January’s Potpourri

by LtCol J.P. Glasgow, Jr.

. . . LtCol Batcheller’s commentary on Officer Competence (Jan82) resurfaced many of the traditional complaints concerning the inequities and uncertainties of the present manpower system. I basically agree with him, but offer the following observations on two of his recommendations:

Promotion Criteria: I strongly disagree with the recommendation to establish a policy favoring FMF tours and command assignments as guarantors of promotion. The general consensus is that the existing system already favors those billetholders. Precisely because of this perception we forfeit combat proficiency by squeezing as many people into those hallowed billets as possible, with priority of assignment going to those who have been away the longest. I agree that we need clear cut promotion prerequisites-but not this way. We must go back the other way stressing billet performance in concert with other prerequisites.

Officer MOS Exams: No! No! No! Such exams as prerequisites for promotion would be grossly inappropriate and thoroughly biased toward those individuals fortunate enough to have spent a tour in their primary MOS prior to consideration for the next promotion. Exams are clearly not the way. Perhaps an alternative would be completion of certain schools (career level, ILS) either by residency or correspondence prior to consideration for promotion. Another alternative would be completion of predesignated correspondence courses germane to particular ranks and primary MOSs.

Maneuver Warfare: Maj Gregor’s searing letter echoes my sentiments of Capt Wilson’s regurgitation of Messrs. Boyd and Lind. By resurfacing Bill Lind’s old gaps, Capt Wilson does nothing but cloud the issue. Are we to assume that such thinking is germane to every conceivable combat environment-Vietnam, NATO’s northern flank, the Middle East, the Steppes of Russia, Central America, etc? What about the defense, or is maneuver warfare symbolic for always being on the attack? Who provides security for all the “dumps” far forward? Does our resupply system change with this thinking-and if so-how? What’s the real difference between “mission oriented orders” and “frag orders” once the players are on the field? How does one hide a giant task force in this day and age? With the Sixth Fleet off Tripoli, I doubt that Qaddafi would believe false communication transmissions concerning a pilgrimage to Bethlehem. Have I been out of the artillery so long that “artillery far forward and in reserve” is generally accepted policy? When did it become fashionable for the artillery to be “attached” rather than have specific artillery missions of direct support, general support, etc?

Before I slipped down that “insidious black hole” and lost touch with the here and now, “maneuver” was a generally accepted principle of war; and, I thought, a pretty good one. The last pure example of its use to perfection in my lifetime was the relief of Pusan-MacArthur’s bold stroke at Inchon on 15 September 1950. It worked then and no doubt it will work again; but it is a principle, not a be all and end all for doing business.

Maneuver Warfare’s Complexities

by LtCol J.R. Phaneuf, USMC(Ret)

The appearance of articles by Maj Skipper and Capt Klepper relating to the logistical ramifications of maneuver warfare in the Jan82 issue was particularly encouraging. These articles indicate Marines are examining the total, overall scope of new concepts and doctrine. . . .

Marine planners at all levels should continue to invite the logisticians (and I don’t mean only supply officers) to their meetings and planning sessions. The LAV, aircraft, or infantryman up front is the small tip of a triangle which spreads widely as you look to the rear areas. The true logistics requirements to keep that man/machine mix in action is represented by the broad base of the triangle. . . .

Engineering and food services are just two of the logistics requirements to which I am aluding. Take a moment to tally the remainder, and it becomes frightening. There are no easy solutions, but we must keep at it. Let’s not have another Iran, where the mightiest nation in the world could not react, not because of a lack of combat forces, but because we couldn’t support them if we could have found a way to get them there.

Reexamining Maneuver Warfare

by LtCol Gordon Batcheller

All the coverage on maneuver warfare leaves me uneasy for several reasons: First, I’m not sure how its proponents conceive of its application to a given body of troops. Perhaps at the field marshal level a genius of war can, with imagination, intuition, reliable intelligence, and daring, launch his forces on a series of lightning thrusts that will dismember the enemy-body, brain, and/or will. History is full of stories of successful small unit leaders who were able to succeed because of their aggressive exploitation of opportunities. But I need to hear more about how this technique or doctrine is superimposed upon an entire division or, in our case, a MAF without a certain amount of chaos resulting. Somewhere in the organization, training, and employing of forces, all the trappings of “cookbook recipes” so lightly dismissed by the maneuverists are required. If the maneuverists are talking about good old flexibility, and boldness, I can applaud the objective but am bewildered by all the fuss over something so obvious. But if they are advocating some dramatic new doctrine that rejects fire team, squad, platoon, company, and battalion formations, or recognizable patterns of maneuver, then I think they may be candidates for processing under ALMAR 246-81. History has produced precious few military geniuses, and they have been most recognizable when they were in command of all the forces involved: combat, combat support, and combat service support. I have difficulty with a concept that appears to presume this level of competence down to and including the small unit level.

Second, there is an obvious inconsistency between “mission order tactics” without detailed control and “completely integrated logistical and tactical considerations,” to say nothing of the coordination of supporting arms and adjacent units. Very few logisticians exist in the Marine Corps, and none of them are mind-readers. In the tactical arena, fire and maneuver must be closely integrated, and they both must be continuously supported. This requires, unfortunately, detailed control of all elements of the MAGTF, and its subordinate units. I won’t even go into the demands placed on the communicators by the freewheeling approach. The need to command, control, and support certainly inhibits flexibility, but need not destroy it, nor render imagination and genius ineffective. But I haven’t seen a thoughtful examination of all the ramifications of the “turn them loose” approach yet.

Third, I am concerned that the application of maneuver warfare, with its undeniable roots in land warfare, to the amphibious Marine Corps can lead to a fascination for land vehicles and tactical “mobility” for sustained land warfare that is inconsistent with our primary mission and statutory areas of responsibility. The resulting changes to our force structure, manpower, and training needs, and even our naval identity could lead us down the proverbial rabbit trail and away from areas of our more legitimate concern. I would suggest that our real need in the mobility area is not so much a way to increase or extend our land mobility, but a light, effective, and reliable way or ways to decrease the enemy’s mobility. Although over-simplified, the points is: we don’t need more tracked vehicles; we need more tracked vehicle killers.

Finally, I don’t see a careful consideration of the difference between strategic and tactical maneuver, nor of the relevancy of either to a Service’s primary mission. The simplistic embrace of maneuver warfare leads inevitably to more mechanization as a means of tactical mobility. The effect on strategic mobility is seldom thrown into the analysis. Getting there may not be half the fun, but it’s a prerequisite to what fun there might be. What the relevance of all this tactical mobility is to a Service structured for violent assault, short operations, and stubborn defense is not clear. The promised mobility might be more mirage than oasis. Machines that can’t be maintained or supplied or operated are hardly “force multipliers.” The maneuverists task the combat service support element with providing flexible, responsive support, but there is precious little analysis of the feasibility of this tasking, nor examination of the difference between maneuver warfare fought close to a friendly industrial base and maneuver warfare fought at the end of a 10,000-mile sea line of communication.

Maneuver Warfare Roadmap: Part II: Concepts of Employment & Tactical Applications

by Col Bruce G. Brown, USMC(Ret)

Part 1 of this article was published last month. In it the author discussed how amphibious doctrine must change if we are serious about adopting the basic concepts of maneuver warfare. He then identified six structural/organizational trends that must accompany a transition of this kind: In brief, he believes the Corps will have to break with mirror image infantry battalions and organize its ground combat elements in three different forms-light, foot-mobile infantry, tight armored forces, and heavier mechanized combined arms forces. He sees a new emphasis on heavy-lift helicopters (a trend already begun by the acquisition of M198 artillery), a need for new command relationships with helicopters, and a seabasing logistics concept. In this article he continues his analysis describing how an amphibious landing force might be organized for maneuver warfare and presenting examples of how it might conduct operations.

