Archives: Gazette Magazines

By Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

Like TDG #98-6, this scenario is a continuation of TDG #98-4, “Bridgeton Crossing,” based on the author’s solution to that problem published in MCG, Jun98. Only this time, things have turned out differently.

Situation

You are a rifle company commander in 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. Your company is mounted on AAVs and has been reinforced with a tank platoon, TOW section, combat engineer section, and Dragon section (attached to the rifle platoons). As the MEF advances generally north, your regiment has been ordered to swing west and seize a crossing of the Diesty River at Bridgeton in order to facilitate the continued advance. Intelligence now reports an enemy mechanized battalion heading south on Highway 1 to reinforce Bridgeton, expected to arrive sometime midmorning. Your company has been ordered to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force toward Bridgeton along Rte 6 in order to ascertain the nature of enemy defenses.

The weather is lousy and you doubt if much will be flying until it clears. You approach Bridgeton with 2d Platoon deployed onto River Bluff to protect your blind right flank. Gaining a vantage point overlooking the town, you discover that Bridgeton seems to be unoccupied except for what looks like a reconnaissance patrol. Just then, 2d Platoon reports “enemy mech on the River Road about 3 clicks east of Bridgeton. So far I count 6 APCs and 2 tanks headed southwest, but there could be more coming into view.” Convinced that you have a momentary opportunity to seize a critical crossing site, you order 2d Platoon to engage and 1 st Platoon to take the town immediately. You put the tanks and TOWs in overwatch at Bridgeton Rise and hold your 3d Platoon and engineers in reserve. Your FO calls for fire east of the town. Once your platoons are on the move, you report your decision to battalion. 1st Platoon races for the town and appears to have crossed the bridge into the town without resistance. Your tanks and TOWs succeed in holding off the enemy column from the east; a couple of enemy tanks have been knocked out. The battalion commander comes on the net: “Imperative you hold Bridgeton until we can reinforce. You’re now division main effort. Hang on; we’ll be there as fast as we can. Good work.”

Hardly moments later, Bridgeton Rise begins to come under artillery fire and you hear and see explosions and sounds of combat erupting from the town. You are unable to contact the Ist Platoon, but it has obviously come up against well-concealed, wellprepared defenses-some sort of urban ambush-deeper in the town. After a couple of extremely long minutes an unidentified voice, which you believe to be from the 1st Platoon, reports, “We’ve run into a mess. All the amtrac have been hit. It’s awful. The lieutenant’s dead. We’re in buildings just across the bridge, but everybody’s hurt. We need help.” The time is now 0920. As of 10 minutes ago, battalion still had no word on the enemy battalion to the north. What now, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue any instructions and make any reports/requests. Once that is done, provide a sketch of your plan and a brief explanation of your decision. Submit your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #98-7, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640823.

By Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

This scenario is a continuation of Tactical Decision Game #89-4, “Bridgeton Crossing,” based on the author’s solution to that problem published on p. 83 of this issue.

Situation

You are a rifle company commander in 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. Your company is mounted on AAVs and has been reinforced with a tank platoon, TOW section, combat engineer section, and Dragon section (attached to the rifle platoons). As the MEF advances generally north, your regiment has been ordered to swing west and seize a crossing of the Diesty River at Bridgeton in order to facilitate the continued advance. The previous night, friendly reconnaissance elements were driven from Bridgeton by an enemy mechanized force estimated to be platoon to company strength. Intelligence now reports an enemy mechanized battalion heading south on Highway 1 to reinforce Bridgeton, expected to arrive sometime midmorning. As the regiment prepares for a deliberate crossing, your company has been ordered to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force toward Bridgeton along Rte. 6 in order to ascertain the nature of enemy defenses and find possible river-crossing sites for AAVs.

The weather is lousy, and you doubt if much will be flying until it clears. You approach Bridgeton with 2d Platoon deployed onto River Bluff to protect your right flank. Gaining a vantage point to the town, you discover that Bridgeton seems to be unoccupied except for a reconnaissance patrol. Just then, 2d Platoon reports “enemy mech on the River Road about 3 clicks east of Bridgeton. So far I count 6 APCs and 2 tanks, but there could be more coming into view. They’re heading for the town like a bat out of hell.” You order 2d Platoon to engage and 1st Platoon to take the town immediately, with tanks and TOWs in overwatch at Bridgeton Rise and 3d Platoon and engineers in reserve. Your FO calls for fire east of the town. Once your platoons are on the move, you report your decision to battalion.

