Archives: Gazette Magazines

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

LtCol W. Frank Ball and Morgan D. Jones based their article, “Improving Marine Commanders’ Intuitive Decisionmaking Skills” (MCG, Jan96), on my article, “How We Decide” (MCG, Oct95). They misconstrue my meaning so badly that it is necessary to respond. They apparently missed my basic point that there are times when methodical analysis is preferred, and I discussed those situations in my October 1995 article. My main point was that intuitive decisionmaking is superior in the vast majority of typically fluid, uncertain, highstress tactical situations.

My argument with Ball and Jones is that they try to extend analytical decisionmaking to those situations that call for intuition. They start out by supporting my argument that (in their words) “intuitive decisionmaking is usually all that battlefield conditions allow,” but then they promptly proceed to make the old argument for the analytical model. They actually warn against relying on intuition and instead argue in favor of generating multiple courses of action for every situation, comparing the courses concurrently according to some set of criteria (in this case, a series of predetermined questions), and picking the optimal solution. This concurrent comparison of multiple options (known in the field as multiattribute utility analysis (MAUA)) is precisely the core of the classical, analytical decisionmaking method and precisely the same basic method, although less formalized, as used in FMFM 3-1’s command and staff action sequence. It is fundamentally different than what I described as intuitive decisionmaking.

The rationale for their argument is the typical one: that (1) intuition cannot be trusted and (2) an analytical approach will lead to the optimal decision. It is important to deal with both of these points, because they are wrong. On the first point, as I mentioned in my original article, intuition scares many people because it cannot be easily documented, quantified, or reduced to a procedure. The process is, as the name indicates, intuitive, and for many people a process that cannot be reduced into methodical steps cannot be trusted. But my main point was that, given an experienced commander, intuitive decisionmaking does work-in fact, in the typically uncertain, time-competitive, friction-filled, high-stress environment of combat, it generally works better than MAUA.

As to the second point, Ball and Jones mistakenly suggest that I criticized intuitive decisionmaking because it does not aim to reach the optimal decision. Actually, I argued that given the complexity, uncertainty, fluidity, and friction of most tactical situations, there is no such thing as a perfect decision. Whereas MAUA seeks to optimize, intuitive decisionmaking seeks to “satisfice”-to find the first solution that satisfactorily solves the problem. My position is that it is generally better to reach and execute a good decision quickly than to waste time agonizing over an optimal decision, which generally doesn’t exist. As Gen George Patton said, “A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.” Analytical decisionmaking may seek to optimize, but it will invariably fall short. Again, contrary to Ball and Jones’ interpretation, my point was that in most tactical situations, given an experienced and skilled decisionmaker, intuition works.

Indicative of their misunderstanding, Ball and Jones write:

Most of the time intuition gives us decisions that are, as Maj Schmitt says, ‘good enough,’ because the problems we normally face are not momentous. But on those occasions when our decisions have critical consequences, we run heavy risks if we rely on intuition. The reason is that the unconscious mind can easily mislead us . . . as it does, for example, to the quarterback who misreads a blitz and gets sacked, or to a leader in combat whose misreading of a battlefield situation results in excessive casualties and failure of the mission.

Whether a decision is good enough has nothing to do with the seriousness of the consequences. Either the decision is good enough or it isn’t. If the decision gets the jobs done, it gets the job done no matter how serious the potential consequences. And do Ball and Jones mean to suggest that a quarterback in the pocket should not rely on intuition born of experience but should instead deliberately analyze the defensive scheme as the play unfolds? I can pretty much guarantee that he will get sacked if he does that because he will quickly be overcome by events. Their own example of the quarterback under the pressure of a blitz illustrates just why intuition is essential. Why is it that rookie quarterbacks seem to get intercepted and sacked so frequently? It is precisely because they lack the intuitive pattern-recognition skills that their experienced counterparts have developed over time.

Ball and Jones imply that intuition is impulsive and unprofessional and has “an insidious downside.” On the contrary, in a skilled commander there is nothing impulsive about intuition; it is a highly developed and sensitive skill. It can demonstrate a degree of perception and insight that no series of pre-established questions (or any other MAUA process) can capture. In my opinion, highly developed intuition is precisely what professionalism in this context is all about. It is what separates the true master from the mediocre commander. To go back to the authors’ quarterback example, it is exactly this highly developed intuitive pattern-recognition skill that made the physically unexceptional Joe Montana arguably the greatest quarterback ever to play the game of football.

Ball and Jones write that “probably no other human mental trait has led to more needless combat casualties and military defeats.” There is no empirical basis for that statement. Maybe poor decisions have, but those are a function of bad decisionmaking and not necessarily of the decisionmaking method. Analytical decisionmaking is certainly slower and more methodical than intuitive decisionmaking, but there is not evidence whatsoever to support their claim that it is any more likely to guarantee a good decision.

In stating that analytical decisionmaking is by far “more comforting,” Ball and Jones betray the real reasons behind their preference-by providing a veneer of rational, scientific process, analytical decisionmaking lets us convince ourselves that we are making better decisions. These two authors are not alone in this desire for comfort. War, as Clausewitz wrote in On War, is characterized by high levels of friction, uncertainty, disorder, and stress. The common appeal of the analytical method is that it allows us to deceive ourselves into thinking we have more control over what happens than we really have.

I do not suggest that intuitive decisionmaking is not subject to human biases or that those biases may not lead to misperceptions and errors in judgment. Research shows, however, that given an experienced and skilled commander the likely result will be effective decisionmaking. Moreover, biases, preconceptions and lock-in can just as likely find their way into an analytical process. We have certainly seen it happen with the command and staff action sequence. In fact, recent observations in a Marine Corps-sponsored study suggest that experienced commanders reach effective (and often better) decisions faster using intuition than their staffs can generate courses of action by following staff planning models.

