Maneuvers & Sanctuaries

by Gen Raymond G. Davis

I read with great personal interest the piece by William S. Lind and note with pleasure that his judgment on Marines and maneuver warfare has matured. A few short years back he castigated us unmercifully in The Washington Post.

It now appears that, as we suggested, he educated himself on the facts about our mobility and maneuver in Korea and in Vietnam. The early years in Korea and late in the Vietnam War saw maneuver used as strategic and tactical innovations with unparalleled success. Success, that is, up to the point where political decisions gave sanctuary to enemy forces behind arbitrarily drawn lines.

Once the enemy gained protection in sanctuaries he had all the choices-when and where to attack us. We could only react to push him back. Then when he was hurt he fled back into safe areas.

Rarely could enemy forces be decisively defeated and destroyed because political lines prevented our deep penetration into his rear or on his flanks.

In Vietnam our “high mobility” innovations gained success in trapping enemy outside their safe areas, but only because our small stealth patrols could provide concise information on enemy movements.

Possibly Mr. Lind could “run interference” for the military in efforts to limit the adverse and costly effects of sanctuaries. Documentation of the extreme costs to us in Korea and Vietnam could be most helpful.

by 1stLt John R. Studt

I especially enjoyed reading Mr. Lind’s Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare. He seems to have addressed many of the most common arguments that are heard concerning “maneuver warfare.” Whether Mr. Lind’s ideas and words will ever be completely accepted by the Marine Corps remains to be seen. But, as a junior officer, I find his articles thought provoking and fascinating. It’s too bad that the Corps doesn’t utilize him more fully.

Maneuvers & Sanctuaries

by Gen Raymond G. Davis

I read with great personal interest the piece by William S. Lind and note with pleasure that his judgment on Marines and maneuver warfare has matured. A few short years back he castigated us unmercifully in The Washington Post.

It now appears that, as we suggested, he educated himself on the facts about our mobility and maneuver in Korea and in Vietnam. The early years in Korea and late in the Vietnam War saw maneuver used as strategic and tactical innovations with unparalleled success. Success, that is, up to the point where political decisions gave sanctuary to enemy forces behind arbitrarily drawn lines.

Once the enemy gained protection in sanctuaries he had all the choices-when and where to attack us. We could only react to push him back. Then when he was hurt he fled back into safe areas.

Rarely could enemy forces be decisively defeated and destroyed because political lines prevented our deep penetration into his rear or on his flanks.

In Vietnam our “high mobility” innovations gained success in trapping enemy outside their safe areas, but only because our small stealth patrols could provide concise information on enemy movements.

Possibly Mr. Lind could “run interference” for the military in efforts to limit the adverse and costly effects of sanctuaries. Documentation of the extreme costs to us in Korea and Vietnam could be most helpful.

by 1stLt John R. Studt

I especially enjoyed reading Mr. Lind’s Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare. He seems to have addressed many of the most common arguments that are heard concerning “maneuver warfare.” Whether Mr. Lind’s ideas and words will ever be completely accepted by the Marine Corps remains to be seen. But, as a junior officer, I find his articles thought provoking and fascinating. It’s too bad that the Corps doesn’t utilize him more fully.

The Asymmetrical Ace

by Col J.J. Edson, USMC(Ret)

“Thinking About War” by LtGen Philip D. Shutler, USMC(Ret) (MCG, Nov87) is a difficult article, but it can provide those who stick with it new insight into maneuver warfare, operational art, and general military theory. I hope it gets wide attention.

The Guadalcanal Campaign illustrates many of the author’s basic ideas. In 1942, the United States moved to stop the Japanese advance by sending MajGen A.A. Vandegrift’s 1st Marine Division to the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area. On D-day some 11,000 Marines stormed ashore, more than enough to deal with the 2,000 or so Japanese-primarily construction troops-who were in the area building what the Marines would name Henderson Field.

This projection of U.S. power into the Solomons chain confronted the Japanese with a major problem. To be certain of overtaking U.S. forces and continuing their advance, the Japanese needed a troop strength advantage of perhaps three to one. For three and a half months they tried to achieve it, but they never reached that goal. In each of their major ground attacks on the Marine position-Tenaru River, 21 August; Bloody Ridge, 12-14 September; Henderson Field, 23-26 October-they moved too soon with insufficient strength and were turned back in vicious fighting. But the issue was really decided elsewhere by the “shields” that were extended around the Guadalcanal positions. Aircraft, surface ships, and submarines operated in the surrounding areas. They fought five major naval battles and almost continuous lesser actions to limit Japanese reinforcements and hold counterattacking air and surface bombardments to manageable levels.

Some of these engagements were “symmetrical,” i.e., they brought two similar forces, such as surface fleets, into action against each other. In these instances heavy losses were often suffered by both sides. Other engagements were “asymmetrical,” e.g., unprotected troop transports destroyed by aircraft or surface combatants. These often resulted in dramatic successes, such as on 14 November when the Japanese lost 7 transports and some 7,000 Guadalcanal-bound troops.

“Thinking About War” focuses our attention on the “modes” of warfare-on the kinds of forces involved in engagements. It reminds us how vulnerable a unit can be before it is fully deployed or when it comes under attack by a combat element it was never designed to engage. Thus an amphibious landing force is essentially helpless before it lands. En route to the objective area, it is totally dependent on the effectiveness of the shields provided by the Navy. (See Maj Milstead’s “Defending the ATF” MCG, Sep87.)

To keep the concept simple, Gen Shutler did not distinguish among the various types of land, sea, or air forces. Obviously, not all ground forces are the same. Artillery, light infantry, armored forces, surface-to-air missiles all come under the heading of ground forces, but they are vastly different in capabilities. Impressive victories have been won when artillery, for example, was able to standoff and engage light infantry and when light infantry has penetrated inadequate defenses and closed with missile units, command posts, or service support units. The importance of fielding a balanced combined arms team is immediately apparent from these considerations. If a force is lacking any major capability, it opens the door for asymmetrical attack and potentially severe losses. Providing sound air defenses, effective counterbattery capabilities, sufficient antiarmor weapons, etc., reduces the weaknesses that might be exploited by a competent, well-equipped enemy.

Once two reasonably balanced combined arms teams are locked in combat, the likelihood of one side or the other finding a decisive asymmetrical advantage diminishes greatly. Both sides are apt to suffer high losses with little to show for it Maneuver warfare seeks to break this symmetrical gridlock and open opportunities for more productive engagements. One of the major advantages of an amphibious capability is that it also opens such opportunities not only by projecting assault forces against vulnerable rear area units, but also by forcing the enemy to reposition/ redeploy forces, i.e, temporarily adopt formations that can be readily attacked asymmetrically by air, naval gunfire, or artillery.

It is interesting also to think about over-the-horizon assault in terms of Gen Shutler’s modes of warfare. If the assault force can land in lightly held areas, its presence may force the enemy to make major readjustments, moving armor units, troop units, support, and headquarters over long distances to react to the new threat Ideally, the assaulting force should be prepared to take advantage of this-and these preparations could easily drive major changes into the landing plan. Having deep and distant reconnaissance elements in place with an abundance of air, artillery, and combat engineer (mines) support available in the earliest stages might offer far greater advantages than would a more traditional landing plan with its infantry heavy assault waves.

Gen Shutler speaks a different language. I’ve not been faithful to his terminology, and I have touched only a few of the ideas implicit in his article. I believe he has made a true contribution to military theory. Now we must absorb, understand, and use it.

The Operational Art

by William S. Lind

Among the challenges facing Marines is understanding the operational level of war. The Corps’ adoption of maneuver warfare as doctrine, announced in the 1988 edition of OH 6-1, Ground Combat Operations, means that the operational level is also Marine Corps doctrine since it is central to maneuver warfare.

Neither the term nor the concept are new. Both were introduced by the Germans in the 19th century. The Soviets make frequent reference to the “operational art,” and their approach to war is focused on the operational level. The term was officially introduced into the American military vocabulary by the 1982 edition of the Army’s field manual FM 100-5.

What is the operational level of war? It is sometimes defined as actions taken at or above corps level. However, that is not a very useful definition since it really does not tell us much. It has little relevance to the Marine Corps, which normally deploys units smaller than corps. It is also partially incorrect because small units may at times undertake operational actions. We call those actions “special operations.” What makes them “special” is not so much their technical or tactical characteristics, which may differ little from a standard infantry raid, but the fact that they have operational or strategic significance. In fact, a good definition of special operations might be, “tactical actions that in and of themselves have direct operational or strategic significance.”