At 0850 you meet up in the town with your 1st Platoon commander who reports: “Town secure. We got 2 scout cars. One escaped north. Otherwise, the place seems empty.” The battalion commander comes on the net: “Imperative you hold Bridgeton until we can reinforce. I’m getting you all the support I can, including anything that’ll fly. You’re now division main effort. Hang on; we’ll be there as fast as we can. Good work.” The firefight to the east has died down. You check in with 2d Platoon, which reports: “We knocked out one APC. Enemy has pulled back. We’ve got three tanks and an APC visible in the treeline 3 klicks northeast of the town. The rest of the column seems to have withdrawn; I can’t tell where.” The time is now 0900. Battalion still has no word on the enemy battalion to the north. What next, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue any instructions and make any reports/requests. Once that is done, provide a sketch of your plan and a brief explanation of your decision. Submit your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #98-6, P. O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

By 2dLt Paul C. Merida

Situation

You are a squad leader leading an ambush patrol through wooded terrain, which usually limits visibility to 50 meters or less. In addition to your three fire teams, which are well-equipped with claymores and grenades, you have a machinegun squad (two three-man teams, each with an M240G). You are equipped with a radio. Your squad is in its ambush site along a trail frequently used by the enemy. Your objective rally point (ORP), where you have left two Marines and your packs, is about 200 meters to the southwest.

It is about 0100, and you have been waiting for about 2 hours when automatic gunfire suddenly erupts from the direction of the ORP. The firing lasts only a few seconds and now it is silent again. It happened so quickly you can’t be certain, but your sense is that there were at least 2 weapons involved but certainly no more than 3 or 4. You try to recall the sound of the exchange to determine if any of the weapons were M16s, but you cannot be sure. It will be light at 0500. Your platoon’s patrol base is about 3 kilometers to the southeast.

It has now been 3 minutes since the incident and you have heard or seen no sign of activity from the direction of the ORP. What now, Sergeant?

Requirement

In 5 minutes decide on your course of action, issue any orders, and make any reports or requests. Then provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision. Submit your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #98-5, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

By Dr. Gary Klein, Michael McCloskey, Marvin Thordsen, David Klinger, and Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

Situation

You are a rifle company commander in lst Battalion, 3d Marines. Your company is mounted on AAVs and has been reinforced with a tank platoon, TOW section, combat engineer section, and Dragon section (attached to the rifle platoons). The MEF has been advancing generally north. Your regiment has been ordered to swing west and seize a crossing of the Diesty River at Bridgeton in order to facilitate the continued advance. Originally the regimental commander had hoped to force a hasty crossing with 1st Battalion, but bad weather has slowed the advance. The previous night, friendly reconnaissance elements were driven from Bridgeton by an enemy mechanized force estimated to be platoon to company strength. Intelligence now reports an enemy mechanized battalion heading south on Highway 1 to reinforce Bridgeton, expected to arrive sometime midmorning. As a result, the regimental commander has decided he will now have to conduct a deliberate crossing and has ordered more forces forward. In the meantime. your company has been ordered to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force toward Bridgeton along Rte 6 in order to ascertain the nature of enemy defenses along the axis of advance as well as at Bridgeton. You are told to advance as far as you can without getting decisively engaged. You are also instructed, if able, to look for sites near Bridgeton suitable for crossing by AV since the banks of the Diesty are frequently accessible to amphibious vehicles.

