Maneuver Warfare Training

Units of the 2d Marine Division, 2d Force Service Support Group, 4th Marine Division,-and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing have been at Camp Pickett, Va., since early September undergoing field training and refining a variety of maneuver warfare concepts.

Subordinate elements involved include Headquarters 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade (6th MAB); Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT 2); 2d and 3d Battalions, 2d Marines; 3d Battalion (-), 24th Marines; nearly 60 tanks from 2d Tank Battalion; more than 50 assault amphibian vehicles from the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion; company sized elements from 2d Reconnaissance Battalion and 2d Engineer Battalion, and Combat Service Support Battalion 22 with a sizable bridging capability from 8th Engineer Battalion.

In addition to extensive weapons firing for troops and classroom work for officers, each battalion had a full week of mechanized-countermechanized training that involved extensive familiarization with LVT and tank operations followed by a three-day war.

From 13-15 October, the 6th MAB, commanded by BGen J. E. Hopkins, conducted a command post exercise coordinated with a free-wheeling regimental level exercise by RLT 2. This training focused on specific aspects of maneuver warfare, such as bridging and river-crossing operations and employment of a mobile combat service support detachment.

During the training, MajGen A. M. Gray, Jr., commanding general of the division, deployed forward with a small “jump command post” element and joined in the field maneuvers to test communications and staff functions during periods of rapid movement.

Maneuver Warfare Board at Lejeune

The 2d Marine Division recently established a Maneuver Warfare Board as a focal point for the tactical ideas now being emphasized throughout the division. MajGen A. M. Gray, commanding general, appointed approximately 15 officers-primarily company and junior field-grade-to the board, which is headed by LtCol Shawn W. Leach, commanding officer of 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. Gen Gray and the commanding generals of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and 2d Force Service Support Group-MajGen K. A. Smith and BGen R. E. Moss, respectively-form the steering committee that oversees the activity.

The board will take the lead in collecting, receiving, and disseminating theoretical and practical information regarding maneuver warfare. Its purpose is to improve upon the understanding of maneuver warfare concepts and encourage their refinement and test in field exercises.

Specific board duties assigned:

  • Publish a reading list of books that provide the historical and theoretical basis for modern maneuver warfare thought.
  • Distribute current articles dealing with maneuver warfare concepts and techniques.
  • Publish terminology associated with maneuver warfare theory.
  • Develop and present a series of lectures and seminars about maneuver warfare.
  • Develop a maneuver warfare training guide.
  • Publish a periodic newsletter to disseminate information on maneuver warfare theory and training.

Mr. William S. Lind-legislative assistant to Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo.), military analyst and frequent contributor to the GAZETTE and other periodicals-visited Camp Lejeune 16-21 August to observe training and discuss maneuver warfare concepts with the officers of all major commands within the division.

Among the background readings first recommended by the board were the following GAZETTE articles:

  • Oct79: Capt S. W. Miller, Winning through maneuver, Part I-Countering the offensive.
  • Dec79: Capt S. W. Miller, Winning through maneuver, Conclusion-Countering the defense.
  • Mar80: William S. Lind, Defining maneuver warfare for the Marine Corps.
  • Sep80 Maj William C. Fite, Some lessons from the Israelis.
  • Apr81: Capt G. I. Wilson, The Maneuver Warfare Concept.

Lind’s latest GAZETTE article, Tactics in Maneuver Warfare, appeared in the Sep81 GAZETTE.

Tactics in Maneuver Warfare

By William S. Lind

Interest in maneuver warfare has been spreading rapidly in the Marine Corps. Almost every issue of the GAZETTE now includes some reference to it. The Commandant has expressed support for it in testimony to Congress.

However, when we come to the subject of tactics, we run into some confusion. Many Marines are asking, “What does maneuver warfare mean in terms of tactics? Do we need to change our basic tactics and if so, how?”

In some cases, these legitimate questions are receiving a dangerously wrong answer:

Maneuver warfare is just a different tactical formula. Instead of attacking frontally, we will attack into the enemy’s flank and rear. Instead of defending a rigid line, we will allow the enemy to penetrate, then counterattack and encircle him. That’s all maneuver warfare means to the tactician.

Flank attacks and elastic defenses are techniques likely to be employed in maneuver warfare. But they are not formulas for maneuver tactics, since maneuver warfare is not a new formula, but a replacement for formulas. In maneuver warfare, the object is to shatter the enemy’s organizational and mental cohesion by creating unexpected and dangerous situations more rapidly than he can deal with them. If our tactics are formulistic, our actions will be predictable. If we are predictable, we will seldom be able to create situations unexpected by the enemy, [dagger]

Thus, all formulas are wrong. How then do we come to understand tactics in maneuver warfare? Are they just a “gut reaction” on the part of the commander? If we cannot follow a tactical recipe book, what do we do?

Perhaps a definition of tactics in maneuver warfare will help. This definition may seem somewhat abstract until we think it through, but since we cannot offer a formula, a certain degree of abstraction is necessary. Let us define maneuver tactics as:

A process of combining two elements, techniques and education, through three mental “filters” or reference points-mission-type orders, the search for enemy surfaces and gaps, and the focus of our own main effort-with the object of producing a unique approach for the specific enemy, time, and place.

Again, this sounds abstract. But as we look at it bit-by-bit, the pieces quickly fall into place:

  • Techniques. Marines are familiar with these. They range from how to fire a weapon, give an order, or make sure the troops are fed up through how to organize an attack, set up a defense, or reconstitute a reserve.

Specific types of offenses or defenses, including the flank attacks and elastic defense mentioned earlier, are not tactics but techniques. Tactics is the process of selecting from among techniques to produce that unique approach for the specific enemy, time, and place.

Some Marines accuse spokesmen for maneuver warfare of incorrectly deemphasizing the importance of techniques. Any such deemphasis would indeed be incorrect. Excellence in techniques is highly important in any style of warfare. What maneuver advocates have correctly condemned is seeing tactics as nothing more than techniques. When we do this, we become formulistic.

Maneuver warfare demands excellence in techniques, but it demands more: creativity and originality in selecting from among and combining techniques. The other elements in our definition-education and the three mental “filters”-are the tools which help us to be creative and imaginative in making our selections and combinations.

  • Education. The officer must be able to see the opportunities in the combat situation facing him. To do so, he must be educated in the art of war. He must have sufficient understanding of military history to be able to put his specific situation into context, to see how the situation looks through his opponents’ eyes, to have some idea about the enemy commander’s thought process. He must understand how to think through his own situation.

This is perhaps the hardest part of our definition to explain clearly, because our goal is not a commander with a mental “checklist,” but one with what the Germans call “a feeling in the tips of his fingers” for his situation and the opportunities in it. Seeing these opportunities is a thought process rooted in a Gestalt-in seeing something as an entity-not in checklist-type analysis.

Study of military history must not be a search for precise analogies, for there are none. Its focus must be not the actions, but the thought process of commanders. The goal is not knowledge, but understanding; not what to think, but how to think. As Gen Hermann Balck has said:

Therefore, one of the first principles has to be: There can be no fixed schemes. Every scheme, every pattern is wrong. No two situations are identical. That is why the study of military history can be extremely dangerous . . . No one thinks of becoming a great painter simply by imitating Michaelangelo. Similarly, you can’t become a great military leader just by imitating so-and-so . . .

  • The three “filters.” These are mental reference points, not rules. They are concepts the commander keeps in the forefront of his mind as he attempts to fashion a unique combination of techniques for his specific situation.

― Mission-type orders. The commander does not expect or attempt to control every action of his subordinates. Nor does he attempt to foresee and plan for every event which will take place. Rather, he determines his intent-what he wants to have happen to the enemy. He makes certain this intent is consistent with the intent of his superiors, and he communicates it clearly to his subordinates.

As the action develops, he supports and expands the local successes of his subordinates, committing his reserve where he perceives the enemy weakest and the chance for success greatest. At times, he will issue detailed orders in order to do this. But in general, he will trust his subordinates’ abilities to make the best decisions as to how to achieve his intent-what techniques to select for their particular unit-within the framework of his guidance and support.

This definition of mission-type orders is somewhat different from the way the term is often used in the Marine Corps. To many Marines, a mission-type order is, “Captain, I want your company to take Hill 432.” This order does not really give the company commander an understanding of the battalion and brigade commanders’ intent-what they want to have happen to the enemy. Nor does it leave the captain much latitude for initiative, especially if intelligence proves wrong or the situation changes.

Marines will need to rethink what they mean by mission-type orders. In fact, they might want to use a different term, such as “intent orders,” to make it clear that this is something new.

― The search for enemy surfaces and gaps. Maneuver warfare seeks to avoid enemy strengths-surfaces-and throw maximum strength against enemy weaknesses-gaps. This can result in something very much like the socalled “von Hutier” tactics of the German 1918 offensive, which were in turn very like German armored warfare tactics in World War II.

But there is a danger here. Von Hutier tactics were appropriate in positional warfare in World War I. Their development into blitzkrieg was appropriate against Poland in 1939, France in 1940, and Russia in 1941. They will be appropriate against some opponents in the future, in some times and places.

But they cannnot be allowed to become formulas. The starting point of the thought process which is tactics cannot be these German techniques. Our starting point must always be the specific strengths and weaknesses of our specific opponent in the time and place in which we face him.

An illustration may be helpful. In the 1950s, the Israelis developed effective tactics against Arab fortified positions. They attacked frontally, got into the trench-works, and engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. This may not sound like maneuver warfare, but it was. The Israelis had identified a specific weakness of their opponent. The Arabs’ lack of social cohesion outside the family made it very difficult for the Arab soldier to show initiative. He had no reason to expect support from those around him. When faced with a melee in the trenches, the Arabs’ cohesion came apart as each soldier looked out only for himself. The Israeli techniques were very different from those of German von Hutier tactics, but the process of tactics was the same.

