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In late July, LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, the recently appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations at Headquarters agreed to give the GAZETTE his views on a variety of issues important to the future of the Corps. Col J.C. Scharfen, USMC(Ret) conducted the interview.

As Deputy Chief of Staff Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC/S PP&O), you are the Commandant’s interface with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Can you tell us about the Commandant’s role as a member of that body?

Gladly. Most Marines see the Commandant only in his role as the leader of Marines. By law, however, he and his counterparts are only secondarily the heads of their Services. Their principal responsibility is in their JCS role as military advisors to the President. It is a heavy and time-consuming responsibility. The Chiefs meet three afternoons a week, one of which is usually with the secretary of Defense. To prepare for these meetings the Commandant draws support from both the Headquarters Marine Corps staff and the Joint Staff.

What are the topics for these meetings?

Everything dealing with the military and issues of national security. The Chairman chooses the agenda. In general, each meeting consists of a mixture of policy items and discussions on current issues. A typical afternoon might cover such disparate topics as arms reduction negotiations, the Central American and Middle East situations, operational plan reviews, and base rights negotiations. The Service staffs and Joint Staff help frame the issues for the Chiefs. They take their guidance for action from the outcome of the JCS discussions. It’s not dissimilar to the command and staff action process set forth in our field manuals.

Recently, and not for the first time, the JCS have come under attack for being cumbersome, ineffective, and torn by Service parochialism. Several reorganization proposals have been advanced to correct these alleged weaknesses. What are your views on the subject?

It would take the rest of this interview to cover my views, so let me restrict myself to three observations. The first one is the most important. The JCS are, like the Supreme Court, people-people charged with very specific responsibilities. The organization designed to meet those responsibilities is of less importance than the people who make it up. To use a British expression, “It’s not the blocks in the organization chart what counts; it’s the blokes what’s in the blocks.” If you have four good Service Chiefs and a strong Chairman who has the confidence of his fellow Chiefs, the JCS will be most effective. Conversely, weak or inadequate leadership will be ineffective regardless of how much you may try to prop it up with structure. It is a case of picking the right people for the job.

The second point I would make is that this organization has been under scrutiny and criticism for three decades. Yet, wisely, the Congress has been very careful about making change. It is properly chary about moving toward the purported efficiencies of a general staff or a super chief, not so much out of fear of a man-on-horseback, but out of a legitimate concern that such an arrangement could be conducive to giving bad or single-dimensional advice to the President.

My third point is derived from our political heritage. The institutions of this nation were built on a system of checks and balances, indeed, on adversary relationships. This has served the Republic well for two centuries because it allows opposing views to compete, with the best solution usually emerging in the process. Thus, the reference to “parochial views” should be more properly viewed as healthy “contending perspectives” that present a broader range of alternatives for the President.

You are saying then that there is no need for any JCS reorganization?

I’m saying that people are more important than systems. I’m also saying that any organization can be improved, but be careful that you improve the system and not just tamper with it.

Haven’t the Chiefs recently done their own appraisal of the organization of the JCS?

Yes, and this has resulted in some in-house improvements that are proving effective. For example, there is more timely top-down guidance being provided by the Chiefs, and the famous-or infamous-“flimsy, buff, green” process for addressing an issue is being streamlined. Also, the quarterly rotation of the Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman has led to better continuity. In addition, the Chiefs have also made some significant recommendations relating to the Defense Department in general. They know how the joint system can best work, but it has to be seen within the context of the entire Defense Establishment. In the final analysis, though, I return to my first point-the form of the organization is less important than the “blokes what’s in the blocks.”

A number of radical changes seem to be underway in the Marine Corps. Permanent MAGTF headquarters, MPS, and the LAV battalion are examples. Are we seeing a new Corps emerging?

I’m not sure I’d categorize the changes as “radical,” nor is a “new” Corps emerging. Our roles and mission remain the same-that is, to provide amphibious forces for the fleet with the flexibility to undertake any other mission the President may direct. What you are witnessing is the fruit of a great deal of past thought and effort. It’s evolutionary progression rather than revolutionary change, and the effort responds to new realities and new capabilities.

Could you elaborate on these realities and capabilities?

Let’s take realities first. Given the far ranging nature of U.S. security interests, the Naval Services must be capable of global operations. This includes the capability of naval force projection by Marines and forcible entry if required. But amphibious ships are both expensive and limited. At present, roughly a brigade’s worth of amphibious lift is available in the Atlantic and Pacific. Additionally, there is the need for speed to get to trouble spots to either forestall a problem or to act decisively if need be. There are a number of ways of dealing with the variables in this equation. One is to revitalize the amphibious ship-building program. Such a program is underway to give us the capability to lift simultaneously the assault echelons of a MAF and MAB. Complementary to this is the Maritime Pre-positioning Ship (MPS) Program, which also serves to supplement the forward deployed fleet posture in potential hot spots.

How will the MPS concept work?

It’s not just a concept; it’s already a reality in the form of the Near Term Pre-positioning Force; NTPF is the quick fix to what will eventually become the MPS. We now have a brigade’s worth of heavy equipment aboard ships in the Indian Ocean. The tactical unit to employ that gear is the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) at Twentynine Palms. Should the services of the MAB be required, the troops will fly to a designated point to marry-up with the gear off-loaded from the NTPF. In short order you have a very potent force at the scene of action. I call NTPF the quick fix because the present capability is an ad hoc arrangement. It is made up of merchant ships not specifically designed for the purpose for which we are using them.

What is the status of the MPS?

The MPS program is underway. It will provide three sets of ships designed expressly for pre-positioning purposes. The first comes on line in 1984 and the remainder in subsequent years. When the third set is in place, the original NTPF set will come out of service.

While that sounds expeditionary, it doesn ‘t sound very amphibious. Don’t you need ports and airfields to make it work?

Currently, yes. With the MPS we’ll have an over-the-beach capability so ports won’t be necessary. But you are correct in implying the need for a secure environment to marry-up the air and sea elements of the MPS force. I noted earlier that MPS should be viewed as a complement to amphibious forces. It can operate independently, in a preemptive or reinforcing role, but with any kind of strategic warning you can expect that at least a MAU will be in the vicinity of a potential trouble spot for which an MPS MAB is activated. A MAU, of course, has an amphibious capability and can contribute to the security of the incoming MPS brigade, alone or in conjunction with friendly local forces. In that scenario the initial insertion of a MAU and MPS MAB can be succeeded, if necessary, by additional forces to build a MAF.

Where will the three MPS sets be located?

That’s currently being addressed by the JCS. The Navy and Marine Corps have made recommendations as to a sequence of activation and general location, but the decision hasn’t been made yet, so I’m not free to address it.

Will a MAB be identified with specific MPS sets, and if so, will MPS MABs also have the traditional amphibious role?

Those questions are also currently being worked. The dynamics of the situation and the experience we gain as we deal with the first MPS set will help determine the final setup. At this point, we do know that MPS is here to stay, and we are going to do the thing right. That means that the first MPS brigade is going to be very busy building on 7th MAB’s NTPF experience as well as building on its own. I would say for the time being, at least, the initial MPS MAB will have its hands full with MPS matters. That’s one of the “realities” I alluded to earlier.

The establishment of permanent MAGTF headquarters-is that also a response to “realities” such as the MPS?

Yes, it’s all part of the larger reality of lift shortfall, worldwide commitments, and the need for readiness and professionalism. We are currently doing business on a MAU and MAB basis in both the amphibious and soon-to-be MPS modes. Yet, we also see the MAF as the only way to fight a significant engagement. These combinations cause task organization problems. all too frequently we jury-rig our command structure for an exercise, then disband it at the conclusion of the event, losing the benefit of continuity. To ad hoc the headquarters of a MAGTF at any of these levels, if combat is imminent, is sloppy at best and disastrous at worst. After long study and analysis, it was determined that the new permanent MAGTF headquarters provides the best combination for stability and flexibility.

How will it fit together?

The permanent MAGTF headquarters concept establishes the MAB as the basic building block. The MAB with a fully structured H&S company is capable of fielding up to two MAU headquarters and still retain a nucleus planning staff. The MAB staff can be expanded to an operational MAF headquarters by superimposing a MAF nucleus headquarters cadre on the MAB. The process would integrate designated billets to form a cohesive, fully structured MAF headquarters. The same principle applies for creating a MAF H&S company. The Marine Corps will establish three MAF nucleus headquarters, three MAF nucleus H&S companies, and six MAB headquarters by 1990.

What does this do to the traditional division, wing, and force service support group (FSSG) structure?

They remain the same. MAGTFs are formed from their assets. There is nothing new in the sense that the division, wing, and FSSG have always been the backbone for deploying MAGTFs.

Isn’t there duplication of command and control elements in this concept?

Not really. The MAGTF headquarters concept provides a rational method of maintaining effective MAGTF command and control during the force buildup in the theater, building from a forward deployed MAU to a MAB, or from a MAB to a MAF. Some see redundancies between the permanent MAGTF headquarters and the division, wing, and FSSG headquarters; however, these latter headquarters are essential both for fielding MAGTFs and as command and control elements of the MAF. Their operational capabilities must be retained.

What are the weaknesses of the concept?

Sequential MAB deployments, with the objective of forming a single MAF MAGTF for employment, generate a crucial operational problem-the need to reorganize your force in theater from multiple MABs to a single composite MAF. We have an effort underway to critically review the problems associated with forming the composite MAGTFs.

How about the LAV? Where does it fit into all of this?

The LAV falls into the same “reality” category as the reorganized infantry battalion, the improved FSSG, and the new M198 howitzer. All of these are responses to the need for a more powerful and effective fighting and sustaining structure. War is becoming increasingly lethal. Yesterday’s techniques will not work tomorrow. The LAV is a recognition of this reality. It is not a fighting vehicle; it is a support vehicle that provides direct fire support and off-road tactical mobility with a modicum of protection from fragmentation and small arms.

Is there a concept for employing the LAV battalion?

Yes, but at this time only in the most general terms. One of the great things about Marine Corps’ tactical development is that procedures and techniques are user-tested and user-accepted before adoption. At this point we have tactical concepts for LAV use, but the LAVs utility and place in the force structure will result from Marines trying it in a variety of conditions and scenarios. I can see many uses in addition to infantry transport-reconnaissance, screening, deception operations, and combat engineering. The Marines who use it will tell us how best to employ it.

