Ten Years of TDGs

by Maj Brendan B. McBreen

Almost 400 solutions to tactical decision games (TDGs) have been published in the Marine Corps Gazette during the last 10 years. These published orders reflect the tactical thinking and orders techniques of a small but thoughtful percentage of Marines. These orders can provide us with some interesting insights and assist us in thinking about the orders we issue and receive within our own units.

I reviewed all of the TDG orders published between June 1990, when the first solutions were published, and November 2001. Discounting a small number of unique TDGs whose solutions were not combat orders, I analyzed the remaining 365 orders against the standards that our doctrine and our education system recommend for a good order. A good order includes:

* An assessment of the situation.

* A tie to the higher intent.

* A unit mission and intent.

* A series of subordinate tasks and intent.

* A designated main effort.

* A designated reserve.

Conversely, a good order avoids excessive conditional phrases, confusing task organizations, micromanagement, and trivial “more of the obvious” phrases. My observations are based on the following questions:

(1) Is the order clear? If I were a subordinate commander receiving this order, would I understand the plan and my role in the action?

(2) Is the order complete? Are any key pieces of information missing?

(3) Is the order flexible? How well would a leader who received this order be able to exercise his initiative and react to changes in the situation?

Observations

Every order published during the last 10 years communicated a tactical plan. Actual units would have responded well to the majority of orders presented. The following observations identify those areas in need of improvement.

An assessment of the situation. Only 27 percent of the orders included some assessment of the situation. Most times, where a situation was included, the information was usually a repetition of the facts, devoid of context or insight. This trend reflects our doctrinal emphasis on almanac information-facts, rather than assessment.

A tie to the higher intent. Only 12 percent of the orders included any link to the higher commander’s intent. We teach that the actions of a leader who does not know the higher commander’s intent cannot support his commander, whereas the actions of a leader who knows the intent of his headquarters two levels up cannot fail to support his commander. Some authors may have assumed such an understanding already existed, but the overwhelming absence of this fundamental precept of our warfighting doctrine is significant.

A unit mission. The majority of orders-75 percent-included a clear and concise mission statement. The remaining 25 percent had no mission at all but went straight to issuing tasks to subordinates. A few confusing orders issued a scheme of maneuver as the mission statement.

An intent. Forty-seven percent of the orders included an intent in some part of the order. However, some of these intent statements added no value to the order. Weak intent should be cause for concern. In reading hundreds of intent sentences, my sense is that many leaders understand the concept but few have experience with expressing solid intent. Intent should be why not how. Some intent was nothing more than, “I intend . . . ” followed by the scheme of maneuver. “I intend to encircle his forces north of Balzar and attack along two axes from east of the river. ” Other weak examples equated the intent with the mission. “Attack Objective A in order to seize Objective A.” Your intent should justify your mission. Ask yourself, “Why is this important? Why are we doing this?” Good intent focuses on the enemy, fair intent focuses on friendly forces, and weak intent focuses on terrain.

A series of subordinate tasks and intents. Forty-six percent of the orders used the good practice of linking each task with a corresponding intent or purpose. Since each task becomes a mission statement for your subordinate, each task is best understood when phrased as a mission statement with an accompanying intent. The most concise technique is to link the mission and the intent with “in order to.” “Seize the tower in order to prevent its use as an enemy observation post.”

More than half of the task statements contained no intent. Many of the poorer tasks were “puppet orders,” physically placing units on the deck but communicating no hint of what was expected of them. “Move to Checkpoint One. Orient east.” Other weak tasks were nothing more than detailed movement orders. “Move south between Route 5 inclusive and Route 10 exclusive. At release point follow river, stay in trees, cross east of bridge. Enter treeline north of creek and establish position there. ” Defensive tasks, especially, need to avoid the puppet tendency. “Occupy and defend battle position 10.” A better example is, “Defend battle position 10 in order to prevent enemy fire on our main supply route.” Defensive tasks that include only targeting information-“lead four vehicles are yours–are especially weak. Defensive orders need a clear intent to encourage subordinates to conduct an active, aggressive defense.

A designated main effort. Only 37 percent of the orders designated a main effort. This powerful technique has been recommended by our doctrine and taught in our schools for over 10 years. The main effort is the unit that will strike the decisive action. This concept unifies the actions of all subordinate units and serves to focus their attention when the situation changes. The main effort focuses fire support, logistics support, supporting units, and other priorities. A main effort that is weak, relative to other units, is evidence of a misunderstanding of the concept, a lack of tactical focus, a “fair share” mentality, or a failure to make tough economy of force decisions. Every order, for all units, for all types of missions, should designate a main effort.

