New Doctrine or Slipping Into the Past?

by LtCol Gary I. Wilson, USMCR

Maj Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. in a well-crafted piece (MCG, Jul93) covers the spirited debate that over the last decade has led to a major change in the Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine. The Gazette has been a key forum in this debate about warfighting philosophies.

Today, the warfighting philosophy emphasizing force ratios, attrition, and frontal bludgeoning contests has largely been replaced by one of maneuver and deception. The significance of this philosophical change was even noted by the Secretary of Defense in his Annual Report To The President And The Congress of February 1992:

The effectiveness of our Marine Corps forces was most dramatically demonstrated by the brilliant movement of I MEF through numerically superior defensive forces into Kuwait City revalidating the maneuver warfare doctrine adopted by the Corps.

While McKenzie highlights the positive aspects of maneuver warfare philosophy, he doesn’t get it all quite right and may miss the mark all together in a couple of crucial areas. For example, McKenzie contends that maneuver warfare is only now moving beyond the partially formed visions of its founding enthusiasts to become a workable, guiding doctrine. Does this mean maneuver warfare thinking of the Gulf War and the execution that sliced deep into Kuwait were mere flukes? One thinks not. Also, the advent of maneuver thinking was marked by an intellectual revival sometime ago as noted by MajGen Paul K. Van Riper in Perspectives On Waifighting No. 2, Vol. 1:

. . . many of the ideas put forth by the military reformers found a wide acceptance in the armed forces in the 1980s, especially in the Army and Marine Corps, the climate for this acceptance was created by the self-generated intellectual revival begun within the professional military schools.

One can’t help but believe that the process of transition from theory and philosophy to doctrine is more advanced than McKenzie realizes.

In fact, maneuver warfare or third generation warfare was conceptually developed and operationally tested 75 years ago during the German offensives in the spring of 1918. Recognition of this led the “founding enthusiasts” of maneuver warfare in the 1980s to ask what might fourth generation warfare look like and where do we go from here (see “The Changing Face of War: Into Fourth Generation” MCG, Oct89).

McKenzie, on the other hand, argues that maneuver warfare thinking (as mature doctrine) is “now” culminating in a set of precise terms and techniques that describe and control combat as reflected in draft FMFM 2-1, a document that he seems to regard as the Holy Grail of maneuver doctrine. FMFM 2-1 centers in part around three fundamental concepts: battlefield geometry, battlefield operating systems/battlefield activities (BOS/BACT), and top-down planning (TDP). McKenzie goes on to point out the hidden goal of these fundamental concepts is “synchronization”

While McKenzie has given credit to the Corps for throwing off its philosophy of attrition and head-on bludgeoning, he sharply turns in his focus and becomes logically inconsistent when attempting to link maneuver thinking to the concepts of synchronization, BOS/BACT, and TDP. Synchronization means you can only move as fast as your slowest unit. This definitely is not a tenet of maneuver warfare. Col James G. Burton. USAF(Ret) in Proceedings (Jun93) describes in vivid detail how VII Corps Ml tanks performed in DESERT STORM. They did well, but an overemphasis on synchronizing and battlefield geometry (phase lines and control measures) allowed Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard to slide out the back door.

If synchronization is indeed a hidden goal of FMFM 2-1 as McKenzie suggests, it appears that the Corps’ warfighting philosophy is being led down the primrose path. Marines will be so busy synchronizing battlefield operating systems and battlefield activities with top-down planning (to say nothing of scoping out battlefield geometry) that there will be little time left to engage the enemy. As Col Burton commented:

Clearly, Frank’s failure to cut off the Republican Guards’ escape can be traced to his strict adherence to the synchronization element of the Army’s new doctrine Synchronization also prevented Luck and McCaffery from circling around behind.

Additionally, McKenzie describes draft FMFM 2-1 as a close cousin of the Army manual FM 100-15. Corps Operations. Does the Marine Corps want doctrine that so closely resembles Army doctrine? After all, it was this doctrine that literally provided the dogmatic underpinnings allowing the Republican Guard to skip out the back door.

I suspect LtGen James C. Breckinridge is rolling in his grave at the prospect of Marine Corps doctrine so closely iesembling Army doctrine. Ms Kerry Strong, Archives Director, Marine Corps University, in a research paper quotes one of Gen Breckinridge’s constant complaints in the 1930s, “Marine officers are not Marine officers in much more than official designation. They are Army officers in Marine uniform . . .” Ms. Strong writes that Breckinridge believed this because Marine Corps schools imitated Army schools. When Army personnel asked for information on what the Marines were doing and what they had developed “in their own particular line as Marines,” the Marines offered them back most of their own Army teachings.

