Archives: Gazette Magazines

by LtCol James D. Burke, USMC(Ret)

Imagine the young infantry officer who, in his first Vietnam combat engagement, experiences overwhelming success against a numerically superior enemy force. Like his grunts, he has been instilled with historic Marine combat victories, but now, he has suddenly experienced victory firsthand! After the fight, he considers what worked and realizes infantry victory built on tactical surprise, firing first-accurately, rapidly, and with better guns from a secure position-and firepower/attrition warfare can be a great way to fight. And the best part? No friendly casualties and plenty of enemy casualties!

This first win would establish his mindset for the rest of his life.

Years later, while serving as a Captain at 8th&I in the mid-70s, he attends a PME conducted by a self-described “defense reformist” named William Lind. Lind, an Ivy League academic, wastes no time in claiming the Marine Corps will never win another battle because we are too light to fight against armor-mechanized forces and too heavy to fight what is now called counterinsurgency. The young infantry officer rises to his feet and directs Lind s attention to the scores of volumes of USMC history comprising the Center House library. The argument, “We were the first to defeat the German infantry at Belleau Wood and the first to defeat the Japanese infantry at Guadalcanal”-that we always find a way-falls on deaf ears. Unimpressed, Lind goes on to claim that the only answer for our Corps is to embrace the defense reformists3 enhanced version of Blitzkrieg entitled “maneuver warfare,” the tenets of which are now known to all. The Captain believes this is easier said than done, that the enemy always has a vote, that he, too, may change his tactics rapidly. Further, he believes that iris better to let a numerically superior enemy throw himself at our tactical defense to be killed and lose much of his combat power before we attack and destroy him than to hope to “outmaneuver” him on his ground.

The defense reformist and the Marine are at a stalemate.

The Marines next tour as a Major with BLTs 2/8, 2/6, and 3/6 over 30 months and two Landing Force Sixth Fleet cruises instruct him in great detail on the capabilities and limitations of reinforced Marine rifle battalions3 ability to attack from the sea and advance ashore under varying conditions. He learns through experience.

Still the bright, shiny object-maneuver warfare-draws much attention at HQMC and Quantico. Respected Marines are advocating maneuver concepts. Now, as a student at the Naval War College with an academic requirement to write a tactical concept paper, the Marine considers the possibility that he might be wrong-that perhaps maneuver warfare should be embraced as doctrine going forward. So he selects “Maneuver Warfare and the MAGTF” as his concept paper topic and reads everything published at the time on maneuver warfare.

He concludes firepower/attrition warfare is still the way to go.

To his surprise, his views are well received at the Naval War College. He is encouraged to submit the concept paper to the Gazette. It is published and “draws fire” from the “maneuverists.” He returns fire. The debate is on!

His eight Gazette-published conclusions emphasize that the 1980s1 MAB {forerunner to today’s MEB) was structured for firepower/attrition warfare, not maneuver warfare, and should be employed as such. And for good reasons-the Marine Corps’ missions were based on “seize, occupy, and defend,” not “outmaneuver! ” Our fundamental imperative is that we need to win our first engagement against peer or near-peer adversaries to set the tone for the campaign and to live up to the heritage handed to us at Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, and other fights. He still believes that firepower/attrition warfare is our primary modus operandi because it brings all the MAGTFs combat power to bear on the enemy at a place, if not time, of our choosing.

2018-a saved round-finally fired. In the big leagues, pitchers don’t succeed with just a fastball, slider, or change up because hitters adjust. Asked today, that not-so-young Marine would reply that decades of counterinsurgency, stability and support operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, foreign internal defense, clear and hold, nation building, and expeditionary operations of all sorts combine to demand Marine leaders to consider firepower/attrition warfare, maneuver warfare, and other approaches as tools in the toolbox- ready to be used, as is taught in our tactics courses everywhere-based on “the situation and the terrain!”

