The CAX Is Crucial

by Capt Paul J. Borror

The enhanced Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) discussed recently (MCG, Mar89) is a tremendous opportunity for unit commanders in the maneuver battalion to train in a fastpaced, ever-changing mechanized environment As the air officer for 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (Rein), I was able to participate in constant staff planning in reaction to the vari ous frag orders. We augmented our two existing forward air controllers with an additional two, allowing all three maneuver elements and recon to control aircraft. I believe this added significantly to the training at CAX 2-89.

CAX 2-89 brought with it two tremendous training improvements: more pre-CAX fire support and maneuver training and the battalion-level force-on-force exercise. The introduction of the LAI battalion and its impact on maneuver warfare offer even more new and innovative training challenges.

During our debriefing, the increased cost of the enhanced CAX was discussed. One of the possible options to meet this cost would downgrade the improved pre-CAX training to budget for the force-on-force exercise. The potential for improvement in maneuver warfare through the enhanced CAX deserves the Commandant’s attention and priority. The tremendous training opportunities offered by the enhanced CAX-especially the upgraded mechanized training exercises, increased fire support coordination exercises, the frag order CAX. and the battalion-level force-on-force exercise-should be allowed to continue and expand.

Enemy-Oriented Operations, What Makes Them Hard?

by LtCol Gary W. Anderson

In the previous article in this series (MCG, Apr89) the concept of enemyoriented operations was introduced. The heart of the concept is the R-E cycle of recognizing and exploiting enemy weaknesses, mistakes, and vulnerabilities. The best commanders throughout history have proven adept at maintaining a short R-E cycle. The battles and campaigns of Alexander the Great were replete with instances of timely completion of the R-E cycle. Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Napoleon, and Lee each showed the ability to rapidly complete the R-E cycle in their best battles. Lee and Napoleon only lost when they allowed their foes to dictate an attrition style of conflict. Bad commanders, through skill of good subordinates, have occasionally won battles by a rapid completion of the R-E cycle; conversely, good commanders have lost by misreading perceived enemy weaknesses. Despite these variations one of the marks of truly good commanders has been the ability to complete the R-E cycle more rapidly than their opponents.

In the days prior to the American Civil War, the completion of the R-E cycle was relatively uncomplicated. A commander could generally see the entire battlefield. Once he spotted a key enemy mistake or vulnerability, the commander could act himself or send a subordinate to exploit the opportunity. The Napoleonic era complicated the situation greatly. The French revolution ushered in modern mass armies, and Napoleon’s innovation of marching by corps began the evolution of an operational level of war to fill the gap between tactics and strategy. The introduction of telegraph and wireless radio further expanded the battlefield far beyond the physical control of the individual commander.

Ironically, these very innovations made the R-E cycle much harder to complete in a timely manner. In most cases today, a key enemy weakness may be spotted by a subordinate many miles and several layers of command removed from the only leader capable of exploiting the mistake or vulnerability. This situation has lengthened the R-E cycle.

This lengthening of the R-E cycle creates opportunities for maneuver warfare in conventional operations. A commander who must depend on fragile communications and the observations of others to form a picture of the battlefield will be much more likely to have his observation-orientation-decision-action cycle disrupted. This lengthening of the R-E cycle is illustrated very well in Harold Coyle’s excellent novel Team Yankee. In this speculative account of World War III’s first days, a U.S. Army tank-heavy combat team captures a key bridge in Germany due to a Soviet mistake. The U.S. commander encounters tremendous difficulty in getting his superiors to recognize that he has uncovered a key enemy weakness. It is obvious that Maj Coyle has encountered similar problems in his military career. Many Marine readers will be able to recount similar experiences in their own backgrounds in peacetime military exercises. There is no guarantee that our peacetime exercise experience will not be repeated in war; we really do tend to fight the way we train.

The Zero Defects Mentality and the Self Syndrome

It would be too easy to write off the problems associated with the lengthening R-E cycle to technology alone. In truth, we have exacerbated the problem in many ways. The U.S. military has fallen prey to the twin curses of the zero defects mentality and the Von Schlieffen or “self syndrome.”

The zero defects mentality is in part a natural outgrowth of a human attempt to deal with the more threatening aspects of technology, and it is not all bad. I always want the pilot of the aircraft that I’m flying in to be a zero defects kind of guy; I want him to follow every checklist to the letter. There are certain situations, however, where a zero defects mindset is inappropriate. Tactical and operational planning are two such areas. War is the realm of chaos and mistakes; to deny or ignore this is a major mistake.

In all too many instances in the sixties and seventies, avoiding mistakes replaced the pursuit of military excellence as a goal in the U.S. military; the Marine Corps was no exception. The Marine Corps is making a heroic effort to eliminate the zero defects mentality. There are two very clear dangers in a zero defects philosophy. The first danger is that we don’t learn from our mistakes because we refuse to admit to the mistakes in the first place. The second danger is that in a world where all mistakes are considered fatal, we fail to recognize the really key ones. The proverbial story about the platoon commander who becomes so obsessed with properly dug fighting holes that he fails to recognize an open flank is a case in point.

The “self syndrome” is a phrase that identifies the tendency of modern military decisionmakers to become so absorbed with what is happening to their own plans that they ignore what is happening to the enemy. It is the attempt to press on with one’s own plans despite annoying actions on the part of the enemy that suggest the need for change. The Schlieffen Plan of World War I disrepute is an example of this syndrome. The Schlieffen Plan was designed to be blindly implemented despite annoying political or strategic changes that might occur. Thus, the Germans were drawn into a war they should not have fought. Such preoccupation with your own planning can only occur at the expense of a focus on the enemy, which is the legitimate target of any military operation. A military force can only afford such self-absorption if it has such a clear superiority in men and material that enemy actions are rendered irrelevant-certainly not the case in most potential U.S. operations plans.

Even Robert E. Lee was not immune to this syndrome. In his superb novel The Killer Angels, Michael Shaara described one such incident at Gettysburg where Confederate Gen James Longstreet saw a chance to make an end run around the Union left flank and destroy its forces from the rear. Lee stubbornly refuses to change his battle plan of an assault on the union left flank; his mind is made up, and the plan has assumed a life of its own.

Historians, such as Douglas Southall Freeman, have castigated Longstreet as an insubordinate obstructionist at Gettysburg, but anyone who has studied the character of the man will recognize that he was an early proponent of enemyoriented operations. One can only speculate how different history might have been if Lee had emulated Longstreet’s desire to combine the operational offense with a tactical defense in the Pennsylvania campaign. Gen Meade almost certainly would have been forced to attack if Lee had chosen a strong defensive position in the Gettysburg area. Instead, Lee gave the opportunity to his northern opponent Good subordinates allowed Meade to capitalize on his enemy‘s mistake.

EnemyOriented Operations and the Center of Gravity

Shortly after the first article in this series was published (MCG Apr89), a regimental commander whose opinion I respect, complained that it did not sufficiently address the concept of center of gravity, which he considered to be a key maneuver warfare concept. He felt that center of gravity is such a key concept in maneuver warfare that to ignore it in the greater context of enemyoriented operations is a fatal flaw in the argument. In retrospect, he is right.

The concept of center of gravity is the most elusive concept in all maneuver warfare. In my own mind, I used to think of it as the key enemy weakness, but that does not fully grasp the essence of the concept. The enemy‘s center of gravity is the point where, if proper pressure is applied at a given time and place, we can achieve decisive results against him. The same obviously holds true for our own situation.

Centers of gravity can shift. At one point in time, it may be a key enemy weakness, such as a slow observation-orientation-decision-action cycle. At another time the center of gravity may be a strong enemy commander such as Rommel in North Africa. In such situations, the key weakness or vulnerability may be an unguarded approach to the commander’s location. Because the center of gravity can shift, our actions can influence the enemy‘s center of gravity. In this respect, war is like a wrestling match where each participant is constantly looking for a shift in his opponent’s center of gravity and an opening to exploit that point A good wrestler will often make moves designed to confuse his opponent enough to open up opportunities. The wrestler doesn’t necessarily know how his opponent will react; he is looking for mistakes or vulnerabilities that will lead to an opening that exposes the other guy’s center of gravity.

The enemy‘s center of gravity is seldom self-evident. If he knows himself well, he will hide it and protect it; obviously, we should do likewise. The enemy will have many weaknesses, mistakes, and vulnerabilities. Each is a window to his internal workings, but it is like looking into the window of a building containing a merry-go-round; the center of gravity will only be visible for a limited time. That time will be determined by the poverbial speed of the merry-go-round. The essence of enemyoriented operations is to find potential windows, look through all of them, identify the one that contains the center of gravity, and attack it with sufficient combat power before the merry-go-round moves on. This process was a lot easier before the Civil War than it is today, and that is what this article has been all about. (Figure 1 illustrates this concept.) All of this is complicated by the fact that these windows can be created by our own actions.

Ideally, a commander begins an operation with a perception of his enemy‘s center of gravity. If that center of gravity is also his key weakness, it is particularly desirable. If he is correct, the commander can consider that he has completed the recognition portion of the R-E cycle and can go onto the exploitation portion. In some situations, the commander may not believe he has a feel for the enemy‘s center of gravity or that he knows how to get at it. In this case, his initial point of main effort may be his reconnaissance/intelligence force. The early Mongols were masters of this concept as were the Boers of South Africa and the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong in the late war in Indochina.

The great commanders in history have been those who have been able to constantly seek and create windows to their enemy‘s center of gravity and determine which windows led to the actual prize. Once the key windows were discovered, these commanders were capable of exploiting the enemy‘s center of gravity in a timely manner. This is true art Many windows lead to false objectives; the enemy may create false windows as part of his deception plan. A platoon’s center of gravity may be irrelevant to battalion or, alternatively, it may lead the way to the essential center of gravity. The ability to exploit an enemy‘s center of gravity through a key window of vulnerability or weakness is the toughest military nut to crack; hence the title of this article.

It takes an extraordinary soldier to consistently complete the R-E cycle with any success. Frankly, in the last 20 years the Marine Corps as an institution has done a pretty miserable job of creating an atmosphere where such soldiers can flourish. Most of us have grown up in an atmosphere of mindnumbing conformity to directives and orders that stifle initiative and risktaking at all levels. Good people are trying to change that, but it’s still an uphill battle. For every Commandant who tries to create a thinking warrior mentality and every commanding general who allows a free play force-on-force atmosphere in training, there are other seniors hell-bent on returning us to mindless obedience. Enemyoriented operations are not about techniques and tactics as much as they are about mindset. That is really what makes enemyoriented operations hard.

EnemyOriented Operations Needed Today More Than Ever

The importance of enemyoriented operations becomes particularly important in this era of rapid change. The need to overcome the difficulties outlined above and achieve excellence in this area is more critical than ever. The apparent disintegration of civil order in many parts of the world has provided a series of challenges that transcend purely military considerations. South Lebanon may well serve as a model for the complexity of future conflict situations that U.S. military forces could face in the future.

The failure of the Israeli use of maneuver warfare in South Lebanon is not a result of misunderstanding the maneuver warfare concept. It occurred because maneuver warfare was not relevant in that situation. There are many more Lebanons on the horizon. The seeds of the combination of social disintegration, drugs, terrorism, religious chaos, and racial hatred that mark South Lebanon have been sown in many locations in the Third World. South Lebanon may be the face of things to come in the 21st century.

In many cases, the key vulnerability or weakness of an enemy may not be in areas that can be exploited by military action. Let’s take the case of the Iran-Iraq War as an example. One can only speculate how much earlier the war might have ended if the Iraqis had elected to introduce a competing Shiite sect capable of challenging Ayatollah Khomeini for leadership. Would the old man in Qom have been forced to divert forces from the war front to internal security duties, thus ending the war much earlier? We can only speculate on the potential outcome, but the result would certainly have been worth a try considering the alternative in casualties that were actually sustained. This is just one example of how a nonmilitary solution might be applied to an area that normally would be considered a purely military matter.

Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation

by William S. Lind

The maneuver-dominated battlefield makes special demands on air as well as ground. Marine aviation must be able to operate effectively in such an environment. It must make its own contribution to achieving a decision. Like its ground brethren, air must have a focus of efforts, be able to operate at all levels with mission orders, and know implicitly how to find, identify and select targets on its own. And it must do all of these things while maintaining air superiority.

The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as doctrine for the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The MAGTF is the only combat organization in the world intended to integrate ground, air, and logistics into a cohesive fighting unit at the lowest possible level. For this integration to occur, maneuver warfare doctrine must be thoroughly institutionalized in each of the MAGTF components.

The MAGTF command element must understand the nature of maneuver warfare on both the tactical and operational levels be prepared to issue mission orders clearly articulating commander’s intent to all three element of the MAGTF, and be able to unify the efforts of all three components in a single focus. The ground combat element must be able to put maneuver principles into practice-which is very different from simply talking about them.

As essential components of the MAGTF both the air and the logistics element must also be able to operate consistently with maneuver doctrine. Unfortunately both have been slighted in the discussions on maneuver warfare. The purpose of this article is to open an intensive discussion on maneuver warfare and Marine aviation in the context of MAGTF warfare.

Where can we start in assession what maneuver warfare means for aviation? The best place may be a picture of the maneuver-dominated battlefield. On that battlefield, there is no forward edge of the battle area; forces are intermixed, friendly and enemy, often to considerable depth. Units, both friendly and enemy, are on the move, often moving rapidly. As commanders at all levels take advantage of opportunities, units move in unanticipated directions, following only general lines of thrust Enemy counterthrusts create emergency situations quickly and unpredictably. Major enemy units, including armor units, get into our rear area, just as we get into theirs. Communications are often interrupted, and command is exercised through mission orders, not through constant directives. Shifts of reserves are of critical importance to both sides. Fire support from higher echelons is difficult, sometimes impossible. Key commanders are sometimes out of touch because they are up front, not in headquarters.-Planning at all levels must be improvised. In everything, time is the most critical quantity, as we seek to drive the tempo faster than the opponent can accommodate.

This is a battlefield dominated by the uncertainty, rapid change, disorder, and fog that make up friction. Following maneuver concepts, Marines attempt to magnify the fog and friction for the opponent, knowing they can operate in that medium better than he can. Guided by the commander’s intent, their mission, and by knowing the focus of efforts, they move fast and take audacious actions. They focus all their combat power on achieving a decision quickly.

Marine aviation must be able to operate effectively in this environment. It must make a major contribution to achieving a decision. Marginal contributions-causing some general attrition among the enemy, helping a platoon there and a company here by knocking out an occasional strong point, even winning the air battle (which alone usually hasn’t much effect on the outcome on the ground)are not enough.

Demands of Maneuver Warfare on Marine Aviation

How can we translate the nature and requirements of the maneuver warfare battlefield into aviation terms? A useful way to start is by looking at some of the specific demands maneuver warfare makes on its practitioners-air and ground.

Focus of Efforts

It demands all efforts be focused on achieving a decision. This is the concept of the Schwerpunkt or focus of efforts. In the focus of efforts, the commander decides what he will do in the specific situation to achieve a decision, always seeking to pit strength against weakness. Then he translates his concept into a unit, the unit that will lead the effort That unit becomes the focus and the commander supports it with all his combat power.*

If air is to operate on maneuver warfare principles, it must also have a focus of efforts. Generally, air’s focus will be the unit that is leading the ground effort. But that does not mean all air will simply act as close air support (although that may sometimes be the case). Rather, the air focus of efforts is the answer to the question, “What can air do in this situation that no other arm can do that will have a decisive effect on the outcome of the ground battle?” That “decisive effect” directs air in support of the ground focus of efforts because it represents the commander’s attempt to attain a decision on the ground. But the phrase “that no other arm can do” opens the door to many considerations.

Why should air focus its efforts on doing something that no other arm can do? The answer is simply because it is wasteful to have something-aviation-that can handle a wide variety of tasks doing something artillery or mortars or good infantry tactics can do just as well. It violates the principle of economy of force.

Some examples may help clarify the situation. Let us say that 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (2/8) is the focus of efforts in an attack. It has had good initial success and has outrun its artillery. In maneuver warfare, you do not want to stop at that point to let the artillery catch up; to do so would sacrifice tempo and let the enemy recover. However, 2/8 is now encountering heavy resistance it cannot bypass and needs fire support In this situation, close air support-using aircraft to replace the unavailable artillery support-is something decisive that only air can do. The mission order goes out from the MAGTF commander to the aviation combat element (ACE), “Support 2/8’s attack to keep it moving forward.” To accomplish this mission, air must be able to mass immediately in support of 2/8 and give it the fire support it needs.

