Archives: Gazette Magazines

by Maj Jacob H. Wilde

In reading LtCol G. Stephen Lauers article “Damn the Torpedoes,” (MCG, Febl9) I struggled to understand how it was possible for a retired Marine infantry officer and current School of Advanced Military Studies professor to write an article supporting the basic tenets of attrition warfare. Such an article would have been completely at home in the Gazette during the mid-1980s with the debates surrounding the Marine Corps’ adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine, but that such antiquated thinking and assumptions about the character of war still exist in the mind of any military professional-to say nothing of one entrusted with the development of our future strategic thinkers-is both baffling and troubling.

LtCol Lauer states that the purpose of his article is to “demonstrate the extraordinary departure of the current Marine Corps Operating Concept from the traditional assumptions of amphibious operations.”1 Missing from this purpose is a recognition that in an ever-changing operational environment, military thinkers must continually question and reassess those traditional assumptions, and accept that they may no longer be valid. Throughout history, various developments periodically conspired to force a complete shift in the manner in which wars were fought. Whether one calls them “military revolutions,” “generations of war,” or some other label for classification, the fact remains that each brought a paradigm shift in the baseline assumptions and conceptualization of war. Those organizations willing and able to adapt to the new paradigm won and survived. Those unable or unwilling to adapt did not. The recognition that the character of war is in the midst of another paradigm shift is absolutely necessary if the United States is to retain its place in the world and succeed in its future engagements.

To defend his position, LtCol Lauer builds his argument on several indefensible assumptions. In the exposition of his first point, he argues that the British failed at Gallipoli because “the landing force lacked the land superiority to win decisively against numerically superior military forces of the Ottoman Empire.”2 A careful study of the failures at Gallipoli reveals that the relative lack of combat power was far from the decisive factor in the failed contest for Gallipoli. In fact, Lieutenant General Stop ford enjoyed a ten-to-one local numerical superiority for two full days at Suvla Bay.3 Had he attacked aggressively with the force he had, there is little question that he could have cut the peninsula in two and established a foothold to expand the lodgment ashore. Rather than an underwhelming force strength, it was weak and unimaginative leadership and a failure to press the attack inland that brought the Gallipoli campaign to its disastrous end.

The author derides the Ellis Group’s emphasis on expanding the concept of combined arms integration to include information and cyber warfare, calling it a

turn from decisive maneuver to a multi-domain and philosophical view of warfare that elevates the ephemeral over the tangible, the cognitive over the physical, disruption over destruction.^

Certainly, the author is aware that the Marine Corps’ foundational doctrine, MCDP 1, Warfighting, repeatedly refers to both itself and maneuver warfare as philosophies. Further, a significant number of notable military commanders and theorists have noted and extolled the relevance of the intangible arenas of war as being decisive. LtGen A. A. Vandegrift stated, “Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be heldV Similarly, Napoleon’s oft-quoted belief that “Moral is to the physical as three is to one,” further attests to the decisive nature of seeking victory in the moral and mental realms of human conflict-using every capability available-to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.

Regarding his assertion that the Marine Corps departed from a doctrine of air, sea, and land superiority and turned toward an emphasis on positional advantage to destroy or disrupt the enemy’s cohesion as late as 2014, indicates a complete ignorance of the development of the Marine Corps’ post-Vietnam doctrine.6 In his book, A New Conception of War, Maj Ian Brown explores the debates surrounding the adoption of maneuver warfare, which initially centered on how the Marine Corps could contribute to a NATO fight against the Soviet Union.7 In such a fight it was assumed that as an amphibious force, the Marine Corps would be outnumbered, out-gunned, and out-armored. The solution to this mismatch rested on a concept of mobility, maneuver, and high operating tempo in order to disrupt or destroy the enemy force’s ability to operate as a cohesive whole and enable its piecemeal destruction or incite its surrender. To suggest that this doctrinal concept did not emerge until 2014 is simply incorrect.

The idea that “the infantry is the Marine Corps” demonstrates an apparent misunderstanding of the true strength of the MAGTF and the fundamental purpose of combined arms integration.8 It further demonstrates a failure to recognize the changing character of war and that a more nuanced view of combined arms integration is absolutely necessary for success. Capabilities such as information, cyber, legal, and economic warfare can certainly be employed with significant effect to undermine or destroy an opponent’s center of gravity and erode his ability and will to fight. Nowhere in his article does the author address the possibility that the weapons and capabilities available to America’s near-peer opponents might prevent a landing force from even arriving at the operational area intact and retaining some modicum of surprise. The author’s conclusion that, “The Marine Corps has acquiesced into the sliding loss of its naval character and the irrelevance of any naval roots,” when the MOCclearly identifies the integration of the naval force as one of its five critical tasks is also baffling.9

Lastly, the author fails to clarify the conditions under which a massive amphibious operation might be employed as he describes. What strategic objective would it seek to accomplish? What use is a massed ground combat force against an enemy whose warfighting ethos is based in Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong-a lesson the U.S. failed to learn in Vietnam? Would the U.S. potentially seek the complete overthrow of a near-peer state, or is it more likely that the amphibious force might be used for more limited objectives, such as deterring or countering actions that threaten regional stability or the interests of the U.S. and regional partners? Without ties to strategic assumptions or objectives, such a concept exists solely for its own benefit-a product of what Chuck Spinney refers to as “incestuous ampliThe fi cation”-and is dangerously detached from reality.10

What LtCol Lauer essentially advocates is a return to the ‘”‘glory days” of World War II: The days when large forces of aggressive and disciplined Marines and Soldiers charged the beaches and wrestled terrain from the enemy by raw mass and firepower-and died by the thousands doing so. At a time when 71 percent of American youth are ineligible for military service of any kind, the prospect of wasting the lives of the narrow band of young people that are both willing and able to serve is unconscionable and self-defeating.11 Furthermore, the assumption of fighting on enemy soil far from home automatically limits the U.S.’ ability to introduce a numerically superior force ashore, particularly in an environment of contested sea and air control. The proliferation of sensors, unmanned vehicles, and other emerging technologies means that the U.S.’ reliance on the “few and exquisite” platforms required to support the author’s conception of amphibious war falls fíat against competitors arming themselves with “small, many, and smart” platforms that sidestep American strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities.12 Not only is the cost imposition upon the United States in such an engagement wholly unsupportable, but the unacceptable risk for which the author denigrates the MOC is significantly greater under his own operational conception.

Ultimately, the author builds his argument on an outdated conceptual framework and a set of assumptions about maritime operations that fails to recognize the changing character of war. It does not address the threats that emerging technologies and methods pose to American forces, capabilities, and interests. It further fails to recognize the capabilities that those same emerging technologies provide to U.S. forces as a means of exploiting maneuver and combined arms integration in new domains beyond the traditional land, sea, and air of the physical realm. This is dangerously regressive thinking. Drawing upon history is only valuable if the correct lessons are learned, and improvements at fighting the last war do nothing to improve the chances of victory on a wholly new and different battlefield.

by GySgt Neil D. McCoy

Let’s Start with Some Questions. We invite you to try something today. Whether you are in the field or at the office, ask one of your subordinates, peers, or superiors this question, How well do we train our junior Marines? We determine that most answers will come back as “pretty well.” Now ask this: How well do we educate them? Before one attempts to answer this question, let us review the meaning of education. Military education is an integral part of tactics and the operational art. Education removes the need for simple checklists and “canned” solutions. It enables commanders to place constantly changing situations on and off the battlefield into the larger context of military history, theory, and behavior in combat. The ability to contextualize and think logically under the rigors of combat will lead to creative and innovative solutions to the problem. Knowing this, the answer to this question by many would most likely be “not that well.” We are convinced that, in this respect, we repeatedly fall short. How much longer are we willing to accept this?

With the current educational construct, enlisted Marines are only required to attend approximately 40 weeks of technical or “educational” schooling throughout a career of 20 years. If the Marine completes only one enlistment of four years, that number is reduced to twelve weeks if the Marine is promoted to sergeant and attends Sergeants Course. All-in-all, the maximum amount of schooling an enlisted Marine will receive from the Marine Corps in a period of twenty years equates to ten months. This does not even equal one tour at the Expeditionary Warfare School that officers attend. How then can we expect our enlisted Marines to be conversant in Marine Corps doctrine and maneuver warfare? How can we expect them to speak a common language (doctrinal language) throughout the Marine Corps if we do not spend the required or necessary time to debate and discuss it? Most PME schools give only an introduction to MCDP 1, Warfighting1 by reading and discussing chapter one of the first book. There are nine total doctrinal publications, and most Marines are not even aware of publications such as Planning, Logistics, Command and Control, and Intelligence.2 Again, I ask how can we expect Marines across all the MOS to speak on common ground during combat operations without having first discussed these documents? This article addresses how our current enlisted educational system both in the Operating Forces and the institutional system is in need of desperate improvement.

Before we attempt to answer these questions in new ways, let us first reflect on it from a historical perspective. We must revisit a time of significant transition in terms of war fighting doctrine, a time where these questions were dissected and discussed by some of the brightest minds the military has ever seen. At the end of the Vietnam War, a small group of mostly company grade officers identified the need to readdress how Marines think, fight, and win wars. Together with the help of a number of civilians, these officers created our waffighting philosophy and doctrine: maneuver warfare. During this time, some of the greatest work on the subject of maneuver warfare was being written, published, discussed, and debated. Examples of this include, The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Patterns of Conflict, The Dynamics of Doctrine, the OODA Cycle, and FMFM 1, Warfighting.3 Maneuver warfare requires Marines at all levels to use their minds in pursuit of achieving their respective missions. The Marine Corps, unfortunately, has placed great importance on only educating officers. For instance, all officers spend six months at TBS. This is not their boot camp, (OCS is) this is six months of training and education. When done, they continue to their follow-on MOS school. Furthermore, it is time we change this, and it is not a matter of wanting to change: we must. For evidence we need only look at today’s highly complex challenges and ever-adapting enemies. Both Expeditionary Force 2D and the Squad Leaders Development Program agree with us on this point. Although the Squad Leaders Development Program is in its early stages, the Marine Corps has identified the need to spread this same construct to all MOSs. Imagine a platoon where not only the lieutenant, but all the unit leaders spoke the same language in regard to our warfighting philosophy, doctrine, techniques, and tactics. But how do we get there, and is it even possible?

We absolutely determine this is possible. We start by immersing our junior Marines in our warfighting philosophy. “Free maneuver has to become a way of life, a state of mind,” Gen Alfred M. Gray, our 29th Commandant, once said. A way of life or state of mind does not simply start after attending a month-long course. It must be present at the beginning of a Marines career and reinforced throughout. So we must begin at recruit training.

Start at the Start: A New Kind of Recruit Training

At boot camp, junior Marines should become highly familiar with the ideas presented in our doctrinal publications, particularly Warfighting, Tactics, and Marine Corps Operations2 Recruits do not necessarily need to read the MCDFs. They can instead go through the excellent MCI Warfighting Skills Program f which the Marine Corps used in the 1990s but has since {and inexplicably) abandoned. This introduction to our beliefs and theory of war will initiate the development of critical thought. The young recruit may not fully grasp the concept of the entire texts, but that is fine to begin with. Thoughts will begin to form. Conversations will take place. Debates will emerge. Senior drill instructors and series commanders can present simple decision-making exercises that draw out the core ideas of maneuver warfare and ethical values of the Marine Corps. This will allow the recruit the opportunity to speak his thoughts and facilitate a better understanding of the subjects. It will be the starting point to get the ideas into Marines, that these publications can guide us through our quest to become a more effective and efficient warfighting institution.