The simplistic example that Ball and Jones provide to support their argument instead reveals the considerable practical problems with their approach. They describe a company commander who must decide how to take out an enemy machinegun position, and they depict him discussing the problem with his executive officer according to a series of predetermined questions. First, I think they seriously underestimate the time (25 seconds by their calculations) and effort it will take to hold this conversation in the middle of a firefight. Second, they describe the decision essentially as a multiple-choice test asking which of three choices to use to destroy the machinegun position. But most tactical decisions are not a simple matter of selecting from among a few well-defined existing options: Most tactical situations require the creation of a unique practical solution to a unique set of circumstances. Third, the example shows the company commander asking three questions for which the same option is clearly the preferred answer. But what happens when the answers are inconclusive or when there is a split decision-when the questions solicit different preferred solutions? Do the authors propose some sort of tie-breaker rule? Fourth, the example shows what amounts to a technical decision about which weapons to use against a particular target. The proposed method will have much less utility in dealing with the less tangible factors that usually influence tactical decisionmaking. When it comes to considerations like morale, the element of surprise, or deciding on a scheme of maneuver, the simplistic types of questions Ball and Jones propose will offer little insight. And a more complicated set of questions would actually risk becoming an impediment by making the decisionmaking process unduly cumbersome. In summary of the above points, I think Ball and Jones have seriously underestimated the natural complexity and difficulty of tactical decisionmaking, even at the lowest levels. Finally, the example illustrates just the kinds of decisions that should be made intuitively. Any company commander who has to deliberately analyze how to respond to the scenario described does not deserve to be responsible for the lives of a company of Marines.

It concerns me significantly when Ball and Jones suggest that “the Marine Corps can easily formulate a standard systematic sequence of questions for battlefield situations.” Presumably, if the questions are to have any utility at all, different sets of contingent questions will have to be developed for a huge variety of situations. The result will be that instead of providing actual experience in decisionmaking, which is essential to developing requisite pattern-recognition skills, training will focus on memorizing numerous lists of pre-established questions for a broad number of situations. Any professional worth his or her pay check will rebel at the idea of having to make tactical decisions by referring to a list of proforma questions.

All this having been said, however, there is some utility to Ball and Jones’ suggestions. But the value is in critiques during training and education rather than in actual decisionmaking situations. I think the idea of systematically questioning decisions after the fact is an excellent way of accelerating the learning process. Likewise, raising and discussing alternative courses of action is a valuable after-action technique in educational situations. Vigorously questioning decisions to uncover key assumptions, considerations and thought processes is precisely the technique we have used in tactical decision game seminars for the last 6 years. But I would prefer to see the questions based on judgment and the understanding of a particular situation rather than on a predetermined format.

Ball and Jones have got it precisely wrong when they submit that their techniques are “needed to overcome a lifetime of our relying on unchallenged intuition.” A lifetime of unchallenged intuition? Hardly. What has gone unchallenged over the years is the denial of intuition as an acceptable decisionmaking source and the misguided belief that the blind adherence to mechanical processes will lead us to better tactical decisions.

By Capt William D. Harrop III

JASK, IRAN 0230 10 NOV 2008. LtCol Norm Allen cursed quietly as the tiny vibration pad slowly thumped into his cheek bone. “Which company commander was it now?” he thought as he reached for the frequency control knob on his radio vest. “Station calling, this is Dagger 6. Go ahead,” Alien said as he squeezed the throat mike dose to his neck.

“Dagger 6, this is Shamrock 6. Contact! Wait out.”

“Well, this is it.” Alien thought to himself. “It’s finally begun. The 0100 L-hour went off smoothly. All the MV-22s made it into their landing zones and the companies readied their initial objectives. The invasion was on.”

The sharp radio transmission Allen heard was from Capt Leonard C. Matthews IV, a capable, confident officer with whom Allen enjoyed a unique relationship. He really couldn’t put his finger on it. There was just something there: an unspoken understanding, a mutual confidence each had in the abilities of the other. Allen knew how Matthews thought-Matthews seemed to be able to anticipate Alien’s next order. Maybe it was all of those combined arms staff trainer exercises he’d forced the S-3 to put together or maybe it was these new radios-‘actuals’ they called them, because actuals were the ones on the nets. What he did know, however, was that the Corps’ recent emphasis on implicit communications was really paying off.

Squelch broke again. “Dagger 6, this is Dagger 3.”

“Go ahead 3.” Allen replied automatically.

Maj John McCandless, Allen’s operations officer, was calling. “Dagger 6, just got off the hook with the MEU 3.” The handset keyed again, “His computer screen isn’t making any sense to him, and he wants to know what’s going on, over.”

Allen thought for a second and quickly replied, “Understand 3. I’ll take care of it. Out.” Allen thought to himself, “This guy just doesn’t get it, does he? I don’t think he’s ever heard of, let alone understood, the meaning of ‘trust tactics,’ not to mention the fact that he still hadn’t learned how to operate a computer.”

Just then the squelch broke again: “6, this is Shamrock 6. Just engaged what I believe was a squad-sized unit. One KlA and one WlA. Enemy broke contact. I’m pursuing east toward Checkpoint 15.”

“Roger Shamrock 6,” Allen replied. “I’ll get a medevac headed your way, Len. 6 out.”

Watching Allen and Matthews work together was nothing less than exhilarating. It was almost as if each was somehow in the other’s presence, each able to observe and communicate until the other without actually being there. It seemed as if they had reached the pinnacle of implicit communications.

Then Allen instinctively reached to the control knob so he could change his frequency to one that would connect him to a satellite relay on MEU command net, a satellite communications link. He thought to himself”patience, Norm, patience”-and began to sort out the situation with the MEU S-3. At least he didn’t have to worry about Matthews.

Although the story of LtCol Allen and Capt Matthews is fictitious, their relationship represents an example of highly developed, implicit communications skills between a commander and subordinate. Today, units or individuals that possess this ability are, unfortunately, the exception rather than the rule. No longer should we be satisfied with an unacceptably small percentage of leaders and subordinates who, either through conscious effort or luck, communicate implicitly. The challenge is to educate Marines everywhere on the concept of implicit communications and empower them with the tools necessary to develop this skill. The end result is to ensure that this form of communications becomes what it should be-the rule, not the exception. First, however, one must understand the nature and relevance of this communications technique.

Implicit communications is communicating through mutual understanding using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other’s thoughts. Unlike the written word captured on paper, implicit communications is not something that is easy to wrap your arms around. Although most of us have experienced some form of implicit communications in our lives, few actually realize there is a term for it. Some describe it as “the Vulcan mind meld,” others simply say “I’m not sure what it is; we just click,” or “he understands how I think and anticipates my orders.” The fact of the matter is that each of these describes some type of ability to communicate implicitly. Let’s take a look at two, famous commanders who understood and used this powerful tool.