Consider another case that illustrates a more subtle air focus of efforts. As a result of the close air support it received in the previous case, 2/8 breaks through into the enemy’s open depth. The ground commander commits his reserve to exploit the break-through and begins moving his whole force through the gap. At the same time, he knows the enemy has a powerful mechanized force in reserve. He tells the MAGTF commander, “I’ve opened a major gap to my northeast and I’m going through it” The MAGTF commander’s mission order to the ACE is, “Prevent enemy reserves from blocking the ground element’s advance to the northeast.” The ACE commander knows about the enemy’s reserve, because he is always fully read in on the ground situation (whenever possible, he should be collocated with the MAGTF commander). His order to the air units is, “Block movement of enemy mechanized reserves.” Again, the air must respond immediately with mass to perform its mission. It does so, and the enemy is caught in a combined arms dilemma: if he moves his reserves on the roads in columns, Marine air decimates them. If he does not, they will get there too late. He begins to come apart psychologically as well as physically.

These examples draw some key points about the air focus of efforts. First, to have a decisive effort, air must be able to mass. A few aircraft here, a couple more there, each flight doing something different, will seldom have a decisive effect. Such “penny-packeting” is the opposite of focusing efforts. This does not mean all aircraft always come in on one huge strike, though that may sometimes happen. As in the Luftwaffe’s support for Guderian’s Panzers at the crossing of the Meuse in 1940, the air support may be spread out over the time the ground force believes critical. But it will always be focused on accomplishing the decisive task, decisive in the ground battle, not the air battle.

Second, air must be able to mass on very short notice to accomplish something that was not planned. Tempo is vital in maneuver warfare, and air that can form or shift its focus quickly can accelerate the tempo. But if air takes hours or days of prior notice to mass, it is likely to slow the tempo, undermining rather than supporting the efforts of the ground force.

Third, air has a special quality other supporting arms do not share: the ability to shift its focus quickly over wide distances. As a battle or campaign progresses, the focus of efforts will often shift in response to changing threats and opportunities. Air can refocus its efforts much more quickly than other supporting arms. This is particularly true at the operational level, where the shift may involve distances of hundreds of kilometers.

Last, when we speak of an air focus of efforts, we are not saying that air is the focus for the MAGTF. There has been some misunderstanding on this point. Because in almost all situations it is the ground battle that is decisive, all efforts of the MAGTF are focused on the ground battle. As noted above, the air focus of efforts is the answer to the question, “What can air do that no other arm can do that will have a decisive effect on the ground battle?” In other words, the air supports the ground, at least the majority of the time. There may be some situations where an action by aviation would be the focus of the MAGTFs efforts, i.e., where air would be looked to for a decision. One case where this may occur is in the phase of an amphibious landing before the troops come ashore. But once ground combat is joined, history suggests air will seldom, if ever, be the MAGTFs focus of effort. The history of attempts to achieve decisions by air alone is one of repeated failures.

Mission Orders

Another demand maneuver warfare makes on its practitioners, ground and air, is that they be able to operate in fluid, rapidly changing situations. In air-to-ground battle, it means that aviation must be able to operate at all levels-from wing down through the individual aircraft-with mission orders complementary to ground mission orders. Air cannot expect to be told precisely where to go and what to do; rather, it must be able itself to translate-again, at all levels-the intent and mission and needs of ground commanders into appropriate actions by aircraft.

This means aviators must have a good understanding of ground warfare-as good an understanding as ground officers. They must understand it generally and also specifically in terms of the situation. The ground side must ensure that aviation is kept fully up to date on the ground picture. In turn, all aircraft, regardless of their specific mission, must always undertake reconnaissance of the ground battle. The information they gather must quickly be passed to the ground commander.

Air and ground must be a complete, integrated team, not through some organizational diagram or complicated command and control system, but through each having a shared picture of the other’s environment. The ground officer must strive to learn all he can about aviation and how it can assist him, just as he does with crew-served weapons and artillery. Aviators, for their part, cannot simply be technicians who fly airplanes and expect someone else to tell them what to do. Mission orders do not work that way. A system designed to provide specific direction cannot work on a fluid, rapidly changing battlefield; the situation will change faster than the detailed orders can be written and transmitted.

Intermixed Battlefield

In a maneuver ground battle, enemy and friendly forces are intermixed, there is no forward edge of the battle area, and forces change position rapidly and often in unexpected directions. No centralized, top-down system can tell aircraft where friendly forces are or whether forces in a given location are enemy or friendly.

This means that for aviation, the principal problem in air-to-ground work is not hitting targets but finding and identifying them. Finding them is alone very difficult; amid vegetation, fires, smoke, and a wide variety of vehicles, targets such as tanks, even tank units, can be very hard to find. Technology can be of some help here. But it is of little or no help in the second half of the problem: identifying friend from foe on the ground. There is no technology that can do this; the eyeball remains the best means. Historical experience suggests that maximum range at which targets can be correctly identified is a few hundred yards. Fastmoving aircraft cannot do it, at least not without repeated passes. And if aviation cannot do it, it is restricted to hitting little other than fixed targets.

A battlefield where forces are intermixed also poses a major challenge to helicopters. The attack helicopter, because of its ability to hover, may be significantly better able to find and identify targets than can a fixed-wing aircraft. But all helicopters face a new and serious survivability problem. Helicopters attempt to survive by flying very low. But on a battlefield where forces are intermixed, helicopters will continuously be flying low over enemy units. Modern ground forces have a large number of automatic weapons, and they can be counted on to point them in the direction of helicopters and shoot. Directly over enemy forces, at low level, helicopters will be relatively easy targets.

During Lam Son 719 in February and March of 1971, when the Army of the Republic of Vietnam invaded Laos in an attempt to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, just such a situation occurred. North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese units were mixed over approximately 500 square miles of battle area. U.S. Army helicopters, which were used to move troops and artillery about the Lam Son battlefield, were subjected to intense ground fire. The Army officially reported that 108 helicopters were shot down and 618 others damaged. Many believe these figures were actually much higher.

The maneuver battlefield raises the question, can helicopters survive over such a battlefield by flying low? Will losses to automatic weapons be prohibitive? If losses will be prohibitive with current tactics, what new tactics are called for? More fundamentally, is there an answer to this problem, or will the helicopters simply not be viable on a battlefield where friendly and enemy forces are intermixed? Clearly, a force that follows maneuver doctrine needs to answer these questions before it continues further investment in helicopters.

Selection of Targets

Air must be directed against targets that matter. Maneuver warfare is not merely a tallying up of “kills.” In that kind of warfare, attrition warfare, destruction of any enemy assets may count as a success.

In maneuver warfare, the object is to destroy the enemy’s ability to fight as a cohesive, organized force. History suggests that, for aviation, some targets matter a great deal more than others. In general, attacking fixed targets-lines of communication, rail yards, supply dumps, etc.-does not have much effect on the enemy’s ability to fight effectively. The targets that matter are, in general, enemy combat units and, more specifically, units that are doing something critical in the ongoing ground battle.

Attacking fixed targets-interdiction bombing-has a long history of failure: Operation STRANGLE in Italy during World War II, Operation STRANGLE in Korea, ROLLING THUNDER and COMMANDO HUNT in Vietnam. In none of these operations was air integrated into the ground battle. It simply battered the enemy, and the battering had no decisive effect. The redundancy, repair, and rerouting capabilities of the enemy’s supply system were able to overcome the effects of the bombing.

Other historical examples suggest that attacking some kinds of fixed targets can be effective when integrated with the ground situation. In Italy, following the failure of Operation STRANGLE, air was concentrated on the Germans’ logistical system, including both fixed and moving targets, at the same time that Allied ground forces undertook a major offensive. The air attack on their supply lines, when combined with the demands for supply generated by the Allied ground action, left the Germans with insufficient supplies, especially of fuel, to maneuver in the defense. This in turn convinced them to withdraw.

In general, attacks on enemy units are what count. For aviation to be effective on a maneuver battlefield, it must be able to find, identify, and attack enemy combat units. Examples of cases where air has had a decisive effect by doing this include the German blitzkrieg and the use of Allied airpower at Normandy.

There is an interesting symbiosis developed by air and ground working together in a maneuver environment. The nature of the ground battle makes moving enemy units especially important. Often, the moving units are reserves coming up to block a breakthrough or exploit a success, or major units that have gotten into our rear. In order to do what the enemy needs done to achieve a decision, they must move. Often, they must move fast, which usually means in column on roads.

This in turn makes them vulnerable to air attack. It also greatly reduces the quality of their air defenses. Generally, attacking fixed targets or stationary enemy units with emplaced air defenses has resulted in high aircraft losses and little important damage to the enemy. But when enemy units can be found and attacked while on the move, aircraft losses have been light and results good. Results encompass more than destruction; if the enemy units are significantly delayed by air attack, the delay itself may be decisive in maneuver warfare. In fact, the more maneuver oriented our ground forces are, the more delay will be disastrous to the enemy. So we have a symbiosis: the more our ground forces compel the enemy to move, the more vulnerable he is to air attack. And the more he can be delayed or destroyed from the air, the easier it becomes for our ground forces to carry on a battle of rapid maneuver. Here, air and ground really become a mutually reinforcing team.

It should be noted that this use of aviation does not translate simply into close support. Often, the most critical enemy units will not yet be engaged with our ground forces. Nor does it imply interdiction, which usually means hitting fixed targets. Perhaps the best term for much of what air should be doing is “armed reconnaissance.” Guided by the ground forces’ intent, aviation concentrates armed reconnaissance in the sector where we are seeking a decision. Aircraft crews know the ground situation, know what kinds of targets matter, and go out looking for them. When they spot them, they attack. Again, this places major demands on the air crews; they cannot simply be technicians who know how to fly airplanes and put bombs on targets designated by others. They must be able to operate in the ground combat environment as the ground forces themselves.

Air Superiority

One element remains to be discussed in the context of our maneuver battle on the ground: air-to-air action. The above discussion contains two major, if somewhat subtle, implications for the air-to-air battle. Usually, we are told that we must win air superiority before we can do much ground support. The air-to-air battle is given priority in time: it comes first.

Maneuver warfare challenges this dictum on two counts. First, the purpose of aviation is to help achieve a decision on the ground. Therefore, the ground situation, not some abstract rule, determines the priority of air-to-air compared to air-to-ground missions. If the ground battle is such that air must concentrate on air-to-ground action at the outset in order to have a decisive effect, then this is what it must do. If, for example, the enemy catches us by surprise at the outset and breaks through into our rear with major armor forces, aviation must concentrate on helping destroy those forces. It must do so at once; it cannot wait while it first fights the enemy air force. On the other hand, if the ground situation is not urgent at the outset, it may well be desirable to destroy the enemy air force first. This may be the case in amphibious operations before the MAGTF comes ashore.

Second, enemy air may not be a significant threat to our ground forces, depending on how well it can meet the above challenges. Is it focused on doing something decisive? Can it mass quickly in the face of the unexpected? Can it operate in a fluid, rapidly changing situation, i.e., with mission orders? Can it distinguish friend from foe on the ground where forces are intermixed? Can it effectively hit targets that matter, such as our reserves while they are moving to do something of critical importance? If the enemy can meet these criteria, his aviation is a major threat. Destroying it becomes a high priority.

On the other hand, if he cannot meet these criteria, his aviation may not matter much. It will cause us some random attrition, but it is not likely to have a decisive effect. This is true even if the enemy has a lot of modern aircraft. In this situation, the air-to-air battle takes on less importance. Certainly, it is desirable to destroy the enemy’s attack aviation because it will cause us some damage. But the priority is lower. Know which situation is the case-Can he operate effectively in a maneuver environment or can he not?-is the critical question for our intelligence.

At the same time, air-to-air action may be highly important to our own attack aviation. If the enemy has a capable fighter force, it is important that his fighters be kept off our attack aircraft. The ground attack pilot needs to concentrate fully on his task, with minimal distraction from enemy fighters. Air-to-air action that is needed to support our own ground attack aircraft also supports the ground commander.

This discussion gives us a conceptual frame of reference for examining aviation in maneuver warfare. Others will certainly be able to draw out additional implications. But it gives us an initial picture from which to work.

Where Does Marine Aviation Stand?

If we look at today’s Marine aviation, two different pictures emerge. One is of a number of aviation units that are working effectively toward maneuver warfare. They are wrestling with the requirements of the maneuver battlefield: use of mission orders, rapid massing, seeking to have a decisive effect, etc. An example of such work comes from a recent wing-level exercise. The opposing force (OpFor), comprising about an air group of mixed aircraft types, operated maneuver style. The results were most encouraging.

Unfortunately, not enough of this type of thinking and training is being done. Most Marine aviation units are not operating in ways consistent with a battle of maneuver on the ground. In exercises, they seldom have a focus of efforts; the very concept of seeking to do something decisive is usually missing (as it too often is on the ground side as well). Air units have little or no picture of what is happening on the ground, the scheme of maneuver, or the ground commanders intent (again, this is at least as much the fault of the ground commander as of the aviators). Mission orders are seldom employed; instead, everyone is tightly controlled through a centralized, directive, fragile, and very slow command and control system. Aviators are reduced to acting with no understanding of why they are doing something or what result is needed in terms of the ground battle. Such reduction of aviators to technicians has in turn undermined the true air-ground team to the point where many aviators now have little knowledge of, or interest in, ground warfare. Training seldom includes the most difficult task, finding and identifying targets from the air. Nor does Marine Corps aircraft procurement take this task into account; it is questionable whether it can be done from “fast movers.” The central problem maneuver warfare presents to the helicopter community, that of operating over an intermixed battlefield, goes unaddressed.

Again, it must be stressed that many individual aviators and some aviation units are exceptions to this gloomy picture. As one Marine aviator noted:

Most all fixed-wing pilots would like nothing better than to have a decisive impact on the ground battle but are not given the chance to fly an armed recce or fluid interdiction mission. . . . I don’t think it is the pilots’ fault. The system needs changing.

Unfortunately, the ground side has done little to draw aviation into maneuver warfare and into ground warfare. Ground commanders and units seldom make much effort to keep aviation apprised of what is happening on the ground in exercises or to build strong relationships with air units through regular exchanges of personnel, through inviting aviators to join them in the field and sending ground officers to spend some time with aviation units. Both ground and air seem to accept the growing air-ground split

What Must Be Done?

Clearly, this situation cannot be allowed to continue. Marine air must be able to operate according to Marine Corps doctrine-maneuver doctrine. What are some of the specific changes that are required?

Command and Control

One of the principal reasons for Marine aviation‘s inability to operate on a fluid, high-tempo battlefield is its elaborate, centralized, bureaucratic command and control system. A quick look at command and control for close air support illustrates the cumbersome and indeed unworkable nature of the system.

Let us look at Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9). The battalion is the focus of efforts of a Marine expeditionary brigade and has plenty of close air support sorties assigned to it. The leader of 2d Platoon, which is leading one of several thrusts in an attempted breakthrough, finds he is being held up by a strong enemy company-sized position. He knows 1/9 has outrun its artillery support, so he calls for air to suppress the enemy position.

What happens? Our platoon leader has to go through an elaborate process that includes:

* Establishing communication with the nearest forward air controller (FAC) (there is just one with the company) and requesting air.

* The FAC passes the request to the direct air support center (DASC), usually by radio Communications may be down, in which case the platoon leader gets no air support. If communications are up, the DASC responds positively if it has aircraft available. The DASC usually has little or no knowledge of the ground situation and cannot decide which requests are vital to the focus of efforts.

* The FAC’s request to the DASC is monitored by the battalion, regimental, division, and ultimately MAGTF fire support coordination centers (FSCCs). All have the authority to deny the request. In doctrine, silence is consent. Some units follow doctrine in this respect, but in others, each level must give positive approval.

* If the mission is approved, the DASC initially coordinates it. The aircraft are under close (or positive) control by the DASC and/or the tactical air coordinator (airborne) (Tac(A)). If events in the battle-enemy jamming, disruption or destruction of the DASC, or shooting down the TAC(A)-break the aircraft-to-DASC/TAC(A) loop, the mission cannot go.

* As he nears what he has been told is the target, the pilot comes under close control of the FAC or FAC(A). If this loop cannot be completed, the mission is aborted. If it can be completed, the FAC or FAC(A) directs the aircraft to the marked target. If events in combat have prevented marking the target, the aircraft will probably have a difficult time finding it, and the mission will fail. If it is marked, the pilot usually will still have no idea what the platoon commander needs done, i.e., suppress the target long enough for him to go around it. Through all of this, the two key players-the platoon commander and the pilot of the aircraft-have never talked directly with each other.

Such a complex, fragile, and communications-dependent system as this cannot hope to work on a maneuver battlefield. Indeed, it will have trouble working on a set-piece, slow-paced battlefield. Generally, for scheduled and on-call air, it requires a day to arrange a mission-a very long time in combat. “Immediate” air support exists in theory, but is seldom if ever practiced. Where does the current system leave our leaders of 2d Platoon, Company A, 1/9? Waiting, waiting, waiting . . .

How would a maneuver warfare air command and control system work? The details will have to be worked out in field exercises, but in general, for close air support it would work as follows:

Because 1/9 is the focus of efforts, it has ample close air support assigned to it as direct support. This translates into actual airplanes loitering in the vicinity or on nearby ground alert (within direct communicating distance) if they are vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft. The pilots know the ground situation, the ground commander’s intent (break through into the enemy’s depth, then envelop him from the right), and that 1/9 is the brigade Schwerpunkt.

