Archives: Gazette Magazines

There are at least two lessons that emerge as fundamental truths from DESERT STORM. They were alluded to by the editor in the March Gazette, and it is important to the future well-being of the Corps that they be understood and heeded. The first of these deals with firepower, the second with the overriding importance of balanced capabilities within combined arms teams. My intent is to expand on these lessons and reemphasize their importance.

FMFM 1, Warfighting provides the philosophical foundation for maneuver warfare, the new style of warfare that was officially adopted by the Corps in 1989 with the publication of the manual. Maneuver warfare’s roots reach back to efforts in World War I to find an answer to the statemate resulting from increased battlefield firepower. Maneuver warfare’s fundamental concepts include focusing on the enemy rather than terrain objectives, avoiding enemy strengths, attacking enemy critical vulnerabilities, acting more quickly than the enemy can react, using mission-type orders, and exploiting tactical opportunities uncovered by subordinate units. The goals throughout are to seize the initiative by a series of high-tempo operations, to create chaos and confusion for the enemy, and to destroy his cohesion and ability to react effectively. Bold, rapid maneuver supported by firepower is the principal agency for execution of this warfare style.

It would be a serious mistake to believe that DESERT STORM merely tested and validated the concepts set forth in FMFM1. What the operation did was reaffirm something that was already clear from earlier Arab-Israeli wars-technology over the last 20 years has created a revolution in firepower. Vastly improved reconnaissance, surveillance, and detection means can now locate critical targets of all types throughout an entire enemy country; precision-guided weapons of great lethality, accuracy, and range can then attack these targets. Unless the enemy has highly effective missile and air defenses, a high percentage of these targets can be quickly destroyed.

This is precisely what happened for the 43 days of Operation DESERT STORM. Having obtained complete air superiority in the initial hours of the operation, a massive number of aircraft sorties, as well as missile and artillery missions were launched against thousands of Iraqi targets carefully selected for their strategic, operational, and tactical value. Electronic warfare efforts reinforced this explosive assault.

Iraqi forces were quickly deprived of intelligence, their air arm put out of action, command and control centers destroyed, communications disrupted, supply dumps leveled, reserve units battered, weapons systems obliterated, bridges and roads destroyed. The attack created widespread chaos and confusion at every level. Attempts at maneuver by Iraqi forces rendered them more vulnerable, more exposed to immediate destruction.

As a result of these actions, the initiative passed entirely to coalition forces. In maneuver warfare terms the air campaign not only put the allies “inside” the Iraqi observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop but actually destroyed Iraq’s ability to employ an OODA cycle and carry out coordinated action. The systematic destruction or neutralization of selected critical targets simply collapsed the Iraqi forces, wiping out a significant part of their combat capability and much of their will to fight.

The principal goals sought by maneuver warfare doctrine were brilliantly achieved, but the job was done by firepower, not maneuver. What we witnessed is a demonstration of the new relationship between maneuver and firepower. Maneuver is no longer the sole or even the primary means of gaining and achieving decisive results. Indeed, unless firepower has done its work, unless enemy weapons systems are neutralized, maneuver in the face of prepared defenses is most apt to be a costly proposition. FMFM1 must be revised to reflect this and make perfectly clear that the commander has not one but two powerful tools as he seeks to collapse the enemy and thus avoid having to attack into the teeth of an effective defense. These twin tools are firepower and maneuver, and of the two the former is king.

Although the air campaign in DESERT STORM was key to the collapse of Iraqi forces, Allied ground forces were essential to the operation. They deterred the enemy from further advance, fixed his position, and thus secured the airfields from which much of the air campaign was waged. They reconnoitered and probed. Their firepower neutralized and destroyed tactical targets, contributing significantly to the collapse at that level. The ground forces breached obstacles and advanced to occupy the ground, accept the surrender, and disarm the defeated Iraqi forces. Ground force planning and execution appears to have been well done, but it is abundantly clear that the basic issue was decided long before the first Allied ground forces crossed the Kuwaiti border. The air campaign, in which 3d Marine Aircraft Wing played an important part, had done the collapsing.

The significance of the revolution in firepower is such that the Marine Corps might have been better advised to term its new 1989 style of fighting “Firepower Warfare” rather than “Maneuver Warfare.” Like maneuver warfare, firepower warfare would be much more than its name implies-a matrix of concepts including almost all those woven into maneuver warfare. It would, for example, seek out critical enemy vulnerabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and describe how these would be identified, located, and systematically attacked by a variety of firepower means. The distinction between the selective, precise targeting of firepower warfare and attrition warfare would be carefully drawn. And just as firepower plays a role in maneuver warfare, maneuver plays an essential but secondary role in firepower warfare. The point of this paragraph, however, is not to propose a name change,* but to emphasize that FAMFM 1, despite an occasional bone thrown to firepower, fails to reflect the new realities wrought by technology. The maneuver-firepower relationship has changed. In a growing number of threat situations, firepower must precede rather than follow maneuver. Properly understood and applied, today’s firepower is as far removed from attrition warfare as maneuver, and it can collapse an enemy more quickly, more effectively, and with far fewer casualties than can be accomplished by maneuver options. On many battle-fields its prior application will be indispensable if maneuver is to succeed.

It is unlikely that a force as vulnerable and ill prepared as Iraq will challenge the United States on a conventional battlefield in the foreseeable future. Media coverage has made the lessons of DESERT STORM available to everyone throughout the world. If the United States is challenged, it may well find that its firepower attacks on critical vulnerabilities are not so uniformly decisive; losses to integrated missile and air defenses and counterbattery fire can be anticipated. Firepower alone will not always produce the massive collapse seen in DESERT STORM. More of the task may have to be allocated to maneuver forces. Commanders then must be prepared to orchestrate their twin tools of firepower and maneuver in a coordinated, simultaneous effort. Against a competent, well-prepared enemy, this may prove costly and vastly more difficult than anything experienced in DESERTSTORM. Indeed, a stalemate may be the unavoidable outcome. But a force that does not grasp the essence of the fire-power revolution will suffer severely for this failure.

There is nothing new at all about the second fundamental lesson from DESERT STORM-that battles are most often won by balanced combined arms teams has long been recognized. It is folly to field a force that has asymmetrical vulnerabilities, a force that cannot counter one or more of the arms available to the enemy. It makes no difference whether the force involved is a corps or a company. If it cannot answer enemy artillery fire, resist attack by enemy armor, or defend itself against enemy aircraft, it can be subjected to the same fate as Iraq. It can be annihilated by a force that it is unable to engage or harm.