As the recruit graduates and earns the title, “Marine,” the School of Infantry (SOI) -whether it be the Infantry Training Battalion or Marine Combat Training-could set aside time for follow-on maneuver warfare-themed guided discussions and exercises. At this point, the Marine will now have a rudimentary understanding of the science and art of war, but an understanding nonetheless. The Marine will be able to take this understanding and put it to work immediately in their unit. To get here, we must allow recruits and SOI students to openly speak their minds. Instructors, in turn, must actively listen with appropriate verbal and nonverbal responses, giving proper feedback and acceptance, all while remaining nonjudgmental. Of course, the focus of SOI should remain on the technical skills and the science of war, but discussions of doctrine and maneuver should be actively pursued when the time allows.

The implementation of this education throughout the entire enlisted ranks in the Marine Corps, in any MOS, must be a priority. There are many reasons why infantry and noninfantry Marines should be well-versed in our doctrinal publications and maneuver warfare. Infantry alone cannot be successful in war without the assistance of supporting agencies such as fire support, aviation, and logistics. Focus of effort {Schwerpunkt), that is the understanding and implementation of, is essential in maneuver warfare. A commander must understand this to establish the unit that will achieve the decision in that phase of the battle and must apply all support necessary to do this. If all Marines understood this at generally the same level, ground commanders would be able to work more efficiently together to focus all combat power in accordance with commander s intent. This understanding will further increase the longevity of the support and supported relationship.

At this point, some readers may think that, while this sounds all well and good, we need Marines who practice instant and willing obedience to orders. We teach our junior enlisted Marines that such obedience is key to mission accomplishment. But, at what point does this idea become irrelevant or even dangerous? We argue that on today’s battlefield that such unthinking obedience can cause its own chaos, uncertainty, and friction. A Marine who has neither the ability nor the will to analyze a problem or understand the purpose of an order through implicit communications can be just as dangerous as the enemy. Furthermore, immediate obedience to orders inherently stifles boldness. Let us be clear, we do not want Marines to question every order. Rather, if we want our Marines to practice boldness and take the initiative, we must first develop their thought process, which will allow the understanding of the situation as a whole. This will then naturally temper boldness with sound judgment. In doing this, we encourage understanding of the “why” behind orders, which leads to immediate obedience to orders through implicit communication.

Education in the Marine Corps as dictated by MCDP 1 should be three tiered: the education establishment, the commander, and the individual.7 First, the professional schools of the Marine Corps should focus not only on the technical skills required in that specific field, but also the application of the art of warfare that is appropriate to that specific rank of Marine. Schools must not be completely filled with the memorization of facts and knowledge regurgitation. A portion of the curriculum may call for classes of this type, but they must also encourage discussion, sound judgment, and decisionmaking exercises. Second, commanders must consider it essential to their job as leaders to expand upon the baseline of education received at the professional establishments. Junior leaders must be seen as a direct reflection of their commanders. This expansion can be done through free play field exercises, terrain walks, supervised reading programs, map exercises, wargames, decision-forcing cases, or any other creative way that will facilitate learning. Lastly it is the responsibility of the individual Marine to self-educate and dedicate the time to studying military history and theory. MCDP 1 states:

Self-directed study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintaining physical condition and should receive at least equal time.

Conclusion

Yesterday’s Marines already identified the importance of this education for our officers years ago. We are now at another point where this education has become just as important for the enlisted Marine. Aligning ourselves with Expeditionary Force 21, and preparing our Marines for disaggregated operations throughout the world, we simply must extend this education of maneuver warfare and study of Marine Corps doctrine to our enlisted Marines. As William Lind said in The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, “We must return to personnel management as explained by MCDP l,”8 and carefully select those commanders and operations officers who will advocate this type of education and training in the Fleet Marine Force and the school system. With the right men and women in the right positions, those who truly believe and understand maneuver warfare, can strive for a more effective decentralized command, which will allow our team leaders, squad leaders, section leaders, and platoon sergeants the freedom necessary to analyze the situation and implement smart decisions on and off the battlefield. This thought process and ability to make decisions is vital to success in the asymmetric wars we fight today.

by Mie Augier & Maj Sean F.X. Barrett

“[P]eople are more important than systems,”‘

-LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, Marine Corps Gazette, September 1983 2

Following seventeen years of war in Afghanistan and. Iraq, the Marine Corps is in the process of turning its focus to the “reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” with “revisionist powers,” as directed by former Secretary James N. Mattis’ National Defense Strategy.2 The Marine Corps will be forced to confront this new security paradigm with a force that has increasingly little combat experience, especially among its company grade officer and NCO ranks. Given the enormity of these challenges, including the “increasingly complex global security environment,”3 the Marine Corps will benefit from looking at its own history in order to inform how it will confront this future operating environment. While today’s siren song of technology, weapons systems, and artificial intelligence promises quick and clean solutions,^ this article notes that seemingly radical change is oftentimes messy, surprisingly gradual, and attempts to nudge the pendulum back toward the idea that people matter most. This emphasis is consistent with important aspects and people in Marine Corps history, especially regarding maneuver thinking. In particular we draw on the post-Vietnam intellectual renaissance in the Marine Corps, which emphasized the development of critical thinking skills and professional military education under the leadership of Gen Alfred Gray, as a way to inspire a reinvigoration of strategic thinking and education to meet the challenges and uncertainty of the future.

Critical Thinking, PME, and Maneuver Warfare

After the decades-long Vietnam war effort, the United States faced great challenges, including a great power competition with the Soviet Union, a burgeoning terrorist threat, an inflationravaged economy, and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force.3 Military thinkers were again beginning to question the future of the Marine Corps and the need for an amphibious capability in the Nuclear Age.6 The quality of the Marine officer was also challenged. In 1978, William Lind, who would become an influential member of the maneuver warfare movement, wrote a critique of Marine officers- observing the lack of new tactical or operational concepts introduced in the Gazette, which he attributed to an inadequate knowledge of theory and history and a promotion system that did not emphasize theoretical ability.7 He was also critical of how unwilling some senior officers were to adapt to the changing security environment. In the face of such challenges, the Marine Corps began the long march toward the development of the maneuver warfare thought process.

The maneuver warfare movement partially traces its roots to Vietnam in the 1960s. Body count strategies, centralized decision making unable to cope with fluid battles, and inadequate doctrine led to the early adoption of maneuver warfare tenets on the battlefield and created a burning desire for change among junior members of the officer corps following the war.8 Gen Gray proved instrumental in the development of multiple hardware programs, such as the LCAC, V-22 Osprey, HMMWV, and the light armored vehicle, which increased the Marine Corps’ mobility on the battlefield and facilitated its adoption of maneuver thinking/theory.^ However, Gen Gray never lost sight of the primacy of the individual Marine and his bias for action as the basis of maneuver warfare.

Based on this mindset, Gen Gray took a bottom-up approach to implementing maneuver warfare, notably as CG, 4th MAB, the Marine Corps Development & Education Command, and 2d MarDiv. In addition to tinkering with task organizations and increasing the mobility and firepower of Marine GCEs, Gen Gray began to combat the anti-intellectual current in the Marine Corps at the time by making reading and serious self-study an expectation. For example, as CG, 2d MarDiv, he consolidated a packet of literature on maneuver warfare for his Marines to read,10 activated a “professional study group,”11 and established a Maneuver Warfare Board to act as a clearinghouse for spreading ideas on maneuver warfare.12 Additionally, during his rime at Quantico, after working-hours debates-wherein the merits of a given idea and not the rank of the holder mattered-were commonplace.13 This enthusiasm for ideas enabled Gen Gray to recruit Marines to come work for him at the Doctrine Center in Quantico, which helped create momentum for maneuver ideas.1″1 At Lejeune, he consistently fielded requests to join the 2d MarDiv. The Marines knew they were creating something which inspired them to relish the challenge.13

As part of this, Gen Gray was determined to make his leaders and junior Marines think. During after-action reviews, for example, he was more concerned about why a Marine did what he did {and what he was thinking about it) than whathe did.16 In continually challenging his Marines in command post and field exercises, which emphasized “free play” instead of scripted scenarios, he let his Marines discover the merits of the maneuver philosophy first-hand.17

The creation of an open and collaborative environment that broke down traditional notions of hierarchy was essential to nurturing critical and creative thinking. A tireless operational critic, Gen Gray insisted on these after-action reviews following wargame and field or command post exercises, during which discussions took place without rank insignia being visible, thus encouraging open dialogue and emphasizing the merit of ideas over rank.18 Additionally, even though outside of Gray’s immediate purview, maneuver warfare discussion groups at Camp Pendleton- inspired by those at Lejeune-insisted on participants, regardless of rank, referring to one another as “Sir,” thus placing a similar emphasis on the merit of ideas.17 The conceptual debates in the Gazette, also central to the eventual organizational embrace of maneuver thinking, were not inhibited by a deference to rank either.20

The emphasis Gen Gray placed on ideas and understanding the need for fresh inputs involved non-Marines as well, leading to an eclectic mix of reform minded politicians, military theorists, staffers, and Army officers who joined forces with the Marine maneuverists.21 For example, a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, fighter pilot, and influential military theorist, John Boyd, inspired a generation of Pentagon reformers with his broad perspective on warfare encapsulated in his famed “Patterns of Conflict” lecture.22 Gen Gray and other influential Marine maneuverists, such as Col Mike Wyly, invited Boyd to speak to their Marines, beginning in the early 1980s.23 William Lind, a legislative aide to Senators Robert Taft, Jr. and Gary Hart, proved to be another key contributor to the debate and the conceptual development of maneuver warfare. He was a frequent contributor to the Gazette and initially met Gen Gray at a seminar at Carlisle Barracks in the mid-1970s. Though Lind was known to be an iconoclast at times, Gray was willing to speak with anyone who had ideas and wanted to help.24 Additionally, inviting outsiders to contribute helped avoid the deleterious impact of becoming a closed system while fostering innovative thought. It also embodied one of the most important roles of education; to help broaden minds-helping students learn how to think about complex issues (not what to think) and reinforcing the importance of learning as a lifetime activity.

The intellectual underpinnings and arguments in maneuver thinking {represented, for instance, in the Gazette debates and Boyd’s briefings) fit well with Gray’s maneuver exercises and broader operational philosophy and experience. This created a synergy that enabled him to nudge the entire organization toward a maneuver warfare philosophy that incorporated people {e.g., study groups), organizational processes {e.g., exercises), and thinking (e.g., core organizational documents, especially AMAM /).

