The NCO and Maneuver Warfare

by Capts William H. Weber IV & David J. Furness

1992 Chase Prize Essay Contest First Place

As leaders, we must push power downward to the young Marines who hunger and thirst for more responsibility-and are quite capable of handling it. . . . In combat, NCOs carry battle. Is it fair to expect them to do this in war if we have not trained them in peacetime-by allowing them significant responsibility and authority?

-Gen Walter E. Boomer

On the third day of the ground war during Operation DESERT STORM, a platoon of Company A, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion moved north toward Kuwait International Airport as the point element of the battalion’s drive, conducting an aggressive forward reconnaissance with the battalion moving up quickly behind them to assume blocking positions north of the airport. At 1700, an Iraqi strongpoint halted the battalion’s movement, and the point platoon came under sporadic machinegun fire. Far over on the right flank, a light armored vehicle, commanded by a corporal, pushed out on its own to try and find a way around this obstacle. Unsupported by any friendly forces, the vehicle commander found a route that would allow the battalion to bypass the strongpoint and continue its mission. The corporal called his platoon commander: “Red 1 this is Red 6, I’ve got a way around over here on the right. We can get on a trail under those power lines on the 68 grid line and continue moving.” The platoon commander acknowledged the transmission and immediately changed his direction, moving his platoon and the rest of the battalion around the obstacle and onto the route blazed by the corporal. The battalion accomplished its mission, arriving in its blocking position an hour early, ensuring that other units could seize the airport without concern about possible Iraqi reinforcements descending from the north. A junior NCO, using initiative and making decisions, allowed the battalion to accomplish its mission. His platoon commander listened to him and was willing to commit the battalion to a route chosen by a corporal. This is maneuver warfare.

Understanding maneuver warfare is difficult. Executing it is even harder. Our current warfighting doctrine, as set forth in FMFM 1 and FMFM 1-3. fails to address the key to maneuver warfare execution-creating a command environment that empowers our NCOs. Without NCOs who are willing and able to make decisions on their own, and without officers who will support those decisions, we will surely fail. Our doctrine of maneuver warfare “applies equally to the Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire team leader.” It is a decentralized system that “requires leaders at all levels to display sound and timely judgment.” How do we make our Marines into the warfighters our doctrine demands? The answer is simple. If we are going to fight the way our doctrine dictates, we must empower our NCOs so that decisions are made and executed at the lowest level.

Empowering our NCOs is critical for many reasons. In Men Against Fire. S.L.A. Marshall observes: that no commander is capable of the actual leading of an entire company in combat, that the spread of strength and the great variety of the commander’s problems are together beyond any one man’s compass, and that therefore a part of the problem in combat is to determine which are the moral leaders among his men when under fire, and having found them. give all support and encouragement to their effort.

If a commander cannot control all of his people, then how can he ensure unity of effort and reliable action by subordinates? The solution lies in proper leadership, and commanders must take notice. If we, as an institution, fail to develop our NCOs so that they are the tactical equals of junior officers, we risk slowing our physical and mental speed at the point of contact and throwing away many valuable opportunities for battlefield success. Our NCOs must make and execute decisions.

The empowerment of the NCO starts with the leadership of the unit commander and the command environment he fosters. He must personally take an interest in his NCOs’ professional development and give them the responsibility and knowledge to train junior Marines. FMFM 1 describes this command environment:

All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Commanders should foster a personal teacher-student relationship with their subordinates. . . . [and] should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves.

Besides our doctrinal emphasis on junior leaders who make decisions, we also stress the use of mission tactics as the best way to take advantage of these junior decisionmakers. Mission tactics requires units that can quickly execute basic and advanced techniques and are led. down to the lowest level, by men who make timely decisions. This decentralized decision authority must include the NCO. In his book On Infantry. John A. English concluded his discussion of the subject by saying:

. . . the decentralization of tactical control forced on land forces has been one of the most significant features of modern war. In the confused and often chaotic environment of today, only the smallest groups are likely to keep together, particularly during critical moments.

The noncommissioned officer therefore holds the key to the execution level of maneuver warfare, the level where we translate our doctrine into action. The Marine Corps must acknowledge this. Many company grade officers do not regard the NCO as a leader, trainer, and decisionmaker. They are not comfortable with young corporals and sergeants training their Marines or having the freedom of action necessary to grow as leaders and decisionmakers. Hampered by the need to clear all decisions before executing, the junior leaders atrophy. Action at the point of contact slows to a crawl. Opportunities and battles are lost.

But we can solve these problems. Our company grade officers must force our NCOs to accept more responsibility while simultaneously focusing their junior officers and staff NCOs on improving the abilities of NCOs to lead, think, and fight-added responsibility should be accompanied by the training that will allow NCOs to succeed. This is empowerment. The command environment we foster and the schools we send our NCOs to must work together toward this end if we expect to create true warfighters.

Conversations we have had with several of our contemporaries convince us that we were truly fortunate as new lieutenants to be sent to units that viewed the tactical expertise of NCOs as their number one priority. One of our company commanders explained his priorities to all of his new lieutenants and staff NCOs in these terms:

* The NCOs would be the principal trainers of Marines.

* Our responsibility was to ensure that the NCOs were tactically proficient and could conduct effective training.

* Our focus of training would be at the individual, team, and squad level.

He understood that expertise at the small unit Jevel is essential to the execution of our warfighting doctrine. He believed that by focusing the efforts of the company on building strong NCOs and strong teams and squads, the company as a whole would succeed. He realized that limiting the NCOs participation in the planning and execution of small unit training negated their responsibility for ensuring that their unit was prepared for combat. It also diminished their credibility in the eyes of their Marines. By clearly defining the NCO‘s proper role in the conduct of training, we began to give them the power they needed to succeed.

We believed that for the NCOs to train their Marines, they had to become unquestioned experts in techniques and procedures, battle drills, and tactics. They needed to understand completely our warfighting doctrine and what their role was in it. To reach these goals, we established a program at the company level that should be a part of every unit in the Marine Corps. The program began with an examination to test the basic skills of the NCOs. Then, using existing publications such as The Essential Subjects. The Marine Battle Drill Guide and Command Tasks, Soldier Skill Level 1, 2, 3, 4 for MOS 11B and 11C, the company began to train the NCOs while simultaneously conducting basic individual training. Once our NCOs mastered the basic skills, we began to teach them advanced warfighting techniques and concepts. We conducted sandtable and map exercises designed to illustrate the fundamental maneuver warfare principles. These exercises forced the NCOs to develop their own courses of action and express them in a standard five-paragraph order format. We stressed the ability of the NCO to communicate his plan to his Marines. There were no right and wrong answers, but unsound tactical thinking was thoroughly critiqued. The intent of this training was to develop the thought process that we could later expect the NCO to employ in combat. We tried to train the NCO to become the tactical equal of the junior officer.

Initially, the transition from troop handler to small unit leader was difficult. Many junior NCOs lacked the technical and tactical expertise to educate and train their Marines, and they were reluctant to assume their new role. They quickly overcame this initial reluctance when they realized that we meant to give them real power. They then became eager to learn about their profession. They understood that their increased role brought additional responsibilities, and they rose to the challenge. After several months of intensive training, augmented by many quotas to NCO school and the division’s squad leader’s course, the technical and tactical proficiency of the NCOs skyrocketed. These corporals and sergeants were hungry for additional tactical expertise-they were becoming professionals. As they began to instruct their Marines, some astonishing things happended:

* The NCOs’ status as leaders increased dramatically.

* A clear teacher-scholar relationship grew between the NCOs and their Marines. The NCOs’ focus became training. They became inquisitive and interested in professional reading. Marine Corps Institute courses, and tactical decision games.

* The example set by the NCOs constantly reinforced critical skills and techniques throughout the company. A strong bond developed between the NCO and his men, leading the Marines to an almost unquestioned faith in their junior leaders.

* The entire company’s growing competence in battle drills, techniques, and procedures allowed the NCOs to adapt easily to rapidly changing tactical environments. They became much more aggressive and willing to make significant decisions. During free-play exercises, the NCOs’ new-found freedom translated to dramatically improved physical and mental speed at the small unit level.

The company became a warfighting machine driven by a desire to learn and become more competent. The worth of an NCO rested not only on how well he could drill or prepare for an inspection but also on how he could think and execute on the battlefield. The officers were constantly challenged professionally because even the most junior leaders in the company clamored for knowlege. Morale was never a problem because the command environment bred professionalism.

This is what a Marine Corps rifle company should be.

The second element in our drive to create true warfighting NCOs is formal education. To get a better understanding of the importance of education in our present situation, it is wise to look to the experience of the German Army between the two World Wars. The treaty ending World War I dramatically limited the size of the German officer corps. Given their reduced officer strength, they realized that they would have to rely more heavily on their NCOs. The Germans moved quickly to raise the competence level of their troops. During the 1920s and 1930s-while the American enlisted man was wasting away-the Germans began sending their NCOs to a new school, a school dramatically different from any other in the world.

The Germans designed their NCO schools to create decisionmakers. They believed that a man could be trained to make decisions quickly by getting him in the habit of making decisions. Once that habit was in place, all that remained was to give him the experience necessary to make good decisions. They were, in essence, attempting to teach intuition, an effort which modern research suggests was not in vain. Recent research also suggests that the best way to do this was embodied by the structure of the German NCO school: force men to make decisions again and again punishing only timidity while gradually giving them the experience and knowledge needed for the development of battlefield intuition. They will become battlefield leaders.

This school was very different from our current NCO schools where much of a Marine’s time is focused on garrison skills that although admittedly important subjects for the NCO. are of limited value in the face of the enemy. Our educational system makes the considered point that drill is but a means to an end, but there is a demonstrably superior way of reaching our goal of NCOs who crave responsibility and consider themselves as elite professionals in the U.S. Marine Corps. Specifically:

* NCO schools should be lengthened from their present 38 days to at least 4 months. The schools should devote this additional time to two things-decisionmaking exercises and directed study on the art of war, study aimed at making the NCO both knowledgeable and hungry for more learning.

* Attendance at NCO schools should be an absolute requirement for promotion to sergeant.

* Because NCO schools would be truly professional schools, we would expect to be paid back by the Marines who attend it: any Marine graduating would serve at least 2 additional years in the Fleet Marine Force before he could leave the Corps. Attendance al an NCO school would therefore be voluntary, and any Marine refusing to attend would not be promoted past the rank of lance corporal. Failure at NCO school would mean reverting to lance corporal for the remainder of the enlistment or immediate release from the Corps.

Making these changes would be costly. The future success of our Corps, however, depends on producing Marines who can fight our doctrine on a decentralized battlefield. Institutionally, we are not doing this, and we must. The money must be spent, and the NCOs must get the power they need. We must force our future company commanders to let their NCOs do their jobs. We must educate our company grade officers at Amphibious Warfare School on the real role of the NCO in warfighting and on how to train him to fill that role. We must also change the expectations of the NCOs by changing our NCO schools-the NCO should leave these vital schools fully expecting to be challenged professionally by his officers. He should return to his company with a burning desire to take charge on the battlefield, and, by doing so, force the Marine Corps to execute what we spend so much time talking about-our doctrine.

Commentary on Amphibious Operations

by Maj F. G. Hoffman, USMCR

. . . Much of the Navy’s ignorance of, or seeming indifference to, amphibious issues, which was noted by Col Batcheller, may stem from more than its preoccupation with the now outdated maritime strategy or its traditional interest in carriers and nuclear submarines. In fact, the Marine Corps itself may be partly to blame.

Over the past decade, Marines have focused a lot of attention on the merits of new and innovative approaches to warfare. Their exploration of boldness, speed, tempo, and all the other tenets of maneuver warfare have also contributed to the present pessimistic state of amphibious capability in the Navy. It may have been an oversight, or it may have been done in ignorance, but FMFM 1. Warfighting mentions amphibious operations only twice. In fact, the Navy is mentioned only once and only as an aside. Other key words, such as “naval,” “seapower,” “maritime,” and “littoral,” are inexplicably absent.