A platoon leader says, “Wolf Pack (aircraft in direct support) this is Storm Cloud” on his radio.

The flight leader of AV-8s holding recognizes the call sign Storm Cloud as that of 2d Platoon, Company A, 1/9 and responds, “Go Storm Cloud.”

PLT: “Need suppression of strong enemy unit located at 897345 for next 15 minutes while we bypass. Friendlies located 500 meters south. Will ID our position by smoke. Call inbound and one minute out.”

The aircraft immediately take off. The flight leader knows the platoon’s intent and what it needs from aviation: 15 minutes of suppression on an enemy position. Knowing he has only enough ordnance to make two passes, he calls additional aircraft to help cover the 15-minute period.

AV-8s: “Wolf Pack lead inbound. Dash-2 20 seconds in trail.”

PLT: “Copy.” The lieutenant readies his smoke. “Roger, identify smoke?”

AV-8 lead: “One minute out.”

PLT: The lieutenant pops his smoke. “Roger, identify smoke?”

AV-8 lead: “Tally, I’ve got green smoke.”

PLT: “Roger, Friendlies at green. Target 500 meters north.”

After the first aircraft goes in, the second finds the target by the burst of the lead’s bombs and a correction from the lieutenant, who is personally observing the fire. Additional passes are pinpointed on the target. Covered by the fire from the aircraft, 2d Platoon bypasses, detailing a machinegun detachment to keep the strongpoint suppressed from its rear as follow-on units come up while the rest of the platoon continues the advance. Close air support has had a decisive effect by allowing the advance of the Schwerpunkt to continue.

In his comments on a draft of this paper, one Marine aviator with Vietnam combat experience wrote, “I have flown a number of CAS missions in direct support of units that were a main effort, and I flew them with the stated mission to support the unit’s mission. We just didn’t use the current terms of Schwerpunkt and missiontype orders. But the control by the ground commander being supported was exactly like you state control should be. There was no complicated TACP communication loop that our manuals speak about . . . We, and I mean a number of airplanes, simply loitered in a secure area with direct communications to the ground commander. When he called we were there in a matter of minutes . . . We do not exercise these types of missions in peace time exercises . . . I have only been involved in one exercise that used CAS realistically and unfortunately that was with the Army in the Philippines. I personally could not get a Marine MEB commander to exercise in the same location. Very few of our Marine ground commanders and aviators have seen Marine CAS work the way it is supposed to.”

This is a radically simpler system than the present one. It has only one critical communication link: the man on the ground at the critical point and the pilot. It is driven from the bottom up, not the top down. It can react to fast-changing events as pilots use initiative rather than waiting to be told what to do.

How does the armed reconnaissance mission work under this new system? We can find an example in Hans Ulrich Rudel’s book Stuka Pilot. At one point, during the long German retreat back through Russia, Rudel observed a German tank unit that was falling back. Separated by some masking terrain but on a collision course he saw a strong Soviet tank force. He realized that by the time the Germans saw the Soviets, they would be in trouble. Worse, Rudel and the rest of his flight were out of ammunition. What did he do?

I fire red Verey flares, wave and drop a message in a container . . . . By dipping my aircraft towards the spot where the T-34s are travelling at the moment, I tip [the Germans] off to the nearness of the enemy.

Thanks to his warning, the Germans ambush the Russians and destroy their whole force with no loss to themselves.

This classic case of effective armed reconnaissance raises some questions:

* Could an F-18 or AV-8 going fast at low level, have found the tank force and, if it found it, recognized it as Soviet? Maybe.

* Would the Marine aviator immediately have appreciated the threat this force posed to the rear guard, i.e., would he have understood the ground situation from what he saw? Not if he were one of the many aviators who always ignored “the ground stuff.”

* Does current Marine air-ground doctrine allow an aviator to immediately attack a hostile enemy ground force within close proximity of friendly units, even without any communications? No.

Under the new approach advocated here, Marine aviators would act just as Rudel did. They would understand what they were seeing on the ground because they would be thoroughly educated in ground warfare and they would be well briefed on the ground situation. They would be able to make sense of what they were seeing. They would always have permission to act on their own initiative, according to the situation-whether or not they had communications with the ground.

Equipment

The debate over how to adapt Marine aviation to maneuver warfare should focus for the most part on using the equipment it already has. The defense budget situation suggests that major new procurements are unlikely for the foreseeable future.

However, funding should be sufficient to permit two relatively small, but quite important, acquisitions. The first is the 30mm gun pod. Unlike the 25mm gun, the 30mm gun can effectively strafe armored vehicles. It has a tank-killing capability. Sufficient gun pods should be acquired to equip every Marine aircraft that can carry one.

For similar reasons, every suitable aircraft should be equipped to deliver air-scatterable mines. While these mines are not likely to achieve many kills, they have considerable ability to delay enemy armor columns. In maneuver warfare, delay is often as useful as destruction. The mines themselves should be acquired in large quantities so they can be used extensively in combat.

At the same time these systems are acquired, two equipment-related actions now underway should be reconsidered. The first is the acquisition of the MV-22 Osprey. Until the issue of helicopter vulnerability on a battle-field where ground forces are intermixed can be resolved, it is foolish to proceed with the procurement of an aircraft that will share the helicopter’s vulnerability. By going ahead with the Osprey without resolution of this question, the Marine Corps risks putting an immense amount of money-around $30 billion-into a system that may not be viable in combat. Indeed, even if the vulnerability question is resolved, it is doubtful whether a Service as small as the Marine Corps should attempt, virtually alone, a $30 billion program.

Second, the planned elimination of the OV-10 should be reconsidered. The OV-10 undoubtedly has weaknesses, but it also has the advantage that it flies slow enough so its crew can see things on the ground. Its main mission, reconnaissance, will be vitally important in maneuver warfare, and it is questionable whether effective tactical reconnaissance can be done from fast-moving jets. Further, it appears the OV-10 can carry the 30mm gun pod, which would turn it into a well-armed ground support aircraft. Especially in Third World “low intensity” conflicts, the OV-10 might prove substantially more effective than its faster, but largely blind brethren.

Finally, when funds for new aircraft do eventually become available, serious considerations should be given to the acquisition of what is sometimes called a “Blitzfighter” or “Mudfighter.” The closest thing to a true Mudfighter currently in the inventory is the Air Force’s A-10. Like the A-10, the Mudfighter is slow, because it is difficult to find and identify ground targets at high speed. Unlike the A-10, a true Mudfighter would be small, agile, and cheap. It is possible that a projected future version of the Harrier, the mini-close-air-support Harrier, might be a suitable Mudfighter, as might be a propeller-driven aircraft currently under development by British Aerospace.

Training

The most important implication of maneuver warfare for Marine aviation training is that it must integrate Marine aviators with Marine ground forces in every possible way. When Hans Rudel, was asked to state the most important piece of advice he would like to pass on to his successors, he said, “Always think of yourself as a soldier, not a flier.” This maxim must guide all aviation training. From his first day at The Basic School onward, the Marine aviator must understand that “the ground stuff is just as important to him as it is to the Marine ground officer. He will live and work and fight in that environment just as much as will his ground counterpart. In fact, he bears a double burden: he must know how to fly his airplane and he must understand ground warfare. If all he knows is his airplane, he will be ineffective as a Marine aviator; he will not be able to operate on mission orders in the context of a fast-changing ground battle because he will not be able to make sense of what he is seeing.

This overriding requirement in turn mandates some more specific changes:

* We must design exercises so aviators face the challenge of finding and identifying ground targets, just as they will in combat. Marine versus Marine exercises are not very helpful here because all the equipment is the same. Marine versus Army helps to some extent. If structured correctly, exercises with other countries could be very valuable for presenting this problem.

* All exercises must use mission-type orders. The ground commanders and the overall MAGTF commander must require aviation to operate in a free-play environment, with tasking on short notice and demands for massed air focused on doing something decisive. A requirement for quick responsiveness in a free-play environment will quickly bring deficiencies like those in the command and control system to the fore, at the same time generating pressure for change.

* Nowhere-not in exercises, not in schooling, not in basing-should aviation be separated from the ground forces. In training such as that at Marine Aviation Weapons Training Squadron 1, the ground side should not simply get a ritual bow, with a slide of a “grunt” at the start of the brief, some hollow rhetoric about “we’re here to support him,” and a minimal ground scenario that is really just a fig leaf over an overall air plan.

One Marine aviator, a lieutenant colonel, wrote:

If there is one thing that has always proven to be true when supporting ground units, it is that being read into the scheme of maneuver from all angles is a must! This can only be done by living and breathing it. I found it mandatory when perfonning FAC(A)/TAC(A) to attend ground planning/training sessions, sand tables, etc. so as to perform the basic mission. . . .

* Training should be used to build personnel relationships between air and ground. Each air squadron should have a ground unit as its regular partner. In combat, the need to mass air in support of the Schwerpunkt means one air unit cannot always support the same ground unit. But a habitual, institutionalized relationship in peacetime can build valuable personal relationships and a genuine interest in ground warfare on the part of aviators. As part of the relationship, aviators should do tours with the ground unit, and not only as FACs. The occasional but infrequent practice of giving an aviator a ground billet, including assignments as a platoon or company commander, should be greatly expanded. It is natural for an aviator to focus on his air-craft; training must be designed to overcome that natural tendency and focus him instead on soldiering.

* Air training itself needs substantial reform. The current overemphasis on safety-one of the many unfortunate byproducts of overpriced aircraft-must be brought under control. An air squadron commander should be rated more on the tactical proficiency of his squadron than on whether or not he loses an airplane. “Five hundred foot bubbles” and other impediments to realistic training must be eliminated. In air-to-air training, large free-play scenarios must be the norm, and flight hours must be increased. Carrying as he must the double burden of knowing how to fly his airplane and understanding ground warfare, the pilot must not be given yet another burden: massive amounts of paperwork and “collateral duties.” As on the ground side, junior officers must be allowed to make mistakes, to experiment and innovate, and to take initiative.

* Just as with ground officers, aviators must be educated in the history and theory of war. They must read military history-ground to air. They must know the history of such issues as what kinds of targets matter, what characteristics make an aircraft successful or unsuccessful, and how air can make a decisive contribution to the ground battle. They must know what has not worked in the past so they do not repeat it They must be prepared to advise MAGTF commanders on the employment of air, not simply the technical side, but tactically and operationally.

Institutional Culture

Training considerations lead naturally into the last and most important area where maneuver warfare demands changes in Marine aviation: institutional culture. Rudel’s call for aviators to be soldiers first and fliers second is a call for a change in culture. Despite rhetoric about the “air-ground team,” what we really have today is an air-ground split. As early as The Basic School, lieutenants who know they are going to aviation often disregard “the ground stuff,” much as ground officers too often ignore material on aviation. Tours as FACs are generally dreaded (in part because ground units often do not make good use of their FACs). Canned air-ground exercises increase the split by leaving aviators bored with air-to-ground action. In many exercises, the split continues as air operates according to its own rules and preferences, and the ground side, while resenting it, accepts it

Replacing the air-ground split with a culture that makes Marine aviators (especially fixed-wing, since helicopter pilots tend to work more closely with ground forces) soldiers first and pilots second is the greatest challenge facing aviation‘s leadership-at all levels. Senior aviators must come to realize that cultural issues, not budgets and equipment, are the most important in terms of winning in combat. They must drive aviation to focus on ground combat at all levels. The schools alone are not enough; it must happen in squadrons, groups, and wings as well. The Commandant is now driving a similar process on the ground side. He needs support from aviators in making it happen on the air side.

Perhaps the greatest impediment to the Rudel mentality is an attitude prevalent among aviators that as long as they are competent technicians-as long as they can fly their airplanes well, win dogfights, and get bombs on target-they have done all that should be expected of them. Technical expertise is necessary, but not sufficient. History has many examples of technically competent air Services that had little effect on the outcome of the battle or conflict; the Air Force in ROLLING THUNDER is an example. Just doing the technical job right is not enough.

More fundamentally, no officer should ever be a mere technician. He may have to be a technician among other things, but any billet that requires none but technical skills should be filled by a technical specialist. If we are to have officers as aviators, then they must be real officers: people who can think and lead as well as fly airplanes. They must understand war, not just machinery.

Again, others will certainly be able to add to what has been written here. There are undoubtedly further implications for Marine aviation in the Corps’ adoption of maneuver warfare as doctrine. The purpose of this article is to get the ball rolling, to begin to focus thought and discussion on Marine air in the context of maneuver warfare. My hope is that this paper will stimulate Marines of all ranks, air and ground, to take on the question, “What does maneuver doctrine mean for aviation?” More than 10 years ago, we began a similar discussion on the ground side. The time has come to bring aviation into the maneuver warfare MAGTF.

Note

*The concept of focus of efforts does not translate into a single thrust Almost always, an attack involves multiple thrusts, which are critically important for generating ambiguity and confusion. Multiple thrusts are undertaken both within the unit that is the focus of efforts and also by other units. If another unit’s thrust obtains better resulls, it may be redesignated the focus of efforts. This does not alter the fact that combat power, particularly supporting arms, will be concentrated to support the unit that is the current focus.

Also note the term “focus of efforts” (plural). This was suggested by Col John Boyd as an improvement to the singular “focus of effort” It suggests the idea of multiple thrusts and actions. It is particularly apt for MAGTF warfare, which always involves the efforts of ground, air, and logistics.

Marine Air

by Maj James P. Etter

A 1988 Chase Contest Entry

During the Falklands conflict in May 1982, the successful Argentine bombing attacks against British shipping were carried out at altitudes below 200 feet Debriefs with Argentine pilots found that before the war, daily training was conducted at 50 feet. Argentine pilots believed it was easier to learn to fly at these altitudes in peacetime than on the first day of war.

It is well known that military units “fight like they train.” For this reason, we must step back and reflect on the focus of our training and ensure that it will meet the demands of the battle-field-that it will provide the experience and create the skills needed to win. If we do well in properly focused training, we should do well on the battlefield. This article will address the focus of Marine air training in target identification, tactical flying, and maneuver warfare-three areas that are of vital on today’s battlefield.

Target Identification

Ask any aviator what is the most difficult task on the battlefield, and he will tell you target identification. Historically, the battlefield has required specific target identification when attacking either ground or air targets. For example, recent air strikes in Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya required that aircrews positively identify their targets before engaging them. If targets were not identified, pilots were restricted from releasing their ordnance.

The fundamental problem with target identification is that the main equipment used to identify and distinguish targets has not changed with the advance of technology. The human eye remains the same. Although many nations have spent millions of dollars attempting to extend the eye’s capabil-ity, the battlefield limits this process. The human eye is still the dominant identifier in airto-ground and airtoair combat.

Historical data gathered in a 1983 Pentagon study shows that between 1954 and 1982 only four airtoair kills were achieved beyond visual range (BVR). All other airtoair kills involved visual target identification by the pilot. Although aircraft missiles give us the capability to shoot beyond visual range, BVR kills are few due to rules of engagement and battlefield dynamics.

When aircraft were first armed with offensive weapons, the ranges of these weapons were less than the range of the human eye. A target would be found and then the aircraft would be flown to the target to employ its weapons system. Today, however, the reverse is true. The range of an aircraft’s weapons system far exceeds the identification range of the human eye. This allows the target to be in range of the weapons system before the pilot can detect it visually.

Our training, however, seems to have focused on the extended capabilities of the weapons system but ignored the actual limitations that exist on the battlefield. In the Marine Corps fighter community, some F/A-18 training uses BVR target elimination even though BVR kills will be the exception in combat. Fleet missile shoot exercises, which are the pilots only chance at firing a missile, are also structured to allow for the firing of AIM-7 missiles under BVR conditions. In addition, these missile exercises are built around benign, nonmaneuvering, and straight and level scenarios.

Combat airtoair missile engagement results from Vietnam and the Falklands’ air war illustrate how unrealistic such training is. Prior to Vietnam, missile statistics from training showed an 80 percent kill capability for both Sidewinder and Sparrow missiles. However, “during the period from February 1965 to March 1968, U.S. Air Force Phantoms fired 224 AIM-7 and 175 AIM-9 missiles achieving only an 8.9 and 16.0 percentage of kills, respectively.” During the Falk-lands conflict British pilots continually tried in vain to shoot Argentine air-craft from the head-on position. Technologically, the new AIM-9L missile had this capability, but out of “18 airtoair kills, there were zero head-on kills.” My point is that both the American and British pilots had much greater technological capability than the battlefield would allow.

In the ground attack community, airto-ground target identification training is a critical problem. Little realisitc training is being conducted where pilots have full responsibility for properly identifying a target. In all cases a forward air controller on the ground or in the air-a FAC or FAC(A)-or a range controller confirm identification for the pilot or the pilot merely tries to hit what is in close proximity to the marking round.