Task Organization of Landing Forces

Concepts of employment and tactical applications are inevitably linked to the capabilities of the amphibious task force (ATF) and its component landing force (LF). The LF component, a Marine air ground task force (MAGTF), may range in size from a MAU to a MAF. The basic concept of task organizing the LF is sound and should remain constant. However, what should change is the perception and application of the doctrine. The problem is that the doctrine is the essence of flexibility while applications have been stereotyped. Requirement documents such as the Marine Corps mid-range objective plan (MMROP) present notional MAU, MAB, and MAF troop lists (i.e., one list for each “representative” MAGTF). Prior to publication of the Commandant’s White Letter 1-80 and the assumption of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) tasking, contingency planning was based on the basic assumption that MAFs would deploy as organizational entities. Both of these examples portray stereotype MAGTF task organization.

Now there is a new ballgame called the “composite MAF.” It provides an opportunity for the Marine Corps to demonstrate the flexibility of its doctrine. MAGTFs can be tailored (sized and task organized) for the specific contingencies they are tasked to support by drawing from the assets of all three MAFs. Equally important, requirements documents can reflect the wide range and differences represented by these contingencies through the use of several representative troop lists at each MAGTF level.

In order to illustrate the difference in perception and application, let’s look at the MAF exclusively. First, assume that each of the three ground combat trends identified in Part I results in a minimum of two regiments in the total force structure; i.e., two mechanized combined arms task forces (MCATFs), two light armored task forces (LATFs), and two foot-mobile infantry commands. Also assume that all six of these reinforced regiments are available to deploy in an amphibious mode. Given these assumptions, the flexibility of the basic doctrine can be illustrated by the following description of the MAF-level forcible entry capability.

The MAF

The MAF is built around two to four RLTs and a task organized aircraft wing. The smallest MAF contains five BLTs. The largest MAF configured for seaborne forcible entry operations could contain 12 BLTs and 2 tank battalions-this upper limit set by anticipated amphibious shipping constraints.

The MAF can be task organized in a wide variety of ways to meet the terrain conditions and anticipated threats associated with specific contingency tasks. For example, the largest and heaviest MAF could contain two heavy MCATF RLTs and two LATF RLTs. The maneuver warfare potential of this MAF in suitable terrain far exceeds the sum of its parts. In areas where restricted terrain is the dominant characteristic, a MAF containing two foot-mobile infantry RLTs and one or two LATF RLTs also has exceptional maneuver warfare potential.

For purposes of this article, a MAF containing one heavy MCATF, one LATF, and one foot-mobile infantry RLT will be used as the illustrative example.

General Concept of Employment

The overall concept of employment involves seaborne forcible entry and a maneuver style of warfare ashore while seabased. Focus is on defeating a numerically superior tank-heavy mechanized force on terrain that is largely unrestricted and on gaining control of the operational area. There appear to be eight definable steps (Figure 1) implicit in such operations. A brief discussion of each step follows:

* Step 1-Gain and maintain air and naval superiority. Although this remains a fundamental part of doctrine, tactics may be much different if the enemy force is numerically superior in either category, or if a situation of approximate parity exists at the time the initial engagement commences. A multipurpose ATF would, as feasible, directly assist other naval forces in achieving the necessary air and naval superiority.

* Step 2-Determine the place and time of the main ship-to-shore attack. Use of demonstrations, feints, raids, covert reconnaissance, and overt reconnaissance-in-force operations ashore would be used in almost all seaborne forcible entry operations. These operations would seek to gain detailed information, and perhaps deceive or confuse the enemy as to when and where the main attack will strike. However, the primary purposes are to ensure accurate knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of the enemy defense and test enemy reactions.

* Step 3-The main ship-to-shore attack. The main attack is fundamentally characterized by the landing of the heavy (nonhelicopter-transportable) MCATF. Because the MCATF is very difficult to extract once it is committed ashore, its landing signals a main attack and the intention to maneuver ashore indefinitely.

*Step 4-Early operations ashore while outnumbered. An understanding of this step is critical to the survival of the landing force. A numerically superior enemy with heavy tank and mechanized forces will surely understand (as his doctrine clearly indicates) that his best chance of defeating a landing is through large-scale, early counterattacks. Therefore, during this step, recon-pull tactics are used to ensure that the landing force is not trapped into a firepower-attrition contest nor defeated piecemeal. The principle of security is emphasized in coordination with maneuver.

* Step 5-Parity operations. When approximate parity exists between forces, the immediate goal should be to increase enemy hesitation and decrease his initiative. Parity does not mean that the enemy’s “cohesion has been shattered” or even seriously impaired. Also, remember that although a senior enemy commander may be or may appear to be confused, his tactical units and smaller commands will follow orders loyally and fight with intense determination. History shows that such behavior sometimes turns apparent defeat into victory.

* Step 6-Superiority operations. Obviously, this condition permits an increase in the tempo of maneuver and attack at times and places of your choosing. However, defeat of the enemy is through focus on his vulnerabilities rather than on one “grand, command-push attack.”

* Step 7-Mission fulfillment. Once the enemy has been defeated, other explicit or implicit elements of the mission can then be accomplished. This could include continuing control of the landing force area of operations (LFAO) for an indefinite time, conduct of ground and air interdiction operations, or reconnaissance-in-force operations.

* Step 8-Amphibious withdrawal. This step is designed to imply that the best use of landing forces in a maneuver style of warfare is as a continuing component of an ATF-an ATF supporting the naval aspects of a joint campaign. It does not mean that landing forces would never be committed to sustained land combat, only that such commitment should not be viewed as the doctrinal norm.

Sample Concepts of Employment/Tactical Applications

The examples presented below are based on the ground maneuver elements of a reinforced division task organized as shown in Figure 2. They focus exclusively on the ground maneuver elements in order to simplify the presentation. Also, it will be assumed that a CH-53E type helicopter is the primary transport helicopter of the landing force, and that the numbers (estimated ‘to be 85-95) are sufficient to transport the scheduled serials of one LATF BLT in one lift. Such numbers would also be sufficient to transport 2,700-3,000 foot-mobile infantry Marines in one lift-a figure estimated to equate to the entire foot-mobile RLT. In addition, the ATF is assumed to contain 70 landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vehicles, sufficient to transport all tanks of one tank battalion in one lift, or the scheduled serials of an entire LATF or foot-mobile infantry RLT.

The first example illustrates reconnaissancein-force applications related to step 2, determination of the time and place for the main ship-to-shore attack. (See Figure 3.) This illustration portrays the flexible options provided by the lighter RLTs in conjunction with the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC. Repeated overt reconnaissance insertions/extractions and reconnaissance-in-force attacks/extractions could lead to a reconnaissance-in-force operation without a predetermined extraction. In such case, the commanders would have the option of landing the heavy MCATF in lieu of extracting the reconnaissance-in-force elements; i.e., recon-pull of the main ship-toshore attack.

In most cases, however, it is believed the main ship-to-shore attack would be a coordinated command-push operation in an area containing an undefended or lightly defended surface landing site (i.e., a portion of the shoreline where AAVs and LCAC can land). Before illustrating the main attack, it is useful to keep in mind that throughout step 2 operations and at the commencement of the main attack, the ATF is maneuvering to pose a threat to land anywhere in the LFAO (Figure 4).