I find this bizarre, given the Corps’ mandated role for service with the fleet. As the “authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight,” FMFM 1 is deficient in its regard to our naval character and our relationship to the Navy. I would recommend that this be corrected by the development of new naval doctrine, as suggested in the implementing actions of ” . . . From the Sea.” The first product of the new Naval Doctrine Center should be a rewrite of FMFM 1 that properly reflects the roles of each of the Naval Services in preparing for and conducting war.

Maneuvering Blind

by LtCol Bruce E. Brunn

Recent Gazette articles on use of the aviation combat element (ACE) as a maneuver element (see box) have been both timely and important during this period of force reductions and budget slashing. As we face the prospect of a substantially smaller Corps, no one can argue that Marine aviation will play an increasingly critical role in the total combat power of the Marine airground task force (MAGTF). Unfortunately, Marine Corps aviation lacks the basic ability to “see the battlefield,” which is essential for maneuver warfare.

The excellent article by Maj Thomas X Hammes (MCG, Feb92) came closest to this fact by clearly identifying the need for increased intelligence capability within the ACE to enhance its ability to perform the observation-orientation-decision-action loop functions fundamental to maneuver warfare. He was mistaken, however, in regards to the MAGTF and the ACE having the necessary equipment to support this maneuver role. Since the retirement of the RF-4B in 1990, the ACE has abrogated the aerial reconnaissance mission to the U.S. Air Force, thereby slaving the MAGTF and the ACE to the air tasking order (ATO) process. While this 3-day ATO process is marginally capable of supporting static defense operations, it cannot support the tactical aerial reconnaissance required for maneuver warfare. As confirmed during Operation DESERT STORM, MAGTF and ACE commanders have become nearly totally dependent on national and theater sensors to see the battlefield, resulting in the loss of the timeliness that was previously provided by tactical sensors. Additionally, DESERT STORM also witnessed increased difficulty in the ability of the ACE to insert ground reconnaissance teams, employ unattended ground sensors, and to operate aerial observers at effective altitudes in the vicinity of the forward edge of the battle area-all of which further degrade the MAGTF commander’s view of the typical Third World battlefield. The Pioneer remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) is an outstanding target acquisition platform, but it lacks the speed, range, wide-area search sensors, and all-weather capabilities of the RF-4B and other tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

An immediate fix is urgently required if the ACE is going to be a viable maneuver element. While it is not feasible to upgrade the capabilities of all three Marine expeditionary forces, at least one set of equipment must be obtained to enhance the MAGTF and ACE commanders’ ability to acquire and rapidly target enemy forces in the deep battle area. A minimum capability must include the following:

* F/A-18 recce pods using existing RF-4B film and side-looking airborne radar sensors fitted into a standard F/A-18 fuel pod.

* Secondary imagery dissemination systems to rapidly disseminate imagery, target graphics, and products needed for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to the ACE and the ground combat element.

* A joint surveillance target attack radar system ground station to receive a direct downlink from the only effective broad area search sensor in the theater.

* Intelligence work stations to rapidly exchange targeting and IPB information between the joint task force, the MAGTF, and major subordinate commands, to include a dry process reproduction capability to disseminate much of the information in easy-to-assimilate graph and IPB formats.

* Forward looking infrared and precision navigation equipment for flight leaders on penetration missions to rapidly locate and confirm enemy targets.

Eventually, mid-range and endurance unmanned aerial vehicles will be able to perform many MAGTF reconnaissance missions, but these systems have been delayed for years, and we need this capability today. A blind man cannot effectively conduct maneuver warfare, and with the notable exception of the few Pioneer remotely piloted vehicles we have, MAGTF and ACE commanders are largely blind on today’s battlefield. Tactical reconnaissance in the joint environment has been and will continue to be a Service responsibility. We must move rapidly and decisively to restore our organic target acquisition capabilities as soon as possible, not only to facilitate the use of the ACE as a maneuver element, but also to enhance MAGTF combat power as a unique and vital force on the joint battlefield of tomorrow.

For further reading:

  • Maj R. Scott Moore, “The Act of MAGTF Warfare” (Apr89)
  • William S. Lind “Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation” (May89)
  • Maj John B. Saxman. USAF, “The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare” (Aug89)
  • Maj Steven B. Donnell, “The ACE as a Maneuver Element” (Aug89)
  • Majs Gordon C. O’Neill & Daniel A. Driscoll, Jr., “Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt This Philosophy of War?” (May91)
  • Maj William H. Dixon. Jr., “The ACE Is Not a Maneuver Element-Yet!” (Feb92)
  • Maj Thomas X. Hammes, “Air as a Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” (Feb92)

Employing the Defense in Maneuver Warfare

by Maj Joseph V. Medina

1990 Chase Prize Essay Contest Honorable Mention

Defensive tactics have never been “popular” with Marines, but knowing when and how to assume the defensive is crucial on the modern battlefield.

Marines, being naturally aggressive, shun the defense because it lacks boldness. We revert to it only as an economy of force measure that allows us to strike elsewhere or because weakness compels us to adopt it. To optimize our combat potential, however, we should seek to employ the defense in maneuver warfare for its strengths. When and how we decide to employ the defense is critical if we are to be successful in shattering the enemy’s moral and physical cohesion rather than just attempting to rack up more numbers to the enemy’s attrition.

Our focus of effort must be directed to wherever-or whatever-will cause the most decisive damage to the enemy. Often our focus of effort will be directed to the enemy’s obvious weak areas: his command posts, logistics support areas, communication sites, reserves, etc. However, there comes the time when our focus of effort should be directed against an enemy’s combat forces. This may be a result of a unique opportunity presented that must be exploited, because at this particular time and place this is his vulnerability or simply because the destruction of the enemy’s force has become, in itself, a decisive objective (as Paulus’ German Sixth Army became the Russian objective in the Battle of Stalingrad). The method of destruction is a critical decision the commander must make. A key technique, but one often overlooked for sheer destructive power, is to assume the defense.

Why do we have a reluctance to consider the defense, or to use defense techniques, when we are looking for destruction of the enemy? When we review what our own doctrine tells us, we find in FMFM 1 the following:

The offense contributes striking power. The offense generally has as its aim some positive gain; it is through the offense that we seek to impose some design on the enemy. The defense, on the other hand, contributes resisting power, the ability to preserve and protect oneself. Thus, the defense generally has a negative aim, that of resisting the enemy’s will.

This leads us to the conclusion that while the defense is the stronger form of combat, the offense is the preferred form, for only through the offense can we truly pursue a positive aim. We resort to the defensive when weakness compels.

Our own doctrine tells us that we must constantly strive for the offense in order to be victorious, and that we only assume the defense as a result of weakness-not to take advantage of our strengths. Although I embrace FMFM 1 as a welcome and needed change, there is more to the art of the defense than is reflected here. The defense can provide striking power, and can offer positive aim-that being the destruction of the enemy, his cohesion and integrity-if employed properly at the right time and place. We should consider assuming the defense to exploit our strengths and the enemy’s weaknesses. This is not to imply that we surrender the initiative. We must always maintain the initiative, especially when using the defense for a decisive stroke. This is the tricky part, but an essential element of employing the defense in maneuver warfare. Additionally, in contradiction to FMFM 1, in the defense we must seek to impose some design on the enemy. We must not be reacting solely to his offensive moves.

The destruction of an enemy force by assuming the defense is not a new concept. In fact, it has been employed by some of the masters of warfare, and a number of decisive battles were won by the defender. We need only look at Hannibal in the Second Punic War or, more recently, at MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift at Guadalcanal. A brief review of these examples will help to better understand how the defense can provide us much more than an economy of force effort, and it should help to clarify employment techniques in maneuver warfare.

The Trebia to Cannae: A Lesson From Hannibal

A full 22 centuries ago, Hannibal engaged in a military campaign in Italy lasting 15 years. Fighting both the weather and the Gauls, Hannibal crossed the Pyrenees and the Alps in 218 B.C., arriving virtually undetected in the Po Valley of northern Italy. There he engaged and defeated every Roman force that rose to meet him. His first major battle against the Roman Legion, the Battle of the Trebia, is an excellent example of using defensive techniques for tactical success. After establishing a deceptively weak defensive position, Hannibal lured the hot-headed Roman leader, Sempronius, to attack across the freezing Trebia River, whereupon an effective counterattack struck the Roman flank and rear. The ensuing onslaught resulted in 30,000 Roman casualties. The following spring, after a surprise crossing of the snowy Apennine passes and a strenuous march through marshes thought to be impassable, Hannibal established his force on a narrow defile on the line of communication between the Roman army and Rome. From their position on the cliffs overlooking Lake Trasimene, the Carthaginians conducted the greatest ambush in history when they caught the Roman column moving to reestablish their link to Rome resulting in another 30,000 Roman casualties. At Cannae, Hannibal met a newly raised army of Roman and allied legions. In this tactical masterpiece of military history, Hannibal established a defense anchored on a bend in the Aufidus River. Although outnumbered by over two to one, he purposely weakened his center and strengthened his wings and allowed the overwhelming Roman infantry to push, but not break, his thinned center. At the decisive moment, Hannibal’s strong wings hit the Roman flank and rear, causing chaos and resulting in a complete slaughter.

What lessons can we take from these examples of Hannibal? The Carthaginian general fought his greatest battles at times and places of his choosing. His defense was never static, but relied on his greatest weapon-a swift, strong counterattack by a very capable force, his formidable Spanish, Gallic, and Numidian cavalry. He was not reluctant to change tactics and formations when he recognized the value of change; in fact, he adopted much of the Roman formations and tactical systems when he saw their superiority.

Guadalcanal: A Test of Determination

One of the best examples of a key defensive battle comes from our own history-the Guadalcanal campaign. What began as an offensive amphibious battle soon became a solid defense of the small perimeter surrounding Henderson Field. While there may be some argument whether this should be classified as a defensive campaign, this is best resolved by viewing the Guadalcanal campaign by stages according to Baron von der Goltz’s four variants of offensive and defensive action. The amphibious assault was assuredly an offensive action, both in the tactical and operational sense. However, after a successful landing, the operation turned to the tactical defense, guarding the airfield, but remained offensive in the operational sense. The initiative could very easily have slipped into Japanese hands, and only through active measures was Vandegrift able to retain it. These measures included continuous patrolling (even an attempted reconnaissance in force operation), limited objective attacks, employment of Marine aviation, constant adjustments in force dispositions and expansion of the perimeter, and pressure on the Navy for more active supporting operations. Vandegrift was not only able to achieve the first major operational success in the Pacific, he also made a sizable blow to the Japanese ground forces. The defense again moved into the tactical offensive in December 1942 after the 1st Marine Division was relieved by the XIV Corps, but by then the Japanese defeat was ensured. The defense of Guadalcanal should be reviewed in more detail, because only then will we understand the nuances of the defensive measures employed.

Employment of the Defense: Lessons Learned

Many other examples could be cited -Wellington at Waterloo, the Battle of Saratoga (Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights), Morgan at Cowpens, Jackson at Second Bull Run, Lee at Antietam, or Meade at Gettysburg; the list is extensive. By careful analysis of these examples we can see common threads which makes the defense “the stronger form of combat,” and makes it a technique we must keep in our professional bag of tricks for sheer destructive power and/or to gain a decisive edge over the enemy. A critical review highlights the following points:

* Offensive Action: The most effective defense employs many offensive techniques-often the distinction between offense and defense becomes blurred, as at Cannae. The reverse may also be true in that the defense may be employed as part of an overall offensive move. Care must be shown when taking up defensive positions to retain our offensive capabilities. Helmuth von Moltke the elder believed that:

A clever military leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from the strategic point of view that the enemy is compelled to attack us in them.

We should look to combine the strategic offensive wilh the tactical strength of the defensive.

* Deception: Deception is a key element. The enemy should be of the opinion that he is gaining a decisive edge in his attack; he should believe he is going for our center of gravity or exposed critical vulnerability. In order to do this, we will have to plan the battlefield so that it creates the illusion of vulnerability, i.e., creating exposed critical targets (headquarters, communication sites, air command and control facilities, etc.) or key avenues of approach. However, we should never expect the enemy to do exactly what we desire (move along a specific corridor, for example), but rather we should attempt to create a situation that would allow us to anticipate his intent.