A designated reserve. Twenty-six percent of the orders assigned a reserve. The more times a commander is surprised by unexpected enemy actions, the more he learns to maintain an untasked reserve. In the Marine Corps, during field exercises or map exercises, we are rarely surprised, so many leaders do not internalize lessons concerning the reserve. On the other hand, most TDGs address small unit problems. Our doctrine suggests that small units below the company level should not be expected to identify a reserve. “You are also the reserve” is a potentially dangerous tasking. When a surprise arises, is that unit available or engaged? A reserve provides flexibility. Without one the commander has few options available when the situation changes.

Excessive “on order. ” Only three percent of the orders included more than two “on order” or other conditional phrases. Too many “on orders” is an indicator of a fragile plan overly dependent on good communications and the commander’s ability to make all the decisions.

Task organization confusion. Nine percent of the orders were unclear or unnecessarily complex in task organization. Unclear command relationships were usually the result of imprecise language: “travel with Ist Platoon, ” “send two tubes with 3d Platoon, ” or “organize the battle position with 2d Platoon and tanks. ” The doctrinal terms direct support or attach should be used. Many of the identified confusions applied to the weapons platoon of the rifle company– an administrative-not a tactical unit. Unless attached out, weapons sections work directly for the company commander and are not tasked through the weapons platoon commander.

Micromanagement. Ten percent of the orders attempted to micromanage the tactical employment of a subordinate commander’s unit. A few examples broke units apart or assigned individuals. “Pull two men from your 3d Squad across the river, ” or “use that vehicle crewman to set up the landing zone.”

More of the obvious. Only a tiny number-3 percent-of the orders included any more of the obvious phrases. What does a Marine think when given the following instructions? “Care for your wounded. ” “Make timely and accurate reports.” “Normal radio procedures apply.” “Be flexible, move fast fight aggressively. ”

Tendencies

The majority of the TDG orders were short, direct, and unambiguous. Overall, however, there was far too much evidence of poor orders practices. Almost three out of four leaders failed to designate a reserve. Nearly two out of three leaders failed to designate a main effort. One out of every two leaders failed to provide a commander’s intent.

One out of four leaders communicated no mission at all but went straight to issuing tasks to subordinates. Either the commanders felt that the mission had not changed and did not need to be repeated or the heat of the moment required immediate taskings. An order lacking a mission statement is inherently weak and prone to misunderstanding. These types of orders can be heard frequently on the radio during unit exercises in the Operating Forces.

A large number of muddled orders failed to identify a main effort A main effort should always be identified. The concept of the main effort is such an integral part of our warfighting doctrine that its absence in almost two-thirds of the TDG orders should be cause for concern.

Most orders avoided the debilitating practices of excessive conditional phrases, confusing task organizations, micromanagement, or more-of-the– obvious phrases. This is probably caused by the concise TDG format and recommended time limit that combine to encourage brevity. The large number of repeat authors is also probably a contributing factor. Leaders who write many orders develop clarity of thought and clear phrasing habits that avoid most poor orders practices.

A large number of orders were written by the same people. Twenty-two percent of the orders were written by non-Marines. Eleven percent were written by enlisted Marines. Forty-four percent were written by company grade Marine officers. Twenty-three percent were written by field grade Marine officers. This does not include the far larger number of orders received by the Marine Corps Gazette but not selected for publication. In one regard, this shows that these individuals are interested in their profession and are practicing and contributing. On the other hand, this may indicate the interest that tactical decisionmaking and the orders process has in our organization. How many units train with TDGs on a regular basis? How many leaders train with TDGs on their own?

What Is To Be Done?

Combat orders, like any communications skill, is more art than science. Issuing concise, unambiguous orders is a skill acquired only through continuous practice. In order to improve our skills we, as Marine leaders, need to improve our own orders technique as well as guide the development of our subordinates’ skills.

Teach orders. Marines learn from their leaders. All leaders need to take the time to train their subordinates on effective orders techniques. A weekly officers’ call that includes a tactical decisionmaking exercise is a valuable event. Some schools focus on the format of orders but provide very little guidance on good philosophies and good habits of combat orders. Developing leaders should not have to sift through numerous orders to develop their own habits. Appendix C of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Cords Operations, includes the precise definitions of tactical tasks.

Require orders. Because the standard written order has grown so complex, some leaders do not require orders during map exercises, wargames, exercises, or unit professional military education. This is a mistake. A brief but effective order is a valid order. Every order written on a notebook page, index card, or issued verbally is a training opportunity gained.