Thus an effective combined arms team is not created solely by incorporating the capabilities needed to deal with every arm of the enemy force. Those capabilities must also be immediately available at the levels where they are needed. If distances, command relationships, employment policies, poor communications, enemy electronic warfare assets, or anything else prevents, for example, the aviation combat element of a Marine expeditionary force from responding to a rifle company’s need for air defense, the company is an unbalanced, vulnerable, easily destroyed force for as long as that condition exists. The same can be said if that rifle company is attacked by artillery, mortar fire, or enemy armor. Thus the levels at which teams are balanced and the procedures that ensure capabilities are available where needed are crucial. This, of course, does not mean that forces have to be a mirror image of their enemies-far from it. It does mean, however, that they must have countering capabilities.

Despite these obvious realities and the vivid example of DESERT STORM, there are those who propose restructuring the Marine Corps as light infantry with reduced capabilities in terms of armor, artillery, and air assets. The Marine Corps cannot afford to limit its contributions to the low end of the warfare spectrum. Any military organization with missions of readiness and forcible entry that cannot compete on the modern conventional battlefield is of little value to anybody. Generations of Marines have adhered to the idea of task organizing-tailoring forces for the job at hand. Given the American style of warfare and what Americans expect for those who risk their lives on the battlefield, there will be but few situations in which light infantry is the preferred answer. If we do encounter an occasion in which technology, heavier weapons, combat support, logistic support, etc. are a disadvantage, Marines can quickly pare down to whatever level of lightness or reduced combat power seems appropriate. The important thing is to structure a Corps-however big or small-with units that can be properly balanced for any battlefield. Even if Marines are left with only enough people for two division-wing teams, they should be teams with the requisite capabilities to fight any equivalent-sized force that can be fielded against them. They must be balanced Marine air-ground task forces that can handle infantry, armor, artillery, and air threats; they must not have “critical vulnerabilities” that an enemy can exploit with minimum risk to himself.

The Marine Corps must think seriously about these issues. If the manner in which the Corps expresses its new style of warfare does not put firepower and maneuver in proper perspective, if its new style does not adequately reflect the revolution in firepower, if it does not realize that only balanced forces can survive on modern battlefields, and if it does not preserve capabilities that enable it to be useful across the spectrum of threats that may confront the Nation, then it will have failed in a fundamental way. A flawed warfighting philosophy will have led it to flawed decisions on structure and equipment.

The goal of FMFM 1 is to establish the foundation for Marine Corps doctrine and define a style of warfare. As such, it is a document of great importance. Making sure that it is absolutely right is now a matter of first priority.

The Gulf War took place in one of the world’s most strategic locations. As such, geopolitical considerations were dominant, but matters of political leadership, international cooperation, economic concerns, resources, strategy, national will, and dozens of other matters added to its complexity. In my view, however, much of the war‘s success hinged on maneuver warfare and the operational art.

Fred Kaplan of the Boston Globe writes that maneuver warfare was once espoused by a clique of renegades and reformers. This philosophy, however, has percolated through the ranks of a new generation of intellectual officers. The Gulf War displayed not only new technologies in American weaponry, but also the new breed of American warrior imbued with this philosophy.

Maneuver warfare was ushered into the Marine Corps over 13 years ago by Gen A. M. Gray and Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret). It took root in the 2d Marine Division in 1981, appearing first as a maneuver warfare board made up of “Young Turks.” Only two unpublished documents existed then: “Gray’s Battle Book” and “Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict.” The effort was accompanied by numerous articles in the Gazette. Now FMFM1. Waifighting and FMFM 1-1, Campaigning have codified maneuver warfare and operational art philosophy for the Marine Corps. Moreover, this philosophy has become Marine Corps doctrine.

The success of this doctrine was spelled out in Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopfs brief of “How the War Was Won.” It is all there: the refusal to join ground combat prematurely; deception operations; multiple simultaneous thrusts; collapsing a flank by deepsweeping forces; firepower in a maneuver context, creating ambiguity; uncertainty, hesitation, and psychological operations shattering enemy unit cohesion.

Gulf War operational art used tactical events (i.e., battles, engagements, and the refusal to join battle) to strike directly at Iraq’s strategic center of gravity. The idea was to win strategically without resorting to a prolonged ground war. It was a matter of deciding where and when to fight, and where and when not to fight. The heart and soul of the operational art was the correct identification of Iraq’s center of gravity. It was not Kuwait, but Baghdad itself. The refusal to enter a ground war prematurely let military planners shape the operation and focus on winning the war at the highest possible level-the strategic level.

War-winning operational art centers on achieving a decisive outcome quickly without visiting the butcher shop of a nasty ground war. The application of the operational art and the correct identification of Iraq’s strategic center of gravity proved central to the maneuver-style success.

The strategic center of gravity, Baghdad, was much more than a geographic location on a map. It was the nerve network and infrastructure of Iraq’s political-military organization. By throwing strength against weakness, allied air against Iraq’s weak air and air defense, Iraq’s command, control, and communications capability was effectively erased. This helped the coalition forces to stay one step ahead of Iraqi forces. Loss of the ability to communicate and exercise command and control at the highest levels prevented Iraq from coordinating the defense of the so-called Saddam Line and counterattacking.

Early naval actions and blockade set the stage for developing the operation to our advantage. From the beginning the United Nations’ sanctions and naval blockade quietly and insidiously tightened the vise on Iraq’s logistics system. The overall effect of naval actions and air served us well in preparing for the ground action vice ground warfare. As a consequence of cutting off all viable logistics support to Iraqi troops, coalition forces rapidly flushed the Iraqis out of Kuwait without having to dig them out in a mutual bludgeoning contest.

Carrying the war directly to Baghdad and refusing to commit ground forces prematurely in Kuwait enabled the warfighters to shape the operation and decide where and when to undertake ground actions. Iraq had the initial advantage of choosing the ground over which to fight. But its static defense quickly turned this into a disadvantage, ultimately fixing its forces in place and limiting other military options. The quick, in-and-out artillery and light armored infantry (LAI) raids by Marines preempted Iraqi efforts. BGen Richard I. Neal, in a Riyadh briefing, noted how the Iraqis were in severe trouble because “we’re inside his (the Iraqi’s) decisionmaking cycle.”

Such actions kept the Iraqis off balance and guessing where and when the Marines were to come from-land, sea, or both. While air power was used to help cut inside the Iraqi decisionmaking cycle, it also was integrated and sequenced to throw strength against weakness. The technological strength of our air was leveraged against the technologically weak and relatively unsophisticated Iraqi Air Force and air defense. Having eliminated most of the Iraqi command and control capability, our air continued to disrupt logistics that were already suffering from sanctions and naval actions. The corps-level Iraqi fire support coordination capability was nullified and any Iraqi offensive action was checkmated.