Where is the training that requires a pilot to hit a moving or camouflaged target? Where is the training that requires a pilot to practice popping up on a target, telling the difference between an M-60 and a T-72 tank, and then delivering effective fire on the tank? The F/A-18, the AV-8B, and the A-6 all tout their accuracy, but shooting at what-a stationary bullseye on a raked range, a stack of rubber tires that is supposed to be a ZSU or an AAA site, or a stationary armor hulk that is placed in an open field for ease of identification?

The average circular error of probability (CEP) for the attack community is approximately 15-20 feet. This score reflects a pilot’s ability to bomb a single, stationary, noncamouflaged target on a known range with little or no consideration to approaching the target tactically. The CEP for the average German Stuka pilot prior to World War II was 10 meters. BGen PaulWemer Hozzel, a retired Stuka pilot reflects:

The accuracy depended on the training of which I have spoken on before . . . . What we aimed at was to achieve hits in a circle with a radius of 10 meters from the center. . . . But you can imagine the difference diving with accuracy and hitting the target without anyone shooting at you from the ground. When you get fire in your face it is quite another situation.

In the attack helicopter community pilots spend little to no time on target identification. Cobra pilots rarely train with multiple targets or in a scenario where they must identify the one or two enemy tanks that are engaged with friendly tanks. Identifying targets at night under illumination or with night vision goggles is a realistic battlefield possibility, but it is rarely practiced.

No matter what the range of the weapon, the target must be identified before it can be engaged. All successful tactics must be based on this fact. If one fails to understand this and bases doctrine and training on the theoretical full capability of the weapons system and absent from the target identification problem, he will find activity on the battlefield quite different from the activity in training. He will find himself poorly prepared for the realities of war.

Tactical Flying

Whether we like it or not, the battle-field will demand certain tactical skills. During the Falklands conflict, Argentine pilots were required to fly at altitudes well below 100 feet in order to survive. World War II Stuka pilot Hans Rudel recounts: “we fly in low over the water from the south; it is dark and murky; I cannot distinguish anything more than 2,000 to 2,500 feet ahead . . . . I am flying at 90 feet . . . . ” Studies from the several Arab-Israeli conflicts indicate that fixed-wing aircraft must be able to routinely operate at altitudes below 200 feet and at speeds in excess of 450-500 knots. As noted by aviation author Jeffrey Ethell, “In South Africa, pilots of helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft are flying as close to the ground as possible in order to survive against a modern Soviet threat.”

If all battlefield indications point to demanding low altitude flying, 200 feet and below, then why aren’t we doing it in training? Low pilot proficiency in low altitude flying as well as other related pilot skills are reflected in both fixed-wing and helicopter communities. This low pilot proficiency in low altitude flying is for a variety of reasons.

First, the fixed-wing community is restricted from flying below 200 feet in its training-a peacetime safety consideration that prevents pilots from acquiring one of the skills that will be absolutely essential in war.

Second, flying next to the ground at high speeds is exceptionally dangerous and requires a large amount of training time to gain proficiency. Pilots don’t have the time to do this training. Pilots can’t deploy on an average of 2 to 3 months per year, properly execute their nonflying duties-S-1, S-2, S-3, etc.-stay proficient in flying, and still fly tactically. As an example, an F/A-18 pilot cannot be tactically proficient when his mission includes both fighter and attack, and will soon include the missions of the RF-4B, and TA-4F/J, the OA-4M, and eventually the A-6E. Technology can aid in mission accomplishment, but it is still the man that is the linchpin in aviation. One man can only do so much.

Another example comes from the helicopter community, where a pilot is required to have 25 hours of night vision goggle (NVG) time prior to flying a terrain following (TERF) mission with troops. The problem is not the 25hour requirement. It is the approximate 12-month period it takes to accumulate those 25 hours of NVG time in order to qualify for TERF NVG flying. The major reason given for this delay is that other commitments prevent the squadrons from flying the required amount of night flying. Although other commitments may seem important, you go to war the way you are trained, as Marine helicopter pilots did on 25 October 1983 when:

. . . at 0305 the first helicopters took off from the Guam, in total darkness. [Grenada: Operation URGENT FURY] . . . . All aircraft carried night vision goggles, but some of the pilots had not yet qualified in their use.

A second reason for reduced tactical flying proficiency is the inability to demand and monitor a high level of tactical excellence. The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) can be a very adequate and reflective tool for measuring tactical flying proficiency and combat readiness, but the aviation community is largely paying lip service to it.

Most units preparing for a MCCRES evaluation are allowed to study gouge sheets or the exact test that has been leaked out so the unit will not look bad or, heaven forbid, fail. Most of the flying portion of the MCCRES evaluation is rehearsed several times by the same individuals who will also execute the mission on the examination. Since MCCRES’s inception in 1978, not a single aviation flying squadron has failed. Further, the average aviation MCCRES score is between 95-98 percent. These results are a better reflection of the high degree of prior knowledge of MCCRES testing material than they are of tactical proficiency or combat readiness.

A squadron commander and his staff can do little in the way of focusing on tactical flying if their ability to evaluate tactical proficiency or combat readiness is somewhat askew or if non-tactical activities prevent them from dedicating enough time for tactical flying.

Maneuver Warfare

The ground side of the Marine Corps has adopted the doctrinal concept of maneuver warfare. What impact does this have on the aviation community? Will the same operational techniques work for aviation no matter what the ground doctrine of battle?

Maneuver warfare is dominated by rapid change, independent action, and decentralized control. The direction of battle is controlled through implicit commands vice explicit commands. Mission, center of gravity, and commander’s intent shape the battle; the focus is on the enemy. It is on this battlefield that Marine air must develop its warfighting concepts.

The essence of maneuver warfare is high operational tempo. A central concept is to increase the dynamics on the battlefield to such a level that the opponent begins to fail, loses his cohesion, and can no longer fight as an effective, organized force. However, for the battlefield to reach such a point of high dynamics, the parts must begin to act independently. Not independently without direction but independent in relation to the whole of battle, which is directed and guided by the commander’s intent, the mission, and the constant focus on the enemy.

The question then becomes what will Marine aviation have to do on this battlefield that is different from what they are doing today? First, Marine aviation must learn to think and act differently. Aviators must look past the cockpit. Aviators must not only know how to fly their aircraft tactically to survive, but they must know what effect they want to have on the battlefield and why. They must start learning the whole of battle so that, when they are compelled by the battlefield to take action, they know what action to take and why. Currently, Marine aviation is focused too narrowly on the mechanics of getting “bombs on target.” Although target accuracy is necessary, in maneuver warfare it is the what, where, and why targets are hit in relation to other battlefield activity that is extremely important.

The Cobra pilots must be able to think like infantry commanders. They must not only understand and know their weapon system and tactics, they must also understand how to employ their weapon systems under the guidance of the commander’s intent and the mission, while continually focusing on the enemy. Fixed-wing pilots must be able to respond immediately to an ever-changing ground situation and understand the ground situation when they arrive in the target area.

For Marine aviation this means that we must break our dependency on centralized control in the execution of air power and become less reliant on preplanned missions. This means that pilots must learn new techniques on how to identify critical targets without the aid of a mark or a FAC, and learn how to employ air power by evaluating battlefield situations. This is much different than taking out a specific target when directed by higher authority. We must truly become an air-ground team in doctrine as well as in training. Marine aviation must focus its training totally on supporting the ground commander’s mission and intent, while all focus on the enemy.

Conclusion

“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is very difficult.”

-Clausewitz

It is because war has so many unknowns that simple things like identifying a target become very difficult. If you have spent your training time trying only to identify targets that are easy to see, static, nonmaneuvering, and not intermixed with friendly forces or places in difficult terrain, you are going to have a tremendous amount of difficulty in war. War offers abundant difficulties; we do not need to add to them by ignoring lessons of the past Granted, we will make plenty of mistakes on our own, but we do not need to repeat the mistakes of others.

Although the battlefield is illusive and sometimes it requires a great amount of insight to ferret out the correct solution, it can and must be done. If Marines are to fly tactically then they must look to the battlefield to find out what skills are required and practice them.

The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrine. It is a doctrine that depicts a very active battlefield. New tactics are the answer, not new equipment Old practices, only done faster and with more “G” on the aircraft, will be of little help.

For Marines the final test will always be the battlefield; anything else that we might do really doesn’t matter. Marines must be able to fight and fight well. In almost all cases the difficulties that we have in training will emerge again on the battlefield. We must not ignore this implication. Marine air must continually look to the battlefield and develop the appropriate tactics, thinking, and realistic training. If it has to be done in war, then Marines must practice it in peace.

The Art of MAGTF Warfare

Maj R. Scott Moore

First Place 1988 Chase Prize Essay Contest

Although almost 10 years have passed since William S. Lind and his followers first introduced maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps, the concepts still struggle for acceptance. While some resistance to maneuver warfare may be attributed to the natural reluctance of any military organization to change, much can be blamed on the so-called “maneuverists” themselves. Mr. land’s abrasiveness aside, the advocates of maneuver warfare have done a poor job of explaining their theory. Couching arguments in vague generalities and historical examples recalling the glory of the German Wehrmacht, they have alienated many Marines who must fight the next battle. This shortfall could have tragic consequences, for the concepts of maneuver warfare offer Marines a fresh means of facing the future. Maneuver warfare, by its concentration on tactical excellence rather than numerical superiority, is uniquely suited to the Corps. Unfortunately, the confusion surrounding maneuver warfare has obscured this basic fact.

If maneuver warfare is to be of any value to the Marine Corps, then it must be grafted to the unique missions and requirements of Marines. A Marine adaptation-a version that meets the theoretical and practical needs of Marine airground task forces (MAGTFs)-should emerge. We might call this the art of MAGTF warfare.

Two basic facts beg acceptance if this change is to be accomplished. First, the concepts of maneuver warfare are based on sound historical examples and cannot be discounted by the military professional. Second, although the Marine Corps, like any military force, has made mistakes, it possesses a fine historical combat record that can, at least in part, be attributed to its doctrine. Acceptance of these two facts should bring the conclusion that maneuver warfare and Marine doctrine are not mutually exclusive. With that in mind, synthesizing the best of both into a practical guide for Marines who will fight the next war is but a short step.

Before maneuver warfare can be interwoven with Marine Corps realities, both elements should be reviewed and understood. The basic concepts of maneuver warfare are actually quite simple. Based on retired Air Force Col John Boyd’s observation-orientation-decision-action cycle (the OODA loop), the theory states that the military unit more rapidly able to receive information and turn it into effective action will eventually place its enemy in an untenable situation. In battlefield terms, this can be accomplished through three so-called “filters”-the focus of main effort, surfaces and gaps, and mission-type orders. Without belaboring the already belabored, this translates into seeking out the enemy’s weaknesses, keeping him guessing, and doing both through decentralized control of subordinate units, allowing them to exploit fleeting opportunities. To Marines, this is often equated to gaining and maintaining the initiative. But it is more than that; maneuver warfare is a way of thinking about battle that continually sees it as a contest of wills, not weapons. Rather than outmuscling opponents, in the tradition of the Somme, Iwo Jima, and Khe Sanh, maneuver warfare seeks to outfight opponents more in the manner of Sherman before Atlanta, the German blitzkrieg, and the British in the Falklands.

Central to the theory of maneuver warfare is the concept of the operational art. A rather esoteric concept, the operational art has never been meaningfully defined for Marines. The Army, in FM 100-5, defines it in terms of corps-sized actions, a notion largely ridiculous to the Marine. Yet, the operational art is critical to the Marine’s ability to fight on the battlefield, for it provides direction to his series of small-unit battles. The operational art, then, is the art of using tactical outcomes, successful or not, to achieve a commander’s objectives. While Mr. Lind may speak of it as being the link between tactics and strategy, it is more straightforward than that. For Marines, the operational art is the art of MAGTF warfare, whatever the size of the MAGTF. This concept will be discussed in some detail below; however, Marines must never lose sight of the MAGTF commander’s unique ability to mesh the tactical outcomes of both ground and air battles into a coherent, multidimensional campaign.

As sound as the principles of maneuver warfare may be, they must be tempered by the realities of Marine Corps operations. Strategically, Marines face a rather clearly delineated set of parameters. Short of war against the Russians, a highly unlikely prospect, Marines will be confronted by low- to mid-intensity conflicts. These range from small guerrilla wars to major armored engagements. One aspect, however, will remain constant-They will be fought with existing forces, within a relatively short span of time, and under political restraints. Mobilization, including the draft, will not be authorized. Most importantly, Americans will expect quick results. Casualties without measurable progress will not be tolerated as shown by contrasting American reactions to Grenada and Beirut. Political objectives, expressed in restrictive rules of engagement, will temper military operations. In short, future combat will be fought for limited objectives with limited forces.

The logistical capabilities of the Navy and Air Force further constrain Marine forces. As all Marines are aware, strategic airlift and sealift are severely limited, particularly for amphibious operations. Quite often, these limitations, rather than operational imperatives, drive the task organization of the landing force. Even with the maritime pre-positioning program, Marines need an Air Force commodity that may not always be available, particularly if they must compete with Army forces to get to the battlefield. These strategic and logistical limitations determine the type of battle an expeditionary Marine force will fight. Not only must the Marine be able to achieve decisive results rapidly for strategic and political reasons, he must do it without the forces or the logistics buildup necessary to achieve overwhelming numerical superiority. The Marine must be able to outfight his opponent, be it a mechanized desert army or a jungle-bound insurgency. The extent to which Marines apply the principles of maneuver warfare may well determine their success.

Fortunately, the Marine Corps possesses a doctrinal organization capable of meeting the demands of the future battlefield. The MAGTF meshes theory with reality by fielding a small, expeditionary, self-sufficient, combined arms force that is potentially far more lethal than its limited size might indicate. The truly unique aspect of the MAGTF resides in its aviation combat element (ACE). Marine propaganda aside, the ACE’s true value does not lie in its ability to provide close support to the rifleman. The MAGTF structure enables its commander to designate either a ground or air focus of main effort, greatly expanding his ability to keep an enemy off balance. The MAGTF thus becomes an operational level command, despite its relatively small size, able to fight an integrated air-ground battle by shifting its emphasis between dimensions as the situation dictates. It can exploit enemy gaps quickly, not having to rely on cumbersome inter-Service coordination and successive command layers. This has been at the heart of the Marine Corps’ insistence or retaining control of its air assets during joint operations and will remain so in the future.

To fully exercise the air-ground capabilities of the MAGTF, Marines must understand the importance of the MAGTF command element. For too long, Marines have regarded the MAGTF command element as little more than a collection of coordinators and referees, whose function centered on ensuring that the ground combat element (GCE) and ACE remained in harmony and in deflecting intrusions from outside headquarters. Yet, retention of a rapid decision cycle demands more of the MAGTF command element. Fire support coordination can no longer be the sole responsibility of the GCE. Given modern, long-range weaponry, the threat, and, most important, the role of the ACE, fire support coordination must take place at the level most able to coordinate fires effectively for the entire force. General support artillery, deep air support, long-range naval gunfire, and rear area fires will all occur within the amphibious objective area and cannot be effectively planned or coordinated by the GCE. Additionally, combat units normally associated with the GCE or ACE may be controlled directly by the MAGTF command element. The MAGTF reserve, for example, cannot be encumbered by an intervening command element. The key considerations must be maintaining the ability to rapidly identify weaknesses and then shifting the focus of main effort, air or ground, to exploit them. This can only be accomplished at the MAGTF level.

The role of the MAGTF reserve, alone, justifies an enhanced command element. The reserve provides a commander with the ability to bring decisive power to bear at the critical point. This translates to that point which will unhinge the enemy’s cohesion. Normally, the MAGTF reserve is expressed in terms of the GCE. The assumption is that the reserve will be employed by the GCE in reaction to a GCE requirement. While such a mission is important, it is the function of the GCE reserve, not the MAGTF reserve. The MAGTF reserve must be keyed to the enemy’s critical weakness, be it ground, air, or logistical. The reserve, therefore, should not be solely a ground unit. Like the MAGTF, it must be an integrated combined arms force and may well be composed primarily of aviation units. It may even be employed before, rather than after, the MAGTF fully commits its main forces, should the opponent’s center of gravity be discovered early in the campaign. The MAGTF reserve, like the command element, cannot be solely tied to the GCE’s capabilities or requirements.