With the introduction of the LAV, the M198, and possibly even the M-1 tank, is the Marine Corps “heavying up?”

“Heavying up” is a tired cliche. It is a hangover from the recent past when the only war talked about in this town was a NATO war. A lot of nervous nellies saw Russian tanks pouring through the Central Region of NATO and judged that if Marines were sent to reinforce the defense, they would need to “heavy up” to be of any value. From the Marine point of view, the commitment of skilled amphibious forces to such a role made little sense short of an extremis situation.

No, we are not, “heavying up” in the NATO sense. That appearance is simply the result of increasing our capability across the board for combat anywhere in the world. Modern weaponry abounds in all the potential hot spots around the globe. Landing a corporal’s guard under bayonet at some remote scene of conflict is no longer adequate. We have to be prepared for warfare at a fair level of intensity no matter where we go. But you also have to keep in mind that strategic lift, to include amphibious lift, is limited. We will be constrained in what we take to war. This results in a balancing act between what you have and what you can take. One of the big advantages of task organizing for the mission, as we do, is that it provides an architecture to trade off assets against requirements.

You mean you customize the force for the job?

Exactly. If we are going to fight in the mountain, we probably go light on tanks. Conversely, a desert battlefield will require tanks and tactical ground transport. That would be the heavy side of the equation. But make no mistake, we are not becoming muscle-bound and building a structure for only one type of war or environment. When a company commander says “Saddle up,” Marines will move out and fight equally well by LAV, helo, or shank’s mare.

I think your response logically leads to a question about “maneuver warfare.” Has the Marine Corps signed on to maneuver warfare as a way of fighting?

The term maneuver warfare has taken on a life of its own and is subject to as many interpretations as there are interpreters. The Marine Corps does not subscribe to any exclusive formula or recipe for warfare. Our approach is to operate on the basis of sound military principles taking into account the dynamics of the situation (that is, mission, terrain, enemy situation, and weather).

Does this mean that the Marine Corps will continue to adhere to the traditional principles of war?

Yes, but not inflexibly. A Marine Corps field commander is expected to focus on the objective of his mission, then exercise his professional judgment in employing his combined-arms force. Needless to say, the commander will seek to achieve his objective in the most expeditious, economical, and decisive fashion and will provide his subordinates the requisite latitude in carrying out their responsibilities. In both offense and defense, we expect our commanders at every level to seize the initiative and to stay progressively ahead of the enemy in both thought and action. The opponent must be forced to react to us rather than we to them. We seek to put the enemy off balance and keep him that way. It is in this context that the Marine Corps not only subscribes to “maneuver warfare,” but also champions what it dxw represents: a means to an end-the enemy’s defeat.

So you do see some merit in maneuver warfare?

Certainly. By subscribing to the principles reflected in the concept of maneuver warfare-rather than to any particular interpretation-tactics, techniques, and materiel requirements will evolve and progress rationally and logically through experimentation and testing. This has been a successful formula for us in the past and has allowed the Marine Corps to pioneer such techniques as amphibious landings, close air support, high-performance VSTOL operations, and vertical envelopment-radical at their inception, commonplace today.

I gather that you still consider amphibious operations to be the bread and butter of the Marine Corps regardless of the advent of MPS, the LAV, and the talk of maneuver warfare?

Without a doubt. By law, the Marine Corps has the mission to be the Nation’s amphibious experts. The mission is rooted in our naval character and the fact, that as a maritime nation, the United States must have the capability to project power ashore worldwide, whether our reception on the scene is friendly or hostile. I might also note that an amphibious operation is a classic of maneuver warfare on the strategic level. You only have to review World War II and Korea to realize that fact.

There are those who say that modern surveillance and weaponry have made Two Jima a thing of the past. You yourself have already alluded to the lethality of modern arms. Would you care to comment on the viability of amphibious operations today?

For openers let me say that as long as there is a need to make a forcible entry from the sea, we will find a way of doing it. As to Iwo Jima being dated-of course it is dated. So are Waterloo and El Alamein. The military profession is dynamic. Marines have a penchant for history-not to repeat it, but to learn from it. The roots of the amphibious doctrine developed at Quantico in the 1930s were founded in the British amphibious failure at Gallipoli in 1915. The rest of the world was content that Gallipoli proved the impracticality of amphibious operations in the modern world-see the Iwo Jima analogy here? But, the Marine Corps knew that in a war with Japan, there had better be a way of carrying out landings in the Pacific or we would never be able to carry the battle to the enemy. So in the early thirties, the students and staff at Quantico studied the errors of Gallipoli and came up with the right way to do the job. What was brought forth in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations provided the basis for the successful Allied amphibious strategy of World War II. Remember that in 1944, the cross-channel operation at Normandy was a testament to the Marine Corps, without a Marine Corps unit being involved in the landing or its planning. Four years earlier at the very same channel, the vaunted Germans were stymied in their invasion plans for England because they didn’t have an amphibious doctrine or capability.

Is that doctrine still valid today-nearly 50 years later?

Yes. Iwo Jima may never be repeated, but modern defenses against amphibious attack can still be bested by changes in tactical techniques. Note, I say techniques-not doctrine. The primal doctrine of the forties is still sound today. We had few options in the Pacific War. We faced fortified islands that provided little opportunity for finesse. Brute force was the only option. Today’s likely targets allow us to be a bit more adroit.

Would you care to expand a bit on that distinction?

Let me use an example. The requirement for sea and air superiority for the conduct of amphibious operations is a doctrinal principle that is as sound today as it was at Iwo Jima. How you achieve that superiority on the other hand is dynamic; it is a function of technique and techniques change over time. Look at the Falk-lands-a modern example. The British had sea superiority, but their ability to achieve air superiority was marginal at best. As a result, their amphibious landing was costly and threatened from the air. They came close to conceding air superiority, which could have been disastrous. That they got away with it was a close thing.

How does the modern amphibious operation differ from those of the 1940s?

I have mentioned that techniques change, not doctrine, and that our contemporary Marine Corps is the product of both realities and capabilities. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the context of amphibious operations. Let me dwell on this for a moment. The realities of modern warfare dictate that we exploit our capabilities to gain the advantage over the enemy-to seize the initiative and hold it. This is where amphibious warfare offers such great strategic and tactical advantage. The advantage accrues in terms of surprise, mass, economy of force, and mobility. We have a number of innovations in amphibious techniques that are either in-being or on the near horizon that will capitalize on these principles and help us gain and hold the initiative.

I assume you mean by using the helicopter and the LCAC?

Correct, those plus a high speed amphibious task force to allow for tactical surprise even if strategic surprise is lost to modern surveillance. An amphibious operation promotes uncertainty on the part of the defender and fosters hesitation or maldeployment of his forces. Intelligence and electronics, including electronic deception, play an important role in achieving tactical surprise. An amphibious force will aim to mislead and confuse the enemy, to fix him in place, to destroy or neutralize his capability to interfere with the landing, and to land where he is weakest. This is tactical surprise. It requires a reaction on the part of the defender that takes place under conditions where the landing forces have the initiative. Like chess, the modern amphibious operation is first an exercise of maneuver and second one of mass.

Regarding helicopters, could you be more specific?

Helicopters are particularly important in an amphibious operation, for they allow ships to remain far at sea. An over-the-horizon capability provides protection from shore defenses and compounds the defender’s problem of where, when, and how to defend. The defender can’t accurately determine the target of the landing force. For illustrative purposes, it should be noted that using only helicopters, a regimental-sized assault force can be landed 50 miles distant in only 90 minutes. This capability will improve in time with the introduction of the JVX.

What about LCAC?

It does for the surface landing what the chopper does for the air landing. The 50-knot air-cushioned vehicles (LCACs) will provide a dramatic capability for the surface landing. To put the modern landing in perspective, consider that a modern Marine amphibious force, equipped with helicopters or the JVX and LCACs and embarked in 20-knot amphibious shipping off Norfolk, can, overnight, move and land anywhere from South Carolina to Long Island and never appear on the horizon beforehand. This is a far cry from Iwo Jima. How would you like the job of defending against that sort of capability? Even if you figure out where we are going to land, we’ll get there in strength before you do.

Your objective is to capitalize on modern technology to project seapower?

Exactly. Far from being victims of modern technology, amphibious forces have exploited technology to develop an in-being capability more potent than ever; a product of hard thinking and hard training.

But suppose the Marines are faced with a narrowly defined, highly defended target such as a modern two Jima; one which does not allow the luxury of maneuver. Can you still succeed?

It would be bloody for both the Navy and Marine Corps, but I am confident that the job could be done if the objective was worth the difficulty and cost involved. It would require the ultimate effort in planning and execution. The principles, however, would remain the same. Through supporting and advance force operations, we would ensure the requisite air and sea superiority, and we would destroy or neutralize the enemy capability to interfere with the landing. The effort necessary to do this would be considerable, but as I mentioned, if the judgment was made that such a landing was necessary we would put together the package to do the job.

And how does the advent of nuclear weapons impact on amphibious doctrine?

A difficult question to answer because you can’t do so without first resolving the bigger question-how does the advent of nuclear weapons impact on warfare? Once the first nuclear weapon is detonated, the entire environment of the battlefield is going to change. Principles won’t change-there will still be the tradeoffs between firepower and maneuver with perhaps the impact of firepower being exaggerated. The amphibious task force and landing force commanders are going to have to remain flexible and innovative when faced with the nuclear threat but no more so than in any other form of warfare.

Earlier you mentioned Central America in the topical agenda of the JCS. What is the role for the Marine Corps in Central America?

I’m not sure what you’re driving at. We’ll go wherever and do whatever the President, as Commander in Chief, orders. If your question refers to a current role in Central America, it is limited. We conduct amphibious exercises and jungle training in the region. We have the normal representation on the joint staff of the Southern Command (USSouthCom) located in Panama. We also fill attache and MILGRP billets within that region. Whether our role expands down there as a result of the power play by the communists remains to be seen.

How about Lebanon? How long will the Marines be there? Will their role and numbers be expanded?

Again, I must say that nobody knows for sure. The situation is fluid and the future uncertain. As I just mentioned, we’ll do whatever we are told to do. If there is an expanded role for us in mission or numbers, we are ready for those contingencies, but we are equally prepared to resume our normal afloat posture in the Med if our Multinational Force (MNF) role winds down.