* See the Battlefield: We must be able to see the battlefield as it appears to the enemy as well as it really is, and we must optimize the use of terrain to our favor. Use of reverse slope defense cannot be over emphasized for, in effect, it represents a form of ambush. Use the terrain to best advantage, but never depend on the strength of terrain alone. (Remember Alexander’s favorite technique was to attack precisely where the terrain and fortifications appeared the most formidable.) We must select the terrain for its true advantage, not solely because it is the highest point on the map. (At Gettysburg, the Little Round Top proved to be the key to the Union line, not the larger Big Round Top.) Look at the microaspects of terrain.

* Combined Arms: Combined arms is a must in the defense. Consider the Cactus Air Force’s contribution to the defense at Guadalcanal. Conversely, the value of combined arms was a lesson forgotten by the Israelis prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War when they overly relied on their armor and air forces to support the Bar Lev Line thereby neglecting their artillery and infantry arms. In this regard, a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is uniquely able to capitalize on combined arms. More on this later.

* Static vs. Mobile Defenses: When we establish a defense, it cannot mean we become static or immobile even if we are defending a fixed feature (such as Henderson Field at Guadalcanal). To retain the initiative we must maintain contact with the enemy through constant patrolling at the small unit level, up to reconnaissance in force operations at the operational level. Other methods to consider are the use of helicopterborne forces for delaying elements or antiarmor teams, raids, etc. In the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi general Abed Al-Rashid attained distinction through his use of a mobile defense at the operational level.

* The Counterattack: Above all else, we must learn from these examples the value of the counterattack. As noted by Clausewitz, “A swift and vigorous transition to attack-the flashing sword of vengeance-is the most brilliant point of the defensive.” The counterattack force must be a strong, formidable force; in a defense employed out of strength, the counterattack force should be the main effort by design. It must have sufficient assets to deliver the decisive blow. Since the battle will unfold in an unforeseen manner, the counterattack force must also be highly mobile.

MAGTF Warfare and the Defense

The Marine Corps’ philosophy of employing all combat units as MAGTFs provides us more of an ability to optimize the strengths of the defense. When planning a defense, the MAGTF command element would be remiss if it did not give special consideration to the capabilities inherent in our aviation combat element (ACE). The concept of the defense should be planned at the MAGTF level, not by the ground combat element (GCE) alone. Airpower is relatively new; we still do not fully recognize this third dimension of warfare. Likewise, there can be no hard and fast rules, such as placing a fixed percentage of your combat power in reserve in the defense, because the defense must be planned around a ‘particular situation. Rather, let’s look at some ideas for employment of the MAGTF in the defense:

* Consider employment of the ACE as the main effort if your intent is the destruction of the enemy. Use the ACE to destroy the enemy’s command and control, strong armor reserve, and logistics support while simultaneously employing a supporting attack (possibly a separate counterattack force). This may entail attachment of a ground combat element to the ACE (possibly a battalion at the Marine expeditionary force level, or a company at the Marine expeditionary brigade level). It must be recognized that the supporting counterattack will have less than the degree of air support desired by the commander in this case.

* Consider holding one-third or less of your GCE in reserve, especially if the ACE is to be designated the main effort. The reserve force still has to have a high degree of mobility and lethality in order to exploit success to the maximum. Positioning of the reserve may also require special consideration; possibly placing it along a flank rather than behind forward elements.

* Consider a deceptive delaying action and follow through with a strong counterattack. Counterattacks are normally not a part of delay actions. If the enemy “reads” delay by your actions, then he should not expect a counterattack; consequently trip the counterattack at a most unexpected location.

* Consider assuming a defense following a successful offensive where you find yourself well behind the enemy’s forward elements. Once you are in an enemy’s rear area, you may find his critical areas well defended. It may be wiser to establish a defense along his line of communications at a location that makes him believe he must attack or wither on the vine.

Summary

The defense must always be based on a thorough analysis of the enemyhis strengths and weaknesses, his commander’s intent, a review of his recent actions, and his order of battle data. Only then can it succeed in enticing the enemy to some goal. Deception is a key; we must paint a picture of surfaces and gaps that expose the “vulnerability” that we desire the enemy to see. It must not only be plausible, it must appear irresistible. We must also analyze our own strengths and weaknesses, ensuring that the capabilities inherent within the MAGTF are optimized. Combining the tactical advantages of the defense with the force multipliers of full employment of the MAGTF, we have the capability to deliver a knockout punch. We should not fail to consider the defense because of our inherent reluctance to show weakness. Let’s plan wisely and consider assuming the defense out of strength.

Military Theory

by Maj W. J. Quentin, USMC(Ret)

Maj Andrew D. Walker’s article, “An Alternative to Maneuver Warfare” (MCG Nov91), is a thoughtful and excellent piece, but I think it is poorly titled.

As I read it. Walker does not reject any of the fundamental concepts associated with the term maneuver. He simply talks about them in a logical and intelligent manner using the six battlefield operational systems that are the basis of AirLand Battle Doctrine. It is important for Marines to do this. In an era of joint operations, those who do not think, talk, and fit in with the doctrine and terminology of the unified commands are apt to be misunderstood and less useful than they ought to be. . . .

by Maj C. H. McGohey

Maj Walker’s article should have been titled, “An Alternative to Movement Warfare.” His thesis is based upon a flawed understanding of maneuver warfare. Maj Walker implies that the “maneuverist” eschews the massive application of firepower in favor of battlefield movement in order to obtain a bloodless decision.

Maneuver warfare encompasses far more than spatial movement. It is primarily a conceptual doctrine of warfighting that focuses on creating and exploiting advantage through a variety of means, including the selective application of massed firepower. The tactics applied are, as always, situationally dependent. The ultimate aim is to shatter the enemy’s cohesion and balance by ensuring that when we commence the destruction of his material assets, we do so at the right place and the right time, for a coherent reason, rather than merely attempting to destroy everything on the battlefield. The act of “maneuvering” often occurs principally in the commander’s mind, as he determines who, when, and where to fight, and what he will fight with.

Operation DESERT STORM was a superb example of maneuver warfare. Targeting priorities, targeting sequence, phasing of the campaign, the identification of critical factors, tempo of operations, and deception are all examples of how Coalition forces “maneuvered” against the Iraqi Army. While some may argue that our massive application of firepower and technology was attritionist, the difference was that when firepower was applied, it was done so for a specific purpose, within the framework of a plan designed to unhinge the enemy. Battles and engagemenls (tactics) were correctly matched against clear operational objectives.

The distinguishing feature of maneuver warfare is economy of force, i.e., the results achieved outweigh the effort expended. The ultimate goal is to defeat the enemy quickly and efficiently. If the attainment of this goal requires the application of massive firepower and technology, so be it.

by LtCol Gary I. Wilson

Maj Walker’s award winning article should be given a second award for using definitions of his own convenience. Walker states that combat has two distinct styles: an attrition style based on firepower and a maneuver style based on movement. His definition of maneuver, however, is nothing more than mere movement.

FM100-5 notes that maneuver is the employment of forces through movement supported by fire to achieve a position of advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the enemy. FM 100-5 further notes that the successful application of the principle of maneuver requires not only fire and movement, but also flexibility of thought, plans, and operations. JCS Pub 1-02 defines maneuver of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

Proponents of maneuver warfare have never viewed maneuver as mere movement. In fact, maneuverists (for lack of a better term) have always described their style of warfare as fire and movement within a maneuver context.

Maneuver, as defined in FM 100-5 and 7CS Pub 1-02, seeks to exploit firepower. Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), in “Patterns of Conflict,” describes how the destructive and disruptive effects of fire and movement tie up, divert, or drain away the enemy’s attention and strength. Walker is apparently unaware that fire and movement play a major role in the maneuver style of war. . . . Walker is quick to quote Clausewitz. Clausewitz assumed war was rational, but the preponderance of historical data from 1945 on does not lend itself to rational analysis championed by Clausewitz. Martin van Creveld’s book Transformation of War boldly challenges Clauswitzian assumptions and demands reading by all professionals. Hopefully, Marine Corps thinking regarding maneuver will not see a retreat to 19th century thought.

A Need For Frank Discussion

by LtCol G. I. Wilson

The letter from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (MCG, Oct91) was refreshing and gives a valuable perspective regarding the “eclipse” of the Joint Chiefs. Both Col Gordon D. Batcheller and Gen Colin Powell have the courage to put their views in writing. This is commendable. The Corps frequently mutes candid difference to accommodate that which is politically acceptable and maintains the status quo.

Indeed, it is heartening to see the Chairman respond to Col Batcheller’s article. We need more of this. All too often senior officers are quick to disagree but unwilling to put their position in writing. Others would do well to follow the lead of Gen Powell and Col Batcheller.

Real professionals can have professional differences. Regrettably, it is the bureaucracy’s milicrats who take it personally, opting to make lightening rods out of those who have the courage and intellectual honesty to be heard.

An Alternative to Maneuver Warfare

by Maj Andrew D. Walker

Winner 1991 Bevan G. Cass Award

The challenge is to identify and adopt a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature of war and the realities of the modem battlefield.

-FMFM 1 Warfighting

The U.S. Marine Corps has sought to meet this challenge by adopting maneuver warfare as its warfighting style, an action based on a conclusion made about the nature and realities of modern battle. As with any conclusion, its truth depends on the validity of the underlying assumptions. By examining these assumptions, it can be determined whether maneuver warfare is truly consistent with the nature of war and the realities of the modern battlefield.

The cogent evidence presented to support acceptance of maneuver warfare is presented in Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting. The reasoning is based on two assumptions about combat. First, combat has two basic components: fire and movement. Second, combat has two distinct styles: an attrition style based on firepower and a maneuver style based on movement. The attrition style is described as the systematic “destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower and technology.” Maneuver style applies strength against weakness with “the object of shattering the enemy’s cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance.” FMFM 1 continues:

Potential success by maneuver-unlike attrition-is often disproportionate to the effort made. But for exactly the same reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carries with it a greater chance for catastrophic failure, while attrition is inherently less risky.

Because of the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and the proliferation of high-tech weapons, the Marine Corps can no longer presume vast numerical and technological superiority. It must win quickly by finding enemy weaknesses and exploiting them. A maneuver style of warfare makes this possible.

The assumption that combat is composed of only two basic components and therefore is defined by two styles of warfare is a vast oversimplification of a complex concept. The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5) Operations, in what it calls the dynamics of combat, describes two components in addition to firepower and maneuver (FMFM 1’s fire and movement). These additional components are leadership and protection. Leadership is described as the most important dynamic and the facilitator of the others. Protection is the countermeasure to firepower and maneuver. It follows that under certain circumstances firepower and maneuver can be neutralized by superior leadership and protection. Maneuver may actually uncover friendly forces, thereby rendering them vulnerable to destruction by well-led and protected forces, in which case, combat power is not made greater with increased maneuver.

As in any human behavior, war has innumerable variables. If these variables could be quantified into a model of warfare, then their effects on war might be more clearly understood. However, to try to create a model that included every component of combat would be impractical. AirLand Battle Doctrine maintains a more accurate model can be formed from six battlefield operating systems: intelligence, firepower, maneuver, protection, command and control, and logistics. A concept of warfighting based on the interrelationships between these components will be a much truer representation of the nature of war than a concept based on only two components.

On today’s battlefield, it is possible for the United States to enjoy a vast numerical and technological superiority. Certainly the United States enjoyed that advantage in the Gulf War. The Marine Corps can expect a similar advantage in many stabilization operations involving the Third World. There is no doubt that the Marine Corps needs the capability to fight in an environment of disadvantage; however, an expeditionary force does not need to take unnecessary risks when it enjoys numerical and technological superiority simply in order to engage in maneuver warfare.

It is both shortsighted and dangerous to follow doctrine that assumes that all combat operations need to take the form of maneuver warfare and that the only enemies the Marine Corps must be prepared to fight are those of equal or greater strength. Though maneuver warfare has much utility in various situations, the Marine Corps must base its doctrine on a more complex understanding of the nature of warfare and on a more realistic appreciation of the varied modern battlefield.