Another common definition is to say that the operational art is the art of the campaign as distinguished from tactics, which is the art of battle. The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 defines operational art as “. . . the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” Unfortunately, this definition is also somewhat unsatisfactory. It implies that any employment of forces in a theater to attain strategic goals is operational art if it manifests itself in “major operations.” Yet such “operations” may be little but floundering from one battle to another, and the linkage to strategic goals may not go beyond the notion that if one wins enough battles one must win strategically. Yet in such a situation-historically, not an uncommon one-the operational art is simply absent.

I would propose a third definition, one I think gets to the heart of the matter:

The operational art is the art of using tactical events-battles and refusals to give battle-to strike directly at an enemy’s strategic center of gravity. In other words, it is the an of deciding when and where to fight battles, and when and where not to, on a strategic basis. It includes the idea that a goal is to win strategically with the fewest possible battles.

FM 100-5 gets at this in the discussion of operational art that follows its definition. It states:

Operational art thus involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. Its essence is the identification of the enemy’s operational center-of-gravity-his source of strength or balance-and the concentration of superior combat power against that point to achieve a decisive success.

This, not simply the notion of “the art of the campaign,” is the heart of the operational art.

Two questions can be raised about the wording in FM 100-5 (as good a document as it generally is). The first concerns the phrase, “concentration of superior combat power against that point.” This could be taken to mean massing large forces directly against some point on a map. Sometimes that will be the case, but not always. As noted, special operations are “operational,” but do not involve large forces. And the enemy center of gravity may not be a geographic “point.” For example, in the current Iran-Iraq war, one of Iran’s centers of gravity is its ability to export oil.

The second objection is more serious. By saying that the operational art involves striking the enemy’s operational center of gravity, FM 100-5 misses its essence. Rather, the goal should be to hit the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. The focus is not winning the campaign, but winning the war. FM 100-5’s error here is missing one of its own most important words, a word central to understanding the operational art. The word is “decisive.” The operational art focuses on achieving a decision, achieving it on the highest possible level-the war-winning, strategic level-and achieving it as quickly as possible with the minimum number of battles. Of course, circumstances affect how closely one can approach this ideal. In some cases, it may require a series of campaigns, in which case it is correct to say the operational art in each campaign is focused on the operational (campaign) level. But the goal of seeking a decision requires the campaign planner to aim as high as possible, which is to say, to aim at a strategic center of gravity. The lower aim is a fallback, only adopted when circumstances compel it.

As noted earlier, the operational art is central to maneuver warfare. As important as maneuver is at the tactical level, it is even more important at the operational level. Why is this the case? There are two basic reasons: tempo and economy of force.

In maneuver warfare, tempo is a weapon, often the most powerful weapon. Maneuver tactics both use tempo in battle and permit operational tempo to be sustained through the course of battle. However, almost all battles, even those which go as well as one could expect, slow operational tempo to some extent. A lost battle can slow it considerably or even stop it. It is, therefore, highly important in sustaining tempo to avoid unnecessary battles, battles where victory really does not do much beyond causing some attrition. Operational art is the art of determining beforehand which battles are worth fighting.

Equally important to the Marine Corps is the macro-level economy of force provided by the operational art. Every battle involves friendly casualties. The smaller force-and a Marine expeditionary force will often be out-numbered by its opponent-can win a series of battles, only to find itself reduced to the point where it cannot win the war because of the casualties each victory entailed. The smaller force must use battle sparingly, because it must economize its forces on a theater basis. The operational art permits you to use battle sparingly. It is thus the basis of theater-wide economy of force.

The notion of using battle sparingly, of refusing battle where a victory will not mean much strategically, is a new and probably somewhat uncomfortable idea for Marines. (Sometimes you will have little choice as a competent enemy may force you to fight where you would rather not.) In the past, American forces have generally attempted to win strategically by accumulating tactical victories, accepting battle wherever and whenever offered. There have been exceptions, such as the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific in World War II, which was based on avoiding battle wherever possible. But accumulation was the rule, and it was essentially a replacement for the operational art (of which, institutionally, we had little or no concept).

Vietnam shows the weakness of the accumulation approach. We kept accumulating tactical victories, but they brought us no closer to our strategic goal. With no concept of the operational art, we could not link our tactics and our strategy. Our ability to win battles was ultimately meaningless. Unfortunately, our opponent did understand the operational art. The Tet Offensive, although it resulted in a tactical defeat, was a major operational victory. It struck a decisive blow at our center of gravity, the home front’s support for the war.

The operational art has direct relevance to the Marine Corps’ principal mission, expeditionary warfare. In most cases, expeditionary warfare is likely to mean military intervention in the Third World. Because of the political reaction in the United States to such interventions, it is of the highest importance that they achieve decisive results quickly. The American people are unlikely to support a lengthy limited war, and no administration is likely to be able to continue such a conflict in the face of widespread public opposition. The operational art is central to obtaining a quick decision, and therefore it is also central to the Marine Corps’ utility to the Nation as an expeditionary force.

The Marine Corps’ seaborne amphibious mobility is also operationally important. In fact, it offers a capability we often overlook, one that can only be exploited through the operational art. We normally think of the Corps’ amphibious capability as providing two advantages: one strategic-strategic mobility; and one tactical-forcible entry. But there is a third in many expeditionary situations: an operational mobility advantage.

In many Third World areas, a seaborne force is more mobile than even a mechanized land-based force, which must contend with few roads, most of them bad. The seaborne force can shift its operational point of main effort faster than can the land-based force. Operational mobility advantages can be decisive. The defender had that advantage in World War I. He could shift reserves laterally by rail faster than the attacker could advance on foot. In World War II, mechanization reversed the operational mobility advantage, giving it to the attacker. The result was shown in France in 1940.

In many expeditionary situations, the advantage in operational mobility the Marine Corps has from being seabased may be more important than the forcible entry capability. In other words, the amphibious campaign may be of more value than the amphibious assault. In this sense, the future of the Marine Corps may be seen better in Wellington in Spain than on Tarawa or Okinawa.

A third way the operational art is of direct relevance to the Marine Corps is in special operations. The Corps has been a late entry into the special operations sweepstakes, and this may be to the good. It may give the Corps the opportunity to get it right. So far, our national record in special operations has been less than impressive. Much of the reason has been a failure to grasp the essence of special operations. It has been defined largely as a set of techniques, techniques for storming airplanes, jumping out of helicopters in wet suits, eating snakes, etc. That conception misses the point. As noted earlier, the essence of special operations is that they must be operational. They must be thought through in such a way that a tactical success has direct operational or strategic significance. Sometimes specialized techniques may be needed, and as in all combat, competence in techniques is necessary; but a well-trained infantry unit may often have techniques adequate to the task.

The key here is the phrase, “thought through.” The quality of thought must be high, both in planning and in executing the operation. That means we want people like T.E. Lawrence, not Conan the Barbarian. The Marine Corps can put such people at the core of its special operations forces.

Understanding operational art is one thing, putting it into practice is another. How does one learn how to do it? As in maneuver warfare generally, there is no method or process by which you can do it. Process-type thinking leads to methodical battle, which is the antithesis of maneuver warfare.

For the individual Marine who wants to study operational art, the best route is probably study of past campaigns. He must look not just at what happened, but why it happened. Memoirs of accomplished practitioners of the operational art are also valuable. One of the best is Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Lost Victories. You could do worse than taking the advice one Army general gave the officers of his division: “Read this book once a year for 30 years.”

There are several institutional steps the Marine Corps could take to develop expertise in the operational art. One, which is currently under discussion, is to establish a small second-year course at the Command and Staff College at Quantico, modeled on the Army’s excellent second-year course at Fort Leavenworth. That course is focused on the operational art.*

Second, it could put out an Operational Handbook on the operalional art, one that would include some good case studies.

Third, it could game the operational art in developing scenarios for major exercises. By developing those scenarios in wargames instead of just concocting something arbitrarily, staff officers could be exposed to operational level thinking.

None of this will make the operational art easy or something anyone can do with a little “common sense.” No military has a lot of von Mansteins floating around. But if the Marine Corps wants genuine excellence in expeditionary warfare, it must come to grips with the challenge. The potential reward for the Corps and for the country is enormous. Excellence in the operational art is the ultimate force multiplier.

Fundamentals of Maneuver Warfare

Operational Handbook (OH) 6-1, Ground Combat Operations, which was published at Quantico last month, discusses the fundamentals of maneuver warfare in terms that closely parallel Capt Moore’s thoughts. The following has been extracted from Section 1303 of the new OH:

Focus on the enemy; not on terrain objectives.

Act more quickly than the enemy can react. Maneuver warfare is as much a mental approach to warfare as it is a physical one. The essence of maneuver warfare is to make and implement operational and tactical decisions more quickly than the enemy. However, this does not mean making rash decisions and executing incomplete plans. The commander who generates a faster operational tempo gains a significant advantage. He seizes the initiative and dictates the course of battle until the enemy is overcome by events and his cohesion and ability to influence the situation are destroyed. Gen AA Vandegrift wrote: “Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.” In order to facilitate the necessary operational tempo, the commander should decentralize tactical decisionmaking, make effective use of mission-type orders, and make his intent clearly understood.