What is the MNF mission of the Marines?

You may recall that we returned to Beirut after the Sabra and Shatella massacres to provide a “presence” in the area. The idea was to have a multinational force in Beirut to provide a sense of security for all factions. Most of all, it was designed to contribute to local stability so that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could get their act together as a competent military force.

Were you optimistic about the situation?

From a military standpoint, yes. Right from the start there was the conviction that Lebanon had to be master of its own house. The MNF could help stabilize things, but the LAF ultimately had to be the instrument of Lebanese sovereignty. It was an unprecedented mission in that it had no military objective other than a hand-holding exercise.

And how do you see the situation now?

While initially the whole thing was fraught with danger and uncertainty we have been surprised how well it has gone. The French, Italians, Brits, and U.S. Marines have done a professional job. The MNF members have cooperated well and, over the past nine months have given tremendous psychological and training assistance in rebuilding of the LAF. We hope in the coming year to see the Lebanese exercising their rightful authority in the country so we can get about other business. In the meantime we will carry on as necessary.

What lessons do you draw from the Lebanon experience?

There are not many new lessons, but lots of old ones that have been reemphasized. Commitment as a peacekeeping force in a volatile, complex environment is a challenging task. Such situations are delicate. Restraint, patience, judgment and, most important, discipline are the characteristics that matter. Leadership, at every level, is subjected to a daily test. Not every military organization can handle this. You have to train for it and work at it. We’re proud of what our Marines have doneand mindful that the challenges they face may well increase before the assignment is over.

Another major lesson you don’t hear much about involves the great usefulness of a Navy-Marine amphibious task force. The operation is a success not only because Marines ashore have done well, but also because of the fleet off-shore. Seabasing much of the support structure reduces vulnerability and simplifies the task. It gives us flexibility; we can reinforce, move, or withdraw on short notice. We have presence with minimum entanglement. Without the Navy-Marine team, Lebanon would be a far different and a far more difficult undertaking.

Thank you, General. Do you have any final thoughts you would like to share with the readers of the GAZETTE?

Yes. I would like to go on record as saying that these are great times for the Marine Corps. There are a lot of challenges for the Corps but never have we been in better shape to meet them.

by LtCol M.D. Wyly

Maneuver, movement, mobility, mechanization, and motorization, all have distinctive meanings; yet, they often become muddled.

First of all, it is important to understand maneuver because all the others may be employed as ingredients that are blended together to form a maneuver. Maneuver is an action on your part that places the enemy at a disadvantage and forces him to respond to you. Thus, he who is maneuvering continuously against the enemy keeps the initiative in the way of a chess player who, toward the end of the game, places his opponent in check with every new move. The opponent, placed at a disadvantage, must be preoccupied, every turn, with getting out of check, to prevent losing the game. He cannot afford the moves necessary to close in on his maneuvering opponent’s king.

While maneuver may include movement and the other “confusing Ms,” it may also include other ingredients. There is no defined limit to what these ingredients may be, but strategem, deception, and ambiguity are some of the most useful.

Movement, itself, is any displacement from one position to another. By itself, movement need not have any adverse effect on the enemy. The distance or speed of the movement does not render it maneuver. Its design does. Its timeliness is extremely important to whether the design will work. Thus, through strategem, or deception, or ambiguity designed to confuse the enemy, movement, at the right time, may have an effect on the enemy that places him at a disadvantage and forces him to respond. Movement timed to coincide with fire, or to enable your force to employ fire, might place the enemy at the desired disadvantage. Thus we have the classic combination of “fire and movement.” Note, here, why purists often object to the term “fire and maneuver” and prefer “fire and movement.” It may be that fire, or the ability to fire, is the factor that renders the movement a maneuver. Fire combined with movement, may be a necessary ingredient that makes the maneuver possible. Without fire-power, a would-be manuever may be reduced to simple movement, having no tangible effect on the enemy. Therefore, the term “fire and maneuver” is usually inappropriate inasmuch as it treats fire and maneuver as if they were separate, unrelated entities, when, really, maneuver is usually totally dependent on the possession of firepower by the maneuvering force.

Mobility is the ability to move. A force may be given mobility by fire-power, if its movement has been restricted as a result of heavy enemy fire. Its mobility may come from breaking loose from a heavy logistic tail and moving by foot in high mountains or jungle. Or, in trafficable flatlands, such as deserts, mobility may come from mechanization. Where road networks are extensive and adequate, motorization may impart mobility.

Motorization is mounting a force on motor vehicles. Motorization, then, enables mobility in some terrain. In close terrain, however, motorization may reduce mobility or cancel it out altogether. If the motorized force can fight from its vehicles without dismounting, it is said to be mechanized. Mechanization, therefore, can enhance both mobility and maneuver but, again, only in some circumstances.

Though all these ingredients may be blended together to form maneuver, no single one of them can be seen as always essential in any measurable quantity. This is why “maneuver warfare” proponents object when their critics accuse them of thinking too much of mechanization. Mechanization may be an ingredient that lends mobility, which enables movement, which combined with fire, outmaneuvers the enemy. In different circumstances, however, more mobility may be achieved with foot infantry, lightly equipped, which may outmaneuver the enemy more decisively than lumbering formations of armor.

by Maj D.C. Waddill

In its efforts to remain competitive on the modern battlefield, the Marine Corps now places great emphasis on highly mobile, combined arms task forces equipped with modern weapons and more effective command, control, and communications systems. Tactics are being reviewed with an ever-increasing interest being placed upon the controversial concepts of maneuver warfare. Though we seem to be making great progress, one glaring deficiency exists that must be corrected immediately or all other efforts will have been for nought. This deficiency is our inability to conduct motorized reconnaissance.

Motorized reconnaissance should be distinguished from long-range reconnaissance. Motorized reconnaissance is a mission undertaken by a highly mobile mounted force to gain information about an enemy. The force normally operates within artillery range and capitalizes on its extensive mobility to carry out its mission. Such a force also has a limited offensive capability and can perform screening operations in support of the maneuver element. Long-range reconnaissance, on the other hand, is a mission undertaken by a small, lightly armed, dismounted force to gain information about an enemy. The long-range reconnaissance force normally operates outside artillery range and capitalizes on its ability to operate clandestinely to carry out its mission. It has no real offensive capability and cannot perform screening operations in support of the maneuver element. The two types of reconnaissance complement each other and must be used together if the maneuver unit commander is to be properly supported.

There is a definite need for motorized reconnaissance within the Marine Corps. Operational Handbook 9-3A, Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF), emphasizes that Marine units must become masters of maneuver and defeat their adversary by throwing strength against weakness. The tactics required are described as “recon pull, not command push.” This simply means that offensive actions are generated as a direct result of reconnaissance efforts and not as a result of a commander’s moving blindly ahead in a frontal assault. Before maneuver elements are committed, reconnaissance elements must determine where they should be used to exploit enemy weaknesses.

The Soviets have long ago recognized the importance of reconnaissance. Not only is a reconnaissance battalion organic to each motorized rifle and tank division, but a reconnaissance company is also organic to each of the regiments of the division as well. These reconnaissance elements, whether they be company or battalion, have the capability to conduct both motorized and long-range reconnaissance in support of their parent unit. This gives the Soviet maneuver unit commander a capability that does not presently exist in any United States division, either Army or Marine.

Reconnaissance for an Army division is performed by its organic cavalry squadron. The structure of the Army division is undergoing a major reorganization to add a fourth maneuver brigade, the combat brigade air attack (CBAA). The cavalry squadron will be in the CBAA and will consist of a headquarters troop, two ground cavalry troops, and two air cavalry troops. The two ground cavalry troops will be equipped with Bradley tracked cavalry vehicles in the armored and mechanized divisions and with light armored vehicles (LAVs) in the airborne, air assault, and light infantry divisions. The two air cavalry troops will each be equipped with four attack and six scout helicopters. While this gives the Army division a highly mobile motorized and heliborne reconnaissance element, it fails to provide the division with a long-range reconnaissance capability.

Ground reconnaissance for the MCATF is provided by the MCATF’s security forces and attached division/force reconnaissance units. Motorized reconnaissance is normally performed by task organizing tank and mechanized infantry elements or by using attached division reconnaissance elements with their organic light vehicles. Initially, this may sound like the MCATF possesses excellent motorized and long-range reconnaissance capabilities, but this is not so.

Performing effective motorized reconnaissance has two basic requirements. First, the unit performing the reconnaissance must possess the considerable technical expertise necessary to accomplish the mission. Secondly, the unit must be equipped with vehicles that are suitable for carrying out the mission. Neither of the two motorized reconnaissance elements generally available to the MCATF meet these criteria.

The task organized reconnaissance force made up of tank and mechanized infantry elements is an ad hoc force composed of several different units put together on short notice. Although this force may have conducted some training in motorized reconnaissance operations, it is doubtful that it has trained together as a team. It is even more doubtful that it has developed the technical expertise necessary to carry out the extremely complicated mission of motorized reconnaissance.

Such a force would be equipped with M60 tanks and LVTP7 amphibian assault vehicles. Both vehicles are designed for another purpose, and both are borrowed from the MCATF’s maneuver elements. The M60 tank is the MCATF’s main battle tank, designed to be used as an offensive weapon, and making maximum use of the shock effect of its firepower and mobility. The LVTP7 amphibious assault vehicle, though designed to carry personnel from ship to shore during an amphibious assault, doubles as the MCATF’s mechanized personnel carrier. It can carry up to 25 troops, although 15 to 17 is a more realistic figure during the high tempo of MCATF operations. While both vehicles are relatively fast, reliable, and possess good cross-country mobility, they are inherently large, clumsy, and noisy when compared to their Soviet counterparts. The M60’s lack of swimming ability is a major drawback when conducting reconnaissance operations, as are the signatures (sight and sound) both vehicles leave as a result of their size and weight. Both vehicles are marginal at best when it comes to performing motorized reconnaissance and should be used only as a last resort.

