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The Taiwan crisis of 2027

>MajGen Maxwell currently serves as the Commander, Marine Corps Installations Command, Commanding General, Marine Corps National Capital Region Command, and Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Facilities). He most recently served as the Vice Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff. He previously served as the Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Plans, Policies, and Strategic Mobility), Commanding General, 2nd MLG, and Combined Joint Director of Logistics for the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

Force Design 2030 and Installations and Logistics 2030 describe evolving missions and new capability requirements driven by a changing operating environment. Installations and Logistics 2030 is explicit about challenges associated with installations in contested environments and makes the following key points:

• To posture ourselves against the threat of peer and near-peer competitors, we need to rethink our view of Marine Corps installations.
• Our installations must be able to provide the full range of infrastructure and trained personnel required by the future force.
• Our installations must enable training, force readiness, experimentation, mobilization, and deployment while also improving quality of life for Marines, their families, and the civilian workforce.
• Smart, resilient, networked installations will provide stand-in forces with enhanced capabilities to recover quickly from attack, persist in contested spaces, and sustain distributed formations.
• We must ensure force protection efforts enable continuity of operations, protection, and safety of our families, and our forces to meet operational requirements.

The following vignette explores the contours of the changing operating environment and the associated implications for our installation through a fictional account of a security crisis occurring in 2027. While longer than most articles, a vignette is the most efficient way to animate the guidance in Force Design 2030 and Installations and Logistics 2030 while also illuminating the many challenges and opportunities associated with making our installations ready.

The Taiwan Crisis of 2027 System Attack–Systemic Defeat
Cloudy, with late afternoon rain was the forecast as Col Kay Smith headed up the gentle rise skirting the Okinawa Expressway toward Taiyo Golf Course for an early morning tee time with Col John Harmon and Col Steve White. As on most Saturday mornings in Okinawa, the plan for Kay was to get her mind focused on having a good round of golf after a week of non-stop mini-crises in her job as the Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Installations Pacific, but today there was something else on her mind: the rising tensions between China and Taiwan had serious implications for the operations and safety of the bases and stations under her command. Eighteen holes with Harmon, the III MEF G-3, and White, the Commanding Officer of 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, offered an opportunity to discuss her concerns with respected friends and colleagues. She seldom saw White, but she looked forward to catching up since they had known each other since The Basic School.

Driving into the parking lot afforded a glimpse of the verdant dark green course, having benefited from the above-average rainfall of the past few months. Unsurprisingly, John and Steve were running a little late, so Kay signed in and started some warm-up swings. After some additional stretches and a brief chat with a friendly groundskeeper, John came hustling over with Steve in trail.

“Hey, sorry we’re late. Let’s get going or we’ll miss our tee time,” said John.

“Right,” Kay said with a wry smile as she glanced at her watch. “Let’s get to it.”

By the 9th hole, the trio had settled into the flow of the game, and Kay ventured some shop talk.

“So, guys, the Chinese seem to be stepping up their Taiwan torment; more aircraft intrusions and more saber rattling. The G-6 says cyber intrusions are way above average. I think we should be stepping up preparations. I know we’re reviewing our base and station readiness.” John and Steve cocked their heads and looked at each other.

“There she goes again, always the professional,” Steve quipped, having known Kay for 23 years.

Niceties dispensed with, John took on a serious tone and said, “Yes Kay, you’re right to be concerned. Indications and Warnings are tipping into the red; we could be in for some unpleasantness in the coming months.”

“We’re ready,” Steve added. “The regiment is in good shape, and we’ve got several elements doing reconnaissance/counter reconnaissance in the lower Ryukyus and northern Luzon. We’ve actually detected some atypical PLAN submarine activity well east of Taiwan. But I’m not sure I get it Kay, what’re you worried about; our bases and stations aren’t going anywhere.”

“That’s precisely why I’m so concerned,” Kay responded. “It’s much easier to target a fixed installation than a low-signature distributed force. Would the PLA be more inclined to use expensive missiles on large, fixed bases or a small, hard-to-target, mobile unit? We’re sitting ducks.”

Somehow that game flow had evaporated. “OK,” John offered, “let’s call it at nine and talk about this over some yakisoba and a Sakura.”

At the table, John picked up where they left off. “OK, let’s remember where we are, so keep it unclass, but let’s think this through a bit. Kay, you started this, so what’s bothering you most?”

“Well, starting at the top, strategically, it just doesn’t make sense to me that we’re treating our bases and stations like we did when we UDP’d here as lieutenants. The threat’s very different now. We’re in the same arc of fires as our deployed operational units. That’s a big difference, right?”

“An attack here would be really escalatory, and might bring Japan in as an active combatant,” Steve opined.

“Remember Putin?” John interjected. “That insanity was just five years ago. It’s hard to predict an autocrat’s decision calculus,” he continued, looking ever more serious. “Kay, tell me what has been done to improve the posture of our installations as of late.”

Looking askance, Steve muttered, “But look where that got Putin: six feet under. Maybe Xi learned something.”

Kay had hoped the discussion would get to this point. “We’ve done a lot, but so much still needs to be done. We’ve barely moved the needle with Headquarters Marine Corps on resources. I think it’s important that we’re now tied into the theater missile defense early warning system and we can send warnings out to all smartphones if the threat dictates. That’s critical for Marines, civilians, and their families. Unfortunately, we’ve still not gotten the mobile cell towers we requested, in part because we’re still working on spectrum access with the Japanese. We need to keep pushing this. Steve, your folks might find them of use tactically, if we go Corregidor.”

Range and capability analysis of People’s Liberation Army Air and Rocket Forces. (Photo provided by author.)Steve chuckled while John’s arched eyebrows conveyed some skepticism over the World War II analogy, but his demeanor was now quite serious.

“And to be fair,” she continued, “there have been some other notable improvements over the last five years, and not just in IT upgrades. After pushing the issue for a couple of years, all our Installation Marines have a T/O [table of organization] weapon assigned and do annual FAM [familiarization] fire at a minimum. We have also developed healthy habitual relationships with elements of MARFORRES. Using reservists to fill holes created by our reduced reliance on FAP [Fleet Assistance Program] billets, and we now have the ability to fill vacancies with individual augments for the remaining FAP personnel when they get pulled during a crisis. Also, while there are IT and sensor elements associated with Global Logistics Awareness, hopefully, you’re seeing a difference in the responsiveness of logistics to operational requirements. The biggest deal has been the change in mindset. Logisticians are no longer waiting to be told the requirement, they are anticipating and planning for future requirements by integrating logistics into operational planning. The old way just won’t cut it given how distributed we are nowadays—and it also helps Installations by improving our situational awareness on LOGCOM [Logistics Command] and FMF logistics support requirements.

“OK,” John said, “balanced argument noted Kay, but give us the wavetops of today’s challenges,” the golf game already a distant memory. “What else?”

“Let me do it in terms you guys might best understand: the seven warfighting functions—it’s still seven right? We haven’t added yet another one recently, have we?” Kay jested, trying to lighten the mood she had precipitated, if only just a tad.

Kay opened a firehose of pent-up frustration. “Let’s start with command and control. John, whether you’re in Guam or here in Okinawa, you obviously understand the importance of your operations center. It needs to work 24/7 regardless of weather or enemy action. You know that, but did you know the communications grid that underpins it is brittle and lacks adequate capacity? You know our computers are old and slow; you see them every day, and you might guess that routers and servers need to be upgraded, but you might not think about the cables running down the streets and in the walls of our facilities. They are from a different era.”

“I’ve been told you might need to actually fight the MEF from your garrison facilities given the ranges of our latest missiles—and the PLA’s. The bandwidth required to support the surveillance, tracking, and targeting of enemy assets is growing constantly. Our IT pipes are strained passing PowerPoint slide decks. So much for full-motion video and passing target data back to CONUS! And it gets better; the power grid that runs the communications grid is even less resilient. Much of our communications grid is buried, but most of our power grid is overhead. We lose power with every hurricane or typhoon. What will it be like if the PLA comes knocking? Steve, you’ve at least got your tactical communications. That’ll work locally, but what if space is denied? A redundant underwater fiber line might be essential for off-island comms.”

“Every Marine loves to shoot stuff—fires is a perennial investment favorite—so you’d think we’d be good to go, right? Well, not exactly. First, Steve, you understand the limitations we have with ranges. Individual and crew-served weapons aren’t too bad, although we probably don’t shoot enough, the big challenges are the limited areas we have to do live fire and maneuver and where we can shoot artillery and missiles. We’re still waiting on funding to build virtual training ranges. Admittedly, a big part of the problem is a posture that mal-positions one-third of our operating forces for training, but we’ll save that one for another day.”

“We need to be able to simulate the entire kill chain for our anti-ship missiles, and we’re just not there yet. The sim center is still just a POM30 unfunded deficiency,” Steve chimed in. “Kay, don’t forget ranges for our loitering munitions. We can do some training at Fuji and Tinian, but that’s it, and since the smaller loitering munitions are integral to squad, platoon, and company operations, we need more reps and sets.”

“Force protection—wow, where to begin?” Kay said. “Of all the priorities in my job jar, this one worries me the most. Talk about multi-domain; we’ve got threats coming from every direction: cyber, drones, SCADA attacks, ubiquitous sensing, insider threats, CBRNE—heck we even have space-based and sub-orbital challenges, plus the usual concerns for hypersonic cruise missile and ballistic missile attack. We just haven’t adapted fast enough to have answers to these threats. From my time in P&R [Programs and Resources], I know there hasn’t been the trade space given our constrained budget topline and we had to get the basic new warfighting capabilities fielded.”

“Damn right,” Steve interjected. “We wouldn’t have been able to provide the sensing and fires to the Joint Force that we can now.”

“I’m with you,” Kay continued, “but now we need to think like the Chinese. This is a warfighting system we’re talking about, a system that doesn’t work without protection, sustainment, and installations that can operate in a contested environment. The PLA doesn’t think in terms of our stovepipes, they see a system and look for the weak link in the chain, and yours truly is holding the weakest link. I feel a disturbance in the Force.”

John had to say something at this point.

“Kay, come on. You SAW [School of Advanced Warfighting] Jedi always love those Star Wars references, but maybe you’re being just a bit too dramatic. We can’t afford to do everything.”