While air pounded away, preparing the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) for a ground offensive, Iraq tried unsuccessfully to draw Marines into a premature battle. Refusing battle may have been as important to the Marines’ ground success as actually joining battle. This refusal to enter into the fight too early illustrates that the coalition was truly in control of time and space in the KTO.

Gradually, the Iraqi Army lost the mobility needed to offset a static defense in depth. It was thrust upon the horns of a dilemma: if it tried to move out of its static positions, it was exposed to increased and precision allied air and artillery and certain death. If the Iraqi Army stayed in its defensive positions, it was vulnerable to attack by maneuvering forces from the west, the south, and the sea. This dilemma, exacerbated by lack of logistics and intelligence, set the Iraqi Army up for a decisive blow from a swift ground action.

Gen Schwarzkopf commented:

We knew that he had very, very limited reconnaissance means. And therefore, when we took out his air force, we took out his ability to see what we were doing down here in Saudi Arabia. Once we had taken out his eyes . . . when we knew that he couldn’t see us anymore, we did a massive movement. . . .

Because the Iraqi Army was unable to see the field of battle and communicate, Saddam Hussein could not exercise command and control of his forces. The coalition outmaneuvered Iraq by creating a high tempo of operations and posing dilemmas that occurred unexpectedly and faster than the Iraqis could keep pace with.

According to LtCol Ray Cole, 1st Marine Division operations officer, maintaining a fast tempo in the 1st Division’s advance was imperative. He noted:

If you are to maintain that quick tempo, you must keep moving. If we would have taken the time to fight everybody in every hole, that would have slowed us. We took a chance on speed and won.

Going through as fast as we did made every action they [Iraqis] took irrelevant, especially when we were behind them already. . . . If you go where the enemy isn’t and then get behind him, their morale is beaten to nothing and you’re going to have a lot of EPWs [enemy prisoners of war], which was the case. The Iraqis were subject to deception as well. Task Force Troy created an illusion of a large troop concentration using decoys and broadcasting noises simulating advancing armor. Ground and amphibious deception literally “faked out” the Iraqis. Marines poised for a large amphibious assault on Kuwait forced the Iraqis to concentrate a reinforced corps along the coast. This significantly tied up well-armed Iraqi forces, allowing Allies to shift to the west and collapse an exposed flank. At the same time the 1st and 2d Divisions penetrated seams in the Saddam Line at weak points as Saudi and other Arabic forces pushed up the coast.

The success of Marine forces breaching the barrier on 24 February 1991 stemmed partially from bold actions by 2d LAI Battalion on 21 February 1991 while raiding deep into Kuwait. This action diverted the Iraqis’ attention from the actual breaching points. The deception worked well and misled the Iraqis. The ground war started 3 days later and ended as abruptly as it began in a 100-hour blitz crushing Saddam’s forces and freeing Kuwait.

The Gulf War capitalized on the maneuver warfare philosophy, generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy and his plan with the least possible cost to ourselves. The essence of the Marine maneuver style rings clear in the words of MajGen James M. Myatt, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division: “Our focus was not on destroying everything. Our focus was on the Iraqi mind and getting in behind them.”

The operational art embodied in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM represents the practical application of this philosophy. It involved surprise, deception (both ground and amphibious), multiple thrusts, bypassing strong-points, sweeping quickly around collapsing flanks, and getting behind the Iraqis, forcing them to give up without a fight. By any measure the Marines’ brand of maneuver warfare was splendid, with two divisions of Marines gobbling up 13 to 18 Iraqi divisions.

“While we should be proud of what we have done, I don’t think it’s wise to get a big head about this war,” reflects LtGen Walter Boomer in the Wall Street Journal. Phil Gold of Insight magazine cautions, “All that can be said of the next war-and there will be a next war-is that it is probably unimaginable today.” Nevertheless, even in the next war, let us not overlook maneuver warfare, the operational art, and Gen Gray’s FMFM 1, Warftghting.

by Majs Gordon C. O’Neill and Daniel A. Driscoll, Jr.

In March 1989, the Commandant of the Marine Corps made maneuver warfare doctrine for Marines when he published FMFM 1. Over the past two years the Gazelle has published numerous articles addressing Marine aviation and its role in maneuver warfare. These articles and the general interest in maneuver warfare have stirred up quite a bit of controversy about Marine aviation and its supposed reluctance to accept maneuver in its training programs. In truth, Marine aviation is undergoing a healthy period of self-reevaluation, one that will help it learn to “fight smarter” and deal more effectively with declining defense dollars.

On future battlefields, one of the keys to success will be how well Marines communicate within and among each element of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). In fact, the better we communicate, the better we’ll be able to make timely and sound decisions in the heat of battle. Maneuver concepts include mission-type orders, commander’s intent, focus of effort, center of gravity, surfaces/gaps, reconpull, logistics push, and more. As aviators, we must understand these concepts and use them to communicate with our ground counterparts, the ground combat element (GCE). The aviation combat element (ACE) can successfully adopt maneuver warfare and all that it represents. In order to accomplish this, however, Marine aviation must improve its MAGTF training programs.

This article will examine some of the precepts of maneuver and what they mean to Marine aviators. Obviously, our thoughts are not all-inclusive of everything that maneuver represents. In fact, only three of the six Marine aviation functions are discussed due to time and space considerations. Our hope is to provide a starting point and help resolve part of the maneuver controversy.

The Marine Corps is a unique and widely envied military organization throughout the world. It is the only air-ground-logistics team in the world task-organized to deploy and fight against any threat to our Nation. When the MAGTF goes to war, it will fight for one of the unified combatant commands throughout the world. In order to succeed in this arena, the MAGTF commander and his staff must be able to operate in this joint and possibly combined environment. They must be able to ask the right questions when tasked to perform a mission and at the same time educate our sister-Service counterparts about the MAGTF’s capabilities. In order to do this we must be familiar with the different levels of war and where the MAGTF fits in.

Through strategy, or the strategic level of war, our government achieves its national policy and objectives; the ends of strategy are the vital interests of national policy.

Tactics, or the tactical level of war, is combat and the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives through fire and maneuver. As Marines, we take pride in our ability to excel at this level of war. The means of tactics include the hardware we design to destroy the enemy; the ways include the techniques and tactics we develop to defeat the enemy in order to achieve the end-victory. Tactics is the art of winning battles and engagements.

Operations, or the operational level of war, is the one at which campaigns are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within a theater of war. The operational commander’s primary tool to organize and synthesize all military efforts in his theater of operations is the campaign plan. The operational commander decides when and where to give battle to the enemy, or conversely, not to give battle.