An example of the main ship-to-shore attack is illustrated in Figure 5. Depending on the “situation and terrain,” the lighter RLTs are landed to ensure control of the surface landing site in preparation for the on-call landing of the MCATF RLT. Although the LCAC-landed RLT may be landed at H-hour when one is sure of an unopposed touchdown, the more common technique would probably be to land the helicopterborne forces first to ensure an unopposed LCAC landing.

In order to further illustrate the flexibility and complementary nature of the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC combined with a LATF/foot-mobile mix, envision a night landing in which on-site, covert reconnaissance has verified an undefended surface landing site. At the risk of preaching to the choir, note the LCAC force could be landed first to secure nearby LZs to ensure their security for the touchdown of the helicopterborne force.

A second phase of the attack is characterized by the unopposed landing of the heavy MCATF RLT. As envisioned here, the normal concept would involve (1) LCACs return to the shipping (which has closed somewhat from the original launch area) to pick up the second lift, the tank battalion; (2) on-call, orchestrated launch of three mechanized battalions in AAVs and the tank battalion in LCACs. Underway launch of the AAVs is conducted as close to the landing site as possible. Which lands first, the AAVs or LCACs, is a function of the specific situation, not a function of doctrine. The only doctrinal tenet envisioned here is that LCAC and AAV waves are not mixed. Upon landing, the mechanized infantry and tank units proceed to assembly areas or preattack positions in accordance with predetermined cross-attachment orders; (3) LCACs return to the shipping to bring in the third lift, self-propelled artillery attached to, or in direct support of, the MCATF RLT.

Before leaving the main ship-to-shore attack, it is appropriate to reflect on the basic complementary nature of the LCAC/AAV equation. In projecting the heavy MCATF RLT ashore, the fundamental goal is to land the ground maneuver elements of the entire RLT intact-one lift-with the tactical integrity required to begin maneuver or execute task force mission assignments shortly after landing. Piecemeal buildup of the MCATF ashore is unacceptable in light of the capabilities of the expected enemy-therefore, the basic nature of the equation is the simple logic of quantity.

The primary problem in the early stages of operations ashore is to expand the maneuver area against a numerically superior enemy (step 4). Although specific tactics would vary greatly, two general examples will be used to show potential contrasts in tactical techniques.

The first example is illustrative of a situation where forces have landed relatively far from major enemy units (See Figure 6.) In this case, expansion of the area is achieved rapidly through offensive action. The action could be either recon-pull or command-push. In most cases, it would attempt to expand the maneuver area along the littoral to a greater distance than expansion inland. In the illustration, note (1) the mobile reconnaissance screen, (2) combined vertical/two-dimensional attack of the LATF RLT, and (3) the retention of one maneuver battalion of the MCATF RLT as division reserve.

The second example is illustrative of situations in which major enemy elements are relatively close to the landing area. In this case, the basic concept is designed to focus on one fundamental of amphibious warfare: the shoreline is a natural and insurmountable obstacle to the enemy. With the landing force no longer tied to a NIS-type beach and a vulnerable beach support area (BSA), the shoreline offers a distinct advantage; the maneuver area of the landing force extends seaward; that of the enemy does not. Figure 7a depicts the general unit dispositions. The MCATF RLT is in a TAOR with the mission of delaying and canalizing an enemy attack toward the shoreline. The foot-mobile RLT occupies major ambush/blocking positions in restricted terrain. The LATF is the division reserve located in an area which would be a logical objective of the main enemy attack, or the shoreline terminus of a major corridor to the coast. In Figure 7b, reconnaissance elements and the MCATF RLT conduct ambush and delaying actions to impede progress of units in the shoulder of the attack while permitting more rapid progress in the center. During this phase, some enemy units are drawn toward a major ambush (temporary blocking) position in restricted terrain where a foot-mobile BLT extracts a toll and withdraws under the cover of MCATF ambushes and/or limited counterattacks. The LATF is extracted by helicopter and redeployed either deep on an exposed flank or near the rear of the enemy force. It attacks selected elements of the enemy force using hit and run tactics. The LATF might be redeployed by helicopter several times during this period; it could also be extracted in some situations.

In Figure 7c, we see that when the enemy attack approaches or hits the shoreline, it must stop or turn. In either event, it becomes most vulnerable. Should it turn in the anticipated direction as indicated in the figure, it will be drawn toward restricted terrain and the MCATF will counterattack in conjunction with a deep thrust by the LATF. Should the enemy turn in the opposite direction, the lighter forces withdraw toward a helo/LCAC extraction area, and at the right moment, the MCATF RLT attacks into the rear of the enemy force. In such case, the extracted forces would be redeployed to support the MCATF attack.

These illustrations should suffice to begin to picture a maneuver style of warfare for future landing forces. Wild?-Maybe not. Exaggerated?-Yes, to illustrate principles and the contrast with conventional landing doctrine, but not beyond possibility if we prepare for it.

Conclusion

This article is essentially a roadmap toward a maneuver style of warfare for landing forces. Evolving the doctrine, tactics, and techniques which would define the Marine Corps’ roadmap is your challenge.

Maneuver Warfare Roadmap: Part II: Concepts of Employment & Tactical Applications

by Col Bruce G. Brown, USMC(Ret)

Part 1 of this article was published last month. In it the author discussed how amphibious doctrine must change if we are serious about adopting the basic concepts of maneuver warfare. He then identified six structural/organizational trends that must accompany a transition of this kind: In brief, he believes the Corps will have to break with mirror image infantry battalions and organize its ground combat elements in three different forms-light, foot-mobile infantry, tight armored forces, and heavier mechanized combined arms forces. He sees a new emphasis on heavy-lift helicopters (a trend already begun by the acquisition of M198 artillery), a need for new command relationships with helicopters, and a seabasing logistics concept. In this article he continues his analysis describing how an amphibious landing force might be organized for maneuver warfare and presenting examples of how it might conduct operations.

Task Organization of Landing Forces

Concepts of employment and tactical applications are inevitably linked to the capabilities of the amphibious task force (ATF) and its component landing force (LF). The LF component, a Marine air ground task force (MAGTF), may range in size from a MAU to a MAF. The basic concept of task organizing the LF is sound and should remain constant. However, what should change is the perception and application of the doctrine. The problem is that the doctrine is the essence of flexibility while applications have been stereotyped. Requirement documents such as the Marine Corps mid-range objective plan (MMROP) present notional MAU, MAB, and MAF troop lists (i.e., one list for each “representative” MAGTF). Prior to publication of the Commandant’s White Letter 1-80 and the assumption of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) tasking, contingency planning was based on the basic assumption that MAFs would deploy as organizational entities. Both of these examples portray stereotype MAGTF task organization.

Now there is a new ballgame called the “composite MAF.” It provides an opportunity for the Marine Corps to demonstrate the flexibility of its doctrine. MAGTFs can be tailored (sized and task organized) for the specific contingencies they are tasked to support by drawing from the assets of all three MAFs. Equally important, requirements documents can reflect the wide range and differences represented by these contingencies through the use of several representative troop lists at each MAGTF level.

In order to illustrate the difference in perception and application, let’s look at the MAF exclusively. First, assume that each of the three ground combat trends identified in Part I results in a minimum of two regiments in the total force structure; i.e., two mechanized combined arms task forces (MCATFs), two light armored task forces (LATFs), and two foot-mobile infantry commands. Also assume that all six of these reinforced regiments are available to deploy in an amphibious mode. Given these assumptions, the flexibility of the basic doctrine can be illustrated by the following description of the MAF-level forcible entry capability.