Support maneuver by fire. Firepower supports maneuver by suppressing and disrupting enemy forces, or physically destroying the remnants of enemy units whose cohesion has been destroyed.

Issue mission-type orders. Mission-type orders specify what must be done without prescribing how it must be done. In order to effectively issue mission-type orders, the commander must ensure that his intent is clearly understood so that subordinates can exercise initiative and still serve the ultimate mission. The high degree of initiative afforded subordinate commanders and the decentralization of decision-making authority provide for the rapid operational tempo essential to success. At the same time, certain combat functions, such as the coordination of fire support with maneuver, require explicit instructions. As a rule, orders should contain only the degree of detail needed to ensure necessary coordination.

Avoid enemy strength and attack enemy weakness. The commander bypasses located enemy strength-sometimes described as surfaces-and exploits enemy weaknesses-also known as gaps-attacking aggressively at key locations where he can achieve local superiority. He seeks to attack at an unexpected time and place and from an unexpected direction. Enemy weaknesses may take the form of physical gaps between enemy units or may take the form of inferior mobility or firepower, inefficient command and control, lack of initiative or flexibility on the part of commanders, poor night-fighting capability, discernible tactical patterns, or any identified characteristic that can be tactically exploited. Attacks follow the course of least resistance into the enemy flanks and rear.

Exploit tactical opportunities developed or located by subordinate units. This technique, sometimes known as “reconnaissance pull,” is the means by which the commander attacks enemy weakness. In this manner, the course of battle is shaped by subordinate units. Higher commanders must maintain the flexibility and agility to react quickly and decisively to fleeting opportunities created by his subordinates. Operations should be fluid and continuous, each operation based on a previous success. Exploitation should be immediate and relentless, offering the enemy no respite until his total collapse is achieved.

Always designate a main effort. The main effort is the most important task to be accomplished, that task on which the overall success of the operation depends at that instant. The commander assigns the main effort to a subordinate unit, which he provides with the necessary combat power and support. Through the main effort, the commander provides focus to the decentralized efforts of his command. All elements of the command must understand and support the main effort. The decisions of where to locate his main effort and when and where to shift it are among the most important and most difficult decisions a commander must make in combat.

Avoid set rules and patterns. The enemy must not be allowed to anticipate tactical events or he will seize the initiative. Each combat situation is based on different circumstances and requires a unique approach. Leaders must take an imaginative, practical approach to solving tactical problems. They must not fight according to checklists.

Act boldly and decisively. Commanders at all levels must be able to deal with uncertainty and must act with audacity, initiative, and inventiveness within their commander’s intent to seize fleeting opportunities. When fighting a numerically superior enemy the commander must be willing to take prudent risks, especially when there is the opportunity for a significant gain.

Command from the front. The commander must be located well forward in order to make effective and timely decisions based on first-hand knowledge of the situation. The commander must not be confined to his command post; rather, he should locate himself where his presence has the greatest influence on the battle.

Because OH 6-1 represents a major shift in emphasis and approach to warfare, the Gazette plans to publish one or more detailed reviews of its content in a future issue.

Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?

by Capt Kevin R. Clover

In 1980, 2d Marine Division commander, MajGen AM. Gray, sent the following correspondence to the Marines in his division:

Realizing that many of our potential enemies could bring superior numbers of men and good equipment to bear against us in a distant theater, it would be fool-hardy to think about engaging them in firepower-attrition duals. Historically, maneuver warfare has been the means by which smaller but more intelligently led forces have achieved victory. It is, therefore, my intention to have us improve upon our understanding of the concepts behind maneuver warfare theory and to train our units in their application.

Under this direction, the 2d Marine Division began to study and practice the concepts of maneuver warfare.

Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing to this very day, an interesting debate has occurred within the Marine Corps about the art of warfare. This has centered on the idea that there are two points on the ends of a “styles of warfare” spectrum. It was argued that all strategy and tactics were some combination of these two styles: maneuver warfare and firepower/ attrition warfare.

Maneuver warfare was also a heated topic of discussion within the other military Services, academia, and even Congress. The House Armed Services Committee directed the Marine Corps to make a formal report in 1982 to explain, “the manner in which maneuver warfare concepts are being or have been incorporated into the policies and training . . . of the Marine Corps.”

The official Marine Corps policy on maneuver warfare was stated in a report sent to the House Armed Services Committee in 1983. The report declared that the “Marine Corps does not subscribe to any exclusive formula or recipe for warfare,” but that “the concepts of maneuver warfare are evident throughout the Marine Corps” and that efforts are being made “to further integrate the concepts of maneuver warfare and amphibious warfare.” The implication of this report was that the Marine Corps considers maneuver warfare to be one of many theories included in the repertoire of Marine commanders on both the tactical and strategic levels.

If the Marine Corps intends to train and fight maneuver warfare, then we need to determine how well we have educated our Marines to fight in this manner. We also need to ascertain how those Marines feel about maneuver warfare. What are their perceptions and attitudes toward it? Insight in these areas would give us a starting point from which to intelligently continue our training.

In June 1986, a survey was completed by a random, representative sampling of 375 Marines in 2d Marine Division. The objective was to determine the level of dissemination of maneuver warfare concepts among these Marines and to appraise their attitudes about those concepts. The 2d Marine Division was chosen because of its reputation as a leader in the area of maneuver warfare. The survey respondents ranged in rank from sergeant to sergeant major and second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel and concentrated on the combat arms military occupational specialty (MOS) groups. The survey was administered to members of 15 battalions. The survey respondents included infantrymen, artillerymen, tankers, assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) and light armored vehicle (LAV) crewmen, and reconnaissance Marines.

This article will report the results of that study by looking first at knowledge about maneuver warfare and its related concepts and then at attitudes toward maneuver warfare.

Knowledge of Maneuver Warfare

Marines were asked to categorize their own knowledge of maneuver warfare tactics as one of the following:

  • I don’t know anything about maneuver warfare.
  • I know very little about maneuver warfare.
  • I have a basic understanding of maneuver warfare.
  • I consider myself an expert on maneuver warfare.

Of the Marines that returned the surveys, 67.3 percent claimed that they had at least a basic understanding of maneuver warfare. Not surprisingly, the enlisted ranks were less confident in their knowledge than the officers, and the number of officers who believed themselves to have a basic understanding of maneuver warfare increased with rank. Very few of the respondents said they knew nothing about maneuver warfare, and very few said they were experts. Of 103 Marine officers surveyed, only one captain considered himself an expert in maneuver warfare theory. Seventeen officers said they knew very little about maneuver warfare and two lieutenants said they knew nothing about it.

The tank/AAV MOS group had the most confidence in their maneuver warfare knowledge with 78 percent reporting at least a basic understanding. The infantry and artillery/engineer groups followed closely at 69.8 and 65.8 percent respectively. The percentage of correct answers to the multiple choice questions did not differ significantly between MOS groups.

In the next portion of the survey, 12 multiple choice questions sought to determine what differences exist in the quantity and/or quality of knowledge about maneuver warfare concepts. The results of this test support both positive and negative conclusions, depending on the criteria of the individual making the conclusion.

If one believes that maneuver warfare can be simply defined as attacking weaknesses and avoiding strengths, then the 2d Marine Division has a widespread knowledge of the concept. Over 80 percent of all Marines surveyed knew that in maneuver warfare, one should “avoid enemy strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses.” Every field grade respondent and 76.2 percent of the sergeants answered the question in this way. Also, the respondents seemed to realize that maneuver is different from mobility and, although there is some confusion, the majority believed maneuver warfare is an innovative way of thinking about war rather than old wine in new bottles.

If, however, one believes maneuver warfare to be a complex concept made up of many concepts and processes, then the knowledge of maneuver warfare tactics among Marines in the division falls short of what is needed, especially among the noncommissioned officers (NCOs), staff NCOs, and lieutenants. Some of the concepts, such as focus of main effort and mission-type orders, are unfamiliar and confusing to many Marines.

An example of this confusion is shown in the answers to the following multiple choice question:

  • “Mission-type” orders require:

a. strict and unquestioning obedience of detailed instructions given during the commander’s briefing.

b. decisions to be made at the highest level possible.

c. that the commander give only general guidance to his subordinates in how to carry out a mission.

d. all of the above.

e. I don’t know.

The percentage of correct responses to this question shows a wide disparity in the level of knowledge about mission-type orders between the officer and enlisted respondents. Over 90 percent of the field grade and company grade officers answered correctly that mission-type orders require “that the commander give only general guidance to his subordinates in how to carry out the mission.” Only 41 percent of the SNCOs and 27.9 percent of the sergeants answered the question correctly.