One can only wonder if Maj McKenzie’s views and draft FMFM 2-1 do not represent a throwback to an earlier era and a resurgence of old doctrinal dogma so disdained by Gen Breckinridge.

Doctrinal Change: The Move to Maneuver Theory

by Col Michael D. Wyly, USMC(Ret)

Maj Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr’s “On the Verge of a New Era,” (MCG, Jul93) captures some of the history of the long struggle for maneuver warfare, but among the missing parts is the most essential: The real origin of maneuver warfare was in Vietnam in the 1960s. Had there been no Vietnam, no body-count strategy, no attempts by senior officers to apply outdated, rigid doctrine to fast-moving fluid battles, no lost war-and had there been no returning veterans, conscious of the inadequacy of our old doctrine-there would have been no maneuver warfare.

What’s more, had there been no William S. Lind or John Boyd, we would have continued our fight for a new style of fighting anyway. The hard lessons learned in combat left an indelible mark on the minds of many of us. But whether or not we would have prevailed in the end as we did without the help of a few outside the organization remains an unanswerable question. We were, after all, relatively junior in rank then, and our views were not favored by colonels and generals.

Our quest for a better way began in combat in Vietnam, as did our experiments with fluid tactics and high initiative at the lowest levels. The need for change was clearly visible at junior levels, among lieutenants, corporals, and sergeants, but often not so among the more senior. The problems in the years that followed were in getting the Corps’ hierarchy to admit that change was needed and in developing an articulation of what those changes ought to be. Maj McKenzie is correct that our observation of the Arab-Israeli wars, especially in 1973, added to our realization that change was urgent. But the struggle had already begun, inexorably, years before.

We who had already committed ourselves to change drew in Lind and Boyd because Lind’s appreciation of history and Boyd’s use of fighter tactics as a model upon which to rethink tactics on the ground added to our bank of source material for ideas. Both men had already become active on their own, outside the Marine Corps-their original dissatisfaction, too, having roots in their observation of Vietnam. But we gave Boyd and Lind as many ideas as they gave us, to which they have always freely admitted.

Lind’s name became disproportionately prominent partly because a rigid Marine bureaucracy found him a convenient scapegoat for criticism in their effort to defend the status quo. Of him they could say “He’s never been in combat so he can’t be right.” So a separate controversy having nothing to do with tactical thought arose surrounding him, a manifestation of George Bernard Shaw’s axiom: “All professions are conspiracies against the laity.”

The truth is that both Lind and Boyd were a tremendous help to those of us who had experienced combat on the ground and sought a better way. First of all, it had gotten lonely within the Corps for those of us pressing for change. As civilians, they could bring pressures where we could not, finding ourselves at every turn “outranked.” Contacts outside the Corps helped to broaden our horizons beyond the Vietnam experience as well, which was important because it was predictable that the next war would not be Vietnam all over again, though it too, would call on us to break from our old doctrine.

But all in all, it was what we saw in combat in Vietnam, contrasted against what Quantico through the 1970s and 1980s insisted on perpetuating as doctrine despite its irrelevance to real war, that drove us to our present style of fighting.

The Last 300 Yards

by Capt Daniel J. O’Donohue

The frontal attack is the most frequent form of attack.

-German Tactical Doctrine

20 December 1942

FMFM 1, Warfighting has spurred a tactical renaissance in the Marine Corps that largely ignores the problems of assaulting the enemy. This preoccupation with maneuver overshadows the squad leadership, fire support techniques, and tactics that propelled divisions across the beaches of Iwo Jima and Inchon. Maneuver warfare seeks to bypass and collapse the enemy’s resistance. Using soft spot tactics. Marines exploit gaps or critical vulnerabilities, thus negating the need for direct, frontal attacks. Some even argue that this warfighting philosophy demands light infantry units that specialize in patrolling, raiding, and infiltrating. The focus is on stalking rather than assaulting skills. In short, the tactics of closing the last 300 yards of an infantry assault is losing pride of place in our training and doctrine. This approach risks leaving fire team and squad leaders unprepared for the chaos and confusion of their first combat assault.