The division reconnaissance battalion is even less capable than the ad hoc tank/mechanized infantry force in performing motorized reconnaissance for the MCATF. While equipping long-range reconnaissance companies with jeeps and calling that a motorized reconnaissance capability may have been an alternative in the midst of the Vietnam era, it is sheer suicide today. 2d Reconnaissance Battalion has been diligently trying to make this concept succeed, but it has encountered several significant problems. The first is mission compatibility. It takes a minimum of one year of continuous training to adequately qualify a Marine in the skills needed to be an effective member of a long-range reconnaissance unit. This training must continue during the Marine’s tenure in the reconnaissance unit or his skill will deteriorate. Giving the motorized reconnaissance mission to the division’s reconnaissance battalion simply burdens the Marine with yet another skill to be mastered. Although both long-range reconnaissance and motorized reconnaissance seek to gain information about an enemy, the manner in which they go about this task is completely different. Long-range reconnaissance emphasizes stealth and covert operations; motorized reconnaissance emphasizes maneuver and mobility and is of necessity an overt operation. A single unit cannot achieve the level of technical expertise desired to accomplish both missions. Even the Soviets use two distinctly different types of reconnaissance units to carry out the two different types of reconnaissance missions.

The second problem is one of vehicle suitability. The vehicle used to mount the division reconnaissance battalion’s motorized reconnaissance force is the M151 jeep. Its limitations are almost legendary, and are extremely well-covered by 1tLt Craig A. Griffith’s article, “Mechanized Warfare: Let’s Get the RIGHT Vehicles,” in the Mar81 GAZETTE. The HMMWV will be an improvement, but it too will lack armor and the ability to swim. In short, division reconnaissance units are not designed or equipped for the mission of motorized reconnaissance. In fact, as yet, a satisfactory motorized reconnaissance capability does not exist within the Marine Corps’ total structure. Fortunately, however, there is a solution in sight-the forthcoming light armored vehicle battalion (LAVB).

The LAVB is still in the developmental stage and a final concept of employment has not been approved. It is clear, however, that the new battalion will not be a general purpose combat organization but will be employed in roles consistent with those traditionally filled by light armor organizations. It can easily be tasked with performing motorized reconnaissance for the division as a primary mission without interfering with any other responsibilities it may have. It can also dedicate its organic assets to developing the high level of technical expertise requisite of an effective motorized reconnaissance unit, while pioneering Marine Corps doctrine in this vitally important area.

The LAVB will be built around the Piranha light armored vehicle in the light assault (LAV-25) and perhaps several other variants. Ironically the criteria for selection of the Piranha were exactly the same criteria necessary for developing an effective motorized reconnaissance vehicle. It will be light, fast, highly mobile, reliable, durable, and easily maintained. It possesses the ability to traverse water obstacles and run on flat tires. This makes it ideal for conducting motorized reconnaissance, especially considering that it has protective armor and a weapons system capable of defeating lightly armored enemy vehicles-all essential elements for conducting screening operations.

The Marine Corps is clearly deficient in the area of motorized reconnaissance, but that deficiency can be corrected by properly tasking the forthcoming LAVBs. Then and only then will we be on the road to satisfying this much needed capability.

by Maj T.W. Parker

Current Marine Corps structure does not provide the MAGTF commander with a responsive, well-trained combat intelligence and target acquisition capability. Our ground reconnaissance forces are disjointed, minimally trained, and wedded to a doctrinal concept more suited to World War II-Vietnam era than to the battlefield of the future. The Marine Corps has neglected its ground reconnaissance community in doctrine, equipment, training, and personnel. The purpose of these thoughts is to stimulate discussion that might result in a new, revitalized view of reconnaissance.

The first and most difficult problem in any discussion of Marine Corps reconnaissance is the attitude of many officers, particularly infantry officers, who served in Vietnam and observed the employment of reconnaissance forces. Their attitude is normally one of derision based on their antagonism toward an “elite within an elite.” They fail to see reconnaissance as a supporting arm and look to the misuse of reconnaissance in Vietnam as the norm.

Second, there is the relentless pursuit of automated systems and high technology solutions. Our experience with various seismic and acoustic listening devices should tell us that they are unreliable, inaccurate, and subject to the environmental stress of heat and cold. Vietnam should have at least taught us this lesson.

Finally, there is the mindset of many Marines that dismisses reconnaissance as a secondary function of infantry Marines who are in outstanding physical condition and qualified as water safety instructors. Surely this is a dangerous attitude. If we are to pursue seriously the tactics and techniques of maneuver warfare, now is the time to reconsider the role of our reconnaissance forces on the future battlefield. In hand with that, thought must be given to the training, manning, equipping, and organizing of those reconnaissance forces and to the doctrine governing their employment.

The primary duty of reconnaissance personnel is to collect combat intelligence. They should have a systematic plan for determining the location and strength of enemy forces, the location and disposition of enemy on the flanks and front and the location of reserves. Without a continuous effort to accomplish these tasks, the MAGTF commander will be fighting blindly. He must have Marines in the field who can provide timely, accurate updates. Aerial reconnaissance, radar, thermal imaging, and SCAMP assets cannot deliver intelligence with the accuracy of a human observer.

A complementary task to the collection of combat intelligence is target acquisition. Reconnaissance personnel must be able to acquire and kill targets with air, artillery, or naval gunfire. The return of the battleship and the increased range of modern artillery, including the ability to conduct observed fire out to 35 kilometers, give the commander a tremendous weapon to exploit. On the future battlefield, the destruction of the enemy’s weapons systems and nuclear delivery means could have a decisive psychological and tactical impact. The importance of having the ability to perform these tasks should be obvious in a maneuver warfare scenario.

A closely related mission that is not now a part of our doctrine is the disruption or disorganization of enemy communications, logistics functions, and headquarters. The Soviet Army relies upon airborne and special mission troops to perform this function. We can expect such forces to be used against us. Marine Corps reconnaissance units could be trained and equipped for similar missions. The ability of the MAGTF commander to use reconnaissance elements to create chaos in the enemy’s rear gives him a significant advantage-one that currently is lacking.

The traditional roles of beach and landing zone reconnaissance should not be neglected. The Marine Corps vitally needs an organic beach reconnaissance capability. The proven value of such a force makes it a sine qua non of any amphibious operation. In addition, the reconnaissance force can determine routes of egress from the beach and disrupt enemy reactions to the amphibious assault.

Our most important asset, as always, is our personnel. We cannot afford to have less than the best, nor can we casually assume that any Marine with an infantry MOS can be an effective reconnaissance man. Candidates for reconnaissance duty should be screened from the FMF for intelligence, physical fitness and general health, swimming ability, motivation, and perhaps most importantly, the ability to function independently. Once screened and assigned to a reconnaissance unit, the selected Marine should then enter a period of up to six months of intense training followed by at least six months of unit training. A year is not an unreasonable period of training to produce a basic reconnaissance Marine. Consideration needs to be given once again by Headquarters to assigning a primary MOS of 0321 (reconnaissance man) to provide a pool of talent for assignment to reconnaissance units. If we can afford a well-driller’s MOS, it seems reasonable that we can also afford a reconnaissance MOS.

The training of reconnaissance personnel is woefully lacking. Although we have amphibious reconnaissance schools on both coasts, they are neither comprehensive nor intense enough to produce well-rounded reconnaissance Marines. All Marines who are assigned to reconnaissance units do not have the opportunity at the present time to attend these schools. Often the instructors themselves have little or no experience in the field prior to their assignment and cannot provide expert instruction. The Marine Corps needs a rigorous school that all fledgling reconnaissance Marines attend.

Reconnaissance Marines need an airborne capability for clandestine entry into an objective area. That means of entry-whether it be conventional parachute, various highly maneuverable wings, hang glider, or some other aerial device-is more the subject for another article. Helicopters, our primary means of entry at the present time, do not provide a covert means of access to enemy controlled terrain.

Substantial numbers of our reconnaissance Marines need to be SCUBA qualified. Not only does this provide a clandestine means of entering an objective area, modern nuclear submarines require SCUBA trained personnel to conduct lock in/lock out missions. With the exception of our force reconnaissance personnel, we now send only selected individuals to these schools as the meager quotas become available.

We need to seriously consider the foreign language capability of our reconnaissance Marines and begin to train selected individuals in languages of the areas into which they are likely to be committed. This could be an invaluable resource for any unit operating in rear areas or areas with heavy civilian populations.

Finally, the U.S. Army maintains excellent schools such as the Ranger School and Special Forces Course, which should be exploited to the maximum degree along with our own schools. Our junior officers and NCOs in particular can obtain the type of intense, detailed instruction necessary to make them proficient.

My purpose as stated at the outset has been to stimulate discussion of this topic in the Marine Corps. Our notions of the mission of our reconnaissance forces may need to change. Our preconceptions concerning elite units may need to change. What cannot change is an unwavering commitment to well-trained, well-equipped, adequately manned, reconnaissance forces supported by a realistic concept of operations for the modern battlefield.

by Col H. M. Whitfield

One of the major attributes of Marine Corps aviation is its capability to deploy and operate, ” . . . in every clime and place.” The personnel and equipment in the Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) make a large contribution to this capability. This article describes the MWSG organization, gives examples of how it may be employed, and provides a projection of future support requirements. The article is written from the perspective of MWSG-37, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing located at MCAS El Toro, Calif. However, all three Active and the one Reserve MWSGs are organized similariy.

Maneuver warfare as a tactical and strategic military concept has recently been rediscovered. Maneuver warfare consists essentially of the ability to operate, move, and control a military force at a faster tempo than one’s adversary, thereby, confounding the enemy’s ability to respond to your actions. Properly organized and equipped to assist the ground commander, aviation can be a decisive advantage in maneuver warfare. Marine aviation because of its support elements, possesses unique and outstanding rapid deployment characteristics.

The MWSG we have today is a continually evolving subordinate Marine aircraft wing (MAW) organization designed to support the wing aircraft and their operational employment requirements (see figure 1). The MWSG organization reflects the proven combat service support logistic principles set forth in FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The MWSG’s general mission is to provide those combat service support functions that are closely alined with airfield operations. Normally, the MWSG, like the force service support group (FSSG), functions as an integral group in a garrison environment or whenever the entire wing is employed as a unit. Otherwise, the MWSG supports smaller units with elements of the group task organized to support the deploying unit. Such task organizations may exist for an indefinite period of time, according to their duties and specific missions.

