Clash at Timpan-ni Reversed

By Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

This scenario is roughly the reverse of Tactical Decision Game #979, “Clash at Timpan-ni, the solutions to which were published in MCG, Nov97. Does having seen the situation through the enemy’s eyes influence your decision?

Situation

You are a rifle company commander in 1st Marines. You are operating in rugged, broken terrain spotted with sparse vegetation. Line of sight is rarely more than a kilometer. Vehicle movement is restricted to the roads and tracks, although the vegetation and small hills are generally not a problem for infantry. The enemy is a tough infantry force reinforced with tank and mechanized support.

Intelligence indicates that the enemy is beginning to advance north in division strength; his main axis seems to follow the Jho Valley east of Rte. 110. Your regiment has been tasked to infiltrate south and then east generally along Rte. 306 in order to launch a spoiling attack into the enemy’s left flank. As the lead company of the advance guard battalion, you have been instructed to avoid detection as long as possible but to develop the situation quickly and aggressively once detected. You have been reinforced with a tank platoon, assault amphibious vehicle platoon (AAV), TOW section, and Dragon section (which you have distributed throughout the rifle platoons). Rte. 110 is a two-lane paved road; Rte. 306 is a gravel road; they are the only improved roads in the area, although the freezing temperatures have kept the unimproved routes trafficable for heavy vehicles.

Bad weather seems to have grounded the planned Cobra support, so you advance cautiously, staying off the main road to avoid detection. As you approach Checkpoint 84, the fork intersection west of Rte. 110, your forward air controller (FAC) tells you your Cobra section (“Trapper”) is airborne and will be on station within 10 minutes. You tell him to put Trapper on the company tac net. Then battalion halts you with an urgent message. You are put in touch with a reconnaissance team located near Hill 328B (you had no idea it was operating in the area) which reports:

An enemy mech company passed us about 20 mikes ago, heading north on 110 toward Timpan-ni. Estimate about 15 tracks, 5 tanks, 8-10 light vehicles. At present, we can only see the rear element, a mech platoon that is now halted off the road east of Hill 305.

You ask if the team has called for fire on the enemy column and the team leader reports that he has submitted several requests but received no fire missions. Just then, you hear .50 caliber fire up ahead. Simultaneously, a pair of enemy attack helicopters passes overhead from north to south. A Stinger shot sends them ducking for cover. They were visible for several seconds, and you wonder how much they were able to see. Your 1st Platoon then reports it has chased an enemy observation post off of Hill 305 and is sending a squad to investigate. The reconnaissance team now reports: “Something’s happening. That mech platoon’s coming to life.” Artillery starts to impact in the woods to your north. What now, captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, decide what you do by issuing any orders, reports or requests. Then provide a sketch and a brief explanation of your decision. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-12, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-6161.

Clash at Timpan-ni, Part II

By Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

This scenario is the continuation of Tactical Decision Game #97-9, “Clash at Timpan-ni,” based on the author’s solution to that situation as presented on p. 91 of this issue. In the scenario, you are a rifle company commander in 3d Marines. You have been reinforced with a tank platoon, an assault amphibious vehicle platoon, a TOW Section, and a Dragon Section that is now distributed throughout your platoons. You are operating in rugged, broken terrain spotted uith sparse vegetation and small lakes. Line-ofsight is rarely more than a kilometer. Vehicle movement is restricted to the roads and tracks, although the vegetation and small hills are generally not a problem for infantry.

Guarding the regiment’s left flank as it advances north, you meet what appears to be an enemy company or battalion of tanks and mechanized infantry southwest of Timpan-ni. You decide to seize the initiative and develop the situation by launching the Tank Platoon on a reconnaissance-inforce southwest from the village while 2d Platoon overwatches. Your initial main effort, however, is 3d Platoon, which you instruct to deploy “south of Hill 305 to block enemy movement east toward 110.” 3d Platoon’s observation post (OP) on Hill 305 is supposed to call for immediate suppression fires and come up on the company tactical net to keep you advised of the developing situation. You hear the call for fire on the conduct of fire net, but you cannot raise the OP on the tactical net. Your forward air controller tells you that a close air support mission is about a half hour away.

Tank Platoon’s attack takes the enemy initially by surprise, although because of the terrain the tank platoon commander can rarely bring more than two tanks to bear at a time. Still, your tanks knock out several T-62s, and your Cobra Section (“Slappy”) also accounts for several combat vehicles. There is no further word from the OP on Hill 305, and your artillery forward observer (FO) takes over control of the fire mission. 1st Platoon, your reserve, reports it is assembled at Timpan-ni with the TOW Section and ready for action.