Closing the last 300 yards of the infantry assault is one of the most demanding tactical maneuvers. The accuracy, range, and lethality of modern weapons magnify the inherent difficulties of moving while under fire. Almost every enemy infantryman is armed with at least an automatic weapon. An enemy squad, equipped with only assault rifles, can deliver 6,000 rounds a minute during these last 300 yards. Over the same ground, the assaulting unit’s supporting fires lose their effect. Artillery, air, mortar, and machinegun fire must shift as friendly troops mask or assault into the kill radius of these weapons. The difficulty of closing this ground without an obscene number of casualties is a compelling reason for maneuver.

Unfortunately, maneuver is not always an option, and proficiency in the close assault is essential. Against competent opponents, gaps will not be readily apparent. Surfaces may be disguised as gaps and vice versa. Additionally, the unpredictable meeting engagements of a chaotic battlefield are won through rapid assaults. Finally, a “soft spot” is a relative term. A battalion may plan a flanking movement to exploit an enemy weakness. For the assaulting squads, however, the battle may be a frontal attack, possibly against a well-prepared position. In fact, the smaller the unit the greater the likelihood of frontal attacks. For the private first class, every attack is a frontal attack.

Despite 13 years of debate and 3 years of doctrinal support, maneuver warfare theories within the Corps have not successfully addressed the problem of the last 300 yards. The most glaring disconnect between theory and practice is the parade-deck method of squad and fire team rushes. This method is still widely practiced in the fleet and taught in some of our schools. During the course of the attack, the squad leader directs his squad from the rear through voice and hand and arm commands. The emphasis is on inward control of the squad as fire team and individuals move in choreographed formations dictated by the squad leader. This form of positive control might work on quiet, linear, and open battlefields. However, this inward precision takes the focus off the enemy, ignores the impact of terrain on movement, and stultifies the initiative of fire team leaders. The centralized control and rigid techniques practiced in our most fundamental fighting unit are a damning indictment of our implementation of FMFM 1.

An infantry assault can occur under a wide variety of circumstances. An assault at night in urban terrain to clear a building against infantry clearly differs from a daylight attack in a forest against a mechanized unit. Still, a common tactical approach, true to the principles of FMFM 1, is essential to fielding squads that can rapidly close the last 300 yards.

The Squad as the Fundamental Tactical Unit

The first point to emphasize is that squads are the focal point of the assault. A battle is shaped to allow these units to work their way across the objective successfully. The true measure of an army is, in fact, the esprit and tactical proficiency of the squad. The strength of German arms in World War II was built as much on superb infantry squads as the more widely publicized panzer divisions.

By any measure, the size of the basic tactical unit has decreased over time. Napoleon’s battalions were replaced by companies in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 (The Captains’ War), and the companies by stormtroop squads of World War I. A basic tactical unit is the smallest element capable of:

* Independent action or performing a simple combat task.

* A personal relationship between the unit leader and his men.

* Voice control by the unit leader.

Today, the squad is the highest level of organization that meets these three criteria. The increased range and lethality of weapons is forcing greater dispersion of units on the battlefield. In his book On Infantry, John A. English estimates that from 1800 to the present, the number of men required to defend a mile of battle front has diminished from 20,000 to 1,000. Thus the squad is the basic fighting unit.

Additionally, the squad is the lowest level at which a unit can fire and maneuver simultaneously. The squad leader can employ his three fire teams and squad weapons to achieve the correct balance between suppressive fires and maneuver units. A decentralized battle fought by squad and fire team leaders provides flexibility to the attack. These small-unit leaders are in the best position to hunt for the line of least resistance. They can exploit the advantages afforded by microterrain and the enemy’s defense.

The last 300 yards of the assault, however, presents more than just a tactical problem. The moral problems of the assault are equally as important and best solved by the squad. On a dispersed battlefield, it is the moral authority of the squad leader and the cohesiveness of his squad that will cause men to assault. The fighting spirit of the Marine Corps is built on the cohesion and small-unit leadership of squads.

The NCO as a Decisionmaker

Within the context of a decentralized and dispersed assault, the squad and fire team leaders become key tactical decisionmakers. Their role is to penetrate lines of least resistance and maintain the momentum of the assault. The squad leader leads from the front, focusing the squad’s efforts forward. Instead of using rigid command and control procedures, squad leaders designate a base fire team from which the other two fire teams guide.* Squad leaders expect fire team leaders to do much more than relay commands. A fire team leader should grab ground with initiative, using every advantage terrain and enemy dispositions afford him to pull the attack forward. Fire teams do not have to stay on line but can leap forward if the opportunity permits. The base fire team provides a general reference to the direction and speed of the attack. It should not, however, restrict the tempo of the attack. The pull from the front, not the push from the rear, decides the speed and direction of the assault.