The MAF

The MAF is built around two to four RLTs and a task organized aircraft wing. The smallest MAF contains five BLTs. The largest MAF configured for seaborne forcible entry operations could contain 12 BLTs and 2 tank battalions-this upper limit set by anticipated amphibious shipping constraints.

The MAF can be task organized in a wide variety of ways to meet the terrain conditions and anticipated threats associated with specific contingency tasks. For example, the largest and heaviest MAF could contain two heavy MCATF RLTs and two LATF RLTs. The maneuver warfare potential of this MAF in suitable terrain far exceeds the sum of its parts. In areas where restricted terrain is the dominant characteristic, a MAF containing two foot-mobile infantry RLTs and one or two LATF RLTs also has exceptional maneuver warfare potential.

For purposes of this article, a MAF containing one heavy MCATF, one LATF, and one foot-mobile infantry RLT will be used as the illustrative example.

General Concept of Employment

The overall concept of employment involves seaborne forcible entry and a maneuver style of warfare ashore while seabased. Focus is on defeating a numerically superior tank-heavy mechanized force on terrain that is largely unrestricted and on gaining control of the operational area. There appear to be eight definable steps (Figure 1) implicit in such operations. A brief discussion of each step follows:

* Step 1-Gain and maintain air and naval superiority. Although this remains a fundamental part of doctrine, tactics may be much different if the enemy force is numerically superior in either category, or if a situation of approximate parity exists at the time the initial engagement commences. A multipurpose ATF would, as feasible, directly assist other naval forces in achieving the necessary air and naval superiority.

* Step 2-Determine the place and time of the main ship-to-shore attack. Use of demonstrations, feints, raids, covert reconnaissance, and overt reconnaissance-in-force operations ashore would be used in almost all seaborne forcible entry operations. These operations would seek to gain detailed information, and perhaps deceive or confuse the enemy as to when and where the main attack will strike. However, the primary purposes are to ensure accurate knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of the enemy defense and test enemy reactions.

* Step 3-The main ship-to-shore attack. The main attack is fundamentally characterized by the landing of the heavy (nonhelicopter-transportable) MCATF. Because the MCATF is very difficult to extract once it is committed ashore, its landing signals a main attack and the intention to maneuver ashore indefinitely.

*Step 4-Early operations ashore while outnumbered. An understanding of this step is critical to the survival of the landing force. A numerically superior enemy with heavy tank and mechanized forces will surely understand (as his doctrine clearly indicates) that his best chance of defeating a landing is through large-scale, early counterattacks. Therefore, during this step, recon-pull tactics are used to ensure that the landing force is not trapped into a firepower-attrition contest nor defeated piecemeal. The principle of security is emphasized in coordination with maneuver.

* Step 5-Parity operations. When approximate parity exists between forces, the immediate goal should be to increase enemy hesitation and decrease his initiative. Parity does not mean that the enemy’s “cohesion has been shattered” or even seriously impaired. Also, remember that although a senior enemy commander may be or may appear to be confused, his tactical units and smaller commands will follow orders loyally and fight with intense determination. History shows that such behavior sometimes turns apparent defeat into victory.

* Step 6-Superiority operations. Obviously, this condition permits an increase in the tempo of maneuver and attack at times and places of your choosing. However, defeat of the enemy is through focus on his vulnerabilities rather than on one “grand, command-push attack.”

* Step 7-Mission fulfillment. Once the enemy has been defeated, other explicit or implicit elements of the mission can then be accomplished. This could include continuing control of the landing force area of operations (LFAO) for an indefinite time, conduct of ground and air interdiction operations, or reconnaissance-in-force operations.

* Step 8-Amphibious withdrawal. This step is designed to imply that the best use of landing forces in a maneuver style of warfare is as a continuing component of an ATF-an ATF supporting the naval aspects of a joint campaign. It does not mean that landing forces would never be committed to sustained land combat, only that such commitment should not be viewed as the doctrinal norm.

Sample Concepts of Employment/Tactical Applications

The examples presented below are based on the ground maneuver elements of a reinforced division task organized as shown in Figure 2. They focus exclusively on the ground maneuver elements in order to simplify the presentation. Also, it will be assumed that a CH-53E type helicopter is the primary transport helicopter of the landing force, and that the numbers (estimated ‘to be 85-95) are sufficient to transport the scheduled serials of one LATF BLT in one lift. Such numbers would also be sufficient to transport 2,700-3,000 foot-mobile infantry Marines in one lift-a figure estimated to equate to the entire foot-mobile RLT. In addition, the ATF is assumed to contain 70 landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vehicles, sufficient to transport all tanks of one tank battalion in one lift, or the scheduled serials of an entire LATF or foot-mobile infantry RLT.

The first example illustrates reconnaissancein-force applications related to step 2, determination of the time and place for the main ship-to-shore attack. (See Figure 3.) This illustration portrays the flexible options provided by the lighter RLTs in conjunction with the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC. Repeated overt reconnaissance insertions/extractions and reconnaissance-in-force attacks/extractions could lead to a reconnaissance-in-force operation without a predetermined extraction. In such case, the commanders would have the option of landing the heavy MCATF in lieu of extracting the reconnaissance-in-force elements; i.e., recon-pull of the main ship-toshore attack.

In most cases, however, it is believed the main ship-to-shore attack would be a coordinated command-push operation in an area containing an undefended or lightly defended surface landing site (i.e., a portion of the shoreline where AAVs and LCAC can land). Before illustrating the main attack, it is useful to keep in mind that throughout step 2 operations and at the commencement of the main attack, the ATF is maneuvering to pose a threat to land anywhere in the LFAO (Figure 4).

An example of the main ship-to-shore attack is illustrated in Figure 5. Depending on the “situation and terrain,” the lighter RLTs are landed to ensure control of the surface landing site in preparation for the on-call landing of the MCATF RLT. Although the LCAC-landed RLT may be landed at H-hour when one is sure of an unopposed touchdown, the more common technique would probably be to land the helicopterborne forces first to ensure an unopposed LCAC landing.

In order to further illustrate the flexibility and complementary nature of the heavy-lift helicopter and LCAC combined with a LATF/foot-mobile mix, envision a night landing in which on-site, covert reconnaissance has verified an undefended surface landing site. At the risk of preaching to the choir, note the LCAC force could be landed first to secure nearby LZs to ensure their security for the touchdown of the helicopterborne force.

A second phase of the attack is characterized by the unopposed landing of the heavy MCATF RLT. As envisioned here, the normal concept would involve (1) LCACs return to the shipping (which has closed somewhat from the original launch area) to pick up the second lift, the tank battalion; (2) on-call, orchestrated launch of three mechanized battalions in AAVs and the tank battalion in LCACs. Underway launch of the AAVs is conducted as close to the landing site as possible. Which lands first, the AAVs or LCACs, is a function of the specific situation, not a function of doctrine. The only doctrinal tenet envisioned here is that LCAC and AAV waves are not mixed. Upon landing, the mechanized infantry and tank units proceed to assembly areas or preattack positions in accordance with predetermined cross-attachment orders; (3) LCACs return to the shipping to bring in the third lift, self-propelled artillery attached to, or in direct support of, the MCATF RLT.

Before leaving the main ship-to-shore attack, it is appropriate to reflect on the basic complementary nature of the LCAC/AAV equation. In projecting the heavy MCATF RLT ashore, the fundamental goal is to land the ground maneuver elements of the entire RLT intact-one lift-with the tactical integrity required to begin maneuver or execute task force mission assignments shortly after landing. Piecemeal buildup of the MCATF ashore is unacceptable in light of the capabilities of the expected enemy-therefore, the basic nature of the equation is the simple logic of quantity.