Consider the following example of Rommel and his artillery commander. During the invasion of France Rommel’s artillery commander, after moving one of his units into position, sent a simple yet powerfully complete message that was both informative, inquiring, and, by its brevity, displayed some form of mutual understanding-“Artillery commander to the general. Maj Crasemann has gone into position 43 left, what is the mission?” In just 17 words Rommel’s artillery commander successfully conveyed not only positional information and a request for a new mission, but also indicated a readiness to fire-and, deeper than that, there appears to be a sense of confidence that even without further guidance some type of action will be taken. Mutual understanding and a minimum of key, well-understood phrases are the secret.

Another commander who understood the potential of implicit communications was Lord Nelson. At the battle of Trafalgar, after having carefully imbued into his subordinates “his sense of personal leadership and doctrine,” Lord Nelson, after the action began with the combined Franco-Spanish Armada, made but three general signals: “England expects that every man will do his duty,” to “prepare to anchor after the close of the day,” and to “engage the enemy more closely.” By building a mutual understanding between himself and his subordinates, Nelson was able to develop a level of implicit communications so strong that even after his death his fleet commanders continued to follow his intent and were eventually victorious.

Implicit communications is important to Marines because our ability to execute mission tactics using decentralized control is tied directly to our ability to communicate implicitly. Decentralized control based on responsible, implicit understanding is faster, more effective, and infinitely more productive than centralized control based on explicit communications. Implicit communications can improve our ability to influence the actions of subordinates while broadening the the effectiveness of commander’s intent. As a result, leaders who foster implicit communications lead units that operate harmoniously and at a higher tempo. Today more than ever, the requirement for commanders to influence the actions of subordinates at the lowest level demands the ability to communicate implicitly. In short, implicit communications is a warfighting imperative.

Having defined and established the relevance of implicit communications, we can now ask the following questions: “What factors affect our ability to communicate implicitly?” and, “Using those factors as a model, how can we improve our ability to communicate implicitly?”

Since there is no simple formula for communicating implicitly it’s necessary to develop our own. I believe that there are at least four separate, but interdependent, factors that affect our ability to communicate implicitly. (See Figure 1). Each factor in turn, when examined, can provide the guidance necessary to create requirements, missions, and tasks used to develop a training strategy designed to improve implicit communications.

Relationships

Relationships are the keys to building mutual understanding. We must teach Marines the importance of building positive relationships between peers, seniors, and subordinates. Leaders, in particular, must be made aware of the requirement to develop and nurture personal yet professional relationships with subordinates for the purpose of building mutual understanding. Relationships at all levels will improve once we teach our Marines that they must possess a desire both to appreciate how their leaders think and to reveal enough of themselves so that those around them can understand how they think.

Communications Skills

The ability to communicate a vision, written or orally, is essential to implicit communications. Marines must be taught and must practice this art. Communicating a mental image is the essence of military communications and at the heart of the commander’s intent. It is the mental picture that improves mutual understanding. Mental pictures are important because they are easily understood, remembered, and carried in the minds of subordinates to be accessed and used frequently, guiding and shaping decisions based on the desire and intent of the commander.

Education

Education is crucial to implicit communications. Without an awareness of, and an appreciation for, the strengths, limitations, and obligations associated with it, implicit communications is dead in the water. Consequently, we must focus teaching this concept at every level and work to improve the psychological education of our Corps-especially such topics as decisionmaking and human dimensions of the battlefield.

Training

Probably one of the most important factors in determining whether implicit communications can be realized is through training. Training, or the sharing of common experiences, is at the core of implicit communications. Training prevents implicit communications from turning into recklessness. Therefore, the following objective must be common to all training evolutions: To improve our implicit communications ability by increasing mutual understanding through shared experiences and interpersonal interaction. Some training methods essential to the development of implicit communications are tactical decision games (TDGs), and combined arms staff trainers (CASTs). TDGs and CASTs improve implicit communications by building a shared way of thinking and a common philosophy within units. While there are many other techniques that will improve implicit communications, these two are particularly effective, easy to execute, and inexpensive.

So what does all this mean to you, the warfighter? It means that the time has come to educate yourself about something that you may have already experienced. Train yourselves and your units to improve your ability to communicate implicitly. Lastly, empower, train, and educate your junior leaders, particularly your noncommissioned officers, and trust them to execute mission tactics based on decentralized control.

These factors of combat power are not new to Marines, in fact each one is deemed a critical aspect of combat power by our current doctrine. Now that we have defined what we are looking for, it is time to set up a simple system designed to find our relative combat power. The relative combat power matrix is a simple and quick technique designed to help commanders develop their courses of action. In it we use the dynamics of maneuver, ßrepowr, protection, and leadership to evaluate each force. We will then match our strengths to his weaknesses, and this will lead us to significant factors that will increase our chances for victory. These significant factors in turn lead us to tactics and techniques that will maximize our strengths in comparison to the enemy. For a demonstration of how this works, I will start with a simple scenario. I am a rifle company commander, and my company is reinforced with a squad of engineers and a section of Dragon missiles. My mission is to destroy the forward security element of an enemy motorized rifle battalion. The enemy unit consists of 9 BTR-OOs, 4 T-72s, and 2 BRDMs. I am defending in a sector 1,500 meters wide by 400 meters deep. The terrain is similar to Quantico, and there is one two-lane paved road running the length of my sector. In my terrain estimate I have concluded that the strip formed by the road and 50 meters to either side is the only terrain negotiable by vehicles. Now I will begin filling in the relative combat power matrix. (Figure 1). In the maneuver box I shall insert our greatest strength and weakness, in comparison to the enemy. 1 have determined that our greatest strength is that we are free to maneuver within the entire sec tor. Our greatest weakness is a slow speed in comparison to his armored vehicles. The enemy is hindered by being roadbound but has high speed. The significant factors I determine are: (1) I own the battlefield; he owns the road. (2) Once he gets past me I’ll never catch him. In the firepower box our strength lies in the large number of short-range antiarmor weapons we possess, such as our Dragons and AT4s. We are weak in long-range fires in comparison to the enemy. The enemy’s greatest strength lies in the large volume of long-range heavy weapons fire he has with his armored vehicles. This leads me to two significant factors: (1) I must get close to kill him. (2) If I am fixed in place, he will overwhelm me with his fires.