“Maybe … maybe,” Kay replied, “but when a lone Chinese SOF operator drops his backpack and releases ten loitering munitions that put holes in six JSF on the flightline, we’ll see how dramatic things can really get. Anyway, that’s a good segue to information and intelligence challenges. Both of these functions have increased steady-state requirements far beyond what they were when we were lieutenants. In competition, especially here in the Pacific, we’re in the fight every day. We need to have 24/7 intel on below-the-threshold threats, and we all read the CHINFO [Chief of Information] media summary every morning. There’s a constant back and forth as we, and our allies and partners, try to expose Chinese bad behavior and counter their disinformation campaign.”

“From my standpoint, we’ve had to band-aid our communications grid, which wasn’t built for the bandwidth and security requirements associated with these new demands. I mean, even battalions and regiments need PED [processing, exploitation, dissemination] facilities and these things often run 24/7, which means 24/7 chow hall hours and IT support. Security of these facilities is an issue as well.”

“You’re not being overdramatic in the least about this point, Kay,” Steve said nodding. “We were running an MQ-9 mission last week and we had some comm problems. We had to call the Enterprise Help Desk, the same service an action officer gets sitting at a desk building slides. I couldn’t believe it. We had to scrub the mission.”

“OK, well my soliloquy is almost over; just two more functions,” Kay said, picking up where she left off. John rolled his eyes.

“Maybe more of a diatribe than a soliloquy Kay,” he said, “but I like your passion. I get where you’re coming from. We need to have a conversation with the CG.”

“So, logistics is still logistics, always key, but Steve you mentioned loitering munitions. We need some additional funding to get the ammo storage facilities up to speed to allow us to store the munitions and their batteries in adjacent facilities, and our NMESIS missile systems would benefit from humidity-controlled storage. But the bigger picture, I’m concerned we could actually be like Corregidor in World War II. We’re at the end of a tenuous line of communications. The PLAN might decide to interfere with them with actions that drive up shipping insurance costs, and they could even get more aggressive and actively interdict shipping to Okinawa. We can’t prepare for everything of course, but we should at least have some extra stores on hand to ensure we have enough fuel, food, and ammo to sustain us should the Chinese decide to cut us off. John, do you agree?”

“I do, as long as we don’t get too crazy. I think I’m going to name the MEF CP Malinta,” he said with a little less sarcasm than his previous quip about World War II analogies.

Kay continued, “There’s also the potential for huge expenditure rates of munitions and the possibility for substantial combat attrition. We need to have a distributed and resilient stockpile of munitions that our operating forces can access, both at home base and when deployed with allies and partners in their territory. Unfortunately, our PGMs [precision-guided munitions] are located in known Navy ammo supply points. We’ve just not been able to get the resources to do distributed prepositioning, which, ironically, is substantially less costly than the old maritime prepositioning approach. I guess ships are just more interesting than warehouses, which is unfortunate because the relevant combat power of our new missiles is on a par with previous configurations and doesn’t require ships, connectors, escorts, and vehicles—all without the delay of RSO&I [reception, staging, onward movement, and integration]. Old paradigms die hard, I get it, but we’ve got to get folks to understand the increased power density of new weapons systems and their amazingly low cost per strike mile … but I digress.”

“Back to the need for reconstitution. We haven’t had to worry about this for decades; it’s just not in our psyche to increase planning factors to account for the kind of expenditure rates and attrition we’re likely to face. We need to have more robust facilities to accommodate repair and refit. This will need to be a long-haul effort to change our cultural proclivities. Finally, I promise, we come to maneuver.”

“Yup, got it,” said Steve.

“Yea, me too, got it, maneuver is key,” John reiterated.

“OK, sure but what about installations?” Kay replied.

“Good grief,” said John. “You’re not going to try and sell us on mobile installations are you?”

“Of course not,” said Kay, “but have you considered that installations, at the very least, provide a base for maneuver? If we were not postured across the first and second island chains and you moved your regiment tactically to the same geography currently occupied by our bases and stations, would you say we have conducted operational maneuver in relation to our adversary? I would say yes!”

“Hmm, hadn’t really thought about it in those terms,” said Steve.

“As we increase our inventories of PGMs at all echelons and their ranges increase, we will increasingly maneuver not to assault, but to gain positional advantage for indirect and long-range precision fires. Our bases and stations occupy terrain in the mutual weapons engagement zone of our forces and those of our adversaries. So, it’s not inconceivable we could be firebases for these weapon systems. It might not be our primary COA [course of action], but if we’re cut off, it might be our only option to take the fight to the PLA. Of course, that moves us up the PLA’s list of target priorities, which gets me to resilience.”

“Obviously, we can’t afford to harden everything, but we need to think deliberately about how to maintain continuity of operations for all of our critical infrastructure. Our critical infrastructure must be resilient and some assets may even need to be hardened for weapons effects vice just resilience.”

“Like in a tunnel or underground,” John winked. He was ready for this one. “The CG has been talking about this issue at nearly every weekly staff meeting. He understands it’s an issue that needs attention. He gets it.”

“Awesome,” Kay said, “That’s what we get for having a loggie as MEF commander. Only the second time, if I recall correctly!” She continued. “Resilience is a term of art in the installations community, but I like to keep things simple. The Air Force has a succinct definition: the capability of an installation to sustain the projection of combat power by protecting against, responding to, and recovering from deliberate, accidental, or naturally occurring events. I think that about covers it.”

“The CG is really worried about fuel,” John said.

“That makes sense; it’s a critical vulnerability. Of course, it’s the vulnerability of the storage tanks, but perhaps the most problematic is the fuel handling infrastructure, especially for aviation. It’s a tough nut,” Kay affirmed.

Two Months Later
Two months after their golf outing, and five years to the day since Xi Jinping was proclaimed “ruler for life,” the onslaught began, not with a bang, but with an incremental, yet unmistakable escalation across multiple fronts.

It appears the Chinese paid as much attention to our doctrine, concepts, and force posture as we had. For over a month, they gathered an amphibious armada that tripped indications and warning systems, so we knew something was coming. We assumed it was a massive amphibious assault on Taiwan, a Chinese version of D-Day, but to our surprise, that did not happen. Instead, they began a graduated, slowly expanding interdiction of Taiwan’s connections to the outside world. Undersea fiber optic cables stopped working, then space-based communications became unreliable, maritime militia significantly ramped up interference in commercial fishing operations throughout the South China Sea, and a northbound container ship sank suspiciously in moderately foul weather.

One month into China’s campaign of intimidation, their playbook of malign activities appeared limitless. It was at this point that one of Kay’s worst fears was realized. Through an intense information campaign, China made clear that any interference in their Taiwan campaign by the United States would result in devastating attacks upon U.S. bases and stations. They explicitly called out Camp Humphries in South Korea, Kadena AFB, Marine Corps installations on Okinawa, and Anderson AFB and Camp Blaz on Guam. The warnings were very precise and stated that any damage to property or personnel other than those named U.S. installations would be unintended collateral damage. China emphasized the attacks would be precision strikes, focused solely on U.S. property and personnel.

The Chinese thus presented our President with a dilemma—support Taiwan’s defense or risk attacks on tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel and their dependents. The President was in a difficult place. If he took overt military action against the Chinese anaconda plan to constrict Taiwan’s line of communications, the United States would be the first party to initiate combat, and at the same time, potentially thousands of U.S. citizens would lose their lives. Xi apparently was taking notes in 2022 when Putin catalyzed Western resolve with a massive, violent military assault on Ukraine. It was a black-and-white situation, whereas China’s actions were all shades of gray.

Early on, when Chinese preparations were accelerating, Marine Stand-in Forces had been deployed from Okinawa and Guam to northern Luzon and Miyakojima, Kumejima, and Tokashiki Islands to the west and south of Okinawa. These distributed Stand-in Forces provided surveillance and sea denial fires options for the Luzon and Miyako Straits while providing enhanced situational awareness to the Joint Force. Given the gradualist approach adopted by China, having a thicker and more diverse range of sensors proved to be especially important to national command authorities given the large uncertainties associated with China’s chosen approach—a massive all-out attack with missiles and an amphibious assault would have provided a more simplified, black and white decision calculus for U.S. response. The options for ISR, cyber ops, information ops, targeting, and strike that Stand-in Forces add to the Joint Force’s expanded decision-maker options to allow for a measured and agile response, able to scale commensurate with China’s incrementalism.

One Month Later
“BREAKING NEWS—CHINA REPEATS THREATS TO U.S. PACIFIC BASES,” read the TV banner in Marine Corps Installations Pacific’s crisis action center adjacent to the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Forward/III MEF COC.

It did not help Kay’s mood that she had been warning about such an eventuality. Told you so was not a helpful attitude, and she knew it. Now was the time to do the best with what was at hand.

“OpsO, I need to see our most recent SITREP,” she requested.

Kay ran through a mental checklist of installation functions to ensure all necessary measures had been taken given China’s demonstrated propensity to avoid surfaces and look for gaps that could be exploited. It looked like installations were truly a gap in PLA eyes.

Law enforcement personnel were working extra shifts and perimeter security was stepped up. Fortunately, the recently fielded AI-enabled drones substantially reduced the manpower required for conducting patrols, but there were still concerns over operatives able to deploy electronic warfare in support of cyber operations, as well as jamming and physical damage to communications infrastructure. The 2024 decision to issue installation Marines weapons was proving to be a wise move, enabling them to provide additional support to perimeter security. Hard to believe we had become so assured in our security we had forward-stationed Marines without weapons or weapons training.

Thankfully, the reservist rotational augments were fully incorporated into bases and stations—yet another manpower improvement over the last few years. Kay made a note to request a surge to get the next rotation in early and to encourage as many currently assigned personnel as possible to extend.

Tenant commands were operating around the clock, so there was an increased demand for chow halls, IT support, and maintenance. Kay made a mental note to talk to John to see what MEF might be able to do to help with surveillance and security operations to allow Marines with specialized installation skills to support base surge ops.

Cpl Sanchez interrupted, “Ma’am, the MEF G-2 is on the phone.”

“OK, I’ll take it,” said Kay with some apprehension, as she had a good idea what Joe wanted. “Joe, how can I help you?” she asked.

“Kay, we’re getting crushed, we’ve got the majority of our tactical sensors deployed and we’re getting fire hosed with data, but the network is clobbered, our PED’sters can’t get their jobs done, and they say it’s not processing capacity, it’s a bandwidth problem.”

