Marine Corps Wargaming

by Capt John C. Ketcherside

The Marines have a history of embracing innovative concepts that add to their warfighting capability. These concepts include intellectual and academic ideas, such as wargaming. The wargaming conducted by the Marine Corp in the 1930s laid the foundation of the amphibious doctrine used in World War II and is still cited as a classic use of wargames to win wars. However, in the Marine Corps today, wargaming below the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level suffers from ignorance and apathy-I don’t know and I don’t care. Most Marines have not been exposed to any wargaming or simulations during their careers, and have no idea why they should be. This is because wargaming in the modern Marine Corps suffers from both misused capabilities and unused potentials.

For clarity, this article is not referring to course of action wargaming as used in the Marine Corps Planning Process. Rather, it is referring to the conventional wargame that is a conflict simulation or as defined by the Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) as:

. . . the artificial replication of a situation of competition or conflict not involving actual military forces, and is characterized by human decisionmaking which impacts the course of events throughout. It revolves around the interaction of two or more opposing forces guided by predetermined objectives, rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real world situation.

The Marine Corps has developed two extremes in regard to wargaming. The first is that most simulations Marines encounter (if they encounter any) are large, complex, high command-level computer simulations that last for days or weeks. On the other end are tactical decision games (TDGs). TDGs are one of the best and most enduring training aids the Marine Corps has used, but they are limited by the fact that they have a static enemy force. They are excellent for what they are designed to do, and that is train Marines to develop an executable plan in the minimum amount of time. But, unlike a simulation, there is no following test of that plan against a thinking enemy. A simulation trains a Marine in the same things as a TDG but also trains the decisionmaking cycle against an intelligent opponent.

As far as the large, complex simulations are concerned, this is where the Marine Corps has misused capabilities. This author has participated in Marine tactical warfare simulations in Twentynine Palms, Camp Lejeune, and with the Marines in Thailand, and in ULCHI Focus LENS in Okinawa and UNIFIED ENDEAVOR at Camp Lejeune. The utility of these simulations for command levels below division was minimal. These simulations were designed to train joint commands on a MEF level and higher. These fall under the category of Title 10 wargames, such as the type addressed in the article by the Wargaming Division, MCWL, “Expeditionary Warrior: The Marine Corps and Title 10 Wargaming,” (MCG, Sep03). These games usually involved dozens or hundreds of people for several days or weeks. The problem is that for Marines and staffs under a divisional level, there is a great deal of time spent with little in return. Since the focus of these games is high-level command and control, small unit staffs are relegated to pushing icons around the screen in a slow and tedious process. There is rarely any realistic tactical play for these units. For instance, the smallest level unit in ULCHI FOCUS LENS was a battalion that could not be broken down into its component units. This is a software problem and could be fixed, but that is not the focus of Title 10 simulations, so it probably will not be addressed.

Nor should it be. The focus for Title 10 wargames is high-level command and control. The actions of an individual company may not contribute to the training objectives on that level. The problem is that battalion staffs, company grade officers, staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) and NCOs are drawn into these simulations to act as unit commanders and staffs. While these units derive some training benefit from these simulations by conducting staff planning and writing orders, this is usually done by the unit only for their use and will end up having no real impact on the simulation. Battalion and company commanders would most prefer to use their scarce time to conduct this type of staff training in conjunction with their own field exercises and training objectives.

The future trend is for more simulations of this type becoming bigger, more complex, and joint. The MCWL Warfighting Division web site at <www.wargaming.quantico. usmc.mil> discusses several of these simulations in detail. This is a good trend and will be most beneficial to joint staffs and higher level commands. Unfortunately, it is not good for units that must participate or send Marines to participate for a week or more at a time in a simulation that provides little to the unit in return.

How can this problem be corrected? Two ways are by focusing and limiting-focusing on what the training objectives of these simulations are and limiting the number of people involved to those being trained and the minimum needed to operate the simulation (usually contractor personnel). Focusing on specific objectives and personnel will restrain the urge to incorporate more and more Marines with the idea that “everyone will get something out of it.” Specifically, if the objective is to train a joint staff in strategic-level operations, then there is no need to incorporate lieutenants as battalion commanders pushing icons across a screen. This addresses the misused capability in wargaming the Marine Corps has, but what about the unused potential?