It is interesting to note that around 25 percent of the sergeants surveyed believed that mission-type orders require “strict and unquestioning obedience of detailed instructions given during the commander’s briefing.”

Another example:

  • The “focus of main effort”:

a. can be changed during an operation,

b. cannot be changed during an operation,

c. can only be changed with specific, detailed instructions from the senior commander,

d. I don’t know.

While 89.7 percent of the field grade respondents answered correctly that the focus of main effort “can be changed during an operation,” only 62.5 percent of the lieutenants and 27.1 percent of the sergeants made the correct response. The number of respondents answering that the focus of main effort “can only be changed with specific, detailed instructions from the senior commander” increased as rank decreased.

Limiting the usefulness of the focus of main effort concept by requiring specific, detailed instructions to be delivered restricts a unit’s ability to maintain the initiative. By quickly and smoothly shifting the focus of main effort, opportunities may be exploited that otherwise could be lost in the drawn out process of creating and promulgating a new operational plan. All Marines must be aware that a senior commander may change the focus of main effort at any time during an operation and they must be able to react accordingly.

In several of the questions, even the field grade respondents displayed a disparity of views concerning the definitions of certain concepts or terms. A “gap,” for example, was incorrectly defined as “a geographical place” by 62.1 percent of the majors and lieutenant colonels. Only 34.5 percent of the field grade respondents answered correctly that a gap could be “any enemy weakness.” Only 29.1 percent of all respondents answered correctly.

This difference between the actual definition of a gap and the definition that the majority of respondents believe correct is a problem. If a large number of the practitioners of maneuver warfare tactics are searching for gaps in the enemy defenses only in geographical terms, then there is the possibility that an enemy weakness or gap of some other form may be overlooked.

The respondents were grouped according to rank to best determine knowledge of maneuver warfare concepts at the levels a tactical order is delivered. The results of this survey show that the definitions a commander has in mind when he delivers an order to his subordinates may quite possibly conflict with the operational definition the subordinate has in mind.

An analysis of the percentage of correct answers based on the amount of time the respondents had spent in the division showed that knowledge levels do not significantly increase with the amount of time spent in the 2d Marine Division. This indicates that Marines coming into the division already have knowledge of maneuver warfare tactics almost equal to those who have been members of the division for some time. This suggests also that there is not, as some authors have stated, a heavier emphasis placed on maneuver warfare tactics in the 2d Marine Division than in the rest of the Marine Corps.

Another survey question asked the Marines to indicate where they had learned the most about maneuver warfare. An analysis of the answers indicates significant differences between officers and enlisted. Enlisted Marines claim they learn the most about maneuver warfare from unit training and operations. Officers believe they learn the most about maneuver warfare on their own initiative-from professional literature and other sources. Neither of these groups believe they learned the most about maneuver warfare from Marine Corps schools.

Attitudes Toward Maneuver Warfare

Command support for maneuver warfare was directly measured through these two survey questions:

  • Does your commander encourage using maneuver warfare tactics during training exercises?
  • Does your entire chain of command support the use of maneuver warfare tactics?

A large number of Marines, ranks sergeant through lieutenant colonel, responded that both their individual commanders and their entire chain of command supported the use of maneuver warfare tactics. However, an equally large number were undecided as to the support for maneuver warfare among their superiors. In fact, 50 percent of the respondents refused to agree or disagree with the statement that their chain of command supported maneuver warfare.

Obviously, there is some confusion among Marines concerning maneuver warfare. This uncertainty could be the result of the intense debate that has surrounded the subject Any Marine who has followed this debate in the professional literature knows there are a wide variety of views concerning maneuver warfare and its related concepts. While this debate is healthy for the Corps, it is obviously confusing to many Marines. While the senior Marine Corps leadership admitted the merits of maneuver warfare to the House Armed Services Committee in 1982, it declined to support it as an exclusive doctrine. And subsequent criticisms made about the Marine Corps and maneuver warfare by the Military Reform Movement probably contributed to this uncertainty. In the summer of 1986, this author sensed that apprehension toward the term “maneuver warfare” was widespread in the 2d Marine Division. As one Marine major put it, “Maneuver warfare is a dangerous subject.”

The next step in determining how the Marines felt about maneuver warfare was to ask if and when maneuver warfare tactics were an appropriate response to current threats to national interests. The respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the use of maneuver warfare tactics in four different types of conflict scenarios. The types of conflicts and the percentage of respondents agreeing that maneuver warfare tactics would be an appropriate response are shown in Figure 1.

The data shown here demonstrate clearly that Marines perceive a direct link between conflict intensity and the appropriate use of maneuver warfare tactics. This is in concert with the official Marine Corps policy that calls for a military response appropriate to the situation. Maneuver warfare, in other words, plays an important, but by no means dominant, role when applied across the spectrum of warfare.

The survey then turned to training. Most every respondent had definite opinions on the adequacy of maneuver warfare training in the division. Very few were undecided. This was measured through the following questions:

  • Is your unit given adequate time for the practice of maneuver warfare?
  • Has your unit trained and operated together enough to perform maneuver warfare tactics in combat?
  • Do your subordinates have the training necessary to perform maneuver warfare tactics in combat?

The results showed that a large number of Marines in the division believe maneuver warfare training to be adequate. An equally large number believe the training is not adequate. This indicates that maneuver warfare tactics are given different amounts of emphasis in training by the units within the division.

When asked where more training emphasis was needed, the Marines as a group agreed that more time should be spent on military education and practicing combat techniques. The priority given to practicing combat techniques was higher than that given to military education.

Perhaps the most important element of any training program is the training environment Two questions were constructed to determine if an environment conducive to the practice of maneuver warfare tactics had been created in the 2d Marine Division:

  • Does your commander encourage boldness and initiative during tactical exercises?
  • Does your commander consider tactical mistakes during an exercise to be educational opportunities rather than grounds for a reprimand?

The results of these two questions were overwhelmingly positive. Only 5.8 percent of the respondents said their commanders did not encourage boldness and initiative and only 5.3 percent of the commanders considered tactical mistakes to be grounds for reprimand. This means that the leadership traits necessary for the performance of maneuver warfare tactics are being cultivated among subordinates by commanders throughout the division. Boldness and initiative are encouraged while tactical mistakes are looked upon as educational opportunities.

Indirect Measurement of Maneuver Warfare Concepts

A rose by any other name . . . .

What if the Marines in 2d Marine Division were not well versed in the jargon of maneuver warfare but were practicing it anyway? Could it be that some or all of the maneuver warfare concepts (see Figure 2) were inherent in the existing division doctrine? Are they performing maneuver warfare tactics but just do not know the terminology?

To probe these matters, six survey questions were constructed to indirectly measure the respondents’ opinions on whether or not some of the underlying concepts of maneuver warfare theory are being practiced in the division. These questions and the maneuver warfare concepts they were intended to measure are listed below:

  • Does your immediate superior commander give only general guidance in his tactical orders and allow his subordinates to accomplish the mission using their own judgment and initiative? (Missiontype orders.)
  • Does your commander issue his orders in such a way that it is very easy to understand what he intends for his subordinates to accomplish? (Commander’s intent.)
  • Does your commander issue his orders in such a way that it is clear which part of the unit’s mission is to receive the highest priority? (Focus of main effort.)
  • Does your commander require his subordinates to request permission to do anything different than what was given in his order? (Mission-type orders.)
  • Do your superiors keep you informed of the commander’s intent at least two levels up? (Example: If you are a squad leader, are you informed of the platoon’s mission and the company’s mission9) (Mission-type orders.)
  • Does your unit avoid attacking enemy strengths and seek to find and exploit enemy weaknesses? (Surfaces and gaps.)

The answers to the first five questions clearly indicated that the Marines believe maneuver warfare concepts are being practiced by the division’s units. The Marines left no doubt that, although they may not understand the terminology, maneuver warfare is included in 2d Marine Division doctrine

The only question on which the respondents were undecided was the last question about avoiding strengths and exploiting weaknesses. This could be a result of official Marine Corps policy that states that different situations require different forms of warfare. Therefore, the respondents would not commit themselves to saying that their unit always avoided strengths. They might have felt that some situations may require directly confronting the enemy’s strengths.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study was intended to evaluate the impact of maneuver warfare theories and concepts on the 2d Marine Division at a certain point in time. And from this “snapshot,” what exactly did we learn?

First of all, the discussion about knowledge of maneuver warfare demonstrated we have a considerable amount of educating to do throughout the ranks of the Marine Corps. Marines are just not “reading off the same sheet of music” when it comes to maneuver warfare terminology.