Under these conditions, squad and fire team leaders must rapidly orchestrate the best line of attack, speed, and combined arms effect for their weapons. Among the most difficult and subtle decisions is deciding whether the squad is winning or losing. Many engagements are won by the leader who takes the “longer breath” and continues the assault despite seemingly insurmountable difficulties. As Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift noted in World War II “. . . there comes a point in every close battle when each commander concludes that he is defeated. The leader who carries on wins.” It takes a skilled squad leader, however, to tell the difference between intestinal fortitude and pressing a doomed attack. An equally difficult task is determining when to call for help. Deploying a platoon or calling for artillery fire to remove a sniper is time-consuming and wasteful. The squad leader must develop a feel for the threats he can handle without slowing the attack to employ outside assistance. Moreover, squad and fire team leaders must decide these issues while employing their personal weapons, for they are fighters as well as leaders.

On the maneuver warfare battlefield, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) must make decisions based on tactics, not just rigidly apply techniques. The decisionmakjng requirements are stringent. As was noted in Infantry in Battle, published in the 1930s:

. . . the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formula that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory . . . he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is the process of years.

Fire Support

The suppression of the enemy’s weapons on the objective during the assault is normally the most critical task of company fire planning. Within this context are two critical decisions-when to initiate indirect fires and when to shift supporting fires in order to prevent friendly casualties.

* Initiating Indirect Fires: Indirect fires are an important component of the combined arms effect called for in FMFM 1. This combined arms effect, however, is much more responsive when achieved with organic weapons. At the lowest level, the bursting power of the hand grenade complements the direct fire of the M16 rifle. Hand grenades drive out and destroy an enemy driven to the ground by a fire team’s direct fire weapons. German stormtroopers of World War I and Marine infantrymen of the Vietnam War were alike in their keen appreciation for the grenade as an indirect fire weapon. The M203 grenade launcher increases the fire team’s indirect fire range from 50 to 300 meters. The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW) and AT4 can also be employed to complement the squad’s M 16s and squad automatic weapons. Although these are direct fire weapons, their concussion and bursting power simulate the effects of an indirect fire weapon. All these weapons can be directly controlled by the squad or fire team leader.

The company 60mm mortars, battalion 81mm mortars, and the artillery battalion provide the rifle squad increasing firepower. but at a price. The cost is decreased responsiveness-the additional time required to call for and adjust these weapons. A squad leader should aggressively employ his organic weapons to achieve fire superiority during the essential first moments of a firefight. An excessive reliance on supporting arms will slow the assault. In both Vietnam and Grenada, units would needlessly halt the attack in order to employ nonorganic supporting arms.

This is not to say that artillery support should be forfeited in all circumstances. Rather, the desired combined arms effect should be initially built using the organic weapons of the lead units in contact. The supporting arms of companies will therefore build on the firepower of squads, and battalion’s firepower will build on the company’s. The combined arms effect is thus built from the frontlines to the rear and from lower units to higher. This method fosters the aggressiveness, maneuver, and initiative of forward units. Moreover, a little well-organized violence now is better than a lot later, especially during a hasty attack when speed is essential.

In all cases, supporting weapons should be pushed forward to maximize their responsiveness to lead units. Rommel, for instance, would position his artillery with his assault troops. Even at the company level this practice is not always followed. The 60mm mortar is a case in point. Company mortar sections can use the improved range of this mortar to fight from more secure (and rearward) firing positions. From these positions, however, they are subject to the uncertainties of radio communications, lose situational awareness, and are incapable of directly engaging targets (direct lay). The company commander’s “hip-pocket artillery” should be just that, well forward in his hip pocket.

The obscuration and suppression effect of supporting arms is often required to cover an assault. If at all possible, however, surprise should be preserved. The closer an assaulting force gets to the objective before opening up the better. Not only is the enemy put off psychologically, but he has had less time to bring his heavy weapons systems to bear.