You are encouraged to discover the rest of the firepower/attrition warfare maneuver warfare debates for yourself at the Marine Corps Gazette’s online Maneuver Warfare Collection.

>Editor’s note: Access our Maneuver Warfare Collection at https://www.mca-marines.org/magazine-category/maneuver-warfare/

by Capt Brandon Bocian

Over my last eight and. a half years In the Marine Corps, I have read MCDP 1, Warfighting, no less than five times. I have also been a part of four different units. So, every time I have checked into a new unit, I have been asked to re-read MCDP 1, Warfighting. The beautiful thing about this 96-page work is that you have a new revelation each time you read it. At first, when you are trying to simply find out exactly what maneuver warfare is, you walk away knowing a flanking attack is always the answer, and whoever tries to tell you otherwise is an attritionist! Another time, the difference between supporting arms and combined arms comes to light, and you wonder why we don’t call the combined arms exercise the supporting arms exercise. There’s nothing wrong with these takeaways. They’re explanations of warfare. In fact, the first two chapters (49 pages) simply condense thousands of years of warfare into explanations specifically geared toward those who have either never been to war or think they’ve figured it all out. The third chapter (and the shortest, at fifteen pages) discusses preparation for war. The final chapter is where our doctrine discusses how the Marine Corps wishes to conduct warfare-through the use of mission tactics, commander’s intent, and main effort. I have learned through the study of Warfighting that you can apply its principles to your leadership style and ultimately lead a unit that can understand and win through maneuver warfare. MCDP 1 was not written as a leadership book, but if a leader cannot embrace its principles, he cannot execute maneuver warfare.

Let’s begin by looking at maneuver warfare, arguably the driving force behind publishing FMFM1, Warfighting, in 1989. Though the word “maneuver” doesn’t appear until page 30 (aside from the foreword and table of contents), and “warfare by maneuver” doesn’t appear until page 37, the concept is ingrained within the doctrine. Maneuver warfare is on the opposite end of the spectrum from attrition warfare, neither of which exists in pure form. “Warfare by attrition pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower.”1 This is relative, however, as what may look like a brilliant maneuver to one person may look very much like a dreaded frontal attack to another. Armies, generals, and individual soldiers have been conducting maneuver warfare long before the term was coined. Though I believe the concept is best summed up where it first appears on page 37: “warfare by maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on.”2 Another way to view maneuver warfare is as a form of critical thinking and problem solving. To be effective in maneuver warfare, we must take the limited resources we have and apply them to the problem. This idea, though not obviously stated, shows itself multiple times in Warfighting, through initiative and response, speed and focus, surprise and boldness, creating and exploiting gaps, decision making, commander’s intent, and surfaces and gaps. Marines who are not proactive will spend the battle being reactive. Leaders must allow their Marines to be proactive and must be understanding of the outcome. If we are unable to think two, three, or four steps ahead, we cannot locus on the solution to a problem and apply that solution with speed.

Now that we can see how the need for critical thinking is woven throughout Warfighting, you can see why Marines at a decisive point may need to think outside the box, or unconventionally. This does not come at a specified point (age, rank, experience, MOS), which is why leaders must be open to their Marines thinking critically at all levels and İn all situations. But before scoffing at the notion that we, the Marine Corps, don’t encourage Marines to think, ask yourself if you’ve ever heard a Marine say, “I’m not allowed to think,” or “I’m not allowed to question orders,” or “I don’t know,” etc. The idea behind an immediate obedience to orders is drilled into Marines during entry-level training, and the expectation is maintained throughout one’s time İn service. Our culture has bred us not to think unless we’re specifically asked. I was once told by a major, “The only one İn a battalion who’s allowed to have an opinion is the deuce [intelligence officer]; everyone else just needs to do what they’re told.” Really? I would argue that every Marine should have an opinion and know when to ask questions. As officers, we are taught to ensure that every mission statement or task has a purpose associated with it. The why is the most important part of the mission. A critic may argue that Marines can’t be taught to question orders because not following those orders could lead to immediate failure of a mission or, worse, death for those involved. This may be true, but İt is why Marine leaders at all levels must build inherent trust with their Marines before first contact with the enemy is made. I shouldn’t need to explain my actions when in contact if I first built trust with my Marines. My Marines won’t question my orders but will intuitively trust that I am making the best decision. Leaders at all levels should strive to build an understanding with their Marines at every opportunity. Not only will leaders learn what their Marines understand and are capable of, but the subordinate Marines will have an intuitive understanding of how their leader thinks. If Marines feel their welfare is being addressed and that they are being listened to İn garrison, they will be more comfortable when they’re asked to put their lives on the üne İn combat. Building this trust İs essential to effective leading.