When he became Commandant, Gen Gray institutionalized the intellectual renaissance undergirding maneuver warfare by revitalizing the Command and Staff College curriculum and faculty, publishing a reading list for all Marines (enlisted and officers), revising the Marine Corps Institute professional education curriculum, introducing a Professional NCO and SNCO Education Training System, and securing funding for the construction of a credible library and research center. Gray’s vision was to consolidate “all of the educational type institutions in the Marine Corps under the broad umbrella of such a Marine Corps University”-an institution which soon celebrates its 30th anniversary.23

Success on the battlefield in Operation Desert Storm was in many respects due to maneuver warfare.26 Gen Gray proved to be a transformational leader not because of any technology or hardware he championed, but rather because of the intellectual renaissance he led, which empowered the institutions most precious asset: the individual Marine. As Rep Ike Skelton, (D-??) noted, having observed the Marine Corps’ transformation under Gray’s leadership: “The Marine Corps, thanks to General A1 Gray, did a complete 180-degree turnaround, which today makes us very, very proud of the Marine Corps, not just in its graduate staff level, but now with its War College.”27

General Gray s Educational Vision and the Future

Ike Skelton was a keen observer of the military and was in charge of the Military Education {“Skelton”) Panelin the late 1980s. He believed the education of officers was a lifelong process and studying military history was central to it: a vision he shared with Gen Gray.27 Gen Gray’s maneuver warfare transformation had important educational underpinnings and elements too.

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy predicated on competent leadership, decentralized command, and empowering young leaders to adapt to changing circumstances and generate a faster operational tempo by making and implementing decisions consistently faster than the enemy.30 Gen Gray, who found greater kinship with Sun Tzu than Clausewitz, remarked, “But I believe in the indirect approach. I believe in the absolute essentiality of using the subtleties of war and thinking as part of the major game plan.”31

As such, Gen Gray’s intent for the Marine Corps PME system was to teach military judgement, not material to be memorized.32 History, Gray noted, should be used to teach such judgment, “not to make academic historians or simply teach facts.”33 He insisted that lesson plans enabling learning objectives, and terminal learning objectives are “inappropriate for education,” and that it is inherently impossible to “objectively” or “quantitatively” measure an art.34

Imbuing this sense of judgment will become increasingly important to a Marine Corps with increasingly less combat experience. The first President of Marine Corps University, then-BGen Paul K. Van Riper, observed:

I often noted in my two years at Quantico that the primary Weapon” that officers possess remains their minds … [and] that books provide the “ammunition” for this weapon … I wanted to impart a simple lesson: a properly schooled officer never arrives on a battlefield for the first time, even if he has never actually trod the ground, if that officer has read wisely to acquire the wisdom of those who have experienced war in times past.33

Such vicarious experiences impart wisdom and military judgment and enable “practitioners of war to see familiar patterns of activity and to develop more quickly potential solutions to tactical and operational problems”-one of the first principles of maneuver warfare.36 He eagerly embraced the case study method as most conducive to instilling such judgment and critical thinking skills in our Marines.

The importance of critical thinking is not only crucial to fostering initiative on the battlefield, but also in managing change (e.g., through articulating our hardware needs to Congress). Congressman Mike Gallagher, who served as an intelligence officer in the Marine Corps for seven years and now sits on the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, observed that traditional arguments for seapower and the defense budget have fallen flat, necessitating a new, more compelling story identifying what the future fleet will do and how it will differ from today’s.37

Hope for the Past, Lessons from the Future

Throughout Gray’s strategic leadership of the Marine Corps, thinking and education remained central; his awareness of people, ideas, and organizations made him unusually skilled in leading the change toward an organization embracing maneuver warfare. This did not happen overnight, but over time, changes were gradually built into “how the organization was thinking” and fighting. Though a seemingly radical transformation, it was quite incremental and evolutionary in nature. A detailed examination of his leadership and the organizational transformation will give useful insights into how to create organizational changes in the future, but here we just point to a few implications in light of current debates regarding PME.

Last April, Under Secretary of the Navy, Thomas Modly, convened an Education for Seapower (E4S) Study to “develop a series of observations and recommendations for knowledgebased continuing learning throughout the naval services.”38 In full recognition that there are no simple solutions, a few observations from the Marine Corps’ post-Vietnam revival that may inspire future changes are:

* The centrality of leadership; inspire and understand; do not dictate or prescribe. This can be done by enabling forums that foster creative and innovative discussions and thought. In contrast to this way, requirements are oftentimes a symptom of the abdication of leadership. When Gen Gray appeared befor1e the Skelton Panel, he noted, that the joint PME requirements in the Gold wat er-Nichols Act not only told the Service Chiefs what to do, but also how to do it, which took away their flexibility and was inimical to the ideals of mission-type orders.39

* Quality over quantity. More requirements can easily lead to a box-checking mentality and a creeping careerism, which Gen Gray disliked.40

* A greater appreciation for opportunity costs. Gen Gray made thinking a priority. Today, however, constantly increasing requirements and administrative matters can make us victims of a “tyranny of the inbox” syndrome. Retired U.S. Army MG Robert Scales often remarked that the DOD is “too busy to think.” It is easy to become too focused on what is seemingly urgent rather than what is important.

* Fresh input. In the spirit of the E4S Study and Gen Gray’s emphasis on thinking, judgment, and education, the Marine Corps (as well as other Services) might find inspiration in how other professions and their educational institutions have transformed and improved in the past.41

Finally, the importance of the evolutionary nature of seemingly dramatic changes. When asked about whether the establishment of permanent MAGTF headquarters, the maritime prepositions squadrons, and the LAV battalions were “radical changes” that heralded in a “new Corps,” LtGen Trainor responded,

I’m not sure I’d categorize the changes as ‘radical/ nor is a ‘new’ Corps emerging. … What you are witnessing is the fruit of a great deal of past thought and effort. Its evolutionary progress rather than revolutionary change.4^

Enduring organizational changes takes a significant amount of time and effort. It promises to get messy; the road to progress is rarely easy or straight.

by LtCol David W. Baas

In guidance preceding the 2025 planning effort, the Commandant offered a severe warning: “Failure to change the shape and form of the Service will condemn it to irrelevance.”1

The 2025 effort has imparted change-such as structure and naming conventions-under the umbrella of broad Service concept documents. However, the clear vision and detail required for unified evolution of the major subordinate elements of the MAGTF toward a cohesive, modern force-one that adapts to the future operating environment (FOE) while remaining true to our maneuver warfare roots-has not followed. As subordinate plans develop, they often lack the clarity of vision and practical detail required to drive unity of effort across disparate occupational fields.

The GCE needs a clear vision-the “ends” to unify force development efforts. This article intends to add to the dialogue around ívhat must change about the GCE and why. In considering these questions, we must also recognize an important constant: the unchanging “nature” of ground conflict and the role of the GCE within the MAGTF. A clear vision informs force development efforts of other MAGTF elements-just as a dulled vision provides little practical insight and leaves room for wasted or uncoordinated effort and expense. As the 2025 effort is effectively into execution, our planning horizon must expand. This vision considers our unchanging nature and what is presupposed of the FOE to arrive at a series of mutually supporting conditions: the “ends” for a 2035 GCE to meet the likely missions, address the premier problems, and remain relevant to the MAGTF and the joint force.

The Unchanging Nature of Ground Conflict and the GCE

As we assess the implications of the FOE, it is clear the character of the GCE must adapt and evolve. However, any changes must enhance, not compromise, our ability to thrive within the unchanging nature of ground conflict. The GCE serves as the “base” unit within a MAGTF and must be an expert practitioner of maneuver warfare. In concert with the other MAGTF elements, the GCE must consistently take action to generate and exploit a relative advantage over the adversary as a means of effectively accomplishing the mission.2 The unchanging goal in conflict is “to diminish enemy freedom of action while improving our own-so the enemy cannot cope with events as they unfold, while we can.”3

The GCE interacts with populations, terrain, and conflict, across the spectrum in a direct and personal manner. It must embody recognized, time-tested fundamentals of ground conflict:^

* Maintaining situational awareness.

* Exploit known enemy gaps.

* Control key terrain.

* Dictate the tempo of operations.

* Neutralize the enemy’s ability to react.

* Maintain momentum.

* Act quickly.

* Exploit success.

* Maintain flexibility.

* Be audacious.

* Provide for the security of the force.

Any change must enhance these fundamentals to retain our ability to generate a faster relative tempo, seek out and shatter an adversary’s cohesion, and destroy their “ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole.”5

The Projected Future Operating Environment

With the unchanging nature of ground conflict reaffirmed, an understanding of key trends presupposed of the FOE provides the “why” for evolving the character of the GCE. The following trends incorporate common aspects and challenges from multiple joint and Service documents for the 2035 timeframe.6 They should not be viewed in isolation, as the GCE will likely be required to operate within and across several at any given time.7

Complex conflict in complex environments. Adversaries have learned to leverage complex environments-those with physical and cognitive stressors that also limit the effectiveness of technology- to their advantage, reducing any fight to infantry alone.8 This includes jungle, mountain, cold weather, and the urban megacity. Rapid growth of megacities coupled with demographic shifts will stress traditional social norms, resources, and infrastructure-setting the stage for imbalance, unrest, and potential conflict.9 The “three-block” war is likely to evolve to a “three-floor war” where actions occur among an intermingling of combatants and non-combatants in high-rise buildings within one block of a crowded urban littoral slum.10 Conflict will be a “multi-agency fight across multiple lines,” spanning sectarian, ethnic, health, or other issues.11 Destruction from extreme weather, natural disasters, desertification, resource shortages, and migration of distressed populations all increase the likelihood that water, food, and energy issues will accompany regional instability and crisis.12

Increasingly contested maritime domains. The increasing “congested, contested, and competitive” character of the maritime global commons will revitalize the importance of the GCE in naval actions to ensure freedom of navigation and commerce.13 This pits the value and utility of amphibious forces against the proliferation of state and non-state anti-access and area denial capabilities. Additionally, new areas of contention may emerge-such as control of Arctic waters. ^

Technology proliferation and evolution of employment. From the global commons to “high tech warfare at knifepoint range”13 in an urban three-floor war, technology proliferation must be leveraged to enable and streamline- not overburden-the ability of GCE echelons to sustain a relative advantage over adversaries. Standing efforts to evolve situational awareness, precision lethality, and force protection are joined by signature detection/management, manned/unmanned teaming (MUM-T), preventative health and expeditionary medicine, and threats from proliferated chemical/biological agents. Signature is an area of particular urgency. To adapt, ground forces must manage signatures across all aspects of contact, from visual to electromagnetic-as well as understand and be able to exploit the signatures of an enemy.

Information as a weapon. In balance with signature management, the GCE must become more effective and efficient at leveraging information networks to establish conditions, achieve specific objectives, or create and exploit opportunities. This begins with ensuring continuity of our networks through redundancy and defenses “capable of reacting in a highly dynamic environment.” 16 With a protective foundation, global network “connectedness” offers leverage points to observe, orient, and find gaps through which to act- “leaping over” traditional military force to directly influence an adversary via effects on select leadership, audiences, or infrastructure.17 The speed and depth of human connectivity offers a specific challenge to turn the “rallying power of information connectedness”18 from a historically counterproductive force to one that actively supports security objectives.

The 2035 GCE

To establish the desired clear vision and end state, we add consideration of the likely missions the GCE will face in 2035, across three categories:1920

* Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

* Support to extended deterrence, freedom of navigation, and global commons stabilization.

* Military support to foreign partners.

* Crisis response and limited contingency operations.

* Support to Department of State (DOS; Diplomatic Post Reinforcement, non-combatant evacuation operations).

* Support to stabilization (blocking operations/exclusion zones, punitive raids).

* Global commons defense.

* Large-scale combat operations.

* Global maneuver and seizure (power projection to defend interests, seize key terrain/objectives).