The object of warfare is victory. The idea that a commander has a choice to seek victory on the one hand through the systematic destruction of the enemy (attrition warfare) or on the other hand by shattering the enemy’s cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance (maneuver warfare) ignores the complementary aspects of the two styles of warfare. To imply that the enemy can be confused into surrender by intricate, high tempo maneuver alone is irresponsible. This may work against a poorly led army with low morale. But an army with the will to fight will not be overcome only by maneuver. The enemy’s means to resist often must be destroyed before victory is certain.

The 19th century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz described the nature of war when he wrote:

How are we to prove that usually, and in the most important cases, the destruction of the enemy’s forces must be the main objective? How are we to counter the highly sophisticated theory that supposes it possible for a particularly ingenious method of inflicting minor direct damage on the enemy’s forces and control of his will-power as to a constitute a significant shortcut to victory? [Maneuver warfare?] Admittedly, an engagement at one point may be worth more than at another. Admittedly, there is a skillful ordering of priority of engagements in strategy; indeed that is what strategy is all about, and we do not wish to deny it. We do claim, however, that direct annihilation of the enemy’s forces must always be the dominant consideration, We simply want to establish this dominance of the destructive principle.

Real confusion of the enemy will result from the systematic destruction of his command and control systems, air defense systems, and major weapons systems. This destruction will limit his ability to observe the battle and to fire back accurately. All warfare should attempt to do this.

The destruction of enemy forces has become an important element of the modern strategic objectives of war. An enemy left with a potent military force poses a considerable threat of future conflict. This opinion would have met with disagreement from Sun Tzu, the 4th century B.C. Chinese military theorist and early maneuverist. He wrote, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” and, “Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.” These maxims are held by maneuverists as the ultimate measure of success.

However, Sun Tzu is referring to the Chinese practice of conquering other warring states with relatively small professional armies. To seize the conquered state intact with low casualties was to add power to the victor’s state without bankrupting it. Modern warfare is different in that it has limited strategic objectives. Today it is unacceptable to absorb sovereign nations. The Gulf War is the most recent example of this reality. Clausewitz saw modern warfare more accurately, writing that:

We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.

The destruction of the offensive capabilities of a defeated enemy should always be a strategic objective of modern war. The maneuverist’s optimal result, that of a bloodless war, is not consistent with the objectives of modern war.

As a commander must focus his tactics on the enemy and not terrain, the style of warfare chosen for combat must be consistent with the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. The art of war is knowing what the capabilities and intentions of the enemy are. Clausewitz understood the relationship of warfare to the unpredictable reactions of the adversary. His “fog of war” is based on the elements of uncertainty that arose largely from the impossibility of gauging enemy intentions and reactions. The commander who can properly counter the enemy’s capabilities and intentions will have freedom on the battlefield. This is not to suggest that warfare is a step-by-step process that is reactive to the enemy. Many proactive operations can be prosecuted simultaneously, as long as the objective is to destroy the enemy’s means to resist. Once the enemy’s ability to affect the battle has been neutralized, victory is only a matter of attrition-enemy attrition.

Development of a doctrine or concept of warfighting must be based on the interrelationships of the principal components of combat. The six operating systems of combat previously mentioned (intelligence, firepower, maneuver, protection, command and control, and logistics) are appropriate for this purpose. Instead of only one style of warfare, this more complex model suggests many possible styles. The difference in styles of warfare is in the application and integration of the different components of warfare to bring about the destruction of the enemy’s ability to fight. To suggest maneuver warfare or any one style of warfare is consistent with the multifaceted nature of war is to ignore the need for the flexibility of matching friendly strengths to enemy weaknesses in all the components of warfare. Before a concept of warfare can be created based on these components, they must be defined, and their interrelationships understood. Additionally, if this concept is to stand the test of time, future trends of these components should be examined.

Intelligence

FM 100-5 defines intelligence operations as

the organized efforts of a commander to gather information on terrain, weather, and the enemy. Obtaining useful intelligence prior to the initiation of operations is a vital task.

The art of war is knowing the enemy’s capabilities and predicting his intentions. Intelligence is principal to clearing this “fog of war” so that the commander is able to see the battlefield accurately.

The trend of the future will be realtime intelligence. Real-time intelligence is the optimal tactical intelligence. The goal is for all tactical leaders to have an accurate picture of the battlefield at the very moment they are making their decisions. Real-time intelligence at all levels of command would be the ultimate union of intelligence and command and control. Just as the AWACS (airborne warning and control system) can be downlinked into the cockpit of a fighter aircraft, the target information gathered by JSTARS (joint surveillance and target attack radar system) needs to be downlinked in a usable form to all levels simultaneously. This will facilitate centralized control of fires, but localized execution. The principal shortcoming of intelligence has always been getting the appropriate information to the right commander. This problem will resolve itself as computers network information, and the information passed becomes that which the tactical commander wants, namely, critical target information. The strategic and operational commanders may need analyzed intelligence but the tactical commander’s primary concern is target acquisition.

Firepower

“Firepower provides the destructive force essential to defeating the enemy’s ability and will to fight.” Firepower can be used to facilitate maneuver by suppressing enemy fires or it can be used independent of maneuver to destroy the enemy’s operating systems (i.e., intelligence, firepower, maneuver, protection, command and control, and logistics). Firepower is the decisive element of combat. If victory is gained by the destruction of the enemy’s means to resist, then firepower is responsible for the destruction. All other components (the six operating systems) ultimately support firepower.

Firepower of the future will be increasingly accurate with greater effect and will be susceptible to fewer adverse environments and less jamming. The smart weapon is here to stay. However, dispersion and mobility will be critical to the survival of forces on the future battlefield. To optimize firepower, the systems will have to be able to fire on the move and concentrate fires even while dispersed. The Ml tank is an example of the “fire on the move” technology present on today’s battlefield. To concentrate moving, dispersed fires, networked onboard computers will have to generate the gun data for an entire battalion of self-propelled artillery pieces, all in different locations. No matter how effective one weapon system becomes, the integration of combined arms systems will always allow for the most effective use of firepower. Any one system can be defeated when employed by itself. However, the effectiveness of a weapon system employed as part of an integrated package is multiplied many times.

Maneuver

Maneuver, according to FM 100-5, “is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage.” It is the means by which firepower can be concentrated at a critical time and place to achieve surprise and gain momentum. Technological improvements in mobility and communications have given maneuver additional speed and flexibility. However, maneuver will rarely be possible without firepower and protection. Though firepower must support maneuver, ultimately maneuver supports firepower by positioning firepower to advantage on the battlefield. Maneuver is the dynamic component of combat. The less the enemy is prepared to handle a dynamic battlefield, the more maneuver becomes effective.

Maneuver on the future battlefield will stress dispersion and mobility. Speed and freedom of movement will become increasingly important. The air arm presents a medium that allows for both speed and freedom of movement. Tilt-rotor technology will expand the horizons of maneuver tactics. Distances, speeds, and loads will increase as vertical envelopment becomes the maneuver of choice.

Protection

Protection is “the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place.” FM 100-5 divides protection into two categories-first, actions to counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver and, second, actions to keep soldiers healthy and their morale high. Though the latter actions are important, the former actions are those that have application to a warfighting concept. Actions to counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver include security, air defense, dispersal, cover, camouflage, deception, suppression of enemy weapons, mobility, and counter-mobility. More than any other component, protection is structured to the enemy’s capabilities. As enemy capabilities are reduced, actions to provide protection can be reduced to afford greater offensive flexibility.

Protection techniques will also be needed on the battlefield of the future. Effective protection starts as deep as possible on the battlefield. “Star Wars” technology for antimissile and antiair defense is here today with the Patriot missile system. Ultimately, the use of space to position defensive weapons will provide a versatility that cannot be matched. No matter how sophisticated protection becomes, the key ingredient will be the individual warrior’s desire to fight. No protection will be sufficient to protect an army that does not have the desire to fight.

Command and Control

FM 100-5 points out that command and control “must facilitate freedom to operate, delegation of authority, and leadership from any critical point on the battlefield.” The principal element of this component is leadership. It is leadership that “will determine the degree to which the firepower, maneuver, and protection are maximized.” Without competent and confident leadership, the courage and competence of soldiers, the excellence of their training, the capability of their equipment, and the soundness of their combined arms doctrine are meaningless.

For the force to be successful, this competent and confident leadership must be present in the battlefield commander. He must be decisive, experienced, and able to affect the action. Clausewitz believed much of the success of any operation was due to the “genius” of the commander. “Genius” did not refer as much to clever tactics as to the ability to find a way to carry on through adversity. Combat requires a commander who would rather advance on his own responsibility than remain waiting for orders. Complementary to this “genius” is a plan flexible enough to allow for shifting the focus of main effort. With a commander decisive enough to capitalize on a momentary advantage and a plan that allows for exploitation of momentary advantages, determination and flexibility are wed.

The modern battlefield has produced many advantages in command and control. However, the strength of command and control is best tested when no communications exist. If the commander’s intent is understood and subordinate independent action is encouraged and expected, then the enemy will be incapable of stopping the force by disrupting command and control systems.

Command and control in the future will rely on reliable, directional, covered burst communications. With the increased fluidity of the battlefield, communications with adjacent units will become as important as communications with superiors. The future will see the increased use of artificial intelligence to make the standard decisions that fire support coordinators and air controllers do today. The computer will verify the target information, compare it to restrictions, and decide who should fire the mission. The challenge for the commander will be to use the technology to its best advantage without becoming a slave to it.

Logistics

The final component is logistics. It has been said by many that “amateurs speak of tactics; professionals speak of logistics.” This maxim recognizes the principal importance of logistics to warfare. All else becomes irrelevant if the forces in the field cannot be sustained. Napoleon’s march on Moscow is the classic example of what happens when this military maxim is ignored. FM 100-5 lists six key sustainment functions: manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protection of the sustainment system. Technology on the modern battlefield has become necessary to manage the incredible amounts of supplies required to fight a high-tech army. Computer systems for ordering and warehousing supplies have become commonplace. Containerized shipping and cargo movement systems are now utilized for rapid offload and distribution. The future battlefield should see artificial intelligence systems planning and executing lift and sustainment operations to optimize time and space requirements.

No matter how high-tech the battlefield may become, certain tenets of logistics will never change. Logisticians must anticipate the requirements of combat if they are to keep up with demand. They must “push” supplies to the front, rather than wait for requests to “pull” supplies forward. Logistics must be integrated into the concept of operations from the beginning of the planning process. Logistics must be continuous and redundant. Supplies cannot be interrupted because one mode of support is temporarily or permanently lost. The system must be responsive by performing surge operations if the momentum and initiative are to be maintained by maneuvering forces. Improvisation is required of every good logistician. Those who can improvise will always have an advantage over those who cannot.

To form a doctrine of warfare these six components must be brought together in a workable concept. The maneuverist might expect that increasing maneuver increases combat power. But this in only true when the enemy’s mobility, countermobility, fire support, and command capabilities have been brought under control through other means. If the reality of today’s battlefield is that “the United States can no longer expect to enjoy vast numerical and technological superiority,” as is noted in FMFM 1, then maneuver may very well lead to disaster. Certainly maneuver against an enemy with limited command and control that can no longer see and react in its area of influence is the tactic of choice. However, a well-protected enemy with greater numbers of conventional arms and equal technology is not automatically a candidate for maneuver. Once the battlefield has been shaped by a coordinated effort against the enemy’s ability to see and react, maneuver becomes viable.

A doctrine of warfare should be appropriate for every environment and enemy. It must be adaptable to the jungle as well as the desert, be equally applicable to high-intensity conflict and to low-intensity conflict, and prove effective against high-tech enemies as well as primitive ones. What must be considered in each situation is the unique and distinctive nature of the environment and the enemy. A relative advantage in one of the components of warfare must be developed. Once one advantage is attained, others can be developed. This is the doctrine of “relative advantage.”

This principle of relative advantage is valid at all levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategically, a country should choose the type of war that matches its relative strength. Using Clausewitz’s trinity of war (the government, the military, and the public) as the components of a country’s strength, a country with a stronger military than its adversary should obviously engage in military action. However, a country with a stronger public will to fight but a weaker military than its adversary may prefer to use guerrilla tactics, and a country with stronger political means may find cold war tactics (i.e, economic and political sanctions) to be its most effective strategy. At the operational and tactical levels, the six components of warfare are the strengths to be evaluated-the areas in which relative advantage should be sought.