Despite “trust” only being mentioned ten times İn Warfighting (five times in one paragraph), it is inherent İn building a cohesive unit. When you replace war with everyday life in the Marine Corps, you realize the nature of war (friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, complexity, the human dimension, violence, danger, and physical, moral, and mental forces, etc.) also applies to an armory draw, vehicle maintenance, or range week. Very little of what the Marine Corps does is kinetic operations. If we view our daily operations through a maneuver warfare lens, these skills will easily transfer to the kinetic operations. Is there any reason why every month, week, and day in garrison shouldn’t begin with the commander (or any leader) issuing his intent to his subordinates? If a Marine is confused, lost, or not understanding his role İn the mission, what İs an extra 30 seconds to explain to him the why? Additionally, by showing our Marines we care enough to give them the time to locus on their input, we also encourage feedback and new ideas from our Marines. Regardless of how many schools you’ve been to, books you’ve read, or deployments you’ve been on, the 40-plus Marines in your platoon or 150 Marines İn your company will bring an entirely new perspective to the problem set.

This must all come together for maneuver warfare to be successful. A Marine will not take the initiative and exploit a gap İf he is not allowed that opportunity in garrison or training because there is a lack of trust between the leaders and the led. “Trust is an essential trait among leaders-trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors.”3 Without taking time to build these relationships-to develop that trust-Marines will be unable to effectively conduct warfare by maneuver. Leaders must be able to trust that their Marines will accomplish the mission when given an intent without being told how; subordinates must be able to trust their leaders will give them an intent and the latitude to accomplish the mission. As this relationship is being built, mistakes will be made. Leaders have a responsibility to understand their Marines will make mistakes, and subordinates have a responsibility to learn from their mistakes. As Gen Charles C. Krulak said,

There are lessons to be learned from mistakes. Good leaders create an environment where subordinates are allowed to make mistakes, yet are not put into situations for which they are unprepared or for which the scope of the mistake could be dangerous.

Now, all too often, we as leaders fear our Marines making mistakes. We must foster an environment where Marines at the lowest levels can not only make decisions but also make mistakes. If you build the right environment, Marines will learn from their mistakes when training. They will learn what their left and right lateral limits are with respect to their commander. We must encourage thinking outside the box and accept when it fails or when Marines make mistakes. Only then can we, and our Marines, truly learn how we’ll react in adverse situations.

Throughout EWS, several speakers posed the questions, “Is MCDP 1 still applicable?,” “Does the concept of maneuver warfare still apply?,” “What will future technologies mean for MCDP 1?” While I personally do not know what the cyber domain or artificial intelligence means for warfare, I believe it is safe to say that there will always be people involved. When nuclear weapons were developed in the 1940s and 1950s, it was common belief that nuclear weapons would take the place of ground combat. Wars would be fought by aircraft, which delivered strategic nuclear strikes, and wars would be over in days. Despite this new’ technology, the Marine Corps continued to find itself deployed across the globe, with smaller and smaller unit actions having operational- and strategic-level implications. As Marines, we must continue to invest in the lessons of MCDP 1 and look to apply its leadership principles.

