figure out ways to make dynamic comm plan changes simple and easy to cope with after we get back. For now, it is game time.

As the company landing team infiltrated Duffer’s Island and for the first four hours, we were able to avoid using any radio communication at all. We requested the grid of the LZ to be provided before wheels-up so that transmission was avoided. The recon element reported the LZ clear for landing with a chem-light buzz-saw so that transmission was avoided. To indicate to the battalion that we had all arrived safely, I gave a pre-arranged thumbs-up to the pilot to relay when they get back. As for actions on the objective, the squads and platoons did according to their plan and their rehearsals. With encrypted GPS to guide them, navigating to their pre-arranged patrol bases was very simple, though some needed adjustment as the micro-terrain did not provide the preferred defensibility and concealment. Adjustments were all reported by runners in buddy pairs. The platoons and company were well enough informed on the changing situation.

Platoons eventually shifted from security patrols to scouting patrols to ensure there were no surprises awaiting us in our company assault on the Via Saltu airfield. The scouting patrols brought back plenty of grid coordinates of relevant targets for the mortars; a single guard post, a largely unoccupied barracks, a motor pool with a few dilapidated trucks, avenues of approach, visible micro-terrain from which to adjust fires, etc. The mortar section had no information requests when it came time to coordinate the assault.

During these eight hours, HF skywave antennas were used to communicate, but units would only be talking during their comm windows. The brevity code for “nothing significant to report” was simply “[platoon number] then Zulu.” However, there were important reports to make, and platoon commanders were as concise as possible, being certain to un-key the handset every four seconds or less.

As we proceeded into the final eight hours before the assault, everyone stowed their HF radios in favor of VHF radios to get back to frequency hopping as the operation got closer to the decisive phase. Radio discipline, brevity codes, and communications windows were still used if communication was necessary as the company massed in the vicinity of the objective rally point and support by fire positions.

In the final 30 minutes before launching smoke and illumination, we switched to the UHF frequency-hopping radios to add spectrum to the list of our many elements of surprise.

Units maneuvered. Fires supported maneuver. Units communicated implicitly, verbally, and over the radio when necessary. Marines exercised initiative in accordance with the commander’s intent. While we confronted token resistance, the airfield was captured because of our overwhelming relative combat power.

While the airfield occupants probably telephoned or radioed to report the situation, the C-130 carrying the aviation ground-support equipment was in-bound according to schedule. Fuel, bombs, and other enablers landed and made this airfield a forward arming and refueling point. When it came into operation an hour later, the F-35s surged into this airspace further than they had at any point in the campaign up to this point, made possible because we provided them a safe place to land, rearm, and refuel, and get back to safety at the end of the day.

With air superiority promised, surface superiority followed soon after.

Two days later, the FARP was still intact, and the mission was a complete success. However, we knew the enemy was looking for an opening to launch some GPS-guided missiles at our aircraft, fuel, or ordinance during FARP operations. As it turned out, our fleet’s cooperative engagement capability was very busy defending our FARP from missile attacks. It was only a matter of time before the enemy succeeded. The retrograde order came, and we packed up. As the MAGTF afloat passed nearby the island, we retrograded knowing that our infiltration worked this time on this island, and we were able to successfully surge striking power at the enemy. Next time, we will need a different approach as the MAGTF surges air and surface superiority toward some different aspects of the enemy’s war-making capability. They will be waiting.

A Message From the Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics

This is truly an exciting time for our Marine Corps Installations and Logistics Enterprise. Today, we are balancing the demands of a ready force in day-to-day competition with the imperative to support the development of the future force. We recognize that success in a contested environment hinges on the ability of our Marine Corps elements to persist in early phase maneuver across vast, dispersed littoral maneuver space.

Our Commandant continues to identify logistics as the pacing function for the Marine Corps. I will continue to ask all Marines and our civilian teammates, regardless of occupational field, to think critically and offer solutions for how we can reduce demand and mitigate challenges associated with sustaining our force in campaigning and conflict. Logistics is not just a critical requirement; it is a critical vulnerability. With this in mind, we must work quickly to transition thoughts into action and concepts into capabilities to ensure future success.

As we look to the future, we are shifting our mindset from a streamlined supply chain that is vulnerable to threats to a resilient sustainment web that assures mission success. Our homestation installations and advanced bases are integral as force generation, deployment, and sustainment platforms. We are leveraging opportunities to globally position equipment and supplies at or near the point-of-use, accurately forecast and plan sustainment using real-time data, and coordinate logistics support across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. We are exploring ways to reduce demand on a distribution system across long and vulnerable lines of communication. We are also maturing habitual relationships with partner, allied, joint, and interagency support capabilities and agreements.

Over the past three years, we have focused on expanding global logistics awareness, diversifying distribution, improving sustainment, and making our installations ready for a contested environment. We have cultivated emergent technologies to advance our tactical logistics capabilities, wargamed and exercised with variations of force organizations, and experimented across the FMF and Supporting Establishment. The output of this logistics experimentation has been critical for us to refine our organizations, capabilities, and concepts. For all who have contributed to these efforts—thank you. This is a team effort, and your voices matter!

The articles in this Marine Corps Gazette are representative of the innovation occurring across the Marine Corps Installations and Logistics Enterprise and illustrate the complexity of sustaining our forces in a globally-contested environment. This is no easy feat, but our Marines have proven time and again that they are up to the job as long as we set the conditions for their continued success. We appreciate the opportunity to share these articles with our Gazette readers and invite your thoughts on the challenges ahead. Semper Fidelis!

 

Semper Fi,Image

Edward D. Banta
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics

Offense Wins Games, Defense Wins Championships

Installations in a contested environment

>MajGen Maxwell is the CG of Marine Corps Installations Command.

>>Col Novario is a Logistics Officer and currently serves as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Engagement, Mission Sustainment, and Innovation at Marine Corps Installations Command.

“Recognizing growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the United States’ homeland from our strategic competitors, the Department will take necessary actions to increase resilience–our ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.”
—National Defense Strategy 2022

Soccer is often referred to as “the beautiful game.” As the most recent World Cup Champions, Argentina demonstrated in Qatar, the only way to win the championship trophy was by fielding a combination of a lethal offense and a resilient and impenetrable defense that blends seamlessly together. The path to being able to raise the cup is by scoring more goals on your opponents than they score on you over a series of matches. It is unique in that for 90 minutes of the game, the play is generally fluid and continuous—there is no play calling from the sidelines or television commercial breaks. For 45 minutes in each half, it is two teams locked in competition with each other, one side leveraging the strength of their team to generate and attack while the other team is posturing to defend their goal and, more importantly, seize the ball from the adversary to generate their own attack and strike a goal. It is a constant battle for position to create a window of temporary advantage to allow an attack to develop or to seize a strategic opening to strike quickly and unexpectedly. This is the nature of championship tournaments—it is also the nature of great power competition. Today in this era of great power competition, the Marine Corps is part of a similar contest, fighting for positional advantage that will lead to decision advantage and result in “net” effects.

In many respects, the mutually supporting and reinforcing nature required in the relationship between the installations and the operating forces we support is much like the relationship between the eleven players who take to the pitch. For the Marine Corps, holding the defensive line are the Marines and civilians operating and protecting installations around the globe while simultaneously providing the foundation from which the FMF can generate an attacking offense. It is this mutually supporting relationship that allows the Marine Corps to gain the advantage and deliver the necessary effects.

If the Marine Corps Installations team is the defensive line, the foremost priority is to defend the goal—to ensure installations are secure and there is a resilient defense, capable of shifting to counter diverse points of attack, whether securing our installation perimeters, protecting the installations communications network, or ensuring the resiliency of the installation from climate and energy effects. Without a strong defense, a team will be under constant pressure, and midfielders and forwards will be forced back just to help defend the goal. For the last twenty years, we have been able to accept risk in the defense. Our adversary was not able to generate an attacking threat that could get out of their back half and cross the midfield line. This is no longer the case today.

The global nature of warfare has changed. Modern technology allows command and control from anywhere to anywhere. Drones can be piloted from around the world. The cyber domain is actively contested today—with attacks coming through virtual private networks that complicate tracing and attribution. Numerous recent examples have illustrated the ways our enemies can attack our installations. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has dramatically changed the traditional calculus. Meanwhile at home, 11 September is perhaps the most striking example, but there are also smaller examples: Oldsmar Florida water treatment plant hack in 2021 and the Colonial Pipeline attack against our fuel infrastructure. Regular cyberattacks on airlines and healthcare systems all expose potential vulnerabilities and risks to the installations, which provide many similar services. Add to this disruptions caused by climate events like hurricanes and droughts or economic impacts of COVID-19, and it is apparent the contested environment is a today problem. Worse yet are the opportunities for our adversaries to put us in a dilemma by pressing their attack when we may be distracted by these events. Much like one player might make a deep run past a defender while another looks to exploit the space it creates, our enemies will look to be aggressive when we are dealing with another problem.

Thus the role of installations must also change. There was a time when we relied on our installations primarily for force generation and to a lesser degree force projection. It was a place to rest and refit before returning forward. Now, a defender must be able to repel an attack while providing the opportunity for a counter—potentially fighting through a contest without assistance from the midfielders or strikers. Perhaps those attacks are small UAS intrusions or swarm attacks or long-range missile attacks. Perhaps they are attacks against the communications network or the utilities infrastructure. Installations must be able to sense and make sense of those attacks and defeat the threat using both kinetic and non-kinetic responses without unduly reducing the capacity of our offense. Consistent with the themes in Talent Management 2030, we must build a team that strikes an appropriate balance of the offense and defense as well as develop players, both Marines and civilians, who can take to the field, fight, and win.