Fight real opponents. In competitive fights, where an implacable enemy with a free will attempts to counter friendly actions, commanders learn how to issue robust orders. Only when the enemy has the capability to surprise us and disrupt our plans do leaders internalize solid lessons on the criticality of reconnaissance, the benefits of a simple task organization, the importance of a main effort, and those difficult decisions surrounding the use of the reserve. Leaders need to fight wargames, fight map exercises, and fight in force-on-force exercises against a thinking and difficult foe. Your orders will benefit from these realistic experiences.

Encourage practice. The average Marine Corps officer has caught more fly balls than he has issued orders. We get plenty of practice in unimportant skills but too little practice in our critical skills. Leaders need to schedule and encourage more practice on orders technique– teach more, require more, and fight more. Our serious professional force needs to get serious about the key professional skill of communicating tactical decisions.

Conclusion

TDG orders coming from a small percentage of Marines who were published in the Marine Corps Gazette may not be representative. One-third of the orders were written by the same author who wrote the TDG scenario. These individuals are especially interested in tactics and their profession. If the TDG orders were written by leaders who are keenly interested in the process, what of the average? Think about your own unit. How would you rate your average leader’s orders abilities? How would you rate the orders abilities of those leaders who do not regularly practice? Do you and your leaders issue the type of robust orders that will increase the combat power of your unit when committed to action? Our expeditionary force philosophy is tomorrow we may go to war. That means that today we need to train to fight and train to issue orders to prepare for war.

Encounter on the Coast

By Capt Gregory A. Thiele

Situation

Four days ago, the country of Green invaded its southern neighbor, Orange. The army of Orange had little notice of the attack and was quickly overrun. Due to treaty obligations the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (11th MEU(SOC)) was introduced into the country of Orange yesterday in order to stabilize the situation.

You are the company commander of Company B, the light armored reconnaissance company attached to the battalion landing team. Your orders were to push north along the coastal road, establish a screen line north of the capital of Orange, and provide the MEU with time so that it can offload without interference. In the S-2’s last briefing before you came ashore you were told that the enemy does not want to fight U.S. forces and will likely halt their attack and use the territory they have gained to this point as a bargaining chip.

You have pushed your company about 50 kilometers (km) north of the capital and established a screen line. Highway 1 is a four-lane, hardsurfaced road that runs along a flat, broad coastal plain. There is another road, Route 16, that runs toward the capital to your west. It is also a hard-surfaced road, but this valley is narrower and off-road movement is more difficult than on the coastal plain. There is only one road that runs between the coastal plain and this valley between your position and the capital. It is about 5km to your left rear.

You take these things into consideration and deploy your company. You direct 2d and 3d Platoon to screen along Highway I and the coastal plain and send your lst Platoon to screen along Route 16. You place your mortar section behind the two platoons on the coast. As you take stock of your fire support assets, you discount the possibility of artillery support. They won’t be off the ship until the morning. You will have a section of AH-1Ws on 10-minute alert off the deck of the USS Peleliu if you need them.

After 2 uneventful hours on the screen line, you see and hear your 3d Platoon engage an enemy force. The platoon commander quickly reports that two enemy reconnaissance vehicles fired on his vehicles and that the enemy had been destroyed. Shortly afterward the 1st Platoon commander sends a similar report. His platoon has also engaged an enemy reconnaissance element, but he has taken three casualties, none lifethreatening. As you report the situation to higher and request that the Cobras get airborne, the Ist Platoon commander comes over the net and tells you that he can see a sizable force of BMP-1s moving south toward his position about 6km away. He estimates the size of the enemy force at a company minus. This information is troubling enough, but more bad news comes when he sends an update and tells you that he can see two or three T-55s as well!

What are your orders?

Requirement

In a time limit of 3 minutes issue your orders to your platoon commanders. Provide a fragmentary order, overlay of your scheme of maneuver, and the rationale for your actions. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-12, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@ mca-marines.org>.

Kill All the Lawyers?

By Maj Cody M. Weston

Situation

You are a rifle platoon commander for Fox Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (13th MEU(SOC)) operating in the African country of Blueland. Your platoon has been sent ashore to reinforce the American Embassy in the nation’s capital, Blueland City. Blueland is in the middle of a civil war between the pro-U.S. democratic government and rebel forces known as the “Zebras” because of the distinctive black and white utilities they wear. The Zebras have small arms, primarily AK-47s. The violence has escalated to the point where the Embassy staff may be in danger despite the presence of a 10-man Marine security guard (MSG) detachment.

At the MEU confirmation brief prior to the launch, the MEU lawyer, or staff judge advocate, spelled out the rules of engagement (ROE). He said that: (1) the Zebras had been “declared hostile”; (2) “proportional force” was authorized to defend U.S. forces, the Embassy staff, and any other U.S. citizen against any “hostile act” or demonstration of “hostile intent”; (3) tear gas and pepper spray were not authorized; and (4) all efforts must be made to “minimize collateral damage.”