The unused potential is the widespread availability of wargames and the ability of battalions, companies, and squads to use them for their own training. For the purposes of this article there are three types of wargames available for widespread use-computer, manual, and nonspecific.

Off-the-shelf computer wargames abound. They can be obtained cheaply and are easy to learn how to use. These include much more than traditional “first-person shooter” games such as Doom© and Tom Clancy’s Rainbow Six© series. For instance, Talonsoft has an entire series of games called The Operational Art of War© spanning conflicts across the 20th century. This series of games allows the player to command units from battalions to divisions. On a lower level, games such as Steel Panthers© by Matrix and Talonsoft’s Eastfront and Westfront allow the player to command any number of individual squads and vehicles. Generally, even the first-person shooter games give the player the option of controlling anywhere from 1 man to a 12-man squad in game-provided scenarios or in player-generated scenarios.

These games can be configured to suit unit training objectives. Most have scenario generators that allow the user to develop his own scenario, tables of organization, and tables of equipment for play. 1st Battalion, 6th Marines used Steel Panthers to simulate various engagements from Operation DESERT STORM, using scenarios generated by the battalion commander.

This article cannot even begin to cover computer wargames in any depth with the wide variety of games available. Rather, the intent is to show they are available, cheap, easy to use and, despite being designed for entertainment, have training potential.

Manual wargames are those simulations that have traditionally been called map exercises by the military. These span almost as wide a spectrum as computer games.

To begin with, like computer games, there is a wide variety of commercial board wargames available. A game can be found to simulate almost any conflict, historical or hypothetical, on almost any level from TSR/SPI’s Sniper!©, commanding individual men and vehicles, and Avalon Hill’s Advanced Squad Leader©, commanding squads and vehicles, to the popular Milton Bradley game Axis and Allies©, where the player commands an entire country or coalition. With a manual game such as this, it is even easier to modify it to suit the training objectives of the unit. Board wargames are much more difficult to find in stores than computer games, but they can be easily found on the Internet.

But manual wargames are not limited to what can be bought commercially. Anyone with paper and a map can conduct a manual simulation. Units can be represented by labeled pieces of paper moving across a map (or on a command and control personal computer) with a predetermined movement rate and fighting with a predetermined combat value. Dice rolls, a system of tables, or the ruling of a referee can resolve combat. Of course, this is simulation at it simplest. According to how the unit wants to train, factors such as weather, terrain, etc. can be factored in. What makes this system easy to use in the Marine Corps is that, unlike commercial games designed to entertain, the Marine Corps can use a referee in place of a more complex rules system for combat resolution. This is the method the German General Staff used at the Kriegsacademie in the mid- to late-1800s.

A variation of manual wargames would include the use of graphics or miniatures on a sandtable. The same basic concepts of movement and combat apply, but a sandtable has a greater flexibility in configuring terrain and adds a three-dimensional aspect. Miniature wargames are rising in popularity in the civilian sector. Games such as Warhammer© by Games Workshop is particularly popular. Warhammer is a fantasy/science fiction game that uses models to represent units on an elaborate map table that has realistically sculpted terrain. While not directly applicable to Marine Corps use, the principles of Warhammer can be applied to sandtable exercises. Warhammer is popular to the extent that it may be worth the time to query the Marines in a unit to see if there is a Warhammer player among them. And, like board wargames, there is a wide variety of miniature wargames to be found on the Internet, though the spectrum of conflict is narrower. Miniature wargaming focuses primarily on the tactical level as this is what models can best represent.