A strong defense will not only secure and protect the goal but will create opportunities to generate and sustain the attack. It is out of the defense that the ball is projected forward and the beginnings of the attack are generated. If our opponent is pressing us, it may take time—we will have to distribute the ball quickly, moving it around, often back and forth between the defense and the midfielders, looking for the opening to be able to move forward and press into the opponent’s final third. Our FMFs are the offense. They move forward, operating out of expeditionary advanced bases, constantly exercising, training, deploying, redeploying—always sensing, probing, and conducting reconnaissance to understand where the opponent’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities are. At the point of the attack, forces like the Marine Littoral Regiment are ready, waiting for the moment, and sensing the opportunity to find the opening to strike or to lay the ball off and create an opening to attack elsewhere. They are supported and sustained by MEF units transitioning between the installations and advanced naval bases forward into the opponent’s side to initiate, reinforce, or sustain attacks while at the same time always being prepared to support and reinforce the defense if under attack.

But increasingly, our operating forces can attack from anywhere and we can support from anywhere. Joint, all-domain command and control, robotics, and autonomous vehicles will only increase this global connection of our installations with our strikers. In a sense, we have big legs that can put shots on goal from around the globe. As we demonstrate the ability to fight from our installations, we must be prepared to defend them.

Just like the eleven players on the field, the installations and FMF players connect. We cooperate. We are inseparable and mutually dependent. We can project power and hold our enemies at bay. If we are resilient and prevent our opponents from penetrating our defense, our strikers can stay on offense. If the defense is brittle or weak, we may be unable to generate the offense against an effective opposing force firing on our goal. We should recognize the accumulated debt of under-investment in our installations is akin to the yellow card that can haunt a player for multiple matches, restraining play to avoid a second yellow card and ejection, or a red card that forces a club to play a man down the rest of the game.

Defeating the threats presented by today’s adversaries ensures installations can continue to support the attack but also preserve our offensive forces’ capacity if we can defend the installations with limited FMF augmentation. Resilience through disruptions will also provide continued installation support to our offensive forces. The dilemmas described above can be overcome if installations are resilient. The ability to mitigate or recover from the effects of hurricanes or power outages allows the continuation of power projection. When our enemies know we not only can survive but can adapt and respond in a contested environment, they will know our resilience is a source of strength and give them pause.

Though our homeland is no longer a sanctuary, and our goal can be shot upon at any time, the same is true for our opponents. The offense and defense are mutually integral to our strength. One must complement the other to achieve a synergistic effect. If our strikers keep the pressure on the opponent, the ability of our adversary to truly put pressure on our defenders will be limited. If our defenders can prevent or quickly repel penetrations, this allows the continuation of the attack. We must maintain pressure on the opponent’s goal. Keeping their players collapsed on their goal prevents sustained and effective pressure on our goal. On the field of competition today, this is very challenging. The game of soccer depends on two teams accepting the rules of the game. As we respect the international rules of order, the principles of national sovereignty, and the freedom and democratic values that form the foundation of this Nation, we will be constrained in what offensive strategies we can employ. Meanwhile, our adversaries do not appear to be constrained by these same values. We must assume they will have the opportunity and ability to generate an offense that can strike at our goal.

Marine Corps installations must be ready today while we make ready to meet the emerging challenges and support the future force design requirements as we provide the core of our Corps’ defense. If we want to continue to raise the champion’s trophy, we must have both an offense that can strike and score and an installations team with the capability and capacity to generate the attack and defend our critical goals.

MCDP 4, Logistics 2.0

Resilient logistics for the force today and tomorrow

“The thoughts contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. This book contains no specific techniques or procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.” 1
—Gen Charles Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Marine Corps is adapting to an evolving strategic environment and emergent threats. Great power competition, globally contested environments, and expanding warfighting domains are changing the context and character of Marine Corps and Joint Force operations. The Force Design 2030 initiative is intended to modernize the force for a multi-domain crisis and conflict. Logistics is an essential part of this modernization.

Anti-access/area-denial capabilities, new and emerging threats, and time-distance challenges complicate how we sustain our forces, particularly Stand-in Forces. Modernization efforts that account for these challenges will result in relevant capabilities that will be positioned or sustained in contested environments. Therefore, Gen Berger considers logistics “the pacing function for both modernization and operational planning.”2 Service-level efforts to systemically change the Marine Corps Installations and Logistics Enterprise through analysis and experimentation are ongoing. To help guide, inform, and complement these efforts, MCDP 4 has been updated with immediate relevance for the force today and to continue to shape how we fight tomorrow.

Updating logistics doctrine is a supporting effort for Force Design 2030. The original MCDP 4, Logistics, was signed in 1997 and provided all Marines with a conceptual framework for the understanding and practice of effective logistics. This document described how logistics relates to the Marine Corps philosophy described in MCDP 1, Warfighting. While much of MCDP 4 is enduring and timeless, Marines operate in a strategic context and environment much different than the one that existed when the foundational doctrine for Marine Corps logistics was originally published. Therefore, MCDP 4 has been revised to reframe Marine Corps logistics in this emergent, high-threat environment. The primary changes address logistics in great power competition, in a globally contested operating environment, and with an increasingly important Joint Logistic Enterprise (JLEnt). The revised MCDP 4 is intended to encourage innovative thinking, experimentation, and collaboration throughout the Naval Services and Joint Force to sustain forward-positioned forces over time.

Logistics in Great Power Competition
MCDP 4 explains how logistics fit into great power competition. MCDP 1-4, Competing, provides an updated framework for understanding the relations between international actors. This framework expands upon the old war/peace construct by presenting international relations as an ongoing competition. Marines compete daily through logistics activities that sustain expeditionary forces while also assuring allies and deterring adversaries. Forward posturing of logistics capabilities enables the force to rapidly respond to crises and stand ready to defeat enemies in conflict. The revised MCDP 4 aligns with MCDP 1-4 and provides considerations and examples of how logistics relates to each of these competitive acts.3

Globally Contested Environment
Another change from the late 20th century is the realization that military operations can be contested globally. Adversaries have invested in ways to match U.S. capabilities or achieve asymmetric military advantages such as mature precision strike, space platforms, and cyber networks. U.S. adversaries can attack or disrupt military operations in lethal and non-lethal ways using a variety of multi-domain options. The result is that U.S. military forces can be targeted from the most forward forces all the way back to the homeland, which includes academia and industry that form the Nation’s defense industrial base.

MCDP 4 captures the challenges of this contested environment, explores the operational implications of this environment, and provides potential ways to address these threats. For example, it is unlikely that U.S. forces will always be able to project forces into a foreign country using large-scale commercial shipping (such as maritime prepositioning ships) in permissive littorals as they did in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Marines must develop capabilities, experiment with techniques, and train to move over distance and at scale while being attacked and disrupted by opposing forces.

MCDP 4 also explores how to create a resilient logistics system. While traditional security means such as hardening, recovery, and active defense remain valid, elements of avoidance, dispersed capabilities, and swarming provide additional ways to achieve the survivability necessary to sustain forces over time. This discussion includes a shift in the paradigm from efficiency to effectiveness exemplified by using supply webs versus supply chains.

The Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)
The revised MCDP 4 dedicates a chapter to explain how Marine corps forces interface with the larger Joint Force to sustain forces. The 1997 version emphasized the self-sufficiency of naval expeditionary forces. However, decades of combat experience demonstrated that sustaining forward forces over time requires significant Joint Force cooperation. Marine Corps logistics is never conducted in a vacuum and the ability to harness capabilities from international, interagency, and inter-Service sources are important to supporting any operation. Understanding the activities, capabilities, and limitations of the JLEnt enables Marines to leverage opportunities and material resources from the entire Nation.

Image
Figure 2. Levels of war and logistics focus. (Figure provided by author.)

The demands of great power competition and globally-contested environments increase the need for Marine logistics efforts to be integrated within the larger JLent. In the future, Marines may be called to missions they have not performed in the past, particularly logistics operations that enable the Joint Force to get to the fight, sustain the fight over vast distances, and win. For example, Stand-in Forces may be the only node in a logistics system that can rearm or repair naval vessels or refuel joint and coalition aircraft.

Logistics at Each Level of War
Logistics activities vary significantly at each level of war. The original version of MCDP 4 explicitly focused on tactical logistics, while the revised version describes what activities need to be accomplished at each level of war, and who is responsible for conducting them.

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Figure 3. Logistics function activities at each level of war. (Figure provided by author.)

Understanding how operational and strategic logistics activities influence the force and provide opportunities is increasingly important. Demands affected by the threat and environment are so great on the Joint Force that Marines may increasingly be asked to contribute to operational-level logistics efforts. The time horizons and funding considerations of strategic logistics require different skills and approach than those required for tactical logistics. The revised MCDP 4 includes an updated framework with examples of how activities vary at each level (Figure 3). This framework is intended to expose Marines to the wide array of activities required to sustain the force and provoke creative ways of executing them in more relevant or effective ways.

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Figure 4. Warfighting functions. (Figure provided by author.)

Figure 3. Logistics function activities at each level of war. (Figure provided by author.)
Operations, Logistics, and Warfighting Functions
The revised MCDP 4 modifies how the relationship between operations and logistics is presented. Operations are the result of interplay across all warfighting functions. Each warfighting function is integral in both enabling and limiting every operation. Additionally, each warfighting function influences the others (Figure 4). For example, providing critical supplies to suffering people impacts the information aspects of humanitarian operations, to include even strategic messaging. Operational success is the result of the harmonious interactions of each warfighting function aligned to specific objectives.
MCDP 4 is written for every Marine, not just those with certain occupational specialties within the logistics community. Commanders, planners, and staff at each level must consider how logistics influences achieving goals and objectives. Plans that do not incorporate supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, and health factors risk being unfeasible, unacceptable, and un-executable. Logistics demands cooperation. Everyone plays a role in maintaining the combat power of the force.