You have no attachments or detachments. You have your organic platoon weapons-M16s, M203s, M249s, 9mm pistols-as well as nonlethal weapons to include shields, batons, stinger grenades, beanbag rounds, and rubber bullets. A forward command element (FCE) consisting of the MEU executive officer, two other officers, and three radio operators inserted into the Embassy 3 days prior to conduct liaison with the U.S. Ambassador. The MSG Marines have already spread concertina wire around the perimeter.

You inserted via helicopter into the Embassy compound, did some quick coordination with the FCE, and then established three hasty squad defensive positions along the Embassy perimeter. The MSG Marines are inside the Embassy building itself.

Once you were satisfied with your initial defensive scheme you went back into the Embassy to conduct more detailed coordination with the FCE. Within a matter of minutes, two of your squad leaders are trying to reach you via radio.

Ist Squad, at the northern end of the compound, reports that a group of five men are standing about 30 meters away smoking cigarettes. They are wearing the same black and white utilities that the S-2 had briefed and have AK-47s slung on their shoulders. The squad leader is requesting guidance.

2d Squad, at the southern end of the compound, reports that a group of about 50 civilians is within 20 meters of their position shouting and waving their fists at the Marines. A few civilians are throwing rocks at the squad. The Ambassador overhears the conversation and mentions that his MSG Marines have tear gas grenades and pepper spray canisters that your Marines can use to disperse the crowd.

What do you do?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue your orders to your squad leaders. Provide a brief rationale for your actions and a sketch of your plan. Include a discussion of how your orders fall within the ROE. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-11, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e– mail <[email protected]>.

Sergeant, You Have Your Orders. Carry Them Out, Now!

by MSgt William D. Lohan, USMC(Ret)

Situation

You are the company gunnery sergeant of Headquarters Company, 3d Assault Amphibian (AAV) Battalion. The battalion has been assigned to the Ist Marine Division. The division is currently deployed in a Third World country as part of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).

The battalion is encamped 7,000 meters inland on the south side of a primary road. The compound is one of several that forms a defensive perimeter around the country’s second largest city. The battalion’s letter companies are deployed forward in direct support of division’s regiments. Headquarters and service company’s AAV platoon periodically supports field operations.

In an effort to extend the city’s defensive perimeter approximately 1,700 meters along the waterfront, the division commanding general has directed the attached Navy mobile construction battalion (NCB) to erect a new camp for the AAV battalion on the beach to the northeast side of a small mountain. A monastery belonging to the country’s primary religious sect is located on the mountain. The nation’s senior cleric remains in the monastery during the day. However, each evening he returns to the city in a late model, armored automobile.

The NCB agrees to build the camp provided their work detail can return to their primary defensive camp within the perimeter each evening. They offer to provide 81mm mortar support from their camp, approximately 1,000 meters north of MAGTF headquarters, for any security detachment assigned to protect the worksite. Their mortar position is approximately 4,000 meters from the new campsite.

The decision is made that elements of headquarters and service company will provide security at the new encampment. The security element consists of 10 AAVs and their 3-man crews, platoon commander, platoon sergeant, radio operator, 2 mechanics, truck driver, and a corpsman-a total of 37 personnel.

During the first week the encampment is subjected to small arms fire and an occasional rocket propelled grenade (RPG) being fired into the area. It has been determined that the harassing fire coming from caves located on the mountainside is being directed by observers in the vicinity of the monastery. At the request of the platoon commander the platoon is reinforced at night with additional headquarters personnel-roughly 13 Marines under command of the company gunnery sergeant.

Several days later the encampment is hit hard with small arms fire and several RPGs. In responding to the situation you find several Marines have been wounded, one Marine seriously. His left arm has been severed at the shoulder from an RPG round that struck within 3 feet of his position. A ground medical evacuation is conducted that catches the enemy offguard, and all wounded Marines are safely evacuated.

The following morning, still dressed in your blood-spattered uniform, you report to the battalion commander (CO). The battalion interpreter accompanies you. The CO is livid and informs you that you will go to the monastery and speak with the head monk. He directs you to inform the cleric, “If one more round is fired at my people on the beach from the vicinity of that rock pile, the next time he sees you will be the last time he sees you.” Although you remind the CO that division has explicitly directed that contact with the head priest must first be approved and coordinated by MAGTF headquarters, the CO tells you to carry out your orders.

As you prepare to do so the interpreter asks for some time to compose a letter to his family. When asked why he tells you he does not expect to return from the visit to the monastery.