Thus, we must understand surfaces and gaps on a macro, not just a micro level. The micro level is technique-useful technique-but unless it is relevant to the specific opponent, it is a formula. The techniques which take advantage of the weaknesses of one opponent will run head-on into a different opponent’s strengths. In maneuver warfare, techniques must be formed into tactics in relation to the specific opponent.

― Focus of effort. This is the German concept of Schwerpunkt. It is usually translated as “point of main effort,” but this leads to misunderstanding. It is not a point on a map. The focus of effort is a unit, not a geographic point or a direction. There is always a focus of effort, but there is never more than one at a time. The Schwerpunkt is a conceptual focus of effort which each subordinate commander uses to link his actions, through the intent of his superior, to the actions of those around him. It is the “glue” which permits mission orders to allow initiative without losing cohesion.

Again, an illustration may help. You are the commanding officer of a regiment. You are advancing with two battalions forward, one in reserve. On the basis of our reconnaissance, you believe the enemy is weak in front of the 1st battalion, stronger in front of the 2nd battalion. You designate 1st battalion as the focus of effort. All supporting arms are given to 1st battalion, and the reserve is echeloned behind it. The commander of 2nd battalion asks himself the question, what can I do to help the advance of 1st battalion? All his actions are devoted to that end. So are all the actions of everyone else in the regiment-not following detailed orders from the regimental commander, but on their own initiative.

The focus of effort may shift during the attack. 1st battalion runs into an ambush. But 2nd battalion has launched a supporting attack, intended as a feint, which takes the enemy by surprise and breaks through. Immediately, the regimental commander gives an order, “Focus of effort now with 2nd battalion.” The supporting arms switch their fires to 2nd battalion, the reserves move laterally to echelon behind 2nd battalion, and the axis of advance shifts. Everyone now asks himself, how can I assist the effort of 2nd battalion?

Can we now understand more clearly our definition of tactics? Let us return to our regimental commander. The attack we have just described is successful. He collapses the enemy line of resistance, pocketing one enemy battalion, sending a second plus the enemy reserve fleeing in disorder. He passes the encircled enemy battalion off to a division reserve unit to contain or reduce. He advances until he meets the enemy’s second defense line.

Now he must again think, “What are my tactics here?” He looks at the new situation and asks himself, “What techniques can I employ?” That is, given the factors of METT, the availability of supporting arms, etc., what is the full range of options open to him? He puts his situation in an educated context-how have successful commanders thought through situations like this in the past? He considers his three “filters”: What are the specific strengths and weaknesses of this enemy in this place? What intent does my superior have, and what intent do I communicate to my subordinates? Which unit do I designate as my initial focus of effort?

The answers to these questions are a set of actions, a combination of techniques. But tactics includes the whole thought process, not just the actions. Unless we see tactics as the whole process, we are likely to be reduced to formulas, to techniques applied by the book.

Understanding tactics as a process rather than just a set of actions on the battlefield requires a major mental “shift of gears.” But if we want to do maneuver warfare, it is a necessary shift.

In turn, if we expect Marines to think in a new way, we must change some of the ways the Corps as an institution does business. We must give officers time to read, think, and reflect. We must devote our schools to educating officers in the art of war, not just to more training in techniques. And we must rewrite our FMFMs so they cannot be read as recipe books (a deficiency in the new ECP 9-5, Marine Amphibious Brigade Mechanized and Counter-mechanized Operations).

Maneuver warfare is not a way of moving but a way of thinking. Its essence is well illustrated by the remarks of two generals. The first, Gen Henri Nivelle of the French Army, was the author of the disastrous French offensive of 1917. To garner support for his planned attack, he told the Allied leaders “I have the formula.” In contrast, his opponent, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, said in his memoirs, “There is no panacea. A formula is harmful. Everything must be applied according to the situation.”

Prince Rupprecht’s approach is the one we want to follow.

Maneuver Warfare

By Capt G.I. Wilson, USMCR

MajGen Trainer’s remarks on modern warfare (GAZETTE, Dec80/ Apr81) are convincing, a movement in the right direction, and basically in concert with Bill Lind’s maneuver warfare thinking (GAZETTE, Mar80/ Apr81). . . However, Lind does point out a very basic flaw in the [Trainor] approach to C^sup 3^. Higher level of commands must relinquish subordinate combat commanders from the micromanagement grip of high technology C^sup 3^. We don’t need generals or presidents talking to squad leaders which sophisticated electronics allows us to do with high technology C^sup 3^.

Unless there is an increased reliance on mission order tactics and enhanced trust in subordinates at all levels, the high technology C^sup 3^ will serve only to unwittingly strangle the initiative of combat commanders and subordinates. This is not to say that combat elements will be allowed to run wildly over the battlefield-a true understanding of mission order tactics clearly precludes this. A balance needs to be struck between high technology C^sup 3^ and combat effective C^sup 3^. This can be accomplished by keeping in mind that initiative and maneuverability will be a premium on any battlefield and essential to maneuver warfare. This is a sharp departure from MajGen Trainor’s handling of C^sup 3^, but it is a necessary one. Bill Lind appears to be correct in his approach to C^sup 3^ advocating combat effective C^sup 3^ in contrast to high technology C^sup 3^. . . .

Effective employment of maneuver warfare will depend primarily on the interaction of several factors: (1) reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance effort, (2) mission order tactics, (3) Schwerpunct, (4) extensive training, (5) reliance upon and trust in subordinates, (6) maximum and effective use of artillery, and (7) flexible logistic systems with a fuel-it-fix-itforward thinking. It must be emphasized, however, that these are only factors requiring interaction, not a cookbook formula for maneuver warfare.

Maneuver Warfare

By Maj K. L. Thompson

Col Brown freely admits that his “outline of a revised mission orientation and structure is by no means a complete picture, . . .” Nevertheless, I would recommend that it be given a most thorough review at appropriate decision-making levels to ascertain its true merit vis-a-vis our present mid/long range plans. I make this point because I have formed a distinct impression over the last several years, that the Marine Corps lacks a comprehensive, fully integrated, “living” mid/long range planning cycle. I share to some extent, the concerns of Maj K. W. Estes (Paradigm Changes Mar81) when he states, “Improvisations upon the traditional methods are attempted, but with unsatisfactory results.” Efforts to prepare the Corps for the future, be it doctrine, systems acquisition, etc. sometimes bring to my mind a picture of a city with a number of parallel avenues, all eventually ending in a large park. Down these parallel avenues, but isolated from each other, march interest groups with signs representative of their programs-LAV, LVTX, MCATF, FLS, HXM, etc.-the list is endless. As each group reaches an intersection (representative of period transitions, program milestones, whatever) they get a brief glimpse down cross streets of the other interest groups in their like march toward “year 2000 park.” Finally all groups reach the park, but is the product progress or chaos? In the park there may be over 100 acres of containers yet we now favor maneuver warfare with its lack of large fixed installations (a la Vietnam). The HXM may be fully developed upon the “traditional methods” of its predecessor the CH-46 yet it lacks adequate lift and survivability to be a truly viable asset. The LAV and the LVTX may both be operational yet doctrine to integrate and maximize their utility is lacking and personnel to maintain the large numbers of vehicles (each program wanted) aren’t available. We may have elaborate (mega-dollar) C^sup 3^I systems which unfortunately don’t interface well with a high mobility, maneuver warfare situation. Again, this list of developmental (both doctrine and equipment) dichotomies could go on but I hope the point is made.

Col Brown’s article may not be the panacea for our future yet it represents a bold, imaginative departure from our present “product improvement” approach. I believe there is a need for a Marine Corps and this need will increase in the future. However, to paraphrase Col Brown’s words, if anphibious assault and sustained land warfare form the basis of a ‘status quo’ Marine Corps, I can see no window to that future.

The ‘Maneuver Warfare’ Concept

by Capt G. I. Wilson

The term “maneuver warfare” is finding its way into the vocabulary of Marines and is appearing more frequently in journal articles. Several recent articles in the GAZETTE have touched upon the aspects of maneuver war and are discussed herein. Although the concept of maneuver warfare is not a current development in military thinking, it holds promise of fostering a dramatic reconceptualization of the “style” of modern day warfare. What is involved is really a question of maneuver warfare versus firepower-attrition warfare. Interest in the maneuver style of warfare is being generated by the increased likelihood that Marines will engage an adversary numerically superior in personnel and equipment.

What does maneuver warfare mean to the Corps? What does the maneuver style of war hold in store for Marines? These questions were best addressed by William Lind in his GAZETTE (Mar80) feature, Defining maneuver warfare for the Marine Corps. Lind’s presentation should be read, reread, and weighed carefully by all Marines both Regulars and Reserves, for the concept of maneuver warfare may be the very essence of the Corps’ future. The firepower-attrition approach with its “artillery conquers and infantry occupies” thinking cannot be employed effectively in scenarios where the enemy has numerical and materiel superiority. What, then, is this “maneuver warfare” concept that offers the most viable alternative to firepower-attrition concepts?

The key element of maneuver warfare is the disruption and disorganization of the enemy rather than a fixation with the kill-this-and-kill-that syndrome. The maneuver style of war is more psychological in its destruction of the enemy, whereas firepower-attrition war is more physical. With maneuver warfare, the precept is to create for the enemy as many unanticipated and threatening situations as possible, while at the same time seeking out tactical advantages on the battlefield. This seeking out of advantages will require the use of opportunity tactics coupled with bold aggressive action and individual initiative. Marines employing maneuver warfare concepts will have to possess the capability to go anywhere on the battlefield they, choose, creating a myriad of rapid, unexpected, and threatening events for the enemy as they go.

By creating a rapid sequence of unanticipated multiple events to which the enemy cannot react effectively or keep up with, the enemy’s cohesion is shattered. The enemy perceives he has lost control and becomes the victim of disruption, confusion, and disorganization. This rapid chain of unexpected events, which the enemy finds impossible to cope with effectively, is in concert with the “Boyd Theory” as described by Lind in his previously mentioned article.