In the protection block I determine that stealth is our greatest asset; flakjackets and fighting holes are no match for massed firepower. The enemy’s weakness is in his ability to detect us from a moving vehicle, especially if he is buttoned up. Once he dismounts I am at a disadvantage since he will have both infantry support for the close fight and heavy weapons for suppression. This leads me to two more significant factors: (1) I should limit his visibility to the road. (2) I must kill him before he dismounts and can fight infantryman to infantryman.

Leadership is the fourth dynamic we evaluate. Here we evaluate the unit, its commanders, and doctrine. Early in batde there will not be enough data to input here, but as we get to know our enemy we will be able to fill in his weaknesses.

Now I must translate my six significant factors into tactics and techniques for the commander to consider. To do this I must take each significant factor and ask what this means to me:

* He owns the road: Take it away with various obstacles, such as mines, craters, and abatis.

* I can’t catch him: The obstacle must be heavy enough to block him. Attack in depth so he can’t reinforce his breaching attempt.

* Get dose to kill him: Think surprise, ambush.

* If I am fixed, I will be overwhelmed: Defend in sectors, not battle positions. Mobility is the key.

* Limit his visibility: Button him up with supporting arms.

* Kill him before he dismounts: Coordinated attack with multiple ambush sites and volley fires. Integrate fires for quick kills on BTRs.

Using the relative combat power matrix, I have come up with techniques and tactics that will help us accomplish the mission. These in turn lead us quite clearly into a course of action. A glance at these techniques show that there is nothing new or revolutionary here. In fact, all of the techniques are taught in the introductory tactics courses in The Basic School. What this matrix has done is to provide a tool to help the commander concentrate on the significant factors that bear upon this tactical problem. It helps the commander to evaluate his enemy in a logical and orderly fashion. It also helps to weed out unsuitable techniques quickly, allowing the commander to concentrate on the feasible techniques. The relative combat power matrix is neither a recipe for success, nor a system to stifle imagination; it is simply one more technique at the commander’s disposal-one that can help him win in battle.

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

All Marines are familiar with actions such as Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Saipan-wartime amphibious assaults against fortified beaches in the race of staunch resistance. They are the stuff of legend. Less familiar to us, but just as much a part of our history, are countless landing operations that did not involve an assault against a fortified beach-peacetime operations in which the objective was not to seize a lodgment or an advanced base, but to protect U.S. citizens abroad, keep the peace, or stabilize a government. We have a tendency to think of such landing operations as simply easier versions of the more demanding amphibious assaults. In the sense that these operations do not involve a bloody struggle just to get to the beach, that may be true. But these operations have their own peculiar problems-problems that demand peculiar answers. Since these are precisely the type of operations we will most often be called on to conduct in the future, we would do well to study them.

The opening phase of the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1915 serves as both a reminder of our amphibious past and as a possible lesson for our amphibious future, particularly in light of the renewed attention Haiti has begun to receive of late.

Background

In early 1915, a revolutionary movement arose in the northern Haitian port of Cap Haitien against the Haitian government at Port-au-Prince. Haiti was especially important to the United States because it dominated the Windward Passage to the newly opened Panama Canal. A variety of U.S. firms and European nations also had commerical interests in Haiti, and the United States wanted to pre-empt any European action in the region. Consequently, the armored cruiser USS Washington, carrying RAdm William B. Caperton, USN, was ordered to Cap Haitien to restore the peace. On 27 July, as the Washington sat off Cap Haitien, violence broke out in Port-auPrince. Some 200 political prisoners were massacred by the chief of police. In response, supporters of those murdered, bodily dragged Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, Haiti’s President, from the French Legation, where he had sought refuge and hacked him to pieces. His chief of police was similarly dragged from the Dominican Legation and murdered. When the Washington arrived off of Port-au-Prince there was no government control. The densely populated city was in turmoil. The American, British, and French ministers requested immediate intervention. Caperton concurred.

The Naval Force

The landing force totalled about 340 men organized into 5 companies: the Washington’s Marine detachment, organized as a company; the 12th Company of embarked Marine expeditionary troops; and three companies of bluejackets formed from the Washington’s crew.

The landing force commander was Capt George van Orden, commander of the Marine detachment. The landing force was organized into two battalions: the First Battalion, comprising the thee bluejacket companies, and the Second Battalion, comprising the Marine force, commanded by Capt Giles Bishop, Jr., commander of the 12th Company.

The Washington, with her 10-, 6-, and 3-inch guns would be in position to support the landing by fire, if necessary. A Navy lieutenant would control the movement of the landing force to shore and would support the landing force with two armed steam launches from the Washington.

The Timing of the Landing

The Washington had arrived at Port-au-Prince shortly before noon on the 28th. Caperton made the decision to land troops at 1600 after conferring with various ministers. (Instructions from the Navy Department to land troops did not arrive until 2200.) Planners preferred to land early in the day, but Caperton decided that the volatility of the situation demanded immediate intervention. Troops would have to land at dusk in the face of an unknown situation.

Where To Land

As with any amphibious operation, in any conditions, the critical question was where to land. There were only two sites suitable for the Washington’s boats. The first was at the newly constructed municipal pier in the heart of the city. A year earlier, Marines had successfully made a similar landing in the face of sporadic resistance at the pier at Veracruz, Mexico. The second option was to land across a beach near an abandoned naval yard at the suburb of Bizoton, some distance west of the city proper.

The former option would involve landing troops directly into the most densely populated part of the city. The critical phase of getting organized ashore would have to take place in the dark in the midst of a potential threat. There was little chance that the landing might actually be defeated, but there was definite potential for trouble.

Other considerations that had to be considered included:

* Fort Islet, an old stone fortress at the end of the municipal pier, which dominated any approach. It might or might not be defended.

* The long axis of the city was north-south. A landing at the pier would involve moving eastward across the narrow axis of the city, leaving portions of the city unsecured on either exposed flank of the landing force.

* Naval gunfire in support of a pier landing would be in the form of overhead fires, which, especially in the dark, would be more dangerous and less effective. Additionally, if needed, naval gunfire at this landing site would cause greater destruction to the city.

Conversely:

* A landing at the abandoned naval yard would likely meet little if any resistance. This would likely allow commanders to get their troops organized ashore before having to deal with any resistance-especially important since most of the troops were untrained in landing operations.

* If it did become necessary to support the landing with naval gunfire, the sparsely developed area of Bizoton would suffer less damage than would the heart of the city.