As Kay suspected, installations communications grid upgrades had been an unfunded deficiency for four years running. Base comm grids were largely still copper and simply lacked the capacity. Back in Virginia, she recalled having fiber run to her house by a commercial vendor years ago, providing one gigabyte per second upload and download speeds. Her house had more bandwidth than the MEF-sensitive compartmented information facility, which is crazy but true and not to mention electromagnetic pulse attack was not a big consideration when she decided to shift to fiber for her home—so there was that vulnerability to think about as well.

“Joe, sorry, we understand the problem. Tell you what, I’ll talk to our comms folks. Perhaps we can have them team with Comm Battalion to run some fiber to a tactical SATCOM link,” Kay offered. “I’ve already asked engineers to disperse their generators to ensure we have backup tactical power generation if needed.”

“Kay, OK I appreciate that, but you know space is going to be unreliable. Perhaps they could tie into a commercial fiber point of presence,” said Joe.

“Right, we’ll look into that as well,” Kay agreed. “I’ll let you know tomorrow where we are with the band-aid.”

Kay looked up to see Sanchez back at the hatch looking serious.

“Ma’am, we just got a message saying the next UDP battalion won’t deploy on time—some sketchy stuff going on in Pendleton, Twentynine Palms, and Lejeune.”

“Need some specifics Sanchez, like what?” asked Kay.

“Well, in addition to the interruptions in the Global Logistics Awareness systems you’re already aware of—like sensors dropping off and recurring network outages—there’s been a number of intrusions into our range control systems stateside, and it’s been affecting the training cycle. That ankle-biter stuff set the battalion back a few weeks, but now there’s been major disruptions in contract air operations—but that’s not the worst of it. Third Battalion 2d Marines was at Cherry Point forming up in the parking lot after the buses dropped them off and a quadcopter flew over; they’re thinking it might have dispensed anthrax. They’ve got to all be tested, and it’ll be a day or two before they can confirm what it was. I got a text from Sgt Mulvaney who’s a grunt in 3/2 Mar. He was looking forward to escaping the Lejeune heat since his barracks A/C was broken again, but now they’re back in barracks waiting on test results. Just lots extra friction regardless of whether it was an actual bio-attack or not.”

Kay turned back to the situation report and the logistics support section. Two dry store ships had been delayed due to maritime militia activities in the South China Sea and Naha Port authorities were reporting other delays as well. The commissaries would be out of fresh produce in a week, and there was only a two-week supply of baby formula. Fortunately, the base had gained funding for an additional two-month supply of MREs that could feed all tenants and dependents, but good luck feeding MREs to infants. Maybe we can frag a C-130 to make a run to the mainland for formula, putting a whole new meaning to the old term milk run, thought Kay in disbelief. How did we get to such a place?

At least the training ranges were in pretty good shape, but ammo levels were not what they should be. The arms room concept placed an increased requirement for ammo to qualify a wider number of Marines, whereas before only specialized MOSs qualified on crew-served and shoulder-fired rockets. It was unquestionably critical to have more Marines trained in more weapons platforms, but ammo allowances had still not increased to levels necessary to get everyone trained to standard.

Virtual and constructive training helped with training on artillery and missile systems, but the facility envisioned by Project Tripoli just had its groundbreaking last month. Despite MCICOM’s efforts, it was still taking five years to get new facility construction started and then there were the inevitable construction delays. At any rate, no reason to dwell on this now; it is what it is, she thought. There were more immediate concerns.

Two Weeks Later
There was now no question that China was all in on gaining control of Taiwan. Essential supplies were still arriving in Guam and Okinawa, but merchant ships were now organized into escorted convoys after the investigation of the lost container ship EVER GENTLE revealed ambiguous but highly suspicious indications that there had been a PLAN submarine in the area of the sinking.

Evacuation of dependents proceeded apace with charter flights leaving at regular intervals from Naha International Airport and Kadena Air Force Base. Once these flights were completed, the concerns over food and medical care for tenants would be substantially reduced, but it remained to be seen whether the departure of dependents would make the bases and stations more or less likely to be targeted. On the receiving end, Marine Corps Installations–West was busy with the influx of new families. It would have been good to have rehearsed this non-combatant evacuation operation beforehand to develop a playbook for how to secure quarters, guidelines for what could be taken, and more information to give the displaced about what to expect on the other end. Still unresolved was who would care for all the pets remaining behind.

Currently
To date, the Chinese have still not taken overt military operations and the United States has decided to work with the international community to impose economic sanctions on China while also increasing naval and air forces in between the first and second island chains.

Kay could only hope that sanctions worked. The evacuation of dependents from Japanese locations reduced the burden substantially, but that did not increase ammo levels or ensure that theater air and missile defenses would make much difference if China decided to go kinetic.

Maybe the installations would weather the storm. Kay could only hope because there was nothing else to be done; it would depend on the Chinese.

Epilogue
Can a fait accompli be slow and progressive? Does it have to be so sudden the opponent is unable to offer a timely response in hours or days?

With the benefit of hindsight, what appeared at the time to be a progressive ratcheting up of intimidating actions by the Chinese looks today more like a fait accompli given China’s studied exploitation of our vulnerabilities and the recognition that they had tailored a long-term campaign to gain control of Taiwan and then executed it to near perfection. America and its allies and partners did respond to Chinese provocations quickly but in a measured series of economic, information, diplomatic, and military actions, with varying levels of effectiveness. Yet today, China controls Taiwan’s apparatus of government and is working to consolidate total control over the island.

As an adversary with a mature Long-Range Precision Strike complex, the Chinese changed the battlespace in novel and unanticipated ways. The ability to create effects, without changing location, meant the Chinese could threaten to attack or conduct an attack at very low cost. By manipulating our Indications and Warnings, they were able to force us to react, executing flush plans, conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation, and focusing on internal housekeeping matters while they had none of the traditional logistical or temporal costs associated with moving into battle position.

Attack or threat of attack was fast and cheap for the Chinese, whereas we had to move large forces great distances, evacuate families, and implement ad hoc defensive measures to cover installation vulnerabilities. Also, their attack options had the benefit of being precise, thus allowing them to modulate collateral damage. Importantly, they could attack any target set within range of their munitions while we had perhaps overfocused on protecting tactical formations to the detriment of fixed installations.

The DOD rightly recognized the need to improve its abilities to target and attack PLA forces back in 2018, but this focus evolved into tunnel vision given resource constraints across the Department that forced budgets to focus only on the “top” priorities vice the Joint Force’s system priorities. Underinvestment in system enablers opened a seam the Chinese drove their missiles through. The Chinese viewed all U.S. assets within their weapons engagement zone as valid targets, and without the baggage of our cultural propensities, they were clear-eyed as to where the U.S. was most vulnerable and what targets would best achieve their political objectives.

The Chinese knew our democracy demanded the President pay close attention to public sentiment, and Taiwan did not resonate with the American polity as had Putin’s attack on Ukraine. This was not because Americans had a greater affinity for a European war. Rather, it was because of the way the Chinese had learned from Putin’s mistakes and adopted a gradualist approach that avoided bloodshed until the very end of their campaign. By then, it was too late to walk back the chain of events they had orchestrated.

China’s strategy leveraged American ambivalence by threatening to attack U.S. citizens and military personnel at U.S. bases and stations located within their desired sphere of influence, and the President decided to avoid escalation until U.S. non-combatants could be evacuated. Perhaps savvily, China chose not to interfere with the evacuation. They understood they were losing some of their leverage, but the vulnerability of U.S. installations left plenty of targets possessing both military and iconic value for them to threaten. In return, they gained more of their most valuable commodity: time.

It is clear now that posture matters greatly. Vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities, whether operating force or supporting establishment, especially in the eyes of an adversary who may understand political vulnerabilities better than the U.S. military, given they have the benefit of not being burdened by the U.S. military’s inclination to focus primarily on military outcomes.

The Joint Force and the Nation’s infrastructure and industrial base comprise a system that was perhaps better understood by previous generations. In World War I and World War II, key cities, bases, fortresses, and industries were early military objectives of both sides, but during the long interregnum of our military hegemony since then, we forgot. The Chinese had not.

How multi-disciplinary Marines provide maximum flexibility to a distributed force

>Capt Sanderfield is currently serving as the Operations Officer for 1/2 Mar. He was the Company Commander for Alpha Company, the experimental Force Design 2030 company from July 2021 to April 2023.

The character of war is changing, and the Commandant has taken ambitious steps to redesign the force to confront a capable adversary in the Pacific. One of the most contentious aspects of the Commandant’s Force Design initiative is the Arms Room Concept. Under this concept, the Marine Corps infantry would transition away from some specifically defined MOSs to a force that leverages a multi-disciplinary Marine capable of employing a variety of different weapons systems on the battlefield. Responding to a question about the Arms Room Concept, BGen Watson, Commanding Gen Marine Corps Warfighting Lab said, “So the arms room means that you would have a sort of an armory of many different systems, and your Marines would be trained in all of them, and then you pick the weapons suited to the mission … as opposed to having single-threat Marines who are only experts at one system.”(1) As a company commander of Alpha Company 1/2 Mar, an experimental Force Design 2030 rifle company, my team and I have been on the forefront of creating multi-disciplinary Marines utilizing the Arms Room Concept over the last eighteen months. This period has resulted in many lessons learned and recommendations on how infantry battalions can overcome systematic shortfalls and effectively implement the Arms Room Concept going forward. With additional investments of time, resources, and an adjusted approach to enlisted infantry schooling, infantry battalions can employ multi-disciplinary Marines to provide maximum flexibility on a chaotic and distributed battlefield.

The push towards the development of the multi-disciplinary Marine is not one of desire, but one of necessity. Static positions and massed formations are terribly easy to find and target, especially against an adversary like Russia and China who possess a robust suite of sensors and persistent ISR capabilities. However, as this technology continues to develop and spread, it is no longer just the major power players who possess the ability to leverage space-based ISR platforms and unmanned-aerial systems to hunt their adversaries. These systems, coupled with precision-guided missiles, long-range rockets, and cheap loitering over-the-horizon suicide drones will force military formations to become smaller and more dispersed to survive. Operating within this type of environment makes it no longer tenable to train Marines to become experts at one singular weapons system. As formations operate further away from their higher headquarters, small units will be required to possess a multitude of assets, weaponry, and capability sets.

The common question that comes up when discussing the creation of multi-disciplinary Marines is which weapons systems should encompass the arms room and which capabilities will require a Marine with a specific MOS. While training every Marine to become proficient and qualified in every weapons system is desirable, it is unrealistic in application. Within Alpha Company’s Force Design structure, specialty-trained Marines and weapons traditionally held at the battalion level, such as Javelin missiles, heavy machineguns, mortars, and loitering munitions, have been transferred from what was previously weapons company to the company’s hunter killer platoon. These complex weapons systems require Marines with advanced-level training and were not included in our training to create multi-disciplinary Marines.