MAGTF warfare, however, remains hollow if not adapted to the major subordinate elements. As the ground gaining component, the GCE has been the priority target of maneuver warfare reform, and it would be redundant to recount the precepts established in OH 6-1. Ground Combat Element. Two points should be reiterated, however. First, and most crucial, the GCE is nothing if not a combined arms team. This seems obvious enough, but the term “combined arms” is an abused phrase. Too often, it equates to prep fires followed by an infantry assault, not much different in principle from the Somme. Combined arms imply more than just supporting fires. Properly understood, the term refers to fire and maneuver molded into one element, confronting the enemy with a dilemma. Actions taken to defend against firepower automatically endanger him from maneuver. When the dust clears, the enemy should emerge from his hole confronted by a Marine or, better still, bypassed and useless to the battle. In achieving this, suppression reigns. While destruction of a target may be impressive, its accomplishment not only wastes ammunition, it prevents the maneuver element from approaching its objective before the enemy survivors can recover. Neither can be afforded. Combined arms, more than the mere technical application of supporting fires, must be the foundation of the GCE.

The second MAGTF warfare principle associated with the GCE is the missiontype order, which is neither the exclusive property of the GCE nor well understood. The mission-type order applies equally to the ACE and the combat service support element (CSSE). For all three, it provides a means of battlefield control and integration. The key ingredient resides in the commander’s intent, a clear statement of what the commander intends to do to the enemy. This is critical. Mission-type orders often come encumbered by vague statements proclaiming defeat of the enemy or, worse, seizure of so-called key terrain as the intent. An effective mission-type order clearly delineates what effect the mission should have on the enemy. This enables the subordinate leader to meet the inevitable confusion of combat. If, for example, the objective is to seize a hill, then the intent should tell the unit what effect seizure of the hill will have on the enemy. The subordinate commander may then bypass the hill, should it be heavily defended, and still place his unit in a position to accomplish his mission. The mission-type order thus functions as a control mechanism, obviating many of the oft-used restrictive measures. In drafting a mission-type order, simplicity rules. A concise, standard mission statement followed by “in order to” and an equally concise statement of intent suffices. Mission-type orders offer an uncomplicated glue that binds together the diverse elements of the MAGTF.

While the GCE has slowly adopted these concepts, the same cannot be said for the ACE. This is indeed unfortunate, for the ACE provides the MAGTF with a wide ranging, potentially decisive maneuver element unknown to any other military force of similar size. All that really differs from the GCE is the dimension in which it operates. The ACE, too, can be designated as the focus of main effort or the reserve and may even assume responsibility for a geographic area. To do so, a few cherished beliefs may have to be dispelled. First, the ACE’s primary mission is not direct support of the rifleman. The MAGTF‘s operational mission determines the ACE’s tasks; many of these will not involve flying in close proximity to the forward edge of the battle area. Indeed, quite often flying there will mean suicide. Given the potential threats, to wait until the enemy is engaged with the rifleman may well be too late. Second, support relationships between the ACE and the GCE need not be one way. Elements of the GCE should be prepared to provide direct support or even attach units to the ACE. Finally, aviation tasking need not be centralized to be effective. The cumbersome Marine air command and control system contains the seeds of disaster in its reliance on extensive communications and detailed air tasking procedures. Mission-type orders apply equally to the ACE. Detailed frag orders assigning specific missions to individual aircraft bypass the command prerogatives of squadron and group commanders and often prove slow and inflexible. The ACE as a maneuver element cannot afford to be so hindered.

If the ACE is to be a maneuver element, Marines must reexamine current concepts of air support. While deep air support, interdiction, and air superiority already occupy places in a Marine’s vocabulary, other, less conventional missions present themselves. The ACE may exploit breakthroughs, conduct pursuits, screen flanks, act as the MAGTF reserve, or even control terrain. These missions can only be accomplished by a combined arms team of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and ground units, particularly infantry, under the ACE commander. The greatest argument against such task organization is the paucity of command and control assets available to the ACE, particularly those for fire support coordination. Yet, this is a superficial detractor. Employment of the ACE as a maneuver element will differ fundamentally from that of the GCE. ACE missions will be short term in nature and conducted over long ranges, usually outside the artillery fan in order to take advantage of aviation capabilities. Infantry will be inserted and extracted quickly, forming a series of ambushes or overwatch positions to fix the enemy, both supporting and supported by attack aviation. Using these tactics, the ACE possesses the necessary command and control assets. The airborne supporting arms coordinator, or SAC(A), linked to forward air controllers and an airborne tactical air controller can effectively coordinate fires. Modern airborne communications suites, the most common being the ASC-26, enable the on-scene commander to maintain control of the battle, a task greatly eased by mission-type orders. The obstacles to employing the ACE as a maneuver element may not be doctrinal or technical; they may be in the minds of Marines.

However impressive the maneuvering of both the GCE and the ACE may be, neither can function without a CSSE that is equally attuned to the style of warfare. Combat service support must anticipate, rather than react to, the needs of the maneuver elements-a concept often called forward-push logistics. Resupply cannot wait for requests from units in contact with the enemy; instead, logisticians must be fully aware of the tactical situation and project requirements. Resupply must occur automatically. Forward-push logistics implies a continual flow from the rear, from the main combat service support area to the combat unit, without detailed request procedures. Plans, both tactical and logistical, must include anticipated expenditures, logistics mobility, and timing. The ACE will play an important role in this planning. Aside from the obvious reliance on heavy helicopter lift, other techniques may be applied. The forward arming and refueling point (FARP) concept already practiced by helicopter and AV-8B squadrons can be equally effective in rearming and refueling fast-moving or dispersed ground units. (See MCG, Feb88, p. 60.) Logistics, automatic and attuned to the battle, must be as rapid and flexible as maneuver.

Perhaps the CSSE’s greatest impact on MAGTF warfare rests in its degree of vulnerability. Throughout military history, logistics bases have been the targets of armies. The 20th century is no different than the 1st in this regard. Unfortunately, this truth seems to be ignored by a Marine Corps that is management and technology oriented. The simple fact is that as Marine weapons systems have improved so, too, their logistics tail has grown, sometimes exponentially. This is particularly true for the ACE. Some growth cannot be avoided; unfortunately, some is self-inflicted. Too often, CSSEs pride themselves on the amount of supplies and equipment they can move ashore and stockpile. That feat places the MAGTF in peril, for it creates the type of weakness the enemy may be seeking to exploit. The ACE and GCE share the guilt. Elaborate tent camps, replete with mess halls, modem conveniences, and garrison-like routines, all erected in the name of troop welfare, may well be offering the MAGTF up for defeat. At the very least, such rear area bases must be defended, a task that siphons combat units away from the main effort and forces the MAGTF commander to concentrate on himself rather than the enemy. Most Vietnam veterans can attest to the vulnerability and drain on combat units engendered by the large cantonments and numerous supply bases scattered throughout the I Corps tactical zone.

Yet, like much of MAGTF warfare, the solution to combat service support vulnerability is relatively simple. Recent emphasis on rear area security helps, but with it must come a fundamental attitude change. Only five requirements should be levied on the logistics system of a MAGTF-food, water, ammunition, fuel, and maintenance. All other amenities constitute luxuries and have no place on the battlefield. This may sound hard, and it is intentionally so, but not nearly so hard as defeat. Maximum use of seabasing, dispersion, austere forward operating bases for the ACE, and mobile-loaded logistics trains with no fixed location offer a partial solution. More fundamental, Marines must realize that combat is inherently an outdoor activity, waged in the field under varying extremes of terrain and weather. To deny that by insisting on indoor substitutes ignores the very nature of war. Keeping Marines warm, dry, and reasonably well rested, therefore, should become a function of training, not tonnage. While the infantryman understands these demands, his brothers in the ACE and CSSE must be equally inured to hardship. In doing so, they will erase a critical MAGTF weakness and begin practicing MAGTF warfare at its most basic level.

MAGTF warfare, in all its dimensions, comprises the operational art for Marines. Drawing on the basic principles of maneuver warfare, it adapts the unique capabilities and requirements of the MAGTF to the realities of the battlefield. In doing so, some long-held precepts may need rethinking, particularly as they relate to aviation and combat service support. The expanded role of the ACE as an integral maneuver element will demand imaginative leaders, both ground and aviation. Combat service support, too often forgotten in the equation, must be as flexible and as invulnerable as the maneuver elements. Binding them together, the MAGTF command element, rooted in the principles of mission-type orders, provides operational level planning and command. What emerges is a compact, agile combined arms team. For Marines who fight the battle, MAGTF warfare offers a means of conceptualizing combat in three dimensions-ground, air, and support. More importantly, the art of MAGTF warfare provides practical solutions to battlefield problems.

Editors & Authors

Editors

Over the past decade, the Gazette has published many articles on maneuver warfare, enough to place it clearly among the leaders in the discussion of this style of warfare. In fact, the subject has been covered so extensively that readers have been prompted to ask “How much is enough?” More than once we have felt some doubts ourselves and have suggested to would-be authors that the subject was “for all practical purposes, exhausted.” Then again we expect others have said the same for similar discussions throughout history, such as the British debate over mechanization that occupied the pages of the RUSI Journal and Army Quarterly for much of the 1920s and 1930s. Little does one know . . . .

In truth, of course, styles of warfare and military theory are anything but static. No one has the last word. Complex ideas and concepts are born but partially developed and poorly defined. They must mature and bloom, and they must adapt to ever-changing environments. While admittedly a couple of the maneuver articles may have been rehashes (we called them “useful summaries”), most broadened and clarified the underlying ideas and contributed to the growth and evolution of the concepts.

Still the process goes on. In this issue three more articles assess the maneuver topic. Maj R. Scott Moore (p. 24) expands maneuver warfare into the area of operational art and examines what aviation and combat service support must do if that style of warfare is to realize its full potential. LtCol Gary W. Anderson (p. 57) follows the Commandant’s advice and focuses on lowintensity conflict, pointing out areas in which maneuver warfare theory-at least as normally defined-seems less applicable. William S. Lind, et al. (p. 59) discuss what is meant by the term “combined arms” when it is properly understood. They offer a theoretical foundation that should be of practical value in every Marine fire support coordination center.

There is a lesson here-a lesson about the dynamic nature of the military professional. Almost nothing is final, or beyond change, or as clear or as good as it ought to be. Maneuver warfare is a part of OH 6-1 Ground Combat Operations and the new FMFM 1 Warfighting. It will continue to mature, and we expect you will continue to write about it-a development that will be all for the good.

J.E.G.

Authors

The Commandant’s “Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress,” p. 14, emphasizes the institutional changes accomplished in 1988, and offers a view of the future. Gen A.M. Gray also made members of Congress aware of the greatest issue they and the Corps face: how the Marines can best contribute to national security within the constraints of the budget.

For the third time in eight years Maj R. Scott Moore has won the annual MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest. His entry, “The Art of MAGTF Warfare,” p. 24, was selected from a field of over 32 other Chase essays submitted in 1988. He is assigned to MAG-26 at MCAS New River as an air-ground exchange officer. More 1988 Chase Contest entries appear on p. 37 (LtCol Charles L. Armstrong), p. 38 (Maj Richard J. Macak), p. 42 (Maj R. David Clarke), p. 49 (Capt Jon T. Hoffman), and p. 66 (LtCol Christopher J. Gregor).

This month’s Focus on Low-Intensity Conflict continues the discussion launched under the same title in Mar88. Now, more Marines are fueling the discussion. Maj Susan J. Flores, who first wrote for the Gazette in Oct88 with an assessment of reconnaissance, takes a look at “Marine Corps Employment in Low-Intensity Conflict,” p. 30. She is joined by four 1988 Chase contest contributors (see above) and two Reserve officers.

Editors & Authors

Editors

Over the past decade, the Gazette has published many articles on maneuver warfare, enough to place it clearly among the leaders in the discussion of this style of warfare. In fact, the subject has been covered so extensively that readers have been prompted to ask “How much is enough?” More than once we have felt some doubts ourselves and have suggested to would-be authors that the subject was “for all practical purposes, exhausted.” Then again we expect others have said the same for similar discussions throughout history, such as the British debate over mechanization that occupied the pages of the RUSI Journal and Army Quarterly for much of the 1920s and 1930s. Little does one know . . . .

In truth, of course, styles of warfare and military theory are anything but static. No one has the last word. Complex ideas and concepts are born but partially developed and poorly defined. They must mature and bloom, and they must adapt to ever-changing environments. While admittedly a couple of the maneuver articles may have been rehashes (we called them “useful summaries”), most broadened and clarified the underlying ideas and contributed to the growth and evolution of the concepts.

Still the process goes on. In this issue three more articles assess the maneuver topic. Maj R. Scott Moore (p. 24) expands maneuver warfare into the area of operational art and examines what aviation and combat service support must do if that style of warfare is to realize its full potential. LtCol Gary W. Anderson (p. 57) follows the Commandant’s advice and focuses on lowintensity conflict, pointing out areas in which maneuver warfare theory-at least as normally defined-seems less applicable. William S. Lind, et al. (p. 59) discuss what is meant by the term “combined arms” when it is properly understood. They offer a theoretical foundation that should be of practical value in every Marine fire support coordination center.

There is a lesson here-a lesson about the dynamic nature of the military professional. Almost nothing is final, or beyond change, or as clear or as good as it ought to be. Maneuver warfare is a part of OH 6-1 Ground Combat Operations and the new FMFM 1 Warfighting. It will continue to mature, and we expect you will continue to write about it-a development that will be all for the good.

J.E.G.

Authors

The Commandant’s “Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress,” p. 14, emphasizes the institutional changes accomplished in 1988, and offers a view of the future. Gen A.M. Gray also made members of Congress aware of the greatest issue they and the Corps face: how the Marines can best contribute to national security within the constraints of the budget.

For the third time in eight years Maj R. Scott Moore has won the annual MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest. His entry, “The Art of MAGTF Warfare,” p. 24, was selected from a field of over 32 other Chase essays submitted in 1988. He is assigned to MAG-26 at MCAS New River as an air-ground exchange officer. More 1988 Chase Contest entries appear on p. 37 (LtCol Charles L. Armstrong), p. 38 (Maj Richard J. Macak), p. 42 (Maj R. David Clarke), p. 49 (Capt Jon T. Hoffman), and p. 66 (LtCol Christopher J. Gregor).

This month’s Focus on Low-Intensity Conflict continues the discussion launched under the same title in Mar88. Now, more Marines are fueling the discussion. Maj Susan J. Flores, who first wrote for the Gazette in Oct88 with an assessment of reconnaissance, takes a look at “Marine Corps Employment in Low-Intensity Conflict,” p. 30. She is joined by four 1988 Chase contest contributors (see above) and two Reserve officers.

When Maneuver Fails

by LtCol Gary W. Anderson

The current edition of OH 6-1 describes maneuver warfare as:

. . . an approach to war which emphasizes disrupting the cohesion of the enemy’s tactical units and the mental process of the enemy commander’s ability to make correct and timely decisions rather than simply attempting to inflict casualties at a greater rate than they are sustained.

There is a key unanswered question here: What happens if the enemy doesn’t have cohesion or a decision-making cycle worth disrupting?

This question is not academic. At the operational level of war, the Soviets have grappled with this problem in Afghanistan; the Israelis continue to wrestle with it in southern Lebanon. Both the Russians and the Israelis have tried in vain to identify a point of main effort at which to strike the decisionmaking process of their foes; both have failed. At the tactical level in these two conflicts, the Soviets and Israelis have had notable successes; however, they have not been able to string these tactical successes together into operational victories in the manner prescribed by theorists such as John Boyd and William Lind.

The situations in Afghanistan and Lebanon are not unique. The pattern seen in both of those wars is typical of low-intensity conflict in the late 20th century, and this presents the Marine Corps with a dilemma. The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrine, but it also is currently advertising that its most likely scenarios for employment in the next 10 years will be in low-intensity conflicts. On the surface, this appears to place the Marine Corps in the position of having adopted a doctrine not applicable to its most likely form of employment.

In actuality, maneuver warfare is still relevant to the greater scheme of things; however, to appreciate its applicability we must understand that maneuver warfare is just a part of a much larger concept. In a September 1985 Gazette article, I called this concept the ‘Tactics of Mistake” after the title of an old Gordon Dickson novel; but for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary labels we will merely call the construct “enemy-oriented operations.” The following description, found in Lynn Montross’ War Through the Ages, was allegedly penned by the great Byzantine general, Belisarius. It is a good description of enemy-oriented operations.

In the first skirmishes with the Goths, I was always out to discover what were the strong and weak points in their tactics, in order to accommodate my own to them, to make up for my numerical inferiority. I found that the chief difference between them and us was that our horse and our Hunnish Foederati are all expert horse-bowmen, while the enemy has scarcely any knowledge of archery. For the gothic knights use sword and lance alone, while their bowmen are always drawn up to the rear under cover of the heavy squadrons. So their horsemen are no good till the battle comes to close quarters, and (they) can be shot down while standing in battle array before the moment of contact arrives. Their foot archerers, on the other hand, will never dare to advance against cavalry, and keep too far back.