* By landing at Bizoton and moving east and then north, the landing force would clear the city along its long axis, with its left flank anchored securely on the shore. Additionally, moving from south to north rather than west to east, the landing force would be clearing a narrower front.

* Because the landing force would be moving parallel to the shore, the armed launches and the Washington would be able to support by fire more effectively, firing across the front of advancing troops rather than over their heads. Additionally, with the armed launches moving abreast of the landing force along the shore, control of naval gunfire would be easier.

Based on these considerations, Caperton decided to make the landing at Bizoton. In fact, he had long before selected Bizoton as his landing site in the event that a landing might become necessary. The plans had already been prepared.

There would be no element of surprise in this operation. As the landing force was preparing to disembark, Capt Edward L. Beach, USN, Caperton’s chief of staff, went ashore to notify Haitian leaders of the landing. At the National Palace, he confirmed the landing and stated that the intent was to restore peace but that no resistance would be tolerated. He instructed Gen Ermane Robin, the commander of Haitian forces, to order his troops into their barracks and to keep people off the streets. Then, he and Robin went to personally guide the landing forces through the city. Beach also sent word through the legations for all foreigners to remain indoors and to display their national flags from their residences.

The Landing and Subsequent Operations

The Washington moved to a point close to the shore where it could support the landing and the advance on the city. Shoving off at 1650, the boats made the ship-to-shore movement protected by armed launches. No supporting fires were deemed necessary.

The landing was completed without resistance by 1750, and the landing force advanced on the city in column, the Marine battalion as advance guard and the bluejacket battalion (under the close supervision of Capt van Orden) as the main body, minus a single company assigned as the rear guard. The landing force order specifically stipulated that “Companies will open fire only upon orders from a commissioned officer. Patrols will fire only in self-defense.”

The armed launches kept abreast of the advancing column. At Fort Lerebours, which guarded the southern portal of the city proper, the landing force deployed onto line. Capt Beach and Gen Robin met the advancing landing force at Fort Lerebours and, as instructed, Robin guided the troops through the city without incident. The Marine battalion advanced on the first five north-south streets inland from the shore with one section per street. The bluejacket battalion moved up on the right, with one section advancing on the next street, the Rue de L’Egalite, and one squad providing flank security on the next street inland after that. In this way the landing force fronted the enure native section of the city. Further inland was the foreign section, from which no trouble was expected. Van Orden held the rest of the bluejacket battalion in reserve, echeloned to the right rear, thus protecting the right flank and making the reserve readily available to extend the line in that direction if it became necessary to clear the foreign section of town.

At one point, an angry mob barred the advance. Officers marched at the head of their columns direcdy into the mob, dispersing it without firing a shot. The only firing came from rooftop Haitians who fired a few rounds over the heads of the Marines. The landing force soon reached the Rue des Casernes, where it halted its clearing operation for the night, having secured the National Palace and all other important government buildings. The troops had disarmed Haitians along the way, collecting over five wag-onloads of arms and ammunition. There were reports of sporadic gunfire all during the advance through the city. Some sniping occurred, but much of the gunfire was from the indiscriminate firing of weapons into the air, the typical Haitian response to unrest in the city. There were no American casualties; 2 Haitians died and 10 were wounded.

That night the 12th Company was sent to protect the legations and foreign colony. The rest of the landing force bivouacked for the night of the 28th in the city marketplace. Gen Robin and Capt van Orden went throughout the city that night to ensure that Haitian troops complied with the orders to remain indoors.

By the following morning, the Washington had moved farther north to support the continued advance by fire, if needed. By the end of the second day, the Fort National had been captured against sporadic sniping and the city secured. Two U.S. seamen died, probably from the undisciplined friendly fires of the bluejacket battalion rather than from Haitian resistance.

Results

The military operation was an unqualified success. Through prompt and discreet action, the landing force quickly diffused a volatile situation with minimal loss of life and property. The British Minister, R. M. Kohan, reported to his Foreign Office that:

The landing party put ashore at Port-au-Prince on the 28th July was not strong. … A skillful show of strength was, however, made and by at once seizing all points of military importance, together with practically all Government arms and ammunition and disarming all Haitian military and civilians, die landing force was able to anticipate any serious resistance which might have been offered.

Reinforcements

A Marine company from Guantanamo Bay arrived on the 29th. On 4 August the USS Connecticut arrived from Philadelphia with a regimental headquarters and five more companies. On 15 August the USS Tennessee arrived with a brigade headquarters and another regiment. With the Tennessee was Col Littleton W.T. Waller who was to take command of the Marine brigade, now over 2,000 strong. Its mission: occupy the country. The Marine occupation of Haiti then lasted in one form or another until 1934.

Lessons

While much has changed in the nearly eight decades since this operation, many of the characteristics of the landing can be of use to us today. The following are meant as food for thought, not as a checklist for conducting similar operations:

* The operation involved landing troops in a densely populated, depressed urban area where there was little local governmental control and a large portion of the population possessed weapons-conditions similar to those we would face in many Third World situations today.

* The situation was unclear and extremely tense, especially in regards to the amount of resistance that the landing force could expect. Tactical considerations, such as security and surprise, were clearly subordinated to political considerations. Caperton believed that “reasons of policy greatly outweighed those of tactics.” But just as important, policy did not demand what was tactically impossible.

* Discretion was essential in the conduct of the operation. Although resistance could be expected, the overall environment was not treated as openly hostile. The plan effectively minimized collateral damage.

* The need for action arose quickly when only a small expeditionary force was available. The plan envisioned the later deployment of reinforcements.

* The plan called for early coordination with any remaining local governmental forces.

* Simple and workable rules of engagement were relied upon and clearly disseminated. This made maximum use of the judgment of local commanders.

* Superior firepower was withheld until absolutely required, but it was immediately available whenever needed.

Clearly, given the likelihood of Marine Corps missions at the low end of the intensity spectrum, we have something to learn from operations like the intervention of Haiti. And who knows-we may find ourselves there again.

by Capt Charles A. Poulton & CpI Frederick Zuberer

For the past 20 years, the Marine Corps has trained our Marines to a standard-evaluating our units before giving the approval that they are ready for war. We then send our Marines forward to do what Marines do best: win. With a decrease in operational tempo, we now have the chance to evaluate how we train. Most Marines will admit that training in garrison can be redundant. After repeating the same class for the eighth time, or buddy rushing on the softball field for the hundredth, Marines begin to shut down. So, how can leaders reenergize training to increase our Marines3 skill and will?