3d Platoon reports it is in position south of Hill 305 as instructed and has engaged the enemy: “We caught them in the flank as they went past.” This does not sound right to you, so you ask Slappy what he can see. He reports that enemy vehicles have crossed Rte. 110 heading east with no sign of resistance. Slappy engages the column, which he reports to consist of 15-20 vehicles. After a confusing conversation, you are finally able to ascertain that 3d Platoon is not blocking the enemy’s eastward movement toward Rte. 110 but is sitting astride Rte. 110 west of Hill 328 and that some “five or six” enemy vehicles have crossed Rte. 110 to its south. The 3d Platoon commander now reports enemy dismounted probes to either flank.

Meanwhile, the Tank Platoon has continued to make steady progress and has accounted for four more enemy combat vehicles. The enemy’s T62s are hastily falling back, and now your platoon commander reports dismounted infantry to both sides of the trail. “I could use some infantry support,” he reports. What’ll it be, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 2 minutes, decide what you will do by issuing any orders, reports or requests. Then provide a sketch and a brief explanation of your decision. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-11, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703640-0823. US MC For more detailed information on the structire of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Operation DEEP STRIKE

By Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

You are the commanding officer of Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) DEEP STRIKE, consisting primarily of two light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions, a detachment of UH-1 and AH-1 helicopters with ground support, and a mobile combat service support detachment (MCSSD) consisting mainly of refuelers. You have been deployed to the war-torn and drought-plagued African country of Kushmahdi as one of the leading elements of a joint task force (JTF). Relief organizations have been operating in Kushmahdi for several months, ministering to the star ing and displaced population. Military forces from the neighboring country of Tsanu freely make incursions deep into Kushmahdi and have lately begun raiding relief centers at Yummy, Middleville, Stumpz and Barstool with increasing frequency. Of these, Stumpz is the most important. Relief convoys bound for Stumpz out of Waterside are postponed. While Tsanu has one of the most capable militaries in the region, intelligence estimates conclude it lacks the command and control to conduct coordinated, large-scale operations.

The initial JTF plan calls for the deliberate deployment throughout the country from Waterside as forces arrive at the port and airfield there, but the frequency of attacks against the relief centers necessitates immediate action. SPMAGTF DEEP STRIKE is instructed to strike quickly to secure the relief centers, sweep Tsanu forces from the country, and establish a screen line along the border at the Odaroloc River in support of a Military Exclusion Zone sanctioned bv the U.N. Your task force will be supported by carrier aviation and will be sustained entirely by a combination of in-theater foraging and aerial logistics.

On D-day, Company C from 7th Marines and Company D, 1st LAR arrive by strategic airlift at Middleville. 1st and 3d LAR battalions arrive at Waterside by sealift and airlift and immediately advance inland. On D+l, 3d LAR secures Barstool, 1st LAR relieves Stumpz, and Company D, 1st LAR drives Tsanu forces out of Yummy. By late D+3, Ist and 3d LAR have advanced to the border to monitor crossing sites along the Odaroloc, augmented by stealth reconnaissance and sensors. 3d LAR is in the north, 1st LAR(-) in the center, and Company D, 1st LAR and C/1/7 in the south. The Tsanu Government immediately protests the establishment of the Military Exclusion Zone, which it describes as a provocation. By D+5, as more U.S. forces are arriving at Waterside, intelligence reports describe an unprecedented massing of Tsanuan forces near the border. On D+6, at first light, an enemy force estimated to be battalion strength attacks D Company, 1st LAR in the vicinity of Yummy. Another probes 1st LAR’s positions near Pooker, while a mechanized/motorized force of at least one battalion breaks through at Cheery, heading west along the heavily populated Highway 10 corridor. Satellite imagery shows that the enemy column is moving about 25-30 miles per hour.

You are instructed to deal with the problem. An allied tank company located at Waterside is placed under your operational control. What is your plan?

Requirement

In a time limit of 20 minutes, provide your solution in the form of a concept of operations, tasks for subordinate units, and any other pertinent planning guidance. Then provide a sketch and an explanation of your plan. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-10, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703640-0823.