Second, there is a great deal of confusion when it comes to whether or not maneuver warfare is official doctrine in the Corps We must reassert the Marine Corps’ position on maneuver warfare so it is clear to all Marines that, in certain situations, the Marine Corps supports the use of maneuver warfare tactics. Mannes must understand maneuver warfare is one style of warfare the Marine Corps intends to keep in its repertoire and that it is a style of warfare requiring great amounts of training.

But there was also some very good news

Maneuver warfare advocates should be encouraged by what appears to be a doctrinal base within the 2d Marine Division that favors a maneuver warfare style of fighting. The commanders of the division should be congratulated for creating an atmosphere that allows their subordinates to show initiative and to experiment with tactics without the threat of recrimination

Also, despite unfamiliarity with the terminology of maneuver warfare, a large percentage of Marines throughout the division are following the basic tenets of maneuver warfare theory, including such important concepts as mission-type orders and focus of main effort.

The Marine Corps appears to have made a good start at bringing maneuver warfare into its doctrine. What now needs done is to further identify those areas requiring attention and act to correct the deficiencies. As a start, I would otfer the following recommendations.

  • Create a program of standardized unit-level training to ensure a common understanding of maneuver warfare tactics and related concepts among Maones.
  • Place more emphasis on educating tactical leaders from the platoon level down in the concepts and terminology of maneuver warfare.
  • Make tactical leaders aware of the differing levels of knowledge about maneuver warfare among their subordinates so that they may ensure all have some common level of understanding. This may avoid costly tactical errors stemming from confusion over terms.
  • Increase the amount of education and discussion of maneuver warfare tactics in Marine Corps
  • Ensure all Marines remember maneuver warfare concepts by adding key definitions to the essential subjects manual.

These are all very simple measures that could be implemented at virtually no cost in dollars. But they are important measures because they would allow us to all read from the same sheet of music. In this way we would make certain, as we reported to the House Armed Services Committee in 1983, that “the concepts of maneuver warfare are evident throughout the Marine Corps.”

Over the past decade the Marine Corps Gazette has been at the forefront of the discussions on maneuver warfare and has contributed notably to therenaissance of interest in warfare concepts stressing mobility and the indirect approach. More than 50 Gazette articlesaddressed these themes from every aspect and with diverse viewpoints. Most of them are as pertinent today as when they wereinitially published. Here are some suggestions, drawn from this group, for those interested in further reading on thetopic schools.

Capt Stephen W. Miller, “Winning Through Maneuver, Part I-Countering the Offense,” MCG, Oct79.

“Winning Through Maneuver, Part II-Countering the Defense,” MCG, Dec79.

William S. Lind, “Defining Maneuver Warfare,” MCG, Apr80.

Maj William C. Fite, “Some Lessons from the Israelis,” MCG, Sep80.

MajGen Bernard E. Trainer, “New Thoughts on War,” MCG, Dec80.

Capt Gary I. Wilson, et al., “The Maneuver Warfare Concept,” MCG, Apr81.

William S. Lind, “Tactics in Maneuver Warfare,” MCG, Sep81.

Col Brace G. Brown, USMC(Ret), “Maneuver Warfare Roadmap, Part I-Trends & Implications,” MCG, Apr82.

“Maneuver Warfare Roadmap, Part II-Concepts of Employment,” MCG, May82.

Maj Jack W, Klimp, “Attack on a Fortified Area: Lessons From the Past,” JWCG, Jun82.

Maj James D. Burke, “Maneuver Warfare and the MAGTF,” MCG, Sep82.

LtCol Michael D. VVyly, “Thinking Beyond the Beachhead,” MCG, Jan83.

William S. Lind, “Preparing for Maneuver Warfare,” MCG, Jun84.

Maj Gary W. Anderson, “Maneuver, Attrition, or the Tactics of Mistake,” MCG, Sep85.

LtCol Edward J. Robeson IV, “Forrest War: Putting the Fight Back . . . ,” MCG, Aug86.

William S. Lind, ‘Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare,” MCG, Jan88.

Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare

by William S. Lind

Over the past 10 years, Marines have made significant progress in understanding and applying the concept of maneuver warfare. Many Marine officers now devote substantial time and effort to studying tactics, reading military history, and thinking about the art of war. In terms of both level of interest and knowledge, the situation has advanced greatly from where it was in the mid-1970s.

At the same time, a number of misconceptions of maneuver warfare have arisen. This is a normal part of the process of change and innovation. But it will strengthen the debate and help move it forward if the misconceptions outlined in the following paragraphs can be corrected.

* Maneuver warfare is just some theory propounded by a small group of “armchair generals. “Maneuver warfare is not the- ory; it is historical fact. Everything that maneuver warfare proponents (who include many Marine Corps and Army officers) call for has been done, in combat, by armies-successful armies. Focus of effort, surfaces and gaps, and mission-type orders are concepts with long combat histories. All the theorists have tried to do is explain the common threads that run through these histories and relate the experiences of other times and nations to today’s Marine Corps.

* Maneuver warfare advocates claim that with maneuver, there need be no real fighting, no killing. A look at history lays this misunderstanding quickly to rest. Did Stonewall Jackson or George Patton avoid real fighting? Have the Israelis avoided fighting and killing? All war is bloody business, and maneuver warfare is no exception. It will involve plenty of hard fighting. What maneuver warfare advocates have pointed out is that maneuver can often reduce friendly casualties, compared to running head-on against an enemy at his strongest point; that in a campaign of maneuver, a relatively high proportion of enemy casualties are often prisoners (again, a historical fact); and that the amount and difficulty of actual fighting is situational, depending on the skill and toughness of the opponent. We need to prepare and train under the assumptions that our opponents will be skilled and the fighting, tough. If, as on Grenada, that proves not to be the case and maneuver alone is sufficient to collapse them, so much the better, but we cannot count on that.

* Firepower is not important in maneuver warfare. Nothing could be further from the truth. Firepower, often massive firepower, is highly important in maneuver warfare. Rommel’s Infantry Attacks describes cases where a few squads were given whole machinegun companies and artillery batteries for fire support Rommel constantly stressed plastering the enemy with tire as soon as he is encountered.

What changes in maneuver warfare is the use of firepower. It is used to open the way, to support maneuver by blasting a “gap” or fixing an enemy in place so you can maneuver around him, not just to cause enemy casualties. Perhaps the greatest change is the stress on immediacy of fire support. Tempo must not be sacrificed to the need for fire support control; fire support must accommodate the tactics, not the other way around. This places increased emphasis on direct fire weapons and implies a revolution in command and control of indirect fire weapons-including air support. A few rounds that are immediately available may be worth more than a massive bombardment hours or days later, after the enemy has had time to regain his equilibrium or prepare his positions. In sum, maneuver warfare will require that fire support be made more responsive, perhaps through more decentralization of control, but it in no way lessens the importance of firepower.

* Maneuver warfare is irrelevant to amphibious operations. Maneuver warfare relates directly to amphibious warfare at both the tactical and the operational levels. At the tactical level, it offers the landing point amphibious assault as an alternative to current doctrine. The landing point assault carries the infiltration attack over into the amphibious assault itself, with multiple deep penetrations on separate axes. At the operational level, maneuver warfare opens a vista on the amphibious campaign, which may be more important under modern conditions than the amphibious assault. It suggests that we look at amphibious warfare not only in terms of Tarawa and Iwo Jima but also of Moore and Wellington in Iberia.

* Maneuver warfare means heavying up-mechanizing the Marine Corps. Actually, for most of the Marine Corps, maneuver warfare means lightening up. It requires the conversion of most Marine infantry from line to true light infantry. That means getting rid of vehicles, cutting the Marine’s load to no more than about 46 pounds, reducing greatly the size and complexity of headquarters, etc. True light infantry is the most mobile type of force in close terrain, and maneuver warfare demands mobility. For mobility in open terrain, vehicles are required, but for the Marine Corps, these may be trucks, LAVs, and motorcycles rather than personnel carriers and tanks. The goal should be a mix of light infantry and mounted forces, from which a force appropriate to the terrain can be task organized.

* Maneuver warfare is just common sense tactics. Depending on one’s philosophical approach, everything that is successful in life may be termed “just common sense.” Common sense is certainly useful in maneuver warfare, but if that were all it required, history would have seen many more “Great Captains” of maneuver warfare. In fact, developing an accurate picture of the battlefield and figuring out how to outmaneuver the enemy in a specific situation requires considerable ability. It requires commanders and operations officers with what Clausewitz called a “talent for judgment,” composed of imagination, creativity, and intuition. It requires study of the enemy, his weapons, techniques, doctrines, and, if at all possible, his commander’s tendencies. It adds up to a good deal more than is usually meant by “just common sense.”