The United States’ doctrine, weapons, and tables of organization were formed for fighting high- to mid-intensity conflicts. Low-intensity war will provide much different problems for maneuver warfare. The command and control of insurgents is decentralized and therefore is difficult to confuse. Large formations of troops are purposely not present in guerrilla warfare and therefore cannot easily be maneuvered against. The insurgents’ vulnerability is their logistics. Successful counterinsurgencies have always started with the separation of the guerrilla from his support.

The Soviets’ inability to cut the Afghan rebels from their sustainment is the reason for the defeat of a high-tech army by a low-tech army, not the Soviets’ inability to maneuver. Though the Vietnam War was not an insurgency, it was low intensity in most cases. An argument can be made that a type of maneuver warfare was practiced in Vietnam. However, it was not effective because the jungle environment did not allow for the fixing of the enemy. Their true vulnerability, logistics, was never fully neutralized for primarily political reasons. But for whatever reasons, maneuver warfare was not the appropriate warfighting style.

If the doctrine of maneuver warfare has alerted the Marine Corps to a forgotten component of warfare-maneuver-then it has served its purpose. Certainly maneuver is a dynamic factor of combat that positions firepower for the destruction of the enemy. But firepower is not subordinate or even equal to maneuver. Firepower is the decisive factor in combat. Firepower can support maneuver, but ultimately maneuver supports firepower. Historically, maneuver was invented to concentrate firepower for the maneuvere’s advantage. From Frederick the Great’s oblique formations to Napoleon’s parallel columns, maneuver has always had the purpose of concentrating firepower into the enemy’s relative weakness.

To use maneuver on today’s and tomorrow’s battlefields, the preparation of the battlefield is crucial. It is only through the disabling of the enemy’s ability to fight that maneuver becomes viable. The disabling or neutralizing of the enemy’s components of warfare is done by applying the friendly forces’ relative advantages to the enemy’s relative weaknesses. As the enemy’s capability is diminished, the battlefield becomes free for use of maneuver. This is not to say that maneuver cannot be used early in some situations. Maneuver may be the relative advantage the friendly force enjoys. However, there are some circumstances where maneuver will not be a relative advantage early in the conflict. Only after the enemy’s ability to stop maneuver is neutralized does maneuver become effective.

Although maneuver warfare is valid under certain circumstances, the nature of war and the realities of the modern battlefield call for a much more flexible doctrine of warfare. The concept of relative advantage, focusing on the six essential operating systems of combat discussed above, may serve this purpose.

Observations on SWA

Capt Paul E. Bowen, USMCR

BGen Paul K. Van Riper’s “observations” hit right down the middle in describing the personnel problems and material shortfalls discovered during the “staffing up” and “fighting” of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) for Operation DESERT STORM. He correctly identifies the “administrative” mindset vice the “combat operations” mindset that interfered with some intelligence functions. Over 800 I MEF “augmentees” arrived as the first week of Operation DESERT STORM drew to a close. The Targeting Section, Fire Support Coordination Center, G-3,1 MEF, for example, had not worked together as a staff before hostilities. . . .

Logistically, I MEF was ready to go, thanks to years of exercising maritime pre-positioning force concepts. Operationally, I MEF arrived in Southwest Asia (SWA) with sufficiently heavy forces, but with insufficient staffing and liaison support. The implementation of BGen Van Riper’s proposals will make the next MEF/MEB general staff a “proactive” response vice a “reactive” result in the next conflict.

LtCol Ky L. Thompson, USMC(Ret)

The frank assessment of DESERT STORM operations by BGen Van Riper was good to see, and I hope that we profit from the lessons learned. I also hope, however, that we don’t find ourselves-as we often have in the past-“preparing to fight the last war.” On the subject of maneuver warfare, I find myself coming down more on the side of the “Col Edsons” rather than on that of the “LtCol Wilsons.” In my opinion, the “Wilsons” (See MCG, Jun91, pp. 23-27.) tend to mistake common sense and sound tactics for some mysterious, new-found, philosophy of warfare. I guess that’s one of the points that has always bothered me about the rabid disciples of the maneuver warfare school.

Col Gordon D. Batcheller, USMC(Ret)

Being retired means not losing sleep over the maneuver warfare debate, usually fatuously framed as a choice between being a mindless attritionist, cheerfully feeding our men into a meatgrinder, or a clever maneuverist, masterfully dominating the battlefield with guile and audacity and bloodlessly guillotining the enemy with his unraveled observation, orientation, decision, action (OODA)-loop. But as Col Edson demonstrated in the June issue, being retired lets you weigh in with something besides the politically correct dogma those on active duty seem temporarily burdened with. It is intriguing to hear the maneuverists talk about getting inside the Arab OODA-loop, especially when, as Col Edson points out, firepower took out the “OO.” If ever there was a war that proved the efficacy of firepower, it was the Mother of All Victory Parades. But the war didn’t end until units maneuvered; anyone looking at the entire war “discovers” what was being taught ages ago at The Basic School, sometime after Korea and before Vietnam.

The simple fact is that there are some nine principles that have proven historically to be relevant to success on the battlefield, and that most battlefield decisions involve the orchestration of fire and maneuver and combat service support to secure victory over an enemy. “Maneuver warfare” no more satisfies the need for an intellectual foundation for tactical competence than some Latin phrase in the Mass explains Christianity. . . .

BGen Van Riper’s observations on DESERT STORM in the same June issue confirm that familiar issues of at least 30 years’ standing remain unsolved; Maj Taylor and Bennett identify disturbing deficiencies when one considers that I MEF has theoretically been primed for a DESERT STORM for some 10 years. We should take pride in what we did well, thank Saddam Hussein for giving us the time to do it, and attack the identified “discrepancies” with an urgency that will make us less dependent in the future on the incompetence of our enemy.

No one expects a perfect FMF, and with the normal maturing and turnover of the Corps from year to year there will be few organizations at any given C-day totally prepared, even for their most likely contingency plan. But it ought to be embarrassing for a lot of Marines to review Gen Van Riper’s list of things that need fixing, or worse yet, inventing. We need to spend a great deal more effort on the basic nuts and bolts. For at least 20 years I have been aware of a large body of thought, if not a consensus, that we don’t do as well as we should getting ready for D-day because we are so overcommitted to exercises and peacetime projects and fuzzy thinking and misordered priorities. Concern normally focuses on the effects this has on small unit training, but as Gen Van Riper indicates, higher headquarters-or command elements-pay a high price also. If budget cuts keep us closer to the flagpole for the next couple of years, it appears that we will have a few things to keep us busy.

MLRS and Maneuver Warfare

by Maj Charles W. Morris

The Multiple Launch Rocket System is a war-proven weapon that adds immensely to a commander’s ability to bring massive amounts of fire to bear on deep targets-a capability that will enable commanders to destroy enemy cohesion more effectively.

As early as 1814, Sir William Congreve had written of the theory of rocket system employment. In his writings he discussed “the facility of firing a great number of rounds” as quickly as possible, thereby advocating the capability of massing fires and the benefits that accrue to a rocket system. He stressed two characteristics: the simplicity of a launcher and, primarily, its capacity to mass fires on a’large target instantaneously, thus effecting total surprise on the enemy. His theories on the tactical employment of rocket launchers are still valid, and were validated during the war against Iraq.

The U.S. Army acquired the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 1981. It is a tracked, self-propelled, allweather rocket system capable of launching twelve 227mm rockets in a single ripple of approximately 60 seconds or engaging targets individually with a single rocket. The armored self-propelled loader-launcher (SPLL) is operated by a crew of three and provides an automated positioning and firing capability. Its onboard communications system and fire-direction computer are digital and provide a burst transmission link to higher and adjacent headquarters. It is produced by the LTV Corporation and each dualpurpose, improved conventional munition (DPICM) rocket is able to deliver 644 antimaterial/antipersonnel grenades. It is air transportable by both the C-141 and C-5A aircraft. It is highly mobile and is designed to augment cannon artillery in its suppression, counterfire, and interdiction roles. It may be used in the general support (GS), general support-reinforcing (GSR), or reinforcing (R) role as an indirect-fire, area artillery weapon system. The inherent responsibilities of each of these missions are similar to those for tube artillery. The MLRS provides additional firepower while freeing tube artillery units for the direct support (DS) role. Its present range is more than 30 kilometers, but with the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) that was used with great success against Iraq, its range can be increased to 130 kilometers.

The Army is presently organized utilizing the MLRS battalion (three batteries of nine launchers each) as a corps asset, either independently deployed or attached to a field artillery brigade within the corps. The battalion is organized to provide rocket fires in support of the corps, as well as to reinforce other corps artillery units. In addition, an MLRS battery is organic to the divisional artillery of the Army’s heavy divisions (mechanized and armored). This provides general support fires for the division. The batteries that are organic to the division artillery are virtually identical to those within a corps’ MLRS battalion.

The concept for employment of the MLRS is GS and GSR at the division level while the battalion can be used in an R, GSR, or GS role at the corps level. It can be used not only for the attack of deep, high-payoff targets, but also to augment tube artillery suppression of enemy air defense, counterfire, and interdiction. Its value in augmenting tube artillery by providing additional firepower is made evident when considering that one rocket with 644 submunitions equals 7.3 rounds of 155mm (88 submunitions per round). This equates to a single launcher with 12 rockets equaling or exceeding the massed firepower (one round per tube) of 11 batteries of 155 mm howitzers.

There are some drawbacks to the MLRS, including cost and logistics; still, the system does offer some significant advantages when considered in light of the Marine Corps’ concept of deploying as a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) and employing as a Marine expeditionary force (MEF), and when considering the system’s potential employment in conjunction with maneuver warfare. Due to the fact that many potential enemies are now equipped with Soviet-style mechanized, armored, and rocket units, thought must be focused on these types of forces and what the Marine Corps will need to face them in future conflicts. The intensity and complexity of warfare has increased due to extended engagement distances, very mobile armored forces, and shorter duration of engagements due to those highly mobile forces being placed in armored formations. In such an environment, the commander of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is going to need more firepower than three or four battalions of artillery can provide him. He will have to mass his fires repeatedly and with great intensity if he is going to succeed in his mission. It is under these circumstances that a rocket launcher becomes a very useful weapon system. Its major characteristics of heightened volume of fire, shock, and surprise-effect fulfill a definite requirement for the massing of fires on high-priority targets.

At the present time Marine Corps GS artillery is limited to the 155mm M198, the same system used in each of the Corps’ DS battalions. While bold and aggressive use of this artillery by means of flexible command and control and organization for combat may temporarily suffice, long-term considerations for additional fire support need to be addressed. Given the growth of artillery capabilities worldwide, the Corps will need the greater range and volume of fire traditionally available from GS artillery. A possible solution is the acquisition of the MLRS as a GS system. The major disadvantages and advantages to this proposal are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The first of the disadvantages that require discussion is the problem of cost. Currently, one MLRS launcher costs approximately $3.04 million, according to the FY94 Program Objective Memorandum. The real issue, however, is the cost of ammunition. A 30-day supply for the planned acquisition would cost nearly half a billion dollars. Based upon the number of launchers acquired, this can become an expensive proposition. However, the increase in combat power available to a MAGTF commander must be weighed, as must be done for every acquisition, against the cost. It appears to be well worth it.

A second drawback is logistics support. The rockets are large and cumbersome, but while 30 days of ammunition for the MLRS is slightly heavier, its cube is smaller than the ammunition for the 8-inch howitzer Marines previously fielded. Still, it is important to have support vehicles to transport this load. A ripple of 12 rockets fired in less than one minute can expend a great deal of ammunition, so indiscriminate use of the MLRS against all targets should not be contemplated. Current five-ton trucks (M900 series) would not be able to provide the necessary ammunition resupply support. But the acquisition of three Mk48 logistics vehicle system (LVS) per artillery regiment has relieved this problem to a certain degree. Still, the additional costs of this logistics system must be considered. Prioritization of the overall targeting effort to consider high-value targets for engagement by MLRS would aid in the justification for accepting these additional problems.

An additional disadvantage to be considered is the fact that MLRS is not helicopter transportable. On balance, this is not an overly significant weakness considering that the M198 howitzer can be transported only by the CH-53E.