* Counterinsurgency and peace enforcement.

To be successful across these missions in the FOE, the 2035 GCE must adapt its character without compromising its nature. Toward this balance, two premier problems must be addressed:

* Evolve intelligence and command and control (C2) to support situational awareness (observe, orient) in complex conflict and terrain, without provoking cognitive overload of small unit leaders, to provide the foundation upon which the battle for relative tempo is won.

* Leverage situational awareness into bold, relentless action through a complementary evolution in maneuver, fires, force protection, and logistics to overcome a sophisticated multi-domain defense-in-depth.

Given our nature, FOE, missions, and problems to be solved, the GCE must focus force development actions toward ten specific conditions that collectively define an end state for 2035 (see Figure 1).

This vision-nine initial complementary conditions enabling a tenth and final condition-İs illustrated via the following three vignettes.

Vignette #1: Support to DOS-Company in Sub-Saharan Africa. Migrants fleeing food and water shortages stress the aging infrastructure of a developing capital city, creating unrest. As outlying camps develop into slums, the population grows to over ten million residents, with migrants increasingly pitted against traditional residents. Clashes over resources, law enforcement, and wages deteriorate the situation. Despite international attention, western nations do not intervene- angering migrants. Extremist groups leverage information networks to import and distribute ideology, gaining influence and radicalizing individuals toward employing violence. As the U.S. Embassy becomes a focal point for protest, the DOS assesses the threat as requiring rapid additional military support.

An expeditionary landing team (ELT), comprised of a rifle company and enablers, reinforces the post while its parent battalion landing team and MEU postures to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance and/ or non-combatant evacuation operations if required. Inserting under cover of darkness, the ELT assumes a defensive posture around two facilities separated by several city blocks. Compatible communications allow the ELT to quickly connect and contribute to overall situational awareness, leveraging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to assess, identify, and track key instigators of violence. Patrolling and numerous disposable sensors expand the situational awareness network as the fire support team (FiST) works with MEU informationrelated capability (IRC) enablers to disrupt the adversary’s ability to rally protests, isolate them from external information, and discredit/distance them from the population. Resupply is received via unmanned logistics systems (ULS) with smaller ULS distributing between the separate facilities. Preventative measures protect Marines from disease while corpsman are able to stabilize and treat serious injuries- providing more time for evacuation or avoiding the need at all.

Condition 1 (situational awareness). Accurate situational awareness is the foundation upon which we generate and sustain a relative advantage over an adversary. Enhancing this begins at the small unit level (company and below) by combining unit leaders capable of understanding a complex, rapidly changing environment with a light, rugged, and simple common tactical picture (CTP) interface. Multiple wargames reinforced the need to provide a CTP down to the lowest echelon possible.21 However, access to excessive and untailored data risks cognitive overload. The interface must enhance the leader’s ability to understand the environment-enabling rapid assessment of situations and the potential to “see the enemy first.”22 Complementary development of disposable low-signature sensors to seed areas will expand the network of information that can be collected, filtered, and interpreted. Consistent with our maneuver warfare foundation, the interface should focus on the small unit first and then expand to higher echelons. Implementing, enhancing, and safeguarding a layered situational awareness network is key toward addressing larger issues such as countering adversary long-range precision fires.

Condition 2 (interoperable communications). Provided the best situational awareness, gaps and inefficiencies in communications degrade our ability to act quickly-allowing the adversary opportunities to recover or preempt our action. Again, wargames point to the need for:

* CTP integration for intelligence, information warfare, fires, and C2 information.23

* Extended range/redundancy in complex terrain by leveraging civilian infrastructure, combat/tactical vehicles, and the use of unmanned (ground/air) communications nodes.24 23

* Interoperability with aircraft, naval forces (ships/landing craft), special operations forces, and DOS security personnel.

* Adjustable electromagnetic signature to manage risk in varying environments.

This condition should also focus at the small unit level first, then expand upward to higher echelons.

Condition 3 (small unit employment of IRC). Rules of engagement or other circumstances may limit our ability to gain advantage over an adversary through physical maneuver or fires until an overt hostile act is committed. IRC employment in this vignette to exploit known gaps and neutralize the adversary’s ability to react is critical for mission success. We must refine the company FiST to provide complementary kinetic/ non-kinetic capabilities in support of maneuver. While IRC may best be provided through missi on-tailored enabler packages, the FiST must have the knowledge, experience, and access to the authorities and equipment to produce the most appropriate effect for the situation.

Condition 4 (sustainment of distributed small units). Meeting this condition encompasses both a reduction in the amount of required sustainment and enhanced means of distribution. In balance with maintaining small unit capabilities, required sustainment may be reduced but never eliminated. Distribution of sustainment by ULS provides promise, with different sizes in a modified hub-and-spoke system from the seabase down to the small unit.26

Condition 5 (enhanced small unit medical coverage). Increasing operating distances and degraded health environments require enhancing preventative and field medical care. Urbanization and proliferation of disease adds to the difficulty of preventative measures as GCE personnel are called upon to operate in “overcrowded urban environments where human waste, garbage, and insects combine with a lack of sanitation,” potentially requiring regional specialization for units to deploy rapidly.27 Once deployed, the traditional concentration of medical capability above the company level necessitates enhancing the ability of line corpsman to provide the “gift of time” through casualty stabilization at or near the point of injury.28 29 Additionally, leveraging ULS to transport medical supplies and evacuate casualties holds significant potential.

Vignette #2: Global Commons Stabilization/Defense-Battalion in South China Sea. Following increasing congestion and competition over resources and territorial rights, adversarial nation threats to restrict freedom of navigation have brought international sanctions and intervention to avoid large-scale conflict. In partnership with allies, an expeditionary advanced base (EAB) is established by a special purpose MAGTF centered on an infantry battalion to retain the base and conduct stabilization and defensive activities in support of freedom of navigation. The battalion is organized to project company ELTs with small boats, assault support aviation, amphibious combat vehicles (with surface connectors), ISR and IRC enablers, and long-range precision fires. Should conditions escalate, the battalion is equipped for interoperability with joint forces that could be deployed to the area.

A punitive raid is directed to counter adversary emplacement of an anti-ship cruise missile system in a critical international shipping area. Two littoral combat ships and a submarine support an ELT raid via small boats. The fire support coordination center aligns IRCs to isolate the target while concurrently employing multi-signature decoys, sensor swarms, and long-range fires to identify and exploit adversary gaps and protect the ELT-maintaining the initiative throughout the operation. Two additional ELTs posture (one air assault, one in amphibious combat vehicles aboard connectors) as an alternate raid force or a means to reinforce.

Condition 6 (reconnaissance by force: sensor swarms and decoys). Achieving a relative advantage over a sophisticated adversary requires GCE echelons to gain and maintain contact while simultaneously reducing or masking their own signature. In balance with our ISR/C2 demands, we will likely only manage signature-never eliminate it. Therefore, we must work, as we gain and maintain contact, to degrade the effectiveness of the enemy’s decision cycle through multi-signature decoys and cheap, disposable sensor swarms that seek to activate and overwhelm adversary ISR and strike networks.30 This low risk reconnaissance by force will provide gains in information and elicit adversary reactions-exposing gaps through which we can maneuver or enable us to find, fix, and attack high pay-off targets (like long-range fires).

Condition 7 (expeditionary advanced bases and punitive raids). EABs offer a vital role to the GCE-to control key terrain and facilitate access and maneuver, they offer persistent presence while freeing up and reducing risk to valuable naval shipping.31 Raids offer a limited response to hostile disruptions of the commons. Non-traditional naval assets-like an littoral combat ship or submarine-can support audacious low signature maneuver under an umbrella of IRC and kinetic fire support from the EAB. Alternate means of achieving or reinforcing the objective (air assault, heavier surface forces) retains flexibility as circumstances develop.

Condition 8 (enhanced fires and air defense). The GCE must extend the range of kinetic fires to support dispersed and distributed units, fully integrate employment of IRCs into fire support/coordination cells, and contribute to countering adversary air/ unmanned systems. We must refocus on the nature of fires in support of maneuver, employed to destroy when necessary, but primarily to disrupt/obscure and neutralize the enemy’s ability to react effectively to our tempo. Additionally, efforts toward efficient small unit targeting, counter longrange precision fires, and fire support de-confliction within a complex urban environment are needed.32

Vignette #3*’ Global Maneuver and Seizure-Regiment/Division in the Baltics. Following a popular uprising in the eastern portion of a Baltic NATO nation, the initial allied, response pushed through proxy forces to reveal multiple adversary battalion tactical groups (BTG). A Marine division is deployed to destroy the adversarial forces and restore territorial integrity in the dead of winter.

The division employs regimental combat teams (RCTs) conducting complementary infiltration and exploitation operations in the cold weather to seize and maintain a speed/ tempo advantage in relation to the BTG-oriented defense in depth. Decentralized and dispersed action by light and mobile forward infiltration units and heavier mechanized exploitation units enable each RCT to deny enemy effective situational awareness, identify and exploit gaps, and by-pass/ hand-off urban areas to allied/hostnation forces. Sustaining a higher relative tempo and speed keeps attacking echelons ahead of threat long-range fires and allows the RCTs to break up each BTG and neutralize/destroy it at will.

Condition 9 (equip and train for specialized environments). The GCE must equip and train itself to operate across all environments. Adversaries will exploit conditions (jungle, mountain, cold weather, etc.)-as well as chemical or biological weapons-to disrupt our tempo and gain an advantage. While chemical and biological conditions apply uniformly, attempts to train and equip every GCE formation equally for every environment is likely unrealistic. Ensuring readiness may require unit specialization to effectively leverage limited resources.

Condition 10 (modern breakthrough battle). The integration of the first nine conditions culminates to produce this tenth and final condition: a cohesive GCE-base unit of the MAGTF-capable of modern breakthrough battle. Our battalions, regiments, and divisions must be the foremost practitioners of maneuver warfare to counter a sophisticated adversary’s integration of technology within a multi-domain defense in depth. Dispersed tactical maneuver must still behave “like water,” infiltrating to seek out weaknesses via multiple thrusts by small units, decoys, and sensors. In combination with fires, these thrusts disorient/disrupt defenders thereby gaining and maintaining the initiative while slowing the enemy’s ability to react. When a gap is identified or created, it must be exploited ruthlessly by subsequent echelons of strength to “unhinge the front” and bring about the collapse of the enemy’s cohesion and ability to resist.33 A 2035 RCT organized for breakthrough battle:

* One infiltration battalion combining sensor swarms, multi-signature decoys, and maneuver companies to seek and aggressively develop gaps through:

* Light MUM-T vehicles to enhance air-transportable low-signature mobility.

ш Longer-range anti-armor weapons.3^

* C2 tools that enable CTP, targeting, IRC enablers, and signature management.

* Two exploitation battalions that maximize mobility, protection, and direct fire/shock effect by mechanizing with armor and managing their signature with regimental IRC support.

* Enhanced fires and air defense to neutralize high payoff targets, disrupt and obscure in support of maneuver, provide counter-battery fires, and counter air/unmanned systems.