In addition to creating this turbulent environment which overloads the enemy’s “observation-decision-action cycle,” maneuver warfare requires that reserves be used to reinforce success and exploit opportunity tactics. To accomplish this the combat commander (especially at the lower unit level) will need to have the ability to take well calculated risks when the opportunity arises. Maj W. C. Fite’s prize article in the GAZETTE (Sep80) addresses this very matter of calculated risks when writing about the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF):

Gen Ariel Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal in the October War of 1973 is an excellent example. Sharon’s actions are still debated even in Israel, where calculated risk-taking is almost an art form; however, it is difficult to argue with success. A week after crossing the canal the Israelis had surrounded and isolated the Egyptian Third Army of 300 tanks and 20,000 men. No gambler wins all the time, but the IDF has demonstrated that bold, unexpected moves can bring success against seemingly great odds. Israeli leaders dare to make the moves. We should note, too, that although the IDF has not been fettered by careerism, no nation has shown more concern for its own war casualties than Israel. Though inhibited, they continue to take risks because they know the value of surprise and they know that caution can be very costly to the side with fewer numbers.

However, as Maj Fite observes, this “dare to risk” approach is all too often dampened by careerism, and being careful becomes paramount:

A critical difference in the two systems, however, is that advancement in the IDF is based largely on initiative and competence in battle; in the U.S. Armed Forces a clean or “zero-defects” record may be the most common criterion for promotion. The importance of a nearflawless record of performance in the Fleet Marine Forces is greater than for other duty and greater still for performance while commanding in the Fleet Marine Forces. Our officer-assignment policy allows only brief, widely spaced opportunities to command in the Fleet Marine Forces, and command in combat is rarest of all. The message is clear to many; BE CAREFUL!

As a consequence of the “be careful” mentality, Marine officers may run the risk of nurturing a bureaucratic mindset. Training today is conducted within a bureaucratic/political structure with all its governmental and environmental regulations. It is quickly perceived that whatever keeps the political/bureaucratic structure tranquil in training is also acceptable in combat. This bureaucratic/political compliance may prove disasterous for some. Suppose a Marine is restricted from digging a fighting hole in training for fear of disturbing some endangered species, the consequence of which would be an environmental violation. That same Marine in combat may fail to construct an adequate fighting hole. The “endangered species” at that point would be the Marine. The bureaucratic structure unwittingly undermines the efficiency of military training. Josiah Bunting in the September 1980 issue of Harper’s magazine accentuates this bureaucratic barb when writing of Marine boot camp training:

Only in combat can the efficacy of a military training program possibly be proved, but even then the connection between recruit training and disciplined enterprise can be inferred only tenuously. Boot camp cannot instill valor. It can at best habituate a young Marine to a certain kind of stress (that which approximates the erratic, capricious, wildly oscillating stresses of combat); but it is just this kind of stress that, paradoxically, the dogged rationalization of all aspects of boot camp at Parris Island, imposed by the reforms, has removed from training.

The military officer who becomes a product of the bureaucratic training and political compliance will be conditioned to cover his “six” with a paper trail. At the very best in combat, he will probably be reluctant “to dare to risk” maneuver warfare. And even worse, bureaucratic training and political compliance may have made it all but impossible to distinguish a competent commander from an incompetent one without the existence of combat.

In addition to the bureaucratic and political environment, careerism has restricted real leaders, eliminated strategists, and made management supreme. More often than not, Marine leaders generally end up managing Marines and leading things, when in fact they should be leading Marines and managing things. The management approach does lend itself to a degree of efficiency, but inevitably the conflict of managerial efficiency versus combat effectiveness emerges. What generally occurs is managerial efficiency deteriorates combat effectiveness. Our present day dilemma is best summed up by Dr. Edward Luttwak of Georgetown University: “We end up with gross materials to fight stupid.”

To be effective in combat, where a Marine unit will likely be pitted against an adversary with a preponderance of combat power, may require the adoption of the maneuver warfare concept. The characteristics of the battlefield of the future will include great speed and destruction; see-and-hit weapons of extreme accuracy; and lightweight, highly mobile weapon systems. Freedom of movement on the battlefield will be enhanced, and distances will become less important with advances in technology. To cope with the characteristics of future battlefields, it may be necessary to consider an alternative to the firepower-attrition style of warfare. The answer will be maneuver, for firepower-attrition will not measure up to the challenge.

Does the Corps lend itself to the maneuver warfare concept? Yes, it does, given its fairly small size, flexibility (land, sea, and air capabilities) and present technology favoring lightweight, highly mobile weapons. When considering maneuver war in terms of the Corps, attention should also be directed to the areas of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, command and control, combined arms, EW, air assets, NBC, mines, countermine measures, and flexible logistical systems.

Undoubtedly flexible logistical systems will be an essential and extremely important aspect of the maneuver warfare concept. The fast pace of future battle arenas will demand expeditious logistical support as events develop spontaneously. Capt R. C. Stout emphasizes the logistical aspect of warfare in the GAZETTE, Nov80:

Marines must recognize that the logistical dimension of warfare is, at least, on an equal footing with the operational, technological, and social dimensions. If we are to suceed in future combat, the Marine Corps’ logistics system must be maintained, and specialized, highly qualified, logistics officers must be available to cope with the vast array of problems that occur in this area.

There cannot be any doubt of the tremendous importance of the flexible logistical dimension of maneuver war.

The officer corps will need to possess this same flexibility in its thinking. For the maneuver warfare concept to be effective, a reeducation of our officers will be necessary. Col J. C. Studt touched upon this when he wrote (GAZETTE, Jun80) of Lind’s remarks:

Mr. Lind’s article on maneuver warfare in the March GAZETTE was brilliant and thought provoking . . . I’m struck with the magnitude of what he is suggesting, which is far more than merely shifting emphasis from firepower-attrition to maneuver tactics. He is proposing a dramatic reeducation of our officer corps to develop a much higher level of self-reliance, individual initiative, and creative thinking which will result in flexible command on the battlefield.

Along with flexible command and logistics, the need to develop the Marine’s ability to perform independently on the spur of the moment and use his individual initiative will be indispensable in the scheme of maneuver warfare. Combat commanders will have to use initiative, aggressively seize opportunities, and issue mission type orders to subordinates to impose a turbulent environment on the enemy. Once the enemy perceives that he can no longer influence the action effectively, he is beaten. This is often more psychological than physical. Yet, the nemesis of maneuver warfare may be the micromanagement of the bureaucratic training structure. LtCol D. J. Myers bracketed the problem (GAZETTE, Nov80):

The modern battlefield more than ever requires leaders at all levels to exercise initiative and aggressiveness. Leaders who are not allowed to practice this in peacetime will not know how to do it in war. They will await orders because that is what they have been trained to do.

With the Corps deploying units to various parts of the world and the increased probability of Marines facing a numerically superior force, maneuver warfare may offer the only substantial hope of success in combat. It will be up to the individual Marine leader to act immediately upon receipt of mission type orders. The concept of maneuver warfare is generally thought of in terms of armor and this can be misleading. Maneuver warfare can be applied to the infantry. Mechanization alone does not necessarily mean maneuver warfare. It is important to remember what William Lind considers a key to comprehending maneuver warfare:

A key to understanding maneuver war is to realize that not all movement is maneuver. Maneuver is relational movement. Maneuver is not a matter simply of moving or even of moving rapidly. Maneuver means moving and acting consistently more rapidly than the opponent.

Moreover, maneuver warfare can logically be applied to the Corps’ amphibious capability. There are third world scenarios where an amphibious projection of combat power within a maneuver warfare concept would prove extremely valuable, even if only deterrent in nature. Gen Barrow in the AFJ (Nov80) pointed out the following:

True usefulness of amphibious capability begins with the deterrent aspects, even from the day of loading out. Because there’s no accurate forecast of where you’re going and what you’re going to do, and there’s no dependence on bases and overflight rights that require your commitment to be one that you can’t call back. The deterrence aspects of being in a given region or nearby a scene of some crisis merits better understanding. A decision to conduct an amphibious operation is always done with a full understanding that you’re going to have air superiority, and that you’re going to land in a place and time of our choosing, not the enemy’s. You do not choose to land where he’s strongest-you choose to land where he is weakest and where he’s less likely to reinforce quickly.

The Marine Corps must anticipate combat against forces steeped in Soviet doctrine, superior in numbers and materiel, and with logistical support near at hand. Even though outnumbered, Marines can with the maneuver warfare concept exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities and win decisively. The time is now for actively accepting, teaching, and training for maneuver warfare. What is desperately needed is a doctrinal publication on maneuver warfare, a manual of maneuver warl To be sure, the Marine Corps does succinctly address maneuver warfare in Operational Handbook (OH) 9-3A, Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces. However, the treatment of maneuver warfare is extremely brief, inadequate, and isolated from the rest of the text. OH 9-3A does contain the necessary “nuts and bolts” and “how to” material to organize a MCATF. Where OH 9-3A fails is in its handling of the manuever warfare concept itself. What one ends up with is only half of the equation. A complete doctrine of maneuver war must be developed. In conjunction with the development of a maneuver doctrine and publication, serious consideration needs to be given to the wheeled combat vehicle and the permanent integration of Marine infantry with tracked vehicles (LVTs). The development of “formulas” and “rules” for maneuver war, however, must be discouraged. Such an approach to maneuver warfare would serve only to impede the initiative of combat commanders at the lower unit level where initiative is needed most in the doctrinal scheme of maneuver war.

The psychological barriers of “play it safe,” “be careful,” and “avoid obvious risk” are significant and pose the greatest threat to doctrinal acceptance in the immediate future. There is a “clear and present danger” that Soviet expansionism will attempt to profit from the turmoil in the Third World and that U.S. national interests will be severely threatened. We can no longer afford to wait to develop an effective maneuver warfare capability. We need it now. Let’s get on with it!