Throughout history, the consistently successful military leaders have shown an ability to accurately determine enemy weaknesses, mistakes, and vulnerabilities in a timely manner. In battle after battle since antiquity the victor was the commander who could most quickly recognize his enemy’s key vulnerabilities and exploit those miscues in a timely manner. Alexander’s timely recognition of a gap in the Persian lines at Arbela combined with his subsequent charge to take out the Persian command group was one of the first documented examples of this concept. Caesar learned early in his career that his barbarian adversaries would charge uphill and tire themselves before they even reached Roman lines. Whenever possible, the opportunistic Roman would find a hill and endeavor to entice his adversaries to charge up it.

This timely cycle of recognition and exploitation of enemy mistakes and weaknesses was possible in the years before the U.S. Civil War because the commander was generally able to view the entire battlefield or, at least, significant parts of it. The commander himself or a key subordinate was usually the individual who spotted the crucial enemy mistake, and this made the cycle of recognition and exploitation (R-E cycle) relatively short. At Arbela, the R-E cycle was nearly instantaneous; it was completed in the short amount of time that Alexander needed to make his decision and raise his arm to signal the charge to his companion cavalry, which was sitting behind him at the moment he made the decision. At Leuctra, Epaminondas positioned himself on his own Theban left where he could supervise a buildup of superior mass against an expected Spartan weakness. When the expected weakness was confirmed, Epaminondas was in a position to execute a very short cycle of recognition and exploitation. As a rule of thumb, the only thing that generally slowed the R-E cycle during pre-Civil War operations was any delay by the commander in making a timely decision or in the physical delay caused by transmitting an order to the exploiting force. At Waterloo, Napoleon probably lost the battle when he uncharacteristically delayed a decision to exploit the capture of the key strongpoint of La Haye Saint for over an hour. In other battles, the R-E cycle was lengthened by lost messengers and subordinate commanders who failed to carry out orders in a timely manner. The true masters of pre-Civil War combat were those commanders who could most quickly complete the R-E cycle.

The flip side of the R-E cycle is the ability to recognize and correct friendly vulnerabilities and weaknesses. This recognition-correction (R-C) cycle is the shield in enemy-oriented operations, while the R-E cycle acts as the sword. The true practitioner of enemy-oriented operations must be careful to concentrate on the really key mistakes and vulnerabilities both friendly and enemy, lest precious time and resources be frittered away in pursuit or irrelevant objectives. Col Joshua Chamberlain’s quick reaction at Little Round Top at Gettysburg is a classic example of the concept of the R-C cycle properly at work. When his unit (20th Maine) ran out of ammunition at a critical juncture during the battle, Chamberlain ordered a bayonet charge that so unhinged the Confederate force facing him that the rebels withdrew, saving a vital piece of terrain for the Union. The concept of the R-C cycle is key to enemy-oriented operations. It is valid at both the tactical and operational levels of war.

Most readers will note that the theory of the R-E/R-C cycles is similar to the observation-orientation-decision-action (O-O-D-A) cycle; they are similar, but they are not the same. O-O-D-A cycle works in that part of the continuum of warfare where both opponents have a coherent decisionmaking cycle worth disrupting. Indeed, in the area of small unit tactics, the O-O-D-A cycle may be universally applicable. But at the battalion level and above in low-intensity conflicts, the O-O-D-A cycle is less relevant. This is true also at the highest end of the conflict spectrum-nuclear war.

At the high end of the spectrum, maneuver warfare becomes irrelevant if command, control, and communications systems are destroyed. In many cases our nuclear systems are designed to respond despite this loss of control. (Figure 1 shows where maneuver warfare comfortably fits into the conflict spectrum.)

What all of this means is that the O-O-D-A cycle as represented by maneuver warfare doctrine is really one of a number of options to be selected if the enemy’s mistakes or vulnerabilties warrant it However, other elements of what we now call maneuver warfare are universally applicable along the entire spectrum of conflict Figure 2 lists the areas where maneuver warfare as defined in OH 6-1 is universally relevant as well as those that are relevant in conventional conflict

An enemy-oriented mindset as represented by the completion of the R-E/ R-C cycles is a universal construct The O-O-D-A cycle and maneuver warfare are a subset of the greater whole. We need to realize when the precepts of the O-O-D-A cycle are relevant and when they are not Adopting maneuver warfare as a doctrine isn’t a bad idea; it is merely an incomplete one.

Cultivating Critical and Strategic Thinkers

by Mie Augier & Maj Sean F.X. Barrett

We recently wrote about the intellectual renaissance inspired by the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Alfred M. Gray, and the relevance of maneuver warfare ideas today. {See “People First,” MCG, Junl9.) This article intends to explicate some themes regarding the thinking and decision making under uncertainty alluded to in our earlier article, as well as their usefulness given the trends in the current (and likely future) strategic operating environment.

FMFM1, Warfighting states,

In an environment of friction, uncertainty, and fluidity, war gravitates naturally toward disorder … It is precisely this natural disorder which creates the conditions ripe for exploitation by an opportunistic will.2

Early critics of maneuver warfare, however, argued that maneuver warfare did not give enemy commanders enough credit. After all,

it should not be assumed that enemy commanders will lose control of the situation and their forces disintegrate when faced with rapidly changing situations.

Additionally, are we to assume our Marine commanders will somehow remain unaffected by the same conditions? Enemy forces have proven throughout history that they will fight on in spite of “a disastrous logistics and command and control situation.”^

We acknowledge that such assumptions are not altogether valid and aim to address these concerns by placing maneuver warfare philosophy within the larger literature on learning and problem solving under ambiguity in order to provide some recommendations-nested within both established educational curricula and Marine Corps history-for facilitating interdisciplinary problem solving and re-cultivating this capability in our Marines.

In this article, we analyze the nature of thinking and. “thinking about thinking,” but we do not discuss in detail the processes and pitfalls for critical and strategic thinking. Rather, we hope to extend the conversation about teaching critical and strategic thinking and to nudge our Industrial Age teaching and learning mindset not just to the Information Age, but rather one step further to the Judgment Aged

An important point to keep in mind regarding learning {and approaches to learning) is that education aiming to help nurture critical and strategic thinking has both cognitive (i.e., knowledge) and attitudinal (i.e., instinctual/affective) aspects; neither are automatic. However, while cognitive skills for analyzing and understanding can be taught through concepts, heuristics, and methods, attitudinal aspects are more difficult to teach but still important and must be cultivated through mentoring and fostering curiosity and judgment.6 Thankfully, there are important lessons from the Marine Corps’ own history (and the institution’s emphasis on education for judgment) that might be useful to re-invigorate the education of future thinkers.

Ill-structured Problems and Learning and Problem Solving Under Ambiguity

Any informed discussion of how to improve thinking, learning, and education should be based on understanding the nature and process of human thinking and learning, the types of decisions humans make, and how we can improve decision making.8 A better understanding of such fundamentals of thinking and decision-making processes will help us to improve current and future practices, as well as help us learn from what has not worked well so that we can avoid simply becoming better in irrelevant areas.

Building on and integrating some ideas from Herbert Simon, Gen Gray, LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, and others, we argue that most decision making is best viewed as taking place under conditions of bounded rationality, ambiguity, and when confronted with varying degrees of ill-structured problems-a key element of the current and future strategic environment. In particular, Van Riper’s distinction between analytical, intuitive, and systemic decision making is an instructive lens through which to view the usefulness of our teaching and learning approaches as well as the different types of problems for which they are useful.^

Analytic decision making. Some conceptions of decision making falling into this category include rational choice theory, (most of) game theory, and systems analysis. These are useful frameworks to describe some decisions as long as the conditions and assumptions upon which they are built are valid, there is only a little uncertainty (quantifiable risk), and the problem at hand is linear and relatively well-structured. Systems analysis in particular has been a major analytic framework for decades of DOD decision making. Despite its analytical elegance and simplicity, models used to capture analytic decision making are rarely useful in the domain of human activity, including war.10 The early fathers of systems analysis themselves were aware of the limitations of their perspective, emphasizing the need to understand these limitations as well as the importance of not suppressing judgment in the name of analysis.11 However, many are still often quite eager to understand the world through analytical models even at the expense of realism and understanding.12 Van Riper appeals instead to the use of two other perspectives of decision making, which are applicable to problems that are neither linear nor simple and emphasize uncertainty, ambiguity, and the limits of human rationality.

Intuitive decision making. As Van Riper, Simon, and others have noted, most people do not think and make decisions in terms of numbers. Instead, we use pattern recognition and intuition enabled by mental or cognitive models. This is especially true with more ill-structured problems, when more uncertainty is present, and when having to make decisions with many unknown variables. We make intuitive decisions when we face situations under uncertainty. We recognize things as if part of a pattern or something we have seen (or read about) before; thus we convince ourselves that we do not need to think about it.

Systemic decision making. The most difficult form of decision making is when confronted with wicked problems and when you do not recognize patterns: no shared mental models can be relied upon. For these instances, Van Riper appeals to developing an understanding of the logic and drivers of the situation and using holistic, interdisciplinary, and empirically driven problem solving. John Boyd’s emphasis on thinking, analogies, and synthesis is a useful approach for such decision making.

Van Riper’s (and Simon’s) approach to decision making involves both art and science. However, given the complexity of the security environment, understanding and teaching the “art” aspects are paramount:

The art of war and the science of war are not coequal. The art of war is clearly the most important. It’s science in support of the art. Any time that science leads in your ability to think about and make war, I believe you’re headed down a dangerous path. The art is the thinking. It is the intellectual underpinnings of war.13

Fortunately, Marines have acknowledged this for quite a while, and the emphasis on systemic and intuitive decision making is built into core organizational documents and Gen Gray’s vision for Marine Corps PME. Thus, remembering his emphasis in the context of current PME challenges, including what teaching methodologies are most appropriate, will be useful.

Learning and Thinking in the Marine Corps and Beyond

As mentioned in our previous article, Gen Gray sought to institutionalize the intellectual renaissance in the Marine Corps and key to that was the founding of Marine Corps University (MCU). Fundamentally, he wanted to ensure his Marines were as mentally ready to fight as they were physically. This required more than Marines simply memorizing facts or becoming academic historians; instead, education was intended to serve as a vehicle for sharpening judgment and warfighting capabilities:

Through education we can equip ourselves to make sound military judgments even in chaotic and uncertain situations. The ability to make clear and swift judgments, amidst chaos, is what sets the warrior apart intellectually. Though practice in the field and in wargames is important to improving military judgment, its development remains anchored to education about warU

This emphasis on education was reiterated in FMFM 1, which emphasized every Marine’s responsibility to study the profession of arms on his own, putting self-study on par with physical training: “Self-study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance and should receive at least equal time to maintaining physical condition.”16

As Commandant, Gen Gray ordered his Marines to read and publish a manual, Book on Books, to introduce and explain the professional reading program he would institutionalize as the Commandant’s Reading List. Col Mike Wyły, who wrote Section 1, noted that professional reading itself was not the end product desired; thinking and actions on the battlefield are. However, reading, thinking about what you read, and internalizing by relating it in real ways to one’s job are necessary preparatory actions.17 Wyly explains the lessons, ranging from the most tactical to the most strategic levels, one can learn from reading in depth about a single battle and how they can be applied to other battles. Military literacy only improves by reading about multiple battles.18

This learning emphasis is similar to the case method, which first rose to prominence at Harvard Law School in the late 1800s and at Harvard Business School in the early 1900s.15 The DOD could further incorporate the case method-in lieu of more enabling and terminal learning objectives-into PME institutions to foster critical thinking and judgment. According to Kenneth Andrews’ classic definition, a case is

a carefully written description of an actual situation in business which provokes in the reader the need to decide what is going on, what the situation really is, or what the problems are- and what can and should be done.76

The case method balances the tension between experiential and academic knowledge, placing less emphasis on the abstract knowledge against which Gen Gray warned and more on how to recognize and react in concrete situations. While critics warn that too heavy an emphasis on the case method might detract from systematic knowledge and analytical skills and argue that cases can be overly simplistic, the principal claim of proponents is that the case method develops students’ problemsolving skills for when they are later confronted with ill-structured problems in the real world, and it leverages the heterogeneity of the students to foster interdisciplinary problem-solving.21 Gen Gray recognized and emphasized the merits of this form of instruction and took steps toward emphasizing both thinking and judgment in exercises as well as key institutional documents to help educate for the future.22

This form of instruction has a history in Marine Corps PME institutions that even predated the founding of MCU and is rooted in the initial development of maneuver warfare philosophy. When Col Wyly took over as Head of Tactics at Amphibious Warfare School for the 1979-80 academic year, he felt the curriculum (that he had studied himself while a student at Amphibious Warfare School) was lacking in history and intellectual rigor. Dissatisfied with Marine Corps doctrine and educational curricula, Wyly turned to the ideas of John Boyd and resolved to deemphasize instruction on manuals and doctrine, which he felt became ends in themselves.23 Wyly invited Boyd to speak during that school year, and he incorporated historical battle studies and exercises that required students to make decisions. Wyly also eliminated prescribed solutions that instructors had previously relied on during these exercises and even deviated from established norms and curricula by taking his students to the field for tactical exercises without troops.24 His ability to transform the curriculum was made possible by the high degree of freedom his chain of command afforded him. However, when his superiors changed, Wyly was ultimately reassigned to a mundane staff position because his superiors wanted to return to the old attrition doctrine.23 This episode is instructive in that it highlights the bureaucratic tendency to resist change and emphasizes the need to build and maintain a broad base of support that can foster change from the bottom up, a tactic that Gen Gray presciently employed.

Other important bureaucratic tendencies that Gen Gray warned against is the desire to measure-ostensibly “progress”-and create standard processes, both of which oftentimes are the enemy of critical thinking and create burdensome requirements that undermine a Marines motivation to learn.26 In the forward for Book on Books, he recognized that individuals and units could use different methods for executing his order to read. This theme of decentralized implementation continued throughout the text and is consistent with mission-type orders. In explaining what to read, Wyly asserted, “Marines should pick their books according to their needs.”27 The books referenced were simply meant to be “seed corn … to stimulate interests in reading about the profession.”28 Implementing the program would be “left up to the discretion and initiative of commanders and individuals.”2^1 In marked contrast to today’s mounting administrative and training requirements, Wyly informed readers, “Do not anticipate a reporting process, or a centralized requirement for written exams, designed to assure that Marines are reading.”30

The perils of relying on centralized exams and requirements too heavily, as well as the importance of active learning (e.g., cases), should inform current educational initiatives. In discussing the aims of education, Alfred North Whitehead warns:

In education, as elsewhere, the broad primrose path is represented by a book or a set of lectures which will practically enable the student to learn by heart all the questions likely to be asked at the next external examination.3*

While acknowledging that “such examinations have their use in testing slackness,” Whitehead contended that the uniform central examination

kills the best part of our culture. When you analyse in the light of experience the central task of education, you find that its successful accomplishment depends on a delicate adjustment of many variable factors. The reason is that we are dealing with human minds, and not with dead matter. The evocation of curiosity, of judgment, of the power of mastering a complicated tangle of circumstances … all these powers are not to be imparted by a set rule embodied in one schedule of examination subjects.32

Thus, fostering a culture that inspires Marines to “realize [their] own potential in order to better fulfill [their] professional calling” is a culture consistent with Gray’s vision for education as well as earlier foundational discussions concerning the history and philosophy of education, the emphasis on interdisciplinary reading and learning, and the importance of thinking and understanding (i.e., not just accumulating facts).

Implications for PME

As senior leaders increasingly call for improving the education of critical and strategic thinking in our PME institutions,34 a new doctrinal philosophy for learning might find inspiration from integrating the philosophies of Whitehead and Gray, as well as from Simon and Van Riper’s emphasis on human thinking and problem-solving. The story of Gen Gray’s emphasis on education, thinking, and judgment-and their significance to the maneuver warfare movement-is important to more than the story of a particular period of Marine Corps history. Rather, it provides an intellectual framework for dealing with the type of ill-structured, complex problems that Simon, Van Riper, and others emphasize and lays the necessary groundwork toward providing the intellectual and institutional structure {e.g., MCU) to support an enduring emphasis on teaching thinking and judgment. However, implicit in both Whitehead and Gray’s philosophies is the difficulty in measuring educational advancements and benefits as well as their concern that attempts to do so only serve to suffocate thinking. Unfortunately, the tendency of large organizations, including those that house PME, is to evolve in ways that suppress individual creativity, thinking, and other “disruptive” forces even though they are the very foundation for strategic and critical thinking. Thus, senior leaders of PME institutions and military organizations must always seek to counter the forces stifling thinking, including internal politics and processes that seem designed mostly never to change.

Furthermore, even the best designed institutional educational structures can only do so much if the students or Marines are not inspired with a curiosity to explore, discover, think, and learn. The philosophies of Gray and Whitehead thus underscore creating a “culture of curiosity” as the first mover to improving education, as well as the centrality of leadership and mentorship to learning and thinking. While a wider perspective will probably shed some light on how the architectures of larger organizational structures might need to be reformed in order to support, not stifle, the education of strategists and thinkers, first developing certain attitudes {rather than functional knowledge and content) and ways of thinking in our Marines can prove to be an integrating force in the development of future strategic leaders. Thankfully, the Marine Corps has a rich history of empowering lower-level leaders with mission-type orders that it can leverage to further embrace and enhance education and ward off the calcification and status quo (and other) biases inherent in large organizations.