* Maneuver warfare is just a formula for flank attacks. In maneuver warfare, a usual goal is to attack the enemy in an unexpected place. But that does not just mean flank attacks. If you always attack his flanks, he will soon figure out the pattern you follow, and he will be waiting for you at the flanks. His flanks will, in effect, become his front.

More fundamentally, maneuver warfare is not a formula for anything. Maneuver warfare tactics never follow a checklist. Those who just make up a new checklist with “commander’s intent” and “focus of effort” on it do not understand maneuver warfare. It is a way of thinking, a way of thinking that recognizes that each combat situation is different and, therefore, requires a unique approach. Through education, training (especially free play, force-on-force training), and careful selection of commanders and operations officers, it cultivates the creativity, active spirit, and willingness to innovate and take risks that yields situational rather than checklist tactics. Maneuver warfare requires officers who have been taught how to think, not what to do or what to think.

* Focus of effort (or Schwerpunkt) is just a new buzzword for the main attack. It is much more than that. When a commander designates his focus of effort, he says, in effect, “This is the unit with which I will achieve a decision.” It is not a casual or simple decision, nor one to be taken lightly. Then he ruthlessly concentrates combat power to support that unit, often taking major risks elsewhere. This second element in particular is somewhat new to Marines, in that it often means depriving other units and sectors of what they regard as “their” assets. In Marine exercises, such assets are usually distributed so that everyone gets his “fair share.” That contradicts the concept of focus of effort. Focus of effort demands the total focusing of combat power at what the commander thinks will be the decisive point.

* Maneuver warfare advocates don’t consider techniques important. Not true. A military with sloppy techniques will be ineffective in combat, no matter how good its schemes of maneuver. Excellence in techniques is very important in maneuver warfare, and many maneuver warfare advocates strongly support such efforts to improve technique skill levels as the new Marine Corps Battle Drill Guide.*

At the same time, maneuver warfare brings some changes in techniques. Examples include the three-element assault, where a small assault element, supported by a strong suppression element, makes a small breach through which a large exploitation element is passed to collapse the enemy from the rear while pushing still deeper into his depth;** forward push logistics; and the use of ambushes in the attack.

* Advocates of maneuver warfare ignore the chaos and confusion of combat; they think battle is neat and orderly. Quite the contrary. Maneuver warfare is rooted in the realization that combat is dominated by uncertainty and rapid change, by what Clausewitz called “friction.” The very core of the maneuver warfare concept is that we can turn the confusion and chaos of battle to our advantage, but only by taking risks, using mission-type orders, allowing wide latitude for subordinates to act as the situation requires (and expecting them to do so), and by placing heavy stress on junior leader initiative. While attrition warfare usually attempts to eliminate the chaos and friction of war with centralization and strict control, maneuver warfare accepts chaos and confusion, seeking to work within it while magnifying it for the enemy. Maneuver warfare also recognizes that “friction” increases as you move up the chain of command and away from the actual scene of battle. Therefore, it stresses commander’s intent, commanders forward, and initiative and flexibility on the part of subordinate commanders who are closest to the actual fight.

* Maneuver warfare advocates are not interested in aviation, fire support, or logistics. In fact, all three are vitally important in maneuver warfare. However, all supporting arms and combat service support must be keyed to supporting the ground scheme of maneuver. The great challenge is embodied in the ideas of immediacy and decentralization. In the areas of aviation, fire support, and logistics, the state of the discussion is about where it was 10 years ago in ground tactics. We need to generate thought and debate in each area, beginning not by asking for answers but for the right questions. How can air support and artillery support be made more responsive? How can each be focused, not on following its own procedures and methods, but on the ground scheme of maneuver? Can logistical support be pushed forward, especially to the focus of effort? Are organizational changes and changes in institutional culture required?

Maneuver warfare advocates urge all Marines to join in the attempt to create thoughtful debate and discussion in each area-debate like maneuver warfare itself has generated in relation to ground tactics and operations. Clearly, maneuver warfare will bring changes in each area. What those changes need to be can best be thought through by Marines, especially Marine aviators, artillerymen, and logisticians.

Again, Marines have made great progress in understanding and beginning to implement maneuver warfare. The fact that some misconceptions have arisen is understandable and indeed inevitable. The task now is to clear up those misconceptions, deepening the understanding and expanding the experimentation. The achievements of the past decade are substantial. On the base they provide, progress can be steady and rapid toward the shared goal of improved combat effectiveness.

Generals Speak Up-Or Do They?

by Maj James P. Etter

LtGen Victor H. Krulak’s article was challenging, thought provoking, and inspirational. In his opening paragraph he stated that “the essence of loyalty is the courage to propose the unpopular …, and the essence of leadership is the ability to inspire such behavior.” Well, I am inspired to put my loyalty to the test….

I am writing about Marine Corps generals and the quality of their creativity as defined by LtGen Krulak. He states:

However important the quality of creativity is in the subordinale, it is even more important in the superior. If he has a strong instinct to innovate, if he is willing to speak up and to write for publication himself, it is likely that he will be an effective vehicle for nourishing the ideas of his subordinates.

During the past 10 years, the Gazette has published 125 articles or commentaries by generals-a rate of approximately one per month. At first glance this seems like quite an acceptable quantity, but the figure ‘requires more detailed examination.

Twenty-four of the articles were posture statements-reprints of testimony given before one or more of the congressional committees. Articles of this type are routinely prepared by the staff to reflect the existing position of Headquarters and are then reviewed by the principal delivering them. They typically deal with the status of equipment and personnel and expound on the outstanding posture of the Corps, except where an effort is being made to justify new hardware or programs. Much like a snapshot, they report “what is,” without any of the why or value judgments.

Thirty of the articles written by generals were largely historical in nature. These dealt either with chronological events or presented personal accounts of a historical event. These articles rarely looked back in order to give guidance to the future; rather they told “what was.”

Twenty-five of the total were “work related.” These articles told what was accomplished in a specific billet or during a specific training exercise in which the particular general was a participant.

Thirty of the articles can best be classified as “miscellaneous.” They include letters to the editor, reprints of statements by deceased generals, and articles on subjects not related to the Marine Corps.

Sixteen of the articles are left. These are the ones in which the generals speak out and, to quote Gen Krulak’s words, “emphasize that their minimum duty to you, to your institution, and to their country is an honest and fearless expression of their best thinking. …”

It is this small number, 16, categorized as “speaking out” articles that causes concern. In the past 10 years, our general officers have written only 16 articles that attempt to deal with the many issues that the Corps has faced and will continue to face. It is important to note that 11 of these articles were written by MajGen Richard C. Schulze and MajGen David M. Twomey. This means that only 7 individual generals over the past 10 years have chosen to speak out or address the major issues that could, did, and do affect our Corps, and 3 of these wrote after their retirements. One would think that subordinates deserve more than this amount of “speaking out” by our senior leadership.

In the past 10 years, the Corps has been involved in many significant events and has confronted several key issues. Yet our generals have not spoken out in print. Where are the articles debating our performance in Beirut and Grenada, driving home the lessons learned? Maneuver warfare has been debated and written about by all except our generals. Surely they have opinions. Our generals talk about the new equipment and the ever increasing quality of our manpower, but where is their discussion about how these new resources should be applied on the battlefield? Is this reluctance to speak a manifestation of careerism at the highest levels? Should the Corps be led by officers who express no opinions unless they are blessed by the Commandant?

Gen Krulak stated it well when he said:

Young officers must strive to keep alive their creative and innovative energies, to do all that is necessary to improve the Corps. And senior officers must encourage and promote this attitude…. For both, it is a matter of duty and obligation.

The caption above the Gazette’s Ideas and Issues section reads, “candid professionally oriented comments on matters of interest to Marines.” Who is more qualified to give their candid opinions on ideas and issues than our generals? If we as subordinates are to glean the wisdom that is gained through experience and should be passed on to us, then our generals must put their thoughts in print and “speak out.”

Sorting Out Maneuver and Attrition

reviewed by Col Gordon D. Batcheller

Sorting Out Maneuver and Attrition MANEUVER IN WAR. By LtCol Charles A. Willoughby, USA, The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1939, 286pp. NA. Reprinted 1986 as NAVMC 2796.

Those participating in the maneuver warfare dialog will be interested in NAVMC 2796, the reprint of the 1939 edition of LtCol Willoughby’s Maneuver in War. The title alone is enough to make it an obligatory “read.” While it is dangerous to draw conclusions on the superficial reading that most of us find ourselves limited to, the book contains some interesting observations for those trying to sort out maneuver, attrition, and Forrest warfare. (See LtCol EJ. Robeson IV’s article in MCG, Aug86.) Strangely enough, it will bring little happiness to the maneuverist camp. On page 1 it warns the student to be wary of those who claim to have found THE ANSWER to war’s challenges by quoting from Gen Douglas MacArthur’s 1935 Annual Report as the Army Chief of Staff:

They apparently cling to the fatuous hope that in historical study there is to be found a complete digest of the science of war rather than simply the basic and inviolable laws of the art of war. . . .