The primary problem in the early stages of operations ashore is to expand the maneuver area against a numerically superior enemy (step 4). Although specific tactics would vary greatly, two general examples will be used to show potential contrasts in tactical techniques.

The first example is illustrative of a situation where forces have landed relatively far from major enemy units (See Figure 6.) In this case, expansion of the area is achieved rapidly through offensive action. The action could be either recon-pull or command-push. In most cases, it would attempt to expand the maneuver area along the littoral to a greater distance than expansion inland. In the illustration, note (1) the mobile reconnaissance screen, (2) combined vertical/two-dimensional attack of the LATF RLT, and (3) the retention of one maneuver battalion of the MCATF RLT as division reserve.

The second example is illustrative of situations in which major enemy elements are relatively close to the landing area. In this case, the basic concept is designed to focus on one fundamental of amphibious warfare: the shoreline is a natural and insurmountable obstacle to the enemy. With the landing force no longer tied to a NIS-type beach and a vulnerable beach support area (BSA), the shoreline offers a distinct advantage; the maneuver area of the landing force extends seaward; that of the enemy does not. Figure 7a depicts the general unit dispositions. The MCATF RLT is in a TAOR with the mission of delaying and canalizing an enemy attack toward the shoreline. The foot-mobile RLT occupies major ambush/blocking positions in restricted terrain. The LATF is the division reserve located in an area which would be a logical objective of the main enemy attack, or the shoreline terminus of a major corridor to the coast. In Figure 7b, reconnaissance elements and the MCATF RLT conduct ambush and delaying actions to impede progress of units in the shoulder of the attack while permitting more rapid progress in the center. During this phase, some enemy units are drawn toward a major ambush (temporary blocking) position in restricted terrain where a foot-mobile BLT extracts a toll and withdraws under the cover of MCATF ambushes and/or limited counterattacks. The LATF is extracted by helicopter and redeployed either deep on an exposed flank or near the rear of the enemy force. It attacks selected elements of the enemy force using hit and run tactics. The LATF might be redeployed by helicopter several times during this period; it could also be extracted in some situations.

In Figure 7c, we see that when the enemy attack approaches or hits the shoreline, it must stop or turn. In either event, it becomes most vulnerable. Should it turn in the anticipated direction as indicated in the figure, it will be drawn toward restricted terrain and the MCATF will counterattack in conjunction with a deep thrust by the LATF. Should the enemy turn in the opposite direction, the lighter forces withdraw toward a helo/LCAC extraction area, and at the right moment, the MCATF RLT attacks into the rear of the enemy force. In such case, the extracted forces would be redeployed to support the MCATF attack.

These illustrations should suffice to begin to picture a maneuver style of warfare for future landing forces. Wild?-Maybe not. Exaggerated?-Yes, to illustrate principles and the contrast with conventional landing doctrine, but not beyond possibility if we prepare for it.

Conclusion

This article is essentially a roadmap toward a maneuver style of warfare for landing forces. Evolving the doctrine, tactics, and techniques which would define the Marine Corps’ roadmap is your challenge.

Maneuver Warfare Roadmap: Part I: Trends and Implications

by Col Bruce G. Brown, USMC(Ret)

A number of articles have appeared in professional magazines over the past two years or so which constitute a refreshing refocus on the art of war. Maneuver warfare and the Boyd Theory are in the “spotlight” of this dialog. The purpose of this article is to stimulate further thought on the tactical implications of a maneuver style of warfare as applicable to the landing forces of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). It is presented in two parts. Part I deals with doctrinal implications and force structure/task organization trends believed to be inherent in any adoption of maneuver warfare concepts. Part II will attempt to portray those trends in terms of concepts of employment and tactical applications in amphibious warfare.

It is also noted in introduction that the terms “maneuver warfare” and “Boyd Theory” are sometimes used as “buzz words” (words or phrases that become popular primarily because nobody within hearing knows what they really mean). The point is that the maneuver style of warfare and Boyd Theory are important to the Marine Corps. That they are also elusive at this stage of their development is one of the primary reasons for writing this article.

A Point of Departure

The basic literature on maneuver warfare is contained in contemporary professional publications and military history. Specifically, the Apr81 issue of the Marine Corps GAZETTE is of particular interest to Marines, and it is not believed necessary to review that issue or other writings here. However, it is appropriate to have a consensus on a point of departure relative to the fundamentals of a maneuver style of warfare. As this is written, the basic dichotomy in the dialog focuses on the psychological aspects of maneuver warfare theory as advanced by Mr. William S. Lind. It is very difficult for most Marines to embrace that aspect at the tactical level.

However, it is not necessary to embrace the psychological aspect (or discard it) at this time. What is necessary is agreement that at least some of the fundamentals offer the beginning of a path toward tactical applications through which one can fight outnumbered and win. Therefore, let’s start with the Marine Corps’ current perception of the fundamentals as the only logical point of departure. This perception is currently contained in Operational Handbook (OH) 9-3 (Rev A), Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF), March 1980, and Education Center Publication (ECP) 9-5, Marine Amphibious Brigade Mechanized and Countermechanized Operations, 20 January 1981.

Table 1 depicts extracted portions of the basic tenet of these documents. Note that they exclude direct focus on the psychological aspect. With all due respect to Mr. Lind, this exclusion is believed helpful at this time, due to the nature of the dichotomy. It is critical to get more Marines embarked on USS Maneuver before it leaves port. Ah abandon ship drill during the embarkation phase would be disastrous-the doctrinal Marine alternative may not be firepower-attrition; it may better be described as adherence to frontal assault tactics. Also, keep in mind that maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps will be a unique style, built by Marines, for Marines-a style that will fit Marines.

Doctrinal implications

As used herein, doctrinal implications include basic contrasts, believed to be explicit or implicit, between the fundamentals of maneuver warfare as depicted in Table 1, and codified doctrine, tactics, and techniques reflected in current Landing Force Manuals (LFMs) and Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs). Not all contrasts are included, only the basic or more obvious. Collectively, they constitute an indictment of current doctrine and a challenge to change it.

* An amphibious forcible entry operation is an attack launched from the sea-it is not an assault and should contain no phase with that title.

* Frontal attack and assault are the antithesis of maneuver warfare. Frontal attacks are to be avoided; you hold (or delay, or withdraw) in front of the enemy, you attack his flank and rear. Assaults, when used, are not only conducted on a flank or rear, but should be conducted with something near a 10:1 force ratio advantage vice a 3:1 ratio, and should be conducted against hasty-vice-prepared defenses. Prepared defenses are to be avoided like the plague-bypassed, left stranded-or the enemy must be enticed to leave them.

* The force beachhead line (FBHL), normally drawn from a trace of the final terrain objectives of the landing force, is not applicable to the conduct of a maneuver style of warfare by landing forces. It must go. Also, the advent of the vertical envelopment concept (how many years ago?) and now the landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC) make the term beachhead obsolete. The lodgment is by no means a beachhead and, in the context of maneuver warfare, is much better defined as a landing force area of operations (LFAO).

* The shape and size of the LFAO should be influenced by maneuver warfare concepts. Obviously, the size will vary significantly between different types’ of missions, threat forces, and between different-sized MAGTFs. However, it is believed the general shape will be constant; that is wider than it is deep. There are many reasons for this, but the primary ones relate to the umbilical cord to the sea. The Navy portion of the amphibious task force (ATF) remains a vital part of the maneuver concept and capability throughout the operation. Deep inland thrusts stretch the umbilical cord to a point where the landing force ashore becomes ineffective no matter what tactics are employed. However, operations along the littoral do not stretch the cord. They take full advantage of assets at sea such as naval gunfire (NGF), LCACs, and helicopters. (See Figure 1.)