Notes

1. We are grateful to Andrew Marshall, Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr., USMC(Ret), Col G.I. Wilson, USMCR(Ret), and MajGen William Mullen for comments on a previous version and discussions on the topic. Any remaining errors were produced without help.

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, FMFM 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1989).

3. Richard H. Voigt, “Comments on Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: March 1982).

4. Ibid.

5. Al Gray and Paul Otte, The Conflicted Leader and Vantage Leadership, (Columbus, OH: Franklin University Press, 2006). Gray and Otte discuss how the knowledge age, or knowledge revolution, moved us from emphasizing managers to emphasizing leaders. The Judgment Age extends the focus on uncertainty and leadership and places a key emphasis on the important role of judgment, an art very difficult to teach yet critical to emphasize in PME.

6. Additionally, while critical thinking is an important educational tool and the processes in critical thinking can be important knowledge tools to help de-bias ones thinking and make it more logical, “thinking critically” is not “just” critical thinking, which oftentimes devolves into a check list. Structured analytic techniques which rose in prominence following the intelligence community’s failures vis-a-vis the attacks on 9/11 and the case of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, are examples of this mentality. A good discussion of the difference between critical thinking approached as analysis and the kind of critical thinking that is essential to PME can be found ín Paul K. Van Riper, “The Identification and Education of U.S. Army Strategic Thinkers,” in Exploring Strategic Thinking: Insights to Assess, Develop, and Retain Army Strategic Thinkers, (Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2011).

7. Robert H. Scales, Jr., and Paul K. Van Riper, “Preparing for War in the 21st Century,” in Future of Warfare Anthology, revised edition, edited by Robert H. Scales, Jr., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000).

8. Daniel Kahneman, for example, divides thinking into two systems: System 1 and System 2. System 1 “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” and is prone to making systematic errors in specified circumstances. In contrast, System 2 is more often associated with concentration and allocating attention to the “effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations.” While System 1 runs automatically, System 2 is typically “lazy” and sometimes fails to override mistakes made by System 1. Such errors are known as biases. Kahneman’s heuristics and biases approach prefers formal models or rules. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Past and Slow, (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011). Another relevant reference here is Gary Klein, one of the developers of the naturalistic decisionmaking approach. Those from the naturalistic decision-making line of research are skeptical about imposing universal rules and structures on judgments in complex environments. Klein conducted field work to study decision making by experts, who make decisions based on a twostage process involving intuitive recognition of what response is required, followed by mental simulation evaluating whether the response is valid. Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). Kahneman and Klein explore the differences between their two approaches in Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein, “Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree,” American Psychologist, (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, September 2009). The authors also provide suggestions for improving the quality of judgments and choices.

9. Gen Gray and Dr. Paul Otte also capture important elements of the larger environment and the importance of judgment.

10. As Simon noted, all the information in the world will not solve the problem of limited rationality and complex interdependencies: ” [T] he dream of thinking everything out before we act, of making certain we have all the facts and know all the consequences, is a sick Hamlet’s dream. It is a dream of someone with no appreciation of the seamless web of causation, the limits of human thinking, or the scarcity of human attention.” Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Vol. 2, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982). Simon’s lifelong passion for an empirically driven and realistic conception of decision making speaks both to the real nature of limited rationality and complex decision making and to the inclination of scholars, especially economists, to reduce reality to what their models can capture. Much of Simon’s emphasis is consistent with the spirit ofVan Riper and FMFM 1.

11. Charles Hitch writes, “Uncertainties make life difficult for the systems analyst, but this is so because the problem of intelligent behavior under uncertainty is really hard.” See Charles Hitch, “An Appreciation of Systems Analysis,” Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, (Cantonsville, MD: INFORMS, November 1955).

12. Van Riper mentions what can go {really) wrong when we apply models designed for systems analysis to the domain of imperfect rationality and conflict, recalling Secretary Robert McNamara’s introduction of systems analysis to the battlefield. In linking his reflections on the more recent MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE Exercise to the lessons not learned from Vietnam, Van Riper observed,

What I saw in this particular exercise and the results from it were very similar to what I saw as a young second lieutenant back in the 1960s, when we were taught the systems engineering techniques that Mr. [Robert] McNamara [Secretary of Defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson] had implemented in the American military. We took those systems, which had good if not great utility in the acquisition of weapon systems, to the battlefield, where they were totally inappropriate. The computers in Saigon said we were winning the war, while out there in the rice paddies we knew d… well we weren’t winning the war. Uncertainties make life difficult for the systems analyst, but this is so because the problem of intelligent behavior under uncertainty is really hard.,

See “The Immutable Nature of War,” Public Broadcasting Service, (Online: April 2004), available at https://www.pbs.org).

13. “The Immutable Nature of War.”

14. Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1967). Our inclusion of Whitehead here is no coincidence; he was an important figure in the early development of certain approaches to learning (along with William James and others) that emphasize interdisciplinary and holistic problem-solving and teaching “how” to think, not what to think. This emphasis is very consistent with Gen Gray’s vision for Marine Corps PME and learning. Thus, future elaborations of Gray’s vision and the development of educational documents in line with FMFM 1 might find inspiration from studying and applying Whitehead’s ideas, too.

15. Gen Alfred M. Gray, Book on Books, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University), Alfred M. Gray Collection, Box List Part 2, Box 5, Folder 9, BGen Edwin H. Simmons Center for Marine Corps History, Quantíco, VA. The quote is from Section 1, which was authored by Col Mike “Wyly.

16. FMFM 1, Warfighting.

17. Book on Books.

18. Describing the tacit knowledge acquired through reading that enhances military judgment, Wyly writes,

A Marine who knows one battle well knows more about his profession than one who has read a hundred manuals. He may not be able to define what he knows, or divide the battle into phases, or tell you where the line of departure was, or who manufactured the aircraft or what kind of alloys were in the metal ofthe machines. He may still need to read some manuals. But he has gained a sensing of what the batde was about. And he needs this sensing.,

See Book on Books.

19. Míe Augier and James G. March, The Roots, Rituals, and Rhetorics ofChange: North American Business Schools After the Second World War, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), for a description of the case method’s law school origins and its spreading to and among North American business schools.

20. Kenneth Andrews, The Case Method of Teaching Human Relations and Administration, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951).

21. The Roots, Rituals, and Rhetorics of Change.

22. Gray wrote,

My intent in PME is to teach military judgment rather than knowledge. Knowledge is of course important for developing judgment, but should be taught in the context of teaching military judgment, not as material to be memorized … The focus of effort [of PME] should be teaching through doing, through casestudies, historical and present-day, real and hypothetical, presented in war-games, map exercises, and table exercises, free-play, force-on-force ‘three day wars’ and the like. … As education progresses … the material should grow more complex, but the essence should remain the same: teach officers and NCO’s how to win in combat by outthinking as well as out-fighting their opponents.

Commandant ofthe Marine Corps to CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Training and Education,” October 1988, located in the Alfred M. Gray Collection, Box List Part 2, Box 6, Folder 12, BGen Edwin H. Simmons Center for Marine Corps History, Quantíco, VA.

23. Fideleon Damian II, “The Road to FMFM 1: The United States Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare Doctrine, 1979-1989,” (Master’s thesis, Kansas State University, 2008).

24. “The Road to FMFM 1.” Wyly developed an instructional program to teach maneuver warfare, which he later published as an appendix to Bill Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Each lesson consisted of a historical background of the concept being taught as well as a scenario providing a practical application exercise regarding the application ofthe concept. A copy of the handbook can be found in the Alfred M. Gray Collection, Box List Part 2, Box 50, Folder 5- Wyly also developed a reading list for his students which developed into what would become the Commandant’s Reading List.

25. Ibid.

26. Gray notes that the current evaluation process relying on lesson plans, Enabling Learning Objective and Terminal Learning Objective “is inappropriate for education, although it may have use for training in techniques. A new evaluation process must be devised that recognizes the inherent impossibility of ‘objectively’ or quantitatively measuring and art.” Commandant of the Marine Corps to CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Training and Education,” October 1988.

27. Book on Books.

28.Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. The Aims of Education.

32. Ibid.

33. Book on Books.

34. Summaries of its intent can be found at Thomas B. Modly, “Memorandum for Distribution: Department of the Navy Education for Seapower (E4S) Study,” (Washington: DC, April 2018) and Ben Werner, “Focus on Critical Thinking is Key in New Navy Education Study,” USNI News, (Annapolis, MD: August 2018).

A New Conception of War

reviewed by Maj Skip CrawleY, USMC(Ret)

A New Conception of War A NEW CONCEPTION OF WAR: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare. By Maj Ian T. Brown. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2018. ISBN: 9780997317497.357 pp.

After years of fighting a seemingly endless war, the new challenge is to refocus on fighting peer competitors again after over a decade of counterinsurgency operations. Having spent billions on fighting the endless war, our equipment is worn out and in need of modernization while peer adversaries used the time to modernize. Dollars for defense are tight. Finally, individuals outside the Marine Corps believe “that technological progress by future adversaries has made amphibious assaults too hazardous.”1 Is this the present day Marine Corps? No. This is the 1970s Marine Corps> post-Vietnam.

A New Conception of War: John Boyd, The U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare by Maj Ian T. Brown is the story of how:

The Marine Corps, bereft of numbers and weapons and struggling with the consequences of misunderstanding its adversary in Vietnam, found itself drawn to Boyd’s ideas. In them, the Marines saw answers to the problem of what the Marine Corps was to do with itself [post-Vietnam] and how it was to do it… [t]hey took and injected Boyd’s ideas-or what they understood to be his ideas-into the larger debate of how maneuver might serve the future Corps better than simply buying a new tank or adopting a different NATO mission.

Maj Brown’s A New Conception of War is partially a biography of Col John R. Boyd, USAF(Ret), which tells the story of Col Boyd’s years of study and observation that led to his view of warfare ultimately culminating in his “Patterns of Conflict” presentation. The book also illustrates how Boyd’s ideas on warfare were instrumental in assisting the Marine Corps refigure itself in the post-Vietnam era by helping to answer the question: “Where do we go from here?” Lastly, this is the story of the ultimately successful struggle to adopt maneuver warfare as the official doctrine of the Marine Corps and the publication of FMFM 1, Warfighting in 1989.2

Fighter Pilot, Military Theoretician, Iconoclast

Boyd’s philosophy was “to be or to do.” He once told a young Air Force captain:

One day you will come to a fork in the road. And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go that way[,] you can be somebody… you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments.

Boyd counseled that the other fork in the road was harder and lonelier, but if offered a chance for true accomplishment: “You can do something- something for your country and for your Air Force.”

Boyd’s entire Air Force career and post-Air Force career was driven by “the determination to produce” accomplishments that mattered. As an instructor in Fighter Weapons School in Nellis AFB, NV, Boyd “wrote the first manual on jet aerial combat”3 and became known as “40-second Boyd:” Accordingly, throughout Boyd’s career:

He made a standing bet that he would meet any pilot over a preselected patch of ground, get on his tail for a kill within 40 seconds of the engagement commencing, or pay the victor $40. No pilot ever collected on that bet ý

One of Boyd’s “accomplishments” was his development of the wellknown observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop; an important tenet of maneuver warfare. Most Marines-including myself-thought Boyd’s OODA Loop “was a derivative of aerial dogfighting” based upon his experiences as an F-86 Sabre pilot in the Korean War. Instead, “Boyd was clear that the loop’s genesis came from work and anomalies associated with [the] evolution and flight tests of [the] YF 16/17.”

Acknowledging that this simplifies a complex issue, Boyd learned during the mid-1970s Lightweight Fighter Program fly-off between the YF-16 and the YF-17 (precursor to the F/A18) that the top speed of a fighter visa-vis its adversary is less important than its ability to “shed and regain energy far more quickly” against an adversary. Consequently:

Boyd labeled these traits fast transient maneuvers, and he found that they granted the YF-16 pilots’ quicker responsiveness and a faster operating tempo, repeatedly generating favorable mismatches against the less responsive YF-17- The notion of mismatches contributing to one’s success and survival-of using agility and tempo to overwhelm an adversary’s perceptions and reactions, thus causing his perceived reality to diverge from actually reality-stuck with Boyd.

Utilizing the OODA Loop and other concepts, Boyd developed his “Patterns of Conflict” presentation summing up everything he had learned about war-just in time for the Marine Corps to make use of it.

Boyd s Influence on the Marine Corps

Post-Vietnam, the Marine Corps had an enormous problem: how does a traditionally naval-oriented, medium-weight force remain viable in the new operational environment of massed Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored and mechanized armies? The Marine Corps was getting a lot of outside advice, including the infamous Brookings Institution’s, Where Does the Marine Corps Go from HereN But wise people, both inside and outside the išdarine Corps, felt that debating whether to mechanize or lighten the Marine Corps or assuming the NATO Northern Flank mission missed the point; what was needed was a new warfighting construct.

Boyd’s “Pattern of Conflict” provided “the conceptual framework” that eventually lead to the adoption of the maneuver warfare doctrine by the Marine Corps.

Maneuver Warfare-The Answer and the Struggle to Adopt It

I found the last chapter of Maj Brown’s book, tracing the debate about maneuver warfare from its inception to being adopted as official doctrine, the most interesting. As Brown explains, four individuals were responsible for the successful adoption of maneuver warfare as the official doctrine of the Marine Corps: William S. Lind, Col Michael D. Wyly, Gen Alfred M. Gray, and Capt John Schmitt.

Lind was “the promoter;” the “outsider” whose “widespread public access and sheer enthusiasm” and “ability to connect key people to each other, combined with the force of his enthusiasm for Boyd’s work, extended Boyd’s reach to new and wider audiences.” Though, as is well-known, Lind was also persona non grata to many in the Marine Corps.

Col Wyly was “the teacher.” A rifle company commander in Vietnam, he was “frustrated by stale tactics and doctrine,” and had a strong “desire to preserve the lives of his men by finding less wasteful ways of fighting.” Wyly spent much of his career as a field grade officer trying to update tactics instruction until he was chosen by Gen Gray to be the Vice President of the newly established Marine Corps University, an assignment for which he was “perfectly suited.”6

Gen Gray was “the doer.” As is well-known, Gen Gray adopted maneuver warfare in the 2d Marine Division and encouraged officers of all ranks to study and discuss maneuver warfare. Appointed Commandant in

1988, Gen Gray “used his authority to make the maneuver philosophy based on Boyd the cornerstone of Marine Corps combat doctrine.”

Capt Schmitt was “the writer.” As a junior officer, Schmitt “found maneuver warfare, with its emphasis on lower-level initiative, empowering” and “became one of maneuver warfare‘s true believers.” Gen Gray give Schmitt “free reign” as to what to write:

You have to satisfy me and nobody else. You don’t answer to anybody except me. If anybody tries to unduly influence what you’re saying or you’re writing, you tell me about it and I’ll take care of it.

Consequently, “Schmitt was free to talk with whomever he wanted and used the ideas of any theorist he desired … he consulted with Lind, Wyly, and others.” Five months later, Schmitt “presented his completed draft to Gen Gray for comment. Gray read it and, as a testament to how well he believed Schmitt had captured his intent, made only two changes in the whole document.”

With the publication of Warfighting, maneuver warfare was now the official doctrine of the Marine Corps.7

Conclusion

Just as “Patterns of Conflict” arrived at the right time to assist the Marine Corps in the process of adopting maneuver warfare, A New Conception of War comes at an auspicious time for the Marine Corps as it struggles with understanding where to best position itself in the current operating environment refocusing on peer warfare. While reading A New Conception of War, I came across five different articles from various media sources providing advice on how the Marine Corps should go forward. While some of the material in the articles is redundant, referencing and quoting each other, the articles collectively illustrate that the Marine Corps is currently facing an “identity crisis.”8 Sir, Who Am 1? An Open Letter to the Incoming Commandant of the Marine Corps by Maj Leo Spaeder, a MAGTF planner, poses the “existential question” of what is the identity of the Marine Corps and the necessity for a “big idea organizing principle.”9 Maj Mark Nostro, also a MAGTF planner, suggests that the Marine Corps “must look to the future to evolve into a force that is reflective of its naval purpose.”10 A Proceedings article, coauthored by highly regarded LtCol Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR(Ret), explains why “amphibious power projection remains viable” and that “[t]he tactical value of the Marine Corps’ forcible-entry capability has not expired.11 A Washington Post article with the self-explanatory title, “Marine Corps Suffers Identity Crisis in Age of Cyberwarfare, Artificial Intelligence”12 and Russell’s Century-Old Plea for the Marine Corps, Updated for 2019 by Maj Brian Kerg support these articles. Maj Kerg “[i]mplore[s] all the stakeholders in the future of the Marine Corps to do their due diligence in providing our senior leadership with meaningful recommendations on how the Marine Corps should determine its purpose, character, and mission.”13

Earlier, I stated A New Conception of War is partly the story of how the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrine. As important as that narrative is, the greatest benefit of reading A New Conception of War is the story of how the Marine Corps, facing a post-Vietnam operational environment with seemingly insurmountable problems, successfully overcame them. A New Conception of War provides confidence to present day Marines that we can successfully meet the challenges of the present operating environment, just as Marines in the past have done.