Even more interesting, as a sign of the time, the quotation is part of a longer dissertation on military historical study and the military profession. Maybe during lean fiscal years, with a paucity of programs and systems to arvel at, thoughts turn to more enduring aspects of our profession. (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to the rescue?)

The book goes on to develop the historically revealed “principles of war,” demonstrating in the process the fundamental importance of terrain in warfare and the requirement for the successful practitioner of war to draw from a broad knowledge of these principles, of terrain, and of the behavior of men in dealing with the situation confronting him. Napoleon, one of the greatest military “cooks” of all time, would have little sympathy with a rejection of these principles because they are conducive to “cookbook tactics.” He would appear to endorse the requirement for a cookbook, based on the diversity of dishes on the menu of war, and on the variety of skills found in the kitchen.

On page 133 the student learns that superiority in numbers, while not essential to victory, is eminently desirable: Napoleon had a 2 and 5 won-lost record when outnumbered, and Moltke deliberately avoided such engagements. Similarly, the value of defensive warfare receives support and endorsement, and Moltke is given credit for recognizing that “the tactical defensive has gained an unmistakable advantage over the offensive, as a result of increased firepower.” Several lines later: “. . . the attack of a position has become increasingly more difficult than its defense.” But rather than espousing one form of warfare or another, the book serves to underscore only that the study of war reveals a number of principles that commanders must be able to apply to the tactical situation at hand. Battles are fought, on at least one side, by moving men, and the author finds it useful to repeatedly talk in terms of mass and direction, and of the advantages derived from the proper combination of these vectors. But he makes it clear that this proper combination will come most frequently to the commander with good intelligence and a sound plan.

There is nothing m Maneuver in War that suggests Marine Corps doctrine or style is as woefully deficient as the maneuverists claim; rather, it shows that maneuver is one of several means to an end, and the attainment of that end is more likely when the commander accommodates the “basic and immutable” principles and properly prepares the battle. It is normal for historians to search for order and meaning as they interpret the “what” and the “why” of the past, and it is normal for the participants in past events to reinforce (or create anew) order and reason as they recount the events. But even allowing for these tendencies, it is difficult to find support for the fluid, uncoordinated battle that maneuverists seem to champion. Maneuver in War advocates an approach to battle that stresses planning, and preparation, and coordination, and discipline. It may be only a matter of emphasis, but the tendency of the maneuverists to belittle the unimaginative mindset of those concerned with formations, and firepower, and terrain, and coordination detracts from the valid points they would make. Perhaps the best end for this discussion is to revisit its beginning and agree that dogma, from either end of the spectrum, is fatuous.

In any event, Maneuver in War is worth the time it takes to read it, and the Marine Corps has done us all good service by keeping this book available for a new generation of readers.

Maneuver

by Capt Michael H. Decker

LtCol Robeson (MCG, Aug86), correctly identifies the central problem with the popular version of maneuver warfare: nobody ever gets killed in the OODA-loop (observation, orientation, decision, action). Armchair strategists don’t have the stomach to visualize what really happens when the flagged-pins on their board games close on each other.

Both LtCol Robeson and Maj Davis (also MCG, Aug86) point out that maneuver warfare rightly consists of maneuver that climaxes in brief, localized firepower/ attrition engagements (read: riflemen kill the enemy). “Forrest War recognizes that both firepower and maneuver are essential components of warfare and that they must be integrated. . . .” And from Maj Davis “… the Army did not accept the contention that maneuver and firepower/attrition were dichotomous….”

I think that active duty proponents of true maneuver warfare (vice the armchair strategists’ popular version) understand that fighting belongs in the OODA-loop. They make their stand on maneuver versus firepower to focus on the difference between the military art and the bureaucratic method.

LtCol Robeson’s “OODAF-loop” reminds us that after getting there first with the most men, you need to close with and destroy.

by Col Gordon D. Batcheller

Maj Davis’ piece on military history and other things was valuable for several reasons, but primarily because it points out that many things that are intellectually attractive or superficially compelling become considerably less so when taken out of the realm of speculation and plopped down in the midst of experience. One thinks of the dramatic difference of battle as reported by S.L.A. Marshall in Men Against Fire and as implied in Col Boyd’s OODA-loop theory. One is superficially attractive because it makes things simple, and maybe some things are simple. But battle is not, and a theory of warfare built on the analysis of a one-on-one shootout between two pilots, or two swordsmen, can be interesting but of limited utility in understanding war. Reliance on such a theory could be disastrous. Clausewitz said “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.” It is all well and good-and totally uncontroversial-to be in favor of initiative and alertness, aggressiveness and audacity; it is something else to claim warfare is reducible to a label, or a single way of thinking, and argue that one type of operation should determine the organization, structure, and tactics of all Services. The maneuverists would be much easier to listen to if they realized this.

LtCol Robeson’s article also does a creditable job of keeping “maneuver warfare” in perspective and highlighting its limited utility for a force designed for strategic maneuver and tactical assault. One can forgive him for creating yet another warfare label. There are, depending upon your national orientation, about nine generally accepted principles of war. While disparaged by some as a checklist crutch or the ingredients for “cookbook tactics” or a substitute for thought, they, rather than simplistic ideological labels, provide the frame of reference from which practitioners of war approach their profession.

by LtCol Wesley L. Fox

The August GAZETTE surely meets the criteria expressed as the purpose of our magazine, the advancement of knowledge, interest, and esprit of Marines. I wonder if it was by chance that LtCol Ed Robeson’s interesting and thought-provoking commentary of “Forrest War: Putting the Fight Back” and the two book reviews on “America Can Win” by Hart and Lind appear in the same issue and only two pages apart. Majs Funk and Anderson in their separate reviews gave good support to LtCol Robeson’s position of a third model of war fighting, identified as “Forrest War.”

I like the six characteristics of Forrest War. All deserve the commander’s fullest attention, but the last one, “Pursuit,” deserves special recognition, thought, and study. “Positioning of friendly forces for battle to ensure that they will end the initial engagement where they are advantageously deployed for the next event” requires more of the commander’s influence than can be satisfied with the free play of the maneuver model.”. . . over 8,000 troops thrown into a rout and driven headlong for nearly a hundred miles by just under 5,000″ is what it is all about. ATTACK! ATTACK! ATTACK!

by IstLt W.P. Miller, USMCR

Maj Davis misses an important point in his article on military history and reform. Proponents of maneuver warfare don’t necessarily maintain that only one form of warfare will succeed. Rather, they maintain that given the realities we face today, it is the only method that is likely to bring us success. Grant fought Lee toe to toe because he rightly saw his main objective as the destruction of Lee’s army. In a future conflict, we’ll more likely face Lee’s dilemma-keeping our force intact in the face of a numerically superior enemy.

American Can Win

AMERICA CAN WIN. By Gary Hart and William S. Lind. Adler and Adler, Bethesda, MD, 1986, 301pp., plus index, $17.95 (Member $16.15)

reviewed by Maj R.C. Funk

Recently, a new book has been published entitled America Can Win. Written by Senator Gary Hart and William Lind, it outlines in detail the military reform movement and its goals. After reading the book, I thought that its message was important enough to warrant a review. Many of the points made by the authors have been made before, some in the GAZETTE, and some in other military and civilian publications. But I felt that the compilation of their ideas and criticism into one book was particularly effective in focusing the debate on military reform.

The twin problems of our record of military failures since World War II and our inability to spend ourselves strong, say Hart and Lind, require fundamental changes in our defense policy. The authors believe that our long string of military failures is the most important reason we need new defense policies, because a military system that fails in combat endangers our existence as a nation. Huge increases in the defense budget have also failed to produce any real improvement in our military strength. Despite a 33 percent increase in the trillion dollar defense budget since 1980, the authors contend that not a single unfavorable element of the U.S.-Soviet military balance has been reversed. In 1980, NATO was inferior on the ground and still is, and, in the authors’ opinion, the balances at sea in submarines and in the air in tactical fighter aircraft are still unfavorable.

The military reform movement is basically comprised of two wings, one civilian and one military. The civilian wing is headed by a core group of five individuals who provide much of the substance for the reform movement in the creation and formulation of ideas. The other important element of the civilian wing is the Congressional Military Reform Caucus. It is a bipartisan organization in Congress, composed of both liberals and conservatives, that has had some limited success in amending legislation on defense matters. The authors make the point that the caucus’ most important function, however, is to educate the members of Congress on defense matters and to change the terms of the congressional defense debate from “spend more to spend less” to “what do we need to do differently to restore the combat effectiveness of our Armed Services.”