Conclusion
The original MCDP 4 provided time-tested, combat-proven principles, yet it needed to be updated within the current warfighting context. The updated MCDP 4 includes significant and actionable concepts and ideas such as resilient supply webs versus supply chains, hybrid logistics and optionality, talent management, wargaming, and risk. This updated version also highlights the importance of installations as operational platforms for force generation, force deployment, and force sustainment. Several historical and fictional futuristic vignettes are used to broaden the reader’s perspective of logistics. This refreshed MCDP 4 brings to life the challenges of sustaining the force in a globally contested environment, within multiple domains, and across the competition spectrum.

MCDP 4, Logistics, challenges every Marine to read, think, and write about logistics. To this end, the Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics is spearheading efforts to modernize installation and critical infrastructure, invest in the people who sustain the force, diversify distribution capabilities, and develop concepts for moving and sustaining forces in contested environments. Efforts include a deliberate experimentation campaign plan to exercise, learn, and refine how we operate at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Armed with an understanding of the challenges of the future war, Marines will overcome these challenges with their can-do attitude and relentless spirit, as they always have in the past.

Notes
1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting,
(Washington, DC: 1997).
2. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030 Annual
Update, (Washington, DC: May 2022).
3. Gen David H. Berger, MCDP 1-4, Competing,
(Washington, DC: December 2020).
4. MCDP 1, Warfighting.

Pushing Lethality to the Edge

A smarter, deadlier MAGTF

>Capt Holden is a Marine Officer currently assigned to USSOUTHCOM where he has worked in security cooperation and collections management billets as well as managing a variety of projects implementing cutting-edge technological solutions to address the range of threats in the area of responsibility. He previously served in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility with 3d Mar and Combat Logistics Battalion 3, where he deployed in support of the PACOM Augmentation Team Philippines and aboard the USNS SACAGAWEA in support of Task Force KOA MOANA 17 to support a range of partner nation engagements across the Pacific.      

The threats facing today’s MAGTF have evolved significantly—even over just the last decade. Cyber capabilities, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and more have dispersed across a wide range of actors and become prominent factors in conflicts across the globe. Capabilities that were once the domain of advanced states can now be found in the arsenals of rising powers, transnational criminal organizations, and terrorist groups. These technological forms of warfare are cheaper to purchase, more user-friendly, and more portable than previous generations of military hardware. A 2021 Office of the Director of National Intelligence report assessed that these trends were likely to continue, creating new disruptions.1 The spread of these capabilities has some stark implications for how the Marine Corps needs to organize, train, and equip for the next fight.
Understanding the aggregate effect of all these changes in technology and domains is essential. This is a difficult task, with many experts disagreeing (and plenty making book deals) and speculating about these impacts on warfare. It is probably most salient how these technologies are applied to modern conflicts and to project those effects into the future. Current and recent conflicts provide an exciting window into what a future U.S. engagement might look like with some of these changes.
Battlefield experiences in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Ethiopia all point toward three clear lessons for the MAGTF of the future. First, advancements in technology have caused lethality to become more accessible and dispersed to lower echelons than previously feasible, which is pushing lethality to the tactical edge of formations. Secondly, the war in Ukraine has shown the value of joint integration at the lowest possible level, with members of each Service able to understand, access, and employ the capabilities of the other Services. Finally, having a deep reserve of technical capability is critical in a modern conflict. A technologically skilled base of citizens to pull from in times of conflict offers a distinct advantage in an age of technologically-focused warfare. These three elements will allow the MAGTF of the future to retain a competitive advantage in the future operating environment.

Technology Pushing Lethality to the Edge of the MAGTF
Technology has improved across a broad range of metrics over the last two decades, thus becoming more reliable, resilient, powerful, lethal, and compact. Furthermore, the cost of technologically advanced systems has greatly declined, allowing more capabilities at a fraction of the price they would have cost in years past. Major advances in unmanned aerial systems (UAS), loitering munitions (LMs), and mobility options mean that the MAGTF needs to invest in ways to push high-lethality weapon systems to lower echelons while guarding against the same effect in adversary forces.
UAS can significantly extend the range of enemy fires. This allows them to reach well behind the forward lines of troops and strike at valuable targets for a relatively low cost in manpower and resources.2 This is a powerful incentive to disperse capabilities to lower-level units, leaving them less vulnerable to attack by UAS. UAS and LMs are not just a concern during combat operations against a major state. The MAGTF prepares to deal with this technology across the spectrum of adversaries. The Ethiopian Civil War against rebels in the Tigray region provides an interesting example of technological proliferation in a developing country’s warfighting capabilities.The second most populous country in Africa, it is one of the poorest and with less than one percent of its GDP for military funding leaving them with an annual military budget of around one billion dollars.Despite the constrained budget, Ethiopia’s fight has featured the use of several types of drones: Chinese-made Wing Loong 2 armed UAV, Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 armed UAV, and Iran’s Mujaher-6 have all made appearances in the battlespace.As these technologies get cheaper and improve in quality, more adversaries will have access to drones across the spectrum of threats in future MAGTF engagements.
In Ukraine, small commercially produced UAVs have seen wide use at the tactical levels, serving in roles from reconnaissance to fire control to loitering munitions. Many of these UAS are commercially available and donated by outside groups. Drone enthusiast groups who ended up being part of the war effort produce some locally.These UAS are relatively inexpensive. If they are lost, broken, or destroyed, it is not a major event with replacement models available to purchase for $1000–$2000.Replacement parts can also be 3D printed by local groups of citizens or soldiers who brought those skills with them into the service.The relative cost and ease of replacement for these systems make them attritable, easy to disperse to frontline units, and well suited to the tactical edge of combat. The adoption of these systems provided significant benefits to Ukrainian forces across a range of operations.
LMs are a specific type of UAS which have become increasingly popular on the battlefield. Early versions of these munitions have been around since the Vietnam War, originally designed to home in on the radiation emitted by anti-air defenses.Advances in artificial intelligence have combined with the miniaturization of electronics to allow for munitions capable of much higher levels of autonomy.10 The ability of these munitions to loiter overhead while searching for targets within a certain signature parameter before striking or returning to base to be refitted and launched again creates a useful blend of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and munitions. These characteristics made them incredibly effective in the Azerbaijani war against the Armenians in 2020 when LMs played a key role in destroying enemy air defenses and armored assets.11 Furthermore, their lightweight design and relatively low cost (when compared to traditional air assets or missiles) provide an economic way to extend the umbrella of fires of a force with low cost in manpower and support. Turkey, Armenia, Iran, the United States, Israel, and China (among more than a dozen of others) have begun producing these munitions or incorporated them into their arsenals, which means that the MAGTF of the future will need to be prepared to handle them.12
The Marine Corps has done some experimentation with versions LMs and how they might be integrated into the MAGTF. The UVision Hero series of LMs have been integrated onto LAV-25 platforms with the intent to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and a precision-strike capability from one package on these vehicles—a significant enhancement for lethality.13 The Marines have also discussed intentions to test an air-launched version that could supplement traditional aircraft munitions, providing greater situational awareness for the crew while also providing fire support that could outlast the limited time on station for most aircraft in the Marine inventory.14 Incorporation of these types of munitions could provide enhanced battlefield awareness, close air support, and precision-strike capabilities at a fraction of the cost of traditional air assets while also maintaining the ability to disperse risk and capability. The Marine Corps needs to continue work to procure and develop lightweight, high-lethality systems that can be dispersed widely to forces.
Increasing the mobility of small teams empowered by these technologies also has a major impact on lethality. Electric bikes and motorcycles can increase the mobility and stealth of reconnaissance and sniper teams operating close to, or forward of, the front line of troops while allowing them to carry bulkier weapon systems into position. Ukrainian forces have employed versions of electric motorcycles with front-line troops for exactly this purpose. Domestically produced models of these bikes boast top speeds of 55 mph, a range of over 90 miles on one five-hour charge, and the ability to carry up to 330lbs—all having a relatively light weight of under 200lbs.15 These bikes have been used to provide greater mobility to anti-armor teams, carrying modern NLAW and Javelin anti-tank guided missiles into place, firing and displacing quickly.16 The combination of speed, lightweight build, and near-silent performance allows small teams to move into position to identify a target or to act as a shooter themselves. While the United States has invested in concepts like this in the past, Ukraine provides a fascinating proving ground that once again shows the value of quiet, highly mobile systems that can move high-lethality capabilities around the battlefield.17
The systems that the Marine Corps chooses to invest in for the MAGTF will play a large role in helping it maintain an edge in warfighting capabilities, but simple cultural shifts will allow access to much greater firepower and support by leveraging the unique capabilities of the Services fighting alongside them.