After reading A New Conception of War, I read both Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War by Robert Coram,14 and The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security by Grant T. Hammond.^ Boyd was previously on the Commandant’s Professional Reading List (CPRL) until replaced in 2017 by The Mind of War. I agree that a book about Boyd’s development of his warfighting theories and their impact on the Marine Corps is worthy of inclusion on the CPRL, but highly recommend Maj Brown’s A New Conception of War be that book. Maj Brown provides a coherent overview of Boyd’s career (as do the other books), while also dictating a broader narrative concerning Boyd’s influence on the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare debate, and the story of how maneuver warfare was adopted as the official doctrine of the Marine Corps via the efforts of some key individuals.

A New Conception of War is strongly recommended for anyone desiring an in-depth understanding of how maneuver warfare was adopted by the Marine Corps, and for those Marines currently struggling with ascertaining the best path forward for the Marine Corps today.

Notes

1. Frank G. Hoffman and. George P. Garrett, “Amphibious Assault Will Remain a ‘Core’ Competency,” Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, March 2019).

2. Renamed MCDP 1 in 1997.

3. Grant Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, (New York, NY: Smithsonian Institution, 2012).

4. For all the times I have read Boyd described as a “former Air Force fighter pilot,” he “only accumulated 29 missions and44 combat flight hours before the signing of the [Korean] Armistice.” Boyd did not fly combat in Vietnam, possibly because by that time, “his career to this point was largely defined by solving scientific problems.”

5. This study suggested several ideas including mechanizing the Marine Corps to fight on NATO’s Central Front or go the opposite direction and change the Marine Corps to a light infantry force, transferring Army airborne, air assault and special operations units to the Marine Corps.

6. Boyd.

7. In a 1993 Gazette article, Wyly explicitly stated: “Had there been no … Lind or John Boyd, we would have continued our fight for a new style of fighting anyway.” Boyd’s contributions were instrumental, but he was not the central figure in the process of getting maneuver warfare adopted as doctrine.

8. Carlo Munoz, “Marine Corps Suffers Identity Crisis in Age of Cyber warfare, Artificial Intelligence,” The Washington Times, (Washington, DC: April 2019).

9. Leo Spaeder, “Sir, Who Am I? An Open Letter to the Incoming Commandant of the Marine Corps,” War on the Rocks, (Online: March 2019).

10. Mark Nostro, “Discarding the Ptolemaic Model of the Marine Corps,” War on the Rocks, (Online: April2019)11.

“Amphibious Assault Will Remain a ‘Core’ Competency.”

12. “Marine Corps Suffers Identity Crisis in Age of Cyberwarfare, Artificial Intelligence.”

13. Brian Kerg, “Russell’s Century-Old Plea for the Marine Corps,” War on the Rocks, (Online: April 2019).

14.1 found Coram’s Boyd to be an informative, yet fawning, narrative of Boyd’s life and career that does little, if anything, to explain Boyd’s part in adopting maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps’ official doctrine that Brown’s book fails to cover any better.

15. The Mind of War. I agree with Maj Brown’s assessment that “The Mind of War has … [a] better focus on Boyd’s professional career, but … it only briefly assess Boyd’s impact on the Marine Corps.” “Briefly” is an understatement.

Intellectual Renaissance

by Maj Austin M Duncan

In the wake of a long and bloody conflict in Vietnam, the U.S. Armed Forces faced the daunting task of reflecting on what went wrong and how to reorganize for future wars. Every service transformed from their experiences in Vietnam; however, none were as significant as the United States Marine Corps’ intellectual renaissance, culminating with the adoption of a new warfighting philosophy. Though many organizational artifacts remain, over thirty years later, the transformation of the Marine Corps during the 70s and 80s is an unheralded part of our history. During the Marine Corps’ intellectual renaissance, the Service increased education standards for potential recruits, birthed a new philosophy of warfighting, professionalized the force through education, and institutionalized maneuver warfare. We must continue to build on that legacy today.

Social, Political, and Economic Context

Following Vietnam, service members returned from fighting elusive adversaries in the jungle to arguably an even more significant fight at home. The United States experienced significant strife, tearing at the very social fabric of the nation. Racial tensions and drug abuse were rampant, affecting every sect of society.2 The situation was even more magnified in the military. In 1971, Col Robert Heil wrote in the Armed Forces Journal:

Historical precedents do not exist for some of the services’ problems, such as desertion, mutiny, unpopularity, seditious attacks, and racial troubles. Others, such as drugs, pose difficulties that are wholly NEW. Nowhere, however, in the history of the Armed Forces have comparable past troubles presented themselves in such general magnitude, acuteness, or concentrated focus as today. ^

In addition to monumental discipline and morale issues, the military faced an evolving political landscape. In 1973, President Richard M. Nixon ended the draft and the U.S. shifted to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), emphasizing the importance of quality recruitment.^ Mounting casualties at the end of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal altered American’s faith in government leaders and discredited the military for years to come.5 In terms of foreign policy, “Vietnam Syndrome” took root, leaving America reluctant to commit troops unless absolutely necessary-another significant blow to the military brand.6 Economically, the Vietnam War severely damaged the U.S. economy, spiking inflation and interest rates, spurring an economic recession.7 In sum, despite a significant impetus for change following the U.S.’s “unprecedented and unrepeated defeat and humiliation” in Vietnam, the Armed Forces faced considerable headwinds.8 A historical social divide, cancerous discipline issues, changing political landscape, and the prospect of economic austerity prefaced any attempt at reform.

Out of all the Services, discipline and morale concerns were even more exaggerated in the Marine Corps. In the 1973 General Officer Symposium, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Robert Cushman, acknowledged the Marine Corps had the highest absentee and deserter rate of all Services. Ironically, he also bragged about the health of recruiting, noting each district made quota in 1973 for the first time since 196710 Initially, the Marine Corps was optimistic it could recruit an AVF in a fiscally austere environment while also addressing discipline concerns; however, by 1975 it was clear there was a problem: “the Marine Corps had the worst rates of imprisonment, unauthorized absence, and courts-martial in the armed forces.”11 The Corps needed significant reform.

Wilson-Barrow Reforms: Increasing the Education and Quality of Recruits

In the summer of 1975, Gen Louis H. Wilson became Commandant. Facing intimidating obstacles, Gen Wilson devised a plan to navigate the AVF era and address the poor discipline throughout the Corps. While the Army was loosening standards to meet recruiting goals, the Marine Corps chose to do the exact opposite.12 With high school graduates accounting for less than 50 percent of recruits, Gen Wilson stated the new goal was “three out of four Marines have high school diplomas when they come in, and the remainder have completed tenth grade or higher.”13 Additionally, he oversaw a significant reboot of the entire recruiting system, to include establishing a chain of accountability “from the individual recruiter to the depot commander,” and implementing a recruiting management course to improve efficiencies at recruiting stations around the country.14

In 1979, Gen Wilson’s tenure as Commandant ended, and he handed over the reins to his protege, Gen Robert H. Barrow to oversee the remainder of the manpower reform. By the time Gen Barrow changed command in 1983, 82 percent of recruits were high school graduates.13 Because of an increased emphasis on education and improved accountability of recruiting, the Marine Corps experienced a dramatic reduction in discipline issues while also increasing the quality and elitism of the force.16

Seeking a New Philosophy of Warfare

With manpower reforms underway, another group of professionals intellectually sparred over the warfare philosophy guiding the Service. Coming on the heels of defeat in Vietnam, many veterans of the Corps questioned their “received wisdom” of doctrine and training.17 Whereas firepower and attrition previously dominated military thought, some Marines questioned if the Marine Corps, a numerically inferior and inherently seaborne force, should focus on maneuver. In 1978, a young Marine captain astutely summarized the state of the Corps in the Marine Corps Gazette: “In recent years, while the Marine Corps’ existence is being questioned from without, many of its members are experiencing an identity crisis of their own.”18

The heart of the identity crisis stemmed from the prospect of war on the Eastern front against a massive and highly capable Soviet military. In a renowned 1976 Brookings Institution report, the authors questioned the Marine Corps ability to fight alongside NATO in Central Europe, suggesting the Corps should reorganize as a land force to fight together with the Army.19 However, doing so threatened to alter the defining character of the Marine Corps as an amphibious force, a sacrosanct consideration for a force plagued by the perpetual organizational paranoia of its looming demise.20

In 1979, the Marine Corps Gazette featured a two-part series by Capt Steven W. Miller arguing that

maneuver doctrine can propel the Marine Corps into the 21st Century where it will again, as in World War II, provide the leadership to this revolution in warfare.21

Though his articles marked the start of the official Marine Corps debate, Capt Miller appropriately noted the origins of maneuver doctrine trace back to Genghis Khan and the more recent unpublished works of Col John Boyd, USAF, (Ret) ,22 Maneuver warfare was nothing new, but a debate emerged within the Corps, spurring a clash of “maneuverists” versus “attritionists.”23

Between 1979 and 1993, the Marine Corps Gazette published more than 50 articles concerning the debate on warfighting.24 Though there was no shortage of opinions on the matter, the intellectual giants of the time were Col John Boyd, LtCol Michael Wyly, and William Lind. As Robert Coram later summarized, “Boyd’s ideas were the foundation and impetus for changes, but Wyly, as an active-duty Marine Corps officer [head of tactics at the Amphibious Warfare School], was the agent of change.”23 Additionally, William Lind heavily advocated for maneuver doctrine, often hosting study groups in Quantico with anyone who would listen while also writing prolifically in the Marine Corps Gazette and later penning the Maneuver Warfare Handbook.26

The maneuver theorists had a tremendous impact, ultimately informing a new philosophy of warfare. Opposed to the firepower-attrition doctrine prescribed in Army field manuals, which intended to defeat the enemy in the physical domain, maneuver doctrine sought to disrupt and disorganize the enemy psychologically.27 The new style of warfare stressed mission-type orders, decentralized operations, creative thinking, and opportunistic initiative.28 Most importantly, it offered the Marine Corps a way to remain uniquely amphibious while shedding the baggage of defeat in Vietnam. As such, the Corps birthed a new war fighting philosophy: maneuver warfare.

Professionalizing the Force

With the seeds of maneuver warfare taking hold at the grassroots level, the Corps needed a champion to professionalize the force and institutionalize the new philosophy. During Gen Alfred M. Gray’s 1987 confirmation hearing to be the 29th Commandant, he stated a priority goal was improving the “understanding of the art, as well as the science of war.”2’1 He made quick work realizing that goal. On his second day in office, he ordered the creation of Marine Corps University, an organization to synchronize the disparate education commands under one roof with a common vision.30 He also demanded each school be accredited and yield degrees for their students, an enormous undertaking which was not realized until the mid-1990s.31 Furthermore, Gen Gray, with the help of LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, implemented a professional reading program organized by grade.32 The education reforms during the late-19 8 Os cannot be understated. Not only did Gen Gray accelerate professionalism throughout the force, many elements of his education reform remain intact today-a true testimony to their impact.

Though Gen Gray’s acute focus on education was remarkable in its own right, his legacy stems from the publication of the Marine Corp capstone document: FMFM 1, Warfighting. Enlisting a small group of deep thinkers, including Col Boyd and Capt John F. Schmitt, Gen Gray turned years of maneuver warfare debates into the guiding philosophy of the Corps. FMFM 1, now known as the MCDP l, crystallized maneuver warfare as “the Marine Corps concept for winning.”33 After nearly two decades of debate following the embarrassment of Vietnam, the Corps institutionalized maneuver warfare as their new philosophy of warfighting, and the credit belongs to Gen AI Gray.

Conclusion

Post-Vietnam reform redefined the Marine Corps. On the battlefield, adversaries threatened to defeat an outmoded war fighting philosophy; at home, skyrocketing discipline issues threatened to destroy the Corps from the inside out. To preserve the legacy, the Marine Corps recruited “the few, the proud,” deliberated a new warfighting philosophy, and professionalized the force through education.3^ The dramatic post-Vietnam transformation culminated with the publication of Warfighting, marking the institutional adoption of maneuver warfare and punctuating the Marine Corps’ intellectual renaissance. As Gen William Bowers wisely noted, the Corps was able to achieve an intellectual renaissance because

in the late 1980s the ranks were then filled with tough smart, elite, physically fit, ethical warriors who graduated from high school, scored well on their enlistment tests, were completely drug free, and were capable of understanding the more sophisticated operational and tactical concepts called for by maneuver warfare.33

Today, there is no shortage of spirited debates and admissions of shortfalls within our service. But these are not only the opinions of young authors filling the pages of our Marine Corps Gazette and other professional outlets. The National Defense Strategy and Marine Corps Operating Concept openly acknowledge we are in the midst of “a period of strategy atrophy” and “currently not organized, trained, or equipped to meet the demands.”36 Following two decades of land war, our Corps is once again struggling to define its identity and rectify known deficiencies-not all that much different from the postVietnam identity crisis. Much like the Marine Corps intellectual renaissance of the 70s and 80s, we must invest in the intellect of our youth and champion their ideas if we are to inspire the next generation of our Corps. America’s youth continues to demonstrate they will clear the bar; it is on us to keep raising it.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1: Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

2. The White House Historical Association, “Racial Tension in the 1970s,” WhiteHouseHistory.org, (Online); Tim Stoddart, “Drug Addition Through the Decades-Focus: 70’s,” Sober Nation, (Online: July 2013).

3. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., “The Collapse of the Armed Forces,” Armed Forces Journal, (Washington, DC: June 1971).

4. Bernard Rostker, The Evolution of the AllVolunteer Force, (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2006).

5. “Watergate Scandal,” History.com, (Online: 2009); Alan Rohn, “How Did the Vietnam War Affect America?,” Vietnam War, (Online: April 2016).

6. Geoff Simons, The Vietnam Syndrome: Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy, (London, UK: MacMillan Press, 1998).

7 “How Did the Vietnam War Affect America?”

8. The Vietnam Syndrome: Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy.

9. Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., “Corps Operations Facing Austerity,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantíco, VA: August 1973).

10. Ibid.

11. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991).

12. Col William J. Bowers, “Making Marines in the All-Volunteer Era,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantíco, VA: November, 2014).

13. Gen Louis H. Wilson, “New Directions,” (presentation, Council of the Navy League, Washington, DC, September 1975).

14. LtCol Joseph D. Riech and Maj Gary Kozlusky, “The New Recruiting Command and the Story of Marine Corps Recruiting,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantíco VA: August 1994).

15. Douglas Martin, “Robert Barrow, A Marine Corps Reformer Who Became Commandant, Dies at 86,” The New York Times, (New York, NY: The New York Times, October 2008).

16. “Making Marines in the All-Volunteer Era.”

17. LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC(Ret), “Warfighting Discussion Panel.” Youtube video, 1:23:29, (Online: February 2015).

18. Capt Stephen W. Miller, “Marine: A Question of Identity,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: January 1978).

19. Martín Binkinandjeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1976).

20. Terry Terriff, “Innovate or Die: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps,” Journal of Strategic Studies, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006 ); LtGen Victor H. Krulak USMC(Ret), First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984).

21. Steven W. Miller, “Winning Through Maneuver: Conclusion-Counter the Defense,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantíco, VA: December 1979).

22. Ibid.

23. MAGTF Instructional Group, “QPME: Warfighting: History of the MCDP, Roots of Maneuver Warfare, and the Doctrine in Action,” Gray Research Center, (Quantíco VA: February 2018).

24. Maj Kenneth F McKenzie, Jr., “On the Verge of a New Era: The Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantíco VA: July 1993).

25. Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, (New York, NY: Back Bay Books, 2002).

26. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

27. G.I. Wilson, Michael D. Wyly, William S. Lind, and B.E. Trainor, “The ‘Maneuver Warfare‘ Concept,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantíco VA: April 1981).

28. William S. Lind, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantíco VA: October 1989), “Making Marines in the All-Volunte er Era.”

29. United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate One Hundredth Congress, (Washington, DC: 1987).

30. Gen Alfred M. Gray USMC(Ret), “Warfighting Discussion Panel,” (Quantíco, VA: 2015).

31. “Warfighting Discussion Panel.”

32. Ibid.

33. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: June 1997).

34. Jeff Schogol, “Marine Corps May Replace ‘The Few, The Proud’ as Its Recruiting Slogan,” Marine Corps Times, (Online: September 2016).

35. “Making Marines in the All-Volunteer Era.”

36. U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Advantage, (Washington, DC: 2018); Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operating Concept: How and Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, September 2016).