The weather is lousy and you doubt if much will be flying until it clears. By 0805 you have advanced within 5 kilometers of Highway 1 and are surprised that you have not made contact with enemy security forces. In response to your inquiry, battalion reports no new information on the enemy battalion approaching from the north. You deploy 2d Platoon onto River Bluff to protect your blind right flank. At 0825 Ist Platoon, your lead element, reports: “Just flushed a scout car off Bridgeton Rise toward the town.” Moments later, Ist Platoon calls again: “You better get up on the double to look at this.” You move forward and find the platoon commander watching Bridgeton from a turretdefilade position offering excellent observation of the entire town. He says: “Take a look. I’ve been watching for 5 minutes now and I’ve spotted 3 scout cars and maybe a handful of troops. . . enough for a recon detachment. Otherwise the town is dead.” With your binoculars you confirm the lieutenant’s observations: no sign of infantry, mechanized vehicles or heavy weapons; no signs of any defensive preparations. Just then, 2d Platoon comes on the net: “We got enemy mech on the River Road about 3 clicks east of Bridgeton. So far I count six APCs and two tanks, but there could be more coming into view. They’re heading for the town like a bat out of hell. Do you want me to engage?” It is 0835. What do you do, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue any instructions and make any reports/requests. Once that is done, provide a sketch of your plan and a brief explanation of your decision. Submit your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #984, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

Situation

You are a platoon commander in Company K, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines. Attached to your platoon is one squad from the machinegun section of Weapons Platoon (two M240Gs). The company is conducting a movement to contact, through gently rolling wooded terrain broken by small streams, in order to locate and destroy enemy forces infiltrating your battalion’s area of operations. Yours is the lead platoon. Visibility is generally limited to less than 75 meters because of the thick vegetation. Streams have occasional pools, but are easily waded.

The company march objective is Hill 410. A half hour ago the company commander told you to step it out and reach Hill 410 as soon as possible to begin setting up the company’s defensive perimeter for the night. As a result, you are about 500 meters in front of the company when your lead squad seems to run into a large ambush directly to your front. It sounds like an enormous amount of fire is being delivered on 1st Squad as the whole platoon goes quickly to ground. 1st Squad begins to return fire, and you can hear the squad leader screaming commands. From your position with the machineguns, you start to make your way forward toward 1st Squad when a similar amount of fire erupts on your right flank back around where 3d Squad should be. From your position you cannot see either contact, but you can hear rounds whizzing overhead.

LCpl Vargas, from 1st Squad, crawls back to your position and reports: “Sir, Sgt Carden says 1st Fire Team is down, and we can’t get to them. He thinks there’s got to be a platoon in front of us!” At the same time, word is passed forward from the rear of the platoon: “Platoon sergeant says two men are down in 3d Squad; at least two enemy squads closing in from the right and rear.” Your company commander is on the radio wanting to know what’s going on. What now, Lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue any orders you would give and any reports/requests you would make. Once this is done, provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #98-3, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

By Maj Kevin D. Poling, USA

Situation

You are the commander of Company A, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, currently assembled about 45 miles west of Middleburg. Your unit is part of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), which is supporting Arconian defense forces in resisting an invasion from Baltonia, its neighbor to the east. Reinforced by infantry, tanks, and artillery, the battalion is ordered to secure at first light the two bridges near Colenso Crossing in order to facilitate the attack by follow-on mechanized forces east along Highway 8 to defeat Baltonian forces and restore the Arconian border.

The time is now 2115. Your battalion commander briefs you on the situation: Arconian forces have broken contact and withdrawn to a hasty defensive line along the Longhorn River following a Baltonian attack. An Arconian regiment is located in Middleburg with forces on Hills 299 and 304. Since the Baltonian attack, only small enemy patrols have been sighted near Colenso Crossing, with no reports of enemy movements further west. Baltonian forces are equipped with secondhand Soviet-style gear and adhere loosely to Soviet doctrine. The Baltonians are not equipped with the latest thermal devices for night fighting, but there is a good chance they have captured some thermal devices from the Arconians. The Baltonians can achieve local air superiority for up to a few hours at most.

Highway 8 is a paved, two-lane highway in various states of repair between Middleburg and Colenso Crossing. The terrain is mostly rolling farmland with patches of forest. Because of steep banks, it is believed the Longhorn and Mineral Rivers can be crossed only at bridges or identified fords. Sunrise is at 0500 and sunset at 2000. Colenso Crossing is culturally significant, being the site of several historic Arconian landmarks.