* Shifting Supporting Fires: In many cases, surprise is not possible and supporting fires must be used to cover the assaulting force. At approximately 300 yards, the assaulting force must begin shifting the supporting fires that cover its assault or risk friendly casualties. Therefore, just as an assault leader is subject to the bulk of the enemy’s firepower, his own fires diminish. There are several methods to counter this effect:

– Establish a gun-to-target line that is perpendicular to the direction of attack. This placement minimizes overhead fire and the masking of fires by lead units.

– Maximize the employment of organic direct and indirect fires in the final stages of the assault. The relatively small bursting radii of the 60 and 81mm mortars allow them to be fired much closer to the assaulting units than artillery. The Mk19 automatic grenade launcher, SMAW, and AT4 can apply bursting munitions with still more precision.

– Use effective signals to shift base of fires. “Leaning into” your supporting fires is possible by either allowing a certain amount of fratricide or by devising an effective signal for shifting fires at the last moment. One method is to mark an assault’s advance by using infrared chemical lights that can be observed through a night observation device at the base of fire. These infrared lights can be strapped to the helmets of a flank or lead unit. Larger chemical lights can be thrown on the deck.

Minimum Essential Control: The Role of Platoon and Company Commanders

The infantry assault is a series of nested battles that begins with the squad sector and works up to the platoon, company, and battalion battle. The platoon commander assigns sectors, protects squad flanks, shifts the main effort of his attack when required, and acts in general as an onthe-spot problem solver for his squad leaders.

The company commander is also up front controlling the suppressive fire of his machineguns and mortars. His job is to shape the battle for his nine squads. He sets the framework for the attack and the employment of company-level combined arms. Supporting fires are used to protect flanks and isolate the battlefield for platoon commanders and squad leaders.

Once the company is in the final assault, the company commander cannot retain positive control, nor should he. Once supporting arms are shifted, it is a squad leader’s battle. How then does the company commander prevent a company attack from dissolving into a series of independent squad actions? A company commander must retain the minimum essential control that ensures a coordinated attack without limiting the aggressive actions of his squad leaders. There are several ways to do this.

* Above all is a commander’s intent that includes a clear end-state for the attack. This commander’s intent started the day the company commander assumed command and was consciously reinforced during training. By the time of the assault, unit leaders should know how their commander operates in general and his specific expectations for the attack. When the company commander unleashes his assaulting squads, this intent will guide the attack.

* An effective leaders’ reconnaissance and rehearsals are also important to synchronize the assault Contingency plans and coordination problems can then be worked out.

* A base unit, the main effort, can be used to guide the attack rather than detailed timetables. Units can move, begin firing, and shift fires in relation to the base unit. By controlling just one squad, the base squad in the platoon with the main effort, the company commander can control his company.

* A follow-and-support unit can be used to reinforce the main effort. This unit can be task organized to provide engineering support enemy prisoner of war teams, first aid and litter teams, and demolition teams. This unit can also destroy bypassed units and, in general, support the rapid advance of the main effort.

* A company commander can also train his subordinates to think two levels up. In the attack, squad leaders are considering the company when looking for attack positions, directions of attack, and likely enemy weak points. When stalled in their attack, they can fix the enemy and scout for a company attack. By thinking two levels up, squad leaders provide the reconnaissance pull for the company, not just their squads.

Implications

* The tactical responsibilities of NCOs as decisionmakers must be recognized by increased status, training, and education. Meritorious and regular promotions to NCO should be based on these moral and tactical responsibilities. Squad leader’s school should be expanded to include fire team leaders who are now expected to be tactical decisionmakers in their own right and must fill the gap if the squad leader is hurt or killed. Company training should focus on squads. In short, NCOs must become the “backbone” of our Corps in fact as well as name.

* Company training should focus on squads. The pull of higher level commitments must be resisted. Once the company commander has unleashed his dogs of war into the assault, he has lost positive control. His responsibility is to train the squads realistically, provide a clear commander’s intent from the day he arrives, and frame the battle. A company commanders attempt to control the final assault personally is doomed to failure. In the words of S.L.A. Marshall:

. . . no commander is capable of the actual leading of an entire company in combat. . . . therefore [he must] determine which are the moral leaders among his men when under fire, and having found them, give all support and encouragement to their effort.

* The art and science of employing weapons as combined arms must be emphasized at every level, but especially within the squad. Regular and realistic live firing drills are the key. Hand grenades must be integrated into live fire assault courses. If not, we risk fielding Marines hesitant in the employment of a key infantry weapon. The exceptional weapons handling of our individual Marines in Somalia is, in large part, a tribute to the training and ammunition invested at the Schools of Infantry. Are our squad and fire team leaders equally adept in the combined arms employment of their organic weapons? At a minimum. Fleet Marine Force ammunition allowances and live-fire ranges must be maintained during budget cuts to ensure this proficiency.