* Reconnaissance contributing to situational awareness and deception with decoys and unmanned vehicles operating “like traditional cavalry” to demand/distract enemy attention.33

Conclusion

Success begins for the 2035 GCE with the battle for situational awareness. Our ability to gain and maintain contact while selectively masking our own signature remains essential to reducing the effectiveness of enemy decisions and actions. Illustrative of a sophisticated enemy, the BTG’s primary advantage relies on an ability to find and target slow-moving formations, command posts, or other nodes emanating an electronic signature with long-range systems.36 Building on an unchanging nature in ground conflict and maneuver warfare, we must enhance and evolve the character of our echelons across the conditions described above to produce a 2035 GCE that will outpace our enemy, find and exploit gaps, and close with and destroy through bold and relentless action.

by Majs Joseph Horvath, Erika Teichert, & James Connolly

[As] U.S. dependence on space has increased, other actors have gained access to space-based systems and information. Governments and private sector firms have the ability to launch satellites into space at increasingly lower costs. The fusion of data from imagery, communications, and geolocation services allows motivated actors to access previously unavailable information. This ‘democratization of space’ has an impact on military operations and on America’s ability to prevail in conflict. Many countries are purchasing satellites to support their own strategic military activities. Others believe that the ability to attack space assets offers an asymmetric advantage and as a result, are pursuing a range of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons.1

The MAGTF is impacted by both the adversaries’ ability to attack space assets and the proliferation of capabilities they have access to in the military and commercial sectors. Despite this challenge, Marines must still be able to “shoot, move, and communicate” in order to close with and destroy our enemies, whether with a bayonet or cyberfire. Space operations support them at each step. Within the collections and targeting processes, spacebased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); environmental monitoring (EM), and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) are all used to find, fix, and track a target. When engaging that target through a lethal or non-lethal strike, PNT and satellite communications (SATCOM) are in support, along with ISR for battle damage assessment. When “moving,” Marines are using ISR and EM to understand terrain and weather, as well as PNT for precision navigation. Finally, SATCOM and PNT are necessary to support communications in a distributed, expeditionary environment. Understanding the capabilities of the space domain and operating them whilst being contested is critical to enabling advanced maneuver warfare in the terrestrial and maritime domains. The MAGTF of today does not understand how to take full advantage of spacebased capabilities and is not prepared to operate in a denied, degraded, or disrupted space-operating environment (D3SOE). The Marine space support team concept is designed to address these areas by providing organic, scalable space operations capability in order to increase our lethality, survivability, and operational tempo.

Background and History

The DOD has been involved in space operations since the late 1950s when the United States began launching satellites to provide SATCOM and strategic reconnaissance. Over the next few decades, space capabilities became more complex, spreading throughout our military capabilities and mission areas. Operation DESERT STORM represented a defining moment for space operations where U.S. forces capitalized on precision GPS-enabled navigation and guided munitions, SATCOM, and ISR in order to overwhelm the Iraqi forces with speed and accuracy. This was the first major engagement harnessing the power of space operations capabilities. Throughout the next two decades, the U.S. military continued to further refine these capabilities, benefitting from our overwhelming advantage within the space domain. Meanwhile, our adversaries identified this asymmetric U.S. advantage as a gap in their capabilities. While space capabilities have provided an advantage, the increasing reliance on this asset is a noticeable vulnerability. Adversaries began to aggressively pursue space technologies and capabilities for their own benefit, while also preparing to deny, degrade, and disrupt our use of space. For this reason, space is now considered a warfighting domain and must be treated as such.

Since the early 2000s, the Marine Corps has relied heavily on Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) to provide support at the MEF level. These teams deploy out of the 1st Space Brigade and are comprised of both active and reserve units who provide planning, coordination, and integration of space capabilities. The reality is that while the teams provide a useful capability, their support cannot be guaranteed because they are considered a combatant commander (CCDR) asset. During Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, the Marine Corps was able to leverage these teams on a recurring basis, but there is no guarantee of future support, especially during training and exercises.

The usefulness of the ARSSTs was the impetus to permanently assigning each MEF a Marine Space Operations Officer (MOS 8866) billet in 2012. This billet is located within the fires and effects coordination center (FECC) and was established to provide permanent and organic subject matter expertise. Flowever, there are severe limits in the ability of one individual to provide all necessary functions during 24/7 operations either in training or real-world operations. Furthermore, while the Space Operations Officer’s education (a two year master’s degree) is substantial, there is no training required for the billet.2 The second “space MOS” is the Space Operations Staff Officer (MOS 0540). The Space Operations Staff Officer was originally designed as an additional MOS to add specific space training requirements to necessary billets, usually intelligence- or communications related, but was never intended to be a billet MOS. The courses required to receive this MOS are typically two to four weeks in length; those courses also lack the training received by ARSST personnel. Because of the ever increasing reliance on space capabilities, the introduction of tasks related to operations in the information environment (OIE), and an increasing threat to the space domain, the current model does not provide the ability to integrate space operations across the operational phases or a capability that can “fight tonight.” The MAGTF cannot continue to rely on the ARSSTs as the support is not guaranteed, the ARSST may not arrive for months after the beginning of a conflict, and Army personnel are not as familiar with MAGTF-specific operations. Additionally, the current structure of one Space Operations Officer and two minimally trained (educated) Space Operations Staff Officers at each MEF falls woefully short of meeting the increasing demand signal.

Doctrine and the Warfighting Functions

The Marine Operating Concept states,

“Our ability to successfully execute the concept will depend greatly on the extent to which we have … mastered the implementation of 21st century combined arms as our means to conduct maneuver warfare across all domain….3

In the space domain, these concepts are not limited to the strategic level of warfare. At the operational and tactical levels of warfare, the MAGTF will be impacted by adversaries’ ability to conduct maneuver warfare concepts in the space domain. The MAGTF must understand the threat of the adversaries’ ability to attack space systems and assets. Joint Publication 3-14 (JP 3-14), Space Operations provides doctrine for space operations and was updated in April 2018 with significant changes to highlight the paradigm shift to space as a warfighting domain. According to JP 3-14:

Space operations are those operations impacting or directly utilizing spacebased assets to enhance the potential of the U.S. and multinational partners. DOD space forces are the space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and personnel, or combination thereof, necessary to conduct space operations.4

The primary support to MAGTF operations comes from the space mission areas ofISR, PNT, satellite communications, missile warning, environmental monitoring, and space control. Space situational awareness, satellite operations, space lift, and nuclear detonation detection are largely a focus of the other Services, which acquire, launch, operate, and defend the assets on-orbit. Figure 1 outlines the space operations mission areas and how they support doctrinal warfighting functions. This breadth of support exists across all seven functions to include the newest function: information. The authors and several colleagues developed this table, and though it is not doctrine, it is based on the collective insight and experiences of the Marine space operations community. It is also based largely on a figure in the draft version of JP 3-14 that did not make the version published in early 2018. While the Marine Corps does not own or operate its own spacecraft, Marines are a significant end-user of these systems and have equity in the capabilities provided by all mission areas.

It should be noted that while the Marine Corps considers space operations a supporting function of OIE, this is only one of multiple areas in which the MAGTF leverages space capabilities. JP 3-14 describes the relationship to information as:

providing [Joint Force Commanders] the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information, while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of all military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the end stateri

In this way, space operations and the employment of information environment activities are mutually reinforcing. The Marine Corps Space Operations Concept of Employment reiterates this point very clearly in saying,

Space Operations are considered a core mission of [OIE] in full recognition they enable or support all warfighting functions, MAGTF operations, and other MAGTF capabilities beyond the scope of [OIE].6

A MAGTF Space Operations Officer is primarily focused on supporting the unit’s ability to “shoot, move, and communicate,” in concert with the other functional areas of the operations sections, with a secondary focus on supporting operations in the information environment.

The Marine Space Support Team Concept

After experimentation during recent MEF exercises, the Marine Space Support Team (MSST) concept was developed to fill the requirement for organic and scalable space operations support across the MAGTF. (See MSST drawn box.) The proposed mission statement for the MSST is to plan, integrate, and coordinate spacebased capabilities across all warfighting functions, in support of the MAGTF commander’s requirements. Additional requirements and tasks are as follows (not inclusive):

* Commander’s primary advisor on space operations.

* Develop the appropriate space operations portion of a base operations order or applicable annex. Develop space operational requirements and the space estimate.

* Support a unit’s staff with space operations expertise. Provide space operations analysis and specific products to the staff. Support subordinate elements that do not have embedded space operations officers to ensure proper consideration of space capabilities and operations to the unit.

* Provide situational awareness of the space domain, to include threats to spacebased systems and spacebased threats to the MAGTF. Ensure possible effects of a D3SOE are integrated into staff planning and execution. Recommend specific priority intelligence requirements and/or information requirements to the G-2. Ensure G-6 awareness of electromagnetic interference threats and incidents.

* Plan, integrate, and coordinate U.S. Strategic Command-unique capabilities for SATCOM, PNT, ISR, navigation warfare, MW, EM, and space control capabilities into staff planning.

* Support red team capabilities involving threats to spacebased systems, specifically GPS and SATCOM jamming.

The concept maximizes use of existing structure, while minimizing new costs, as well as utilizing established and proven systems and methods already developed by the joint force. Focused on providing support at the MEF, but adaptable for MEUs or Marine forces, the MSST is simply a collaboration between the G-3 FECC space operations officer, the MEF Information Group (MIG) Space Operations Planners, as well as the G-2, G-6, and related technical specialties (cyber, electronic warfare, and special technical operations). The G-3 FECC and MIG will maintain control of space operations officers within their respective staffs. Marine Forces, U.S. Strategic Command (MARFORSTRAT) has an active duty space operations officer along with its Reserve Individual Mobile Augmentee Detachment of space operations planners. These Marines are trained to support MEF-level MAGTFs and the MSST concept and may provide reach back support and coordination with Strategic Command and other Service component commands, to include the Armys 1st Space Brigade and the Department of the Navy’s Naval Network Warfare Command. The MARFORSTRAT space operations planners may also provide augmentation to the MSST when requested for major operations or exercises.

With appropriate training and systems, the MSST may largely replicate the capabilities of an ARSST, as well as organically support the MEF and provide the fight tonight capability that an ARSST cannot. The MSSŤ can assist with training the MAGTF on advanced threat scenarios such as a GPS-degraded environment. Additionally, with the assistance of the 1st Space Brigade and MARFORSTRAT, a MSST certification checklist will develop based on current tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the ARSSTs. The checklist is used on an annual basis to certify the ability of the team to conduct its mission. This certification could be added as a Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) reportable item for the MEF to show the MSST is mission capable.

As identified earlier, the current space operations MOS structure of8866/0540 falls short of meeting the MAGTF’s space needs partly because of a lack of training on the necessary software and tools required. While the MSST structure may ensure collaboration between these personnel, without additional training the Marine Corps will still fall short of the requirement. The needs of the MAGTF (and thus the MSST) necessitate the creation of an intermediate MOS (tentatively being referred to as MOS 0545, Space Operations Planner). The new MOS will require an additional level of training over and above the requirement for the space operations staff officer in order to fulfill the needs of the MIGs. Whereas the original 0540 MOS will continue to be used to add basic space knowledge to some billets, the O545 MOS will specifically prepare billet holders to utilize the systems and tools necessary to provide tactical space operations planning and support to the operating forces. This additional MOS has precedence, as it will mirror the information operations community, which has a basic staff officer level, an advanced planner level, and a master’s degree level (MOSs 0510/0550/8834). Specific courses for the new MOS have been identified and are currently used to train the MARFORSTRAT Reserve space operations planners to validate the requirements. These courses include the Army’s Tactical Space Operators Course and the Air Force’s Space Warfighter Preparatory Course.