Your company will form the battalion advance guard and main effort, and at 0500 will conduct a surprise attack to seize Objectives Gin and Tonic, the two bridges at Colenso Crossing. You will be reinforced with an infantry platoon on assault amphibious vehicles and a tank platoon, both of which are on their way to your company assembly area. The battalion main body will follow an hour behind and will consolidate positions around Colenso Crossing or reinforce your attack if needed. Supporting artillery will provide on-call suppression. Radio listening silence will be in effect until contact with the enemy. The battalion commander instructs you go forward with him at 2145 to coordinate the passage of lines with the Arconians at Middleburg, leaving you very little time to make the necessary arrangements. What is your plan, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, issue any orders and make any appropriate reports/requests. Then provide a sketch and explanation of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #98-2, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan95, p. 5.

By Capt Timothy E. Barrick

This scenario is the continuation of TDG #97-6, “Contract at the Han Lu River Bridge,” (MCG Jun97; Solutions, Aug97)

Situation

You are the commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. Your battalion has attacked north to secure a bridgehead across the Han Lu River for the regiment’s attack into the enemy’s rear areas. Your company has just successfully seized the Jomsom Bridge over the Han Lu River, while Company B (the main effort), supported by Company C, has seized a bridge 6 miles east. Your platoons are consolidating the bridgehead when you receive the following message on the battalion tactical net:

Bravo and Charlie are engaged with an enemy mechanized battalion about 10 clicks to your east. The enemy seems to be fighting a delaying action west toward Jomsom. You are in a position to cut off his only avenue of retreat. I expect him to break and run at any time. Your mission is to ensure that no enemy forces be allowed to escape west of Jomsom. When the enemy main body commits to its retreat, you will become the main effort and receive priority of fires. [The battalion has one artillery battery, a section of Cobras and two sections of Harriers in direct support.] In addition, I’ve already sent you a tank platoon and CA-AT [combined antiarmor team].

You tell your XO, “Get the orders group assembled for a frag order and have the company ready to attack immediately.”

You move to Hill 305 for a look. You see wire and ditches stretching across all open areas from Hill 451 to Rte. 2. An enemy unit, apparently squad size, is entrenched atop Hill 451 overlooking the obstacles. East of Jomsom, Rte. 2 is devoid of traffic, but Jomsom itself is a flurry of activity with 20-30 trucks and about 6 BTRs being loaded with equipment and personnel. You see enemy soldiers but no civilians. There are about 10 trucks already heading west out of Jomsom. Looking to the east, you see the smoke and hear the sounds of battle but no enemy forces heading your direction . . yet.

At the base of Hill 305 you find your commanders standing by. You see four MlAls and five HMMWVs (three with TOWs and two with Mkl9s)just now crossing the bridge. Your FAC tells you the Cobra Section has checked in and is ready for action. The Harriers are on strip alert with a 15-minute flight time. As you begin to brief the situation, you hear the following report over the battalion net:

Enemy breaking contact and heading your way. Estimate two BMP-2 companies and one T-72 company. ETA Jomsom: 20 mikes. It is 1535-about 90 minutes of daylight remaining. The weather is clear. The woods are not thick and allow passage of vehicles although the going is difficult. Your ammo is at 70 percent.

What is your plan, Captain? Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue any orders and make any reports or requests. Once this is done, provide a sketch of your plan and an explanation of your decision. Send your solution to the Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #98-1, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or fax 703-640-0823. US tMC

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in TDG sketches, see MCG, Oct94, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in Jan 95, p. 5.

by BGen F. P. Henderson, USMC(Ret)

The authors of your tactical decision games (TDGs) may be interested to know that their problems in the Gazette each month do not seem to be generation sensitive. From my experience, a Marine trying to find the right solution to one of them a decade or more from now will not feel that they are “Old Corps” stuff. I must solve them with my recollections of the Fleet Marine Force of 1959, plus the changes I have learned of in the Gazette since then. Despite this handicap, I find them interesting, challenging, and that my solutions are usually acceptable, sometimes in the black, and possibly even better. In working one I always wonder why it took so long for the TDG concept to be thought of, accepted, and become a regular feature in the Gazette. It should have happened a couple of Marine generations ago.

However, I would like to recommend adding some elements to each problem that I feel would give them additional reality, factors that certainly would be considered by the problem commander in making his decision if it were actual combat. These are the weather, the length of day and night, and the combat effectiveness of his command. The Gazette has published articles on how the first two affect combat operations (Mar88 and Jul89).