The primary mission of the MWSG is to provide general motor transport support, refueling support for aircraft and ground equipment, utilities support, material-handling equipment support, aircraft launch and recovery support, and general engineer support for the MAW. The MWSG has over 1,500 highly trained Marines in its headquarters, motor transport, and engineer squadrons. In 3d MAW, MWSG-37 also keeps Detachment A at Camp Pendleton, Calif., to support MAG-39 and Detachment B at the expeditionary airfield (EAF) at the Marine Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at Twentynine Palms, Calif.

The three squadrons in the MWSG have extensive specialized equipment necessary to support a MAW. Headquarters Squadron 37 has 20 tactical airfield fuel dispensing systems (TAFDS), 18 helicopter expedient refueling systems (HERS), expeditionary airfield (EAF) matting, airfield lighting and recovery equipment, and a consolidated administration center for the whole group. Each TAFDS has a storage capacity of 120,000 gallons, each HERS 9,000 gallons, of jet fuel. Wing Transportation Squadron 37 provides motor transport and vehicular aircraft refueling support to the wing. The squadron has over 560 vehicles such as jeeps, 2 ½- and 5-ton trucks, and 12-and 20-ton high and low bed trucks. Wing Engineer Squadron 37 provides construction, utilities, material-handling equipment, mobile electric power, and earth-moving equipment support. The squadrons all provide organizational or second echelon maintenance of their equipment.

To support a MAW with suitable airfields or landing sites, each wing has over 3 million square feet of aluminum AM-2 matting, 12 Fresnel Lens landing lights, and 9 M-21 arresting gear systems. This equipment is sufficient to install four expeditionary airfields and three vertical or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) sites of various sizes. A 96×96-foot vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) pad could be constructed to support a helicopter or AV-8 section. Next in size, is a VSTOL facility consisting of a 150×900-foot runway. A VSTOL air base features an 1,800 foot runway and can support a squadron of VSTOL aircraft. Further buildup of the VSTOL air base results in an expeditionary airfield (EAF) with 5,200 feet of runway. The EAF is capable of supporting six squadrons of light to medium fighter/attack aircraft or helicopters. The EAF will normally employ M-21 arresting gear, a TAFDS, and other typical airfield support requirements. The final phase of the “building block” concept is a strategic expeditionary landing field (SELF) 8,000 feet long such as the one installed at Twentynine Palms. Obviously, in a combat environment, effective use would be made of existing airfields or any other suitable surface, such as a paved road, to operate VSTOL aircraft and helicopters. But, as was demonstrated at Chu Lai in Vietnam, when an airfield is required where none exists, the Marine Corps has the trained personnel and equipment to build and operate one and it can do it rapidly. Although the MWSG has considerable engineer and aircraft recovery assets, extensive earth preparation and mat laying would require assistance from the FSSG.

In order to prepare for possible contingencies, MWSG-37 trains extensively using the above equipment. Essential subjects training is conducted in a consolidated manner at the group level. The majority of the training is done in week-long block periods in the field at Camp Pendleton. This approach has proved to be highly effective and motivational. A few examples of recent support projects highlight the diversity of the training effort. During this past winter at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center Pickle Meadows, Calif., MWSG-37 extended the helicopter facility runway to 1,000 feet, installed a TAFDS, and erected two hangars. One of these hangars is of the traditional metal PASCO type; the other is a Sprung Instant Structure, 90×145 feet, large enough to accommodate CH-53Es. The Sprung Structure uses an aluminum rib frame to which a reinforced PVC fabric is attached and tensioned. These structures come in all sizes and have been used for a variety of purposes commercially throughout the world. In June 1983, the Sprung Structure will be moved to the EAF at Twentynine Palms to test its utility in a desert environment.

Many of MWSG-37’s commitments involve the EAF at Twentynine Palms. A permanent Detachment B is located there to operate the airfield. In addition, MWSG-37 provides equipment and personnel for 2d, 3d, and 4th MAW CAXs and JCS-directed exercises at MCAGCC. When the EAF was first built in 1976, no one planned on its indefinite use, and the subsoil was never adequately stabilized. Consequently, due to erosion and aircraft landing stresses, the airfield requires four extensive rehabilitation periods a year. A plan has been proposed to make the EAF a concrete runway, leaving the taxiways and parking ramp AM-2 matting. This would reduce the costs of the numerous repairs required and enhance the effectiveness of MCAGCC from an aviation training and rapid deployment standpoint.

In March 1983, MWSG-37 continued the present series of 3d MAW exercises called COMFORT LEVEL by constructing a 1,200-foot VSTOL airfield at Twentynine Palms. In a tactical environment, working 24 hours a day, the airfield matting, taxiways, and 3 AV-8 bermed “hides” were constructed in 5 days. Plans are also underway to build a simulated LHA pad for AV-8s at MCAS Yuma next month. In addition to the many operational commitments of the Support Group, the Biannual Weapons Tactics Instructor Courses conducted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 at MCAS Yuma also receive TAFDS support. Last but not least, the Group participates in amphibious exercises as part of Marine air-ground task forces under I Marine Amphibious Force.

As capable as MWSGs presently are, there have been some organizational changes proposed by both 2d and 3d MAW to enhance their effectiveness. A study is presently underway within the Department of Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps to evaluate the adequacy of MWSGs and MABs organizations. With the fielding of the F/A-18s, CH-53Es, and shortly the AV-8Bs, this study is very timely. The maneuver warfare potential of our ground combat element will be increased measurably with these aircraft and our MWSGs must be ready to support this capability to the optimum.

by Maj Edward J. Robeson, IV

Maj Burke, in his article, “Maneuver Warfare & the MAGTF” (MCG, Sep82) apparently ruffled some feathers, but more importantly, perhaps he instilled some genuine doubt into the minds of Marines who have been bombarded for the past few years with the virtues of “letting the battle flow” maneuver warfare. He stated:

“The MAGTF will be committed as a limited defensive response to the Threat and since the MAGTF builds its combat power from zero, it is logical to look to the tactical defense as a probable solution.

This statement has generated many responses, both pro and con. The most lengthy of the negative responses was the recent article “Thinking Beyond the Beachhead” (MCG, Jan83). This essay condemned the solution proposed by Maj Burke, and strongly endorsed a maneuver warfare concept that would find the MAGTF in extended positions forward of the beachhead.

Tactics are driven by the scenario, and there are scenarios where, initially, the MAGTF could maneuver freely with little regard for rear security of vital areas. This could prove to be the case in a “banana” scenario like El Salvador or in a NATO reinforcement role, perhaps in Denmark. In either circumstance Marine intervention would probably have the support of almost all the local population, and local defensive forces could free the MAGTF to maneuver alone or in conjunction with other allied formations.

If, however, the scenario requires an amphibious assault, which, by definition, is across a hostile beach, a completely new set of circumstances becomes apparent. For instance, introduction of Marine forces by amphibious assault into Southwest Asia (Maj Burke’s scenario) would probably encounter a hostile population and a sophisticated enemy that could make sea-based logistics too vulnerable to be practical. Certainly the creation of the “benign environment” required to marry up with NTPS equipment would demand that vital areas be established ashore, and then defended.

If this scenario is accepted, simple mathematics can be used to demonstrate the futility of discussing maneuver warfare beyond the beachhead. In order to protect the vital areas, the FEBA for the MAGTF must be at least 10,000 meters forward of these areas to provide reasonable assurance that artillery could not be employed effectively against them. Assuming a 180° defensive sector, a semicircular FEBA would be 31,400 meters long. Marine Corps doctrine states that one battalion, on ideal terrain, can defend up to 3,000 meters. Therefore, there is a requirement for over 11 battalions, just to defend the vital area. This should not be overlooked by the maneuverists. And how does one propose to move all of those battalions quickly in today’s Marine Corps? Not until the entire 82d Airborne Division and the entire 7th MAB are ashore will maneuver warfare even be a remote possibility in the most likely USCentCom scenario.

This fixation on maneuver has even been defended in recent GAZETTE articles by recalling Iwo Jima and Okinawa as positive examples of maneuver warfare, and Anzio as a nonmaneuver negative example. Maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps cannot be validated by comparing the Marine Corps of today with our record in the Pacific in World War II. We no longer have the luxury of six divisions, unlimited strategic lift, and isolated, fixed enemy forces on relatively small pieces of real estate. Recalling Anzio as an historical example is just as irrelevant. The Anzio operation exceeded the size of our entire Corps. Today, we would have difficulty just establishing 33,000 Marines ashore in 4 months, much less holding a beachhead or conducting maneuver warfare while suffering the 33,000 casualties that the Allies did in a 4-month period at Anzio.

Those who espouse the tactical defense do not eschew the sound principles of offense, mass, and surprise. When the size of the MAGTF vis-a-vis the enemy permits, rapid and flexible indirect tactics should characterize all Marine operations. The danger is in becoming enamored with “maneuver warfare” until we begin to believe that our greatest potential adversary will be defeated by “dislocation” rather than destruction. The performance of the Soviet Army in the long withdrawal to Leningrad and Stalingrad in the Great Patriotic War should have debunked that nonsense long ago. This idea of “dislocating” the Soviet soldier is the first fatal flaw of maneuver strategy.

The second flaw is that our maneuverists generally think “heavy” and their heroes invariably include Rommel and Patton. In fact, one recent writer asked, “How can we possibly ignore Patton’s unique combination of the 3d Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command?” That question reminds one of the hungry traveler who said to his companion, “If we had some ham, we could have some ham and eggs . . . if we had some eggs!” In these days when we are stretched to deploy a genuine MAB at short notice and discussing such expediencies as a “composite MAF,” we need to remember that Patton commanded huge forces. He had an ARMY and an AIR FORCE. We have neither, and unless we can convince some featherweight adversaries to pick on us, I recommend that we think METT (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops), fire support, and logistics with a little more emphasis on the “T’s” and consider the advantages that accrue to a commander who has learned to live within his means and to conduct a skillful tactical defense in these days when the defense is, once again, in the ascendancy, and the liftable MAGTF is, thankfully, potent, but regrettably, small.

by Capt C.A. Leader, USMCR

Sex, religion, and politics, we are counseled in The Marine Officer’s Guide, should be discussed among officers only with the greatest discretion. Each of these topics is of intense emotional concern and involves personal beliefs. Each subject is difficult to discuss objectively and quickly generates emotional and confused issues as each involves basic values and lifelong commitments.