A final aspect of the concept is the necessary systems and equipment to support the MSST capability. The ARSST teams utilize a specific space operations software package associated with the Distributed Common Ground System-Army system. This package includes the software toolsets to accomplish the analysis and product development required for the MSST mission. HQMC is working to integrate this toolset into a future system that will be used by the MEF and the MIG. This software, combined with the appropriate training and networks, constitutes the basic equipment required. Additional capacity will be gained from a stand-alone SATCOM capability and a dedicated commercial imagery capability. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is concluding a study, sponsored by Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), that is documenting the MAGTF’s reliance on spacebased capabilities. As part of the study output, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is modifying the Dagger dependency-modeling tool developed in part for Marine Forces, U.S. Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). This tool will allow space operations officers to conduct advanced planning for GPS- and SATCOM-degraded environments, along with other threats to spacebased capabilities. Furthermore, MAGTF Staff Training Program can use the tool as a way to give realistic feedback to the training audience for master scenario event list injects during exercises. The additional structure, training, and equipment represent a small investment for tremendous and necessary capability to support MAGTF operations.

Space Force

On 9 August 2018, the Final Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense was delivered to Congress from the Secretary of Defense. This report recommended the creation of a Space Command and highlighted a number of new organizations as well as a plan to strengthen and focus the DOD approach to space as a warfighting domain. On 13 August, the President signed the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which stated,

[W] ith the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish under the United States Strategic Command a subordinate unified command to be known as the United States Space Command … for carrying out joint space warfighting operations.”‘7

Placing Marines who understand warfighter needs and the reliance on space-capabilities by the MAGTF into this joint force will provide a necessary level of support and influence within the joint space community.

Way Forward

The MSST concept was initially briefed to the Space Operations Working Group in May 2018 and recommended for experimentation by the MEF/MIGs and Marine forces in attendance. Over the course of this year, this concept will provide a framework for experimentation at major exercises to refine and validate the concept with the end goal of formal adoption of the MSST concept. With a minimal cost for training and equipment, and no additional structure necessary for implementing the MSST up to the MEF level, we believe the Marine Corps can drastically increase its level of preparedness for the next war, conflict, or contested action. The MAGTF must take full advantage ofspacebased capabilities in order to increase lethality and survivability, and the MSST is an excellent start to creating organic support to accomplish these goals.

by Maj Brett Friedman

The Marine Corps is not unique in its struggle to address an operating environment frequently characterized by both state and non-state irregular enemy forces equipped with increasingly advanced weaponry and technology. The other branches of Service have struggled equally despite a shared history of success against both conventional and irregular opponents around the world.

The Marine Corps is unique, though, in that its essential core ethos, maneuver warfare, remains a valid and powerful philosophy. Tested again during the opening phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the concept proved sound. As an institution, the Marine Corps continues to produce the kind of dynamic and innovative leaders required to execute maneuver warfare on the modern battlefield.

The Corps must decide, however, how best to address a global trend of adversaries who are increasingly potent given the rapid proliferation of advanced technology. The question of whether the Marine Corps should focus on conventional or irregular warfare itself implies a fallacy: that our maneuver warfare philosophy is designed solely for conventional war and cannot address irregular warfare. This is wrong. The Marine Corps can most effectively wage war against irregular organizations by scuttling the idea that our tactical philosophy is an inappropriate means to address the threats, redoubling our efforts to achieve mastery of those tactics, and fostering a better understanding of the strategic operating environment.

Just Good Tactics

At the tactical level, warfare operates on the same principles whether the actor is a uniformed, conventional soldier or an irregular fighter. A surprise flanking attack on an enemy’s weak point will serve both the professional and the guerrilla well. So-called guerrilla, or irregular, tactics are focused on speed, deception, surprise, and maneuver, but no good professional soldier or Marine should eschew such principles. These are simply good tactics. Any intelligent and effective military force will employ them.

Doctrine has long recognized the similarity between conventional and guerrilla tactics. The 1940 Small Wars Manual, for example, recognizes that all tactics are generally the same. In the section “Small Wars Tactics,” it states,

During the initial phases of intervention, when the landing and movement inland may be opposed by comparatively large, well led, organized, and equipped hostile forces, the tactics employed are generally those of a force of similar strength and composition engaged in major warfare. *

Even in later stages,

the tactics of such infantry patrols are basically the military methods, principles, and doctrines of minor tactics, as prescribed in the manuals pertaining to the combat principles of the units concerned.3

The principles of war that the manual refers to include “mass, movement, surprise, and security.”3 Essentially, the Marines of the small wars era recognized that when it came to the actual fighting, the tactics and principles were similar to those of conventional wars. Even former Commandant of the Marine Corps MajGen John A. Lejeune attributed the success of Marines in the First World War-some of the most “conventional” warfare in history-to the skills and experience they gained fighting guerrillas in the Banana Wars.4

Major strategic theorists would agree. Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his war college lectures on small wars that

the use of weaponry in Small Wars is not different from that in Large Wars. The same is true of those things that are taught to soldiers. Flanking … and sniping … are in Small Wars just the same as in Large Wars.3

Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese guerrilla leader and theorist, prescribed tactics to his fighters:

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.1^

Marines will recognize this as good advice for any type of warfare and can identify the same concepts in our own doctrine, for our capstone doctrine plays the same notes. MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, for example, uses phrases like:

Avoid the enemy’s strength and attack his weakness by focusing combat power against the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. Isolate the enemy from his sources of support … Strike the enemy from unexpected directions.3

Perhaps it would have just been easier to cite Tse-tung than to write the above. MCDP 1, Warfighting, defines maneuver warfare as

a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.8

The best way to achieve this end state is through mass, movement, and surprise, or guerrilla warfare. Maneuver warfare has been criticized as just being good tactics. It is. So is guerrilla warfare. In fact, the two are so similar that MCDP 1 explicitly states,

[Maneuver warfare! applies regardless of the nature of the conflict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungleP

The strategic studies’ academic community has also noticed the similarity of these works’ tactics. In a monograph for the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute called Categorical Confusion?: The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges as Either Irregular or Traditional, Professor Colin S. Gray examined whether dividing war into conventional and irregular warfare makes sense. He unequivocally concluded,

It is an error amply demonstrated by historical evidence to divide threats, challenges, war, and warfare into two broad, but exclusive categories-irregular and traditional (regular, conventional).10

The conclusion for the Marine Corps is clear: there is no distinction between irregular and conventional warfare. If the Corps continues teaching its members an inaccurate conception of warfare, it can hardly expect to be successful at waging it.

The best academic study of this convergence of tactics in modern warfare is Stephen Biddle’s Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Biddle found that modern technology virtually mandates some tactics as opposed to others. Those tactics he refers to as the “modern system.” He found that good offensive tactics are “cover, concealment, dispersion, smallunit independent maneuver, suppression, and combined arms integration.”11 Defensive tactics, he found, operate on largely the same principles,

[demanding] much the same exposurereduction tactics of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, combined arms, and independent small unit maneuver that modern system attackers require, albeit adapted to the particular problems of the defense.13

Yet what the modern system actually describes are tactics that we normally associate with guerrillas. Now, everyone on the battlefield must use them-soldier and guerrilla.

When military professionals, guerrilla fighters, and academics all agree on which tactics work and which do not, it leads to one inescapable conclusion: when tactics are good for one mode of operation, they are good for another. Thus, the true difference between conventional and irregular warfare lies not in tactics but in differing strategic precepts. Differences in uniforms, armament, and professional training are minute when compared to the strategic differences between the guerrilla force and the conventional military. The tactical principles for the soldier and the guerrilla seem similar because they are similar: they are just good tactics.

The distinguishing factor between conventional and irregular war can be explained by the ideas of two strategic theorists: Hans Delbrück and Navy RADM J. C. Wylie. Delbrück was a German historian who believed that there were two modes of strategy: Niederwerfungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation) and Ermattungsstrategie (strategy of exhaustion).13 A strategy of annihila- tion is focused on the quick destruction of the enemy at a concentrated point in time. A strategy of exhaustion, however, is predicated on the wearing down of the opponent vice a fast campaign of attrition. Whereas Delbrück used time to differentiate between the two modes of strategy, Wylie viewed process as the distributing factor. His two modes of strategy are sequential strategies and cumulative strategies.14 In a sequential strategy, each tactical event (battle, operation, movement, etc.) follows logically from the previous one and is contingent upon its predecessor eventually leading to a target that achieves victory. The island-hopping campaign of the Pacific Theater during World War II is an example of a sequential strategy. In a cumulative strategy, however, tactical events are not necessarily connected in a one-after-another manner but happen in a seemingly random pattern. Victory is achieved when one side has simply had enough. This is the strategic logic behind many guerrilla campaigns, such as the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

/Executing a strategy of annihilation in a sequential manner usually requires a professional, organized military force to do the heavy lifting. A cumulative strategy of exhaustion, however, does not. Any force that lacks the required strength to execute the former-such as a guerrilla organization-will choose the latter. A cumulative strategy of exhaustion requires tactics that help to outlast the enemy: ambushes, surprise, deception, and the ability to hide amongst a population. A force with a strategy must be beaten at its own game, outlasted and out-exhausted. A strategy of annihilation, however, cannot succeed against an enemy that refuses to be annihilated. Since 9/11, the U.S. military has attempted to do just that and has focused on defeating insurgent tactics-of IEDs, etc.-while it needed to confront its strategy of exhaustion. This only highlights how important it is for Marines to understand strategy in order to execute tactics successfully.

There are many competing but ultimately distracting concepts that are marketed and sold to the U.S. military. Stylish but shallow concepts like hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, and gray-zone conflicts are simply the recognition of an ancient truth that has recently become more obvious: a strategic actor will not eschew one form of tactics for another except in rational self-interest. Given similar equipment, each strategic actor will choose the most effective tactics. This is not to say that there are not important and significant differences between conventional and irregular wars and the actors that wage them. There are. But when it comes to the actual fighting, at bullet and bayonet range, the same tactical principles apply.

Technology and Trends

The ever-increasing lethality of firepower and proliferating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology is driving a convergence of conventional and irregular methods. If modernization and the spread of technology will eventually produce a general consensus of which tactics are effective and which are ineffective, then in what direction is technology currently driving tactics? Fortunately for the Marine Corps, there is a lot of data to be gleaned from conflicts around the world. What current events show us is that technology is not driving toward new tactics but rather tactics that raise the cost of poor decisions. Biddle’s modern system still holds, but the consequence of failure ıs not just high casualties but the annihilation of entire units. This trend has long held true for our enemies, seen in the Battle of 73 Easting or An Nasirıyah. The trend has now caught up with us.

Still, it is folly to try and differentiate conventional and irregular fighters based on equipment. The Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 vastly outgunned the French Army units it surrounded. The Islamic State (or ISIS) was much better equipped than most other “guerrilla” forces because it captured avast amount of American-made equipment from the Iraqi Army. Additionally, state-sponsored irregular forces like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Donetsk separatists in Ukraine have access to the most modern military equipment. These ongoing conflicts demonstrate the convergence of tactics normally associated with either conventional or irregular warfare.