In conclusion, MCDP 1, Warfighting, lays the framework for how Marines are expected to understand, prepare for, and conduct warfare. As leaders, it is our responsibility to train our Marines to accomplish a mission in any clime or place. To do this within the framework of maneuver warfare, we must encourage our Marines to think critically and develop an implicit understanding between leader and led. As the Marine Corps engages future challenges, we must realize more Marines will have greater tactical-, operational-, and strategic-level impacts. The only way to effectively fight will be to employ the concepts of maneuver warfare. This requires a greater influence from leadership to develop young Marines before they are sent into harm’s way.

by Col Christopher Woodbridge USMC(Ret)

Last month, Gen Alfred M. Gray, USMC (Ret), the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, turned 90years old. In late April, the editors of the Marine Corps Gazette and Leatherneck had the chance to spend several hours with the General for a wide-ranging conversation about his decades of service as a Marine. Gen Gray’s commandancy in the late 1980s came at a pivotal time for the Nation and the Corps.

As Commandant, Gen Gray shaped the Corps’ warfighting philosophy and professional military education in comprehensive ways that prepared the Marines for the 21st Century. The approach to “leading by example” expressed by this tough, thinking warrior was developed over a career spanning enlistment in 1950, service as a infantry Marine and reconnaissance NCO through commissioning, command at every level, from the Corps’first signals intelligence unit and later 1st Radio Battalion in Vietnam to Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic and IIMEF, and ultimately to the Commandancy.

In retrospect, the ability to execute much of what wouldfollow for the Corps throughout the 1990s and into the new century, from victory in DESERT STORM to the concepts of the “Three-Block War” and from “The Strategic Corporal” to the hard-won battlefield successes of nearly seventeen years of continuous operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, can be traced back to Gen Gray’s initiatives.

Maneuver Warfare

When asked about the movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s that led to the development of the Corps’ warfighting philosophy and doctrine based on maneuver warfare, Gen Gray was clear about the “bottom-up” approach to affecting this kind of change in the Corps’ thinking.

“It was very clear coming out of Vietnam that we had to make some changes to our thought process about warfighting. No question about our history- our history was so great. No question about the value of the individual Marine or anything like that. One of the great tricks trying to get some of these things done by those of us who wanted to see some change, and there were many, but the art of really getting it done was to get it done from the bottom up within the context of the situation. You have a lot of senior people, for example, who don’t like change. You had to do this in such a way as not to alienate them because it doesn’t do the Marine Corps any good to have that kind of division. You have to preserve a sense [of] one Corps going forward. And so İt was very difficult. That’s why in the 70s and 80s, particularly in 1981 through 1986, we opted to to try to bring the new thought process of warfighting into being from the ground up instead of developing doctrine and going through all of the layers and challenges of bureaucratic thinking, staffing, and having papers approved at multiple levels. When you do that, you can have a lot of people who didn’t believe İn İt and a lot of dissent, all that kind of thing. We went the other way. The interesting thing was that we really gained “disciples” through exercises and application because the approach really worked in practice. This practical discussion of what really works was more than theory like Col John Boyd’s “OODA” loop, and this is what some people have missed in the way the change really came about.

“There were examples when wellknown leaders, who in some cases opposed our ideas, changed their mind during field maneuvers. An illustration of what we called recon pull’ instead of command push’ was in 1981 while 8th Regiment was training at Camp Pickett (Virginia) on how to break out of an encirclement. We had the regimental headquarters and one of the battalions reinforced with tanks, reconnaissance, and artillery. The other elements of the regiment were the opposing forces surrounding us with the rest of the tank battalion and recon and other supporting forces. The Regimental S-3, then Maj (later MajGen) Ray Smith, put out reconnaissance teams in a 360-degree type environment, and one of the recon teams reported, ‘Were out here by Checkpoint 16 … There’s nobody here.’ Smith grabbed the radio-we had the PRC-25 radio İn those days-and said, ‘the focus of the main effort is now through Checkpoint 16.’ They escaped the encirclement, and Smith became a believer. Well, when you get a young guy like Smith, who won the Navy Cross İn Vietnam, you’ve won a good guy over and you’re on the right track there.