Clash at Timpan-ni

By Maj John F. Schmitt

You are a rifle company commander in 3d Marines. You are operating in rugged, broken terrain spotted with sparse vegetation and small lakes. Line of sight is rarely more than a kilometer. Vehicle movement is restricted to the roads and tracks, although the vegetation and small hills are generally not a problem for infantry. The enemy is a tough infantry force reinforced with tank and mechanized support.

The division is advancing north on two axes, 3d Marines on the left. Your company is deployed to guard the regiment’s left flank. You have been reinforced with a tank platoon, an assault amphibious vehicle platoon, a TOW section, and a Dragon section (which you have distributed throughout the rifle platoons). As the regiment advances, your mission is to “Attack north toward Timpanni, the village at the Rte. 110-306 intersection, in order to provide early warning and protect the regiment against enemy forces advancing from the west.” Rte. 110 is a 2-lane paved road; Rte. 306 is a gravel road; they are the only improved roads in the area, although the freezing temperatures have kept the unimproved routes trafficable for heavy vehicles. Bad weather has grounded the planned Cobra support, so you put temporary observation posts (OPs) on the neighboring hills as you advance along Rte. 110 (although it slows your rate of movement). You reach the objective, the hamlet of Timpan-ni, without incident and report in. 1st and 2d Platoons deploy west. The section of Cobras (callsign “Slappy”) checks in, and you send it to reconnoiter west along 306. The tank platoon is located with you at the intersection. The TOW section takes up an overwatch position on Hill 323. 3d Platoon bringing up the rear is still on Rte. 110. On his own initiative, the platoon commander has put an OP on Hill 305, which reports “8 T-62s and 10 BMPs heading east in column toward 110 about 3 clicks southwest Timpan-ni.” Just then, Slappy reports “nothing on 306, but enemy mech, at least 20 combat vehicles, to the south, moving east about 4 kilometers southwest of the intersection. They have fired an SA-7 at us. Breaking off.” From your location at the hamlet you can see artillery begin to impact on Hill 305. What now, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, decide what you will do by issuing any orders, reports, or requests. Then provide a sketch and a brief explanation of your decision. Send your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-9, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

Skirmish at Pheoville

By Maj David N. Ashby

Situation

You are a UH-1N pilot conducting a routine visual reconnaissance mission when the direct air support center (DASC) diverts you to act as an airborne forward air controller, or FAC(A). Your new mission is to support a Marine squad patrol pinned down in an irrigation ditch south of Pheoville, an abandoned village made of wooden structures. The DASC is also diverting fixed-wing close air support (CAS) for your control and passes a call sign and frequency for an artillery battery that is to provide direct support.

You approach the area to the west of Hill 166 and immediately come under small arms fire from a tree line north of the hill. Your door gunner suppresses the fire, and you reposition yourself to the east of Hill 166, where you have a good vantage point overlooking the area. You contact the squad by radio. The squad leader reports he has had no communication since the initial call for help. He indicates the squad is taking fire from Pheoville and the tree line to the west. Due to the intensity of the fire, the squad cannot break contact and is pinned down in the elbow of the ditch just south of Pheoville. The squad leader reports he needs to get to a landing zone to evacuate two wounded Marines. Although the volume of fires from the west is heavier, the squad leader reports the fires from Pheoville are having more effect and if that target is suppressed the squad should be able to break contact.

Your copilot has been busy identifying targets with a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system. He has identified two BTR-152s, one ZU-23, and at least a squad in Pheoville. On the north side of the western wood, he has identified a bunker that seems to contain a heavy machinegun-possibly a 14.5mm. He also estimates at least a squad in trenches around the bunker. [The location of the inital points (IPs), and the bearing to the three known enemy targets-Phoeville, the bunker position, and the southern troops-are shown on the sketch.] Your wingman lets you know he has contacted Alpha Battery and the battalion air officer for initial liaison. The former reports a maximum ordinate of 5,000 feet. The latter reports no other friendlies in the area. You are given terminal control responsibility.