The essence of operational art is the enemy’s center of gravity, his critical vulnerability, and the application of our superior combat power against that source to achieve the strategic aim over time through the campaign plan. As Marines, we seek to put our strength against the enemy’s critical weaknesses-supporting units, supply depots, lines of communication, airfields, command posts-in order to exploit these weaknesses and force him to lose cohesion. Marines call this maneuver warfare; it is our philosophy of warfighting. We use maneuver, in time as well as in space, to gain an advantage against the enemy commander and exploit it by operating at a higher tempo than the enemy. The precepts of maneuver warfare apply equally at the operational and tactical levels of war.

Where do Marines fit into this picture? The MAGTF commander will operate at both the operational and tactical levels of war. The commander’s area of influence is described as that area in which he can influence combat operations through maneuver or fire support organic to his command. The GCE commander’s area of influence is roughly 18-20 kilometers, which is the maximum range of his organic artillery. On the other hand, the MAGTF commander’s area of influence is several hundred miles beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). This influence is achieved by the long spear of the ACE‘s combat power-the AV-8Bs, A-6s, F/A-18s, AH-1Ws-as well as the other components of Marine aviation. This makes the Marine Corps unique and very lethal and is reflected in the MAGTF commander’s role as a fighter and not just a facilitator. For these reasons, the ACE‘s combat power must communicate with the GCE and combat service support element (CSSE) in order to synthesize their individual combat power into a hammer and anvil delivered with speed and sustained with a system of logistics push.

Antiair Warfare

Antiair warfare (AAW) is one of the six functions of Marine aviation; the others include offensive air support, assault support, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. Every MAGTF Marine will participate to some degree in AAW, which is subdivided into two phases called air defense and offensive AAW. Air defense includes all means, active and passive, to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles and to nullify or reduce their effectiveness if an attack is made. Active air defense is a direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking enemy aircraft and missiles, including aircraft, air/groundlaunched missile intercepts, air defense artillery, automatic weapons, small arms, and electronic countermeasures. The MAGTF employs passive air defense to reduce the effectiveness of air attack and includes the use of cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and protective construction. Marine aviation seeks to conduct offensive AAW against enemy air, air defense assets, and installations before they can be used against us.

The ACE commander, acting through his tactical air commander (TAC), executes the six functions of Marine aviation in order to support the MAGTF commander’s intent and focus of effort against the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. The TAC’s first priority in this process is to dedicate assets to AAW. This fact confuses and upsets many Marines and military reformers because they interpret AAWs priority to mean there will be no assets for the other five functions of Marine aviation and therefore no close air support (CAS). This simply is not the case. The ACE must accomplish all MAGTF requirements with its available assets, but it cannot do this unless it survives the enemy air threat. AAW is vital to the success of the MAGTF mission and really separates the Marines from our sister Services because the MAGTF commander owns these tactical air assets. Perhaps a couple of AAW historical examples might help clarify this situation.

The Yom Kippur War of 1973: At 1400 on 6 October 1973, the Egyptian armed forces achieved strategic and tactical surprise as they launched a preemptive attack against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) stationed along the broad front of the Suez Canal. Simultaneously, the Syrian armed forces attacked the IDF in the Golan Heights in northern Israel. Both the Egyptians and Syrians used their air defense commands (ADCs) as the primary weapon against the vaunted Israeli Air Force (IAF). Following the Six-Day War in 1967, the Soviets had outfitted the Arab ADCs with new surface-to-air missile (SAM) equipment such as the SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6, SAM-7, and the ZSU-23/4 mechanized antiaircraft artillery system. Thus, during the first three days of the Yom Kippur War, the IAF flew into the most formidable air defense umbrellas since Hanoi-Haiphong in Vietnam. The Israeli ground forces desperately needed air support to blunt the Arab attacks on two fronts, but the initial Israeli airstrikes met with disaster. The Syrians and Egyptians shot down approximately 25 A-4 Skyhawks and 5 F-4 Phantoms within the first 90 minutes of combat. At 1600 on 6 October, Gen Elazar, the Israeli Chief of Staff, suspended all tactical sorties until the IAF could devise new tactics that would counter this Arab air defense threat. By 1730, the IAF was airborne again using new tactics that involved staying away from the surface-to-air threats. However, IAF losses continued to rise at a staggering rate.

By the end of the first day the JAF had lost 40 aircraft (30 Skyhawks and 10 Phantoms). By 10 October, after 3 days of combat, the IAF had lost approximately 70 tactical aircraft to the surface-to-air threat, primarily the SAM-6 and ZSU-23/4. This was the IAF’s darkest hour, since it started the war with only 240 jet aircraft. Even more critical, the IAF lost 50 frontline combat pilots. Although the IAF owned the skies against Arab MiGs, it had failed to suppress the Arab air defense barrier and did not gain air superiority. The IAF suffered prohibitive combat losses while providing air support. This was a very hard lesson the IAF would not soon forget; it changed tactics on 10 October, destroyed the Arab surface-to-air threat, and then significantly helped the IDF win the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973.

The 1982 Israeli “Peace for Galilee” Operation: On 6 June 1982, the IDF attacked into southern Lebanon. The IDF mission was to demilitarize the area from all enemy forces up to a range of 40 kilometers in order to prevent further shellings into northern Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian Army manned this area in Lebanon. The PLO consisted of 15,000 fighters equipped with infantry weapons, some artillery and tanks, and a large number of antitank and antiaircraft weapons. The Syrian Army consisted of a division-size force that included 2 tank brigades; 2 infantry brigades; and more than 20 air defense batteries that included SAM-2, SAM-3, SAM-6, SAM-7, and hundreds of antiaircraft artillery pieces.

On 9 June, after two days of beating back the PLO, the Israeli ground forces encountered heavy fighting against the Syrian Army in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. At this point the IAF decisively entered the battle. The IDF needed CAS for its heavily engaged ground forces. However, from lessons learned in the 1973 war the IAF knew it had to neutralize the Syrian surface-to-air missile threat in order to gain local air superiority prior to flying any CAS missions.

In the afternoon of 9 June, the IAF launched a massive airstrike against the SAM sites in the Bekaa Valley. Within 10 minutes the IAF destroyed 19 SAM sites and severely damaged 4 more. At this point, the IAF began a steady flow of CAS sorties for the Israeli ground forces. The Syrian Air Force reacted immediately, and over the next three days the largest air battles since World War II took place. When they were over, the Syrian Air Force was shattered. Amazingly, the IAF shot down 86 Syrian MiGs without any losses.