>>>Editors Note: Col John E. Greenwood

At least a partial answer to Capt Wilson’s call for more comprehensive maneuver warfare doctrine will be found in a new instructional booklet just published by the Education Center at Quantico for student use and field consideration.

ECP 9-5 Marine Amphibious Brigade Mechanized and Counter-mechanized Operations, which was approved by MajGen B. E. Trainor on 20 January 1981, is subdivided into three main chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the initial employment-the ship-to-shore movement and establishment ashore-of a mechanized force of MAB size. Chapter 2 discusses how the mechanized MAB would defend the force beachhead. Chapter 3 covers offensive operation.

A listing of a few of the principles stressed throughout the manual will serve to indicate the extent to which maneuver warfare concepts are incorporated:

  • The primary objective of the force employed must be the destruction of the enemy’s combat cohesiveness. (High priority is to be given to destroying enemy air defense units, engaging enemy command and control elements, separating enemy infantry from his tanks, and attacking combat service support elements.)
  • The enemy must be exposed to the full combined array of our weapons and potential threats. Stereotyped operations must be avoided.
  • The commander must anticipate battlefield chaos and be prepared to maneuver in spite of it. He must be able to mass und disperse his forces quickly and react rapidly to the changing situation.
  • Command and control must be decentralized at all levels and maximum reliance placed on mission orders.
  • Commanders, their control elements, and many service support elements must be as mobile as assault elements.

Numerous other principles thrust in the same direction as the examples above. Although the text runs only to 37 pages, it is an extremely good treatment of maneuver warfare concepts and suggests in a tangible, realistic manner how they might be employed in Marine amphibious operations.

By LtCol Michael D. Wyly

I receive a disquieting signal whenever I hear a briefing on a Marine Corps exercise that uses the computer, TWSEAS (Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation and Analysis System), to measure the would-be casualties. It is that perhaps we have lost sight of the important measure of good tactics. We seem to be focusing on the wrong thing. The signal comes whenever I hear an officer saying, “our air strike will attrite their armor” or “our forces have been attrited.”

The problem is one of both English and tactics. To try to make a verb out of attrite, which cannot be properly used as such,* is ineffectual (and discordant!). But the disquietment comes with the realization that the officer’s tactical sense may be equally ineffectual. We may have to live with bad English, but bad tactics will kill us.

“Attriting the enemy” too often becomes the central activity toward which every effort is directed. Tactics are ineffectual when they focus on the wrong objective. After all, a force that is attrite but full of tenacity and wisely employed is more formidable than an opposing force, fresh, without attrition, but timid and unwisely employed against a poorly selected objective.

Attrition is not even relevant to winning or losing. It is but one of many factors that bear on the course of war. Our war games should focus on meaningful things, such as destruction, not attrition. We destroy the enemy when we destroy his will to resist. We will need much more than attrition to destroy his will, unless he is woefully short on resolve.

The computer is a valuable tool that can be adapted to measure the things that count in battle. Unless we can so adapt it, TWSEAS may well be a hindrance rather than a help in teaching tactics.

If we are amusing ourselves with bean counts of friendly and enemy casualties in our exercises, we are guilty of the same crime for which I blame commanders who ordered their troops to risk their lives counting dead enemy bodies in the Vietnam War. The name of the crime is waste. The count doesn’t mean anything. Where you strike the enemy does. By skillfully selecting objectives, you can throw him off balance so that he can’t pick himself back up. You can destroy him by attacking his command and control or his logistic lifeline. You cannot destroy him by attrition.

*Attrite is an adjective. It means “worn down.” It also has a meaning in Christian theology. An attrite spirit is remorse for one’s sins that arises from motives lower than that of the love for God. A contrite spirit is the perfect sorrow, i.e., remorse for having sinned against God.*

The key is concentrating on the right objective. When we attack our objective, we most certainly must in-flict casualties ruthlessly. We may have to accept as many casualties as we inflict. What counts is that we destroy the enemy in the right place and control something that he cannot do without. Then, when he is off bal-ance, we may exploit and pursue until he is defeated beyond recovery.

I wonder whether anyone supposes that the Soviet Union would be dis-couraged by attrition. If ever they are, it will be the first time in their history. If we are going to fight a war of attrition with the Soviets, we are not likely to win. Their population exeeds ours by more than 40 million.

How crucial is attrition to a U.S. unit? Is it important that we hook up a computer to find out whether our units will lose 10, 30, or 60 percent. Such statistics are helpful in planning for replacements; however, I submit that if such statistics preoccupy us, we are in trouble already. War means casualties. The next war will probably mean more casualties at a greater rate than the last one. We had best engen-der the spirit that will keep our of-ficers and men fighting, even when their ranks have been thinned.

Let us consider history. The Soviet Union lost 8.6 percent of its popula-tion, killed, in World War II. Some 13 percent of its population had been mobilized and 34 percent of those mobilized were killed. The Soviet Union did not lose its will to resist. Germany did. Germany’s casualties were lighter, whether you measure percentage killed or raw numbers. Germany lost only 5 percent of its population, killed. Of the 14 percent that was mobilized, only 31 percent died. In raw numbers, 3,250,000 Ger-man soldiers were killed in action or died of wounds, compared to 7,500,000 Russian soldiers, who met the same fate. No matter how you look at it, then, the Soviet Union, the winner, suffered more casualties than Germany, the loser. The statistics show that higher casualties do not mean defeat, even though I have made no attempt to point out that Germany’s somewhat lighter casual-ties were inflicted by British and Americans on the western front, as well as by the Soviets. Although Germany singlehandedly inflicted tremendous casualties on the Soviets, she failed to find and strike the decisive point. The Soviets’ will to win never faltered.

How do we Americans stand up under casualties? At Chosin, between 27 November and 15 December 1950, the strength of the 1st Marine Division fell from 25,473 to 19,520, a net loss of 5,953 men. Yet, these Marines’ will and resilience while fighting outnumbered stand to remind us of the real meaning of tenacity. On Guadalcanal the 1st Marine Division was, by December 1942, worn down by four months of fighting in the jungle. The tremendous expenditure of Japanese lives that figured in the process of inflicting attrition on our Marines was wasted, however, because the 2d Marine Division and the Americal replaced the 1st with fresh men and equipment. The Japanese could not sustain their operation. They finally evacuated the island, not because of attrition, but because they had lost control of the surrounding seas. They had been defeated at the decisive point. All else, as a result, gave way.

History bears out, then, that casualties have not led to American defeats. This in no way relieves a commander of the responsibility to conserve the lives of his men. He conserves them by attacking only against wisely selected objectives. In this way, the lives that are lost, are not wasted.

Did attrition defeat us in Vietnam? One thing is certain. Attrition did not defeat the North Vietnamese, who lost far more men that we did. Our Marines unquestionably had still the will to resist, right through the day of their departure. If attrition broke the American will at home, we ought to consider a bit of Napoleon’s philosophy. That is, never enter a war that you are unwilling to see through to its successful conclusion, even when winning means expenditure of resources. Great Britain made this mistake in 1775 when she began a war for those colonies, for which she was unwilling to expend the resources required to win.

If indeed, then, we mean to place great emphasis on the body count or how the computer “attrites” our forces, we probably should not be tampering with a thing so demanding as war. If we have become preoccupied with thought of attrition, we would be better off drafting our surrender instead of preparing to fight. For if we do not win, and we will not without being strong in the face of losses, then attrition will amount only to waste.

I use the term, body count, because I hope that it emphasizes the folly of the attrition game. I do not, however, mean that the folly of the game stops at counting bodies. Counting dead tanks, downed aircraft, or damaged artillery is equally misleading. In the 1973 War, Israelis repaired disabled Egyptian tanks and put them to use against their enemies. Likewise, German and British tanks changed hands between both sides in the North African desert in 1942. Our country’s abortive raid in Iran in 1980 failed as a direct result of our preoccupation with numbers of men and machines. The victory goes to the side that has the resilience to replace and repair its losses, or do without. It goes to the side that can use the enemy’s equipment against him and that knows where to strike to destroy the enemy’s will.

Nothing that purports to measure success in combat, no TWSEAS, no computer, no controller, no war game, is worth its cost if it ignores the value of surprise, deception, attacking the flank as contrasted against the front, striking weak points compared to strong. One should look intently at the value of an attack on the enemy’s command and control with electronic warfare, and the effects on us if he attacks ours.

Do we need to count casualties to learn how to employ economy of force? Of course not. You apply economy of force by keeping your reserves out of the battle until the decisive moment.

Napoleon said to find a single point, the decisive point, concentrating our power there to create a situation where the “equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing.” Clausewitz said “in war, the aim is to disarm the enemy.” Sherman said to put the enemy “on the horns of a dilemma.” All three saw their principles applied against their enemies, whose forces crumbled. Let us use the war game and the computer, therefore, not to count casualties. Instead, let them help us to discover where the decisive point is, what disarms our enemy when denied him, and what dilemma can put him on its horns.

As for attrite as a verb, let us not politely discourage its use. Pounce on it. Jump up and down on it. Forbid its mention. And, destroy it.

By William S. Lind

MajGen Trainor’s article, New thoughts on war, Dec80 GAZETTE makes some good points. His warning against attrition warfare is particularly important, since many Marine officers seek guidance from Army FMs, which express a firepower-attrition doctrine. Some Marines may absorb a firepowerattrition mind-set from these FMs without realizing they are doing so.