What Does the Arms Room Concept Provide the Service?
Flexible/adaptive force
A leading benefit of the Arms Room Concept has been the flexibility it has provided the company. As the 2nd MarDiv Experimental Force Design rifle company within 1/2 Mar, the company had the privilege of executing a series of difficult experimental training exercises across the United States. These exercises were designed to push the limits of an infantry company, employing advanced sensors and weaponry within exercise scenarios for the company to distances exceeding 50 kilometers from the rest of the battalion. In each of these instances, the company’s platoons and squads were distributed another five-ten kilometers to accomplish independent tasks assigned by the company commander. Upon insertion of the company into the exercise operational area frequently dominated by adversary sensors and anti-air missile systems, there was virtually no ability to adjust or reallocate key assets or crew-served weapons across formations. Doing so would require the use of already limited transportation platforms and would expose the force to the risk of detection and subsequent targeting.

Alpha Company’s employment of multi-disciplinary Marines and access to previously held battalion-level assets at the company level were key components that enabled success in a distributed operating environment. By having medium machineguns, rockets, long-range precision rifles, and recoilless rifles within each platoon, platoon commanders and squad leaders have the unique ability to custom tailor their table of equipment to provide a mission-ready force to accomplish the task assigned. For the platoons and squads within Alpha Company, this has at times resulted in one squad carrying multiple medium machineguns and rocket systems while another is operating with a much lighter footprint carrying only their primary service rifle into the fight. Only by training Marines on every weapons system could these custom-tailored units have the flexibility required to be successful in a distributed fight against a capable adversary while simultaneously possessing the firepower required to mass when necessary.

Redundancy
Redundancy is another beneficial aspect of the Arms Room Concept. If the Marine who is typically responsible for employing the medium machinegun or Carl Gustav recoilless rifle is incapacitated, there is a squad’s worth of Marines who can pick it up and employ it effectively in the fight. This occurred during several of our exercises and will undoubtedly happen in the next big conflict. While the most common example included a simulated casualty for the Marine carrying a specific weapons system, there were other instances where a Marine became ill or was simply needed to execute some other task. By having this redundancy, the unit never lost the capability that the weapons system provided because there was a ready bench of capable Marines who could pick up and employ that weapons system in the fight effectively.

Redundant capabilities have additional benefits beyond providing a company with a strong bench of utility players. It provides the option to weigh units in a way that was not previously possible. By having thirteen Marines who are trained to employ the medium machinegun or recoilless rifle within a squad, a company commander has the option to weigh that unit with additional weapons to allow for the accomplishment of a task such as an attack by fire or support by fire. The availability of these options has undoubtedly made the unit a more capable, flexible, and deadly force.

It is important to note that although redundancy means that a squad could theoretically hand a medium machinegun, grenade launcher, or recoilless rifle to any Marine within the squad to effectively employ, naturally the proficiency levels amongst the Marines will vary. We have addressed this by striving to train all Marines to be incidental operators with each of the weapons within the Arms Room. This means mandatory, across-the-board cross-training built into the training schedule to ensure every Marine can at least pick up a weapon, load it properly, conduct appropriate misfire procedures, and manipulate a machinegun’s traversing and elevation mechanism or a recoilless rifle’s sight system to engage various targets on the battlefield.

Enhances Integration
A point often used to argue against the Arms Room Concept is that there is no requirement to have these weapons capabilities organic to the rifle platoons and squads, for they can be attached by the company if required. While this argument is true on the surface, it overlooks the significant benefit of having Marines with those capabilities organic to each small unit. By platoons having access to the weapons and Marines during training, they will be best postured to accurately understand their capabilities, limitations, and how to best employ them on the battlefield. The valuable trust built through time and repetitions cannot be replicated with an attachment that may or may not have worked with the unit before. Instead of receiving an attachment whose true physical capability and overall proficiency are unknown and largely assumed, the Marines are already an organic part of that small unit. Under the new construct that employs multi-disciplinary Marines, a single rifle platoon can serve as a heavy support-by-fire element complete with a full complement of machineguns while also providing organic internal security. Previously, this same task would require several attachments from outside the platoon to accomplish. Now, each platoon commander and squad leader have the capabilities required within their units with their multi-disciplinary Marines.

Recommendations
The implementation of the Arms Room Concept provides the Marine Corps infantry with a much more capable, lethal, and flexible force, but it does come at a significant cost. To create highly proficient multi-disciplinary Marines, the Marine Corps will have to adjust the way we man, train, and equip future infantry formations. Below are some recommendations for how infantry company commanders can approach this issue to support its implementation and future use across every infantry battalion.

Building Capabilities Incrementally
Training all Marines within an infantry rifle squad to effectively employ every weapons system available does take an extraordinary amount of time and energy. That said, it is achievable if you take an incremental approach to building capabilities over time. Those who typically push back on the concept will point out that it is impossible for every Marine to have the same level of proficiency as a current machine gunner who has years of fleet experience and advanced-level training. However, the goal of the Arms Room Concept is not to blindly hand weapons to any Marine in your formation and expect the same results. Instead, the goal is to create highly lethal teams made up of multi-disciplinary Marines who can perform a laundry list of tasks and employ a variety of weapons systems. With a future operating environment characterized by contested airspace and severe distribution of maneuvering forces, Marine Corps units cannot afford to fill a critical seat on any insert helicopter with someone who can only carry out one singular task or employ one specific weapon.

Critics of the Arms Room Concept express concern about losing a level of technical proficiency by moving away from designated Marines who employ some of these weapons in the previous, legacy construct. Although a valid concern, the argument tends to exaggerate the complexity of certain weapons while also ignoring that the Marine Corps has long trained Marines to employ multiple weapons systems. Combat engineers and artillerymen each cross-train Marines to employ machineguns for localized security. Even within the infantry, squads for decades trained traditional riflemen to employ the M249 squad automatic weapon, a light machinegun organic within each fire team. Marines carrying this machinegun achieved much success in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan before the Corps transitioned to the current service rifle.

To accomplish our goal of incrementally creating multi-functional Marines who can employ each weapons system in the Arms Room Concept, Alpha Company started by selecting the most common weapons systems the squad would likely use on the battlefield. These included the Infantry Automatic Rifle, the M320 grenade launcher, Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, and the M240 medium machinegun. With the agreed-upon understanding that it would take a large amount of time and ammunition for all Marines to become experts on each of these weapons, we started by qualifying every Marine on the basics, such as the ability to load, unload, and conduct misfire procedures for each weapon. As each Marine effectively demonstrated the ability to conduct these incidental-operator-level tasks, they were classified as qualified Marines capable of employing this weapons system if required. As each Marine trained to become qualified, small-unit leaders identified top performers who were evaluated in employing that weapon on a live-fire range. Those who were successful in this evaluation were designated as certified on that weapon and could now fire that weapon system in support of a maneuvering friendly element. Over the course of the pre-deployment workup, the company was able to qualify nearly every Marine in the rifle platoons on each weapon system while also building an impressive number of certified Marines who were the first ones within that unit to employ the weapon if the requirement was identified during planning.

Use of Simulators to Build Proficiency
Certifying every Marine on each weapon within the Arms Room Concept would require a massive increase in the amount of ammunition typically available to each infantry battalion. To continue to train multi-disciplinary Marines under this resource constraint, infantry companies will need to maximize the use of technology and simulators. The Marine Corps has made great strides over the years to ensure Marines have access to realistic simulators to train and build proficiency, and these systems will only get better as technology improves and becomes cheaper to replicate. Currently, every base installation has an Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT) available for units to schedule and use for training. Although Alpha Company did leverage these systems to a limited degree, this is admittedly a resource we should have used more. Company commanders should embrace the use of available simulators and incorporate them into their weekly training schedules to build individual weapons capabilities without expending the limited ammunition available.

Although the ISMT is a valuable resource for training Marines, there are currently several limitations associated with these systems. First, the limited number of simulators available on each installation will be insufficient to support every infantry battalion as they each transition to the Arms Room Concept. Either the current ISMTs will need to expand, or additional facilities will need to be constructed to meet the increasing demand. There will also need to be an expansion of weapon systems available within the current ISMTs to ensure they encompass the M320 and Carl Gustav, critical weapons within the arms room. Another option could be the investment in an ISMT type similar within each infantry battalion’s office space. While this would require significant initial investment and continued attention to keep them working and operational, the benefits would be well worth the cost. 1/2 Mar has seen the benefit of having an in-house simulator first-hand. Within a battalion command post, there is a dedicated training room with multiple Javelin and TOW missile simulators. Utilizing these training aids does not require an extensive request process or deconflicting with dozens of other units across the base. As a result, the company and battalion have been able to sustain proficiency with these weapons systems while building an impressive number of incidental operators despite not receiving the necessary number of missiles to train effectively. With additional investment in the access and quality of simulators, infantry units can overcome the limited availability of live ammunition and develop a capable unit of multi-disciplinary Marines.

Leverage/Create Subject-Matter Experts
The Arms Room Concept and the creation of multi-disciplinary Marines within infantry battalions are only possible through the possession of unit internal instructors and subject-matter experts to train Marines on the technical proficiency necessary to employ various weapon systems. Alpha Company, 1/2 Mar has been fortunate in this area. To achieve the task organization in the company that included an increased rank requirement, the rifle squads were built from Marines from every infantry MOS. This was particularly important at the small-unit leader level. Each squad was comprised of staff sergeant squad leaders, sergeant team leaders, and several junior NCOs who were school-trained machine gunners, mortarmen, and anti-armor Marines. The presence of this diverse set of skill sets allowed the company to leverage these warriors to develop a team of multi-disciplinary Marines within each rifle platoon.

As infantry battalions adopt the Arms Room Concept and explore ways to replace the different specialty MOSs into a consolidated all-encompassing 03XX MOS, the Marine Corps must ensure units have access to a bullpen of school-trained instructors to fill this critical role. Until the Advanced School of Infantry redesigns its infantry school pipeline to meet this new challenge, infantry battalions must continue to leverage courses such as Advanced Machine Gunners Course, Advanced Anti-Tank Missile Gunner Course, and Infantry Unit Leaders Course. Marines returning from these courses will have the technical proficiency necessary to help develop and train the other Marines in their platoons. In addition to maximizing the use of these current advanced schools to train Marines and build a cadre of capable instructors, each infantry division needs to play a part by crafting division schools that help units achieve the goal of creating multi-disciplinary Marines across their formations.