One last disadvantage to be addressed is its firing signature. Once the rocket is launched, the dust and smoke create a signature that can be easily identified visually and the trajectory of the rocket can be identified electronically. This vulnerability has been overcome to a certain degree by the employment of “shoot-and-scoot” tactics; that is, firing followed by immediate launcher displacement. This requires in-depth planning of battle zones to allow for the rapid movement of launchers and uncovering a large number of firing positions for their sites. (For more on “shoot-and-scoot” artillery raids and MLRS, see LtCol Mazzara’s “Artillery in the Desert, 1991,” MCG, Apr91.)

While the disadvantages are significant and must be considered in light of possible acquisition, there are many advantages to the current MLRS fielded by the Army. Foremost among these is mobility. The M270 MLRS is a tracked vehicle, providing much greater crosscountry mobility and speed in displacement for survivability than current towed weapon systems. The M270 is lighter and smaller than earlier self-propelled systems and is compatible with all present landing craft and the landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC). In addition, it is capable of being airlifted by both the C-141 and C-5A aircraft, making its strategic mobility a point of considerable interest. The ammunition weight and cube are similar to that of the old eight-inch howitzer, which keeps it compatible with the present amphibious lift capability. In addition, the onboard fire-control computer and navigation system allow for individual launcher employment or the massing of the fires of several launchers.

The advantage of increased lethality available with the MLRS has already been mentioned. This increased killing power is due largely to the numerous and diverse types of munitions available and under development for the system. At present, the M77 rocket fired by the MLRS delivers DPICM to a range of 32 kilometers. The MAGTF Master Plan calls for increased capabilities for counterfire and the development of a GS system with a range of 40 kilometers. The MLRS approaches this now. At present, tube artillery is capable of ranging 30 kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles, which comprise only a small portion of the base ammunition allowance. But maximum charges fired to achieve this contribute heavily to tube wear. Developmental warheads for the MLRS include scatterable mines, terminally guided warheads, seek-and-destroy armor (SADARM), and chemical munitions. However, the most significant developmental munition is the ATACMS, which has extended the range to 130 kilometers. While only two missiles per launcher can be employed, literally no launcher modification is required, and the capability of the system in terms of depth of attack will be markedly increased.

An advantage for the Marine Corps lies in the fact that the MLRS has already been fielded by the Army, providing a war-proven, off-the-shelf system for acquisition. There would be some research and development costs associated with it-for instance, hardening of the computerized systems against salt water associated with amphibious operations-but these would be minimal. In fact, the Army may be convinced to participate and gain a product improvement. Overall, there would be limited developmental costs incurred.

Finally, the demands for manpower resulting from adoption of MLRS would be minimal. In these days of tight budgets and manpower reductions, this is an important consideration. The battery structure proposed by then-Maj Andrew F. Mazzara (MCG, Sep88) calls for 5 officers and 71 enlisted (a crew of 3 is required to operate the launcher)-a relatively small investment for the capability acquired.

When looking at a numbers comparison only, the advantages definitely outweigh the disadvantages. However, if the MLRS were acquired, the Marine Corps must still determine how it will be employed. Since the considerations following acquisition are still in their infancy, a possible method of employment for the Marine Corps requires development.

Before developing a Marine Corps concept of MLRS employment, we must first examine how the MLRS would be employed and integrated into the maneuver warfare concept. By its very nature, MLRS would lend itself readily to employment as a GS weapon system with which the maneuver commander can influence combat. Maneuver warfare must be thought of in terms of space and time to gain a positional advantage as well as generating a faster operational tempo to gain decisive superiority at the required time and place. Attempts should be made to shatter the enemy’s morale and physical cohesion through rapid, violent, and unexpected actions. Basically, the aim is to create a situation with which he cannot cope. Firepower, especially that which will shock and surprise the enemy force, will be critical to accomplishing these tasks. The idea is to shift combat power, defined as the sum of firepower and maneuver, to decisive points and times in the battle. Firepower, such as that provided by the MLRS, can rapidly shift combat power without the physical movement of maneuver units. MLRS, with its capacity for mobility, lethality, surprise, and shock, equating to instant suppression and destruction of large areas of the battlefield, can provide that concentration of combat power at decisive places and times. It is capable of immediate response to a situation with massive coverage of a particular area of the battlefield.

Any joint munitions effects manual will bear out the increased effects of a first-round, massed time-on-target (TOT) as opposed to second and succeeding volleys. The key to the employment of the MLRS is the selective application of its massive capabilities against critical enemy vulnerabilities. This would lend itself to the GS mission where control is centralized and exercised directly by the maneuver commander through his artillery headquarters. The attempt is to pose dilemmas to the enemy so rapidly that the maneuver commander dictates terms of battle. He actively works to seek out enemy vulnerabilities and concentrate his combat power against them. Rapid rates of fire and the capability to mass on a single target or engage 12 individual targets from a single launcher provide a capability heretofore unknown by the maneuver commander. The munition pattern from a single rocket covers an area on the ground approximately 200 meters in diameter. The vanety of warheads under development would give the commander a great deal of flexibility.

The present range capability of the MLRS with ATACMS munitions exceeds that called for in the MAGTF Master Plan. ATACMS would allow the maneuver commander to engage extremely deep targets with a surface-to-surface fire support system in any kind of weather and in any type of terrain. Survivability of Marine air assets, the only system now capable of deep interdiction, as well as an overall savings of air sorties available, hang in the balance.

It is interesting to note that the Army organizes its defensive framework to include an area for deep operations. An Army commander has the MLRS as well as joint air attack team (JAAT) operations at his disposal to extend his area of influence and pursue deep operations. While the Marine framework considers three echelons-security, main battle area, and rear-and stresses deep attack, the only fire-support asset available for deep operations is air, weather permitting. Can the MAGTF commander afford to squander air assets and sorties, or worse, let his vital mission requirements go unfulfilled, when there is an all-weather system available that would allow him to provide deep interdiction of enemy second-echelon elements and counterfire? MLRS offers an exciting alternative to extend the MAGTF commander’s area of influence. Given proper intelligence regarding his area of interest and new capabilities for target acquisition provided by the surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group (SRIG), he now has an additional capacity for altacking highpriority targets acquired well beyond the security area.

If, in fact, these points are deemed to have merit and the MLRS is acquired, we must now turn our attention to the numbers of launchers the Marine Corps will require and how they will be employed. It is recommended that the Marine Corps buy 42 launchers (12 each for the 10th and 11th Marines, and 18 for the 14th Marines). (This figure accounts neither for a maintenance nor operational readiness float, nor launchers for the Maritime Pre-positioned Force, all of which may also have to be considered.) The austere artillery assets that would remain without this acquisition are totally inadequate. The 12th Marines would maintain their light stnicture for GS artillery while the 10th, 11th, and 14th Marines would increase their GS capability with procurement of the MLRS.

The increase in firepower and lethality for the MAGTF commander would be substantial. Twelve launchers (two six-launcher batteries) of MLRS can provide the equivalent first-round firepower of 84 tubes of 8-inch howitzers (14 six-gun batteries) per MEF with comparable embarkation characteristics to presently employed systems (comparison is based upon numbers of submunitions delivered in one volley). An added advantage is the strategic mobility of airlift by C-141 aircraft. One battery (six launchers) of MLRS could be attached to the DS battalion of each MEB to increase the firepower of that organization.

Upon compositing to form the MEF, one MLRS battery could provide GS fires to the ground combat element (GCE) and the other battery could provide GS fires to the MEF commander to take advantage of the SRIG’s acquisition capability and allow him to formulate his own counterfire and interdiction programs. Response to the GCE is critical, but the MEF commander must also have a means of increasing his area of influence and providing surprise while also providing rapid and massively destructive fires upon his own priority targets within that area. MLRS provides this by supplying the MAGTF commander an all-weather, expeditionary, surface-to-surface fire-support asset that provides greater survivability for aviation assets, particularly with the advent of ATACMS. Both the GCE and MEF commanders would now have a capability to not only extend their areas of influence, but provide a means of destroying enemy cohesion through selective use of separate counterfire and interdiction programs within these areas. They would have the capacity to mass an element of combat power with a ferocity that has been totally unavailable in the past.

By relying upon the present personnel within the artillery regiment (survey, meteorological, electronics, and track repair) there would be no real requirement for support personnel increases. The GS role for the MEF and GS, GSR role for the GCE would be appropriate with no real changes in the inherent responsibilities delineated in current Marine Corps doctrine. At the MEB level a mission of GS or GSR would be appropriate.

A reinforcing mission would not be appropriate due to the need to strike high-priority targets with mass destructive fires in accordance with the priorities set by the maneuver commander. In addition, the signature associated with those fires must be compensated for when planning zones of action. The maneuver commander must not only be aware of the MLRS mass destructive capabilities, but the fact that its employment makes it a very lucrative target.

The Marine Corps has had an interest in rockets either actively, as demonstrated by their use in World War II and Korea and developmental testing of various lightweight systems, or passively, as demonstrated by continuous study and periodic mention in professional journals. The MLRS is an offthe-shelf, expeditionary system that can provide the MAGTF commander the finest benefits of any rocket system with an increased capability for counterfire and interdiction. He is provided one of the simplest, most direct means of destroying enemy cohesion, the quintessential element in the maneuver warfare concept. The maneuver commander must concentrate on the enemy who, when considered in relation to a nonlinear forward edge of the battle area, may present many high-payoff targets well beyond the capabilities of engagement of the present tube artillery systems. MLRS acquisition and employment would provide increased lethality, strategic mobility, and an overall enlargement of the area of influence of the MAGTF commander, allowing those units assigned the direct support mission to concentrate on close support fires for the individual maneuver units.

The MLRS can exceed the present capabilities and will maintain a relative status quo in amphibious or airlift requirements. It is an expensive proposition, to be sure, but one that provides for an overall increase in fire support, as a subset of combat power. It will allow our maneuver commanders to destroy enemy cohesion, to save Marine lives and aircraft, and above all, to win!

Operational Art and Amphibious Warfare

by LtCol Paul F. Pugh

Unified commanders concerned with warfare at the operational level would do well to consider amphibious forces. As was so clearly demonstrated in Operation DESERT STORM, the Navy-Marine team has unique capabilities to offer those seeking to enhance their operational art.

For over 2,000 years power projection by amphibious forces has contributed to securing the strategic aims of many nations. For example, in the Second Punic War the Roman General Scipio landed in Iberia, striking the Carthaginian center of gravity in hopes of defeating Hannibal. In the Peninsula Campaign during the Napoleonic wars, Wellington used sea-based expeditionary forces to gain a lodgment on the continent, ultimately compelling France to fight on two fronts. Throughout the Pacific campaigns of World War II, the seizure of advanced naval and air bases by amphibious forces provided intermediate objectives leading to the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Each of these historical examples illustrates elements of what is now popularly referred to as operational art. Ironically, as we witness a rebirth of thinking at the operational level of war, nearly all the literature discussing operational art, campaign planning, and maneuver warfare is too narrowly focused on a continental approach. Conspicuously absent from these writings is the link naval forces, particularly amphibious forces provide between tactical engagements and strategic objectives.

This article demonstrates how amphibious forces with their sea and air mobility, organic sea-based logistics, and tailored combined arms organization bring to the theater of war attributes that greatly enhance operational art. Such forces provide the unified commander with the momentum, tempo, and leverage to win, or contribute to winning, the overall campaign. The article first frames the anticipated international security environment, then reviews terminology associated with operational art, and finally describes how and why amphibious forces represent the essence of the operational level of war.

The Threat

Everyone recognizes that the international security environment has undergone dramatic, rapid, and unexpected change. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the economic collapse of the Soviet Union, and the diminishing fear of vertical esclation towards a nuclear Armageddon all indicate that the prospect of war between the two superpowers is unlikely.

The bipolar world of the past has been replaced with the multipolar world of today. The growth of independent regional power bases, some as surrogates of the United States or Soviet Union and others as nonaligned nations, has been most impressive. These regional power bases have impressive military arsenals in terms of quantity, lethality, diversity, and sophistication of both weapons and delivery systems. For example, the Democratic Republic of Yemen possesses about 450 tanks, Cuba has 1,500 artillery pieces, and Mozambique has Mi-24 Hind helicopters. It is no mere coincidence that these countries, all Soviet client states, lie astride geostrategic sea lanes or near maritime chokepoints.