It you tour a random BEQ, you will more than likely come across at least one of the following in every room: a PlayStation, XBox, desktop, or laptop. Marines love their gaming systems. They love them so much that they are willing to spend hours upon hours playing online with friends or complete strangers. Games that Marines play are strategy-based, whether RTS {real-time strategy) games, like Company of Heroes, or FPS (first-person shooters), like Call of Duty. To successfully play RTS or FPS games, Marines must develop a plan before executing certain game stages. You might remember the infamous Leeroy Jenkins video, in which a group of World of Warcraft gamers discussed how to handle an enemy threat before Leeroy infamously blows off the plan and charges forward into battle, resulting in the teams death. What the video overlooks is that the group took the time to assess an enemy threat, analyzed their own task organization and capabilities, developed a scheme of maneuver, and issued tasking statements to group members in about three minutes. This scene sounds a lot like a TDG {tactical decision game), right? It is actually not as far off as you think.

Currently, our company is working to embrace our Marines’ love of gaming in order to improve their skill and will through the use of our decision rooms and virtual training software. Using software to have Marines compete against each other, and to compete together against a thinking enemy, is no longer something from a sci-fi movie- it’s an actual reality thanks to modern technological innovation. Our decision room currently runs three gaming systems for our platoons: VSBII (Virtual Battlespace 2), which is an FPS; CCM {Close Combat Marine IV), which is an RTS; and StarCraft, another RTS. VBSII and CCM IV are both USMC proprietary software, but StarCraft on the other hand, has no ties to the Marine Corps and falls into the category of COT {civilian, off-the-shelf technology). Both VBSII and CCM are solid games that we use to run our TDG‘s, but feedback from our Marines has prompted us to look towards COTs. Repeatedly, Marines have commented in debriefs, “Hey sir, this is fun but have you played_? It is faster and a lot more realistic.” Developing games is not the Marines Corps’ strong suit; however, the civilian gaming industry has made leaps and bounds in the area. The current generation of Marines, and even the past two generations, grew up playing fast-paced, quick-reaction, and highly-competitive games. In trying to increase our Marines’ attention and create interest in our decision room, our company commander tasked me with conducting a comparison study of COT versus USMC proprietary software in order to determine if COT can be used to train our Marines.

After conducting our own company research, my team found that it is feasible to use COT to supplement USMC proprietary software. Games today involve teamwork, strategic thinking, and decision making. Games, such as Battlefield 4, feature weapons systems, ranges, and assets found on the realworld battlefield, all while driving home basic small unit tactics in a virtual, chaotic, and ever-changing environment.

Imagine taking two teams of Marines, each using realistic weapons that act as their real-life counterparts, and giving the teams opposing missions. Teams enter an area in the game and are forced to engage one another, using simulated weapons and assets to achieve a pre-determined objective. Force-on-force is one of the best types of training, but it is also the hardest to simulate in the field. We now have the technology to conduct force-on-force training in our decision rooms, allowing platoon commanders, squad leaders, and team leaders to get repetitions in tactical decision making. The best part of most COT games is that they are built to drive action, which engages the Marines’ primal instinct to win, as our study results revealed.

To help conduct our research, the company commander gave us a squad of Marines to serve as our sample, COT and USMC proprietary software games to analyze, and full use of our decision room for two weeks. We started with the hypothesis that Marines can receive the same training value using COT as USMC proprietary software programs. The two programs we chose to test this hypothesis were CCM and StarCrafit. StarCrafit, released in 1998 by Blizzard Entertainment, was chosen because of its low-impact system requirements to run on our battalion computers. We created a grading rubric that used a 1 to 10 scale rating (10=high, 1 -low) across seven categories along with a simple yes or no for the eighth category. The Marines spent two weeks playing through different game scenarios, situations, teams, and missions. Afterward, the Marines graded both programs in each of the eight categories and compiled an average across the categories. During the two-week trial period, we recorded our own observations of the Marines playing both systems. Our data analysis indicates that it is feasible to use COT to train Marines, but the process requires advance set-up and preparation. (See Figure 1.)

As the data illustrates, StarCrafit out-performed CCM in all areas. The data showed that Marines more readily bought into the training and were more enthusiastic when testing the COT product. Conversely, all 12 testers agreed that CCM is slow and unresponsive, gaving CCM a cumulative average of 1 in both the responsiveness and pacing categories. This is not surprising considering that CCM takes into account real time and space when units maneuver. While Marines agreed that both programs taught them how to use tactics and forced decision making, the results showed that StarCrafit was in some ways better than CCM. Overall, we showed that COT programs are as effective as USMC proprietary software programs to train our Marines.

Golf Company’s decision room is composed of thirty 6300 Dell computers, a projector, a 70″ fiat screen, and 3 white boards. Our company uses VBSII, CCM, and StarCrafit to execute TDGs in our decision room. Because of the results of our COT versus USMC proprietary software combined study and the recommendations of our Marines, we are in the process of testing the most recent COT FPSs and RTSs games that simulate the most realistic force-on-force scenarios on the virtual battlefield. Over the past three months, through trial and error, the company established an operating training model that we believe best integrates our decision room’s assets and technology in order to become better tacticians and decision makers.

Golf Company’s decision room model is broken down into three phases: planning, executing, and debriefing. During the planning phase, two groups of Marines are separated into a Marine and enemy force and are then given a pre-built terrain model or white board that has a pre-drawn map simulating what the Marines will see on the computers during the execution phase. The two groups are then given a quick, five-paragraph order followed by five minutes to conduct their planning. Marine group units are expected to identify what they believe the enemy’s CG (center of gravity) and CV (critical vulnerability) are, develop an SOM (scheme of maneuver) andTCMs (tactical control measures), and to issue tasking statements to subordinates. Marines working on a white board are expected to incorporate proper operational graphics when drawing their SOM. Once the unit leaders have Issued their order and the planning is complete, the two groups move to the decision room where they execute their SOMs in real time.