The second wing of the reform movement is composed of active duty officers of all Services and ranks, although most are younger officers. The authors state that the officer reformers’ motivation is simple-if they are sent into combat, they want to win, and they recognize that many of our current practices and policies undermine what is required to win in combat.

The authors define military reform as an effort to make all our defense policies and practices, from the infantry squad to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress, serve the purpose of winning in combat. The authors take great care to explain what the reform movement is not because they feel it is often misrepresented. To summarize their views, the reform movement is not an effort to reduce or increase the size of the defense budget. Instead, its goal is to reduce the amount of attention the defense budget receives in Congress and the press, and to give more attention to whether we are buying and doing the right kinds of things-right for what is required in combat. It is not an effort to buy large quantities of inferior weapons rather than smaller numbers of superior weapons. They do not advocate quantity over quality, but they feel that weapons should be smaller, less complex, and less expensive, the characteristics that lead to true quality in combat. And last, the reform movement does not call for more centralized management at the Pentagon in search of more efficiency. The reform movement has effectiveness as its goal. Effectiveness means the ability to win in combat, while efficiency means winning at minimal cost. The authors believe that both are important, but effectiveness is the most important.

Most of America Can Win is a provocative, but comprehensive, critique of the Military Establishment. The authors accuse the military of designing weapons that belong in museums rather than on battlefields, asking the wrong questions, teaching the wrong courses, emphasizing the wrong doctrine, and preparing to fight the last war. The book is certain to be controversial because of the emotional issues it raises and the recommendations made by the authors to make our military more effective. Are the authors right in their criticisms? In my opinion, yes, on most issues. Do I agree with their recommendations? Yes, most of them. Some are idealistic and easier said than done; others would take decades to correct, and the cost would be exorbitant.

I was very fortunate to be in the 2d Marine Division in 1982 when maneuver warfare, which is nothing new, was proclaimed as doctrine. I participated in two combined arms exercises at Fort Pickett, VA, and I saw the value of a totally new type of training, that of freeplay exercises conducted with force-on-force maneuver. I saw the value of mission-type orders issued just hours before the start of the exercise, and especially the value of the critiques. It was not uncommon to see platoon commanders and even squad leaders called upon by the commanding general to stand up and explain what the regimental or battalion commander’s intent was, where the point of main effort was, how they accomplished their mission, or why they did not. The zero defects mentality was absent, and the training made people think. Most participants were enthusiastic about its results. That type of training marked real progress. There is good progress and bad progress, and sometimes it may be hard to tell the difference. But we should not reflexively cringe from progress because it is something new. Some in the military have made that a habit.

The reform movement and the issues advocated by the authors, Senator Nunn, Jeffrey Record, Edward Luttwak, Richard Gabriel, and others should be welcomed by the military. Constructive criticism never hurt anyone. Unfortunately, the Defense Establishment is the largest bureaucracy in the country where milicrats exist who passionately believe that business as usual is the plan of the day and resist all change. Even though many officers believe that reforms must be made, the responsibility for military reform lies squarely with our civilian leadership, and it is our duty to give our candid advice.

But here the authors miss the point. In their analysis of Congress, they failed to identify the most critical problem concerning our civilian leadership. That problem is the total lack of military experience of our elected representatives and a whole generation of professionals, journalists, bureaucrats, teachers, and other opinion leaders, brought about by our Nation’s policy of allowing the rich and educated, the middle and upper class, to avoid any type of military or national service. I think it would be safe to say that approximately 90 percent of our elected representatives (and their staffs), born after 1940, have never worn a uniform. A few have served with distinction in the military, some are even decorated combat veterans, Senators Dole, Inouye, and Denton, and Representative McCain to name a few. But in a few short years, the World War II and Korean War veterans will pass on, and the congressional leadership, and ultimately, thePresidency, will fall under the Vietnam-era members of Congress, most of whom have never served. Most have no firsthand, personal experience, either good or bad, with the military. Most do not understand and do not appreciate what is needed in peacetime to keep the military ready to fight and win; most tend to exaggerate what the military can do; and most believe that years of neglect can be corrected with a brief flurry of attention by spending huge sums of money. Our elected representatives are patriotic and dedicated, but we would have a better military, with a more hopeful future, if the people who lead it had also served. Sir Francis William Butler said it best:

The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.

Our nature causes us to object to criticism from outsiders, especially when we know that those who criticize have never served and have never had to cope with the pressures of command and produce results. However, our Military Establishment needs to face these problems, not ignore them, not rationalize them away, nor dismiss the reformers as ignorant boobs, which assuredly they are not. The reform movement reminds me of the 1964 Presidential campaign, when Senator Goldwater persisted in telling the American people what they did not want to hear or believe, but that ultimately proved to be the truth. As I read America Can Win and thought about the issues and recommendations advocated by the authors, Senator Goldwater’s famous campaign slogan kept ringing in my ears-“In Your Heart You Know He’s Right.”

reviewed by Maj G.W. Anderson

A Washington acquaintance of mine once accused Senator Gary Hart (Democrat from Colorado) and William S. Lind of having a Faustian relationship. My friend said that if Hart ever gets elected President, he will have Bill Lind build a superb military machine that will not be used until the Russians get west of the Hudson River. In their book America Can Win, Hart and Lind give us blueprint for their vision of a new and improved Department of Defense.

Readers familiar with Bill Lind’s style will quickly discern that he wrote a vast majority of the book. Hart appears to have written the introduction and the last four pages. The books message will hold no surprises for anyone who has followed Lind’s writing and speaking for the past several years. America Can Win is a total indictment of the way the Pentagon does business, followed by a prescription for a sure cure.

The authors charge that the officer corps is bloated and that most of the Armed Forces still adhere to an attrition warfare mentality. They see the Navy as having made a colossal mistake in emphasizing nuclear submarines and large aircraft carriers at the expense of quiet diesel submarines and smaller carriers. They also see the current Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) structure as hopelessly cumbersome and fatally flawed. Many of these issues are being seriously discussed in the Pentagon, but this book is not a discussion guide. It’s an indictment.

Since the book is not designed for a military audience, its errors of fact, which are many, will go essentially unchallenged by the general leadership. For example, Lind and Hart drag up the notorious JCS system of flimsy, buff, green staffing as an example of the current joint system. What remains unsaid in the book is that the system has been eliminated. There are other mistakes in the volume, bit this one represents the essence of America Can Win. The entire book is a clarion call for an externally directed change of the Armed Forces. The authors believe that military leadership is too hidebound and set in its ways to change, even when change is badly needed. The demise of the flimsy-buff-green atrocity is but one minor example of the fallacy of this view. Lind and Hart are callously contemptuous of the Military Establishment’s efforts to reform itself from within and its successes in doing so are either ignored or shrugged off as being too little too late.

Lind and Hart reserve their most pointed attacks for the Marine Corps for failing to adopt Lind’s pet project “maneuver warfare” as doctrine, ans this is where the reviewer takes special issue with the authors, particularly Mr. Lind. Since the late 1970s, Lind has assiduously pursued the argument that maneuver warfare should be adopted as U.S. military doctrine. As proof of historical efficacy of maneuver, Lind has offered selective historical examples ranging from the battle of Leuctra to World War II. Lind has yet to make a cast that maneuver warfare has valid historical efficacy. In researching his on book on military theory, this reviewer found that maneuver warfare has worked only 40 percent of the time that has been attempted since Leuctra. The reasons for the failures are varied, the track record certainly begs careful review before we seriously consider adopting maneuver as doctrine.

This reviewer maintains that senior Marine Corps leaders are correct; maneuver warfare is a legitimate technique to be used withing the context of the greater whole, but it should not be adopted as doctrine. Doctrine is something that is done automatically unless there is a good reason not to do so. No doctrine should be based on an idea so complicated that is works less than half the time it is tried.

Lind and Hart are on the wrong side of history in selling maneuver warfare as a doctrine rather than a technique; despite this, their book will probably do well. “Pentagon bashing” is popular among those who have only a marginal knowledge or interest in military affairs, and that is the authors’ true target audience.

The real tragedy of Bill Lind’s relationship with the Marine Corps is that he could have a truly positive effect on the Corps if he could be satisfied with incremental change. Senior Marine Corps leaders realize maneuver warfare is but one potential technique among many in a greater scheme that this reviewer calls the “tactics of mistake.” Instead, Lind has opted to support Hart in a quick fix doctrinal employment of maneuver warfare that might as well provide us with a mobile version of Maginot Line.

Marines interested in the Lind-Hart view of the would should review old copied of the Gazette, Military Review, and the Air War College Review; $17.95 is too great a price to pay to have one’s intelligence, dedication, and professionalism insulted.