Warfare is experiencing a technological revolution where precision-guided munitions and unmanned systems will continue to proliferate and dominate the future battlefield. To meet the challenge of a future fight against a smart and capable near-peer or peer adversary, the Marine Corps infantry will need to transition away from a force of single-threat Marines to a more capable and flexible team of multi-disciplinary Marines capable of employing a variety of different weapons available within the unit’s armory. While Alpha Company 1/2 Mar has made a tremendous number of mistakes along the way and certainly does not have all the answers, our experience on the cutting edge of Force Design 2030 experimentation for the past eighteen months has informed us of the benefits of Arms Room Concept and the necessity of multi-disciplinary Marines within the infantry. With additional investments of time, resources, and an adjusted approach to enlisted infantry schooling, infantry battalions can employ multi-disciplinary Marines to provide maximum flexibility on a chaotic and distributed battlefield.

Notes

1. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Update Force Design 2030 After a Year of Experimentation in the Field,” United States Naval Institute News, April 26, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/04/26/marines-update-force-design-2030-after-a-year-of-experimentation-in-the-field.

Using time wisely for professional development

>Col Tiger is an F/A-18 Pilot and the Commanding Officer of Marine Aviation Training Support Group 22 in Corpus Christi, TX.

>>1stLt Grier is a Villanova University graduate and is awaiting jet training in Kingsville, TX.

>>>2ndLt Appel is a Naval Academy graduate and a prior-service Nuclear Electricians Mate. She is awaiting primary flight training in Corpus Christi, TX.

Marines Awaiting Training
In naval aviation, there is a fictional character named Grandpa Pettibone. Borne out of desperation in World War II, this grumpy old codger would impart aviation knowledge to his readers with cartoon drawings and sarcastic humor in a desperate attempt to reduce flying accidents.1 Every naval aviator since 1942 has learned some vital lesson from the cantankerous, pithy, and humorous old Grandpa Pettibone.2

If Gramps saddled up with his cane and book o’ knowledge to tour our training bases, he would probably say, “Jumpin’ Jehoshaphat Devildogs! Why aren’t your Marines awaiting training using this time wisely to further their professional development?”3

Commandant Berger would agree with Gramps. The Commandant’s five priority focus areas include force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. Our Marines awaiting training focus on all five priority areas, with particular attention directed toward education and training.

From commissioning to winging as a fleet aviator, Marine student pilots can spend two years or more in a Marines Awaiting Training status. As Grandpa Pettibone says and the Commandant directs, this time must be used wisely. Marine Aviation Training Support Group 21 (MATSG-21) in Pensacola and MATSG-22 in Corpus Christi are developing unique, low-cost, low-overhead training events that intellectually develop Marines. Some of these events may also be useful to other commands with large student populations awaiting training.

Intellectual Development
The Marine Corps is a learning organization.4 Marine Corps Order 1553.4B states individual Marines are responsible for their own learning, and it is incumbent upon commanders to foster a culture of lifelong learning. This intellectual ability is cultivated through “active engagement with the brightest minds and the most challenging material, which forces Marines to contend with their assumptions, perceptions and concepts.”5

To foster a culture of lifelong learning, MATSG-22 executes a syllabus that teaches lieutenants to read critically, write articulate essays on their subject matter, and brief peers on the lessons derived from various works. Distilled from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps War College syllabi, the MATSG syllabus focuses on both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The final module focuses on military aviation history. Each module begins with a war college-produced lecture, available online and taught by resident experts that describe each war in detail. Students then read, write and think critically about lessons from the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.
The background students receive in reading, writing, and speaking critically about military history will support them throughout their careers. Confidence when briefing aviation operations as a captain, credibility with overseas partners as a major, historically based planning as a lieutenant colonel, and strategic-level depth and insight as a colonel are only some of the positive outcomes our students will achieve with their focus on critical reading, writing, and speaking.

To complement this intensive reading program, MATSG has experimented with critical thought workshops. Instructors and students recently participated in a two-week workshop in a live classroom setting with the Ground Truth Design Company, a private-industry program designed to equip leaders with tools, doctrine, and techniques to think critically and better solve complex problems. The initial results are promising.
Instructors and students were broken into five teams, each with a different problem to address. Using the techniques provided by the instructors, our teams set to work and contacted industry experts, general officers, and even one Congressional Staff who agreed to take our student’s proposal and incorporate their solutions into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. The success our students achieved exceeded all expectations in many cases. These lessons will serve our students well throughout their careers as they address complex problems in the Indo-Pacific region, Force Design implementation, naval integration, and more.

Tactical Training
To complement the intellectual development program, MATSG has implemented a three-tiered system that trains students in the tactical application of their profession.

Our primary tactical training period is called MATSG-22 University, focused strictly on flight training. This week-long course is taught by recent flight school graduates to those awaiting flight training. This course prepares students for the rigors of flight school using books, lectures, chalk-talk, and simulator events. The desired end state of MATSG-22 University is to reduce time-to-train while producing higher quality aviators outside the official period of instruction. As with the intellectual development program, this is a low-cost, low-overhead, repeatable event taught by peers under the supervision of fleet instructors. The course delivery method also demonstrates a transition from the industrial-aged model of learning towards a student-centered, 21st-century learning style supported by Training and Education Command.

Battlefield staff rides, museum visits, and case studies provide the second tier of tactical training evolutions. The Marine Corps Association produces excellent military case studies, ranging from Mogadishu to Guadalcanal to the Chosin Reservoir. Students are selected to lead various case studies, leveraging the Marine Corps Association’s pre-built case studies that describe the historical significance, tactical importance, and strategic implications of each battle. Each package includes detailed maps with the scheme of maneuver and terrain depicted with recommended articles, podcasts, videos, and books that complement the case study. Similar to the critical reading, writing, and speaking from the intellectual development module, students gain experience briefing and leading events among their peers, with guidance and structure provided by the instructor cadre.

The third tier of the tactical training module is Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). Recently implemented and with direct assistance from the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and Commanding Generals of Training and Education Command and Training Command, this program will aid students in completing their professional military education requirements while awaiting flight training. This program has enormous potential for newly winged aviators entering the fleet as senior first lieutenants and junior captains who must focus on the tactical employment of their aircraft while expeditiously completing their PME requirements prior to the promotion board. To compensate for each student’s lack of real-world experience in the course, the Expeditionary Warfare School instructor selected senior Marines to augment the class so that students can leverage their experience. This “hybrid” approach to Expeditionary Warfare School will serve aviators and the Marine Corps well.

Real-World Training
“We must elevate our standards and deliver a more capable Marine to the FMF, while also incentivizing and expanding MOS-specific development opportunities afforded throughout the Marine’s career.”6 MATSG-22 turned commander’s intent into action and sent students around the country and the world to support individual professional development while simultaneously supporting fleet commanders in accomplishing their mission.

One of the most anticipated events in MATSG’s arsenal to expand career developmental opportunities is the Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, held semi-annually at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, in Arizona. Here, students gain an appreciation for graduate-level aviation employment as they observe flight line operations, live ordnance procedures, classified briefs and debriefs, realtime execution from secure facilities, and more. With great support from the MAWTS-1 Commander and his staff, and with proper risk-mitigation measures in place, this evolution is the most sought opportunity among all flight students awaiting training.

Other opportunities for temporary duty exist on a case-by-case basis. For example, a Japanese-speaking Marine flight student recently served as an interpreter for Marine Forces Japan, enhancing joint interoperability between U.S. and Japanese naval forces. MATSG routinely pairs flight students with fleet units who can effectively leverage and employ their unique skills. Fleet units in need of temporary and specific skills are encouraged to contact MATSG-21 and MATSG-22 who can properly vet its 450 students awaiting training to support your mission.

Lastly, MATSG-22 began a monthly program where flight students interact with the Joint Staff J-3 via the Secret video teleconference network. These classified briefings from some of the Pentagon’s resident experts provide valuable insight for young officers interested in European, Middle Eastern, and Asian operations. This interaction sparks students’ intellectual curiosity and provides a frame of reference for the world they are about to enter once they graduate from flight training.
It is important to note the tremendous support MATSG receives from senior leaders, MAWTS-1, the Joint Staff, Marine Aircraft Groups, the Marine Corps Association, and others that assist in mentoring, instructing, employing, empowering, motivating, coaching, and teaching young flight students awaiting training. Their efforts help develop a student’s intellectual curiosity and support critical thinking and builds the bench of future leaders needed to fight and win the Nation’s wars.

Conclusion
The Marine Corps requires leaders at all levels who can achieve intellectual overmatch against our adversaries.7 Names such as Alfred T. Mahan, U.S. Grant, John J. Pershing, George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, John A. Lejeune, Matthew Ridgeway, O.P. Smith, and Colin Powell are noted for their ability to devise, implement and execute military operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Today’s Marines must learn to do the same. MATSG-22 supports this endeavor with intellectual development exercises, tactical training evolutions, and real-world exposure events within a 21st-century learning construct. Grandpa Pettibone would be proud to know our young leaders are dedicated, disciplined, and focused on professional and intellectual development while awaiting flight training.

Notes

1. CAPT Rosario Rausa, “Jumpin’ Josephat! 50 Years of Gramps” Naval Aviation News (Jan–Feb 1993).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Gen David H. Berger, Training & Education 2030 (Washington, DC: January 2023).

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

Fielding cutting edge capabilities

>BGen Walsh is currently serving as the Commander of Marine Corps Systems Command.

“All of our analysis leads us unequivocally to the conclusion that the defense acquisition system has basic problems that must be corrected. These problems are deeply entrenched and have developed over several decades from an increasingly bureaucratic and overregulated process. As a result, all too many of our weapons systems cost too much, take too long to develop, and, by the time they are fielded, incorporate obsolete technology.”
—1986 Packard Commission Report

Never has the Demand for Faster Delivery of Capabilities Been Greater
Global competitors are developing and fielding capabilities that challenge our Nation’s competitive advantage. The advancement of near-peer adversaries, along with the tremendous pace at which technology is progressing, demands rapid modernization of our capabilities for the future operating environment. To contribute to the joint fight as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, we must be able to compete, deter, and facilitate escalation in an increasingly contested battlespace. Yet, despite the urgency of the geopolitical situation we face, the DOD has struggled to accelerate the fielding of cutting-edge technology to provide high-impact operational solutions for the warfighter.