While I was at The Basic School an interesting variation of a sandtable exercise was used. The students were divided into teams and stood at sandtables at such a distance apart that the teams could not interact with each other. Each team was given a number of units to command, represented by their operational symbol on a piece of paper. Each team had the same terrain features on their sandtable and was given a specific objective. All movement, combat, and other information was given to each team by the referees who moved from table to table describing to each team what they could see and what the results of their decisions were. This exercise proved to be very popular with the students and tested their decisionmaking capability, as the referee gave only a limited amount of time for a lieutenant to make a decision. The use of the referee kept the simulation in “real-time” vice “turn based.” In effect, it was like being given one TDG after another in rapid succession, each one being affected by the previous decisions. I have used this exercise several times since for my Marines as it is very easy to set up and run.

Lastly, there are nonspecific games. Under this category fall generic games of strategy that are familiar to all. These include Chess, Go, Othello, Backgammon, Mancala, and any number of others. While they have no direct contribution to training, they exercise decisionmaking cycles and fire up the strategy neurons in the “brain housing group.” Even Monopoly© accomplishes this to some extent. They cost little enough to make available and are at least a much better way to pass time than some.

This article is not meant to imply that wargaming is a panacea to training and budgetary shortfalls in the Marine Corps. Nor is it advocating that wargaming be made mandatory at all levels. Rather, it is attempting to show that wargaming is another tool the commander has to train his Marines. It can be tailored to suit constraints of time and other resources and focused to meet specific training requirements.

High-level simulations are excellent training tools, especially for joint strategic operations. However, these simulations must be focused on specific objectives and limit the number of personnel involved to those who can benefit from the training. On the other end of the spectrum, this article hopes to show commanders the wide availability and adaptability of wargames for their use if it suits their needs. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the study of theory alone will not prepare one for combat, but will educate judgment. 1 Wargames are one more type of professional military education that can be used to educate.

Footnote Note
  1. Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peler Paret, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1976, p. 141.

Operation Extract

by Capt Brian S. Christmas

Situation

You are the rifle company commander for Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. Your battalion has been operating in this area for the last 30 days with great success. The enemy has been reduced to operating as elements smaller than platoon size. Currently your battalion is attempting to conduct a helicopterborne extract and plans to secure two landing zones within its area of operation (AO).

The AO is heavily forested with clearly defined trails overlooked by steep mountainous terrain. The enemy is foot mobile and is armed with AK-47 rifles and medium machineguns. There is an unknown enemy force that is consolidating to the northwest and looks to be in a recovery mode. You are currently moving south to north en route to an open area large enough for 1.5 CH-53Es.

Mission: Charlie Company (Rein), 1st Battalion, 6th Marines conducts a foot movement to secure and prepare a landing zone to accommodate two CH-53Es in order to facilitate the expeditious extract of the battalion.

Table of organization and equipment:

* Three rifle platoons (75 percent strength). (Each fire team has one AT-4.)

* One weapons platoon (75 percent strength).

* One Javelin squad (100 percent). (Each team has a demo kit with C4 (Composition 4) and detonation chord.)

* One section of 81mm mortars is in general support from the south.

Requirement

In a time limit of 10 minutes, identify your specified and implied tasks and develop your scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-12, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail to <gazette@mca-marines.org>.

Dumas Sucker Punch

by Capt Edward P. Mullen

Situation

You are to be the division leader for a mixed flight of two UH-1N Hueys and two AH-1W Cobras conducting aerial interdiction in support of a combined amphibious and heliborne landing. The time is now 1700. L-hour is 0600 tomorrow morning when both the boat and helicopter companies will put “feet ashore.”

Reconnaissance assets report that two ZSU-23-4s have moved onto the Dumas peninsula this afternoon where both companies will insert. The accompanying support structure has been moving ammo to the antiaircraft artillery sites. The enemy is known to have Generation I night, vision devices. No SA-9/13s or reinforcing mechanized infantry have yet crossed the Fajenal Canal onto the peninsula, but they are expected to follow. You are operating off of the LPD of a Marine expeditionary unit in an established fire support area, and the commander, amphibious task force will not exit until 0400.