Today, this same discretion should probably be exercised when discussing tactics. The current debates generated by maneuver warfare reforms have made tactics an emotional and confused topic which seems to threaten lifelong and basic values.

It may be that this confusion results because the basic tactical issue today is not one of conflicting doctrines of warfare as much as it is one of conflicting styles of warfare. When searching for a common denominator for the collective positions of the advocates and critics of what is called maneuver warfare, it appears that at base the conflict is whether war should be practiced as an art or a science.

Specific confusion and distracting emotion surrounding the advocated maneuver reforms can be attributed to three factors: a lack of focus inherent in the title “maneuver warfare,” the deep rooted and emotional misconceptions involved in the use of the German military model as an example of what is to be emulated, and finally, professional resentment of the origins and authorship of maneuver reforms.

Schwerpunkt, or conceptual focus of effort, is an elemental concept of maneuver warfare. It is surprising then to find that the word “maneuver” should be chosen by its proponents as a title. The word is so semantically confused as to almost preclude a theoretic focus. “Maneuver,” “mobility” and “movement,” although having very different specific connotations, are widely perceived as interchangeable. Although the practice of maneuver warfare does not demand mechanization or motorization, the perceived reciprocity of maneuver and the concepts of mobility and movement has created such a perception. “Maneuver warfare” as a title thus creates a most confused punkt in its focus.

Maneuver warfare is unexpectedly placing one’s force, either physically or psychologically, in an advantageous position relative to the enemy that will result in the destruction of his force. This destruction may be immediate and physical, such as by killing the enemy. It may be a psychological destruction resulting in his surrender. It may also be a combination of the physical and psychological, as when the maneuver generates such command dislocation as to allow exploitation and pursuit.

There was strategic maneuver in the movement of thousands of miles to leapfrog islands in our Pacific campaigns. There was also maneuver in the limited movement of the tactics developed to reduce mutually supporting Japanese defensive positions on those Pacific islands we attacked. The assault tactics of those World War II Marines were in many ways similar theoretically to those of the revolutionary sturmtruppen of Ludendorff’s 1918 offensive.

There is difficulty in describing a concept which is both tactical and strategic, physical and psychological, with the single word “maneuver” that has previously had a more restricted meaning in the English language. That the attempt to use the word this way has created confusion is not surprising.

The extensive reliance on German examples of the practice of maneuver tactics largely reinforces this confused focus. The Wehrmacht is incorrectly remembered as a predominantly armored, mechanized, and motorized force. This misconception applies also to their contemporary Soviet opponents. As a result, the identification of maneuver with the Germans raises the specter of Panzerarmees and Soviet tank armies fighting sweeping battles across the steppe. Many Marines initially find little of relevance there to the nature of the battle they expect to encounter.

Beyond this is the existence of a strong misperception of the German military that causes the use of it as a model to generate both negative emotion and perceptual confusion. There is strong Teutophobia based on what is seen as the antidemocratic base of the German tradition and particularly its General Staff. This is ironic in that the tradition of Prussian institutional excellence began with the reforms of the military by Scharnhorst to create a people’s army in the wake of the French revolution. The army was reformed but not the political system it served. Perceptions, however, are stronger than truths in the short term. And the perception exists that the German military was antidemocratic.

Finally, a great deal of resistance to objectively examining either current tactical doctrine or maneuver oriented reform is based on the authorship of those criticisms and ideas. There is a large, and understandable, negative reaction when criticism comes from persons not experienced in combat. That many of the authors of current maneuver oriented thought are civilian intellectuals creates most difficult credibility problems for them within military circles. This is unfortunate. Any theory deserves evaluation on its validity, not its origin. War, of course, is too important a human endeavor for us not to learn from Nazis, communists, barefoot Asians, and even intellectual theorists. Ultimately, theories of war are only disproved in combat, not by discrediting their authors.

In recent months the 2d Marine Division has dedicated considerable time to the study and practice of maneuver tactics. This effort will do much, as much as can be accomplished short of combat, to either prove the validity or inappropriateness of maneuver theory. If nothing else, by having Marines consciously attempt to develop the techniques to support or deny an American maneuver theory, the resulting doctrine will be our own.

Semantics in the defense of current doctrine has created another and bizarre source of confusion. Maneuver theorists have labeled current doctrine as “Firepower-Attrition” warfare. Amazingly, defenders of current doctrine accept and use the same term.

Firepower appears to have a valid application at some point in all theories of war. Attrition, though, is another ambiguous term which too often contributes nothing to the clarity of current discussion. It is another point of emotion. Maneuver theorists are viewed as naively denying the inherent violence and lethality of war. Those defending current doctrine, but accepting the definitions of terms provided by their critics, are placed in the position of being forced to advocate the acceptance of debilitating carnage in our own force as the norm in conducting war.

Maneuver and attrition on a battlefield are not doctrines but only reflections of the style of warfare employed. As such, the maneuver versus attrition argument does not focus on the most basic issue. Searching for the basic American concept of warfare will reveal that the central question today is more whether America is to practice war as an art or science than whether to use a maneuver or attrition style.

It is interesting to examine the roots of current doctrine in that period between the World Wars when America was digesting the lessons of her continental European warfare experience and developing the basic military institution with which, somewhat modified, U.S. forces still operate. The 1941 version of FM 100-5 Operations formalized what was to be American tactics throughout World War II and remains the grandfather of current tactical doctrine. It is interesting to discover that this field manual was written under the influence of Heeres Dienstvorschrift 300 (Army Service Publication), titled Truppenfuhrung (Command of Troops), published in Berlin in 1936.

Interestingly, then, U.S. doctrine since 1941 has been very basically influenced by Truppenfuhrung that provided the tactics the German Army, the given exemplars of maneuver practice, used throughout World War II. Martin van Crevald, in his new book Fighting Power (see MCG, Feb83) displays that whole sentences of FM 100-5 were plagiarized verbatim from Truppenfuhrung. Whole chapters, particularly “Doctrines of Combat,” display structure and theory obviously borrowed from the German manual. What is of specific interest are those parts of the German theory that were rejected in the American doctrine.

The introduction to Truppenfuhrung begins with the passage, “War is an art, a free creative activity resting on scientific foundations. It makes the highest demands on a man’s entire personality.”

FM 100-5 of 1941 had no introductory examination of the nature of warfare. It began with a preface expressing concern for the scientific management of war that is absent in the German model.

Van Crevald is in a position to pass a unique judgment on both American and German doctrine. As a Jew, he is unlikely to be infatuated with the German warfighting institution. As an Israeli, he views America with a detachment unattainable to the average American.

His conclusions in comparing the American and German models offer interesting insight into practicing war as an art or a science. Never losing sight of the fact that America won the war, van Crevald concludes that while the United States attempted to achieve an organizational efficiency that would result in efficiency in combat, the Germans were willing to accept an amount of organizational inefficiency in an attempt to achieve an institutional fighting effectiveness.

The handling of replacements provides a contrast between the two systems. The American model was to regard the replacements as a part of a manpower pool available for interchangeable assignment. This is obviously an efficient way to manage men as assets.

The German system was more inefficient as a management vehicle. It strove to instill a bonding of the individual to the regiment. Each division maintained its own training battalion in the rear with each regiment providing training for its own replacements within one of the battalions’ companies. Replacements thus not only knew in which division and regiment they were to serve but also met some of the officers and NCOs who would lead them in combat. Billets in the training battalion were used as a way to rotate officers and NCOs out of combat.

The two systems have obvious strengths and weaknesses. The American system, currently used by the Marine Corps, is more efficient for the scientific management of an organization. The German model is inefficient but desirable if the goal is to establish units cohesive enough that their increased fighting power offsets the management sacrifice. Van Crevald feels the German replacement system contributed significantly to producing the cohesion that allowed their units to fight effectively long after they knew the war was lost.

This is an interesting point for Marines to consider. Although we attempt to manage manpower scientifically, our avowed goal is to achieve the small unit bonding that is produced by a regimental system.

This conflict between ideals is not new. Reduced to basic assumptions, conflicts between theoretic ideals can normally be viewed as being created by one theory being based on a scientific and quantifiable ideal while the other rests on subjective, humanistic values.

Maneuver theory is undeniably subjective. Psychological dislocation, the adding of a psychological dimension to the concept of maneuver within the three planes, is subjective. The viewing of the enemy cohesion as an objective for attack is humanistic and not quantifiable.

The application of current doctrine, as evidenced by organization, is undeniably scientific in orientation. It is startling to realize the many parallels between our controlling national military organization and organized science as reflected by a research medical facility.

Computerization has vastly increased the ability to quantify the details of war and its attendant organization. It has given birth to the civilian analyst of war who is a pure military scientist-if anything as abstract as these scientists can still be considered military in the classic martial sense. This analyst bears a closer resemblance to the technician doing medical research than to the soldier. It is ironic that as we decry the intellectual military theorist we accept the equally abstract intellectualism of the civilian scientist and contract him as a consultant to explain war and how to win it. Consulting firms have attached themselves like pilot fish to the military. Sharks, however, only tolerate their parasites, they do not ask them for advise on how to fight.

War is studied by these men as if it were a distasteful but fascinating disease that eventually they will know enough about to cure. Solutions are sought to the eternal questions of war. The humanists argue, on the other side, that war will not be solved as any equation; that there are no formulas to understand. War is something that can be humanly understood but not scientifically known.

With such a collection of scientists developing weapons, systems, doctrine, and strategies on the national level, it should be little surprise that America makes war as if it were a medical problem.

At the highest levels, both the Vietnam and Korean Wars can be viewed as attempts to achieve remission rather than either political or military victory. The analogy was often made in both cases that Communism was a cancer whose spread had to be stopped. Unstated was that there existed no cure for either Communism or cancer and that the best case that could be achieved was a remission. Such a mentality readily accepts delineation of the remission by demilitarized zones and other demarcations. It also allows for the unimaginative pumping of men and materiel into Vietnam as if they constituted some social drug that could cure the poltical and military problem.

Our language increasingly betrays this medical and scientific view of war as we speak of “surgical interdictions” and battlefield “life support systems.” We embrace the softer sciences too. The number of sociological and psychological studies and surveys is legion. Problems that traditionally would have been handled within a regimental family as leadership problems are now examined by social scientists.