There are Inherent Challenges to Acceleration
Our acquisition system (inclusive of our requirements and resourcing processes) has long been a source of tremendous frustration. It has been characterized as sluggish, rigid, inadaptable, and unresponsive. Even 37 years after the Packard Commission identified many of the issues that impede warfighting innovation, a pernicious set of underlying problems often prevent us from fielding fully capable equipment, with mature sustainment systems, in the time frame needed by our operational fleet. Too often, we take opposing sides: an exasperated fleet staunchly defending poorly defined, shifting requirements on one side versus a bureaucratic acquisition system mired in risk aversion and a culture of compliance on the other. Add in a multi-year planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process and a regulatory system optimized for oversight vice responsiveness, and our Marines are left wanting.

A great deal of work is being done to address the large, systemic issues. Congress has already granted additional authorities, such as the middle-tier of acquisition and the software acquisition pathway, that the DOD has incorporated in the adaptive acquisition framework and that the Marine Corps is already using. A congressional commission on PPBE reform and an Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption will provide recommendations that may ultimately result in additional acceleration opportunities such as more rapid requirements validation for mature capabilities, broader capability-based budget line items, and adjusting reprogramming authorities to allow additional flexibility in the year of execution. But even in the current environment, there is a way to accelerate.

“Take calculated risks. That is quite different from being rash.”
—Gen George Patton

We Can Go Faster by Balancing Risk, Tilting More Toward Schedule
One of the basic principles of project management is balancing the triple constraints of cost, time, and requirement scope. Optimizing for one inherently creates risk or compromise in another. Recognizing the deep-rooted friction that exists in the acquisition system, we can meet the challenge of accelerating capabilities to the fleet by tilting these constraints in favor of schedule, making well-informed trades, and accepting prudent risks in the other areas.

Program managers are incentivized to reduce financial risk. Programs are regularly measured against financial execution benchmarks and under-execution could mean a loss of program funds. Of course, it goes without saying that our acquisition professionals are bound to be good stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars. However, that does not necessarily mean the lowest cost or lowest financial risk. The taxpayers, and our Marines, need and want the best warfighting value for every dollar. That may mean paying a premium for more engineers to accelerate a design or moving engineers from a less critical program to accelerate a priority program. It could mean making an expensive capital investment to speed production or adopting a contract strategy that incentivizes industry to go faster, even if it increases the financial risk to the government. In a time of constrained resources, this will require close collaboration with resourcing organizations to make the necessary budgetary accommodations.

Our Marines deserve the very best, cutting-edge technology. That axiom, while appropriate and well-intentioned, often drives a dogged reluctance to accept any technical risk. This can manifest as high-end, unique requirements that may be unachievable without significant developmental efforts (i.e. time) or as a reluctance to field a system that satisfies 80 percent of requirements now as a minimum viable product with an executable plan for iterative maturation. In the acquisition community, this can take the form of extended test programs that seek to reduce uncertainty to a minuscule level, or application of strict specifications to uphold compliance, without critical thought to validate the warfighting applicability of those specifications. For the fleet, accelerated fielding may imply supply chain risk and reduced initial readiness as the industrial base builds to full capacity. Technical risk must be accepted thoughtfully, especially where safety and security are at stake. However, a well-informed collaboration can allow smart technical trades for the sake of getting the capability to our Marines as quickly as possible.

Enable Well-Informed, Collaborative Trades, Deferring to Users
Decisions such as these are made every day across the requirements and acquisition communities. Too often, those trades are made by well-intentioned stakeholders who may not have full visibility of second-order effects or the correct perspective to appropriately weigh considerations. The key to acceleration is to enable fully informed trades, at the right level, deferring the final vote to those that will have to live with the results of those trades—the operational Marines.

Close, transparent collaboration between designers and developers, resource managers, program managers, acquisition professionals, users, and requirements owners throughout the entire process is essential to fully inform and define the decision space for the ultimate decision authority. Tilting the constraint equation toward schedule will require trust and a yes, if approach by all stakeholders.

For our acquisition corps, this will mean pushing back against the compliance culture—reducing bureaucracy, documents, and reviews by understanding what is truly essential to delivering capability and tailoring out those that are obsolete, redundant, or unnecessary. There will be resistance from those who own the processes that have been abridged. Avoid the temptation to acquiesce to this risk aversion—know where boundaries are and why, push through toward them, and when you get there, elevate your best assessment of the risks and opportunities of pushing beyond. Do not take a no from someone who cannot give you a yes. Reject the attitudes of the guardians of sacred specifications or processes. In execution, embrace experimentation and prototyping. Put early iterations in the hands of Marines to gain feedback and use all available authorities to optimize acquisition and contracting strategies to incentivize industry for speed and agility to incorporate that feedback. Do not go so far as to become a cheerleader for your program but embrace our role as the truth-tellers who can present operators with the information they need to make well-informed decisions to enable speed.

For resource managers, embrace funding strategies consistent with risk-based acquisition decisions. Help defend these strategies during the planning, programming, and budgeting processes. Advocate for greater flexibility in budget execution and partner with requirement owners and program managers to adjust resources when circumstances change.

For requirement owners and fleet users, resist the urge to demand satisfaction of all requirements in one big bang for fear of never fully achieving the desired capability in a resource-constrained, elongated traditional development program. Specify a minimum viable capability or product—the smallest product that provides usable warfighting capability—and plan for refinement of requirements and maturation of technology over time. Engage with developers early and define requirements collaboratively to ensure they’re achievable within the time and resources allocated. Be prepared to consider commercial or joint solutions that may save significant time but may not meet some of the niche requirements we sometimes levy as Marines. Recognize that there will be hard decisions about the prioritization of resources between many important programs.

Examples of these types of decisions are:

• A partner’s tactical vehicle is already in production in large quantities (i.e. lower cost) and is available now, but does not meet the full fording requirement of the Marine Corps. A new development program will require tens of millions of dollars of development over several years to field a new fully compliant vehicle. Which vehicle does the Marine Corps buy?
• A commercial UAS is available now, at a low cost, but does not meet all of the cybersecurity requirements of the Marine Corps. Does the Marine Corps buy that system or invest in a secure new development?
• A new system has completed testing and meets all technical requirements. However, parts demand history is scant, and suppliers have not built robust supply chains to ensure the availability of parts. Does the Marine Corps field the system or wait until there is higher confidence that readiness can be maintained?
• A program has verified by testing that a new system operates reliably and safely throughout 90 percent of its operational envelope. Clearing the remaining 10 percent will take an additional nine months of testing at a significant cost. Should the Marine Corps field the system with a restricted envelope, accept the risk of operating in the unknown region, or delay fielding until testing can clear the full envelope?

In reality, the choices are rarely that simple. There are multiple intertwined dependencies that must be considered. The key is to have the right stakeholders represented in the discussion. For senior leaders, actively encourage this collaborative approach. Reward creative problem-solving and measured risk-taking. Make time for you and your Marines to participate in this vital work. Send your best and brightest—a small cadre of acquisition Marines at Marine Corps Systems Command and Naval Air Systems Command, working closely with requirements Marines at Capabilities Development Directorate, are making tactical-level decisions with strategic impacts similar to these every day. In the spirit of talent management, invest in an acquisition corps and requirements community that you have confidence in to inform and adjudicate these trades.

While this approach will not address the larger, systemic PPBE and regulatory challenges, it does provide an avenue to move faster in the modernization of our Corps. Proactively engaging in well-informed trade-offs and risk management in favor of schedule will allow us to put new capabilities in the hands of our Marines more quickly than our traditional approach. The Nation’s ability to meet the demands of the global environment and the viability of the Marine Corps as an enabler to the Joint Force count on us.

“There are risks and costs to action. But they are far less than the long-range risks of comfortable inaction.”
—John F. Kennedy

Supporting Force Design 2030 with enhanced infantry Marines

“Look at a man the way he is, and he only becomes worse, but look at him as if he were what he could be, then he becomes what he should be.”
—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

1100 UTC/Zulu Time, 19:00 Local Time. Somewhere in the USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility January 2032
The lights were back again. Slow-moving and just off the horizon, they flickered just beyond the frequent driving rain squalls that made everything worse. SSgt TJ Boyd swore under his breath. He was on day fourteen of an eventful two weeks on the island. Frankly, he was looking forward to extract. With a linkup grid already passed, he was a few hours away from beginning his squad’s displacement to a platoon rally point just off the beach. But the lights complicated things. SSgt Boyd’s well-tuned baseline told him they were too far out to be the local fishing fleet. Those guys normally stuck pretty close to the reef, and something about the back-and-forth course corrections bothered him—too precise, too deliberate. Timelines for extract were normally tight, and the small boat guys were touchy about reprogramming their unmanned surface drones. Especially this late in the process of callbacks to support a beach landing site (BLS). Boyd decided right then and there to get ahead of the problem and roll L-hour for extract by 24 hours. Pro-words were passed via a data transmission mirroring the local electronic spectrum, and an alternate BLS was selected to better support tidal forecasts for the following night. His company commander told him after the OPORD to trust his instincts and adjust the plan when needed, and he was going to do precisely that. But that was weeks ago in the well deck and way before the actual shooting started.

Boyd called over his assistant patrol leader, Sgt John Taylor, already busy putting together the final touches on route planning for the night. Boyd got him working on a new timeline and established a hasty priority information requirement for the Stalker extra lite on the integrated battalion collection plan. Forty-five minutes later, they caught a break in the weather and were running an offset reconnaissance approach on the problematic offshore lights. “What the hell is that thing?” Boyd wondered aloud. He suspected the Peoples Armed Forces Maritime Militia, as he knew the enemy used non-combatants to skirt rules of engagement, screen, collect, and support targeting across the division’s battlespace. Moments later he identified myriad antennae bristling above the retrofitted fishing vessel, clearly illuminated on his handheld feed. Boyd’s suspicion was confirmed. Identified Peoples Armed Forces Maritime Militia presence in the area of operation was an identified commander’s critical information requirement and required a report to higher thereby breaking his squad’s communication window. A burst data transmission was discretely passed on battalion TAC relaying the updated enemy sit, complete with a recommended search zone offset around a hastily named area of interest. Boyd was not only worried about the Peoples Armed Forces Maritime Militia ship but also what else might be lurking further offshore. Fortunately, that was the surface battalion composite warfare commander’s problem to solve. Boyd’s problem lay closer in, just inside the horizon to the platoon BLS.