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes explain how you intend to carry out your orders. Provide a sketch of your actions and the rationale behind them. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-10, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or email <[email protected]>.

Give No Quarter?

By the Staff of the Center for Law and Military Operations and Headquarters Marine Corps, Judge Advocate Division, International and Operational Law Branch

Situation

You are an infantry company commander for Fox Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/2, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) operating in the country of Oriole, a known haven for the Al Bimi terrorist group. Your company has been tasked to conduct a heliborne raid to destroy an Al Bimi command and control cell located in makeshift huts at a camp in the foothills of a mountain range. Part of the MEU(SOC) commander’s intent calls for gathering as much intelligence as possible from the site. Al Bimi forces in the vicinity of the camp have been declared hostile. The S-2 (intelligence) reports that approximately 20 to 25 terrorists equipped with former Soviet bloc small arms are on the site.

Other U.S. forces have conducted raids on other Al Bimi camps and have reported that Al Bimi morale is low and that significant numbers have surrendered rather than fight. Of those who chose to fight, however, resistance has been stiff.

On one of the raids a group of three terrorists feigned surrender and then shot at the U.S. forces trying to capture them. The MEU(SOC) commander has emphasized strict adherence to the law of war, specifically that no Marine will intentionally shoot any Al Bimi member who surrenders. He has further emphasized the intelligence value of captured Al Bimi and that he wants every effort made to minimize the likelihood of unintentionally injuring those who surrender.

Following tried and true raid tactics, you put together a basic scheme of maneuver involving a helicopter insert at a landing zone 10 kilometers away and a foot movement to the objective. You task Ist Platoon as a security element to isolate the objective and block enemy ingress and egress. You task 2d Platoon, reinforced with an M2AOG machinegun section from weapons platoon, as a support element to move to a position to provide supporting fires for the assault force, 3d Platoon. After giving your platoon commanders this general guidance, you tell them to develop a detailed plan and to back brief you.

A short while later the 3d Platoon commander comes to you with a troubled look on his face. “Sir, what are we supposed to do when pockets of the enemy are surrendering on different parts of the objective and other pockets are still firing at us? We know that they’ve faked surrender in the past. They’ve been declared hostile. Can’t we just light up a base of fire and sweep across the objective, even if we shoot terrorists who surrender?”

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, what guidance do you give your platoon commander? Can you rationalize not shooting the surrendering terrorists and potentially putting Marines at risk, or do you concede that sometimes you can intentionally shoot enemy who surrender? Can you make any suggestions regarding tactics? Provide a brief rationale for your guidance and, if it aids in description, a sketch of any tactical suggestions. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-9, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e– mail <[email protected]>.

Island Takedown

By Maj Douglas J. MacIntyre

Situation

The time is now 1630, Wednesday. You are the battalion commander of 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2), an east coast unit deployment program infantry battalion. Your unit is well trained and is currently preparing to return to the continental United States after over 5 months in theater. As part of the United States’ continuing war on terrorism, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command has identified a terrorist training camp on Hok Island located 190 nautical miles from Okinawa. Seizure of this island and capture of these terrorists would be seen as a key indicator of U.S. resolve in the region and a major boost for the American public.

Intelligence estimates place the number of rebels on the island as platoon- to company-sized strength with limited small arms capability. Operating mainly in the northern portion of the island, they have established a village base and a trail network connecting the island’s northern beaches. The terrorists have also been seen operating small patrol craft in the bays surrounding the island.

Hok Island is a small, irregularly shaped island, 5 kilometers by 3 kilometers, located in the Philippine Sea. Except for four beaches, a village, and the known trail network, it is primarily covered with dense jungle and rough terrain. The beaches are generally rocky and rise sharply into the jungle. The two eastern beaches (East Beach 1 and 2) and West Beach 2 are suitable for up to a section of CH-53Es, while West Beach 1 can only support single aircraft landings.

At the 1800 planning session, III Marine Expeditionary Force designated 4th Marines as mission commander, HMH-465 as the aviation combat element (ACE), and 1/2 as the ground combat element. The ACE commander turns and tells you that the lift available is 4 CH-53Es (30 passengers each) with a 4-hour round trip flight window. He also states that fixed-wing close air support will be available continuously ofter L-hour (specific hour at which a deployment operation commences) from available Marine F-18 squadrons and a 3-hour window for an AC-130 mission. L-hour is set as 0600, Thursday.

Mission

Within the rapid response planning process that followed, 4th Marines’ operations order tasked you with the following: “Seize, occupy, and search Hok Island.” With this in mind, the battalion’s concept of operations seems clear-long-range helo insert, seize a foothold, multiple waves. As you are discussing this with your operations officer, an intelligence update is brought in via messenger.