Forecasted ceilings for tonight are broken at 5,000 feet, wind 045/12. Sunset is 1842; moonset is 2024. Both Cobras are up for TOW; only one is up for Hellfire. Only one Huey has a fully operable Star Safire. No friendlies are ashore and no surface fires are available. The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander’s priority of fires is air defense, indirect fires, command and control, and then mechanized assets. Your task is to destroy the two ZSU-23-4s to facilitate landing the heliborne force.

Requirement

Within a time limit of 10 minutes, develop an objective area scheme, following offensive air support briefing considerations, that accomplishes the MAGTF commander’s intent. Explain your geometery and weaponeering choices. Provide a sketch of your plan of action and rationale behind it.

Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-11, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-marines.org>.

The Race Is On

by CAPT Garth Gould, Australian Army

Situation

You are a squad leader conducting a foot patrol in wooded, rolling terrain. You have a machinegun team from weapons platoon (two M240Gs) attached to your squad. You are in radio contact with another squad from your platoon that is patrolling approximately 2,500 meters to your north. The remainder of your platoon is occupying a firm base some distance away. Due to the threat posed by enemy counterbattery fire, your squad is unlikely to receive any indirect fire support during this patrol. Recently, your unit has encountered enemy who are well-trained and usually operate in teams of six, although they regularly combine two or three teams together.

The time is 1600 hours when you suddenly hear the sound of a helicopter flying low to your northeast. Although you can’t see the helicopter through the trees, something tells you it’s in trouble. As you expected, you soon hear the abrupt thud of the aircraft hitting the ground not far from your patrol. You shake your squad out and cautiously patrol toward the accident sight. After only a few minutes your patrol reaches the edge of the tree line. You can see that a friendly utility helicopter has crash landed heavily 300 meters to your east. There is smoke emanating from the engine of the wreck. Some aircrew and passengers are frantically trying to pull other survivors from the wreckage, and it’s obvious that several personnel have been seriously injured in the crash. Just as you’re deciding what to do, your scout draws your attention to a group of enemy moving from the cover of a tree line into a creek about 700 meters to your northeast. They are moving cautiously and appear to be equipped with small arms. You’ve counted five into the creek line so far. What do you do?

Requirement

Within a time limit of 5 minutes, issue the orders you will give to your subordinates. Provide the rationale for your decisions and a sketch of the plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-10, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-marines.org>.

Offroading

By Maj Terry Branstretter

Situation

You are Cpl Smith, USMCR, stationed at Pico Rivera, CA. You are an off-duty police officer with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. You’ve spent the morning four wheeling with fellow noncommissioned officer, Cpl Jones. You decide to take a lunch break near an aqueduct that provides about a third of Los Angeles’ water supply.

You parked your truck where the jeep trail ends near a power substation (1 hour’s drive from the main highway). After trying to check in with your wife (your cell phone did not get a signal), you and Jones decide to hike to some high ground and have lunch. You walk for about 20 minutes to a hill that overlooks the station that pumps water over the mountains to your east.

You remark to Jones as you loosen your boots, “I bet we could have driven most of the way to this hill if we stayed near the water. At least the return is mostly downhill.” You rest and eat while calculating how much water must be moving through the station. You remark at the engineering marvel of the aqueduct and the pumping station. “That much water and it looks like only a few guys actually man the site. I wonder if the pumps are monitored remotely?”

As you enjoy the day, two large vans approach the pumping station. They stop at separate locations (shown on the map). With a set of small binoculars you observe six men exiting the second vehicle. On closer inspection you see that they appear to be armed. A minute later you see the men fire an automatic weapon toward an entrance to the pumping station. Dumbfounded, you murmur, “Why did I leave my pistol in the truck?”

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes explain how you intend to react to this situation. Provide a sketch of your actions and the rationale behind them. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-9, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22184, fax 708-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-Marines.org>.