In the past, there would be no execution phase. Marines would move straight to a debrief, circle around the terrain model or white board, and begin picking apart their plan. Today, the decision room provides us with the opportunity to bring to life unit leaders’ SOMs and simultaneously face a real opponent. We are all taught that no plan survives first contact, and using the decision room helps drive that point home. Though each team is trying to accomplish its own individual mission, the game quickly shifts to who can outcycle the opponent’s OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. The outcome of most games played within the company was based on two factors: who took the time to properly plan, and who was able execute their OODA loop faster than their opponent. During the execution phase, the Marines are positioned at opposite ends of the decision room, away from their counterparts. Once the Marines are logged into the gaming system, a controller, who also acts as an observer, initiates the game and the two teams begin to carry out their assigned missions. Once one group accomplishes its mission or destroys its opponent’s forces, the Marines return to the terrain models and white boards to begin the debrief phase.

During the debrief, our company focuses on the initial plan, how each group communicated with team members, and major decisions that were made but not planned. We try to avoid arguing over who won or who killed whom, which can drag out a debrief and get ugly at times. Once the debrief is completed, a new unit leader is appointed and the groups switch sides and missions. Because Marines are fighting each other, and each Marine thinks differently than his peers, each scenario unfolds differently and can be replayed without losing training value.

Looking toward the future of integrating COT and USMC proprietary software into our decision room will continue to allow our unit to maximize white-space time in garrison, to mentally prep Marines from the youngest PFC to the highest ranking unit member for upcoming events, and to sharpen their ability to make decisions. Our end state is simple: increase our Marines’ skill and willpower, and we believe that the decision room does just that.

by GySgt Paul Nichols, USMC(Ret)

The Spartan helmet, shield, sword, spear, greaves, and breast plate are no longer hanging on the CO’s conference room wall. Different pieces of the Spartan gear are now kept at the company offices and displayed front and center on “gear trees” during formations. The right to display the gear is won through competition during the quarterly Spartan Games.

Every day, the OOD gives a TDG to the duty NCOs; every Tuesday at 0500, an Advance Warfighting Seminar is held that is open to all, usually 10-15 Marines attend. Weekly “war counsels” with the officers, SNCOs, and sergeants gather to go over SOPs, discuss tactics, and voice opinions. The sergeants sit up front and are the last to vote since they will be doing the execution. PME is driven from top-down, then bottomup refined.

The second visit was in August to witness training being done with the decision room, with an ad hoc collection of computers that were scheduled for disposal utilizing software that has been around since 2002. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) had also brought in a project that they were working on-Accelerating Development of Small Unit Decision Making (ADSUDM). I talked to some of the Marines from the battalion and received mixed reviews. They weren’t really sure where the battalion was going with this concept. I also saw Marines doing immediate action drills in the quad.

In September, during Marine Week in Nashville, I ran into a lance corporal from Fox Company. I asked him about the decision room. He explained how he worked on fire team, squad, and platoon tactics at 0200 the day before they left for Nashville.

My third visit, in November 2016, was by invitation to attend the Spartan Technology and Innovation Week. From August to November, ten decision rooms had spread through the battalion. The battalion was able to find enough computers to outfit two decision rooms per company with two more in the battalion command post. The Spartan Emerging Technology Week reviewed the capabilities of simulation-based training the battalion created by utilizing readily-available technology. One of the systems the battalion employed was the Augmented Immersive Team Trainer (AlTT). The 81mm mortar platoon showcased their ability to train forward observers during the eagle eye challenge utilizing this augmented reality system. Platoon commanders built Interactive Tactical Decision Games (ITDG), the subject being each of their most recent operations during the most recent 10day field exercise. Honesty traces of each attack were included with each ITDG, provided through overlays collected via the Instrumented Tactical Engagement System II {ITESS II), showing exactly what occurred throughout the entire operation. Importing data from GoPro cameras worn by the Marines, the platoon commanders created scenarios specific to very detailed and complex decision points. I witnessed platoon commanders reviewing each of their own decisions over and over again, like a football team. The commanders then brought their squad leaders and team leaders through each ITDG in the battalion classroom, presenting their leaders with the decision points. Squad and team leaders were forced to make the same decisions as company and platoon commanders through ITDG. Each repetition of a decision builds the recognition primed decision-making capability of the Marine. Throughout the week, squad competitions were held using Bohemia’s Virtual BattleSpace II. At the conclusion of the scenario, the Marines would gather and debrief using the recorded video and data of each engagement. Cognitive scientists were never far away, recording and questioning Marines to discover why they made the decisions they did. A sampling of Marines participated in the decision requirements interview, testing the capabilities of individual Marines in a verbal test.

The intelligence office was in the field mapping sections of the local MOUT [military operations on urbanized terrain] facility with a DJI Phantom quadcopter. They took the images, reproduced a three dimension virtual map, and imported the map file onto a couple Microsoft HoloLens. This map was then used, in conjunction with ITDG, in the battalion’s planning during the next field exercise.

My fourth visit was only for three hours. I linked up with the battalion at Golf-3 Observation Post to observe forward observer training being conducted with live ammunition against virtual targets using the AITT. After observing the training, I left the hill to talk to some Marines about the training. They pointed out that there wasn’t a need for virtual targets because there were real targets on the range. I mentioned that most of those targets were probably on the range 20 years ago; probably still on the old maps that I used back then. This is when we came to the understanding that the virtual targets offered training in locating new targets and the target location could change constantly. I then left for the MOUT facility.

I arrived at the MOUT facility command post about 20 minutes before the main party. I had a chance to get an advanced look at what was about to be presented. The battalion, with help using ONR hardware, had completed the 3D map using a DJI Phantom quadcopter. Using the HoloLens with the 3D map, they were able to discover terrain obstacles that were not present on other terrain data bases. The S-2 used the HoloLens to brief the battalion which then launched reconnaissance assets within two hours and complete the planning in a little over four hours. The Headquarters & Services Company Commander stayed in the ITESS van and focused on data collection while the companies conducted force on force training. All data was fed into the ITDG.

In garrison, the Marines have unlimited access the decision rooms. Daily- to include weekends and holidays- Marines use Tactical Decision Game (TDG) software to practice decisionmaking repetitions. A few days before a FEX begins the Marines start planning using the HoloLens and ITDG. The Company orders are passed down to the platoons using the ITDG. Mission planning is then done out in the field using ITDG and HoloLens. During the execution, ITESS II captures all of the data on movement and engagement. This data is then fed into the ITDG and the small unit leaders are given an after-action review in the field. When the battalion returns to garrison all of the data is accessible as a TDG for the Marines study down to the individual level.