This is not to say that warfare is not changing or that modern technology is not driving those changes. Both those statements are true. Timeless tactical principles endure but express themselves in novel ways on the battlefield. Cover and concealment, for example, is of vital importance for both professionals and guerrillas as the ubiquity of aerial surveillance drones with long loiter capabilities grows. This is why First World War-style trench works have begun to reappear in places like Donetsk and Mosul, Iraq. The use of ambushes, of course, has been a dominant tactical maneuver in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and IEDs have driven American tactical and equipment adaptations like the MRAP. Firepower, as usual, retains value. Russian artillery fired at targets spotted by UAVs in Ukraine, and ISIS used waves of vehicle-borne IEDs to shape its objective of Ramadi.

What these trends show is that while tactical principles remain the same, failure to adhere to these principles leads to dire consequences, thanks to the proliferation of aerial and precision guided munitions. The use of poor tactics promises not just casualties-but massive casualties.

Implications for the Marine Corps

There are numerous implications of dropping the regular/irregular dichotomy from Marine Corps doctrine. All are necessary to preserve the long-term utiliry and viability of the Marine Corps as a warfighting institution.

When it comes to the tactical level, the Marine Corps has more opportunities than threats. Maneuver warfare, as a warfighting philosophy, is well-suited to the character of modern warfare. The other major strength, perhaps the Marine Corps’ greatest strength, is its NCO corps. Future tactics are in the hands of our NCOs more than anyone else’s, and MCDP 1 recognizes that. Indeed, its use depends on it. Unfortunately, institutional traditionalism frequently clashes with a maneuver warfare mindset. Our capstone doctrine is an ideal for which we must continue to strive; when tradition and philosophy clash, tradition must give way.

Tactical implications include:

* Teaching “guerrilla” tactics at the School of Infantry, Marine Combat Training, and Infantry Officer Course. Let Marines learn to fight as individuals and in small teams in freeplay, force-on-force exercises first, and then build up from there.

* Refocusing training at these schools on the principles of war taught not as a checklist to memorize but as parameters to evaluate tactical options. Train tactical judgment by exercising it.

* Teaching every concept as a lecture, then as a sand table tactical decision game, then a student-led planning phase, then a practical exercise. This method is already used at TBS to great benefit.

The Marine Corps has less inherent strength at the strategic level. It is not so much falling behind the other Services in developing strategic and innovative leaders as it is refusing to join the race. Other Services have strategists by MOS, world-renowned war colleges, and publishing arms that attract talent military and civilian. These institutions and individuals constantly evaluate and research future environments, fostering better vision and strategic planning. With the exception of Marine Corps University, the Marine Corps fails to employ such resources. We prefer to employ common Marine phrases like “stay in your lane” or “shut up and color.” These phrases should be abolished as emblematic of intellectual laziness. The luxury of burying our heads in the sand of tactics is one we can no longer afford.

This can be fixed by revamping the education system for officers. Resident PME should refocus on broadening an officer’s base of knowledge in military history and strategic theory rather than teaching doctrine and enforcing its dogma. Familiarity with and adherence to doctrine are the responsibility of the officer and his chain of command when stationed in the Operating Forces. It is a waste of time and resources to reiterate it during PME. As NCOs increasingly dominate the realm of tactics, officers will increasingly need to understand the broader strategic context of the battlefield. Instilling a lifelong study of war in our officers from the very beginning is no longer an option but a mandate.

Strategic implications include:

* Eliminating the Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division. It makes no sense to segregate irregular tactics in an office aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico.

* Making selected books from the Commandants Reading List mandatory for officers at each grade. Physical fitness is already mandated by HQMC, but mental fitness is merely encouraged.

* Introducing strategic theory to officers at TBS, expanding the strategic theory curriculum at Expeditionary Warfare School, and fostering expertise in strategic theory at the Command and Staff College. A crawl, walk, run approach is appropriate, but officers should be crawling as lieutenants, not as majors.

* Expanding the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s Ellis Group. Use the personnel and cost savings from shuttering the Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division to turn the Ellis Group into a more robust and capable office.

These subtle and inexpensive changes will work slowly but in the long term will reap dividends for the Marine Corps and its members.

Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity

A solid foundation in strategic theory will be necessary for our leaders who will not just be called upon to fight but also to work with foreign partners. Security cooperation was a key component of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, and the United States will increasingly work with and through partnered nations. Building partner capacity is not just a feature of irregular warfare; it never has been. Both World Wars and the Korean War had major building partner capacity components. Wherever and whenever Marines deploy, security cooperation will occur.

Eliminating the assumption that there is a practical division between irregular and conventional tactics will allow Marines to become better partners. Building the tactical expertise of all Marines, and specifically NCOs, will make them ideal partners and trainers. Equipping officers with the intellectual tools to understand strategic and historical contexts will enable them to tailor instruction and training plans to the specific needs of any partnered force. These efforts, in turn, will build a common tactical language and a common strategic outlook among the archipelago of American allies, thus improving the interoperability, cooperation, and coordination of those forces in any situation before that situation occurs. The security cooperation efforts in recent years have been ad hoc and sporadic, rarely advancing beyond basic low-level tactics. When it comes to partnering, Marines should never be put in the position of starting from scratch again.

Conclusion

The irregular warfare debate is stymied not by a lack of answers but by continual appeals to the wrong questions. Should the Marine Corps focus on conventional or irregular war? What is the right mix? How can the Marine Corps succeed in irregular warfare? These are all questions founded on an erroneous assumption that the tactics are vastly different for each. The face of every war will indeed be different, but the principles remain the same. LtCol Pete Ellis said it best when discussing how Marines can succeed in war:

It is not enough that troops be skilled infantry men and jungle men or artillery men of high morale; they must be skilled water men and jungle men who know it can be done-Marines with Marine training.

At a time when the other Services and the DOD are focused on the next technological leap-ahead-and sacrificing training and education to pay for it- the Marine Corps should refocus on and strengthen tactical training, strategic education, and its battle-tested warfighting philosophy. It should drop the distracting conventional/irregular dichotomy and refuse to chase the intellectual flavor of the week. This will make Marines ready for and adaptable to any situation and make the Marine Corps itself more valuable and successful as a partner and ally. In short, Marines with Marine training will be ready for any clime and place.

by Capt Brian R. Raike

“Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.”1

The concept of maneuver warfare has been studied in all domains and is a foundation that guides the way the Marine Corps conducts operations. Retired Air Force Col John Boyd studied the subject regarding air-to-air combat and then translated it to fit conflict in all domains. According to Col Boyd, to outmaneuver an enemy, one must create a greater relative tempo of operations.2 This is true in all domains of warfare. Historically, during conflict, one side’s militarization of a new domain and the other side’s failure to militarize that domain results in a decisive victory for the former and a devastating loss for the latter within that domain. However, as Dr. James Lacey of the Marine Corps War College stated, “Losing in one domain does not equal defeat.”3 While it is true that losing in one domain does not equate to losing a battle, campaign, or war, cyberspace tends to underpin most of the other domains on the modern battlefield. As such, the United States and its allies cannot afford to be outmaneuvered in this space.

The decentralized command and control (C2) of operations enables effective maneuver warfare.^ To create this decentralized C2, the joint community has developed battlespace coordination measures and fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) that govern deconfliction requirements for air, ground, and sea operations. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, addresses the cyberspace problem statement by stating that cyberspace operations require “coordination, cooperation, and a comprehensive approach to achieve common objectives.”3 While joint doctrine addresses a need for this comprehensive approach, it does not prescribe a method by which the Services may achieve this end.

Cyber Battlespace

To enable tempo in military operations across multiple domains, the joint force uses boundaries and control measures. Specifically, commanders “establish various maneuver and movement control, airspace [coordination], and fire support coordination measures to facilitate effective joint operations.”6 The joint force employs these concepts in the air, sea, and land domains; this can be done in cyberspace as well.

The cyber battlespace is essentially composed of the infrastructure, systems, and protocols that make up the Internet. However, it is important that we standardize the way in which we view these elements. By understanding the interrelatedness of cyberspace, we may be able to leverage existing boundaries to institute controls that allow for processes similar to traditional battlespace C2 and deconfliction.

Cyberspace, without defined boundaries, is akin to a map without military graphics, markings, or sector delineations. Autonomous systems, designated by numbers in shared databases (known as ASNs), are interconnected, high-level routers and switches that connect to other networks over physical cables. Large organizations, such as Internet service providers, own and operate ASNs and conduct the intra-domain routing of packets using the language of border gateway protocol.7 Large international backbones carry data over vast distances between ASNs. Large networks may also connect via satellite links using radio frequencies. Once the data reaches a regional gateway, network access points convert the data to the format of transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP). Subordinate to these large networks are smaller networks known as widearea networks and local-area networks, which use TCP/IP to send and receive data, known as inter-domain routing. To reach its final destination, data may ride over multiple methods of transportation, including radio waves and microwaves. The client/server methodology used by TCP/IP allows data to travel to the appropriate destination via routers using interior gateway protocols and provides the appropriate data type based on the server used to deliver the data.

Using the inherent boundaries depicted above, cyberspace can be broken down into areas of operations (AOs) and assigned to military commanders, who can conduct supporting operations to military actions within their geographic AO. In joint doctrine, the joint force commander assigns AOs to his subordinates as a means to enable subordinate commanders to “accomplish their missions … and protect their forces.”8 Similarly, in cyberspace, a cyber-AO (C-AO) may be defined as the logical space and physical routing devices, transmission paths, and network components which may impact the applicable geographic AO. The starting point for defining the C-AO is to determine which ASNs impact the geographic AO. By listing these ASNs, one may understand the larger inter-domain routing pathways that impact the physical AO. The ASNs, which communicate via border gateway protocol, essentially become the outer boundary of the C-AO. Border gateway protocol ıs a path vector protocol, which means that it maintains a specific path for data flow. This is particularly useful in establishing the C-AO because a reading of the protocol at a given point allows one to infer which ASNs connect to the ASNs that directly impact the geographic AO. The associated IP space confining these ASNs makes the first element in the C-AO. (See Map 1.)

An analyst may define the intra-domain atmosphere after discovering the ASNs that may impact the geographic AO. Specifically, he must discover which networks are subordinate to each individual ASN. These subordinate networks are the wide-area networks and the local-area networks. One may identify these subordinate networks through a combination of open-source and intelligence community resources. (See Map 2.)

With a concrete understanding of the construct of relevant networks in a geographic AO, it is imperative to consider outlier technologies, which may bypass the ASN structure. Users within a geographic AO may leverage satellite communications (SATCOM) for data transferal.9 For this reason, the C-AO should include all satellite coverage areas that fall within the geographic AO, the associated, command link data systems, and all of the relevant downlinks. In addition to SATCOM, cellular networks should be included in the C-AO. Cellular networks generally fit more neatly into the geographic AO because of their reliance on the relatively short span of coverage provided by cell towers, which are largely concentrated in developed areas.10 (See Map 3.)

The combination of ASNs, subordinate networks, SATCOM infrastructure, and other cyberspace entities relevant to a specific geographic AO should make up the related C-AO. These entities are logically represented by IP addresses, media access control addresses, and other cyberspace selectors. FSCMs are the method by which the C-AO may be deconflicted.