A section of AV-8Bs and a section of F/A-18s check in on the assigned tactical air direction (TAD) net. The Harriers are carrying four Mk 77 fire bombs each. The Hornets are carrying four Mk 83s each. Each Huey in your section is carrying four 2.75-inch rockets, six 2.75-inch HE, a .50 caliber machinegun, and a 7.62mm minigun. Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, come up with a plan of action. First, describe your overall concept, then provide any reports and support requests. Then provide a brief explanation of your decision. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-8, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703640-0823. For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Rest No More

By Andrew H. Hershey

You command a Marine rifle platoon. You and your men have been in a standdown period for the last 48 hours while the rest of the company has remained in the line to the north. Your platoon has been billeted in two small villages, Hidaway and Overbrook, with a fire team observation post (OP) on Ravenscroft, a steep rock outcropping that overlooks two key roads. Each squad has four AT4s in addition to its normal arms. The swift boulder-strewn stream that runs through Overbrook is passable for men and machines only at the bridge and at a ford located a kilometer downstream from Overbrook.

Truck transport is scheduled to arrive at 0700 to return your unit to the forward area of operations, but you have not heard from the motor transport company as to its estimated time of arrival.

As you wait, you suddenly get this report from your OP:

This is Ravenscroft. I have enemy mechanized infantry in BMPs, estimate platoon strength, heading southeast on Route 4 at 20-25 kilometers per hour. The third and fifth vehicles appear to be bridgelayers. Also suspect enemy mechanized activity 3 klicks north of me on Route 17, though no visual at present.

Almost immediately the sergeant from 3d Squad-in your judgment your most capable NCO-comes on the net and reports that he has just seen enemy transport helicopters lifting off from the edge of the grain field 1.5 klicks southwest of Lower Overbrook. He estimates the helicopters could have inserted an infantry platoon.

As these reports are coming in, an a light armored vehicle (LAV) detachment (two LAV-ATs and one LAV-25) traveling north on Route 8 arrives in Overbrook. You explain the reports you have just received to the lieutenant in charge of the LAVs. He agrees to put himself under your command, but informs you that his TOW vehicles have only five rounds apiece. The LAV-25, however, is fully armed with a mix of armor piercing and high explosive ammo and has three scouts aboard.

How do you plan to employ your expanded command, Lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes draft your frag order and any other reports/requests you might make. Then provide a sketch of your actions and explain the rationale behind them. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #977, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Contact at the Han Lu River Bridge

By Capt Timothy E. Barrick

Situation

You are the commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. Your battalion is attacking north to secure a bridgehead across the Han Lu River for the regiment’s attack into the enemy’s rear areas. There are two bridges in the battalion’s zone, and it is the battalion commander’s aim to secure both bridges to give the regiment more flexibility in choosing its axis of advance. Company B has been tasked with seizing the bridge about 6 miles to the east and is the battalion’s main effort. You are the supporting attack and have been tasked with seizing the bridge to your front. Company C is in reserve to the rear of Bravo.

The S-2 believes that the remnants of an enemy mechanized battalion may be defending the areas north of the river. The enemy is experienced and well equipped with surplus Warsaw Pact weapons and vehicles. However, the force you are facing has been significantly worn down after several days of severe fighting. It is 1420, and the weather is clear. The terrain is wooded and consists of gently rolling hills. The woods are not thick and allow passage of vehicles, although the going is difficult.

Your company is mounted on AAVs. You are moving in a wedge formation with lst Platoon on the left, 2d Platoon in the lead, 3d Platoon on the right, and your Headquarters Section tucked in the middle. You have attached one machinegun squad and two assault teams to each platoon. Your Mortar Section is moving with the Headquarters Section.

You send 2d Platoon forward to get eyes on the bridge. The platoon commander radios that he is dismounting and moving to the forward tree line to observe the bridge. A few minutes later he reports:

Bridge is intact. Roadblock on the south side of the bridge. Dug-in positions in tree line across river on both sides of the road. Estimate platoon size position. I have not been seen. Am continuing to . . .

His radio transmission is interrupted by the chatter of machinegun fire. Beginning with one gun, it rapidly escalates. Moments later, the platoon commander reports again:

Am receiving heavy machinegun fire from tree line across the river. They are vehicle mounted and well dugin. Cannot identify vehicles clearly. Have three casualties and am pulling back to the tracks.

As his transmission ends, you hear and see light mortars begin to impact in the vicinity of 2d Platoon. What now, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue any orders you would give and make any requests or reports. Once this is done, provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-6, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps Units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, 0ct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Meeting at the ‘Mounds’–The platoon commander

By Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

This scenario is the continuation of TDG #97-3, “Meeting at `The Mounds,’ only this time you are the platoon commander instead of the squad leader. The scenario is based on the author’s solution to TDG #97-3, which appears on page 91.