Several overhead searches of the nearest extract site confirmed his fears. Two small boats approached Boyd’s location with what looked like an enemy reconnaissance team’s worth of dismounts. Boyd called in his team leaders and passed a hasty WARNO: prep two loitering munitions, complete pre-combat checks for a possible night ambush, heavy weapons load-out, and procure additional water. His team leaders moved out smartly to prepare for combat, which gave TJ a minute to think and complete his plan. They would act decisively, combine old techniques with new tactics, and destroy their enemies. Boyd produced a weathered waterproof notebook he had kept with him since his earliest days at entry-level training in Southern California. The notebook now served as his de-facto leadership handbook. Something about having his handwritten notes from years of experience was a comfort in the chaos of war. His memories drifted back to his experience at the School of Infantry as he flipped slowly through his debrief notes from ten years prior.

The Combat Instructors, MOS 0913, of the School of Infantry (SOI) deliver infantry Marines to the FMF who are ready to fight and win tonight. We believe these Marines will go on to serve as the more capable future squad leaders and platoon sergeants envisioned by Force Design 2030. While points of uncertainty remain in the Marine Corps’ effort to change, the 0913 works daily to develop tactical skills and decision making the future demands. We believe the skill of the infantry Marine will be called upon soon, with short to no notice, and likely while serving as part of a Marine Corps Stand-In-Force—all while under persistent enemy observation, threat, and detection. To develop tougher, more lethal grunts the Commandant directed Training Command to improve the process of building entry-level infantry Marines. The combat instructors of SOI believe we are achieving this end state and in the process developed an adult-learning model for training that is highly transferable across the Service. In writing this article, SOI hopes to describe many of these new methods of instruction that proved useful and effective in improving entry-level infantry training. A process that resulted in an improved instructor culture, which was a critical requirement to implement change. SOI is certain that the Marine Corps is beginning to make significant gains in its infantry capability, through a better-developed, tougher, and more realistic infantry training program. This article describes in greater detail, and to a wider audience, the enhanced entry-level infantry training conducted during the new fourteen-week Infantry Marine Course (IMC).

On 27 January 2021, Infantry Training Battalion completed in-processing for the first pilot class of IMC. Over the last 24 months, we have gone from piloting a course and continuous experimentation to an approved Marine Corps Program of Instruction (POI). The IMC POI resulted in a drastic improvement to entry-level training, yet in many ways, IMC re-established what many would consider traditional Marine Corps concepts. IMC stresses the importance of maneuver warfare philosophy, non-commissioned officer-led and developed training, tactical decision games, uncompromising physical standards, and a laser-like focus on practical application. These have become the new watchwords at SOI. As of January 2023, IMC is the only course offered for entry-level 0311s, 0331s, 0341s, and 0352s (weapons MOS Marines conduct an additional four weeks of training on machineguns, mortars, or anti-armor weapons at the Infantry Weapons Course or IWC).

As a first step in developing IMC, the Marine Corps embarked on a deliberate process to identify skills believed necessary in a future fight against a peer adversary. Through this process, the Marine Corps developed 39 infantry competencies required of every infantry Marine. Infantry competencies range from traditional skills such as employing the service rifle, patrolling, and land navigation to more subjective, whole Marine concepts skills including: “embodying the Marine Corps’ Warfighting Philosophy.” Through a process based on input from the three Marine divisions and our Service’s Training Command, a subset of twenty infantry competencies or behaviors were prioritized as a requirement for entry-level training. The twenty infantry behaviors selected became the foundation to develop the new IMC POI and the first pilot of the fourteen-week course.

IMC is built on an outcomes-based learning approach that implements 21st-century learning techniques. In a simple description, outcomes-based learning is a model that evaluates a Marine’s quantitative and qualitative ability on each of the 20x infantry behaviors. This model provides a wildly better ability to assess a Marine’s capability to perform individual and collective skills in a more realistic and dynamic combat environment. Outcomes-based learning is a recognition that just because somebody has passed the minimum requirements in a skill set, they by no means have achieved mastery. In the current unit training management construct, individuals and units are evaluated via a binary assessment of mastery or non-mastery, with no other options. This effectively leaves no room for recognizing and evaluating talent. How does a trainer compare a talented combat marksmanship coach’s shooting skills against a young Marine who barely qualified on the range? They have both passed the necessary shooting assessments with the service rifle and are equally good. We do both Marines a disservice by not accurately breaking out skill sets. The Marine who struggles does not get the training he needs and the Marine who excels is not recognized for exceptional performance.

Outcomes-based learning provides an opportunity to highlight the difference in a Marine’s learning. Each Marine’s skill in a particular behavior is graded on a scale. This scale is separated into five tiers we call skill acquisition levels (SALS): novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expert. A detailed grading rubric with highly quantifiable metrics and word picture descriptions aids the instructor in rating the SAL a Marine achieves for each behavior. Generally speaking, as SAL levels increase, Marines can perform each behavior with less supervision, execute the skill in more complicated and dynamic environments, and ultimately become teachers and experts. To graduate from IMC, each student must achieve the minimum SAL for all twenty infantry behaviors as depicted in Figure 1.

Outcomes-based learning also calls for the continuous assessment of a student’s skill across all twenty infantry behaviors. In our old eight-week POI, Marines were given three opportunities to master a training and readiness task. Following evaluation, they were given pass/fail feedback on performance and were then never assessed on that skill again. Cramming for the test and moving on to the next event is a poor method for skill retention over time. During IMC, students are continuously evaluated, tracked, and counseled using a report card to identify, by behavior, a student’s strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities to improve. At the conclusion of the course, these report cards become a warm hand-off tool for Marines reporting to the FMF and are used to support talent management at the squad and platoon levels.

IMC also improved the way instructors teach new infantry Marines. We based this process on an updated adult- learning model. Historically, end-of-course critiques and retention tests revealed a shockingly low return on large classroom instruction and specifically highlighted zero value in PowerPoint lectures. Marines at IMC now invest those training hours in small group interactions provided directly by their combat instructors, who serve as a training squad leader. Our classes are conducted in unit squad bays or directly in a field environment outside of a lecture hall. Ample time is afforded for questions from the students. Small group “class” instruction is always followed by extensive practical application and interaction with the material, equipment, and combat instructors. Student participation is an absolute requirement, and their buy-in and commitment to the process are extremely encouraging for the future of the Service.

Enhanced evaluation via SALs, an outcomes-based approach, and adult-learning techniques all provided a solid foundation to change the way we did business at ITB. However, to really achieve the end state of a better, more lethal entry-level infantry Marine, we needed to improve the instructor culture. We believed that entry-level infantry training methods required a complete overhaul. With this honest self-assessment, ITB moved from an instructor climate that presupposed every student was actively striving to fail, to a course anchored on the principle that every student has exceptional potential. Our students are Marines who raised their hand and volunteered to serve their country, and they should be treated, trained, and developed like adults. Specifically, they should be treated like members of a rifle squad in an FMF infantry battalion. Fostering this type of training environment required an update in the instructor-to-student relationship developed during an IMC class. We had to move instructors from the role of unapproachable passive observers to actively involved coaches, trainers, and mentors. The IMC combat instructor serves as the squad leader for fourteen weeks in a process that is highly similar to Marine officer training at The Basic School. The IMC squad leader billet is loosely fashioned on the new lieutenant, staff platoon commander dynamic for our entry-level officers.

The center of gravity of IMC is the small-unit leadership provided by the IMC squad leader. On training day one, fourteen students are assigned a seasoned combat instructor who will be their coach and mentor for the duration of the course. As the training program progresses in difficulty, these squad leaders shift roles from instructor to tactical leader of the squad. IMC squad leaders take their Marines through patrols, supported live-fire attacks, urban combat, and force-on-force exercises. This close relationship with a combat instructor allows students to develop a deeper understanding of what they are taught while receiving immediate, constructive feedback. Instructors build trust with their students in the process, fostering a highly accelerated learning environment. The squad leader now has time to ensure that every student becomes what they should be. Many of our squad leaders describe class graduations as a bittersweet event. Seeing their Marines complete the course and depart for the FMF leaves many instructors wanting to continue the onward journey with their students. All with the understanding that many of our students will begin a daunting training workup and follow-on deployment upon arrival at an infantry battalion.

IMC’s increased focus on the individual Marine comes at a cost, most notably in time and instructor manpower. IMC is an additional investment in a Marine’s initial training pipeline and a significant increase in combat instructor hours. The new course is not simply longer than our previous eight-week offering. IMC gets more out of our students over each training day across the longer fourteen-week program through a more efficient training schedule. To reduce time spent waiting around, ITB-W implemented a block scheduling process—similar to how a civilian high school might schedule classes. The block schedule is broken down by platoon to eliminate the phenomenon of the large 300-man class milling about smartly. Training is broken down into three platoons and across multiple topics to ensure students stay engaged with different kinds of material during an average training day. Instead of spending an entire ten-plus hour training block on marksmanship, IMC students receive smaller two- to three-hour blocks focused on different infantry behaviors. A typical training day might include blocks for swimming instruction, live-fire training, field craft skills, and radio programming. This approach to scheduling improves student retention by providing manageable amounts of information before students reach oversaturation. It also enhances student recall on demand by providing multiple, repeated, and increasingly complex touchpoints with all evaluated infantry skills. The block schedule, a spiraling approach or “non-linear pedagogy” in education speak, is a proven better way to learn as an adult. The skills trained in week one of the POI carry on through the end of the course and are assessed continuously.

IMC students also receive improved training by layering infantry behaviors together. For example, radio and land navigation behaviors are provided during the same training event. Tactical combat casualty care will occur during a patrolling exercise. Layering skills provide students who might struggle with specific topics multiple opportunities to demonstrate competency. This model accommodates students who have a different, often longer, learning process than others. These simple changes in course ideology and method are producing visible results in our students. Our initial feedback from the FMF highlights a tactically improved, more mature, decision-making infantry Marine.