In combat the ACE commander will face many difficult decisions. Based on the MAGTF mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, and the enemy’s center of gravity, he must make an intelligent recommendation to the MAGTF commander about the apportionment and allocation of his assets. The ACE commander must ask himself, “How can I best support the MAGTF focus of effort, and how can I best employ my aviation assets to decisively defeat the enemy?” AAW priority is not “some abstract rule” as the military reformers suggest, but as history clearly shows, it is a necessary requirement to achieve mission success. Successful MAGTF AAW ensures that enemy air does not impede the other five functions of Marine aviation.

Offensive Air Support

Marine aviation conducts offensive air support (OAS) against enemy ground forces in order to neutralize or destroy their installations, equipment, and personnel. OAS is divided into two areas depending on the proximity of friendly troops when the ordnance is delivered; these are deep air support (DAS) and CAS. DAS is an air action conducted against enemy targets located beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL) in order to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy from attacking our GCE units. DAS does not require detailed coordination with the fire and movement of Marine ground units, but it must be integrated with the MAGTF commander’s overall focus of effort. CAS, either preplanned or immediate, is an air action against enemy targets in close proximity to friendly troops and requires detailed integration with the supported unit’s scheme of maneuver and fires for each CAS mission. As we have noted, in order to successfully conduct both DAS and CAS, Marine aviation must gain and maintain air superiority. As the air threat diminishes, more AAW sorties can be diverted to OAS.

What is the best employment of Marine aviation performing OAS? Should all the assets be dedicated to CAS at the expense of DAS? If so, how does the MAGTF commander shape the battlefield 12-72 hours away? Marine aviation decisively affects the outcome of battles and engagements at the tactical level of war by delivering ordnance in support of the GCE during CAS. In the defense, CAS supports the GCE commander and is a last resort, almost worst-case, scenario. Its use means that DAS and GCE indirect fire has failed to destroy the enemy. In the offense, the GCE will use aviation and artillery to shape the battle.

DAS, on the other hand, supports the MAGTF commander and his ability to affect or shape the battlefield 1272 hours away (or more). DAS sorties decisively affect campaigns and help the MAGTF commander achieve strategic objectives at the operational level of war. The ACE and GCE commanders must integrate and synchronize their efforts in order to maximize the destructive capabilities of both DAS and CAS. Numerous campaigns in World War II and Korea show the importance of integrating the air campaign with ground maneuver.

The Korean War: On 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) stormed south across the demilitarized zone and began a war to unify the Korean peninsula. Gen Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations commander, requested Marine reinforcements to help beat back this NKPA preemptive attack. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by BGen Edward A. Craig, embarked on Navy transports one week after receipt of orders. It arrived in Korea on 3 August 1950, less than 30 days after receiving the initial warning order. This brigade was the advance unit for the follow-on 1st Marine Division/1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) team, which arrived in Korea in early September 1950.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, composed primarily of the reinforced 5th Marines and the squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 33, went to the Korean War as a truly integrated airground team. During their first month of combat, the 5th Marines fought three battles in the Pusan perimeter. These included counterattacks against the NKPA in the Chinju corridor as part of Task Force Kean, 7-14 August; in the Naktong Bulge at Obong-ni, 17-20 August, and again at Obong-ni, 3-5 September. Flying F4U Corsairs from the carriers Sicily and Badoeng Straits, Marine aviators flew CAS missions for each of these counterattacks. They used highly successful World War II, Marine-developed CAS tactics, which they had practiced after the war. Repeatedly, Marine aviators provided the margin needed for victory as they consistently destroyed enemy armor, machinegun nests, artillery, and other targets. The low-flying Leathernecks became heroes to the 5th Marines they supported.

On 6 September, 8th Army Headquarters pulled 5th Marines out of the line so the regiment could join the rest of the 1st Marine Division embarked on Navy transports at Pohang. On 15 September, the 1st Marine Division landed at Inchon and began a 10-day campaign to retake Seoul. In a model for successful air-ground tactics, the Marines took Seoul in a bitter fight. Following this operation, the division made an unopposed landing at Wonsan, North Korea, on 25 October and attacked north toward the Chosin Reservoir and the Yalu River. It then fought the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s 9th Army Group. The Marines destroyed seven enemy divisions in freezing-cold mountain warfare during the 1st Marine Division’s fighting withdrawal.

The Marine successes during the last five months of 1950 once again verified the concept of the air-ground team. Marine aviation integrated air support into the ground scheme of maneuver with devastating results for the North Korean and Chinese communists. Unfortunately, later in the war Marine aviation fell under 5th Air Force as part of “theater air,” and its ability to provide air support to the 1st Marine Division was significantly reduced. The 1st Marine Division’s wait for CAS rose from an average of 15 minutes with 1st MAW to as high as 45 minutes.

OAS cannot be planned and executed in the dark without a clear understanding of what the MAGTF commander wants to achieve and how he visualizes air support affecting the battle. When the GCE is the MAGTF’s focus of effort, which will be most of the time, the ACE cannot plan OAS sorties alone. The ACE and GCE staffs must work together to integrate their efforts in support of the MAGTF’s focus, not just to avoid conflict among their actions. Campaign success depends on the ability to closely integrate ground maneuver, DAS, and CAS.

Assault Support

The Marine Corps first employed helicopters in a combat role during the Korean War. When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived in Korea in August 1950, its aviation assets included several light utility helicopters. During their withdrawal from Chosin Reservoir, the Marines used these helicopters for command liaison and medical evacuation. During the summer of 1951, HMR-161, the first helicopter transport squadron, lifted infantry companies to and from the frontlines. In 1952, the Marines employed helicopters to execute troop movements, combat resupply, and tactical inserts. In virtually every combat operation and major exercise since the Korean War, Marine units have used assault support aircraft. As we look to employ MAGTFs in maneuver warfare, assault support will continue to play a critical role providing operational mobility for the MAGTF. The ACE commander will employ his assets to accomplish the MAGTF commander’s intent, both in support of GCE/CSSE missions and as a maneuver element. In what manner can helicopters be employed as a maneuver element?

A MAGTF commander is not likely to employ a helicopter squadron as a separate maneuver element. Transport helicopters move troops and equipment in order to accomplish tactical, logistical, and administrative missions. They may be an integral part of a maneuver element, but transport helicopters do not lend themselves to independent action. Attack helicopters, however, are ideally suited for maneuver roles, such as screening a flank or conducting deep operations against armored or mechanized threats. However, the relatively small number of attack helicopters in a Marine wing limits the scope and duration of these operations. The ACE commander can better accomplish these missions by task organizing fixed- and rotary-wing units to achieve the synergistic effect of combined arms.

By executing a heliborne assault, the MAGTF commander extends the area that he can influence with the GCE. Normally, the GCE can influence an area of about 18-20 kilometers in depth. Employment of unrefueled CH-46s extends this to a depth of approximately 80 nautical miles. This heliborne assault incorporates surprise and swiftness; it also neutralizes the effects of natural and manmade obstacles on GCE mobility. Employing forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), the helicopter unit can make itself available on short notice to withdraw or reposition the ground maneuver element and to provide resupply, casualty evacuation, and close-in fire support (CIFS).