Jointness: It’s About Firepower
Integration between Services is critical on a modern battlefield, where sensors are ubiquitous and the interconnectedness of fires systems offers a major advantage. This interconnected web of sensors and shooters, each maximizing the most appropriate asset for the given task of finding, communicating, and shooting a target has been called “Mosaic Warfare.”18 The advantages of this high-level interoperability between Services have been demonstrated by the Ukrainian forces. They have been able to successfully link a variety of sensors to non-traditional shooters, allowing them to achieve some impressive battlefield results. During the back-and-forth battle for Snake Island, the Ukrainian forces were able to use Turkish Bayraktar UAVs to spot and target Russian forces and equipment.19 One impressive instance of this was in the sinking of the Russian flagship, Moskva, by a landbased, indigenously-produced Neptune anti-ship missile.20 The ability to string multiple sensors and shooters, taking advantage of various capabilities of other Services is a powerful force multiplier that the MAGTF of the future must be able to employ.
U.S. forces are going through great pains to ensure the interoperability of equipment and personnel across platforms, capabilities, and Services. The technical side of this effort is the Joint All Domain Command and Control program, which seeks to find solutions that will allow multiple generations of current platforms to become interoperable while laying a common groundwork for future systems to share that interoperability.21 The Joint Force offers a far greater variety of platforms and capabilities than those which are available to the MAGTF. This is a good thing since it allows Marines to access greater firepower, mobility, and support capabilities than would otherwise be available to them. But you cannot expect Marines who have been raised to view other Services as rivals or “less than,” led by officers whose time with the Joint Force can work against them for promotion, to fully grasp and maximize the full potential of the Joint Force.
There are cultural and materiel differences that are important to understand and navigate if you want to fully access the capabilities of a sister Service. Junior officers and staff NCOs need to be intimately familiar with the capabilities brought to bear by these forces to appropriately leverage them to accomplish the mission. What does the Army element have that can help address my challenge, how do I get it, and who do I talk to? These questions are vital for junior leaders to have the answers to before the next conflict starts, but unfortunately, the system does not incentivize junior leaders who are in the position to glean that knowledge and bring it back to the force.
The current structure (anecdotally) penalizes Marines for not having Marine raters on their fitness reports, making a tour at a joint assignment potentially damaging to a career, as non-Marine reviewers are seen as less valuable than Marines and there is a strong sense of what have you done for the Corps lately.22 Instead of penalizing young leaders for stepping into a situation that can potentially bring useful knowledge of joint capabilities back to the force, the Marine Corps should be encouraging rotations of junior officers and non-commissioned officers for that exact reason. To be truly effective across the domains of battle and enhance the firepower available to the MAGTF, jointness needs to be embraced.

Upskill for the Kill
A more technically demanding world demands technically competent personnel who can thrive by leveraging existing and emerging technologies. The United States as a whole is struggling to upskill the broader workforce, particularly in manufacturing jobs which have been replaced or moved out of the United States due to more competitive production locations overseas.23 Beyond the current workforce, the workforce of the future needs a higher level of education and technical training to hold meaningful jobs than previous generations.24 Trends in technologically advanced weaponry proliferating across the battlefield and allowing lethality to be pushed down to lower levels of the MAGTF requires a force that has the technical proficiency and mental capacity to embrace these changes.
The current changes to the Marine School of Infantry reflect that desire to upskill the MAGTF. Higher standards for intelligence, physical fitness, and longer training will all serve to lay a foundation for the skillsets that will be needed from their initial training.25 Increased training in crew-served and anti-tank weapons will provide additional skills that have proven indispensable in the conflict in Ukraine, where ATGMs have played such a key role across the battlefield. Beyond training, educational opportunities need to be provided and encouraged by leadership. Although the U.S. military has a higher percentage of the population with a high school diploma than the civilian populace, rates of enlisted attainment of higher education fall at the undergraduate and graduate levels to well below the average in the broader civilian population.26 This is a loss to the MAGTF of the future, which will desperately need both trained and educated service members serving in officer and enlisted roles to be competitive.
There are a variety of ways to upskill the MAGTF of the future. Extending the length of primary training schools to provide a longer period to learn and retain a broadening range of skill sets that are required for basic job proficiency is one way. Requiring more regular follow-on training at career waypoints to reinforce earlier training, update knowledge based on current best practices, and allow for a mixing of experiences by professionals with different operational experiences would have a major positive impact. There are also programs that could be used to incentivize Marines to pursue technical training or educational opportunities on their own time and with a greater benefit to the force. These could look like a structured program to help Marines achieve an associate’s degree or technical certification in a relevant skillset over the first two years of service through distance or night classes. It is a smart investment to make the changes that will maintain the qualitative edge that the MAGTF holds, upskilling the Marines of today and laying the groundwork for the Marines of tomorrow to be more skilled and educated for the next fight.

Smarter, Faster, Deadlier: The MAGTF of the Future
The Marine Corps will have to adapt to the increased pace of warfare in the coming decades. Adversaries across the threat spectrum will have more information, technology, and lethality at their disposal than ever before. By studying the lessons provided by ongoing conflicts across the globe, it is easy to see the path that the MAGTF must take as they move toward the future. A concerted effort must be made to push lethal capabilities and the supporting mobility further toward the edge of the tactical formation. Capabilities previously held at the battalion or regiment level have a place much lower now. The Marine Corps needs to get comfortable, even greedy, with joint opportunities for integration. This is a vital link to assets and capabilities that do not come at the expense of the Marine Corps but could provide the vital element for a successful operation. This needs to be encouraged and pushed to more junior personnel as an opportunity to learn and bring back value to the Corps. Finally, human capital is what has always made the Marine Corps the dominant fighting force that it is. Marines on Wake Island did not benefit from the best equipment as they lashed the Japanese forces. The Corps must continue that tradition, offering increased technical training and education to upskill the force while encouraging the next generation of Marines to come into the force more skilled and capable than ever.


Notes

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Global Trends 2040,” Director of National Intelligence, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf.

2. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Director of National Intelligence, February 2022, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

3. Global Conflict Tracker, “War In Ethiopia,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 20, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia.

4. The World Bank, “Ethiopia Overview,” The World Bank, October 06, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview; and World Factbook, “Ethiopia: Military Expenditures,” Central Intelligence Agency, n.d., https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ethiopia/#military-and-security.

5. Alex Gatopoulos, “How Armed Drones May Have Helped Turn the Tide in Ethiopia’s War,” Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/12/10/how-armed-drones-may-have-helped-turn-tide-in-ethiopia-conflict; and Wim Zwijnenburg, “Is Ethiopia Flying Iranian-Made Armed Drones?” Bellingcat, August 17, 2021, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2021/08/17/is-ethiopia-flying-iranian-made-armed-drones.

6. Andrew Kramer, “From the Workshop to the War: Creative Use of Drones Lifts Ukraine,” The New York Times, August 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/10/world/europe/ukraine-drones.html.

7. Information available at https://store.dji.com.

8. Amy Feldman, “Putting 3D Printers to Work in Ukraine’s War Zone,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/amyfeldman/2022/03/31/putting-3d-printers-to-work-in-ukraines-war- zone/?sh=70814225015f.

9. Weapon Systems, “AGM-454 Shrike,” Weapons Systems, n.d., https://weaponsystems.net/system/1066-HH08%20-%20AGM-45%20Shrike.

10. John F Antal, Seven Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting (Philadelphia: Oxford: Casemate, 2022).

11. Ibid.

12 Manu Pubby, “Indigenous Loitering Munition Successfully Hits Target at Pokhran,” The Economic Times, September 22, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indigenous-loitering-munition-successfully-hits-target-at-pokhran/articleshow/94383125.cms?from=mdr; Stew Magnuson, “Loitering Munitions Proliferate as Tech Changes Battlefield,” National Defense, August 9, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/8/9/loitering-munitions-proliferate-as-tech-changes-battlefield.

13. Dan Parsons, “Marines Handoff Loitering Munition Control Between Air, Sea, Land Platforms,” The Drive, June 3, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/marines-handoff-loitering-munition-control-between-air-sea-land-platforms.

14. Ibid.

15. Howard Altman, “Commander in Ukraine Wants Quiet Electric Bikes for His Sniper Teams,” The Drive, May 11, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/commander-in-ukraine-wants-quiet-electric-bikes-for-his-sniper-teams; and Rachel Pannett, “Ukrainian Fighters Take to Electric Bikes in the War Against Russia,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/26/ukraine-russia-war-electric-bikes-weapons.

16. Matthew Gault, “Ukraine Is Using Quiet Electric Bikes to Haul Anti-Tank Weapons,” Vice News, May 24, 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgde8k/ukraine-is-using-quiet-electric-bikes-to-haul-anti-tank-weapons.

17. David Leffler, “New Spec Ops Dirt Bikes Combine Stealth and Speed,” Task and Purpose, June 15, 2016, https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/new-spec-ops-stealth-bikes-freakishly.

18. DARPA, “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare,” DARPA, n.d., https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision-of-mosiac- warfare#:~:text=The%20concept%20is%20called%20%E2%80%9CMosaic,that%20its%20forces%20are%20overwhelmed.

19. YUSUF ÇETINER, “Ukrainian TB2 Destroys Russian Mi-8 Helicopter On Snake Island in First Reported Aerial Kill,” Overt Defense, May 10, 2022, https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/05/10/ukrainian-tb2-destroys-russian-mi-8-helicopter-on-snake-island-in-first-reported-aerial-kill/; and Xavier Vavasseur, “Watch Ukrainian TB2 Striking Two Russian Raptor Assault Boats,” Naval News, May 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/watch-ukrainian-tb2-striking-two-russian-raptor-assault- boats.

20. David Hambling, “Ukraine’s Bayraktar Drone Helped Sink Russian Flagship Moskva,” April 14, 2022, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/04/14/ukraines-bayraktar-drones-helped-destroy-russian- flagship/?sh=3fe003753a7a.

21. Congressional Research Service, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2),” In Focus, January 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11493/16.

22. Paul W. Mayberry, et al, Making the Grade: Integration of Joint Professional Military Education and Talent Management in Developing Joint Officers (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA473-1.html.

23. Aspen Institute, “Upskill America,” Aspen Institute, n.d., https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/upskill-america/about- upskill-america.

24. Kausik Rajgopal and Steve Westly, “How Tech Companies Can Help Upskill the U.S. Workforce,” The Harvard Business Review, Feb 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/02/how-tech-companies-can-help-upskill-the-u-s-workforce.

25. Otto Kreisher, “Marine Infantry to Become More Commando-Like,” Sea Power, May 12, 2022, https://seapowermagazine. org/marine-infantry-to-become-more-commando-like/#:~:text=Among%20the%20training%20changes%20 underway,14%2DMarine%20element%20during%20training%2C.

26. Kim Parker, Anthony Cilluffo and Renee Stepler, “6 Facts about the U.S. Military and Its Changing Demographics,” Pew Research Center, April 13, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/13/6-facts-about-the-u-s-military-and-its-changing-demographics.