Situation

You are a platoon commander in company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. The company is making a movement to contact, moving south toward Liberty with the mission of locating and destroying any sizable enemy forces en route. The company commander has said he “wants to bag a big one.” The march objective is merely a reference point for the direction of movement; the true objective is the enemy. You are fighting infantry forces that use maneuver and fires aggressively. Your platoon is the advance guard. 1 st Squad, led by your most experienced and reliable squad leader, has the point. You are about 200 meters back, followed by 2d and 3d Squads.

1st Squad has entered an area known as The Mounds. The sudden sound of small arms and machinegun fire up ahead tells you that 1st Squad has made contact. Just then, artillery starts impacting around you. You move through the barrage and notice that 2d Squad has managed to follow you, but 3d Squad has not. You come across a fire team engaging the enemy from one of the mounds and another fire team and machinegun squad doing the same from a mound to the right. The fire team leader points out two enemy positions to the south, which you estimate to have a total strength of at least a platoon. You immediately call for fire on the enemy positions (shifting from your current position, which is a preplanned target). The fire team leader says: “The squad leader and the 3d Fire Team are checking out the left flank.”

“How long ago did he leave?” you ask.

“Less than 5 minutes.”

2d Squad leader has joined you and points out movement in a small wood between two mounds to your left front, very close to one of the enemy positions. You check your watch and are surprised to see that it has only been 12 minutes since the engagement started. Fire has settled to a sustained rate. You search to the left but see no sign of the 1st Squad leader or the men he took with him. You look behind you and see no sign of 3d Squad through the artillery fire. Your radioman reports: “The CO’s on the hook asking for an update.” What do you do, Lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue any orders you would give and make any requests or reports. Once this is done, provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-5, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Battle of Sanna’s Post

By Capt Douglas J. MacIntyre

Situation

You are the commanding officer of a rifle company with an assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) platoon and a combined antiarmor team (CAAT) made up of three TOW HMMWVs and two heavy machinegun (HMG) HMMWVs. The battalion is currently moving south-southeast as 2d Marines’ advance guard. The regimental landing team (RLT) is pushing hard to engage enemy mechanized forces moving east before they can consolidate near the port city of Fontein. Your company’s mission is to provide flank security on the right of the battalion’s movement to contact and to be prepared to assume the lead element as directed.

The terrain in the area is a flat, rocky desert, with sparse vegetation. Two rivers, flanked by steep banks, run through the area and are swollen by recent rains; they are fordable at only a few points. Elsewhere trafficability for wheeled and tracked vehicles is good. It is 0100, partly cloudy with good visibility. You are currently moving 10-15 kilometers per hour south, approximately 3-4 kilometers west of your battalion.

The CAAT team, currently moving in advance of the company, has sent scouts along the high ground to observe the Modder River area, including Sanna’s Post, a small village to the west, and the road running perpendicular to your route. The CAAT leader reports “Enemy sighted, vicinity of Sanna’s Post, 2,000m west of Modder River Ford. Looks like a logistics site with two T-72s, a BTR-60 platoon, and many fuel trucks and supply vehicles. They are stationary near several small buildings. Will maintain observation and move vehicles into firing positions. I don’t think they have seen us. Please advice.

As you digest that information, battalion reports “lead companies heavily engaged with elements of motorized rifle battalion and tank force . . . Regiment will attempt flanking maneuver with its follow-on forces as we fix the enemy . . . I am counting on your company to prevent enemy reinforcement from the west . . .”

What is your plan, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, decide what you will do, prepare appropriate orders as well as any requests/reports you would submit. Provide a sketch and an explanation of your plan. Mail your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #974, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or send fax to 703-640-0823 or Email to ([email protected]).

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Meeting at ‘The Mounds’

By Maj John F.  Schmitt. USMCR

This TDG should look familiar. Its scenario is essentially the same as the one encountered in TDG #97-1 for which three solutions are given on the preceding pages. There is one major difference however-this time you are the enemy. How does having read pages 83-85-having looked at three alternate ways your opponent might see the situationinfluence your decision? Does it help you to have “worn your opponent’s shoes” for a few minutes? Is “wearing his shoes” part of what is meant by orienting on the enemy?

Situation

You are a squad leader in Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. The company is making a movement to contact, moving south toward Liberty. The company’s mission is to locate and destroy any sizable enemy forces en route. The company commander has made it clear that the march objective is merely a reference point for the direction of movement; the true objective is the enemy. You are fighting an aggressive infantry force that when assembled usually either pushes rapidly ahead to bypass your positions or calls in supporting fires and attacks them.