A heliborne assault will normally include provisions for the inserted maneuver unit to link-up with mechanized or motorized forces. An employment option that does not require linkup is the heliborne raid. MAGTFs are well suited to conduct such raids. The fixed-wing support requirements, particularly AAW and OAS, are planned along with assault support requirements under a single command, the ACE. CAS and CIFS aircraft are available to the ground maneuver units immediately upon insertion. Additionally, artillery units are helilifted into positions in order to support the raid force mission, and command and control is enhanced through the use of utility helicopters equipped with command communications modules.

In future combat operations the MAGTF will likely encounter an enemy who possesses a superior armored and mechanized capability. The MAGTF commander will have to employ superior combined arms and maneuver skills in order to defeat this threat. Two Marine Corps Gazette articles in August 1989 suggested adopting battlefield air interdiction (BAI) within our OAS doctrine in order to enhance the Marine Corps’ combined arms capability. BAI is an Air Force term that encompasses airstrikes against targets short of the FSCL, but not directly under control of the ground maneuver element. In a BAI mission the ACE would employ its assets as a maneuver element. But what does this have to do with assault support?

Although BAI is largely an OAS mission, the ACE could easily integrate helicopter assets into this operation. For attack helicopter employment, Army doctrine calls for a joint air attack team (JAAT). (See FM1-112, Attack Helicopter Battalions.) On a JAAT mission, attack helicopters, Air Force CAS aircraft, and field artillery conduct simultaneous attacks against the same target. Army doctrine calls for artillery indirect fire to engage the target while helicopters move into attack positions. Once there, the helicopter flight engages the target, and then the helicopter flight leader coordinates the air support between the ground commander and the CAS flight leader. The ACE could easily use similar tactics in support of the MAGTF.

BAI takes the fight to the enemy and disrupts his scheme of maneuver before he can make contact with the GCE. This gives the GCE commander time and maneuver space to accomplish the MAGTF commander’s mission and intent. If required, transport helicopters can lift artillery into position to support the JAAT. The ACE can improve JAAT responsiveness to identified targets by positioning FARP packages before mission execution. The MAGTF commander possesses built-in flexibility for this mission since all required aviation assets come under a single tactical commander, the ACE.

Screening a flank is a “maneuver mission” that the MAGTF commander might assign to the ACE. The light armored infantry (LAI) battalion conducts screen, guard, and cover operations, which are traditional security missions. Although the speed and agility of the light armored vehicle (LAV) make it suitable for these missions, it is vulnerable to direct fire weapons, particularly from enemy armored or mechanized forces. The ACE can augment the firepower of the LAI battalion with attack helicopters. With MAGTF approval the ACE can integrate AH-1W Cobras, using overwatch techniques, into the LAI mission. Cobras provide CIFS and antiarmor punch using both the TOW and Hellfire missiles. A habitual relationship developed between the ACE and the LAI battalion would provide the MAGTF commander with an enhanced ability to shape the battlefield.

Assault support assets provide a great deal of flexibility and mobility to the MAGTF commander, if they are effectively used. As such, helicopters play a major role in concentrating combat power against enemy critical vulnerabilities. Helicopter effectiveness may be degraded when requirements exceed the assets available. The ACE must ensure that the allocation and employment of its helicopters most effectively supports the MAGTF commander’s intent.

Future assault support aircraft will expand the maneuver capability of the MAGTF. The MV-22, currently under flight test, will have a minimum combat radius of 200 nautical miles and a cruise speed of 250 knots. This is far superior to the 120-knot cruise speed and 80-nautical-mile combat radius of the CH-46. The MV-22 will give Marine commanders a far better capability to conduct air assaults deep into enemy territory. Current fiscal constraints may jeopardize MV-22 procurement; however, we should continue to develop tactics in line with tilt-rotor capabilities. Just as Marines developed doctrine for transport helicopters in 1947, we should plan for the tilt-rotor concept in 1991. While the Marines may not procure the MV-22, this technology clearly represents the new generation helicopter we will take into any future conflict.

Recommendations and Summary

The MAGTF has an awesome arsenal of weapons and well-trained Marines to carry out any mission. Clearly, the ACE maintains the preponderance of the MAGTF’s “Sunday punch.” This combat power allows the MAGTF commander to influence what will be on the battlefield 12-72 hours in the future as well as support the GCE’s battle right now. The MAGTF commander owns these aviation assets and will use them to best achieve the strategic aim. Although not used frequently in the past, the MAGTF commander may use the ACE as the MAGTF focus of effort or as a maneuver element. This is not new. History is full of successful examples of using air as a maneuver element. On today’s battlefield, there are many examples of missions the ACE could perform as a maneuver element; these include screening forces, direct support CIFS/ CAS aircraft, deep raids, LAI/helicopter reconnaissance, and more.

During the summer of 1989, the Marine Corps University instituted maneuver warfare training at all Marine schools. This education, coupled with the Commandant’s new warfighting doctrine articulated in FMFM I, is increasing all Marines’ knowledge of, and experience in, maneuver warfare. As recent graduates of Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College return to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), they will also share their knowledge of maneuver from the academic environment. However, is this enough? Are there any other ways we in Marine aviation can increase our knowledge of things maneuver? We think so.

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1) is the Marine Corps’ collection of duty experts regarding the best employment of Marine aviation. Twice a year, MAWTS-1 conducts a Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course at MCAS Yuma. Marine Corps captains from all the wings attend the course; they are chosen based on tactical performance in their fleet aircraft and their career potential. Upon completion of the very rigorous WTI syllabus, they return home and assume the duty as their squadron’s tactics instructors.

Over the last two years, MAWTS-1 has conducted command element training for several Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) staffs. This training centered on the best employment of the ACE; it followed the WTI course, but took place before the aircraft returned home. In this fashion, a MEB staff had available more than 100 Marine aircraft that represented a typical force structure in combat, coupled with the extensive training areas of Marine Corps Air Station Yuma. Additionally, over the last year the Marine Corps University has conducted MEB battle staff training with each MEB prior to the training conducted at MAWTS-1. These programs are invaluable and an ideal way to get experts, not only in weapons and tactics, but also in maneuver, back to the FMF.

The common “sheet of music” for all Marines, whether it be in training or in combat, is maneuver warfare and the concepts that make up maneuver. As Marine aviators, we must communicate with our ground brethren in a clear, concise manner. Maneuver warfare concepts will enable us to accomplish this at the operational and tactical levels of war. In FMFM 1, Gen A. M. Gray states that maneuver

. . . represents not just guidance for actions in combat, but a way of thinking in general . . . a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty.