Intel Update

“Terrorists on Hok Island appear to have prepared fortified positions surrounding their village and are guarding the two northern beaches. Patrol craft with heavy weapons seen in bay near East Beach 1. Reserve unit of unknown strength seen moving in central portion of the island.”

Requirement

The time is now 2115, Wednesday. In a time limit of 10 minutes, issue the changes to the concept of operations and orders to all companies and supporting arms addressing this updated situation. Provide a brief rationale for your actions and a sketch of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-8, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <[email protected]>.

ECC at the International School

By Capt Sean P. Smith

Situation

You are assigned to the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) service support group (MSSG) evacuation control center (ECC) team as one of the section noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs). The ECC team has been activated to assist in the orderly and systematic evacuation of U.S. citizens and other individuals friendly to the United States identified by the Department of State (DoS). The MSSG ECC team has been inserted into the International School compound in the city of Noroba, Kurkleshstan in order to conduct ECC operations. Once they are processed they will be flown via helicopter to an airfield for evacuation out of Kurkleshstan.

The DoS estimates that there will be approximately 2,000 people who will need to be evacuated. The International School is located on the edge of the city in an enclosed compound that is roughly the same size as a football field. The compound walls are constructed of reinforced steel bars and concrete 12-feet high and 2-feet thick. You have visibility outside the compound through the steel bars in the wall. There are small outposts in the northwest and southwest corners of the compound. The eastern side of the compound consists of a two-story building (the school itself) that can accommodate one CH-46-sized helicopter at a time on the roof. There is one main gate for the compound located in the north wall. The terrain around the compound consists of dirt roads, mild scrub vegetation, and small, one-story shacks and huts.

The ECC team was inserted via helicopter from the MEU amphibious ready group into the compound at 0500 in order to start processing at 0630. A section of the artillery battery is providing security at the compound. They have one fire team in each corner of the compound situated in the outposts and on the corners of the building rooftop. The remainder of the battery section is augmenting the ECC security and escort teams.

The briefing point is located at the entrance to the compound. The ECC team has set up its security, search, and screening/processing stations in the compound. Staging/embark is located on the second floor of the building. There is a MEU interrogation area located on the first floor of the building. The medical station is also located on the first floor of the building in a separate room. There is a temporary holding area surrounded by barbed wire in the northeast corner of the compound with four people detained in it.

The light armored vehicle platoon is currently in the city center approximately 5 miles away providing security on the main supply route in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy and is available for backup if needed.

Processing began at 0630 and hasn’t slowed down in the last several hours. Only a small number of individuals were American citizens. They were the first ones evacuated from the compound. The remainder of the evacuees are mostly native Kurkleshstani’s and foreign nationals who were told they would be evacuated out of the country by the DoS. Most of them are legitimate; however, several have appeared on the black lists, and the MEU interrogator-translator team has determined that at least four have ties to the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

As you look out of the compound, you estimate that there must be at least several hundred people with baggage congregated outside the briefing point wire waiting to be processed. Mixed in with them, and spread outside the compound walls, are hundreds of locals. The crowds are loud, carrying anti-American signs and banners. You begin to hear Muslim chants coming out of a microphone from the crowd north of the compound. You then hear sporadic gunshots off in the distance, and one of the fire teams on the roof reports that an old van drove slowly around the outside of the Embassy and moved out of sight.

Just then an explosion rocks the communications site, killing the ECC site commander and severely wounding the assistant commander and the battery staff NCOIC. The only working communications you have are with the stations and outposts via saber radio. The rooftop outposts report that there are possibly one or more snipers in the adjacent crowd starting to take shots at the compound. Last word was that another helo would not be on the deck for at least another 30 minutes. The crowd is becoming more violent, and more rifle fire is heard. Right now you have 15 evacuees in the compound, and some appear wounded. You realize that you are the senior Marine on the scene.

The security force has M9 pistols, M16s, and squad automatic weapons. They also have two M240G machineguns on the northeast and southeast corners of the rooftop, a limited amount of pepper spray and tear gas (CS) hand grenades/M203 grenade launcher rounds, and four red star clusters. ECC personnel have standard small arms security rounds. The security team has pepper spray, CS grenades, and two red star clusters. Standing MEU rules of engagement include the following provisions: deadly force is authorized if directly fired upon from a known target, and all weapons systems will be in Condition One.

What do you do now, Sergeant ?

Requirement

In a time of 2 minutes, write down your plan on how to handle the situation. Keep in mind all factors involved with the scenario. Be prepared to brief your plan and scheme of maneuver. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-7, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette @mca-marines.org>.