Standoff in the Swamp

By 1stLt Joshua E. Cavan

Situation

You are 1st Squad Leader, 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. Your battalion has been conducting patrolling operations in the country of Jungleland. The battalion is assisting the Jungleland Marines in defeating an indigenous guerilla movement that has been linked to an international terrorist organization. The terrain in the interior, where the guerilla movement is based, features steep hills covered with triple canopy jungle cut by numerous, small, easily fordable streams and swamps in the low-lying areas. Visibility is limited to 100 meters or less in the hills and 200 meters or less in the lowlands.

The guerillas operate largely in 10- to 12-man groups based in villages. They depend on their home villages for food, fresh water, and new recruits. They are armed with a variety of small arms from bolt action rifles to rocket propelled grenades. They are not known to possess a significant heavy machinegun or indirect fire capability.

Company A is operating with a Jungleland Marine company in the area of the small town of Villagton that has several small, outlying hamlets. The company’s mission is to deny the enemy the use of the village in order to cut the enemy off from the supplies and potential recruits in the village. 1st Platoon is tasked with occupying the outlying hamlet of Hamletia and conducting combat patrols in order to prevent small enemy units from infiltrating into Villagton. 2d and 3d Platoons have the same mission in hamlets to the south of the village. Your company command post and the Jungleland Marine company are located in Villagton itself. 2d and 3d Squads will remain in the village while you patrol and will prepare to conduct their own patrols upon your return. Located north of Villagton are 60mm mortars. They are in general support of the company with priority of fires to 3d Platoon, then 2d Platoon, and then 1st Platoon.

Your squad has been tasked with conducting a daylight patrol north of the village along a route that squad-sized enemy units have used previously to move into the Villagton area. You will insert by helicopter and patrol on foot back toward Hamletia. Your mission is to conduct a heliborne and foot security patrol in order to prevent any enemy forces from infiltrating along the known route toward Hamletia and Villagton. Commander’s intent is as follows:

The enemy’s center of gravity is the support, in the form of supplies and recruits, that he receives from the Villagton area. His critical vulnerability is that he uses known routes to infiltrate toward the village. I intend to send out patrols along these routes to find enemy patrols and prevent them from moving toward the village by destroying them.

You will be within range of 60mm mortars during your entire patrol.

You insert at 1200 and begin moving south following a small stream. Radio communications in the dense jungle has been unreliable throughout the patrol. At approximately 1400 you move into a swampy area bounded by two small streams featuring knee-deep brackish water, waist-high grass, and some tall trees, although the area is not so densely wooded as the hills. You are moving on the south side of the swampy area when one of your Marines spots a group of guerillas moving on the north side of the swampy area approximately 200 meters away. You immediately halt and begin to deploy for a hasty ambush facing east across a larger stream along the route you think the enemy forces will take toward Villagton. As you begin to position for the ambush, the enemy force suddenly halts and goes to ground. You are not sure if they have seen you or what they intend to do, but you cannot see them moving away. You attempt to call higher to report, but you cannot get a response.

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, issue your orders to your patrol. Provide a brief rationale for your actions and a sketch of your plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-8, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-Marines.org>.

Decision in the Streets

By Maj David H. Mayhan

Situation

You are the platoon commander for 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6). U.S. forces have been conducting offensive operations as part of a multinational coalition in the desert country of Kartiq. The United Nations coalition is operating under a resolution intended to remove the oppressive Kartiqi dictator from power in order to return stability to the region. Military resistance has been light thus far. While the majority of the Kartiqi population despises their leader, they remain skeptical of American interests in the area. Locals have generally tried to avoid U.S. forces and have not yet demonstrated any open opposition. However, if convinced they were becoming the direct target of military action, they would likely rise up in defense of the homeland. Aware of this fact, the Kartiqi military has increased its presence in urban areas in hopes of drawing the local populace into the conflict.