“Whether İt was a platoon or a regiment, İt was freeplay with an opposing force, and İt was never scripted. You had to use your own reconnaissance to provide your own intelligence and use your own security and your own logisitcs and the like. At every level, the MEF always trained as a MAGTF, and we came to be known as “the Carolina MAGTF.’ It was a tremendous time and it was exciting for the young officers and the staff NCOs and the young NCOs because they were allowed to do things. We had already attacked the so-called mistake-free or zero-defect mentality. We said, ‘You know you can’t let people do things and learn without allowing them to make some mistakes.’ Of course we don’t want them to make mistakes, but when we care more about how we look rather than how we are, well that İs careerism and it is the antithesis of what we were trying to do.

“We were also trying to teach our officers and our noncommissioned officer leaders that you need to think one or two levels up the chain of command and be ready to take over at any time. We had talked a good game about that, but we never really practiced it. So we changed and routinely practiced this kind of thing in training. Very important to this is your understanding of the mission two echelons up and, of course, understanding the commander’s intent is crucial. Because that way you can operate on your own under the umbrella of intent without disrupting the whole overall game plan.”

Professional Military Education

Always a strong proponent of self-education and PME throughout his career> as Commandant, Gen Gray made the education of Marines one of his highest priorities. The impact of this focus remains with us today in the Commandant’s Professional Reading List and in the continued world-class caliber of the colleges and schools of Marine Corps University.

“In my own experience, we had learned a lot through reading. Most of what I learned through the years, I learned through reading. You can’t send everybody to school, so reading was a good way to learn. I wanted that for everybody. I said the privates and PFCs should read the Guidebook for Marines. Everybody else has to be in the reading program. And so from lance corporals on up, we had the reading program. And my thought was very simple: what I was trying to do was hook them on reading.

“I wanted to establish Marine Corps University to include non-resident courses for a Warfighting Skill Program, AWS {now EWS), Command and Staff College, and to have a Staff NCO Academy. I looked at what they taught at Fort Leavenworth {U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), and I looked at what they taught at Carlisle {U.S. Army War College) and at Fort McNair {National Defense University), and I paid a great deal of attention to what they were doing at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama {USAF War College). So hand in glove with our thinking through the years was to have a powerful non-resident program and the ability to grant accredited degrees to our graduates. We looked at all of the universities we could find that were involved in what was called ‘alternative non-traditional education’ like Thomas Edison University in New Jersey, Syracuse University, as well as programs at Oklahoma, California, and Florida for ideas on the non-resident programs and regional accreditation.

“Fet me say a bit more about my relationship with Maxwell, which is related to professional reading and the university. We couldn’t have an accredited university because we didn’t have a first-class library at Quantico. We had a small library on the second deck of Breckinridge Hall, the Command and Staff College. I had seen the library at Maxwell, and that was the genesis of the idea for the research center, so I set a ‘task force’ and sent Col Gerry Turley down there to see their facility. Then I approached Representative Ike Skelton and the other people İn Congress to support our research center-“library” has an administrative connotation, and I knew Congress wouldn’t buy that. There were several proponents of military education in Congress at that time, and I worked with them. So I got a lot of backing even though some people thought I knew nothing about Congress.”

In 1989, FMFM 1, now MCDP 1, Warfighting, was first published as the Corps’ capstone doctrine as the result of the bottom-up intellectual “insurgency”that embraced maneuver warfare, spearheaded by Gen Gray. Today, the General Alfred M. Gray Research Center is among the finest military research libraries. It also houses the Corps’ archives and the History Divison of Marine Corps University. MCU is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools to grant graduate degrees with resident, distance for both EWS and CSC; and the Staff NCO Academy has developed into the College of Enlisted Military Education as part of a campaign plan to modernize enlisted PME. This legacy of learning continues to build Marines who are thinking warriors, better prepared for the uncertainty and unknown challeges of future warfare-all thanks to the vision of our 29th Commandant.