This friction between scientific and humanistic solutions to man’s problems is an ancient one. Dr. Otto Bird, in his essay Cultures in Conflict* studying the origin and history of conflict between theoretic ideals, traces the roots back to the ancient Greek separation of thought into logos and mythos.

Logos was the quantifiable, the absolute knowledge. Mythos was the unquantifiable, that knowledge humanly perceived but not objective. Having recognized the conflict, the Greeks also provided a thinker with a solution; Aristotle. This is of interest to warriors because Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander, by any standard one of the great fighters.

Aristotle divided knowledge between episteme, the scientific knowledge of the specialist, and paideia, a broader perspective of knowledge. The man of paideia was “able to form a fair offhand judgment of the goodness or badness of the specialists’ presentation.” The compatibility of that educational ideal with the belief that war is “a free creative activity resting on scientific foundations” is striking when one remembers that Aristotle provided Alexander such a paideiac education.

Aristotle also provided Alexander with advice on how to deal with the Persians. He recommended treating them as one would treat animals. Alexander, having well learned how to form a judgment on the specialists’ presentations, wisely chose to ignore this counsel.

Alexander’s basic strengths were his judgment and character. He was a persistently creative synthesizer of ideas rather than a creator of original thought. It was Epaminandus, his father’s general, who developed the tactical concept of unequal distribution of force to achieve local superiority that provided the Greek phalanx such an advantage over its adversaries. It was his father, Phillip, who raised, trained, and organized the Macedonian army and brought it to Greek preeminence. It was Phillip who redesigned the Macedonian spear.

The conquests of Alexander were not primarily the result of a tactical genius. Rather, they reflect the unusually creative practice of war as an art. He was a charismatic leader, a forceful character, and a decisionmaker as both judge and commander. His needs dictated his systems rather than his systems controlling his potential.

His indirect tactics, as for example at the Rock of Sogdiana, and his decision to adopt oriental manners while conquering Persia as well as his willingness to let defeated enemies serve him reflect a flexibility of judgment and international acumen previously unpracticed and presaged the use of similar techniques by the Romans and English to gain their empires.

The inflexibility of the primarily scientific approach to our similar problems in Vietnam dramatically reflects the weakness of the scientific approach to political and military problems and appears sound reason to explore alternatives. If war could be scientifically managed to success, Robert McNamara would have done much better in Vietnam.

Whether one accepts or rejects historical precedent, the choices today remain basic. As a Nation we can continue to practice war as an increasingly scientific and quantifiable pursuit capable of being considered abstractly divorced from combat. After all, one recent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our highest war council, had no combat experience but did have a doctorate in physics. Or, we can regard war as a creative activity where the character of the warriors constitutes the greatest strength and determines the nature of the service of science.

Viewing maneuver warfare theories in the context of whether they reflect war as an art or science is illuminating. Such a context makes more readily accessible the theory of Col John Boyd. The OODA (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) Loop theory stressing the time competitive criticality of warfare and identifying the command orientation synapses of the enemyas objectives is generally accepted as a central tenet of maneuver oriented thought.

Boyd has produced the most creative American thought on war since the Mahans. His ideas are presented in theoretic form arrived at through a scientific method and are not easily accessible to the soldier. Although arrived at scientifically, Boyd’s theories are at base artistic. To implement the theories, the soldier must synthesize the scientifically explicit into the artistically implicit. There is a shortage of soldiers capable of that in America today. Boyd offers an American scientific base upon which to build an institutional application of the art of war.

Ironically, many who reject Boyd’s theories accept very similar, though not as well thought out, ideas by George Patton. The often repeated Patton dictum that “A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution 10 minutes later” reflects a recognition of the time competitiveness of warfare. An examination of the letters of instruction distributed by Patton to the Third Army reveals his attempt to formalize the specific actions that achieve the results of Boyd’s theories.

In contrast to Boyd, Patton arrived at his ideas more intuitively than scientifically. Despite the inherent dangers of formalizing his ideas, Patton’s thought was more accessible to the soldier than is Boyd’s theory today.

The compatibility of theory and practice, of the implicit and the explicit, and the fulfillment of the vision of war as an art based on science is found in comparative examination of the theory of Clausewitz and the practice of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.

Mainstein was educated at the German War Academy. Despite the preeminence of Clausewitz in German military thought, his theory was not studied at the War Academy. General of Infantry Guenther Blumentritt writing after World War II explained, “Clausewitz made a science of war, therefore, he was studied by academics rather than by us soldiers.” Boyd is treated similarly today.

Blumentritt felt that only 100 soldiers in the German Army had read Clausewitz and that only 50 had understood him. Manstein does not mention Clausewitz in his war memoirs, Lost Victories, yet the reader familiar with Clausewitz cannot but be struck with Manstein’s understanding, restatement and implimentation of those theories. Neither can the reader not be struck with how comfortably Manstein’s methods fit into Boyd’s theoretic framework.

Manstein was a brilliant soldier, but the excellence of his military education was not based primarily on a study of On War. The excellence of the system that produced Manstein was that it contained soldiers who had been able to take the science of Clausewitz and turn it into a system perpetuating an operational art that could be taught to, and practiced by, the army.

It is at this hurdle that the armed forces of our relatively young Nation are poised. We must now do something coherent, articulate, and consistent if we are to strike an American balance between science and art in war that can be put into practice on the battlefield.

Whichever way we go as a Nation, or a Corps, we should consider well the strengths of America. If managerial ability, scientific technology, and gross weight of wealth constitute America’s real strengths, then our Armed Forces should be organized to reflect that fact. If, on the other hand, the character of the individual American warrior is our greatest strength, then we must progress in a different direction. The art of war, after all, is built upon the collective strengths of the individual combatants.

If the character of the warrior is to be the keystone, we must realine the professional education of our officers to articulate a unity of thought, realine the operational training of our units to reflect that combat is their purpose, and establish priorities in manpower management to support the combat cohesion of small groups of Marines as uncompromisable by cost or other conflicting consideration. To perpetuate the system, we must enforce promotion and assignment policies that reward men of character and fighting abilities rather than men of careerist polish and tact.

The Marine Corps has always leaned more towards those values traditional to the warrior. Being the poorer relation in the Defense Department family, the individual in the Marine Corps has retained a more vital role than in our sister Services. But we too have compromised our small unit’s cohesion in the quest for managed efficiency at the expense of combat effectiveness. We have not allowed our educational system and training priorities to support a consistent orientation for success in combat. And perhaps most embarrassing of all, we have allowed psychologists and sociologists to have an unwarranted influence in drawing us away from the simple, tribal form of leadership that provides the ultimate unit cohesion.

How we educate our officers to view warfare, how we train our Marines to fight, and how we build individuals into units will determine the results of our next combat. History will judge then whether we have done all that the soldiers of a democracy can do to preclude perpetuating a third generation of American veterans of unwon wars.

by Maj Charles O. Skipper

Virtually every issue of the Marine Corps GAZETTE published over the past two years has had at least one letter, commentary, or article dealing with maneuver warfare. Marines at The Basic School, Amphibious Warfare School, and Marine Corps Command and Staff College have heard numerous speakers on the subject. The purpose of this article is to delve a little deeper into specific aspects of maneuver warfare-deeper than many would-be practitioners of the art are wont to go.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the ability of the tactical commander to move his forces. To exercise maneuver warfare successfully, he must be able to move sufficient forces by various means, over varying types of terrain, at the time and place of his choosing (mobility). Simultaneously, he must be able to prevent or restrict the movement of enemy forces (countermobility). Once his forces are committed, the tactical commander must ensure they have sufficient food, water, fuel, ammunition, and protection to achieve their objective (survivability).

If one accepts the above requirements as basic for the orderly achievement of maneuver warfare, then it would appear that combat engineers have a crucial role not only in maneuver warfare, but in every style of ground warfare. After all, if the tactical commander wants freedom of movement for his ground forces, it will be the engineers called in to breach the predictable threat obstacles, such as ditches and minefields, and to install bridges or rafts to get his mechanized forces across both dry and wet gaps. If the tactical commander wants to restrict the ground mobility of the enemy forces, again it will be the engineers who are called in to install log or wire obstacles, dig ditches, emplace minefields, crater roads, or demolish bridges. If he wants to sustain his forces once committed, then the engineers must provide the potable water and bulk fuel; maintain the main supply route (MSR) for effective, timely transport of essential supplies; and dig the fighting and defilade positions that will protect the fighting vehicles, command posts, and artillery positions that are so essential to the success of the operation.

An argument could be made at this point that Marine aviation can be used to enhance mobility by moving troops and equipment by helicopter. A case could also be made for air assets being used to counter the mobility of the enemy. While air assets are of utmost importance, we must recognize two important facts. First, our helicopter assets are just not extensive enough to provide the primary means of mobility for Marine ground forces. Second, we will not always have the air superiority or good weather required to depend totally upon Marine aviation.

Therefore, it is apparent that engineers are crucial to the success of maneuver warfare. There are some critical engineer equipment deficiencies that need to be resolved,* but equally important are the following questions:

– Are developing tactical ground commanders fully aware of the engineers‘ existing capabilities to provide the mobility, countermobility, and survivability required for success on the modern battlefield?

– How effectively are we utilizing the engineer equipment presently in the inventory?

In order to answer these questions let us discuss item by item a few of the key engineer capabilities now available:

Bridging

The Marine Corps presently has in the inventory two types of bridges capable of supporting vehicular traffic, the M4T6 floating bridge, figure 1, and the M6 fixed bridge. Both of these bridges are extremely heavy, antiquated, and slow to erect. They are being replaced (1982-1987) by the medium girder bridge (MGB), figure 2, including a floating version. The MGB is the state of the art for tactical bridging and will certainly enhance the bridging capabilities of the Marine Corps. However, this improvement will do nothing unless Marines get practice in its employment. Seldom, if ever, do Marine tanks, refuelers, and other vehicles drive across bridges made of M6 or M4T6 during field exercises. Few readers will recall a significant Marine Corps tactical exercise that incorporated the timely installation of a key bridge as an integral part of the maneuver plan.