Equally important as geographic position are the demographic implications of these emerging nations; their capital cities and major population centers are near the coastlines. Of the 113 cities in the world considered to be significant to U.S. interests, 80 are within 75 miles of the sea. Moreover, competition between the “have” and “have not” nations is growing at an alarming rate. Consider the State Department’s Global 2000 Report to the President:

. . . Four-fifths of the world’s population will live in underdeveloped countries and three-quarters of the population will live within 500 kilometers of the sea. . . . Many of these disiant Third World regions will become maritime theaters, and amphibious forces . . . will serve as the military instrument of choice.

Coupled with this rise of regional power bases is a reluctance to provide America with basing and overflight rights. Without forward bases the ability of the United States to project power for either global conflict or crisis management is limited. Current operations in DESERT SHIELD highlight the importance of access to friendly forward staging areas.

The next conflicts are likely to be short, politically constrained ware with limited objectives and limited application of force. They will generate from unstable political situations, regional insurgency, and political-military crises and will often be drug or terrorist related. In Gen A. M. Gray’s view this will place a ” . . . premium on capable, mobile, logistically independent naval forces able to demonstrate U.S. presence and power projection capability on the horizon of all but a handful of countries.” Amphibious forces can provide the unified commander with the operational tools to defeat these threats.

The Terms

Over the years the gray zone between tactics and strategy has been referred to as la grande tactique (grand tactics) by the French and English, operativ by the Germans, and operatvnyi by the Russians. The United States refers to it as the operational level of war or operational art. It has come to mean more than simply warlike activity or a way of organizing for war. In fact, it has become a way of thinking about war requiring the vision and ability to orchestrate many diverse and apparently separate elements towards the accomplishment of some distant, ultimate goal. It is as much an intuitive feel of how events will or should unfold as it is a learned military discipline. FM 100-5, Operations, provides perhaps the best baseline description of operational art:

The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations . . . Operational art thus involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle . . . Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends, and effective joint and combined cooperation . . . Reduced to its essentials, operational art requires the commander to answer three questions: (1) What military conditions must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal? (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?

Others have defined it in terms of what it is not. Authors in Parameters (Jun88) state that “the operational level of war relates properly to the strategic aim, not the size, echelon, or type of formations involved.” Richard Simpkin in his book Race to the Swift claims that operational art is more than just a specific level of war. It is a dynamic, closed-loop system characterized by speed and appropriateness of response. It considers the opponent’s will, the synergistic effect of employing forces together, rather than separately, and is self-contained within the scope of its mission. Simpkin, in keeping with Sun Tzu, also noted that “If you were never going to be strong enough to fight and win a battle, you had to achieve operational aims without fighting one.” In other words, you have to move faster, use surprise, deploy in depth, and shatter the enemy’s cohesion.

Closely tied to operational art is the concept of maneuver warfare, as opposed to attrition warfare. Maneuver warfare emphasizes concentration, speed, and surprise in order to shatter the enemy’s morale, break his cohesion, and exploit his vulnerabilities It is frequently described in terms of the tactical level, but applies equally well to the operational level.

The operational level of war is synonymous with operational art, and links the strategic aims of a nation to the tactical battles or engagements that are waged. Joint Publication 1-02 defines the operational level of war as:

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link ladies and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to acomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of lime or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

The operational level normally covers a long timespan by emphasizing that the goal is to retain the initiative, shape events in one’s favor, and focus formations before the battle commences. However, it is important to note that any event that impacts on a nation’s strategic aims, regardless of the size of the force, the timeframe covered, or the space required in terms of land mass needed, can and should be considered to function at the operational level. For example, the singular act of bombing the Marine Barracks in Beirut by a small faction of fanatics could be considered an operational level success. This distinction has direct implications for amphibious forces that have mistakenly been considered too small to function at the operational level.

The vehicle or instrument used by unified commanders to articulate the operational level of war is referred to as a campaign or campaign planning. FMFM 1, Warfighting defines campaign planning as: “A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.”

In practical terms then, operational art is the ability to attack the enemy force before it can be brought to bear; interdict unengaged forces; keep the enemy-to-friendly force ratio manageable at the point of contact; slow or stop the flow of second echelon or reserve forces to the battle; and attack the enemy’s plan-not just his forces.

It should be clear from the above discussion mat operational art can be applied equally to a naval or continental context, and ideally both. Now let’s look at how we apply these terms.

The Theory

By definition, amphibious warfare is one of two naval power-projection capabilities-the other being strike warfare. To conduct amphibious warfare requires sea, air, and land forces. In this regard, the amphibious forces are unique in that these functionally separate parts can be combined into a singular entity and called an amphibious task force (ATF). For the unified commander, this force provides a wide array of force employment options, from crisis response to forcible entry.

At this point, rather than recite traditional amphibious capabilities, it may be instructive to relate the operational tenets of momentum, tempo, and leverage to amphibious forces. Momentum is the product of the mass of the forces involved and the velocity that those forces can generate. Mass, or combat power, is a function of several tangible and intangible components. We tend to think of raw numbers or physical throw weight as mass. But mass is also affected by internal combat multipliers like morale and leadership. External combat multipliers like the choice of ground to wage a battle also affect mass. However, it is not the entire force that produces momentum, it is only that portion that is usable at the point of application. Amphibious forces, through sea and air mobility, can optimize mass by selecting the best terrain and then concentrating superior force at an enemy weakpoint.

Velocity, the other component of momentum, is more than just the speed with which the infantryman walks or the tank moves. Velocity also involves how fast a force can be marshalled, transported to the conflict, and employed. Forward afloat amphibious forces are uniquely qualified in this regard.

Related to velocity is tempo. Tempo is the operational rate of advance, relative to the enemy, considering the aspects of time, space, and sustainabiliry. Simpkin defines overall tempo:

as the distance from the initial line of contact to the back of the final operational objective, divided by the time (in days) from the receipt of orders by the operational commander to accomplishment or abortion of the mission.

If a unified commander can shorten this time, he increases his tempo. Theoretically, the faster the tempo, the greater the advantage gained over an opponent. The use of maritime prepositioned shipping (MPS) can compress the deployment window, thereby increasing tempo. Decentralized command and control, faster processing of intelligence, and anticipation of outcomes through development of sequels and branches all equate to faster decisionmaking and, hence, increased tempo.

Tempo is also related to what operational theory refers to as the culminating point or, as noted in FM 100-5,

a point where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued operations therefore risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.

The goal is to keep relentless pressure on the enemy and attain the objective as quickly as possible before reaching one’s culminating point. Critical to this process is the ability to sustain oneself. Large, lucrative, rear areas with stockpiled supplies will certainly be targeted by the enemy. Loss of these assets will reduce tempo, hence, an advantage to the enemy. Amphibious forces with their organic sea-based 15, 30, or 60 days of supply and selective offload capability can provide the unified commander with the logistic edge to avoid, or at least extend the culminating point.

The last concept to examine is leverage. A key aspect of operational art is the decision as to when and where to give battle. Amphibious forces, by their superior mobility at sea and organic aviation capability, provide latitude for this decision and gain leverage against the enemy. Leverage is the ability to move the enemy center of gravity without direct, brute, head-to-head conflict. It avoids attrition warfare. The threat of an attack in one area can hold the enemy in place; a threat in another can cause him to abandon his position. The combined arms approach to war, which is the full integration of all components in such a way that in order to counter one act the enemy makes himself vulnerable to another, illustrates the effects achieved by leverage, a capability inherent in amphibious forces.

In summary, amphibious forces, through mobility, sea-based logistics, and a tailored force organization, provide a unified command with the tools needed to conduct operations with increased momentum, tempo, and leverage. They enable him to strike at a place of his choosing with sufficient organic staying power to finish the fight.

Examples.

* Traditionally and by law (Title 10, U.S.C.), the United States has used amphibious forces to seize advanced naval and air bases. Considering the paucity of overseas bases, this mission is still valid, and capabilities are far greater than in the island-hopping campaigns of World War II. Today a landing in the Aleutians or Kurils could provide a jumping off point for continued operations. More importantly, these bases serve to shorten the logistic tether and assist the unified commander in avoiding strategic overreach or lack of punch at the focus of combat. In operational art lingo, advanced bases extend the culminating point. Such bases could be used as a hinge or a pivot point enabling the unified commander to employ the concept of leverage. In some instances the fortified base becomes a holding force, while a mobile amphibious task force is free to envelope or turn the enemy’s flank. While seizure of an advanced base may not win the war, it should be considered as a corollary or supporting operation within the overall campaign plan.

* Another more traditional use of amphibious forces is to strike the flanks of an opponent. The best historical example is Inchon. By landing on the west coast of Korea deep behind the enemy’s forward forces at Pusan, MacArthur was able to collapse an overextended enemy both in the physical and psychological sense. Despite a lessening Soviet threat, a unified commander could use this same concept in Norway. Not only could the operational principle of leverage be attained, but also a second front could be opened that would divert Soviet resources. Equally important, seizure of Norway denies the Soviets the ability to use leverage against NATO forces in central Europe. Landing force aviation units ashore could be used not only for the landward sector of the outer air battle, but also in defense of the carriers. If a carrier were sunk, these land bases could provide alternative landing sites as they did at Guadalcanal. Furthermore, land-based aviation could extend the carrier’s scouting and reconnaissance ability against Soviet long-range aircraft, thereby augmenting the indications and warnings effort. It may be useful to note that the number of tactical aircraft in a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) roughly equates to the number aboard one aircraft carrier.

* The third traditional use of amphibious forces is in the control of the sea lines of communications (SLCO). As LtCol Thomas C. Linn has pointed out:

. . . in the event of an attempt to forcibly dominate the southern entrance to the Red Sea by either the Soviets or a regional nation, Marine Corps forces could seize Bab al Mandab, or even Aden. Air assets within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force would ensure positive control over the southern portion of the Red Sea and contribute to the air defense of eastern Saudia Arabia. In addition, the MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force] could counter any threat to Aman by Yemen while protecting Aden as an advanced naval base. It is important to note that this waterway is a vital link in the Soviets southern route connecting European and Asian portions of the Soviet Union. The employment of seapower in this operational context has important application for other vital choke points as well.

* Amphibious forces can function as the theater commander’s operational reserve. Here they could be used either to stop a breakout by blocking a penetration or to counter a strategic turning movement by acting as a counter threat force.

* Amphibious forces will be required for small wars on or near the coastline. Third World countries, using lethal weapons with extended ranges, can easily control maritime chokepoints. These new littoral theaters of war are located along the seams of continental and maritime theaters and include the air space over both. These littoral theaters have no regionally assigned commander and no Service with principal domain. Liddell Hart recognized that distinctions drawn on separate air, sea, and land lines were no longer suitable. He believed that, “Problems need to be tailored in a more integrated way, blending the functions of the three Services.” Amphibious forces blend those functions and provide the unified commander with a unique way to handle a new battlefield.

* Unified commanders can use amphibious forces in a littoral theater of conflict for bold strikes into the enemy capital, paralyzing the will of the government by early seizure of political and economic power bases. In operational terms it means striking at their center of gravity, the hub of all their strength. For most cases, a coup de main requires no bases and no overflight rights. The war is quick, decisive, and avoids escalation. It represents maneuver warfare at its best.

* Amphibious forces can be used to preempt the outbreak of hostilities. In today’s international security environment our strategic aims may not be the total defeat of the enemy. The goal may be to restabilize a situation to allow diplomacy, negotiations or mediations to resume. Using strategic mobility to increase readiness may force the enemy into military submission or simply inhibit his actions.

Preemption is best exemplified by the ‘fleet in being’ theory expounded . . .by Mahan . . . . Mahan states the theory like this: ‘The presence of a strong force even though inferior, near the scene of operations will produce a momentous effect on the enemy’s action.’

* For many conflicts involving Third World nations amphibious forces provide surprise. Surprise can be attained in the moral sense, when the enemy just doesn’t know you are coming, or a material sense, in which he knows you are coming but cannot do anything about it. Surprise can also be related to the use of operational deception by amphibious forces or simply the potential to land those forces in a number of possible locations. This enables the unified commander to deliver a crushing defeat-think momentum-before the enemy has time to galvanize his forces or public support.