A week ago the regiment seized the town of Rikala. 1/6 has assumed responsibility for maintaining the town’s security as the remainder of the regiment pushes north. The battalion has subdivided the town into four quadrants with Company A occupying the northwest. The company’s mission is to control Quadrant Alpha in order to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back and reestablishing power. The company has established checkpoints on the outskirts of town, conducted searches of suspected hideouts, and demonstrated its presence with aggressive urban patrolling. Two reaction forces are always available on 10-minute alert: a rifle platoon from your company and a HMMWV-mounted heavy machinegun section from the battalion. Because the United States is at war with Kartiq, the rules of engagement are much less restrictive now than in the past. Servicemembers are authorized to engage the Kartiqi military by any means consistent with the law of war. Nonmilitary personnel observed committing serious crimes will be detained using minimal force necessary. If all reasonable graduated response techniques have been exhausted, and it appears that human life will be lost, deadly force is authorized. Self-defense is always authorized.

Your platoon has been tasked with conducting a patrol through the quadrant in order to deter renewed enemy action and report on suspicious activity. Advancing north along the streets, you observe a crowd of approximately 15 Kartiqi locals about 2 blocks away, engaged in what appears to be an intense argument. As you approach, they cast a few glares your way but otherwise leave you alone. Thinking better than to continue in that direction, you instead turn west and report the situation to higher. After advancing one block to the west, you notice a large open lot to your front and again decide to detour around this potential danger area. Turning north and then west again, you finally find yourself on a safer route.

Your movement standing operating procedure has been a typical “two up, one back” double column. Your lead squads advance along either side of the road, staggered with respect to each other, providing security to the front and opposite flanks. 3d Squad is moving in trace of 1st while also providing rear security. As you come to the next intersection, you treat it as a danger area and manage to get 1st and 2d Squads across safely. As you prepare to cross with 3d Squad, a rifle shot suddenly breaks the silence, and a Marine from 2d Squad crumples to the ground. “Sniper!”

You know the shot came from the north side but can’t tell from which building. The two squads appear to be executing your immediate action drill. 1st Squad scrambles for the southern buildings to provide suppression while 2d Squad conducts an immediate assault to the north, dragging the downed Marine inside. As the squads disappear from view, you hear tremendous fire erupting from the southern buildings. Apparently 1st Squad has run into a fight of its own. “Ambushed!” you think to yourself. You and your 3d Squad are still east of the intersection. You shout to the other two squads but get no response.

Requirement In a time limit of 5 minutes, develop a plan and state what orders you will issue to your squad leaders. Provide a brief rationale for your decision and a sketch of the plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-7, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-Marines.org>.

Reconned by Fire

By Paul Turnan

Situation

Your battalion intends to conduct a night attack on foot tomorrow night from north to south in order to clear the enemy from your zone of operations-an isthmus 2 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers long.

Your four-man fire team and one other team have been assigned to observe and report enemy positions and activity in preparation for tomorrow morning’s attack. The previous night your patrol established an observation post (OP 1) on the forward slope about 50 yards from the crest. Visibility and fields of observation are good across the treeless grassland. Radio communications with battalion and OP 2 is loud and clear. Your position is well-concealed. Between both OPs you have reported to battalion the positions of the enemy as shown on the map. You observe that the enemy position is well-entrenched. The enemy is behaving rather casually, lining up for chow, doing laundry, etc. The enemy dispatched squad-sized patrols to the northeast earlier in the day.

The time is now 1130. You observe a frenzy of activity on the enemy position. The enemy begins to fire on OP 2 with machineguns and small arms. You monitor OP 2’s report to battalion that they have taken casualties. OP 2’s request to battalion for artillery is denied. Looking to the south you can see OP 2 pop smoke. OP 2 goes silent and does not respond to radio calls from battalion. The enemy continues firing. Now enemy rounds begin to impact all over the hillside you occupy. This fire seems random. You are confident that your OP remains undetected, yet enemy fire intensifies. One of your Marines calls out that he’s hit. An enemy round splashes you with dirt. What now?

Requirement

In 2 minutes decide on a course of action, and issue your frag order. Provide a sketch and rationale for your action. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-6, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-marines.org>.