>Authors’ Note: Gazette readers can access Col Mary Reinwald’s companion article on Gen Gray in this month’s Leatherneck at www. mca-marines. org/leatherneck.

by BGen William J Bowers

On behalf of Marine Corps University, I want to compliment the Marine Corps Gazette’s editorial staff on the outstanding articles they’ve published recently The Gazette is being true to the spirit in which Gen John A. Lejeune created it: to serve as a forum for new ideas intended to improve our Corps. Several of these recent articles have focused on improving the Marine Corps’ professional military education (PME) system. Our PME system is in a constant state of review and refinement, and we need recommendations from the force to help us develop and deliver the most professional, current, relevant, and challenging curriculum possible in order to prevent stagnancy. The purpose of this letter is twofold: 1) to inform the Gazette’s readers on what we’re doing about many of the excellent ideas raised, and 2) to encourage Marines to keep reading, thinking, writing, and publishing their ideas because, as you’ll see below, they do make a difference.

First, it’s important to note a powerful movement that’s quietly occurring across our Corps that will significantly impact the future of PME: enlisted Marines are demanding, receiving, and exercising a greater role in how our Corps educates Marines. For example, SNCOs authored three of the four articles devoted to improving PME in the March 2018 Gazette. Enlisted Marines submitted more than half of the 41 essays we received for the just-concluded Belleau Wood Centennial Essay Contest and penned two of four winning articles. The days in which SNCOs and NCOs feel “‘intellectually under-nourished” by our Corps’ PME system (as a Staff Sergeant Career Course student told me in fall 2017) are gone. At the start of this academic year, the Commandant challenged us to tap into the intellectual potential of our enlisted Marines-what he called “the unexplored gold mine of our PME system”-and in the spirit of MCU’s founder, Gen Alfred M. Gray, we’re moving out. The College of Enlisted Military Education (CEME) staff will cover these reforms in a separate article, but they’re coming-and fast.

Second, SSgt Matthew P. Petitgout’s March 2018 article, “The Reading List and Quarterly PME,” suggests revamping both the Commandant’s Reading List and Quarterly PME programs to achieve greater educational benefit for Marines. For the Commandant’s Reading List, he suggests “some sort of short answer questions to not only inquire about the information gleaned from the book but to stoke the fire of creative thinking much the way guided discussion does.” This is an excellent idea. MCU can (and shall) create a “lesson card” for each of the six books the Commandant personally selects annually to be read by Marines, and these cards will be used as a vehicle to generate discussions and/or used by unit leaders for writing assignments. For the Quarterly PME program, while we would not advocate making this “mandated training for all units,” we do believe that by creating relevant, valuable, and useful tools, MCU can enhance a unit’s PME program by enabling and empowering leaders to run their own PMEs. Our goal for next year is to publish one case study per trimester (see LLI’s (Lejeune Leadership Institute’s) website at www. usmcu.edu/lh for what we’ve done so far) to emphasize a theme important for our Corps.* Case study leader discussion guides will further enable a small unit leader to guide the conversation so that it contextualizes the lessons in ways important for his unit.

Third, GySgt Jay C. Barnard’s “Educational Value” asks our Corps’ leaders, ” [I] s PME really challenging our [enlisted] members as much as it should?,” lamenting a “[PME] check in the box’ mentality” in which “commanders are not willing to send Marines to receive an irrelevant education.” GySgt Barnard specifically challenges MCU to “consider revising the program of instruction provided to our enlisted Marines” by including such subjects as sociology, psychology, and ethics and studying the dynamics of human behavior. The Commandant and Sergeant Major agree with GySgt Barnard. As he suggests, we will add more “relevant, difficult coursework to the [enlisted] curriculum[s],” but as we desire for all Marines to succeed, we will also provide more resources, such as: 1) communications instructors, 2) expanded opportunities for seminar programs, and 3) improved network access. As noted above, these reforms will be covered in detail elsewhere by the CEME staff but they are coming-fast.