When New Concepts and Capabilities Meet the Test of Major War

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A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY

WHEN NEW CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES
MEET THE TEST OF MAJOR WAR

 

Eighty years ago, the final act of the Battle of Guadalcanal (Operation WATCHTOWER, 7 August 1942–9 February 1943) was playing out in the Southwest Pacific.

The six-month struggle had taken on epic proportions, as both the Allied and Imperial Japanese leadership committed nearly all available resources to win what both sides recognized as a potentially decisive test of arms. For the Navy and Marine Corps, Guadalcanal represented the hard but successful first major test of new concepts, doctrine, equipment, and organizations, some of which had been under development and testing for two decades. Operation WATCHTOWER was launched on very short notice in response to the Japanese seizure of Tulagi Island in the lower Solomon Islands chain in April 1942.

When intelligence indicated that the Japanese had begun to build an airfield on nearby Guadalcanal, the focus shifted to the nearly complete airstrip there, and plans were adjusted mid-stride. The operation, launched in early August 1942 at the direction of the Joint Chiefs, was to seize both islands before the Japanese could further strengthen their defenses, using a hastily organized Joint Expeditionary Force under VADM Jack Fletcher. This effort—born out of the opportunity presented after the battles at Coral Sea and Midway—turned into a critically important and ultimately successful first counteroffensive by the hard-pressed Allies.

As Guadalcanal was declared secure in February 1943, Allied commanders and planners put the finishing touches on the next offensive: Operation CARTWHEEL. CARTWHEEL was designed to advance “up the slot” through the Solomons and, in conjunction with Allied forces under GEN MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific fighting up the northeast coast of Papua New Guinea, push Imperial Japanese forces away from Australia. Commanders and their staffs viewed the major Japanese base at Rabaul on the eastern tip of New Britain Island as the key objective of the operation.

Throughout 1943, and covered by growing Allied air and naval power, Allied ground forces were used in short, sharp amphibious assaults on both sides of the Solomon Sea, bypassing wherever possible known Japanese concentrations in New Guinea on the southwest edge and the Solomons chain on the northeast. These dual drives would involve numerous large and small landings, capped by those at Cape Torokina on Bougainville in November 1943 and Cape Gloucester on New Britain in January 1944. Their success neutralized Rabaul and capped the major allied actions in the South Pacific.

The extraordinary history of the larger effort, running from initial organization and planning of the naval force in July 1942 through early 1944, was documented in detail by the Marine Corps Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps in its first and second volumes of The History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, respectively subtitled Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal and The Isolation of Rabaul. Among other things, these volumes highlight the key Allied and adversary decisions, the ebb and flow of the campaigns, and the remarkable array of units and capabilities devoted to the expanding fight. Of note to contemporary force designers is how many of these were repurposed or employed well outside their normal operating mode. Finally, these volumes convey the extraordinary determination and valor of Marines, sailors, and soldiers of the Allied team during those trying months.

For today’s Marines, the many hard-learned lessons of that period inform our understanding of the future. The circumstances of 1942–43 remind us that the FMF must be responsive to the changing strategic context. Evolving geopolitical conditions and technological advances dictate that our Force Design choices account for a broad range of threats and challenges. We must balance our ability to address the most concerning near term ones with the imperative to be ready to respond in any clime and place. This is an incredibly difficult task, but our Corps has a tradition of accomplishing such things.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory/Futures Directorate remains committed to conceiving of and contributing to the development and realization of the most lethal, persistent, and resilient FMF possible. Driven by national and defense guidance, and informed by statutory functions and composition, our activities are designed to ensure the FMF wields modern and relevant capabilities across a broad range of military operations. The example of eighty years ago, which started as a relatively modest naval step to block further enemy gains, grew to a truly a joint and combined effort. This ultimately involved multiple amphibious assaults, defensive counter-air, deep air strikes, coast watchers, close infantry combat, air, and sea interdiction of enemy sea lines of communication, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, air and sea search and rescue, and hundreds of minor tactical actions by light forces as they sought to sense and make sense of enemy intentions and actions. A plausible future conflict will feature variants of all of these, and more.

In the pages that follow, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory/Futures Directorate personnel and others discuss ongoing Marine Corps efforts to conceptualize, design, evaluate, produce, and sustain a FMF that will succeed in a 21st-century version of a broad, deep, and deadly war. It is a sobering topic, but it must be addressed. Our present focus centers on the likely missions and necessary composition of Stand-In Forces, and the operational concepts and required capabilities to execute Reconnaissance/Counter-reconnaissance missions and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations. While these are clearly applicable in the Pacific, they are designed to be employable in contested regions across the globe.

Per national guidance, Marines are committed to standing with allies and partners in competition and conflict. Our immediate Force Design choices underscore our seriousness of purpose regarding this direction. In an ideal world, the development and fielding of such forces will serve to help dissuade and deter unwanted conflict. However, as a Service that is founded as an Expeditionary force-in-readiness, our ultimate task is to prepare for the worst case. We must develop capabilities and capacities which will increase the likelihood of success in joint and naval operations during major war. Such a conflict will be a combined arms one, waged across all domains, and with many actions executed before the first kinetic round is launched. This is the fight we must be prepared for, and a wider array of capabilities is necessary if we are to win our part.

Finally, the fundamentals of maneuver warfare remain at the center of our Force Design effort. Much like the Marine experience of 1942–43, early battles and operations may be defensive due to circumstance, but the means to translate success in the defense into effective offensive operations will be sustained and improved. Even as we develop, refine, and field Stand-In Force capabilities, we are working with Joint, Navy, and allied partners to enhance littoral strike capabilities and enhance littoral mobility and maneuver in contested battlespace. A centerpiece of this effort is our ongoing development of a 21st-century amphibious operations concept in close cooperation with the Navy. We are confident that these many related efforts are bearing fruit, and the Marine Corps of the mid-21st century will remain relevant, ready, and effective across the range of conflict
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K.B. ELLISON
Commanding General,
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

Infantry Battalion Experiment-30 (IBX30) Phase I Results

NeXt-file released

>Capt Hogan is a 1302 Combat Engineer Officer assigned to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. After serving his first tour at 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, he has spent the past two and a half years working as an integral part of the lab’s Infantry Battalion Experiment 2030 team.  

In November, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) released the FD2030 Update: Infantry Battalion Experiment for Service-wide consumption.This publication was the culmination of two years of work within the lab and all three MEFs and concisely presents the infantry battalion experimentation (IBX30) effort’s findings thus far. But before explaining the document, it is worth starting at the beginning, with the Commandant’s sweeping Force Design 2030 (FD2030) initiative.
As a component of Gen Berger’s FD2030 effort, in 2020, an integrated planning team (IPT) developed the design of the future infantry battalion. Starting from the principles articulated in the Commandants’ 2019 Planning GuidanceFD2030, and The Case for Change, the IPT envisioned a battalion comprised of “highly trained and educated, competent, mature Marines, [equipped] with state-of-the-art weapons and equipment” that would distribute its forces to execute offensive, defensive, and expeditionary operations against a peer adversary.The battalion reflected a shift towards peer competition, the growing maturation and proliferation of adversary long-range precision fires, the proliferation of drones and loitering munitions, and the influence of electromagnetic and cyber warfare capabilities. The 735-Marine formation dramatically altered the infantry battalion, inserting new capabilities at lower echelons, divesting of significant structure and personnel, and relying on new concepts such as a more mature MARSOC-like Marine and an arms room.3
After seeing the new design, the CMC published an FD2030 update and tasked MCWL with validating IPT assumptions and analyzing the proposed size and composition of the future infantry battalion, initiating IBX30 Phase I.

Background: What Was IBX30 Phase I?
To test and refine the IPT’s 735-Marine formation, MCWL conducted a series of experiments including modeling and simulation, wargames, and live-force experimentation. All these events examined the experimental focus areas of sustainment, command and control (C2), sensing, and lethality. Working in tandem with other components of Headquarters Marine Corps and by, with, and through FMF partners, MCWL developed a deliberate and iterative experiment plan to test the design that included three battalions, one from each MEF. 1/1 Mar, 1/2 Mar, and 1/3 Mar each experimented with slightly different tables of equipment and organization, testing different components of the original design.
Over the last two years, MCWL conducted eleven live-force experiments in three countries and five states in diverse weather conditions, mountainous terrain, and desert and jungle environments. Experiment locations included Twentynine Palms, CA; Camp Lejeune, NC; the Pohakuloa Training Area, Kaneohe Bay, and Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, HI; Okinawa, Japan; Yuma, AZ; San Clemente Island, CA; Northern Luzon, Philippines; and Fola Mine, WV. The diverse experiments stressed different parts of the design and allowed collection from the squad to battalion echelons, across the warfighting functions, and against the infantry battalion’s core mission essential tasks.
Throughout all experiments, MCWL listened to, observed, and collected feedback from the experimental units and other partners, consolidating that information for analysis and to generate conclusions about the design. The analyses and evaluations provided information and insights on the effectiveness of the 735-Marine design and how it might fight in the future. After producing multiple reports, briefs, and studies, IBX30 Phase I ultimately culminated in a decision by the Commandant in June 2022.