For 75 years, Marine aviators have answered Marine infantrymen’s call while engaged in mortal combat. In the future this will not change as Marine aviation adopts maneuver and learns to fight smarter, pitting strengths against enemy weaknesses in order to make him lose cohesion and the will to fight.

by Maj John F. Kelly and Capt Philip E. Smith

Teaching light infantry concepts is not an easy task. In some ways, it involves teaching Marines a whole new way of thinking, of acting, of solving tactical problems. However, if the Marine Corps is expected to fully implement its new maneuver warfare doctrine, this is what needs to be accomplished.

Training effective light infantry must begin with a thorough understanding of tactical concepts. Most Marine Corps schools, however, traditionally have emphasized specific techniques and procedures and have not addressed the conceptualization issue to any large degree. The “how to” has been stressed over the “why” of tactics. In addition, the techniques and procedures have largely been presented as if they were timeless and appropriate to every war, battle, and skirmish.

Commencing with the initial drafts of OH 6-1, Ground Combat and particularly with the publication of FMFM 1, Warfighting, an evolutionary process of change was initiated at the Infantry Officer Course (IOC). As this process continued, and as we responded to such realities as the expeditionary nature of the Marine air-ground task force, limited war, and low-intensity conflict, a move toward light infantry techniques became inevitable. Fundamental to these changes was the decision to teach not simply the technical details of the infantryman’s trade, but to teach the fledgling infantry officer how to think.

This process begins when the student is first designated a future infantry officer about halfway through The Basic School (TBS). At this point, he receives a required reading list that includes, among many works, Perspective On Infantry, Battlefield Central Europe, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Leavenworth Paper #4), and the Maneuver Warfare Handbook. This process of reading and reflection continues during IOC in the form of additional books and smallgroup discussions.

Throughout the length of the course, students are also issued a number of weekend readings (e.g., book excerpts or articles from the Gazette, Infantry, Armor, etc.) in support of material that is scheduled for presentation the following week. For example, several readings are required on various techniques associated with countermechanized defense. The authors present differing points of view on the “best” way to execute this tactic or how to accomplish this task in a given environment. The instructional point is to increase the student’s perspective on the topic. This process of thought development continues for the duration of the course and is reinforced in sandtable and map exercises, tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs), TACWAR, short tactical decisionmaking exercises (similar to the series that began in the April 1990 edition of the Gazette), and, of course, in all field exercises. Although most of these methods of reinforcement have been standard fare at IOC for a decade or more, they now reflect the doctrinal philosophy of maneuver warfare and modern techniques.

A key factor in teaching any individual to think for himself is the establishment of an environment of open discussion and communication. It is also important to avoid suggesting that a student’s solution is right or wrong, providing a “yellow” or “recommended” solution, or even for the instructor to muse on how he might have accomplished the task. In the first case, it will inhibit students from offering solutions in the future; in the second case, suggesting an institutional right answer will restrict the students’ options if given a similar situation again.

Beyond the aspect of teaching the student how to think is the task of exposing him to the tactical concepts, techniques, and procedures that will ensure his effectiveness as an infantry leader. Any individual attempting to execute maneuver warfare or operate as a light infantryman must be provided, through training and historical perspective, as full a “bag of tricks” and as many techniques and procedures as possible. Procedures are relatively simple, and instruction on them at IOC covers technical tasks such as an in-depth introduction to both the 60mm and 81mm mortars, call for fire, 60mm mortar fire commands, plotting board, all aspects of machinegun employment to include qualification and defilade fire, and “sapper” level assault/field expedient demolitions. Tactical techniques are more difficult, as there is always more than one solution, and the “right” one is personality and situational dependent.

It is clear that modern techniques change as the situation demands. They cannot be codified and expected to apply forever. The first step is to make clear the concept behind the tactic, ensuring that it is fully understood, then introducing a variety of applicable techniques. An understanding of the overall concept allows this “bag of tricks” to be modified as the situation dictates. Instruction in tactical formations is an example of a technique (various formations) too often given precedence over the concept. Only if the concepts that drive unit movement (e.g., thick or light vegetation, open or close terrain, enemy contact likely or unlikely, possible air threat, etc.) are completely understood will the present tactical formations be recognized as only a set of techniques to use as starting points and not restrictions.

Training at IOD commences with mission-type orders, not just in the teaching of tactical skills, but in every aspect of the training day. The focus is on the development of decisiveness, self-reliance, and initiative in the individual and a fostering of team identity in the group. The training environment supports the natural and individual instincts of the students rather than attempting to make them all think in an “accepted” fashion. Field training is emphasized over classroom and application over lecture. Maximum use of the Socratic method is the teaching style and is viewed as critical, as it serves to place the students in continuous decisionmaking situations.

Most field-training exercises at IOC occur at night. Unlimited objective infiltration attacks, extended tactical movements over difficult terrain, and squadsized patrolling exercises are emphasized. These training techniques increase the number of individuals responsible for decisionmaking and navigation, begin the process of building proficient night fighters, reinforce the most infantry-intensive skills, and create unit bonding at the fire team and squad levels.

The course stresses that security and protection are gained not necessarily through the donning of helmets and flak jackets, or by burrowing deep in the ground with massive defensive fortifications, but by moving frequently and stealthily, remaining invisible, and exploiting the micro aspects of terrain. Although the relative advantages and disadvantages of both are addressed, in most cases students seek the reverse rather than forward slopes for their defensive positions.

Although there is little or no differentiation between offensive and defensive operations as they are presented at IOC, it will be useful for clarity’s sake to treat them as separate entities here. The defense is viewed with an ambush mentality that seeks to draw an enemy into the defense and to strike and shock him before he even realizes he is at risk. At this point, his only thought is for survival and not immediate action or calculated response. This approach suggests that it is the minimum ranges of weapons that are important-and they are. The student further understands that the key to any defense is the counterattack. In the case of an antiarmor defense, for example, the students look first to take advantage of the terrain. Most often they will seek to draw the tanks and other armor in close and execute the technique of massed surprise fires rather than the more traditional approach of ever-increasing concentric volumes of fire using heavy, medium, and light antiarmor weapons. In the first case, the secrecy of the ambush is maintained until the defender elects to act; in the second, the ambush is compromised by the defender’s own action. The first suggests nonlinear tactics, while the second employs a linear orientation.