The commander of any force, regardless of type or size, must consider existing and forecasted weather in arriving at an operational decision. Is it the torrential rains and debilitating heat of Guadalcanal? The freezing temperatures, snow, and driving winds of the Chosin Reservoir? In temperate zones around the earth is the foliage in full leaf or are the trees and shrubs bare? Many of the TDG problems have woods that play a role in the commander’s decision. How will the season and the weather affect the length of time it will take him to accomplish his mission? Will helicopter resupply or movement of the reserve be hampered by what tomorrow may bring?

The same consideration must be given to the seasonal length of daylight and darkness in the area of operations. Daylight generally favors a superior force with an offensive mission. Darkness favors an inferior force with a defensive mission. In either case, the commander must determine how he can use each condition to his advantage, especially when he has been given a time limit to accomplish his mission. (A recent TDG informed players that it was now 2030, a key factor in making the command decision. But, depending on the season and latitude, that could have meant it was daylight, twilight, or darkness.)

A common weakness of many map problems is a failure to give a realistic statement of the friendly force’s combat effectiveness. The general assumption is that it is at authorized strength, fully equipped, and rarin’ to go chew up the enemy. But this is rarely, if ever, the happy situation a unit commander will have in combat. Every day since his unit was first committed to combat its combat effectiveness has been eroded. Whether it is a company or division, a squadron or aircraft wing, it has incurred casualties in men and equipment and felt the stress of continued combat. Key personnel and experienced leaders have been lost. A map problem should introduce some of these considerations, without unduly complicating it, to make it more “combat real.”

It seems to me that TDGs can be as addictive as The New York Times crossword puzzles are to people who like to accept an intellectual challenge and triumph. If so, one a month is not a very sturdy diet for today’s Marine warfighters. As a start to correct this the Gazette and the Marine Corps Association (MCA) might consider joining forces to collect and publish all of those prior to 1992 in a soft cover form. These could be sold in exchanges and through the MCA Bookstore. The same could be done for each year’s problems. This would give those favored few who join the Corps each year a backlog to work on between Gazette issues.

by Capt Bruce I. Gudmundsson, USMCR

The Marine Corps is currently benefiting from an explosion of interest in tactical decision games (TDGs). These simple map exercises-most can be presented on one or two pages-have captured the imagination of Marines who see their potential for freeing tactics from the dead hand of the laundry list.

One of the most interesting aspects of this renaissance is its occurrence 100 years after the first introduction of the TDG to the English-speaking world. In the late 188Os military professionals trying to find more “hands on” methods of teaching tactics imported what the Germans called the Planuebung (planning exercise) or the Planspiel (planning game)-short map exercises that required players to come up with a concept of operations to deal with a given tactical situation.

Almost immediately, however, this first generation of TDGs was “improved” by the importers. Whereas the Germans had stressed the content of a solution over the form, the Anglo-Saxon importers used the games as a means of teaching the format of orders. (The five-paragraph order was first designed by Eben Swift as a means of forcing students to organize their solutions to his TDGs.) While the Germans put a great deal of stress on having individuals solve these problems under time pressure, English and American instructors formed their students into teams and gave them an hour or more to work but their solutions.

By World War I, some instructors watered down the TDG even further. Books, like Capt Alfred Bjornstad’s Small Problems for Infantry, were published that provided long, detailed solutions to simple tactical problems. These books were then used as catechisms-students memorized the solutions to the problems and then recited them in class.

Needless to say, such approaches (particular the last mentioned) robbed the TDGs of most of their educational value. After all, the chief benefit of the exercise is to practice the rapid analysis of a tactical situation, the quick ereation of a practical scheme for dealing with that situation, and the effective expression of that scheme in the form of easily understood orders.

Focusing on format rather than content diverted the players from the essence of the problem at hand. With their minds focused on what information went into which paragraph, both student and teacher were unable to give full attention to judging the practicality of the student’s solution. Having lots of time gave the student a luxury rarely afforded to combat leaders. Finally, being formed into committees freed students from the individual responsibility of decisionmaking that is the definitive characteristic of command.

Deprived of their power by these improvements, the first generation of TDGs soon slipped into oblivion. Mated with history in the classic Infantry in Battle, they enjoyed a short “Indian summer” during the 1930s. But by the time World War II was over, they were dead-a victim of rapid mobilization and the “school solution.”