Fourth, SSgt Thomas Maddoxs “The Future of Education is Now” rebuts an article written by an academic questioning the value of online writing classes. SSgt Maddox concludes that “online or distance education works,” and that while professors might not “see” the cross-talk and discussions that occur in a physical classroom, learning takes place virtually via email and chat rooms “in a manner that may be transparent to the professor.” He calls on professors to be “flexible enough in their thinking to adapt to new ideas, methods of teaching, and ways of learning.” Another winning idea. We have actually been talking about some of our distinguished MCU professors offering courses online to Marines across the Corps-why should this expertise stay bottled up aboard the MCU campus? SSgt Maddox’s article tells us it’s tíme to stop talking about it and execute, so that’s what we’re going to do. Next fiscal year, we will begin to offer online courses to Marines across the Corps, and credits will be coming shortly after we complete phase I of elective development. More details will be forthcoming on this initiative.

Fifth, Maj Breck L. Perry s “Reinvigorating Maneuver Warfare Through PME” provides “a model that attempts to reinvigorate maneuver warfare at the battalion level” with a “formalized PME plan.” Maj Perry proposes five lines of effort; an approach, method, and end state to execute the plan; and roles and responsibilities within the battalion to ensure it gets done correctly. He even includes an example six-month PME plan, so he has clearly seen what right looks like. So how can MCU support such a unit PME plan as Maj Perry proposes? By creating and making tools available for Commanders and SNCOs to execute-that’s how.

We’ve covered above how we will create lesson cards for the Commandant’s annual book selections, produce case studies available on the LLI website, and expand opportunities for online learning. We can also help with staff rides by either: 1) making an expert available to travel and conduct the staff ride, or (even better) 2) publishing guidance and expertise on how small unit leaders can do this on their own. We have expertise here, and we will take this task on and post the product on the LLI website.

Sixth, the Marine Special Operations Command Commander and Staff published an article in the January 2018 Gazette calling for measuring Marines’ “ability to think, adapt, and collaborate with allies and partners” by leveraging “time spent in the existing Marine Corps education continuum.” The authors correctly point out that “Marines use many of these skills in educational venues as they interact with classmate peers.” These, again, are excellent points. We have already submitted a waiver to DC, M&RA to write observed fitness reports on our Corps’ doctoral candidates (and have been observing them regularly), and perhaps it’s time to expand this mindset to more of our resident PME students-to include those in CEME. Having observed and/or participated in seminar discussions at every school and having read student papers, there are some students who “stand out” in the areas the MARSOC Marines note. While Faculty and School Directors do typically put some comments on their students’ fitness reports, we’ll get with M&RA and explore ways to more formally document Marines’ student performance in their OMPFs.

In conclusion, the Corps’ Young Turks are once again on the march, and they’re not half-stepping. Moreover, their restless energy and vision is being fueled and nourished by the Commandant, who’s simultaneously telling the Corps’ senior leaders to “Go faster!” This letter explains how MCU is responding to our Marines’ ideas to improve the quality of education we provide to all Marines. We have much vrork to do. We also encourage your feedback on how we’re doing and where we can improve. Finally, we want to encourage Marines to keep reading, thinking, writing, and publishing. As LtGen Victor “Brute” Krulak once wrote:

Progress in military affairs has ever been the product of the curiosity, impatience and iconoclasm of youth. Were this not true we might still be using the phalanx, the ramrod or the hollow square. If young Marines are indeed challenging the status quo I can only declare that they are behaving in the tradition of their forebears, and wish them well.1

Stay after it Marines-we’re listening and executing!