* Maneuver warfare by ATFs and landing forces (LFs), combined with real world deployment and mount-out techniques, mandates a basic doctrine wherein the ATF and LF missions are assumed to be received while afloat, not prior to embarkation.

* Rehearsals after receipt of the forcible entry mission are to be avoided if possible. Exceptions to this general principle would be rehearsals to deceive the enemy. For a comparison of potential phases of future amphibious operations with contemporary phases, see Table 2.

* Recon-pull tactics are critical to the initial projection of power ashore. If the commander amphibious task force (CATF) and commander landing force (CLF) are not confident of “landing where they ain’t,” they simply feint until they are confident.

* Once a CATF and CLF are confident of “landing where they ain’t,” the initial projection of power ashore is a coordinated, command-push operation designed to facilitate initial maneuver, security, and the resumption of recon-pull tactics ashore as soon as feasible.

* Fixed installations, particularly aviation facilities, logistic facilities, and large semifixed command posts (CPs), cannot be phased ashore in a maneuver style of warfare. If frontal attack and assault constitute the antithesis of maneuver warfare on the tactical side of the house, then fixed installations ashore constitute the corollary on the support side. (Please do not begin to rebut this with preconceived bias related to the inevitability of “subsequent operations ashore.”) During the entire amphibious operation, to the last minute before termination, the LF must be free to maneuver unhampered by a rear area jammed with fixed installations. In addition, fixed installations are easy targets for a numerically superior enemy force regardless of who has air superiority. The entire theme of pushing command and control, aviation, and logistics facilities ashore is ludicrous in the context of a maneuver style of tactics. The adage should be to keep them afloat where they are mobile and much more likely to survive and perform their basic functions.

The magnitude of this basic (incomplete) list of doctrinal implications suggests that it is foolish to expect an immediate, or “miracle” LFM on maneuver warfare. This is not intended in any way as a “put-down” of Capt G.I. Wilson’s excellent article in the April issue; it simply means we need a deliberate and comprehensive approach to the challenge. A rapid, frontal assault on the doctrine will only result in inconsistency at best, and chaos at worst.

Force Structure/Task Organization Trends

Three force structure trends implicit in maneuver warfare directly affect the ground combat elements of landing forces. Two of these are apparent trends, the third is less obvious:

The first trend is toward the heavy mechanized combined arms task force (MCATF). Although this is an obvious development, it is still far from complete in concept, programming, or training. It is obvious because, until the tank becomes obsolete, a heavy tank/mechanized capability is required to provide the shock/exploitation action associated with main attacks. It is simply a capability needed to sustain the offensive flavor of an amphibious forcible entry operation against a mechanized/mobile enemy force. The MCATF is a task-organized, tactical entity, built primarily around tanks, mechanized infantry units, and self-propelled artillery, all of which are not helicopter transportable. However, it is still only a trend. This is best illustrated in a MAF level amphibious operation wherein a surface-landed RLT should be fully configured as a MCATF. Remember the definition. It is a mechanized combined arms task force; it is not a mobile task force plus supporting arms.

The second apparent force structure trend is the light armored task force (LATF) concept. Exactly where this trend will wander is unclear at this time. Also unclear is whether the LAV family development will be primarily targeted on nonamphibious or amphibious tasking. The Marine Corps has been placed on the horns of a programming dilemma due to the nature and timing of the nonamphibious tasking related to the MPS concept. The near-term concept places a duplicate set of scarce (inadequate) LVT assets aboard the deployed ships. It is not possible to bring an LATF brigade, equipped and trained, into the force structure as the basis of a 1983 MPS brigade. Therefore, the 1983 MPS brigade will also involve the LVT in further nonamphibious tasking with duplicate equipment sets. The temptation to program LATFs for dedicated, nonamphibious tasking (MPS and/or strategic airlift) is almost irresistible in order to swing the scarce LVT assets back to an amphibious mode. The problem may be further complicated by an institutional fear that programming the LAV family development in other than a nonamphibious/strategic airlift mode might place the development in direct competition with further LVT development.

Despite these complications, it is believed that the Marine Corps should anchor its LAV family development under its Title 10 charter-namely, amphibious warfare. The LATF and LAV family development are crucial to landing force capabilities in a maneuver style of warfare. In amphibious operations, the LATF is needed to complement and enhance the effect of an LVT/tank-configured task force. Given that about one-third of a MAGTF would be fully mechanized as a heavy MCATF, it is obvious that the MCATF alone could not sustain the offensive posture of an amphibious operation against a mechanized/mobile enemy.

The fundamental purpose of the LATF in amphibious forcible entry operations is to combine the vertical envelopment capability with a highly mobile, two-dimensional envelopment capability in order to maintain constant and confusing pressure on the flanks and rear of a very mobile and numerically superior enemy force. Given sufficient L-AV family assets to form several LATFs at the regimental level, the flexibility of the LATF, in size and weight, would give the Marine Corps additional rapid deployment capabilities related to strategic airlift. This flexibility may obviate the requirement for excessive nonamphibious ship building under the MPS concept-but its logical, primary purpose is in amphibious forcible entry.

The third trend implicit in a maneuver style of warfare is foot-mobile infantry. First, an adequate definition of the term may be required because some confusion has apparently developed over time with respect to what these people do best and what they cannot do very well at all. What they can do very well is operate both offensively and defensively in restricted terrain (mountains, jungle, and built-up areas). However, to be effective in these environments, foot-mobile infantry must be truly tailored for those environments. They must not be roadbound in jungle or mountainous terrain-not encumbered with organic weapons systems they cannot maneuver in built-up areas. The definitional focus here then is on infantry battalions that are exclusively foot-mobile/man-pack outfits.

In order to emphasize the point of foot-mobile infantry as a trend implicit in a maneuver style of warfare, let us take time to reflect upon the foot-mobile infantryman in his purest form:

* He can climb mountains, scale and rappel cliffs, maneuver on ridgelines inaccessible to “standard weapons sytems.”

* He can move crosscountry through swamps and jungles, maneuver through dikes and paddies.

* He does not need roads, in fact, he avoids them because he knows they are enemies, not friends.

* He can enter buildings from their roofs, open large vents, open doors/windows, climb/descend staircases, rappel down elevator shafts.

* He can move from doorway to doorway, move across or down railroad tracks, move across or through parks, climb fences, enter and move through sewers, etc.

* He consumes no fuel and expends very little ammunition.

* He is easy to insert and extract tactically by helicopter-he is easy to resupply exclusively by helicopter.

What he obviously cannot do very well is attack tank-heavy mechanized forces on their turf. Give him enough antitank assets, and he can defend well against those forces on his turf, but not really well on their turf. The point is that the contemporary infantry battalion is not structured or tailored for its original purpose and greatest strengths. Therefore, the maneuver style of warfare implies a trend toward a truly foot-mobile capability, applicable to landing force operations wherein restrictive terrain is a significant factor in success or failure.

Three additional trends are crucial for other elements of the landing force if maneuver warfare capabilities are to be enhanced. First is the trend toward the heavy-lift (CH-53E) helicopter as the primary transport helicopter in amphibious operations. This trend is illustrated by the procurement of M198 artillery in direct support battalions and by the LAV development. Either the HXM must be capable of lifting the M198 and the LAV, or the CH-53E program must be greatly increased. When related back to standard infantry, we must forget the “crowd killer syndrome” and learn to fly and land “where they ain’t,” with greater tactical integrity, over a shorter period of time.