Operations with a generally offensive bent take the form of infiltration attacks, although more traditional operational techniques (e.g., mechanized attack, strongpoint neutralization, urban combat, etc.) are also included. Platoons break down to squads, and sometimes into fire teams or smaller, to conduct lengthy moves at night over long distances. If the enemy is encountered during the infiltration, the unit might attack, depending on the mission and commander’s intent. In most cases, if an enemy unit is identified and is beyond the students’ capability to destroy, they might seek to establish ambushes along likely avenues of enemy egress or reinforcement and call observed supporting arms fire to drive the enemy from their positions.

Consistent with maneuver warfare and light infantry tactics, students come to realize that artillery and air support should not and cannot serve as a substitute for good tactics but as an adjunct to them. The functions and capabilities of various fire support agencies are conceptually grasped prior to any attempt at teaching specific methods of employment.

The most difficult task encountered when the IOC staff embarked upon the reorientation of the curriculum was that the staff themselves required philosophical reorientation. The guiding principle was established that maneuver warfare philosophy is different and that it is unlike anything the Marine Corps had done previously. This is important, as effective trainers require a full understanding of the concepts and historical perspective of maneuver warfare and light infantry. Fundamental to this understanding is an appreciation of the various styles and generations of tactics. This can only be accomplished by a thorough familiarity with military history and current military thought gained by focused reading, discussion, and study. It became immediately obvious that the teacher could no longer afford to be a bare semester ahead of the student. The answer was a comprehensive staff development program that initially oriented on specific areas that were immediately required to initiate the transition and then grew broader in perspective. This program remains in place for new instructors and, as is the case with future IOC students, it begins months before an instructor reports for duty.

These are some of the training prescriptions IOC found most effective in implementing the teaching of maneuver warfare doctrine and light infantry techniques in a formal school. This effort has also been somewhat horizontal, as a number of staff noncommissioned officers from both Schools of Infantry, Officer Candidates School, and the Marine Corps Institute have audited the complete course in order to share information, publications, and experiences. Something akin to this effort is required if the Marine Corps is seriously considering “converting” its present infantry units into light infantry. It is obviously much more demanding in almost every aspect to train and operate at light infantry standards. However, along with the much increased tactical capabilities attained by training and operating as light infantry, these units can also execute traditional “line” infantry missions with minimal preparation.

Effective employment of Marine light infantry units requires leaders imbued with the maneuver warfare philosophy. It is therefore a requirement that increasing effort be applied throughout the Marine Corps to increase the speed at which maneuver warfare is institutionalized as our operating philosophy. There are essentially two points of view on how to accomplish this, The “chipping away” method consists of training the entry level personnel (TBS, IOC, the Recruit Training Regiments, and Schools of Infantry) and only a minority of more senior personnel through squad leaders and platoon sergeants courses, Amphibious Warfare School, and the Command and Staff College. This process takes the long view and requires waiting 15 to 25 years for the newly trained lieutenants to become generals and the privates to become sergeants major. This view also assumes that entrylevel Marines (privates and lieutenants) will maintain this “revolutionary” orientation in spite of pressures from above (real or perceived) to conform to the “old way.”

The other method is to do it now. This process requires targeting not only the entry-level Marine but also every other rank through general and sergeant major. This is the most effective means to change rapidly in the short term and institutionalize the ideas quickly.

To do this, every infantry-oriented school that has as part of its curriculum the teaching of topics relative to infantry operations, must conduct a detailed course evaluation with a goal of eliminating superfluous instruction and/or any instruction that does not specifically lend itself to developing self-reliance and initiative as a way of life. The ultimate goal of all schools must be a vision of what the institution wants the graduate to be. The schools must be staffed with only the best and most experienced personnel who are themselves strong on the character traits described above and share the vision of the institution. As an example, the entirely new concept of control as it is articulated in FMFM 1 (i.e., mission orders and commander’s intent) would be emphasized. When a course includes instruction or use of electronic communication assets, the technical and procedural instruction would be moved as far toward the end of the course as is possible. This would allow entry-level Marines to concentrate on tactics and the concepts of communication without getting overwhelmed by procedures that sometimes appear to restrict rather than aid in communications. The use of communication by absolute exception would also be emphasized.

The concept of the program of instruction (POI) needs to be changed from one that inhibits development and change to one that assists in the evolution of change. This means eliminating the reliance on lesson plans that spell out a single way to do specific tasks through such things as enabling learning objectives (ELOs) and terminal learning objectives (TLOs). These do not lend themselves in any way to the teaching of tactics as an art as per the Commandant’s training and education memo dated 1 July 1989.

IOC is the only officer school that focuses exclusively on tactics and tactical techniques and procedures, although TBS has more of this instruction than ever before in its history. The Amphibious Warfare School, of course, teaches tactics, but must focus instruction on the majority of the students who do not have combat arms specialties. This reality orients the program toward basics and makes it less challenging for combat arms specialists than would be possible in different circumstances. Command and Staff College focuses, not on tactics, but on staff functioning and interaction. The tactical frame of reference for the vast majority of officers, regardless of rank or occupational field, is therefore what they learned at TBS or IOC. The Marine Corps must establish a system of cradle-to-grave resident refresher courses for infantry officers similar to the system currently in force for our noncommissioned and staff noncommissioned officers at the Schools of Infantry.

In the case of infantry captains, a four- to six-week resident course organized and conducted at Quantico should be established as soon as possible. The class size should be no more than 30 attendees, with the course condueled two to four times a year. This course should involve a great deal of focused reading and discussion, guest lecturers and seminars, TEWTS, and map and sandtable exercises. The point of the course would be both conceptual and practical. Rather than making this a return-to-the-Fleet Marine Force (FMF) course with all infantry captains attending en route, it should be filled by quota assignment to each individual infantry, light armored infantry, and reconnaissance battalion with the commander sending his best captain. Similar in concept to the Weapons Training Instructor Course for selected aviators at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, the intent would be to have this officer return to his unit and serve as a catalyst for training and education. A similar course for field grade officers would be conceptually identical to the course for captains but would in fact be a return-to-the-FMF course. This would ensure that all potential battalion commanders can understand and operate using maneuver warfare philosophy that is so critical for light infantry units.

While the Marine Corps considers these broader changes in teaching tactics, IOC is continuing to move ahead, teaching the tactics and techniques of light infantry. It is our belief that the future of Marine infantry is primarily as modern light infantry. Training our infantry units to the exacting standards of light infantry tactics, techniques, and procedures will provide the most versatile force possible, and one that is at the same time absolutely adaptable across the spectrum of conflict. The transition involved will be a major one, as it has been at IOC. Light infantry warfare is not simply “business as usual” with new buzzwords, but a new and different way of thinking and fighting. It is, in the view of the IOC staff, what the Corps’ new doctrine of maneuver warfare means for infantry. As such, it should be the focus not only for IOC, but for every Marine Corps infantry unit as well.