Notes

by Capt Austin Duncan

The MAGTF is the Marine Corps’ principal warfighting organization, a taskorganized. force tailored in size and capability to accomplish any mission across the range of military operations. The Marine Corps Operating Concept, published by HQMC in September 2016, asserts, “The 21st century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach … across five domains-air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.” Currently, MAGTFs of all sizes and capabilities are unable to execute maneuver warfare through combined arms in cyberspace. To prepare for armed conflict in the cyberspace domain, the Marine Corps must stop conceptualizing conflict in cyberspace as a primarily defensive operation, enable MAGTFs with organic cyber capabilities, and demand an extension of cyber authorities to the tactical level in support of MAGTF operations. Should the organization evolve, the 21st century MAGTF can, and will, succeed ?n the cyberspace domain.

The essence of maneuver warfare is conducting both offense and defense, simultaneously and ?ndiscernibly. To date, MAGTFs focus efforts in the cyberspace domain almost exclusively on defense of friendly communications networks and safeguarding information. What MAGTFs lack ?s an offensive capability or striking power. A critical component of any defense is the inclusion of offense, the threat of a decisive counterattack to seize the initiative. Similarly, an effective offense requires defensive characteristics to conceal the main effort and achieve surprise. Offense and defense must co-exist. Despite the recognition of cyberspace as a new domain, the principles of warfighting remain the same. Cyber professionals are not only network defenders, but they must be armed and capable of transitioning from defense to offense, rapidly and unremittingly. The Marine Corps cannot continue to emphasize network defense as the primary focus for MAGTF cyber professionals; it must make a concerted effort to also train and equip cyber warriors on offensive principles in order to gain and maintain the initiative in combat.

MAGTFs require organic cyber capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations in a contested-network environment. MAGTFs are currently unable to effectively operate in cyberspace because of a limited number of cyber personnel, rudimentary equipment, and a lack of intelligence support. Present deficiencies are addressed through reachback agencies or an arduous request process for specialized support from the newly created Cyber Mission Force. These shortterm fixes are not viable solutions for a forward deployed MAGTF operating in contested-network environments ?n the 21st century, especially against a potential near-peer adversary. Untimely support requests, technological restrictions on connectivity and bandwidth, and inherent security risks while communicating with a reachback entity represent only a fraction of total concerns. While the cyber mission force may serve as a viable force provider in the near term by attaching support teams, the Marine Corps’ vision must be one which seeks a permanent cyber-force solution inherent within all sizes of MAGTFs. To fight and win ?n the cyberspace domain, MAGTFs require organic cyber personnel and equipment.

The Marine Corps must lead the charge to extend limited cyber authorities down to the tactical level in support of the MAGTF. Critics allege that the inherently sensitive nature and complexity of cyberspace operations require authorities to reside at a very high level. This ?s a valid argument for some operations in cyberspace. However, cyberspace operations span a large continuum of complexity and destruction, ranging from something as benign as network mapping or a denial-of-service attack at a local W?-Fi to catastrophic permanent destruction of critical services. MAGTFs do not require broad cyber authorities, much like they do not retain the authority to indiscriminately engage every target with all fire support assets. MAGTFs simply require limited authorities, captured within clear rules of engagement, to execute cyberspace operations on planned targets and targets of opportunity directly pertaining to the accomplishment of the mission. The Marine Corps must contest senior policy leaders1 current stranglehold of cyber authorities. If left unchallenged, cyber authorities will remain at too high a level for a MAGTF to employ.

The 21st century MAGTF can win in the cyberspace domain. As the Marine Corps’ premier organization, task organized to fight and win across the range of military operations, success in cyberspace is a no-fail mission for the MAGTF. To better prepare for future armed conflict, the Marine Corps must empower MAGTFs to assume the offensive in cyberspace, train and equip them with organic cyber capabilities, and aggressively seek delegation of limited cyber authorities to the tactical level. Evolving the MAGTF by preparing to fight in the cyberspace domain will ensure Marines continue to win in any clime and place.