The second trend is the requirement to place dedicated helo assets (attack and transport) in direct support of separated and maneuvering ground units.

Third, the doctrinal implications, as addressed, drive combat service support and landing support to seabasing. What is needed is a concept to support amphibious operations (no subsequent operations ashore) that will fit on the amphibious shipping expected to be available.

Conclusion Part I

The Marine Corps traditionally has contained a standard infantry battalion; i.e., all 27 infantry battalions are programmed to be mirror images. Fluctuations in the structure have been made across the board (three- or four-company battalions, with or without a weapons company). However, in recent years micromanagement techniques required to cope with constrained manpower have caused the infantry battalions to be less than mirror images in real life (e.g., manning levels, reduced “R” series T/Os). Also, in real life, the fleet assistance program (FAP) changes the composition of the battalions as they rotate into and out of unit deployment cycles. The differing trends outlined above, seen in conjunction with constrained manpower and the “facts of life,” suggest that a new approach to structuring the infantry be considered. Specifically, it is believed that if a number of battalions and regiments are tailored to each of the three infantry trends addressed, the Marine Corps would achieve a more effective force for each capability desired in the total force structure. It is also believed that rigid adherence to the concept of a standard battalion, amidst these developing trends, will inevitably result in more manpower (and equipment) than is needed in the total structure-the “standard” battalion is less effective in any one mode and less efficient in all modes.

Readings on Maneuver Warfare

by Capt G.K. Cunningham

You name 7 of the 11 recommended books on maneuver warfare [see Books in Nov81 and Dec81 GAZETTES]. What are the other four?

>>>Editors Note:

The four that were omitted from the list are:

Lost Victories. By FM Erick von Manstein. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1958.

Infantry in Battle. Ed. by Col G. C. Marshall, USA. Infantry Journal, Washington, D.C., 1939.

Attack. By Ferdinand O. Miksche. Random House, New York, 1942.

Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring, 1862. By Robert G. Tanner. Doubleday, Garden City, N.J., 1976. $13.95.

The first three of these are out of print, but we have good news about two of them. Lost Victories is scheduled to be reprinted in May by Presidio Press and will have a new introduction by Martin Blumenson. Infantry in Battle is being reprinted by the Marine Corps Association and will also be available this spring. MajGen A.M. Gray, Jr., commanding general of the 2d Marine Division, has agreed to write a new foreword.

When we published the original list we thought Tanner’s book was also out of print, but it is still available through Doubleday.

 

2d MARDIV Maneuver Warfare Study

On 11 January, MajGen A.M. Gray, commanding general, 2d Marine Division hosted a combined audience of 250 officers from the 2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 2d Force Service Support Group, and Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, to focus attention on current tactics and the concept of fighting outnumbered and winning. The assembly was invited to hear Col John R. Boyd, USAF(Ret), speak on his evolving theories of warfare.

Col Boyd’s five-hour presentation, which also has been given to students at Quantico, is entitled “Patterns of Conflict.” Based primarily upon an analysis of military history, it is an attempt to discern and synthesize basic trends that reoccur in warfare with emphasis on fluidity, surprise, deception, and flexibility of command. Boyd believes that it is vital to “get inside” what he calls the enemy’s observation-orientation-decisionaction (OODA) cycle. This is done supposedly by maintaining a rapid tempo and taking swift, unpredictable actions that surprise and confuse the enemy and keep him off guard.

Col Boyd’s visit was designed to cap off a six-month campaign by the 2d Marine Division’s Maneuver Warfare Board to expose the division to the basic concepts and theories underlying maneuver warfare. (See Oct81 GAZETTE, p.6, and Books Section in Nov81 or Dec81 GAZETTE.) The board will now focus its attention on refining, interpreting, and translating those concepts into realistic training and techniques for unit commanders in the field.

TWSEAS and Maneuver Warfare

by Capt G. R. Wright

Nearly a year ago (Apr81 GAZETTE) LtCol M.D. Wyly stated that he received a disquieting signal whenever he heard a briefing on a Marine Corps exercise that used the computer TWSEAS (Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis System) to measure the would-be casualties. He went on to say that we have lost sight of the important measures of good tactics and implied that the TWSEAS concept is part of an attrition-minded mentality that ignores good tactics. More recently (Feb82 GAZETTE) CWO-2 B.W. Lavender has advanced similar views.

The mistakes of those who misdirect their efforts and who forget our real mission (find, close with, and destroy by fire and maneuver) should not be blamed on a machine, a mere tool. This particular tool, TWSEAS, is the finest equipment that the Marine Corps has developed to date to train unit staffs in their tactical jobs. Its practical effect is precisely the opposite of what its critics think.

It must first be recognized that the current attrition-oriented mentality, which is so berated by maneuver warfare enthusisats, is a product of a post-Korean War search for objective standards by which to measure commanders and combat efficiency. This objective standard approach is itself part of a “management” approach that has been adopted by the military because of what it perceives as legitimate business-like methods in the civilian sector. It is this attractive “businessman” image that can produce rational, persuasive statistics to “prove” that one is successful in combat situations. It is unfortunate that these statistics often have little to do with the real business of winning decisive engagements. Thus, the body count syndrome received, long ago, a well-deserved disapproval from most Marines.

Smoothly packaged media coverage also serves to attract military leaders to the attrition-oriented mentality, reinforcing the effects of the “management” approach. With the certainty that any future conflict is sure to be shown nightly to 226,000,000 Americans, commanders will want to have measurable results, and may be tempted to shape their strategy and tactics to achieve them. Anything that shows “progress” will be snatched up, like a plank in the hands of a drowning man. Attrition then, is likely to be used as the placard of victory for the inept.

How does all this relate to TWSEAS? It doesn’t, really. One should first understand a tool before he condemns it. This tool especially should be understood. There are three TWSEASs in the Marine Corps; one at Camp Lejeune, one at Camp Pendleton, and one at Quantico. Each system is essentially a program in a box that allows for realistic map maneuver or field maneuver exercises. The system is realistic for the following reasons:

* It allows for better bailledamage assessments. There should be fewer “bangety-bang” arguments which occur despite the tactical exercise coordinator’s decisions regarding casualty assessments. The computer’s math calculations deal with viable probabilities that take into account such factors as terrain, troop posture, tactical advantage, and firepower. If a platoon in the open (in field or on map) receives enemy incoming, the casualty assessment will be reasonable; if a tank platoon is ambushed by four T-72s at close range, the casualties will be equally reasonable, though not particularly palatable.

* Participants are stripped of excuses. Everything that major staff elements must do for real combat must be done for a TWSEAS exercise. This is particularly applicable to the exercises held annually for students at Quantico. Staffs there must provide for aerial reconnaissance, aerial preparation and damage assessment, NGF preparation, and viable landing, logistic, intelligence, embarkation plans. All exercising staffs must respond to tactical contingencies by proper, doctrinally sound use of maneuvers and support assets. If a staff does not do its homework or function competently, it will lose the battle.

* Real time limitations are built in. If Class V supplies are not requested in a timely manner the friendly forces will do without until resupply is brought from shipboard or seabased dumps perhaps hours later. In the meantime, the opposing force commander will be doing his best to sweep the beach clean of friendly forces. Staffs are kept busy processing messages and reacting to developments that occur at an often-stressing pace.