Broken Screen

by Maj Scott E. Ukeiley

Situation

It is 1730 and 1 hour until sunset. You are the Scout/Sniper Platoon Commander, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1). Your battalion is conducting a dismounted movement to contact through an open valley flanked by low ridges. The terrain is rolling with a mixture of wooded and open areas. Scout/sniper platoon is screening 2/1’s northern flank and has established a series of indepth observation posts overlooking the most likely avenues of approach. Your platoon is task organized into two three-man M82A3 .50 caliber special application scoped rifle (SASR) teams and three two-man M40A3 sniper teams that are depicted on the map. You are collocated with Hunter 2. All teams are in good communications with each other and battalion.

Intelligence indicates that a mixture of regular and irregular forces, estimated at battalion strength, occupy the area. These forces possess automatic weapons, mortars, and manportable air defense systems. This last element was a nasty surprise as two Cobras conducting armed reconnaissance were damaged yesterday.

The lead company commander (Echo Company) reports that he has reached the high ground overlooking the valley exit, made visual contact with the enemy, and has not been spotted. Traveling perpendicular to the battalion’s line of march on an unimproved dirt road, the enemy column consists of approximately 80 to 90 infantry. Echo Company is establishing a hasty far ambush and estimates that the enemy will be in his kill zone in 10 minutes.

Just then Hunter 3 reports a platoon of infantry advancing toward his position, approximately 300 meters distant. Hunter 3 is requesting mortar fire to deal with this threat. His fire request has been denied to facilitate Echo Company’s ambush. Just as you are analyzing time and space factors to accomplish your screen mission in light of the enemy proximity to the ridge, the silence is shattered by rapid fire from Hunter l’s M82A3 SASR and M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW). “Infantry, technicals, 100 yards my pos . breaking contact now!” Simultaneously, Hunter 4 reports approximately 30 to 40 men approaching their position from the northwest, 300 yards away.

So much for Echo’s ambush. What now, Lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, detail the orders you give to your platoon and your report to battalion. Provide the rationale for your decisions and a sketch of the plan. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-5, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-marines.org>.

Scout/Sniper Platoon

Task organization

Hunter 1

SASR Team (3 Marines)

1 x M82A3 special application scoped rifle

1 x M249 SAW

1 x M16A2 rifle

Hunter 2

SASR Team (3 Marines)

1 x M82A3 special application scoped rifle

1 x M249 SAW

1 x M 1 6A2 rifle

Hunter 3

M40A3 Team (2 Marines)

1 x M40A3 sniper rifle

1 x M16A2/M203 rifle

Hunter 4

M40A3 Team (2 Marines)

1 x M40A3 sniper rifle

1 x M16A2/M203 rifle

Hunter 5

M40A3 Team (2 Marines)

1 x M40A3 sniper rifle

1 x M I 6A2/M203 rifle

Scout/Sniper Platoon Weapons

The M82A3 SASR is a .50 caliber semiautomatic, magazine fed, shoulder fired weapon equipped with a 10-power scope. The weapon has a maximum effective range of 2,000 yards against vehicle-sized targets. Due to its lack of minute of angle capability, it is not a sniper rifle and considered inaccurate against man-sized targets beyond 600 yards.

The M40A3 sniper rifle is a 7.62mm bolt action, magazine fed, shoulder fired weapon capable of minute of angle accuracy. Coupled with a 10-power scope, the weapon has a maximum effective range against personnel to 1,000 yards.

Battling Terror

by Maj Terry L. Branstetter

Situation

You are the commander of Company B. Your battalion is prosecuting the war on terrorism in the Philippines. The battalion has been conducting company-sized raids from amphibious shipping. You have met with some success, especially since you joined forces with local military and police forces that are sympathetic to your mission. These successes consist of arms seizures and the apprehension of several alleged terrorist leaders.

Today, your company will link up with a squad of local military forces to raid a suspected terrorist training camp on a remote island. The objective is a barracks compound near a small coastal village bordered by vegetation that thickens as you move inland.

Your mission is to seize the objective in order to apprehend potential terrorist personnel and destroy weapons. Your scheme of maneuver is as follows: your 1st Platoon will helicopter into a landing zone (LZ) about 1 mile northeast of the objective. This platoon will link up with a squad of local forces at a nearby cemetery and move along two routes to isolate the objective. One squad will parallel a road to the objective. The remaining members of the reinforced platoon will approach the objective from the east.