However, a few questions do need to be raised about some of Gen Trainor’s views:

  • The Initiative. If understood in terms of the Boyd theory-maintaining a more rapid observation-orientation-decision-action cycle than the opponent-the initiative is a useful concept. Gen Trainor clearly understands it in this way. But if we use the term “the initiative” to mean the Boyd cycle, we run the risk of being misunderstood. Some may understand the term in more traditional senses, such as keeping pressure on the enemy at all times, or maintaining the offensive. In those senses, Pickett had the initiative one afternoon at Gettsyburg and Haig had it at the Somme, which is not what anyone (including, I’m certain, Gen Trainor) is recommending. If we put new wine in old bottles, we risk having it mistaken for old wine.
  • Intelligence. Intelligence is of course important, and Gen Trainor correctly notes it must go beyond the usual order of battle to include an understanding of the psychology and personality of the opponent. But every intelligence officer should have a sign on his door reading, “The more you depend on intelligence, the more vulnerable you are to surprise.” The key word here is “depend.” If you structure your operations plan, locate your reserve, and establish your center of gravity (Schwerpunkt) solely on the basis that intelligence says, “The enemy will attack frontally,” and he hits you in the flank instead, you may be in trouble. You need to structure both to take advantage of your intelligence and to maintain a high degree of agility to deal with/take advantage of the unexpected. The two requirements are often in tension, but that is why war is an art, not a science.
  • Maneuver. I must disagree with Gen Trainor when he defines maneuver as “physically disposing the enemy at a disadvantage to himself and an advantage to us.” This definition is too narrow, in that it fails to portray maneuver as a continuous, psychological as well as physical process. It is also unclear, in that it could be read to mean, “maneuver is getting the enemy in a position most advantageous to my firepower, and least advantageous to his.”

Maneuver is best understood as a continuous process of change in both reality and appearance whereby the enemy’s actions and counteractions are rendered irrelevant in time and place. Both Gen Trainor’s definition and the definition of maneuver as getting into good firing positions are valid subsets of maneuver warfare, but they cannot be seen as its entirety.

  • Combined arms. Let me here suggest some definitions: Combined arms is hitting the enemy with two or more weapons, systems or arms simultaneously, in such a manner that the actions he must take to avoid one make him more vulnerable to another. In contrast, supporting arms is hitting the enemy with two or more weapons, systems or arms in sequence, or if simultaneously, then in such a manner that the actions he must take to avoid one also protect him against the others.

Gen Trainor’s discussion of combined arms reflects the tendency in the Marine Corps to call both of these phenomena combined arms. This is even more evident at Twentynine Palms where the so-called “combined arms exercises” are focused on what I define as supporting arms. Yet the distinction between the two is critical, because from the opponent’s standpoint, they are very different. Combined arms puts the enemy on the horns of a dilemma, and is thus qualitatively different. It not. only increases his physical problems, it also pulls him apart psychologically. If Marines understand the difference between combined and supporting arms clearly (as some analysts believe the Soviets do), they will be in a better position to achieve true combined arms, and thus make more effective use of their firepower.

I must also disagree with Gen Trainor’s statement that, “battle itself must be sought, because war is a killing game . . . only physical punishment (will break the enemy’s will to resist).” This cannot be stated as a rule, because whether it is valid or not depends on the specific opponent. Some opponents will only break after being punished physically, but for others, being outmaneuvered may suffice. How successful would Rommel have been at Caporetto if he had followed a rule that said he had to force the Italians to fight? How often in the Chinese civil war did whole units change sides? War is not a killing game, it is a game to defeat the enemy, which may or may not require much killing, depending on circumstances.

  • C^sup 3^. Gen Trainor has not addressed the dilemma facing C^sup 3^: better C^sup 3^ enables higher levels of command to be better informed and to exercise greater control, but maneuver warfare requires giving subordinate commanders greater latitude. We cannot use C^sup 3^, when it is available, to exercise detailed control of subordinates, then expect these same subordinates to operate independently, showing initiative, when it breaks down. And it is not clear centralized control is desirable even when it is feasible. We need to make a conceptual choice: centralized control through high-technology C^sup 3^, or mission-orders tactics. Gen Trainor presents both as a continuum. They are not; they are in tension, because commanders have great difficulty in giving subordinates sufficient latitude when the means of control are readily at hand.

Finally, I suggest there is a danger in saying, “superiority in the six factors of modern warfare will lead to victory.” The only formula for victory is to recognize there are no formulas. Everything must be relational to the specific opponent in the specific time and place. We can develop understandings of what generally leads to success, but not formulas or check lists. We must see tactics as a process, combining learned techniques with an educated understanding of the art of war, all applied in a unique way to the unique circumstance that is each opponent, each battle. This is not a prescription for a “gut reaction” approach to the battlefield, for a view that says, “since there are no formulas, each commander’s hunch is as valid as any other approach.” Rather, it is a call for education as opposed to rote training, for developing the “sense” for opportunities and enemy weaknesses so often shown by German commanders. Not every officer can do it. But as Gen Balck has remarked, “In the last analysis, military command is an art: one man can do it and most will never learn. After all, the world is not full of Raphaels either.”

By MajGen B.E. Trainor

True to form, Bill Lind has contributed to the dialogue on war in the modern world. I am grateful for Mr. Lind’s development of the thoughts expressed in my essay on the six factors of warfare. I view most of his comments as an extension of the essay rather than a contradiction. For example, there is nothing incompatible between “physically disposing the enemy at a disadvantage to himself and an advantage to us” and rendering the enemy’s actions and counteractions “irrelevant in time and place.” Likewise, the combined arms “factor” is meant to include more than supporting arms (hence my inclusion of EW). It is weapons plus technique of employment.

I do have a problem with Mr. Lind’s treatment of the C^sup 3^ “factor.” Good C^sup 3^ does not necessarily inhibit subordinate commanders, but it can prevent units running nilly-willy over the battlefield. As for my view that war is a “killing game,” I plead guilty to being a hostage of my Service. Marines never seem to fight enemies who capitulate when the rules of chess would so dictate. Until we do, I still think it’s wiser for an enemy to know that we intend to kill him, not psych him.

Curriculum Clarified

By LtCol Michael D. Wyly

I heartily applaud Maj William C. File’s article in the September GAZETTE, Some lessons from the Israelis. As Head, Tactics Division, Amphibious Warfare School (AWS), I have recommended it to every tactics instructor and student.

The article’s one flaw results from no fault of Maj Fite. The AWS of today is much improved over the AWS that Maj Fite may have attended. His article, therefore, is out of touch with what AWS is teaching.

Liddell-Hart’s Strategy of the Indirect Approach is a basic reference that every student is familiar with. Maneuver warfare and firepower-attrition are part of every instructor’s vocabulary. In January 1980, we conducted our first free-play exercise. There were no school solutions. Students produced no staff documents. They’made tactical decisions. Winners and losers were declared regardless of whether they represented the U.S. side or the enemy’s. The exercise will be repeated this year with some added sophistication. This was but one of several exercises in whch we abandoned the school solution (the old “yellow”) in favor of more subjective form of evaluating student work.

Principles of war are weighed and discussed all year, not forgotten about after a two-hour lecture. The acronym MOOSEMUSS is never mentioned. Students learn how J.F.C. Fuller’s list of principles evolved. They write essays on the principles, comparing them with events in required readings, including O’Ballance’s No Victor No Vanquished, Heinl’s Victory at High Tide, and Chew’s account of the Russo-Finnish War.

Some Lessons from the Israelis

By Maj William C. Fite

The 1980 Bevan G. Cass Award

The Middle East is not a new hotspot. Israel and her Arab neighbors have fought four wars there since the end of World War II. More recent events, such as the revolution in Iran, the seizure of Americans in Tehran, the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have underscored the volatility of the region. At the same time, more and more Americans have come to recognize the economic importance of the Middle East to the U.S. and the Western World. We must have oil, and although few believe we could take it by force, a growing number of American leaders acknowledge that the U. S. might have to fight to maintain the right to buy the oil essential to national survival. The need for U.S. Marines to look to their readiness could hardly be more clear.

Combat readiness is the ability to get somewhere quickly and fight effectively. Because moving quickly is easy to test, we have always been good at it. Some Marines even make the mistake of thinking that moving out in a hurry is all that readiness demands. In fact, fighting effectively is more important, but it is not easy to measure before the shooting starts.

Combat effectiveness is a product of materiel and human factors. The materiel factors include weapons, equipment, supplies, and facilities. We are fortunate that ours are among the world’s best, because in the short run their development and supply are pretty much fixed. Most Marines can only maintain, not improve, our material readiness. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and his staff make hard choices every day between more weapons now and better weapons later, but today’s Marines will fight with what we have.

Human factors of combat effectiveness are both tangible and intangible. Marines themselves are tangible. We would like to have more of them, but, like weapons and equipment, they take time to produce, and for many months, if need be, we will fight with what we have. Other, intangible human factors are of vital importance to combat effectiveness. They include spirit, tactics, military skills, and leadership, to name a few. Because these qualities and subjects are hard to measure, we cannot always be as certain about them as we can about our equipment.

Are we ready? Marines are always ready, more or less-depending on the terrain and the situation, as our instructors like to say. In the Middle East the terrain is tank country. Our enemy there will most probably be formidable in his numbers, his arms, and his zeal to destroy us. He may have recent combat experience, and he will probably know the ground well. Unless we can imagine the United States starting the fighting, we may expect to find that the enemy has the initiative. The threat of nuclear war and world economic chaos will rapidly build pressure for a ceasefire, putting a premium on early battle success and reducing the relevance of national industrial staying-power.

Well, no one promised us a rose garden. The contest could be close, to say the least, just as the October War of 1973 was for a time very close for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Despite being caught by surprise, they fought back against desperate odds on two fronts to gain the upper hand militarily by the time of the cease-fire. In this remarkable feat, no less than in the 1948, 1956, and 1967 Israeli victories, the margin of success was due more to human than to materiel factors.