Observations: What We Saw
Many of MCWL’s observations directly related to the battalion’s design, feeding recommendations on how to alter personnel structure or equipment to optimize the unit for the present and future. These included needing more bandwidth for communications and administrative tasks, a shortage of personnel within the 81mm mortar platoon, and friction created by a lack of a dedicated ground-intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance unit among others. These observations fed MCWL’s recommendations to the CMC but do not capture everything we saw. A large part of the experimentation included re-imagining how an infantry battalion will fight with the new organization and capabilities.
The new formation is flooded with new capabilities including company-level signals intelligence and electro-magnetic warfare, squad-level organic precision fires, Group 2 UAS, and lighter, more agile tactical mobility. These transformative capabilities bring aspects of warfare down to the tactical edge at unprecedented density and levels of integration, giving a company the ability to understand and leverage the spectrum during operations, effectively placing a new dimension of war at their fingertips. But sifting through all of the changes, the analysis team identified three fundamental components of the battalion’s future employment that describe how it should fight: interchangeable C2 nodes, hunter-killer pairing at echelon, and hub and spoke operations. While not comprehensive, these ideas underpin the conceptual shift in how the infantry battalion of the future will fight and illustrate why it will be decisive on the future battlefield.
Interchangeable C2 refers to how company and battalion command centers operate and relate to one another. On the future battlefield, survivability will depend in large part on reducing a unit’s signature and improving its mobility, enabled by the ability to shift command and control of an area of operations. The design increases company staff capacity and communications capabilities, allowing for companies to control battalion battlespace for a limited duration, ultimately providing the battalion with five C2 nodes. Redundancy is a must, so the design leverages the companies for C2 redundancy, increasing the formation’s resilience and survivability.
The company’s increased C2 capacity is both required by and facilitates hunter-killer pairing at echelon. In this context, hunters are sensing assets, and killers are kinetic weapons, generally a UAS and a loitering munition, respectively. The new formation boasts a dramatic increase in precision fires capabilities, and ensures the employing units retain the organic capability to find targets for these weapons. This results in loitering munitions at the squad, platoon, company, and battalion level with UASs at the same echelon that match the munition’s duration and range. The munitions gradually increase in capability, from anti-personnel to anti-armor. Together these systems enable every unit to precisely engage an enemy from—and into—defilade and organically counter otherwise overwhelming enemy direct-fire.
Hub and spoke operations refer to the ability of any unit to take control of either UAS or loitering munitions post-launch. Because Marines at the tactical edge can take terminal control of loitering munitions, employing a higher echelon system is simplified. The squad can bring all the company’s firepower, itself dramatically increased, to bear on the enemies it can see, adapting to real-time changes. All these changes, in the context of more distributed operations, alter our understanding of mutual support. The company can launch an anti-armor loitering munition and send it 40km across land or water to a platoon or squad that takes control and strikes a target. Hub and spoke operations are a foundational tactic enabling distributed operations.
These three concepts paint the picture of a dispersed and distributed battalion surviving by limiting physical mass and constantly moving, leveraging, and communicating the findings of its wealth of sensors to open and close kill webs and empowering its unit leaders with sensors and precision fires across great distances. The vision reflects the Commandant’s demand to counter the adversary’s precision fires and sensing regimes with independent and capable subordinate units, resiliency in the formation, and broad employability of sensors and fires across the unit.

The Commandant’s Decision
Combining these more conceptual observations on the shift in how the infantry battalion fights with concrete notes on how the units performed, MCWL coalesced its two years of experimentation into recommendations briefed at the Ground Board, a collection of general-officer level stakeholders in the ground combat element and Headquarters Marine Corps, in May 2022. With Ground Board approval, the recommendations were forwarded to the CMC for a final decision. Once decided, the changes were formalized in a memorandum from Deputy Commandant, Concept Development and Integration.
The approved recommendations include establishing an organic battalion ground intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance unit (the scout platoon); adding one ammunition Marine per tube within the 81mm mortar platoon; retaining the 0352 and 0331 MOS’s while adding a machinegun section and re-organizing company-level crew-served weapons; returning key enablers to headquarters and service company; and removing one Marine from each rifle squad. These recommendations resulted in a battalion staffing level of 811 Marines.4
Taken together these changes address observations from experimentation on where the 735-Marine battalion cut existing structure too deeply when aligned against current manning, training, and equipping capabilities of the Corps. With the CMC’s decision and execution of these intermediate changes Service-wide, the Marine infantry battalion will remain lethal in the conflicts of the present day and the future.

Ongoing Experimentation
After accepting these recommendations, the CMC directed MCWL to continue experimentation with the 811-Marine battalion during IBX30 Phase II. To achieve the optimal force by 2030, we must continue iterating on the infantry battalion’s design, perfecting it over time and continued effort. Phase II has already begun and will continue for the next three years. But as MCWL focuses efforts on 2/7 Mar and 3/4 Mar, we will continue to listen to feedback from the broader fleet.While focused experimentation can produce data and concentrated specific findings, fleetwide experimentation will continue to drive the Marine Corps forward. It is for this reason, to unlock and encourage units across the Marine Corps to experiment on their own, that MCWL released its NeXt File on IBX Phase I, the location of which can be found in MARADMIN 618/22.6 Additionally, reports from Phase I of experimentation are accessible on Intelink.7
The final result of IBX Phase I reflects the original vision of a distributed-operations capable formation while mitigating risk by accounting for the pace of institutional change. The 811-Marine design incorporates new capabilities to stay ahead of changes in modern war, without reducing our capacity in the most basic and fundamental infantry missions today. As the FMF transitions and adapts to the new battalion, experimental exercises, reports, and feedback will help optimize this new design and inform the Service about the unit’s capabilities and how to obtain the best tactical results. MCWL will continue to experiment, but the FMF will drive the Marine Corps forward.
This refinement of the infantry battalion will continue concurrently with another FD2030 priority: the Marine Littoral Regiment. The current Service focus is experimenting with and refining the Marine Littoral Regiment design while establishing future Marine Littoral Regiments. MCWL’s IBX Phase II experimentation, data collection, and analysis directly contributes to the concurrent effort with Marine Littoral Regiment experimentation given the battalion’s role as the base unit of the Littoral Combat Team. Together, these lines of effort will feed MCWL’s recommendations for and the Service’s refinement of the future force.
There remains much work to shape the Service, and the more all Marines contribute to the solution, the faster it will happen and the better the results will be. Across the Corps, all units, organizations, and Marines have a stake in FD2030’s success. This is the Marine Corps our country is counting on to compete, deter, and win America’s future battles.


Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MARADMIN 618/22, Update to MCWL Information Sharing with the Fleet Marine Force, (Washington, DC: November 2022).

2. Integrated Planning Team, Draft Infantry Battalion Design IPT Report dtd 5 May 20.

3. Ibid.

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Bulletin 3120, Marine Corps Global Force Management and Force Synchronization, (Washington, DC: August 2020).

5. Headquarters Marine Corps, Warning Order to Force Design Infantry Battalion/CMC PPO POF, 08/09/2022, 18:33:33, (Washington, DC: August 2022).

6. The IBX30 Phase I X-File is currently available for anyone with a .mil address. To read the full X-File follow the link found at https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/3227550/update-to-mcwl-information-sharing-with-the-fleet-marine-force.

7. Location of all IBX Phase I Reports: https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/mcwl/ExDivReports/_layouts/15/start.aspx#.

Adapt or Die

The maneuver warfare imperative MCDP 1 ignores

>Maj Jessup did not provide a bio.

Philosophy, not prophecy; innovative, not inviolate—MCDP 1, Warfighting, is a living document long past due for revision. MCDP 1 was not written as a stone epitaph; yet, for a quarter century, that is how the Marine Corps has treated it—an exegesis to be exalted, rather than a paradigm to be parsed. The prohibition on this lapse could not be starker than the injunction in the foreword to the 1997 revision: “Warfighting can and should be improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare.”1 Improvements are warranted and overdue.

First, MCDP 1 needs a bold disclaimer: the publication is only a starting point for professional competence in maneuver warfare. Second, it needs a refined focus—warfighting—with expanded horizons; maneuver warfare does not apply to everything, but it applies to much more than the physical battlefield. Third, it needs a deeper appreciation of time and adaptation; time is the constant feature of all systems competition, and adaptation is the engine that underwrites successful competition.

 MCDP 1 needs a bold disclaimer. Maneuver warfare is a complex and nuanced paradigm in which MCDP 1 is neither alpha nor omega. Rather, MCDP 1 is a foundational summary, written for simplicity and broad accessibility. This fact needs to be formalized in the publication itself as a catapult to compel centrifugal, rather than centripetal, study.2 Put differently, MCDP 1 is not a self-licking ice cream cone; the study of maneuver warfare might begin with MCDP 1, but to conclude there is a severe and reckless disregard for professional intellect. If maneuver warfare is truly the Marine Corps’ philosophy for winning America’s battles, then Marines ought to have a depth of professional familiarity exceeding a 45-minute read. The gravity of its subject—a warfighting philosophy—makes this imperative intransigent.

MCDP 1 also needs a refined focus. The present edition bizarrely suggests maneuver warfare applies to everything the Marine Corps does: “[w]hether the mission is training, procuring equipment, administration, or police call, this philosophy should apply.”3 This is wrong. Systems competition between two hostile and irreconcilable wills furiously operating complex decision-making models where proper orientation paired with superior adaptation and its component parts of variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative (VRHI) can induce the adversary system to collapse is not a philosophy suited to everything.4 This is an incoherent paradigm to conduct a court-martial, manage a maintenance cycle, balance a budget, pilot a promotion board, and a myriad of other military matters. If maneuver warfare applies to everything, then it applies to nothing and no one cares about it. MCDP 1’s institutional relevance should accord with the implacable gravity of its subject—a warfighting philosophy sufficient to “secure or protect national policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot.”The Marine Corps undermines the institutional relevance of maneuver warfare by rendering it a ridiculous panacea for all ills.