Initial FMF feedback on IMC students highlights a stronger, more physically fit entry-level Marine. The development of IMC offers our Service a springboard toward establishing quantifiable standards for service as an infantry Marine, where previously very few existed. IMC requires a minimum fitness level to begin training, an absolute must considering the arduous nature of the course. Infantry Marines are now held to a much higher physical standard to graduate. Marines earning the 0311 infantry MOS will be required to achieve first-class scores on the Physical Fitness Test and Combat Fitness Test. They will also achieve a minimum swim qualification of Water Survival Intermediate and pass an evaluation on the Shallow Water Egress Trainer, which simulates procedures for evacuating a sinking aircraft. Several IMC graduates completed Water Survival Advanced during the course, the highest Marine Corps swim qualification. Student outcomes in SALs at IMC are not capped and exceptional performers are given the opportunity to exceed minimum requirements. Student physical graduation requirements also include a grueling weeklong warfighting exercise, a ten-kilometer combat endurance assessment, and completion of a 20km hike with a 75-pound fighting load.

To accomplish this litany of new and improved physical standards, ITB developed a more innovative physical training (PT) plan. PT cards, swim cards, and ruck training are designed under a progressive overload model, which builds up physical fitness beginning at boot camp and continues through IMC through increased weight, distance, and exercise repetitions. IMC class hikes are also conducted as an individual effort without a company structure to set the pace. Marines are thereby forced to participate, understand the route, and take care of their feet as part of the process. They can no longer blindly go internal during physical evaluations. In adding responsibility and freedom to loaded movements, hike times and failures have markedly decreased. All graduates from the course have exceeded the Marine Corps training and readiness standard for a forced march.

Swim training cards are broken out between beginner, intermediate, and advanced swimmers, which improves every student regardless of the skill level they bring to IMC. Our swim training has proven wildly effective in developing Marines who are more comfortable in the water and is not a one-size-fits-all workout program. Pool PT sessions provide the added benefit of de-loading wear and tear on joints. We hypothesize this is a factor in the limited overall injury rate for IMC students. Students also conduct an active recovery period once a week, which is spent stretching while their squad leader discusses whole-Marine-concept topics, including moral leadership, personal accountability, and resiliency. Our PT program is one element of a highly-integrated plan that we believe can help produce the more mature, better-thinking Marine that will be an asset on arrival to the fleet.

Decision making and maturity are areas where we believe IMC Marines can outpace our peer adversaries. One of the foremost complaints concerning young Marines arriving in the fleet is their inability to think for themselves. At ITB we believe new Marines often make questionable decisions because we have failed to provide them with opportunities to think and creatively solve problems. Previous entry-level Marines were conditioned, through a model of Industrial-Age education, to regurgitate facts on command without any thought given to circumstances or conditions. Marines were taught a specific solution to a specific situation rather than being able to critically assess a problem and develop a creative solution. This generated a mindset of learned helplessness. Even when options were available, Marines chose not to act. Individual Marines who can think and decide quickly have always been—and will remain—a force multiplier on the future battlefield. Faster decisions generate tempo by exercising speed overtime against our enemy. The initiative of IMC Marines to take appropriate action at their level can generate combat power. Their actions in training are integrated by an overarching commander’s intent, a concept introduced and continually reinforced during IMC. ITB also uses a constraints-led approach to instruction to maximize decision-making opportunities for students.

Specifically, a constraints-led approach to training provides a student with a problem, followed by the things they are not allowed to do. It then asks the student to solve the problem as they see fit, within the provided constraints. Our course does not tell the Marine exactly what they must do to solve a training problem. We surmise this is a more realistic approximation of actual combat. We tell them what is not allowed and make them use their own judgment to think within the bounds of safe training. The constraints-led approach develops student decision making, judgment, and maturity by forcing them to be problem solvers and applies to all skills layered across IMC. The combat instructor will always debrief the student’s solution to provide immediate, individualized feedback and solidify any learning points. Peers in the course observe training as well to accelerate their own learning and to provide peer coaching- a surprisingly important learning tool for Gen-Z Marines. By the end of the course, students make thousands of decisions and receive feedback for most of them from both combat instructors and peers, increasing the experiential basis for sound decision-making.

“As a lifetime serial learner, I have found that ordinary people can do the extraordinary who are committed to experiential learning, are intellectually curious, and possess an unquenchable desire to acquire new knowledge … this may be our only advantage in the future fight.”
—BGen Lorna M. Mahlock, MCDP 7, Learning

In the cognitive domain, we are developing an entry-level Marine steeped in initiative, creative in generating outside the box options, who has the maturity to assess first- second- and third-order effects, and is decisive enough to choose the best course of action. Building a Marine with this overall maturity and ability is a complex process and requires re-framing how students think. We currently focus the students on how their actions as individuals shape and impact the collective unit. The overarching method for accomplishing these tasks requires an approach to teaching and learning that emphasizes a safe operating space for students to make mistakes. Ultimately, the responsibility for the student’s success falls on the instructor and is achieved through close mentorship and teaching.

Learning experts generally agree that successful adult education occurs when students have a purpose for what they learn. IMC begins with a “Road to War” class that highlights peer adversary capabilities and geopolitical dynamics. We believe this reinforces why each infantry skill provided to IMC students is vital in a future fight. The Road to War class is immediately followed by a combat order for an amphibious assault. After receiving the task and purpose, students are asked to solve a problem in the form of a tactical decision game. While the students do not always provide a sound plan, this exercise forces them into a decision-making role and immediately sets a precedent. They will be required to think during IMC and must plan and execute actions based on their assessment of the situation. The students always discuss their plans with the squad leader, receiving personally tailored, constructive feedback.

Additionally, during IMC, we hold small group discussions on MCDP 1, Warfighting: the Marine Corp’s premier contribution to military doctrine. We believe it is essential that junior Marines develop a solid foundation in maneuver warfare and begin to internalize the countless leadership lessons contained in the pages of MCDP 1. Marines who graduate from IMC possess the motivation to seek information and the responsibility to hold themselves and their peers accountable. To further develop this personal responsibility, IMC students are given a base set of rules to operate on, known as the “Standing Orders of IMC”. The Standing Orders combine timeless principles like individual accountability, understanding task and purpose, weapons and field discipline, with new aspects of the current operating environment such as understanding your electronic signature. A daily warning order is posted each night to set the tone for every day of the course. This drives students to seek additional information and make initiative-based decisions as they participate and prepare for each training day.

While IMC is building a better decision maker, it also produces a significantly more lethal Marine. IMC graduates are trained to a significantly higher standard in rifle marksmanship. They are subject-matter experts and combat capable in all environments with the M27 Individual Automatic Rifle. They are also trained in the employment of medium machineguns, grenade launchers, anti-armor systems, and light mortars—all of which are new weapons skills for 0311s. Each squad conducts multiple non-illuminated, night squad-supported live-fire attacks. Students act as both the maneuver element and support by fire element on live-fire ranges. To develop a basic understanding of combined-arms techniques and battlespace geometry. These collective skills develop a next Marine up mindset and provide every student with a basic level of leadership experience. It also provides each student with the ability to pick up any company-level weapon system and become relevant in a firefight. By better training individual Marines, we sought to develop a course that would aid the infantry battalion operational tempo. By reducing the time required for new Marines to be ready to participate in collective and Service-level training events, we hope to provide battalions with a new ceiling of training opportunities and increased flexibility. Marines arriving at a unit do not require remedial training on basic skills. After receiving an update on specific unit standard operating procedures, Marines are ready for more complex collective live-fire training at the squad and platoon levels. The Marines are prepared and ready to be immediate impact players in a rifle company on their first day in the fleet.

The success of our students at IMC is also not limited to the schoolhouse. Lessons learned in the training environment are directly relevant to their experience at an FMF battalion. SOI improved this learning trajectory during a Marine’s first enlistment, through a squad-cohort shipping model. Graduating Marines arrive at their battalions in the same training squad. Marines now arrive as a cohesive team and are provided a warm handoff from their IMC squad leader to their gaining battalion. IMC squads that are kept together in these same training formations benefit from months of implicit communication, peer mentorship, and camaraderie. They are ready to receive NCO leaders and take training opportunities to the next level.

The Marine Corps continues to draw on a long history of innovation and experimentation. The Marines at SOI believe the daily work we do at IMC can help build momentum toward this ongoing effort to improve our Marine Corps. The combat instructor believes the enhanced skill required of these future infantry Marines is being developed today, time now, in the graduates of IMC. Providing this better infantry Marine is one way we can outpace our potential adversaries. While Force Design 2030 is an ongoing process and the Marine Corps has multiple decision points that may impact the future force, the IMC is uniquely positioned to adapt. Pending Service-level Force Design decisions may shape the requirement for what constitutes an entry-level infantry Marine. The IMC methods described in this article are well suited to this dynamic environment as they are flexible enough to support our Service as it continues to evolve and improve. We also believe the highlights in this article about infantry training are highly transportable across other areas of the MAGTF and we look forward to our small contribution to building the enhanced FMF of Force Design 2030. A fleet of Marines that will remain the Nation’s elite infantry community, ready for hidden challenges in an uncertain future. The 0913 is confident the watch is passed to a generation of young Marines who were highly successful in an exceptionally demanding course, and who have done things never asked of entry-level students. This group of IMC Marines possesses the potential for outsized impacts across the Marine Corps.

A Sample of Commendatory Feedback We Have Received from the FMF

• 06 level commanding officer: Without question, there was a tangible improvement with their tactical acumen, physical fitness, and enhanced field skills. In fact, they outperformed many of their senior Lance Corporals that have been in the unit longer. Additionally, we had very few casualties throughout this training.
• 06 level commanding officer: IMC graduates who struggle in the Fleet are a reflection of poor leadership … We changed leaders and the Marines’ performance took off.
• 05 level commanding officer: Sustain survivability and field craft from setting up individual packs and equipment …They demonstrate a buy-in for part of the process as we evolve the infantry Marine and his training … Their bias for action and bias for leadership is noteworthy … They are critical of the training and critical thinkers on the range.
• Battalion sergeant major: The IMC Marines have shown an increased ability to process information and tactically employ squad-based weapon systems. The IMC Marines have the ability to quickly rationalize the tasks at hand and complete evaluation checklists with minor corrections. The Companies have already begun incorporating IMC Marines into the Machine Gun sections. Their proficiency and understanding of employment considerations were viewed higher by leadership verse that of legacy Marines. The IMC Marines are more likely to apply input in the decision-making process. The legacy Marines have continuously been viewed as a standby for tasking and match intent type of mentality.
• 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander: The new IMC Marines have a higher mental capacity to learn new weapon systems.
• FMF Squad Leader: IMC Marines have initiative like they were born with it.
• FMF Squad Leader: The lowest common denominator is now higher in my squad than it has ever been.