The IDF experiences hold lessons in combat effectiveness for U.S. Marines. Facing parity or disadvantage in materiel factors, we must work to gain advantage in human factors. We must outthink and outfight the enemy. Marines have done so before, but not recently, and not in the Middle East. Using Israeli examples, let us remind ourselves of some fundamentals:

* Know the theories of warfare. Opportunities in war, as in chess, are inherent. They exist, though they may not be seen. The advantage belongs not so much to the strongest or the brightest, but to the side which sees and takes the better opportunity. In chess, to continue my analogy, a knowledge of the theory of the game is necessary to compete with the best. One does not become a serious player merely by learning the rules, the inventory of pieces, and the powers of the pieces; yet we sometimes seek skill in our professsion through a similar approach.

Officers in Marine Corps schools study Marine Corps organization, equipment, and doctrine. They spend an hour or two on the “principles of war” (conveniently reduced to the acronym MOOSEMUSS), but they do not analyze military history, and they do not study theories of warfare, either classical or current. One result is that most Marines know little about maneuver warfare, in which the goal is the psychological defeat of the enemy through movement in relation to the enemy and his purposes. Our doctrine emphasizes the physical destruction of the enemy through firepower, a method known as firepower-attrition warfare-though most Marines are not familiar with the term.

In contrast, IDF doctrine is based on a full appreciation of maneuver-warfare theory as it evolved through the writings of J.F.C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, Heinz Guderian, and others. Early Israeli military leaders and thinkers, such as Yigael Yadin, were especially influenced by Hart’s theory of the “indirect approach” and his assertion that “the real target in war is the mind of the enemy commander, not the bodies of his troops.” Theory soon turned to practice on the battlefield. In The Arab-Israeli War, 1948, military historian Edgar O’Ballance said:

The accepted strategy of the indirect approach, so obvious and so simple once the lesson has been driven home, had to be painfully learnt by the Israelis before Latrun, but once they mastered the technique much of their success was due to skillful use of it. The full value of mobility was quickly appreciated by the young Israeli commanders. Lack of it contributed heavily to the general Arab failures.

In 1956 Moshe Dayan, then Chief of Staff of the IDF, planned “to confound the organization of the Egyptian forces in Sinai and bring about their collapse.” Dayan reasoned that there was little point in killing great numbers of Egyptians because they could easily be replaced.

Through the October War of 1973 the Israelis have, indeed, confounded their enemies by waging maneuver warfare, firepower-attrition warfare, and combinations of the two, as the situation seemed to demand. We need to study theories of warfare, especially maneuver warfare, to have the same flexibility. The efforts of Marines at the Development Center at Quantico and at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at Twentynine Palms are encouraging, as are recent Marine Corps GAZETTE articles on maneuver warfare.* Our schools should teach more theory, however, and individual Marines should study more. Those who understand warfare theory will see more opportunities on the battlefield, and, incidentally, will be less vulnerable to maneuver tactics.

* Know the enemy. In any kind of warfare knowledge of the enemy, especially enemy weaknesses, should be the basis of all planning. The Israelis believe in this principle, and their knowledge of their opponents is legendary. In The Israeli Army Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz described the efforts of Gen Yeshayahu Gavish and others at the IDF Training Command to learn about Russian and Egyptian tactics in the mid-1960s:

Gavish and his colleagues stopped at nothing in their efforts to understand Russian tactics: they analyzed the voluminous Western and Russian literature on the subject, interviewed Israelis who had served in the Russian army, and even read Russian war novels hoping to glean some useful information.

Gen Gavish’s own account of how the IDF trained illustrates the practicality of their approach:

First of all [in discussions] within the training command and then in wider groups where dozens of people participated, each of whom suggested this or that solution . . . We examined [rival] theories and conducted a series of exercises . . . We constructed a Russian-style deployment on a large scale and then attacked it.

The training paid off. In the Six-Day War of June 1967, IDF forces under Gen Gavish defeated an Egyptian force of 5 infantry and 2 armored divisions, taking over 12,000 prisoners in the process. For many reasons U. S. Marines cannot expect to match the IDF’s combat intelligence record, but we would do well to match their effort.

We know that the Soviet Union is our Nation’s primary threat, and we know that the Soviets have armed and trained other potential enemies in the Middle East. But how will the Soviets or their clients attack us? Specifically, what is likely to be the disposition of their tanks? At what range can we expect their gunners to achieve a 50 percent first-round hit probability? Will their infantry dismount from carriers and, if so, where? Where will their air defense be weakest? What vulnerabilities can we exploit? How can we disrupt their plans? Most Marines don’t know the answers to these questions and aren’t required to know them; in fact, most don’t even ask the questions. In our schools we emphasize military intelligence by studying such things as “the sequence of information processing activities and their interrelationships,” and by producing documents, such as estimates and annexes, from excessively long exercise “scenarios.” In our units we sometimes do little more than display posters showing Soviet equipment. These activities offer little or no advantage on the battlefield compared to the study of enemy tactics and weaknesses, which should be our emphasis. Much important information about the Soviets and other potential opponents is readily available,* but studying that information is voluntary, encouraged only by an appeal to individual “professionalism.” Our schools should trim their courses of excessive attention to ourselves and begin to teach Marines about the enemy. Meanwhile, unit leaders can cull relevant information about possible opponents from available publications, teach it to their ssubordinates, and establish standards cm the subject in their units. The more we know of our enemy, the better will be our chances for success.

* Dare to risk. Although U. S. Marines are renowned for their traditional boldness, epitomized in the amphibious assaults of the Pacific in World War II, our most recent combat experience was gained in the Vietnam War where bravery was commonplace, but boldness was not. We entered the war cautiously under very restrictive rules of engagement, and we departed cautiously with avoidance of casualties our greatest concern. In the intervening years we did conduct some bold operations, such as Operation Dewey Canyon, but it is fair to say that they were few. Moreover, certain restrictions and practices at the small-unit level were perhaps more than prudent. Prescribed patrol compositions, manatory helmets and flak jackets for ambushes, prohibition of small stay-behind ambushes, routine registration of defensive fires (disclosing our locations), and liberal use of battlefield illumination are examples of measures that sometimes sacrificed gain to reduce risk. True, we frequently had the best reason for avoiding risk: low potential for compensating gains. The point is not so much to say we were wrong as to remind us that we were cautious.

We still are. Since Vietnam, if not before, the peacetime Marine Corps has been well stocked with careful officers. The reason, in a word, is careerism, which may be defined as the habitual placing of one’s ambitions (i.e., professional advancement) over the good of the Service. Our “up-or-out” system is not inherently bad; Israeli officers who do not advance are usually not retained either. A critical difference in the two systems, however, is that advancement in the IDF is based largely on initiative and competence in battle; in the U.S. Armed Forces a clean or “zero-defects” record may be the most common criterion for promotion. The importance of a near-flawless record of performance in the Fleet Marine Forces is greater than for other duty and greater still for performance while commanding in the Fleet Marine Forces. Our officer-assignment policy allows only brief, widely spaced opportunities to command in the Fleet Marine Forces, and comand in combat is rarest of all. The message is clear to many: BE CAREFUL!

In each of their four wars since 1948, and between wars as well, IDF military operations have been distinguished by boldness, even audacity. Gen Ariel Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal in the October War of 1973 is an excellent example. Sharon’s actions are still debated even in Israel, where calculated risk-taking is almost an art form; however, it is difficult to argue with success. A week after crossing the canal the Israelis had surrounded and isolated the Egyptian Third Army of 300 tanks and 20,000 men. No gambler wins all the time, but the IDF has demonstrated that bold, unexpected moves can bring success against seemingly great odds. Israeli leaders dare to make the moves. We should note, too, that although the IDF has not been fettered by careerism, no nation has shown more concern for its own war casualties than Israel. Though inhibited, they continue to take risks because they know the value of surprise, and they know that caution can be very costly to the side with fewer numbers.

Can risk-taking be learned? Certainly not by everyone, but I believe most Marines are bold by nature. We can combat careerism and encourage the spirit to dare by challenging ourselves and our subordinates to take action and to innovate. We should allow subordinates to fail in a good try, and we should rate bold leaders a notch above cautious ones. We do not need changes without benefits, nor do we need new “systems,” charts, statistics, reports, or other additions to our administrative workload. We do need leaders with the courage to seek new ways to defeat the enemy.

* Learn the odds. Gamblers must have courage, but even more they must know the odds. Las Vegas is no place to learn blackjack, and the battlefield is not the ideal place to learn high-risk operational methods. In our field training throughout the Marine Corps and in the classroom, we must find out what is possible and what is practical. Marines at Twentynine Palms and at Quantico, among other places, work at testing our tactics and developing doctrine, but more can be done elsewhere. The key to learning the odds and our limits is free play.

There are many reasons why military exercises seem to have been planned by choreographers. We want a lot to happen because exercises cost money. We gain much by going through the motions of operations as a form of drill, but often we must simply defer to the wishes of our allies. Nonetheless, we must allow some units, particularly battalions and below, an opportunity to conduct free-play exercises to test tactics and abilities without a scorecard. To know their own limits and to know what works, leaders must be given chances to experiment and to fail without penalty. Free-play exercises will cost more than money. There will be fiascos, especially at first. Welcome to combat! Some leaders may consistently do very badly; better we find out now than later. Despite these and other problems, we will be paid back in spades if our leaders learn to innovate. We should try to move away from the predictable phased occupation of successive terrain objectives so common in past exercises and tactical tests.

Free play or war-gaming in the classroom could bring similar benefits. Most exercises at Amphibious Warfare School and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, with school solutions issued every few hours, emphasize staff procedures and production of staff documents. A common plea of instructors at both schools is, “Don’t get hung up on the tactics.” They might more profitably say, “Don’t get hung up on the procedures; just think about the tactics!”

From the beginning, training for the Israeli soldier stresses flexibility and innovation in unexpected situations. In the field trainees are frequently given tactical problems to solve within a time limit, and then required to react to different conditions introduced just before the time runs out. Similar techniques are applied in the classroom through use of the blackboard, map, and sand table. Emphasis is on commonsense, original solutions, not procedure or doctrine. The soldier learns to think and to improvise. His confidence grows as he learns what he and his unit can do. He becomes bolder and, therefore, less predictable to his opponent.