* Communications are not simulated. For FMF users, the same communication equipment, nets, and personnel that work in the field, work with TWSEAS. In the map maneuver mode, the system is entirely “transparent” or invisible to the staff. The only ones looking at an electronic situation map are TEC personnel or their functional equivalents. At Quantico’s Amphibious Warfare School, exercises use a typical field communications system, reflecting student concern that actual communications difficulties be met and mastered.

LtCol Wyly says further, “Nothing that purports to measure success in combat-no TWSEAS, no computer, no controller, no war game-is worth its cost if it ignores the value of surprise, deception, attacking the flank as contrasted against the front, striking weak points compared to strong.” I couldn’t agree more, but must add two caveats. Firstly, sound tactics are nothing without sound staff procedures and planning. If the Germans have taught us anything, they taught us this. As long ago as the Napoleonic era, the great general himself, who today might be styled a “field Marine” or “maneuver warfare” tactician and who was then so fond of saying, “an army travels on its stomach,” was absolutely defeated by an obscure Englishman who thoroughly understood staff planning in the modern sense. One of TWSEAS‘s greatest strengths is that it truly exercises staff functions.

The second caveat: it must be understood that TWSEAS neither ignores or expounds use of sound tactics; it merely assesses the effects of tactics whether sound or unsound. Moreover, no “war game” fully measures intangibles such as troop discipline, motivation, will to win, or the emotional consequences of tactical surprise. Such things can only be passed by Marines to Marines and can only be measured by experienced leaders observing actual units in the field. This form of “measuring” belongs exclusively to the Corps’ field commanders.

Finally, once it is understood that TWSEAS is a painstakingly developed tool which exercises commanders and their staffs under realistic conditions, it is readily seen that it has nothing to do either with traditional attrition-minded tactics or the much-heralded maneuver warfare tactics. It is neutral. I will make only one further point. If maneuver warfare proponents really want to “sell” their cause to the Marine Corps, they can find no better tool in the world than TWSEAS. It would be a relatively simple matter to schedule either a field maneuver or map maneuver exercise at any TWSEAS location using maneuver warfare techniques in a test scenario. The exercise can be “recorded,” and replayed at any particular point in time to show a particular teaching point. Tapes of one exercise can be shipped to other locations to be “replayed.” The multiexercise capability, newly developed at Quantico, will even permit two staffs to play the same exercise simultaneously. This mode lends itself to one team using traditional tactics and the other using maneuver warfare tactics against precisely the same enemy assets on precisely the same terrain.

So the gauntlet is now thrown; let maneuver warfare come to TWSEAS, and we see what it is really made of.

Comments on Maneuver Warfare

by LtCol R. H. Voigt

I agree with your editorial comment on recent maneuver warfare articles in the Jan82 issue that many contain discussions that are “naive (and) divorced from the realities of the battlefield.” In support of this comment I would like to offer some brief observations on the most often mentioned maneuver warfare concepts.

The maneuver warfare battlefield is described as being fluid, turbulent, and rapidly changing. These adjectives are normally used to support the contention that by presenting a rapidly changing environment to the enemy we will severely, if not totally, upset his reaction capability. This premise fails to appreciate the fact that it will be at least as difficult for us to successfully control our forces in such an environment as it will be for the enemy to react to the fluid situation that confronts him.

Most discussions fail to give the professionals on the enemy side their due. it should not be assumed that enemy commanders will lose control of the situation and their forces disintegrate when faced with rapidly changing situations. I might suggest that our commanders will be as affected by rapidly changing situations as the enemy commander in spite of the fact that the fluid situation is self-imposed.

Many maneuver warfare discussions place the enemy force in some type of “linear” mode. In many cases, maneuver warfare concepts can only be validated against this mode. Enemy commanders are not idiots and it is highly unlikely that, given the appropriate maneuver terrain, they will employ their forces in anything resembling a “linear” formation.

I have a difficult time with the comment that our actions on the battlefield should be directed towards destroying the enemy’s mind not his body. I do not believe that the lessons of history will support this concept to any practical degree. Certainly, all U.S. attempts at this strategy have met with failure and at a minimum have prolonged the conflict and increased our casualties, perhaps unnecessarily. The lessons of Stalingrad, Tobruk, Dresden, Chosin, and Khe Sahn are clear. A professional and determined enemy will continue to fight in spite of being faced with a disastrous logistics or command and control situation.

There appears to be a gross overemphasis on misson-type orders. This emphasis is well-intentioned but fails to grasp the true confusion which will exist on any moderate (or greater) intensity battlefield. In most cases commanders on both sides will not be able to perceive the current or future tactical situation with any real degree of clarity. Certainly, tactical imagination will be required at all levels, but I do not believe that any relaxation of command and control will be appropriate. Without a “big picture” planning and control apparatus, subordinate units will attack low priority targets, will be easily misled by enemy deception tactics, will outrun logistics and supporting arms capabilities, and perhaps will not be available to the commander when a high priority objective presents itself. Voluminous written orders will not be appropriate in the next battle, but the requirement for direction and control measures will certainly increase.

The constant reference to our punching through the enemy’s organization at a weak point or gap is misleading. This comment again assumes a linear type enemy deployment which is unlikely. It is also contradicted, to some degree, by the assumption that the Marine Corps will face an enemy superior in numbers and materials.

An enemy force that possesses this superiority and a commander with some degree of competence will offer few, if any, weak points. He certainly will not expose his logistics and command and control apparatus to any appreciable degree. In addition, the idea of rebounding from a presumed weak point, which turns out to be not so weak, then pursuing another presumed enemy vulnerability, fails to appreciate the difficulty of breaking contact with strong, mobile enemy forces and the hazards of shifting units under fire.

Placing a great amount of trust and reliance on our subordinates is certainly an ideal worth pursuing. I would recommend, however, that all maneuver warfare authors consider the comments of LtCol Batcheller in the Jan82 GAZETTE. In addition, those authors whose FMF experience is limited might benefit from an onsite observation of a battalion or regimental combined arms exercise including our much vaunted combined arms exercises. A realistic appraisal of the tactical proficiency of the average small unit leader will show deficiencies in many basic areas of expertise much less the expertise required to command successfully in fast-moving, fluid situations. Let’s start dealing with reality and not with an ideal.

In conclusion, I feel that many maneuver warfare concepts are valid to some degree. We must, however, base our future discussions on this topic on reality-on the battle as it has proven to be and not on the battle as we would like it to be.

Guerrilla Warfare

by Capt C.A. Leader

. . . The whole question of guerrilla warfare is one I find most interesting. In our present concern with NATO and Southwest Asia, we as Marines seem not to talk about guerrilla warfare. This strikes me as ironic as the guerrilla seems one of the classic examples of inexpensive maneuver warfare. I also have the feeling that in our collective haste to put Vietnam behind us we have not critically examined and recorded the lessons learned there about the guerrilla. It will not be many more years before the most junior Vietnam veterans pass their 20th career year and we lose the bulk of their experience to retirement.

I worry, too, that Vietnam has caused us collectively to equate jungle warfare with guerrilla warfare. The issue is further confused by the semantics of the word “terrorist.” Yet the IRA, the Basques, the Afghans, and the Palestinians should remind us of both the many manifestations and environments in which the soldier may confront the guerrilla.

I would like to see HQMC or MCDEC sponsor symposiums on professional topics such as guerrilla warfare. The topic could be publicized and papers would be solicited not only from the Marine Corps but through other Services’ professional journals. The papers would be reviewed and the authors of the most interesting invited to attend the symposium. This would generate new [ideas and illustrate] the breadth of Marine Corps thought about fighting wars.