While MCDP 1 needs a refined focus, it also requires a more holistic scope. The current publication retains an unhealthy gaze on the physical battlefield.The overplayed and dubious dichotomy MCDP 1 cultivates between attrition warfare and maneuver warfare7 is a prime example that draws the reader into a universe of Materialschlacht,8 obfuscating maneuver warfare as a “moral-mental-physical”9 defeat mechanism.10

MCDP 1 describes attrition warfare in purely physical terms.11 Maneuver warfare is presented as its opposite, but the emphasis on the physical battlefield remains: “[f]irepower and attrition are essential elements of warfare by maneuver … [maneuver warfare] may involve outright annihilation of enemy elements.”12 The emphasis on the physical battlefield even carries through to the maneuver warfare examples MCDP 1 highlights: the German invasion of France in 1940, the failure at Anzio in 1944, the breakout from Normandy in 1944, Inchon in 1950, etc.13 Emphasis on the physical battlefield is also prominent in Chapter 4 (“The Conduct of War”): firepower and speed are discussed in the context of the physical battlefield, shaping actions “render the enemy vulnerable to attack, facilitate the maneuver of friendly forces, and dictate the time and place for decisive battle,”14 combined arms embraces mobility and firepower in a terrestrial melee.15 None of this is wrong; maneuver warfare is entirely applicable to the physical battlefield, but its application vastly exceeds this limited arena.

This emphasis on the physical battlefield is a particularly glaring difference between John Boyd’s nuanced conception of maneuver warfare and MCDP 1’s blunted summary.16 Boyd believed the most efficient and effective warfighting systems will synthesize attrition warfare (exploiting kinetic means in the physical domain),17 maneuver warfare (exploiting an information differential),18 and moral warfare (severing an adversary’s internal cohesion)19 into a unified whole that will “[d]estroy [the] adversary’s moral-mental-physical harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to resist.”20 This holistic concept includes, but far exceeds, the physical battlefield—the opponent is not merely pitting strength against weakness on the field of battle but rather destroying the adversary’s systemic moral, mental, and physical harmony.21 Put differently, Boyd expects successful warfighting systems to utilize a combination of destructive force (attrition), an escalating information differential (maneuver), and friction aimed at inciting internal alienation (moral) to “produce paralysis and collapse [the adversary system’s] will to resist.”22 While MCDP 1 does not entirely blunder past this theme,23 its plane of engagement is usually couched in the physical battlefield and this presents a stunted view of maneuver warfare.24

Third, MCDP 1 needs a deeper appreciation of time and adaptation. Maneuver warfare is incoherent apart from time. Time is implacably pervasive and domineering in every aspect of conflict (and even the peaceful preparation for the contingency of conflict). It “defines the limits of political and military power. It defines the possible and impossible. In short, there is no understanding warfare apart from time.”25 Accordingly, time is a uniquely uniform feature of all systems competition. Yet, MCDP 1 offers a severely undersized and elementary appreciation of time; it recognizes only one aspect of time—frequency—and demands only one application: be faster relative to the adversary.26 This approach disregards the other characteristics of time—duration (the temporal span of a conflict), opportunity (“time-sensitive decision point[s]”27), and sequence (“the order of events”28)—and only accords advantage to a unidirectional view of frequency.29 For brevity, consider just one illustration of how limited a unidirectional view of frequency is: in his book, Fighting by Minutes, Robert Leonhard acknowledges the advantage of high frequency (MCDP 1’s traditional view of tempo); however, he also persuasively illustrates how low frequency can be similarly exploited with decisive effect. Essentially, operating at a tempo beneath an adversary’s expectation precludes the adversary’s effective orientation (mirroring the impact—impaired orientation—of high frequency, only with a vastly different kind of tempo and associated systemic economy).30 Leonhard cites a variety of examples in the context of small wars to illustrate this point and concludes that the United States has normalized a frequency of conflict and has difficulty responding to adversary operations beneath this frequency.31 Leonhard’s studious examination of time generates dazzling illumination that adds significant depth of insight to the philosophy of maneuver warfare.

MCDP 1 also needs an explicit discussion of adaptation as the engine of systems competition and its component parts of VRHI. These components are fundamental to John Boyd’s conception of superior adaptation;32 however, their treatment in MCDP 1 is oblique and glancing at best.33 Nonetheless, these concepts underwrite much of what i does explain; for example, mission tactics generate superior adaptation because they incorporate harmony (a commander’s intent) without jeopardizing variety, rapidity, or initiative.34 While MCDP 1’s discussion of mission tactics and commander’s intent is excellent, it would be materially improved by direct association with the fundamentals of systems competition: adaptation and VRHI.

The success of the Marine Corps demands a warfighting philosophy characterized by reasoned adjustment, not regimented adulation. MCDP 1 is concise, not complete. Maneuver warfare is a complex subject and MCDP 1 must regard itself as a starting point on the path to professional competence. Further, unless the gravity of its subject is cut loose from universal applicability, its institutional relevance will remain flagging and professional study suppressed. A philosophy suitable for everything is suitable for nothing. MCDP 1 expresses a warfighting philosophy, and it should be so constrained; however, it must also embrace a more holistic vision of this subject. MCDP 1s undue emphasis on the physical battlefield obscures the mental-moral-physical defeat mechanism that maneuver warfare champions. Finally, proper handling of this holistic outlook cannot be sundered from a deep appreciation of time and adaptation. Time accords to maneuver warfare as gravity to physics—it is incomprehensible without it. Similarly, adaptation and its component parts of VRHI underwrite the application of maneuver warfare and must be made prominent.

MCDP 1 is a living document; thus, these changes will not finish it, only improve it and that is precisely what MCDP 1 demands. “Warfighting can and should be improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare.”35 Put simply: perfection is a myth; all systems adapt or die; MCDP 1 draws no exception.


Notes1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997), Foreword.

2. While MCDP 1 does plainly command individual study of the profession of arms, it does so on general terms. See Ibid. Further, it does not identify its substance as a summary or mere starting point for professional competence with maneuver warfare; to the contrary, it regards its content as the warfighting philosophy of the Marine Corps, without caveat or disclaimer, and ordains internal study of the publication itself, not external exploration to obtain maneuver warfare mastery. The Foreword and Preface are particularly striking examples of this feature.

3. Ibid.

4. Opting for MCDP 1’s summary description of maneuver warfare does not improve this prognosis; consider: “[m]aneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.” Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. See Scott H. Helminski, “No Room for Maneuver: The Reduction of Maneuver Warfare from Cognitive Approach to Physical Concept in Marine Corps Doctrine, Discourse, and Education,” (paper, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2017).

7. See William F. Owen, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” Small Wars Journal, September 5, 2008, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-manoeuvre-warfare fraud#:~:text=The%20concept%20of%20Manoeuvre%20Warfare,and%20generic%20concept%20of%20operation; B.A. Friedman, “Maneuver Warfare: A Defense,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1, 2014, https://www.mca-marines.org/blog/gazette/maneuver-warfare-a-defens (“The biggest problem for maneuver warfare proponents is the simplistic maneuver versus attrition warfare dichotomy that occupies a central place in the document. There is really no such thing as attrition warfare: there has never been an attrition warfare theorist or book that proposed that attrition warfare should be utilized. Rather, attrition warfare serves as a straw man against which to compare maneuver warfare.”).

8. A German word roughly translated “material battle;” an important inclusion here since no essay on maneuver warfare is complete without some talismanic incantation of at least one German military phrase.

9. John R. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict (unpublished manuscript, 1987).

10. See “No Room for Maneuver,”; See “Maneuver Warfare: A Defense.”

11. “Warfare by attrition pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets … An enemy is seen as a collection of targets to be engaged and destroyed … the logical conclusion of attrition warfare is the eventual destruction of the enemy’s entire arsenal … The attritionist tends to gauge progress in quantitative terms: battle damage assessments, ‘body counts,’ and terrain captured …” etc. MCDP 1.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. See “No Room for Maneuver.”

17. Patterns of Conflict.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.; See Frans Osinga, “‘Getting’ A Discourse on Winning and Losing: A Primer on Boyd’s ‘Theory of Intellectual Evolution,’” Contemporary Security Policy 34, no 3, (2013).

21. Patterns of Conflict, 136; “No Room for Maneuver.”

22. Patterns of Conflict.

23. MCDP 1.

24. “No Room for Maneuver.”

25. Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1994).

26. Ibid., (defining frequency as: the “pace at which things happen … the tempo of events.”); MCDP 1, (“speed over time is tempo—the consistent ability to operate quickly.”).

27. Fighting by Minutes.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.; and MCDP 1.

30. I.E., disrupting an adversary’s orientation by operating at an incoherently low (as opposed to high) frequency, is often a more economic and efficient use of resources in comparison to high frequency which naturally is more resource intensive.

31. Fighting by Minutes. While Leonhard published in 1994, his conception of frequency presciently describes America’s contemporary struggle to challenge the various gray-zone activities of peer adversaries—operations exceeding international customs and the liberal order but ostensibly lingering beneath the so-called threshold of war.

32. Patterns of Conflict; “‘Getting’ A Discourse on Winning and Losing.”

33. For example, MCDP 1’s handling of mission tactics, commander’s intent, and implicit communication approximately grasps at harmony. See MCDP 1. Nonetheless, these touchpoints are largely centered on overcoming friction and uncertainty; they do not incorporate the associated components of variety, rapidity, or initiative or contemplate the VRHI quartet as collective enablers of superior adaptation. Like analysis obtains for the other components individually—variety, rapidity, and initiative receive glancing and solitary handling. At no point does MCDP 1 explicitly tie these components together or describe their critical interplay in enabling superior adaptation.

34. See MCDP 1.

35. Ibid.

The Main Effort of the Marine Littoral Regiment

A credible deterrent

>Maj Schedler is a 7202 Air Command and Control Officer currently serving as the Ground Based Air Defense Division Head at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1. Prior to promotion to Major, he was a Low Altitude Air Defense Officer and has been stationed at both 2d and 3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalions.

>>MSgt Stepp is a 7212 Low Altitude Air Defense Gunner currently serving as the Ground Based Air Defense Battery Operations Chief at 3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion. Prior to promotion, he was stationed at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 and 3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion.