* Be quick. Fighting in future war, especially in the Middle East, promises to be furious. In 18 days of October 1973, the Arabs lost 2,300 tanks, far more than the Marine Corps owns, and 475 aircraft. In the same period the Israelis lost about 2,500 men killed, fewer than the Arabs but proportionally equivalent to over 175,000 Americans. It has been estimated that on 7 October the Israelis flew 20 times as many sorties as could be mustered by the U. S. Sixth Fleet. Artillery batteries on both sides demonstrated a common ability to move locations between 12 and 15 times a day.

We will need to be quick to win. The time we take to reach a decision, draw up and convey orders, and move where required must occur consistently faster than the enemy can react. If the enemy does have time to react to our moves, we are most unlikely to disrupt his operations or to engage him decisively. If we are slow in reacting to him, we are dead.

Given our present doctrine and training methods, we probably operate close to our maximum pace. Are we fast enough? I cannot believe so. In training for operations ashore (but not for amphibious operations), we must change to be faster by valuing speed over form, results over procedures, the simple over the complex, and command over control. Our typical battalion field exercise has the goal of teaching us to operate “by the book”; that is, step by step in all actions. Staff officers, for example, keep logs and journals, make formal estimates, and write out radio messages. We do benefit from these procedures, but they will have to be dropped when the tempo of operations increases. Training time is precious. We can get the most from it by training to do the hardest things we may be expected to do ashore, such as conduct up-to-division-sized operations with only verbal orders. We should not throw away the book, but we need not spend so much of our nonamphibious training time plodding through it. If the situation permits we will always be able to slow down; speeding up takes practice.

It should surprise no one to learn that the Israelis routinely conduct complex operations with divisions and brigades, using only verbal orders. They exert continuous pressure on their opponents by moving, reacting, and making decisions faster than any army in modern times. Practice may not make perfect, but it surely builds improvement. We need improvement.

* Maintain military skills. The importance of military skills-technical and tactical proficiency-is too obvious to dwell on and too important not to mention. Much of the IDF’s success has been due not to incaution or great armor sweeps maneuvering ever to the rear, but to mastery of basic military skills such as flying, tank gunnery, and tactics. In the Golan during the October War, for example, superior shooting and organization of the ground enabled about 180 Israeli tanks to stop about 800 attacking Syrian tanks. Such achievements are all the more remarkable when one considers that the Israeli army numbers fewer than 20,000 regulars (less conscripts). On mobilization, reservists with a 30-day active duty obligation per year fill in cadred units at every level from the brigade commander’s billet on down. Regulars and reservists alike excel in military skills because their training is devoted overwhelmingly to maintaining those skills.

How do we compare? Favorably, surely, in many respects. Emphasis on performance-oriented training and evaluation in the Marine Corps has steadily improved our mastery of military occupational specialty skills in recent years, and better programs are on the way. New courses for formal training of infantry officers and enlisted Marines have been very successful. We do have at least one serious problem: because our training outside of the Fleet Marine Force is not combat-oriented, Marines on other duty tend to lose their military skills. The problem is most acute for officers in the combat arms above the rank of captain, who may be assigned to the FMF only once in a decade or longer. Many infantry lieutenant colonels are in this category.

Should not our battalion and regimental commanders in the combat arms be more experienced in their occupational fields? They are not likely to be, so long as we fill the FMF with officers who have been away the longest. That policy may be fair to individuals, but not to the Corps. Success in battle is our primary goal, and we need every possible advantage to secure that goal. Eight or 10 years away from the field is too long for the “first to fight.” The rapid pace and growing complexity of modern combined-arms tactical engagements can best be met by specialists, not well-rounded generalists. Of Marine officers available for assignment to the FMF, the best qualified should be sent first-beginning with those who want to go. At the outset of hostilities the FMF is our starting lineup. Ability and desire to be in that lineup must count for more than “fairness” if we are to have our best chance to win.

* Leadership: lead and let lead. Two points about IDF leaders are made by virtually every author who has studied them. First, they lead from the front. The costs in leaders killed are high; that the one Israeli soldier killed during the daring 1976 Entebbe Raid was the leader of a rescue unit is symbolic, if not typical, of IDF leadership. The Israelis believe that the strong unit cohesion which results from respect for officers and noncommissioned officers more than offsets the high leader casualties. Furthermore, leaders in front see more and react faster than do directors in the rear.

Second, Israeli leaders trust their subordinates, placing them on their own whenever possible by giving them missions without detailed instructions and by encouraging them to make on-the-spot decisions. This approach sacrifices control to gain quick, aggressive responses to unexpected battlefield situations. In the battle for El Arish during the 1967 war, for example, as explained by Luttwak and Horowitz:

What saved the day was the leadership of unit commanders who never paused to reorganize or to search for their mother formations. In accordance with [Gen Israel Tal’s] standing orders, they continued to fight and advance toward the divisional objective: El Arish. When Col Eytan’s battalion of Patton tanks lost touch with his mechanized paratroops, neither stopped to find the other; both went on to fight separately. One company of the Patton battalion advanced right across the southern half of the Rafah shield, reached the main road, linked up with a battalion of the 7th Brigade, and spearheaded its second thrust through Jiradi, and all this because of a communications breakdown.

Marine leaders, in my experience, know that one cannot lead from behind, but we can probably improve on letting those under us make decisions. Trends in warfare certainly portend increasing demands on junior leaders. The mobility of forces today and the expected rapid tempo of operations increase the likelihood of units becoming physically separated. Enemy electronic warfare may prevent radio communication of specific instructions to subordinates even if time permitted. To fight best on a fluid, fast-moving battlefield, we must let junior leaders lead.

One caveat: the politics of a limited conflict may demand almost purely symbolic military action of minimal risk and absolute control. While encouraging initiative we should be mindful that actions justifiable militarily can sometimes be disastrous to national purposes.

Conclusion

Comparisons can be overdone: every nation is different. The Israelis fight the way they do because they must. We cannot copy the IDF, but their experiences should remind us how human factors can overcome materiel parity or disadvantage.

We Marines spend a lot of time wondering if there will be a role for us in future wars. Gen Barrow probably had the answer when he said, “I’ve been through three wars, and I haven’t seen a crowded battlefield yet.” There will be room for us if we are ready.

In a practical sense readiness is being prepared to win with what we have. The Marine Corps’ hardware is good, but so is that of our potential enemies. Our intangible human resources, however, are second to none. We must make better use of them to be most effective, and all Marines can help. The key to improvement is not harder work (I doubt that Marines could work much harder for long) but different work. I have tried to suggest some ways we can change; GAZETTE readers can think of many more. Let’s get ready.

Footnote

* William S. Lind’s “Defining maneuver warfare for the Marine Corps” in the March 1980 GAZETTE is particularly good, and should be read by all Marine leaders.

*See article by Capt Wright in this month’s Ideas and Issues for a discussion of one such source.

Maneuver Warfare Well Done

By Col J. C. Studt

* Mr. Lind’s article on maneuver warfare in the March GAZETTE was brilliant and thought provoking . . . I’m struck with the magnitude of what he is suggesting, which is far more than merely shifting emphasis from firepower attrition to maneuver tactics. He is proposing a dramatic reeducation of our officer corps to develop a much higher level of self-reliance, individual initiative, and creative thinking which will result in flexible command on the battlefield. While emphasizing the potential of maneuver warfare for light infantry in terrain not suitable for armor, he is also implying a substantial reorganization to include a family of light armored vehicles.

Mr. Lind’s frequent reference to historical examples seems to lend a good deal of weight to his theories. It is not surprising that it is a military historian, rather than a military practitioner, who is proposing a radical change in tactics. As Alfred Mahan once noted: “The study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”

The Marine Corps should rise to the challenge!

Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps

By William S Lind

Several recent articles in the GAZETTE have referred to “maneuver warfare.” The term may have occasioned some confusion among Marines. After all, doesn’t all warfare involve fire and maneuver? Isn’t maneuver just another word for movement? How can there be such a thing as “maneuver warfare“? It may be time to review just what this term means and why it’s important to the United States Marine Corps.

Maneuver warfare refers to an overall concept or “style” of warfare. It has an opposite, the firepower-attrition style.

Firepower-attrition is warfare on the model of Verdun in World War I, a mutual casualty inflicting and absorbing contest where the goal is a favorable exchange rate. The conflict is more physical than mental. Efforts focus on the tactical level with goals set in terms of terrain. Defenses tend to be linear (“forward defense”), attacks frontal, battles set-piece and movement preplanned and slow.

In contrast, maneuver war is warfare on the model of Genghis Khan, the German blitzkrieg and almost all Israeli campaigns. The goal is destruction of the enemy’s vital cohesiondisruption-not piece-by-piece physical destruction. The objective is the enemy’s mind not his body. The principal tool is moving forces into unexpected places at surprisingly high speeds. Firepower is a servant of maneuver, used to create openings in enemy defenses and, when necessary, to annihilate the remnants of his forces after their cohesion has been shattered.

Maneuver conflict is more psychological than physical. Effort focuses more on the operational than on the tactical level. The goal is set in terms of destroying the enemy’s forces not seizing terrain seen a priori as “key.” A defender places only a “tripwire” forward and relies on counterattacks into the flanks and rear of enemy penetrations. “One up and two back” is the rule. Attacks ooze through and around enemy defenses. Battles are usually meeting engagements. Rates of advance are high. Movement is constant, irregular in direction and timing and responsive to fleeting opportunities.

A key to understanding maneuver war is to realize that not all movement is maneuver. Maneuver is relational movement. Maneuver is not a matter simply of moving or even of moving rapidly. Maneuver means moving and acting consistently more rapidly than the opponent.