* A few years ago we heard a lot about competitive strategies or pitting ones’s strengths against an adversary’s weakness. Amphibious forces, by nature of being light and mobile, depend on this concept for success. In the context of maneuver warfare, amphibious forces may employ to multiple sites and rapidly shift forces to exploit enemy weaknesses. This enables the unified commander to outwit the enemy rather than outmuscle him. Moreover, amphibious forces can capitalize on technology and fight asymmetrical battles where dissimilar forces are matched; for example, large numbers of small, mobile antitank weapons systems against heavy tanks. In many situations a light mechanized force has almost the ideal balance of mass and tempo needed for extreme flexibility.

* Finally, amphibious forces can be used for deep raids. The goal of such operations is to break cohesion and shatter enemy morale. For raids, the concepts of tempo and momentum are critical. Amphibious forces with their organic aviation capability can deliver and support raid elements with appropriate mobility and mass to create significant leverage. These deep raids can attack vulnerable rear areas and shape or influence subsequent battles. For the unified commander, such a force is an invaluable tool.

Summary

Because of geostrategic positioning, demographic changes, and economic inequities, the most likely conflicts for the foreseeable future will involve Third World nations. These regional power bases possess sophisticated weapons with the ability to wage intense, lethal, small wars. These conflicts will, in many instances, be fought on or near a littoral and often will require simultaneously coping with sea, air, and land warfare. Amphibious forces are uniquely suited for such situations.

The revival of operational art is encouraging, but should not be so rigidly interpreted as to imply that only large, continental formations, fighting for extended periods of time, are participants. The operative words in understanding operational art are the ability to accomplish strategic goals. In this regard, amphibious forces, which provide anything from crisis management to forcible entry, can contribute at the operational level and respond effectively to national needs.

The inherent strength of amphibious forces is synonymous with the fundamentals of operational art: mobility; combined arms; surprise; increased reach; extension of the culminating point; ability to concentrate or disperse; ability to strike the enemy’s center of gravity; ability to generate momentum, increase tempo and exert leverage; and maintenance of the initiative. Moreover, operational art requires the commander to conceptualize his campaign plan by determining what military conditions will lead to achievement of strategic aims; how those conditions will be phased or sequenced; and how the necessary resource will be applied. Amphibious forces can help answer those questions and provide the unified commander with the combat striking power and, equally important, the sustainability to win.

Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations

by LtCol Jerome F. Bierly and Maj Thomas E. Seal

On 15 March 1991 LtGen Ernest T. Cook, Jr., commanding general, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), signed the Over–the–Horizon (OTH) Amphibious Operations Operational Concept. This concept will provide the basis for determining amphibious assault requirements for the next 20 years.

Development of an OTH assault capability is imperative for two reasons. First is the threat to traditional amphibious forces posed by naval mines and precision-guided munitions. The use of antiship missiles in the Falklands War, light antiaircraft missiles in Afghanistan, and our more recent experiences with naval mines and antiship missiles in the Persian Gulf serve notice that heretofore militarily insignificant states now have the potential to seriously challenge larger, modern forces. Second, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and improved delivery means pose a further problem to concentrated forces ashore or afloat. While these obstacles are not insurmountable, they compel a number of changes in doctrine, training, and equipment.

OTH is much more than a traditional amphibious landing from a greater range. Launched from beyond visual and radar range (usually in excess of 25 miles), the OTH concept is a logical step in the evolution of amphibious warfare. Dating from the development of the helicopter after World War II, the first official mention of an OTH requirement was in 1948. While we possess a limited capability today, full realization of the concept requires both new technology and a wider doctrinal view of amphibious operations.

OTH and Maneuver Warfare

We can no longer expect to fight an evenly matched or numerically inferior opponent. Therefore, we cannot afford to exhaust combat power in a war of attrition. FMFM 1, Warfighting, outlines our philosophy of maneuver warfare, a philosophy deeply ingrained in the essence of amphibious warfare. The OTH concept enhances the flexibility inherent in amphibious operations, broadening their scope as a seaward extension of maneuver warfare. Our ability to conduct such operations will improve as we institutionalize doctrine and training, modify force structure, and acquire advanced equipment.

Improvements in ship-to-shore mobility, command and control capabilities, and long-range fire support provide the means to apply maneuver warfare in an amphibious context. These improvements allow us to threaten a larger area and project forces inland far more rapidly than before, thus achieving objectives quickly and with fewer casualties. Essentially, these improvements equate to enhanced tactical mobility, operational speed, and operational flexibility-the keys to success in maneuver warfare.

Tactical mobility provides the freedom and ability to maneuver. When combined with firepower, tactical mobility becomes the principal physical ingredient of maneuver, enabling us to achieve a positional advantage over our enemy. Anything that enhances our ability to move or react quickly improves our ability to conduct maneuver warfare and OTH amphibious assaults. For this reason, the Marine Corps must continuously examine its operational requirements and the potential applications of new technology.

Enhanced tactical mobility offers many practical advantages. Capitalizing on the enemy’s inability to defend every potential landing site, the extended range and speed inherent in OTH enables the landing force to achieve surprise and concentrate strength against critical enemy weaknesses. By implication, this enhanced mobility complicates the enemy commander’s defensive problem. Barrier, obstacle, and countermobility plans become increasingly unmanageable. The enemy’s command and control problem also grows in direct proportion to the landing force’s mobility, diluting enemy cohesiveness and creating uncertainty in the mind of the defending commander.

Operational speed/tempo enables a commander to seize the initiative, shape the battle, and keep the enemy off balance. In maneuver warfare we strive to operate faster than the enemy can react. By decentralizing decisionmaking, gathering and processing intelligence rapidly, and reacting to battlefield chaos faster than our enemy, we place him in a situation where he cannot effectively function. This creates confusion and hesitation on his part and, in its ultimate form, panic, paralysis, and loss of the will to resist. Our operational tempo must exceed the enemy’s so that we may exploit opportunites and maintain the initiative, thus dictating the terms of the conflict.

Operational flexibility derives from the successful application of combined arms. A Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) presents the enemy with a dilemma. If the enemy postures to counter one element of the combined arms force, he becomes vulnerable to the capabilities of another. For example, massing to counterattack leaves him vulnerable to supporting arms. Conversely, dispersing to avoid the ravages of supporting arms opens gaps vulnerable to exploitation by mobile forces.

There are two primary reasons to conduct OTH amphibious operations. The first is to achieve a tactical advantage over enemy forces on the ground. The second is to counter threats to the amphibious task force (ATF) by launching our assault from farther out at sea. Operational speed, tactical mobility, and the firepower of our combined arms enables the landing force to attack along multiple axes, by air and surface. In so doing, the landing force creates confusion, disrupts the enemy’s planning, compounds his targeting problem, and denies him the opportunity to attack concentrated and relatively immobile forces.

Our tactical mobility forces the enemy to counter the landing with a mobile defense. This defense relies on mobile reaction forces and indirect fire to provide a quick response to landing force incursions. This defense has several inherent vulnerabilities; these include a greater reliance on the initiative of subordinate commanders, dependence on effective intelligence to determine the time and place of landing, the need for more fire support to cover the expanded battlefield, and the command and control difficulties posed by a fluid, nonlinear battlefield. The OTH concept targets all of these vulnerabilities.

Executing OTH

Successful execution of future amphibious operations requires mastery of abbreviated, flexible planning techniques to cope with reduced warning and reaction times. To be successful, planners must anticipate likely missions, have good intelligence, know their responsibilities, and practice standardized plans and procedures until they become second nature. Employing the technique of “intelligence pull,” commanders must make such basic decisions as selection of landing zones and landing beaches virtually at the last minute. A firm understanding of the commander’s intent and flexibility at all levels are imperative.

Intelligence requirements for OTH will far exceed those of traditional amphibious operations. An OTH-capable amphibious force can threaten a thousand-mile coastline within a 24-hour period. The landing itself will cover a much greater area than in the past, both in terms of coastline available for surface landing and the depth to which airlifted forces will be inserted. Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information will therefore be much more difficult in tomorrow’s wide-ranging operations. The landing force commander will require national intelligence collection products and an expanded analysis capability. Expertise in acquiring, processing, and evaluating national level intelligence data must therefore be resident in the landing force. Additionally, the ability to fuse intelligence from all sources, identify that which is needed by various echelons of command, and rapidly disseminate that information in a usable form, both afloat and ashore, is critical to success.

In OTH operations beaches and landing zones serve only as points of entry and control measures for landing forces. The point of OTH is to get mobile, combined arms teams ashore quickly, merge them into combat formations while on the move, and drive deep into the enemy’s rear. These multiple formations need not be mutually supporting in the traditional sense of supporting each other by fire. Their combined actions must, however, contribute to the confusion and dislocation of the enemy commander by making his preplanned defenses irrelevant. While pushing inland, the mobile forces will avoid the enemy’s fixed defenses, obstacles, and likely fire sacks in favor of drawing enemy counterattack forces into a meeting engagement. This tactic renders obsolete the traditional practice of seizing a beachhead to organize for land combat and to prepare for a massive logistic buildup. By implication, it also produces two tactical advantages. First, it avoids creating a lucrative target for the enemy. Second, it precludes a drawdown from the landing force to defend a beachhead with its attendant cost of slowing the pace of the operation.

New logistics equipment and procedures will be needed to support the landing force during OTH operations. The emphasis will be on unit distribution to support long-range, rapidly moving mobile forces. Coming from a sea-based rather than land-based logistics facilities, resupply of committed forces will be more difficult in OTH. Revised procedures for reporting, delivering, and tracking inventories and usage will be required. New items of equipment may also be needed to accomplish these tasks.

Representative Operation

In Marine expeditionary force (MEF) operations, aircraft will land self-contained, combined arms forces well inland, beyond prepared defenses. This could include regimental landing teams inserted some 40 kilometers beyond the beach into gaps in the enemy’s defenses. The mission of such vertical assault forces will be to threaten enemy command and control facilities, logistics sites, and lines of communication. Landing zones will be on the flanks of or behind enemy positions. Aircraft flight paths will be circuitous and at low level to avoid known enemy air defenses and observation, thus increasing the need for speed and range of aircraft.

The surface assault force, also a regimental landing team, will attack across multiple, widely dispersed points of entry. Landing as battalion landing teams, or even as reinforced companies, each specific landing team will be a task organized, self-contained, mobile combined arms force. The mission of each landing team will be to land across a narrow beach, quickly consolidate while on the move, and thrust deeply inland. If one landing team is unable to avoid or suppress opposition, the actions of the other teams should serve to make the defender’s position untenable. The preferred method of meeting the enemy will be to consolidate the advancing landing teams and engage his counterattack forces in a meeting engagement. This allows us to capitalize on our operational speed and tactical mobility.

The surface landing force can expect to encounter mines in shallow water, in the surf, and on the beach. A minefield is a “surface” that the landing force must avoid whenever possible and breach only if necessary. The key to mine avoidance is mine detection. To facilitate rapid planning, minefield locations must be identified and rapidly passed to higher headquarters. The tactical organization and formation of surface waves must minimize exposure to shallow water mines while en route and to land mines once ashore. Although the Navy retains the responsibility of clearing mines up to the high-water mark, the Marine Corps must aggressively pursue all ways to counter the mine threat Perhaps more than any other enemy tactic, effective minefield placement can hinder a surface assault and operations inland.

As with traditional amphibious landings, vertical and surface assaults can occur simultaneously or sequentially. They are designed to be complementary and either can represent the focus of effort. A mobile, sea-based exploitation force can be held aboard ship to influence the action ashore. Normally organized around a reinforced infantry regiment, this force can land by air, surface, or a combination of both.

Continued Development

Although already published, the OTH concept is far from complete. It is a dynamic document that will evolve through continued study and application. In the meantime, the Warfighting Center continues to develop supporting concepts of command and control, combat service support, aviation, and fire support. Through such vehicles as an OTH Working Group, studies, and lessons learned, the Warfighting Center gathers ideas, refines them, and incorporates them where warranted. Given the importance of the concept and its far-reaching effects, all Marines should contribute to this effort.