Your platoon is the advance guard, and your squad has the point. Your lieutenant has given you the following instructions:

I’m relying on you to develop the situation to the best of your ability whenever you make contact. If you can overpower the enemy yourself, fine. If it’s a sizable enemy force, my intent is for you to develop the situation advantageously for the rest of the company. Try to maneuver to fix the enemy so they can’t escape and so the CO can bring the rest of the company to bear. I’ll support you with the other two squads.

Your squad is in a wedge formation with 1st Fire Team on the left, 2d Fire Team in the center leading, and 3d Fire Team on the right. An attached machinegun squad is located with you behind 2d Fire Team. The platoon commander is about 200 meters behind you, and the rest of the platoon is about 300-400 meters back.

Your squad is moving through an area known as The Mounds, generally following a road that winds its way toward Liberty. The terrain is unusual and you have Marines on both sides of the road alert for possible contact. As 2d Fire Team crests one of the mounds, you see the Marines drop quickly to the prone position and begin firing. You crawl forward to the crest and can see an enemy force firing from a stream bed about 300 meters south. Another position soon opens up from a mound to the left front. You estimate the total enemy strength so far at about platoon strength. You notice that 1st Fire Team has also taken up firing positions on a mound to your left. 3d Fire Team and the machineguns are in defilade to your right rear. Supporting arms begins exploding on the road about 200 meters to your rear. What do you do, Sergeant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 2 minutes, issue any orders you would give. Once this is done, describe any additional action you would take and provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision.

A Pointed Projection of Power

By S.E. Richmond

Situation

As the commanding officer (CO) of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/6, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable (26th MEU(SOC)) you’re attending a CO’s and senior staff meeting on USS Wasp (LHD-1) in the Adriatic. The MEU CO is briefing on a mission just received.

“Our Amphibious Ready Group has been designated a Joint Task Force (JTF). We have been tasked by the National Command Authorities to demonstrate the resolve and military capability of the United States to the Serbian leadership by conducting a forcible entry into Mosovic and seizing two indicted war criminals. Rules of engagement allow the immediate use of deadly force against armed men and military vehicles. The S-2 will now fill us in on the opposition.”

“Security for the Serbian headquarters in Mosovic consists of a mechanized rifle company, reinforced with SA-7 teams, mounted in seven BRDMs and some trucks. They are concentrated around the town square. There is a 750-man mountain brigade living in the hills 6 kilometers east. Analysis indicates they will fight. Two Serb mechanized brigades are reported to be dispersing among the Serbian population further to the east. Along with the SA6 and associated radar activity around Bihac and Banja Lake, an EA-6B picked up emissions from acquisition and range radars around the units at the border.”

“Thanks 2. We’ll use a fake helo mishap as deception to set up a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) and staging area here at Kalinovik, 41 nautical miles from Mosovic. Then just before dawn we will prep target reference points (TRPs) 2 through 5 with cluster munitions and drop the northern bridge (TRP 1) with four Mk-84 laserguided bombs. Almost simultaneously we’ll helo assault into Landing Zones Lew and Frenchy to take MEU objectives Alpha and Bravo. If they won’t surrender the bad guys, we seize the town.

“If they call for reinforcements our aviation combat element (ACE) will teach them all about Marine air support. The ACE CO is to serve as the joint forces air component commander and will have opcon of VMFA-224 and VMAQ-1. CVW-7 is tasked in direct support from USS Washington; she has four MH-53s available also.

“We will withdraw under heavy air cover, but detailed withdrawal planning must wait for events to develop.

“Commander Amphibious Task Force 4 (CATF) has shifted to Shreveport. I will command from the Wasp’s Combat Information Center. “CO, BLT we need your scheme of maneuver ASAP. Your battalion is reinforced with a platoon each of engineers, recon, LAVs, tanks, tracks, and a battery of M198s.”

In response to questions the ACE S-3 said they could lift up to 510 loaded personnel per wave, subtracting 19 per HMMWV and 38 per LAV or M198.

Requirement

In 30 minutes provide a scheme of maneuver to seize Alpha, Bravo, and then the town; also recommend a withdrawal option. Include rationale, sup port requests, and a map sketch. Mail your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #97-2, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, or send by fax (703-640-0823 or E-mail ([email protected]).