This is, without a doubt, the best training that I have ever witnessed. The finished TDG is an objective assessment oí training that was completed and can be easily referenced by anyone in the battalion to build on lessons learned. The ITDG is being used as the “glue” that binds the various training systems into one manageable and recordable training event.

The battalion has managed to merge various training systems into one final product: a robust after-action review/ TDG that captures all aspects of the training and affords an opportunity to continuously learn from the event once back in garrison. The TDG gives an objective look at what training actually occurred. While the Battalion managed to do this seamlessly, generally, in my opinion, our training systems stay within well-defined corridors that don’t facilitate cross pollination.

by 2ndLts Austin Dickey, Hugo Jury, Kevin Lowring, Seamus Haggerty, and Andrew Veal

Imagine you are 1st Squad Leader, 2d Platoon, Co G, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2d Bn, 6th Mar). This morning, you decide to fill white-space training with a tactical decision (TDG) game in the barracks lounge over a whiteboard. After briefing the order, the attention of your Marines fades quickly as only the most outspoken fire team leaders brief their plans. At the conclusion of the TDG, most of the Marines immediately take out their phones and heatedly discuss a video game. Frustrated by their enthusiasm for a game and not their job, you realize you need to find an improved way to teach your Marines better decision-making skills through competition.

2d Bn, 6th Mar believes the “decision room” is the solution. Remodeling lounges into computer labs, decision rooms contain 16 DVTE (deployable virtual training environment) computers, tablet computers, a projector, white boards, and a large television screen. This dynamic room is designed to train decision making through interactive TDGs (ITDGs), combat decision ranges (CDRs), and virtual force-onforce gaming through Close Combat Marine (CCM).

As infantrymen, we do not spend as much time in the field as we would like. The decision room is a way to maximize our training and tactical prowess garrison. With little adjustment, DVTE computer systems that are already sourced to units throughout the Marine Corps can support a variety of software designed to test and develop the skill and will of young Marines. With the addition of ITDG, CDR, and forceon-force gaming, we can optimize the natural technical aptitudes of millennial while not requiring units to purchase additional materials.

The ITDG system is a leap forward from the traditional pen-and-paper TDG. It is a developing effort supported by the Office of Naval Research. 2d Bn, 6th Mar is fortunate to be assisting in the beta testing of many decisionmaking programs. Marines build TDGs electronically, using simple electronic overlays and any base map they import. An instructor may observe students build their schemes of maneuver, then brief the scheme of maneuver part by part, injecting enemy actions before, during, or after the student executes his plan.

ITDG layers graphics, much like an acetate overlay on a map. The instructors may digitally overlay new enemy situations as the students execute their scheme of maneuver. ITDG allows for an unlimited number of decision points reinforced by multimedia inserts into the game. For example, a video or image of a T-90 may be inserted onto the map if the student chooses to travel through an open field. The instructor may then explain the tanks actions in reaction to the field crossing.

Marines may create new enemy situations in response to the students plan, but they can also develop totally new TDGs. For example, we uploaded digital TDGs sourced from the Marine Corps Gazette into ITDG. This allows us access to hundreds of previouslymade TDGs easily distributed to students. Marines may upload their own map image, write an associated operations order, import multimedia, and then present this to their class.

To operate ITDG, the instructor must have the ITDG program on his computer, which will then act as the host computer. Student devices connect to the host via a local area or wireless network. ITDG is hosted through the Chrome browser, allowing easy access via smartphones, tablets, and computers without requiring Internet access. This is beneficial because it allows a unit to run ITDGs almost anywhere that we can bring power. For example, using a Toughpad and wireless router, a battalion staff may war game potential plans over ITDG.

It also allows the instructor to build his own scenarios from field exercises. An instructor may upload video from the Instrumented Tactical Engagement Simulation System (ITESS) location feed, UAV feed, or even audio and video from body cameras. This allows the leader to extend his lessons learned and decision making to subordinates while debriefing them in an interactive manner. This capability may also be utilized to mimic case studies of decisions made in historic battles. ITDG also provides the opportunity to conduct virtual force-on-force exercises with minimal setup.

The second program used to build recognition-primed decision making is CCM, a virtual force-on-force game. CCM contains scenarios which highlight specific infantry tactics. Each of these tactics can be tied back to Infantry Training and Readiness Manual tasks. (.NAVMC 3500 44B, Washington, DC: 2013). The instructor may focus on specific tactics critical to the mission ahead, organizing and equipping each force according to the mission. He may assign battalion-level assets, such as heavy machine guns and fixed- and rotary-wing air support, and pick the terrain based on a variety of different maps. Just as with ITDG, CCM requires the instructor to write an order or they may select one already written.

CCM IV features a system that accounts for the experience and human factors of each virtual Marine. The student must utilize sound tactics or risk his troops potentially disobeying orders. With unit tactics and the human decision of each simulated Marine, being factored into the success of the mission, this force-on-force simulator reinforces that both skill and will are required to win battles.

Virtual Battlespace (VBS III), a computer-based first person simulator, is the third program used. The program places the Marine into squad- and platoon-level force-on-force scenarios where he is forced to think tactically, make decisions, and communicate to his subordinates and adjacent units in a complex, competitive environment utilizing a range of supporting assets.

VBS III is a flexible system that promotes creativity in Marines and allows them to formulate their own scenarios that have different focus points or demonstrate different tactics. 2d Bn, 6th Mar, has integrated the above two systems to execute force-and-force exercises in a competitive manner-the Spartan Tactical Competition. During the competition, platoon commanders and squad leaders compete in a tournament against platoons from different companies. The planning process was integrated with the ITDG system prior to game play. At the end of the tournament, the platoon and squad that have demonstrated the best tactical decision-making skills in the battalion are identified. These competitions help us identify the strongest skills and leadership qualities in our Marines and are a practical, educational way to strengthen tactical decision making and morale in addition to building unit cohesion. We have already experienced leaders applying lessons learned in the decision room to force-on-force field operations in order to achieve an advantage over their opponent.

The decision room presents unlimited training possibilities for developing the Corps’ small-unit leaders. By and large, the Marine of today is more proficient than ever in gaming technologies. The Marines of 2d Bn, 6th Mar, are capitalizing on this advantage and leveraging the technology of the decision room to develop the most adept small-unit decision makers in the Corps who can innovate, adapt, and win any fight.

Author’s Note: A version of this article was published in the February Web Edition of the Marine Corps Gazette.