The M4T6 can also be configured as a floating raft, figure 3, for crossing tanks and other nonamphibious vehicles needed to support an initial beachhead for a river crossing. Although each raft would normally require 10-12 hours to construct, rafts could be preassembled in a rear area ahead of time and then flown by helicopter to the crossing site. In this manner a raft could probably be assembled with only three hours work actually on the river site. This would enable us to deceive the enemy longer about our exact crossing site, avoid the large signature of heavy trucks and personnel, and still let us get the tanks and other essential heavy equipment across early enough to help counter the initial enemy reaction. A rafting schedule such as shown in figure 4 demonstrates that an entire tank company could cross a 100-meter-wide river in 59 minutes, once the rafts were constructed. The advantages of having the capability to put a company of tanks across a river to complement the maneuver of lightly armored and lightly armed LAVs and LVTs are obvious.

The Marine Corps cannot afford to ignore the problem of tactical river crossings. Geography and military history agree on their importance:

In Norway (where the Marine Corps has pre-positioned equipment and an assigned mission) there is a bridge every 2.2 miles the length of the country.

For every 10 kilometers in Europe there is a river 10-20 meters wide; every 50 kilometers there is one 20-100 meters wide; and every 200 kilometers there is one 100 meters wide.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War featured crossings of the Suez Canal by both Egyptians and the Israelis.

The conclusions are obvious, we simply must be able to project our combat power across wet or dry gap obstacles with a minimum sacrifice of momentum. We must appreciate the fact that river-crossing operations are exceeded in complexity only by amphibious operations. In fact, the U.S. Army has published an entire manual on the subject, FM 90-13, River-Crossing Operations. We must emphasize gap crossing in our exercises and ensure our units can accomplish it.

Breaching Minefields

Present doctrine calls for expedient breaching of minefields by using the M58A1 line charge. By 1984 it will be possible to fire the line charge from a kit installed in an LVTP7, figure 5, or mounted on an M353 trailer towed behind a variety of vehicles (preferably armored), figure 6. Until then the line charge must be set up and fired from the ground (not a very fast method) or fired from the bed of a dump truck (no armored protection for the driver or engineers attempting the breach). Although this line charge has been in the inventory for 25 years, how many exercises does the reader recall where utilizing it to breach a minefield was essential for accomplishment of a key maneuver. There is now an event in the Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs) at Twentynine Palms that includes utilizing the prototype trailer-mounted line charge to breach a minefield, but that is just not enough. The Soviets’ capability to install minefields is massive; and everytime we have an exercise with Marines moving across ground against opposition, they should practice breaching minefields. Getting through a Soviet minefield will require several breach points and more than a single line charge per breach since Soviet minefields will probably not be a uniform 100 meters in depth (the effective length of the line charge). Speed will be absolutely critical since the Soviets will cover their minefields with fire. If we think we can do it right the first time under combat conditions, we are fooling ourselves. An exercise that omits training in this key area is unrealistic.

Breaching Tank Ditches and Craters

Present doctrine calls for tank ditches and craters to be breached using dozer tanks. There are only four such tanks per division, and that number is inadequate. If a Marine force was required to breach an antitank ditch, in all probability thin-skinned bulldozers or dump trucks would of necessity be employed. Once again few readers will recall an exercise that required tanks or LVTs to get across a tank ditch in order to move to their objective. The CAXs at Twentynine Palms sometimes require a single breach of a tank ditch. This is a small step in the right direction but only reflects the severity of the problem. Twenty to 30 minutes is the normal time required for these breaches at Twentynine Palms, and that is unacceptable. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War showed that 3-5 minutes was the maximum time that should be allowed to effect a breach of a tank ditch. Anything longer usually enabled the defending force to destroy the stalled assaulting force. Until the Marine Corps decides to develop or purchase an armored engineer vehicle, the job will have to be done by thin-skinned bulldozers and dumptrucks. The important consideration is that effective procedures must be developed and practiced. With proper orchestration of Marine air and artillery providing suppressive fire and smoke, perhaps the thin-skinned engineers can make the required breaches. The timing will be crucial, however, and this means practice.

Water

Presently in the USMC inventory are 600-and 1,500-gallon-per-hour (GPH) water purification units. These units are being replaced in (1982-1988) by the 600-GPH reverse osmosis water purification unit, figure 7. No one doubts the necessity of potable water for Marines; in fact, it is an item stressed to all Marines in leadership positions. The problem is where the water comes from. It is much easier to use commercial water sources during exercises. Commercial water is usually readily available from a variety of sources, tastes good, and there is little distribution problem. Seldom do water supply men, MOS 1121, purify all the water used to support the maneuver force. Again, these Marines need practice. To purify water requires setting up, operating, and maintaining numerous items of equipment. Chemicals and filters must be used to make the water safe and drinkable. It is one thing for the Gunny to teach his troops how to set up a water point, make a few hundred gallons of water, and tear down the water point all in one day. It is quite another for the team effort to set up the number of required water points, have the necessary types and amount of chemicals on hand, and run the water points round the clock to make the 1 million gallons per day required to support a MAF by D+15. Additionally, there will be a heavy commitment of drivers and vehicles to transport the water. At present many of these drivers are always available for other missions, and this generates a false sense of security. Water is essential, so we need to practice making it and transporting it on our tactical exercises. This is especially important with the current emphasis on the arid Middle East and the potential of NBC contamination of water supplies.

Fuel

The basic Marine concept for bulk fuel is that fuel will be pumped ashore from amphibious ships using the amphibious assault fuel system (AAFS), figure 8. From there it will be distributed to the wing or ground units as required. The ground units will receive their fuel from fuel farms via tanker truck, and aircraft will be refueled via helicopter expedient refueling systems (HERS) or tactical airfield fuel dispensing systems (TAFDS). This is a fine concept, but it is very seldom completely exercised. Seldom, if ever, is the AAFS utilized to pump fuel ashore, probably because of the logistic and environmental problems. Also, seldom is a full TAFDS set up. Most Marine aviation exercises center around an existing airfield with a permanent aircraft fueling system. The problems with the above approach are similar to the others. Berms must be dug to hold the storage bladders, and a complex assortment of fuel bladders, pumps, filters, monitors, etc., must be set up and operated. Present plans estimate a requirement of 1 million gallons of fuel a day by D+15 in a MAF-level amphibious operation. To expect this lifeblood of support to flow smoothly without periodically practicing it is just not realistic. We all remember the scene from the movie Patton where his tanks run out of fuel. Well, that might have been acceptable then, but do we want to chance that now?

Defilade Positions

Studies have shown the vastly increased survivability of vehicles, artillery, and CPs when they are dug into defilade positions, figure 9. Engineers have an extensive amount of earth-moving equipment that can provide this neces sary support, but it must be organized into effective units and combinations of equipment to provide the optimum capability. These task organized “emplacement units” must then practice digging defilade positions just like the artillery practices displacement. They must stay with the units they support and practice the position preparations in order to get the time required as short as possible. It should be emphasized that this is not a pure defensive action, as units should dig in even when they halt on the offense. In the hurry scurry of combat who will decide the priorities of who gets the limited engineer support? Such priority issues should be dealt with now, in training, when time is available to make sound decisions.

Installing Obstacles

Engineers can install minefields, dig ditches, demolish bridges and buildings, and utilize trees and wire to create obstacles, figure 10. Primarily an offensive force like Marines would utilize this capability for flank security, but it also could be useful during retrograde operations. The important consideration is that engineers need to be active participants in the overall strategy of the maneuver commander. If not, the force could be overly vulnerable to attacks from the flank. Failure of the Germans to blow the Remagen bridge over the Rhine River hastened their defeat in World War II. Failure of the Egyptians to protect their flanks in 1973 led to the encirclement of their Third Army and ultimately the end of their offensive. The examples from military history abound, and the lesson they clearly teach is that we should practice this capability in our training exercises.

Expeditionary Airfields

Expeditionary airfields can be established ashore during the early phases of an amphibious operation. Early establishment of these airfields will sever the Marine aviation umbilical cord to naval shipping, providing more responsive and more timely air cover as Marines continue the advance inland. Utilizing existing stocks of AM-2 aluminum matting and a building block concept, airfields ranging in size from a 72×72 foot vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) forward operating site to an 8,000-foot strategic expeditionary landing field (SELF) can be constructed. It is important to note that again these airfields are seldom constructed. Although it is not realistic to assume we will be able to capture enemy airfields undamaged, almost all Marine aviation training exercises center around existing permanent airfields. By practicing the construction of expeditionary airfields, we would establish the most efficient combination of men and equipment required for implementation. We would better understand the logistical requirements in terms of equipment, personnel, POL, etc.; we would know how many days or weeks are required for construction; and, finally and most importantly, we would enhance our capabilities to phase Marine aviation ashore.

SUMMARY

This brief article has attempted to make a case for the more extensive use of combat engineers in support of all ground warfare operations-not just in wartime, but right now on all training exercises. Just as a football team in the Super Bowl would not run a play without practicing it, the Marine Corps should not expect to get successful combat engineer support in future maneuver warfare without practicing the support ahead of time as a team. Realistically, several actions must take place in order for the Marine Corps to correct the inadequate level of engineer involvement in combined arms training:

– The MCCRES must be modified; not just to test the engineers more extensively, but to test the ability of maneuver units to employ engineers. If we are to fight as a combined arms team, we ought to be evaluated as such.

– Training exercises must be expanded to allow more realistic engineer play. Any exercise that allows Marines to move over ground toward simulated enemy forces without encountering minefields, tank ditches, rivers, and other obstacles is simply poor, unrealistic training.

– Battalion, regiment, and division engineers must work for the G/S-3, not the G/S-4. The very nature of engineer support is tactical, not logistical. The engineer is the one most qualified to advise the G/S-3 of the full implications of terrain on both offensive and defensive operations.

– The realities of environmental concerns must be put in proper perspective. You cannot practice digging a defilade position or tank ditch without digging it. It simply cannot be done on paper.

I hope that all the existing maneuver unit commanders who may read this article can sit back and relax because they have practiced the operations previously discussed and because they have great confidence in the engineer officer whose platoon, company, or battalion will support them in combat. If not, the solution is available. All that is required is a commitment to start practicing today for the realities that will certainly be present in our next battle. Our training exercises may be longer and more complicated, but the benefits to our fighting capabilities will far outweigh the disadvantages. Let’s call the combat engineers in off the bench; it is time for them to move up to “first string” on the Corps’ combined arms team.