Peace Enforcement in Intolerancia

by Rittmester (Cavalry Captain) Patrik Schaathun, Norwegian Army

Situation

You are the platoon leader of a rifle platoon. Your battalion is part of a multinational peace enforcement (PFOR) mission to Intolerancia, a nation tom apart by civil war. The PFOR intent is to prevent the antagonists from fighting each other. The desired end state is reached when no hostilities occur between the opposing factions-the Aloofians and the Utopians. A peace agreement put an end to the fighting a year ago. Since then there have been clashes between mobs as well as murder threats to civilians on both sides. Rules of engagement allow you to use minimum force against individuals who unlawfully commit or are about to commit acts that endanger life or are likely to cause serious bodily harm.

One of your squads has been detached so you only have two left. Your task is to patrol a border area to prevent weapons and explosives from being transported across the separation zone (SeZo). The former enemies have withdrawn their armed forces across their respective sides of the SeZo. The armed forces have been demobilized as demanded by PFOR. Civilians have complete freedom of movement, although few dare cross the SeZo to the opposing side. Wooragoora is inhabited by Aloofians. Argonne, formerly inhabited by Utopians, is now deserted.

The rest of the battalion is located 1 hour to your north and are tasked with checking weapons sites and patrolling.

You have just taken over the patrol base. The outgoing platoon informed you that unarmed Aloofian civilians have recently been looting Argonne and that the former inhabitants of Argonne, now residing in Belleau, are rather dissatisfied with it. The first looters were sent packing by the outgoing platoon who simply told them to leave. Compliance was instant with few questions asked. However, when the situation was reported through the chain of command, the outgoing platoon was ordered not to interfere since this is a civilian matter and should be taken care of by the international police force (PolInt) and the local police. The battalion tactical operations center emphasized response to military activity and armed civilans only. Since then, looters have been left alone.

The local police in Wooragoora aren’t willing to interfere. The nearest Pollint detachment is 1-hour to your west, and recent incidents have demonstrated their reluctance to respond due to duties elsewhere.

A Utopian spokesman in Belleau has declared that if PFOR is not willing to stop the looting, they will take matters into their own hands in order to protect their homes that they hope to move back to one day. According to the battalion intelligence officer, the civilans on both sides have access to small arms.

It is 1000 and both your squads are within your compound. The sentry informs you that two civilian lorries have just arrived at Argonne and five unarmed civilians can be seen looting.

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue your orders. Provide a rationale for your actions and a sketch of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-6, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca– marines.org>.

Fight or Flight

by Capt Curtis E. Moore II

Situation

You are the section leader of a pair of AH-lW Super Cobras on an armed reconnaissance mission. Each attack helicopter’s weapons load consists of 2 TOW missiles, 2 Hellfire missiles, 7 2.75-inch high-explosive rockets, 7 2.75-inch flechette rockets, and 400 rounds of 20mm ammunition. While engaging an enemy mechanized column, your wingman is brought down by enemy fire just as you launch your last missile. After confirming no one survived the helicopter crash, you discover your helicopter has lost external radio communications and has fallen below the fuel minimums required to safely return to the forward arming and refueling point (FARP).

Trying not to think about the loss of your squadron mates, you task your copilot, Sean “Dirty” Canahal, to navigate the aircraft through the mountainous terrain to the FARP under the most fuel efficient conditions possible. During the 24-kilometer flight to the FARP site it is not until you make a hard turn through one of the mountain passes that a reflection from behind your aircraft catches your eye. The reflection emanates from the canopy of an enemy Ka-50 Hokum attack helicopter. You cannot be sure how long he has been behind you, but you determine that since he has not attacked yet, even though you are in range of his weapons systems, he may have another motive. Is his goal to discover the location of the FARP site? If compromised, the FARP could be attacked/destroyed by enemy artillery, rockets, or aircraft. A successful attack on the FARP would kill several people and destroy aircraft and other equipment.

While you consider options, the following conversation takes place between you and Dirty over the internal communications system.

Dirty: “&#*!%$ Hobbit, I thought we had air superiority. Where did that guy come from?”

Hobbit: “Obviously the enemy is pulling a few wild cards out of the deck. The S-2 never even mentioned those in their air order of battle.”

Dirty: “Without any radio communications we cannot call the Hornets to help us out on this one. The way I see it we have two options: we can try to make it back to the FARP site, hope our fuel lasts until we get there, risk compromising the site, and pray our Stinger man-portable air defense missile bubbas tag this guy, or we can turn, try to engage, and shoot this guy down. If we go that way, assuming we get him in our sites and destroy him, I am sure we will be out of fuel before we make it back to the FARP site.”