Recently, the concepts behind maneuver war have been organized and expanded into an overall theory of conflict. This theory was developed by Col John Boyd, USAF (Ret.) and is appropriately known as the “Boyd Theory.”

Col Boyd was the father of energy management air combat tactics. More recently he has devoted himself to studying the nature of conflict in general. He observed that in any conflict situation all parties go through repeated cycles of observation-decision-action. The potentially victorious party is the one with an observationdecision-action cycle consistently quicker than his opponent’s (including the time required to transition from one cycle to another). As this party repeatedly cycles inside his opponent, the opponent finds he is losing control of the situation. Because of his longer cycle time, his reaction is facing a later action by the faster party than that which it was intended to oppose. Instead of achieving convergence with the first party’s action, he finds himself facing everwidening divergence. Suddenly, he realizes there is nothing he can do to control the situation or turn it to his advantage. At that point, he has lost. Often he suffers mental breakdown in the form of panic and is defeated before he is destroyed physically.

The Boyd Theory is the theory of maneuver warfare. In maneuver war, if the enemy is destroyed physically (and often that is not necessary), that is not the decision but merely the outcome. The real defeat is the nervous/ mental/systemic breakdown caused when he becomes aware the situation is beyond his control, which is in turn a product of our ability consistently to cut inside the time of his observation-decision-action cycle.

The French campaign of 1940 is an excellent example of the Boyd process in operation. The Germans presented the French with a succession of new and unexpected situations at a pace too rapid for the French observation-decisionaction cycle. The nerve of the French high command broke under the strain.

How does the Boyd Theory and its application to ground warfare, maneuver war, relate to the Marine Corps? It is relevant, because maneuver war is the most promising tool for the side with fewer numbers and less weight of metal. In many scenarios Marines are likely to be outnumbered in men and materiel. An attrition contest is not promising for the outnumbered force, while maneuver makes quantitative factors less important by striking at the enemy’s mind. As Dr. Edward Luttwak said in an excellent article in the August issue of Air Force magazine:

While the side that has materiel superiority can choose freely between attrition or maneuver, the side whose resources are inferior overall can only prevail by successful maneuver. If an inferior force remains tied by tradition and attitude to low-risk or low-payoff attrition methods, it must be defeated. In the cumulative destruction of the forces ranged against one another which characterizes an attrition contest, the inferior force will inevitably be defeated. It is not surprising that maneuver warfare is so unfamiliar to American military men-in whose self-image materiel superiority still looms large-while it is almost instinctive to those who see themselves as inferior in resources, be they from Vietnam or Israel.

Maneuver war relates directly to the probable main mission of the Corps during the remainder of this century, supporting the United States’ friends in the Third World. Despite the current Administration’s fixation on NATO, Europe is becoming relatively less important to United States’ interests and non-European areas, developed and less developed, more important. Japan is now the United States’ largest single trading partner. America’s vital interest in areas rich in raw materials, especially petroleum, is well known. The increasing economic vitality of parts of Latin America, especially Brazil, suggests our interests in that area may become more important.

In many potential Third World scenarios, the Marine Corps faces an opponent superior in numbers and in materiel-possibly quality as well as quantity of materiel. For example, if we consider the possibility of Marine Corps intervention to assist Saudi Arabia against an attack by Iraq, we see Iraq has an army of 180,000 men, compared to only 80,000 for Saudi Arabia (including the Saudi National Guard). Iraqi forces include four armored and two mechanized divisions. Equipment includes T-62 and AMX-30 tanks, BMPs multiple rocket launchers and ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns-equipment equal or superior to that possessed by Marines. The supporting air force has 339 combat aircraft, including modern MiG-23s, SU-20s and Mirage F-1s. While Saudi equipment is also modern, quantities are smaller. Operational effectiveness also may be less.

Maneuver warfare would offer a Marine amphibious force (MAF) the best chance in assisting Saudi forces to victory. An attrition contest between well-equipped Iraqi mechanized divisions and a single MAF would not be promising. The need is for a force which, although small, can wage maneuver warfare in support of an ally who probably cannot, against an opponent who probably cannot.

Indeed, the force multiplier effect of maneuver warfare should be more striking against a Third World opponent. While Third World armies may be large, well-equipped and competent at operating their weapons systems, they are likely to be tactically and operationally inflexible. Third World nations can produce some highly competent officers and planners, as the Egyptians demonstrated in the canal crossing in 1973. But they are not likely to have many such officers, and flexibility may be lacking in field forces. The impact of maneuver warfare, with its emphasis on speed, surprise and the creation of unexpected situations, could be devastating. Such has been Israel’s experience in several wars with her Third World neighbors. However good the prewar planning and set-piece operations of the Arabs, the Israeli maneuver style of warfare triumphed dramatically once the situation became fluid. The reason was not that Israeli equipment was better or that Israeli troops were more courageous, but that Israeli field forces showed great flexibility. Their opponents did not.

It is sometimes mistakenly thought that maneuver warfare automatically means armored warfare. To be sure, foot infantry cannot fight effective maneuver war in open terrain. But in rugged terrain, maneuver concepts apply fully to infantry warfare. Indeed, maneuver war was first manifested in the West in this century during World War I by German foot infantry in so-called infiltration “von Hutier” or “soft-spot” tactics. The World War II blitzkrieg differed little in concept from these early infiltration tactics, merely substituting tanks for storm troops and achieving the higher rates of advance permitted by mechanization. Infiltration tactics may offer as much potential to Marine foot infantry as to future Marine mechanized units.

Changes will be required in the Marine Corps if it is to fight maneuver warfare effectively. Maneuver doctrine must be developed and disseminated. Marine foot infantry may have to become lighter if it is to fight maneuver warfare effectively in appropriate terrain. Mechanized forces must be formed for open terrain, not based on heavy tanks and tracked infantry fighting vehicles which restrict strategic mobility but on a family of lightweight, probably wheeled combat vehicles such as those discussed by Maj Jim Williams in the October 1978 issue of the GAZETTE. To provide strategic responsiveness, equipment for substantial mechanized units should be prepositioned at sea in potential trouble areas, probably on rollon, roll-off (RO-RO) ships. Some arms, especially artillery, may require expansion.

But unlike the Army, the Marine Corps can develop a strategically responsive force to fight maneuver war in Third World areas. Bound as it is to airlift and to land prepositioning, the Army cannot quickly move mechanized forces over strategic distances. The Army, like the Marine Corps, could preposition equipment at sea. But then the Army would become another Marine Corps, and few force planners think we need two.

A shift to maneuver warfare offers a major challenge to Marines. But it is an exciting challenge, especially for company and field grade officers. In maneuver warfare, the responsibility placed on company and field grades increases dramatically. The key to maintaining a rapid observation-decision-action is to make all decisions on the lowest possible level, the company and battalion level. This is one of the fundamental principles of the German army and is central to their concept of mission orders tactics (Auftragstaktik). Mission orders tactics require company and field grade officers to understand the concepts of maneuver war and of the operation in which they are engaged. Only through a solid conceptual understanding can they hope to make the right decisions on their own as events occur in the field.

There is no question Marines can meet the challenge. By adopting a maneuver concept of war, they can give the United States the capability it needs to defend its vital interests outside Europe. And by performing that task, the Marine Corps can assure itself a solid mission of unquestionable value.

Only a Beginning

By William S. Lind

The May issue of the GAZETTE carried a news story (p. 10) about the mechanized task force tests at 29 Palms entitled, Mechanized combined arms task force test exercise concluded. Unfortunately, this story may have created some misconceptions, especially where it stated that, “the test, held at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, from 26 February to 2 March, marked the third and final phase of the Corps’ evaluation of its capability to operate in a mechanized environment by temporarily task organizing with current assets to accomplish missions.”

In fact, it appears many more phases of testing may be required to enable the Corps to field an effective mechanized force. While Phase III was successful, it had only limited objectives, and it was essentially administrative, not tactical. Future tests appear required to explore the following areas, among others:

* Reconnaissance. Current reconnaissance capabilities, especially force recon, do not seem suitable for mechanized operations. Recon units appear to need more mobility, and, if “recon pull” tactics are to be adopted, greater ability to turn information into intelligence on a real-time basis.

* Definition of the objective. Phase III showed some units still conceive of objectives in terrain terms. Units more than once exerted themselves to seize pieces of terrain which were thought a priori to be significant, but which proved meaningless in terms of the real objective in mechanized warfare-destruction of the enemy forces.

* The basic concept of maneuver warfare may not yet be adequately understood. In Phase III, the focus remained on tactical success. Operational success was presumably to be achieved by accumulating tactical successes. In contrast, maneuver warfare attempts to achieve operational success directly, shattering the enemy command by maintaining an increasing tempo of operations deep in his rear area. Tactical engagements are necessary evils. Operations are not a linear extension of tactics, but are qualitatively different.

* Integration of foot infantry into mechanized operations. If Marines go to war, the bulk of their force for the foreseeable future will be foot infantry. Future phases should attempt to integrate a large quantity of foot infantry into the mechanized operation. The German World War II system of consecutive reliefs, in which the foot infantry permitted the mechanized forces to focus on the operational battle by taking on the actual tactical engagements, may be a useful model. Unless future test phases develop a suitable integrating system, we risk tasking the foot infantry with little more than guarding the baggage on the beach while the small percentage of the force which is mechanized fights the campaign.

* In Phase III, as in almost all exercises, the aggressor was heavily outnumbered. It is unlikely this will be the case in actual campaigns. Future tests appear necessary to address the problem of undertaking offensive operations against a numerically superior opponent.

* Contrary to what might be understood from the GAZETTE article, it is not certain that mechanized forces can be task organized quickly. It may be necessary to have some units mechanized on a permanent basis in order to permit timely response with well-trained forces. Future tests are needed to investigate this further.

These and similar issues should be considered before the Marine Corps decides it is prepared for mechanized operations.