You will arrive in a second helicopter wave consisting of 2d Platoon to assault the objective. A third wave consists of one squad from your company reinforced with engineers who will destroy weapons if found. This wave is oncall and will arrive within 20 minutes of your call.

When you are 15 minutes from the LZ, your 1st Platoon commander reports successful linkup with the local squad. Meanwhile, your CH-46 pilot informs you that one of the flight’s four helicopters had to return to the ship. While passing word about the reduced size of your flight, your radio/telephone operator informs you that a squad from 1st Platoon encountered a minefield and has casualties.

Unable to get the 1st Platoon commander on the radio, your flight arrives at the LZ. As the helicopters depart over the coast, you reestablish communications with 1st Platoon to receive the following report. “Six, this is One. 2d Squad has three wounded in action in a minefield near the road. Break. We have taken fire from the objective. One local killed, one wounded. Break. 1st Squad reports three captured; one is wounded and claims to be American. Break. I am currently between my two forces. Over.”

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, explain how you intend to react to this situation. Provide a sketch of your actions and the rationale behind them. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-4, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-6309147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-marines.org>.

Trouble in Barass

by Rittmester Patrik Schaathun, Norwegian Army

Situation

The battalion you command is part of a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) spearheading the United Nations operation in Barass, a Third World country torn apart by civil war. The aim of the operation is to bolster the democratically elected president by preventing insurgents from taking over the country.

The MEB mission of checking the rebel advance on the capital Cucaracha has been achieved by a show of force. A stalemate has occurred and negotiations are ongoing between the insurgents and the democratically elected government. Your interim mission is to disarm all militias in your area of operations (AO) and provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population. The militias are believed to have withdrawn northward out of your AO. Rules of engagement allow you to use deadly force in selfdefense and if met with noncompliance when disarming militias. A minimum of force is to be used.

It is 1800 and the sun is setting. Its rays won’t be seen again until tomorrow at 0600. The battalion is located 30 kilometers (km) north of Cucaracha. Charlie Company has been detached to guard the U.S. Embassy in the capital. Riots have broken out in Cucaracha, and operations to evacuate foreign nationals are pending. Yesterday morning 12 men from Alpha Company were taken hostage while distributing food to locals 20km west of your position. The perpetrators belong to a group called the “Nasty Boys.” Fueled by alcohol and drugs, they are known to have raped, plundered, murdered, and mutilated their way across Barass. Through an intermediary the MEB has been able to get in touch with the group. Demands for the release of the hostages seem unclear and have ranged from cases of beer, weapons, and cell phones to a HMMWV. Intelligence has revealed that the hostages are held in the village of Liessa. Two scout/sniper patrols are on the site and have reported that the hostages are held in building X guarded by eight soldiers manning four sangars (stone breastwork, lookout post) around the house. A platoon-sized unit has been observed in building Y. At least two more platoons are believed to be billeted somewhere in Liessa. A company is billeted in Fubar, a nearby village. Heavy machineguns are located north of Fubar. In both villages civilians roam the streets. The shallow and fast-flowing Kotori River runs westward through mangrove swamps.

Your immediate superior fills you in. “We have it from reliable sources that the hostages are to be transferred to an unknown location tomorrow evening. Between your present location and Liessa we believe there are between six to eight potentially hostile company-sized militias armed with small arms. We have no antiterrorist unit available to support you. You must rescue your Marines before they are moved. Four CH-53s, two AH-lW Super Cobras, and one CH-46 will support your operation.”

Requirement

In a time limit of 20 minutes develop your intent, plan, and tasks to subordinate units. Provide a fragmentary order, overlay of your scheme of maneuver, fire support plan, and the rationale for your actions. Submit your solution to Marine Corps Gazette, TDG #03-3, P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134, fax 703-630-9147, or e-mail <gazette@mca-marines.org>.