You consider his counsel, take a deep breath, and explain your plan to Dirty.

Requirement

In a time limit of 30 seconds, come up with a plan and be prepared to brief it to your copilot.

Draft a mission statement, intent, and a graphic representation of your proposed course of action. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-5, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <[email protected]>.

Command and Control Fog

By Capt Eric J. Lehman

Situation

You are commanding a detachment of Marines assigned to a joint task force (JTF) conducting humanitarian relief operations in the drought stricken country of Neptonia. In support of a United Nations (U.N.) task force objective, your mission is to produce potable water and fill local cisterns. The likelihood of terrorist activity in the joint operations area has you operating on a heightened state of alert. Although terrorists have raided cisterns throughout the joint operations area, there have been no cistern raids in your area of operations. (See map.)

The JTF commander is concerned that cistern raids may lead to civil unrest in Neptonia and ultimately upset the balance of power in the region. For diplomatic reasons, the JTF commander decided to follow the U.N. task force’s restricted rules of engagement-individual weapons may be cartied in Condition 1, but JTF personnel may only engage an adversary when fired upon.

Figure 1 contains your force list. Routes 1, 4, 7, and 9 are improved roads, and Routes K, X, and Z are unimproved. The commercial tankers cannot navigate unimproved roads.

For force protection you have limited convoys to 15 vehicles, varied convoy departure times, and directed your engineer company to improve Routes K, X, and Z. Additionally, commercial tankers have been integrated into the convoys, and tactical vehicles with mounted machineguns are in the front and rear of each convoy.

On the 31st day of your deployment, you launch a convoy to Village 2. Your engineer company commander has completed improvements to Route K. He is working in the vicinity of checkpoint 4 and anticipates completing Route X in 5 days. You are located in your command post (CP).

The lead element of the convoy has passed checkpoint 8 and is proceeding east when the convoy commander, a staff sergeant, reports hearing an explosion and seeing a column of heavy black smoke east of checkpoint 2. The excited staff sergeant reports two off-road vehicles (ORVs) approaching the convoy from the north at a high rate of speed. After forcing a tanker off the road and causing it to sink in the loose sand, the ORVs retreated to the hills north of the road. The staff sergeant states that the ORVs appeared to have gun mounts, but he did not see any guns.

While talking to the staff sergeant you hear the unmistakable sound of machinegun fire. The staff sergeant confirms machinegun fire coming from the vicinity of the rear of his convoy but states that he cannot see the rear of his convoy.

Requirement

From your CP 12 kilometers away, in a time limit of 3 minutes, what orders do you give to your subordinates, and what do you tell higher headquarters? Provide the rationale for your actions and a sketch of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-4, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or email <[email protected]>.

Lights Out

By Maj Terry Branstetter

General

Yesterday, large-scale power outages occurred throughout metropolitan regions of the United States. Millions of Americans remain without power. The National Security Agency (NSA) has identified the source of these attacks as the Matrix. The Matrix has long been believed to sponsor and lead training for anti-American terrorism. This is their first confirmed cyberattack. The NSA claims that a man called Neo Khalid masterminded this recent attack.

The Matrix has a training compound in the country of Futeria. The Futerian Government has taken no action against Matrix because computer attack is not illegal in Futeria.

The Matrix compound is believed to be a modern training facility. The Matrix is well-sponsored and is believed to have access to a variety of modern light weapons. It is estimated that the compound maintains an active force of about 70 trainers and trainees.

Late today, the State Department persuaded the Futerian President that the Matrix initiated these attacks from his country. He has authorized a restricted retaliation by the United States against the Matrix, specifically to capture Khalid. It is unknown if Khalid knows that he has been discovered as the source of these attacks. National assets indicate that the Matrix compound is in a normal state; however, it must be assumed that the Matrix has prepared for retaliation. The Matrix compound is near the sea and in an isolated part of Futeria.

Situation

You command a Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)), currently afloat. You have just received a directive authorizing military action against the perpetrator of these attacks. You and your staff are quite familiar with the Matrix. They have been on your list of possible enemies for some time. Your MEU is the quickest response to prevent further offensive action by the Matrix.

As part of the Department of State agreement with the Futerian President, air delivered munitions may not be employed. Offensive actions are restricted to the immediate compound area. Lastly, you are directed to capture Khalid and other Matrix members and computer or electronic equipment employed in this attack. You are currently 100 miles from the coast of Futeria and the sun is setting.

Requirement

Draft a mission statement, commander’s intent, and a concept of operations to start your staff’s planning. For this operation, assume any standard MEU task organization or propose a nontraditional organization with justification for current/future relevance. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #02-3, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette @mca-marines.org>.