In 2018, under the guidance of the National Military Strategy (NMS), three fundamental approaches were outlined regarding the future of the United States armed forces. These three policies were force employment, force development, and Force Design.1 The NMS along with the National Defense Strategy have led to many changes in the way we fight as a Joint Force. With the end of the war in Afghanistan and the reduced presence in Iraq, the Marine Corps is looking to reshape and restructure itself with the shift to the Pacific and the inherent maritime nature of conflict in the region. The Marine Littoral Regiment’s (MLR) design is part of this change. Some may argue that MLR is not a traditional MAGTF or even a MAGTF because the centerpiece is not the infantry and the lack of aircraft. Our current standard of warfighting and doctrine needs to adapt to support the NMS and this new formation.
Force Design is changing more than just structure, it is changing the way the Marine Corps thinks and fights. A notable example of this new model is that the infantry formations that form the core of the Littoral Combat Team (LCT) are not predestined to be the sole main effort of the MLR. Depending on the phase of the competition continuum and with the evolution of precision-guided munitions, other elements may be better suited to be the main effort. The MLR is a supporting effort to the naval force, not the MEF. Instead, it provides several critical capabilities to the naval force due to its unique design.2 The elements such as the forward arming and refueling point (FARP) battery, the air control battery (ACB), and the medium-range missile (MMSL) battery all have the ability to be the main effort of the MLR due to their ability to directly support the warfare commanders within the Navy Composite Warfare Commander construct. The infantry, like the Ground Based Air Defense Battery, will be in support of those elements by providing force protection. These force protection elements will maneuver to new terrain features and secure them to allow critical capabilities the ability to enable the Joint Force without prohibitive interference.

Since introductory training, all Marines have been indoctrinated into their reason for existence—to support the Marine infantryman as “the tip of the spear.” To corroborate this mentality, Marine Aviation lives by Maj Cunningham’s, the Corps’ first aviator, quote: “only excuse for aviation in any service, is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground.” Leaders continually remind disenchanted Marines that they, in their own small way, are supporting the lance corporal infantryman. The Corps’ culture was developed from a focus on a landbased enemy: either in the deserts of Iraq or on the beaches of Guadalcanal. However, the purpose of the MLR, much like the Marine Defense Battalions, is to counter a threat from the sea or air. The MLR is designed to exist within the maritime domain, contributing to sea control and performing sea denial from key maritime terrain within their assigned area of responsibility as part of a Stand-In Force across the competition continuum.3 Thus, it needs to be postured to support naval integration and freedom of navigation within critical sea lines of communication.4 As the primary ground formation within the Stand-In Force, the MLR seeks to establish itself during the competition phase without escalation. While this is not a new concept to the Marine Corps, it has become unfamiliar after twenty years of fighting a non-conventional force.

We require a fundamental shift in the way we perceive warfare as Marines. The MLR should not be thought of as just a traditional infantry-centric organization, the most capable weapon that can support the Joint Force in the LCT is a naval strike missile (NSM), a weapon originating from artillery. The MLR is designed to support the Joint Force’s collective kill chains and keep pace with the threat of our adversaries.5 Evolving technology refined the targeting cycle and has eliminated the requirement for a human observer with unmanned aerial systems and satellites taking this critical role in the targeting cycle. Precision-guided munitions such as cruise and ballistic missiles, with ranges of hundreds of miles, have eliminated the need for the enemy to put a pilot at close range to the target to ensure effective fires.6 These new threat capabilities may not require an adversary to control terrain or sea lines of communication to accomplish national objectives; instead, the act of denial of battle, economic, and transportation space to friendly forces allows an adversary to complete strategic objectives.7 The U.S. national policies outlining our commitment to our allies in the region require our military to adapt to support deterrence within regions of strategic importance.8

The MLR’s main effort needs to be the elements that can support the Joint Force and integration within the Navy Composite Warfare Commander. The MLR’s key fires asset, the NSM, will deter threats, and when needed, defeat enemy naval surface combatants providing an area denial capability to the Maritime Component Commander. The ACB provides sensor data building the situational awareness of naval aviation assets patrolling key maritime terrain and enabling kill chains when needed. The FARP battery extends the range of joint aviation assets, enabling friendly naval vessels to be stationed in safer waters while supporting the Maritime or Air Component Commander. The combination of these tasks makes the MLR a critical enabler to the Joint Force’s anti-access/area denial system that can counter an adversary increasing aggression within regions of strategic importance to the United States.9

The Marine Corps infantrymen cannot be the MLR’s main effort in these types of operations because their weapons do not have the capability to operate outside of a force protection capacity against irregular or gray-zone forces. Furthermore, the Marine Corps is not the main effort. In an effort to support the NMS, the U.S. military has adopted an adaptive and innovative Joint-Force capability that will enable seamless operations across multiple regions and all domains. This concept is called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.10 This allows Stand-In Forces to persist inside the enemy weapons engagement zone while supporting the warfare commanders within the Navy’s Composite Warfare Commander, and their ability to affect targets within their respective areas of responsibility.

In the levels below armed conflict, the purpose of the MLR is to establish expeditionary advanced bases that support or enable Joint Force operations. As crisis transitions to armed conflict, the mission of the MLR is to deny the adversary’s use of key maritime terrain buying time for the Joint Force, specifically the Air Force and the Navy, to arrive and assume operational control. In both levels, the infantry provides force protection in defense of vital areas, conducts actions such as maritime search and interdiction in support of host nation forces, and reconnaissance/counter reconnaissance operations.11 The infantry also has the capability to conduct small-scale offensive operations to clear small pockets of enemy ground forces and raids against bases to enable the rest of the MLR to operate without prohibitive interference at the lowest tactical level. The remaining MLR elements will conduct supporting actions in direct support of the Joint Force, which is beyond the capabilities of the infantry battalion alone. This reinforces the need for a shift in our historical warfare mentality of supporting the 0311 as the main effort. The MLR provides the Joint Force critical enabling capabilities. The infantry, and their force protection capabilities at the lowest tactical level, are not considered one of these critical capabilities. Thus, the FARP battery, ACB, and the medium-range missile battery should be the MLR’s main effort as key enablers in accomplishing its mission as a supporting effort to the greater joint or combined force.

As the conflict matures, the MLR still does not have the ability to shift the main effort to the infantry. Just like the MEU, the infantry element within the MLR consists of a battalion reinforced. It is important to note that the MLR does not have the aviation assets to support the infantry like the MEU. The LAAB, the closest thing to an ACE of the MLR, consists of command, control, and communications enablers that help sense and make sense of the environment.12 They also extend the range of aviation assets not organic nor in support of the MLR but in support of the Navy or combined forces. The MLR is a critical enabler for the Joint Force, not the main effort, it is unlikely that the Joint Force’s limited assets in theater will be put into harm’s way to support the MLR. The MLR was designed to excel in the enemy’s weapons engagement zone, not to be defended within it.13

A counterargument to the concept of the infantry not being the main effort of the MLR is the Marine Corps’ Title X requirement to seize and defend advanced naval bases. This article has identified a few key elements within the MLR, the ACB, the medium-range missile battery, and the FARP battery that will serve as the MLR’s enablers to the Joint Force. Since the MLR is designed to establish, utilize, and then displace from vital areas such as airports, seaports, and logistical lines of communication, the challenge comes from the fact that the infantry is the only element that can seize key terrain. The rest of the MLR elements can either directly or indirectly support by denying the adversary use of key terrain. This again highlights the need for a shift in doctrine to move away from the mentality that the infantry is the main effort during offensive operations. The Marine Corps is an offensive organization. Thus, LCT could argue that they should serve as the main effort of the MLR. If this is not held as a guiding priority, then MLR will not be postured to take the fight to the enemy.

This logic is flawed. Offensively seizing terrain does not happen when the MLR is designed and planned to be inserted during the level below armed conflict.14 The MLR is not intended for forcible entry operations. Title X is also a Marine Corps requirement, not an MLR requirement. Instead, the ground that the expeditionary advanced bases would be located on would be provided by and at the invite of a friend and ally. Instead, the main effort in lodgment operations may be the comptroller or person in control of cash that could pay for use of a basing site if the State Department has not already arranged host-nation support. In defensive operations where the primary mission is the protection of a seaport that enables the flow of friendly forces, the infantry will still not be the main effort for the MLR because of precision-guided munitions fired from hundreds of miles away.15 With this change in the enemy weapon systems, the main effort may be the ACB cueing air defense assets in general support of the Composite Warfare Commander’s Air and Missile Defense Commander.16 These actions are what the MLR exists to do instead of traditional infantry-based operations.

The MLR exists to persist and thrive within the weapons engagement zone of our enemy to support and extend the joint or combined force’s warfighting capabilities which enable the use of strategic sea and airspace. The infantry element in the MLR’s LCT has limited ability to degrade enemy kill webs to support the Joint Force similar to the adjacent LAAB. However, this change to Marine Corps culture is not a total transformation. The MEF’s main effort remains the Marine division as the primary warfighting element of the Marine Corps. The conversion is within the MLR, where the infantry exists to secure the next micro-terrain and provide force protection to support extensions of Marine Aviation, command and control, and surface fires, required to support the joint or combined force. As with force design, the culture of the Marine Corps in the MLR needs to adapt to meet the next war ready to fight and win.


Notes1. The Joint Staff, Description of the National Military Strategy, (Washington, DC: 2018).

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020); Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), (Washington, DC: August 2021).

3. Marine Littoral Regiment.

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for EABO, (Washington, DC: 2021).

5. Ibid.

6. Christian Brose, Kill chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette Books, 2020).

7. United States Department of the Navy Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, (Washington, DC: 2015) and Tentative Manual for EABO.

8. The Joint Staff, Description of the National Military Strategy, (Washington, DC: 2018).

9. Tentative Manual for EABO.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Marine Littoral Regiment.

13. Force Design 2030.

14. Tentative Manual for EABO.

15. Kill Chain.

16. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century SeapowerForce Design 2030; and Tentative Manual for EABO.