Traditional FSCMs are either permissive, which facilitate attacks and minimize coordination, or restrictive, which are imposed to safeguard friendly forces. While traditional FSCMs are depicted as specific graphics on maps, FSCMs in cyberspace may not fit as neatly. Instead, they may be better represented as lists of IP addresses, media access control addresses, or other logical designators that appear in the relevant cyberspace. These lists should include details regarding restrictions, rules of engagement, and coordination instructions. For example, a cyber no-strike list is a restrictive FSCM composed of a list of targets within a designated C-AO upon which cyber effects are not authorized. A cyber-restricted target list, on the other hand, is a list of cyberspace targets within a designated C-AO which require additional coordination prior to firing because either another coalition entity is planning a similar operation or the target is politically sensitive and would require interagency approval. Known cyberspace elements that do not appear on either of these lists would be placed on a cyberspace joint target list and require no additional coordination prior to firing. These cyberspace FSCMs are akin to those used in the physical realm to aid commanders in the targeting process.

Delineating the cyber battlespace and implementing associated FSCMs would enable a commander to quickly assess which cyber targets are relevant to his AO. Further, it would allow him to understand the coordination requirements to attack a cyber target, which would enable tempo in cyberspace and could facilitate a commander’s attack on cyber targets to out-tempo his adversary. However, it is important to note that cyberspace rapidly changes. Since cyberspace is constantly updating, the joint force must construct a realtime monitoring authority to facilitate deconfliction. This will be resource- and time-intensive but is the only way to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets needed to outmaneuver an adversary in cyberspace while ensuring the prevention of fratricide.

“But Cyberspace is Different”: An Erroneous Premise

Despite the growing acceptance of cyberspace operations as commonplace, a widely held belief regarding cyberspace operations is that they are too complicated to be compared to traditional military operations. Authors have warned that cyberspace is filled with attackers capable of appearing and disappearing at will, stealing identities, and shifting network nodes.11 While all this is true, if one breaks down cyberspace into separate AOs and implements an authorization authority, his perspective may be more optimistic.

Further, others have argued that the cyber battlespace is composed of only a singular battlefield. The argument is that since there is only “one Internet” which comprises the World Wide Web, then there may only be one cyber battlefield.12 While this argument warrants some merit, it is analogous to an exclamation that because there is only one Earth, there is but one physical battlefield. To mitigate ideas like this in other domains, the joint community divides battlespace in the air, land, and sea and assigns commanders responsibility for the various aspects of those domains which relate to their military mission. Additionally, the Marine Corps traditionally views all battlespace through the “single battle concept,” in which an action taken in one area of the battlespace may very well impact an action taken in another, potentially noncontiguous area of the battlespace. Marines have already accounted for the fact that there is a singular Earth and that military operations are rarely linear and confined to any singular space therein.

Cyberspace is indeed “different,” but only inasmuch as airpower was different to warfare during the attritionist fight in the pre-World War I world. Though both sides of the war exuded initial skepticism, the advancement of air power and the control thereof became a prominent factor in overall strategy by the conflicts conclusion.13 After World War I, the air domain became commonplace to war as we know it. Cyberspace will follow suit.

Conclusion

The ability to out-tempo an adversary is key to winning at maneuver warfare. Tempo demands that a commander must have decentralized control of his operations. To facilitate tempo, the joint community establishes boundaries and control measures in the air, sea, and land domains. Despite the differences that exist in the cyber domain, boundaries and FSCMs in cyberspace will enable tempo in the cyber domain.

by Capt Hill Hamrick & BGen Roger B Turner, Jr.

As the early morning sun rose over Nawa District İn Helmand Province, Afghanistan, a small, eclectic mix of Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) leaders casually finished their breakfast. A few kilometers away at an Afghan outpost, a team of Marine advisors grew increasingly anxious, as they still had no idea what their Afghan partners intended to do that day. Finally, a call came İn from the Afghan district chief of police, who relayed the scheme of maneuver that the Afghans had constructed over their meal. The advisors, members of Task Force Southwest (TFSW), immediately relayed the plan back to the TFSW Joint Operations Center (JOC), initiating the repositioning and tasking of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and fires assets to support the Afghan operation.

Minutes later, the TFSW Joint Terminal Attack Controller told the F-16 flying over Nawa, “Tripoli 6 approves that target,” as the CG, TFSW, authorized an airstrike on three Taliban fighters armed with AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades. The Marines working in the JOC used full motion video from an unmanned aerial surveillance asset to find these three fighters as it scanned a few kilometers ahead of the Afghan ground force. Just seconds after the approval, a 2.75mm rocket hit the three fighters, instantly killing one and wounding the other two. Through his cultural advisor, we relayed the location and result of the strike to the Afghan district police chief on the ground, who immediately sent his forward element to the site. The Marines İn the JOC watched the full motion video feed as Afghan police forces sprinted to the strike site, detained the two wounded enemy fighters, and seized their weapons. The Marines then shifted their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms in search of the next target ahead of the Afghan maneuver unit.

Over the course of a nine-month deployment, TFSW repeated this process hundreds of times, enabling the Helmand-based Afghan National Army (ANA) 215th Corps and Afghan National Police (ANP) 505th Zone to reverse years of Taliban momentum, retake lost territory, and expand population control without once sending U.S. forces to the front lines of combat. The center of gravity in this effort was the confidence of the partnered Afghan force to conduct offensive operations, knowing that coalition support gave them a decisive advantage at the point of attack in every engagement. Building this confidence in our Afghan partners was a twofold effort. First, TFSW advisors fully integrated into the Afghan command structure, advising and assisting the Afghans in each phase of both planning and executing large-scale operations. Second, with the battlespace understanding gained by advising, TFSW delivered precision fires in close support of Afghan maneuver forces, which in turn created Afghan

confidence in their capability to accomplish their security objectives.

Through this operational concept, TFSW effectively enabled the Helmand-based Afghan forces without putting United States troops on the front lines, minimizing the risk to U.S. forces and preventing an unsustainable Afghan dependency on the presence of U.S. troops. As the United States continues to fight wars “by, with, and through” partnered forces, this model serves as an example of enhancing warfighting capability İn partnered operations while minimizing risk to U.S. forces to achieve tactical success. While situationally dependent, these tactical successes can allow the United States and the partnered force to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Arriving İn Helmand Province in April 2017 amidst a dire security situation, TFSW quickly realized restoring Afghan confidence and maximizing combat power were two interrelated and mutually supporting critical tasks. At that point, the ANDSF controlled only the two major population centers of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk and were suffering a crisis of confidence after years of catastrophic losses following the departure of U.S. forces in 2014. With only 300 Marines and an advising mission, TFSW’s success had to come by, with, and through the Afghan forces, which required an Afghan willingness to take the fight to the enemy.

To maximize integration with the ANDSF and increase their confidence, TFSW developed an operational concept that treated the Afghan forces as an organic element. Reverting to Marine Corps doctrine, TFSW built a MAGTF-like unit and functioned like a command element fully engaged İn combat operations. But, in this case, the ANDSF acted as the GCE; an Army combat aviation brigade, an Air Force F-16 squadron, and an assortment of unmanned aerial surveillance platforms comprised the ACE; and contractors and Afghan units served as the LCE. The task force’s advisors were the critical link from the command element to the Afghan forces-not just the ANA but also the Afghan National Police, the Afghan Border Police, the Afghan Local Police, and the National Directorate of Security. The advisors provided TFSW the necessary understanding of the battlespace to properly support, influence, and enable the Afghans İn combat operations. Most importantly, the advisors’ integration with their Afghan partners set the foundation for restoring Afghan confidence.

Equally essential to Afghan confidence was the application of maneuver warfare concepts in this atypical structure. Embracing the by, with, and through philosophy, TFSW avoided im- posing U.S. objectives on the Afghans; instead, we encouraged the senior Helmand ANDSF leaders to jointly develop their own operational objectives and commander’s intent. Once decided, we leveraged TFSW advisors to ensure each Afghan warfighting function adhered to that intent, which synchronized advising efforts and Afghan action to support the operational plan. This approach also kept the Afghans and the entirety of TFSW oriented on the enemy and gave the Afghan leaders confidence that TFSW would effectively support their planned operations and accomplish Afghan objectives.

Once in execution phase, without the capacity or capability to accompany Afghan maneuver forces into combat, TFSW had to overcome the challenge of remaining integrated with our Afghan partners. To solve this, TFSW built ad hoc teams of task-organized advisors, known as expeditionary advising packages, to deploy with the forward Afghan command and control element for the operation. This team of advisors served as the primary link between the Afghan ground forces and the TFSW command element. While these forward-located advisors never achieved perfect certainty of the intentions and actions of the Afghan maneuver force, the information they did gather was enough to allow TFSW to effectively enable the Afghans through precision fires and preserved Afghan confidence in coalition support throughout the operation.

The most critical element of TFSW s operational approach and in building Afghan confidence was leveraging U.S. and coalition assets to deliver precision fires in close support of Afghan maneuver forces. Persistent advising created a MAGTF-like command element to the GCE relationship between the TFSW JOC and the Afghan ground force and provided the requisite communications links to facilitate the close coordination of air strikes. Quickly discovering that Afghan maneuver was the most effective way to find and fix the enemy before conducting a strike, TFSW centered all advising efforts around supporting Afghan maneuver and closely coordinating with Afghan ground forces.

On a daily basis during an Afghan operation, Afghan forces, closely tracked by the TFSW JOC and advisors, maneuvered and forced the Taliban to react by positioning forces, conducting reconnaissance, or staging ambushes. Taliban actions exposed them to TFSW collections platforms and then subsequently to fires assets like Air Force F-16s, Army Apache helicopters, and MQ-1C Predator drones. Every strike required battlespace clearance through the Afghan chain of command and then constant confirmation, as most targets emerged in highly dynamic environments. Following these strikes, TFSW pushed information back to Afghan leaders, who routinely maneuvered to and exploited the strike site, oftentimes leading to more strikes as the Taliban reacted again to the Afghans.

TFSW conducted more than 500 air strikes over the course of the deployment, the vast majority of which occurred because of Afghan maneuver. This close integration and high volume of air support ended the Afghans’ crisis of confidence. Each strike reinforced to the ANDSF that they had an overwhelming advantage at the point of attack in every engagement, and their confidence grew exponentially. And as their confidence increased, their drive to conduct offensive operations similarly grew, and the ANDSF seized the initiative from the Taliban early in TFSW s deployment and never relinquished it. True to maneuver warfare, the ANDSF used tempo as a weapon against the Taliban, conducting at least one offensive operation on approximately 250 of the 280 days of TFSW s deployment. In fact, it became a challenge for TFSW to keep up with the ANDSF tempo, as they often proposed more offensive operations than TFSW could support at one time.

When properly enabled and advised, the ANDSF proved to be a highly willing and capable partner, achieving impressive tactical success by retaking ground from the Taliban and expanding population control. Because of the Afghans’ confidence, TFSW had no need to accompany our partners to the front lines or put U.S. troops in direct combat. This model succeeded in Helmand as a way to work by, with, and through our partners to accomplish tactical objectives at a sustainable level of effort and level of risk to U.S. forces. While there is still much work left to be done, the combined efforts of TFSW and the ANSDF reversed the momentum of the war in Helmand Province and offer a potential model to create the tactical success needed to accomplish the overall operational and strategic objectives of the Afghan campaign.