The point of this little bit of history is not to condemn those who first transplanted the TDG from its native soil. Rather, it is to remind us that even something as elegant as the TDG can be ruined if its essential characteristics-simplicity of design, practicality of solution, rapidity of decision, and individual responsibility-are forgotten.

By LtCol Steven M. Jones & Maj Edwin T. Kang

Success is directly related to the ability to make and execute effective military decisions rapidly under physical and emotional duress. The ability of Marines to outthink the adversary is just as important as the physical endurance and ability to outshoot and outmaneuver him on the battlefield. This guidance was repeated and reemphasized earlier this year in All Marines message (ALMAR) 025/97. The Commandant has expressed the critical need for all Marines to prepare themselves mentally as well as physically for the rigors of combat in his planning guidance by stating:

It is my intent that we reach the stage where Marines come to work and spend part of each day talking about warfighting: learning to think, making decisions, and being exposed to tactical and operational issues.

Military insight and decisionmaking skills can be developed through discussion, decision games, battlefield studies, wargames, and other techniques. A Military Thinking and Decisionmaking Exercises Program has been established to coordinate a wide range of activities that contribute to the mental preparation for warfighting, and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, has been tasked with identifying and providing resources to support these intellectual development initiatives. A forthcoming Marine Corps order will provide guidance on Military Thinking and Decisionmaking Exercises and describe some of the resources available to support it, to include:

* Professional Reading. The Marine Corps professional reading program, centered around the Commandant’s Reading List, will be an important contributor. Knowledge gained through individual reading and study will provide the intellectual framework for warfighting study and the raw material necessary to develop critical thinking skills. However, reading alone is not enough. The raw material must be honed through repeated exercise and reinforcement.

* Professional Publications. Professional periodicals and journals, such as the Marine Corps Gazette (which publishes a monthly tactical decision game (TDG)), provide a rich selection of articles and vignettes to stimulate daily warfighting discussions. Commercial books from the professional reading list and board-based wargames provide excellent scenarios for the program. Many of these commercial products are available through the Marine Corps Association and base libraries. Units should also consider developing their own libraries of these resources to support the program.

* Marine Corps University. The Marine Corps University has prepared a Staff Ride Handbook for use by Marines in organizing battlefield study tours to military historic sites. They have also published Designing TDGs: A Tactical Decision Making Games Workbook. This workbook teaches Marines how to write useful and thoughtprovoking TDG exercises. Further information on these resources is available from the university.

* Marine Corps Modeling and Simulation Office (MCMSMO). MCMSMO has developed a website to provide information on available resources that support the program. The link to this site can be reached through the Internet at mcmsmo.usmc.mil/milthink. It contains electronic versions of the TDG Workbook, the Staff Ride Guide, the Personal Computer (PC)-Based Wargaming Catalog and other useful resources. The PC-based Wargaming Catalog provides a list of commercially available computer wargames that have been evaluated and found to have training merit for Marines. New games are constantly reviewed by Marine Corps volunteers and game reviews are electronically posted to the Wargaming Catalog as they are evaluated. A small team of MCMSMO programmers has also customized several commercial games to enhance their training value for the Marine Corps.

* Formal Schools. Formal Marine Corps schools have a number of products that can serve as a stimulus to daily warfighting discussions. A few examples include:

1) Expeditionary Warfare Training Group has developed situational training exercise scenarios and TDGs for use in their staff professinal military education program that could be adapted for local warfighting programs.

2) Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One publishes quarterly newsletters for each aviation community and the Talon journal, a compendium of articles on tactical aviation issues.

3) Mountain Warfare Training Center publishes the Field Grade Officer’s Handbook.

4) Weapons Training Battalion, Quantico, produces lessons on scout-snipers, high-risk personnel, and breaching. In short, resources to support the program are abundant and their use is limited only by our imagination.

The key impediment to fully implementing the Commandant’s guidance appears to be finding time in our already busy daily schedules to execute his plan. We must all realize that this program enhances our fundamental warfighting capabilities– particularly in an era when our livetraining opportunities seem to be decreasing. Once this concept is accepted as fact, we will find the time to do the right thing, making warfighting discussions a daily activity and inculcating the benefits in our Marines. It is but another way for us, as in institution, to stay highly tuned and ready to answer the Nation’s call.