* Finally, Marine Corps doctrine and training should recognize the complexity of closing the last 300 yards of an infantry assault. Doctrinal guidance within the maneuver warfare context must be provided and training standards should be developed.

Conclusions

Although it is not the preferred form of maneuver, the frontal attack is one of the most likely and demanding. Squad leaders and company commanders alike must prepare for the technical, tactical, and moral problems associated with closing the last 300 yards of the assault. Although maeuver warfare seeks to bypass units and obstacles that cannot affect the mission, organized resistance must be anticipated. This is especially true in an age when even Third World armies are fielding excellent infantry. When infiltration, envelopment, or bypass are impossible, maneuver warfare tenets still apply to the execution of a frontal attack. Leadership from the front, reconnaissance pull, combined arms, and the enhanced role of junior leaders will ensure squad leaders of the future are ready for the chaos and confusion of their first attack under fire.

Maneuver Warfare Theory

by Capt Michael R. Ramos

I read with interest LtCol Lauer’s article. “The Theory of Maneuver in USMC Doctrine and Force Structure” (MCG, Apr93), which challenges the Corps’ reliance on maneuver warfare theory as the basis for its doctrine.

While I agree wholeheartedly with him that the focus of the curriculum at The Basic School must be to teach lieutenants a solid grounding in tactics, techniques, and procedures, I believe the main point of his article is a faulty one. Maneuver warfare theory does not ignore the lessons of Marine combat experience. The theory of maneuver has evolved from a learned appreciation of what an expeditionary force will face in future engagements. We can no longer presume the luxury of having the vast numerical superiority over our enemy that we had in the past. Our doctrine must cope with reaching a rapid decision, with minimal casualties and limited external support, against a physically superior foe. Our doctrine of maneuver warfare, if understood and correctly applied, provides significant opportunity for success under these conditions.

Additionally, maneuver warfare theory does not discount the value of firepower. Indeed, firepower will often be essential in shattering the enemy’s moral and physical cohesion. The key is in not applying firepower indiscriminately, but concentrating overwhelming fire superiority at decisive points to suppress, neutralize, or destroy an enemy in order to achieve a larger purpose.

The MV-22, M1A1, LAVAG, MLRS, and other battlefield operating systems can and should be components of a force structure based on maneuver warfare doctrine. Our combat experience tells us that these systems and maneuver warfare offer the greatest chance for success in future conflicts.

Leadership for a More Educated Corps

by Capt Francis E. Halliwell

With its emphasis on mission orders, maneuver warfare demands Marines who can be innovative, creative, and flexible-Marines who can exercise initiative in fast-moving, fluid situations without the benefit of orders. This need is clearly identified in FMFM 1. Warfighting, which states that “the Marine Corps’ style of warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest level.” Marines with these characteristics will enable our Corps to take advantage of the chaotic battlefield of the future, rather than be hindered by it. These traits, however, don’t come from Marines who just follow orders as if they were robots: they come from thinking Marines with inquisitive, questioning minds. Stifling those minds by requiring blind obedience would destroy the traits we hope to exploit through maneuver warfare. It becomes our duty, therefore, to encourage the questioning, thinking nature of our educated Marines. This will be especially important over the next few years since the average intelligence and education level of our Marines is going to increase, as only the best and brightest will be recruited and retained in a Corps of decreasing size.

The question for us then is this: How do we lead Marines who are encouraged to question orders and authority? The answer is quite simple: We lead them as we always have. All the leadership traits and principles we are familiar with still apply. Today, however, we need to give greater emphasis to the principle of keeping our Marines informed. Since most Marines today are better educated than their predecessors, keeping them informed of basic decisions, such as what we’re doing or where we’re going, isn’t enough. Today’s Marines are a part of the information age. They are accustomed to receiving and accessing almost any information desired, and they bring that expectation with them to the Corps. In a time when we can watch a war on television from the enemy’s point of view, what else can you expect? Under these circumstances we must be prepared to explain the rationale behind our decisions-the why to go with the who, what, when, and where. When a Marine questions why a task is necessary, why it needs to he carried out in a particular manner, or why one Marine is carrying out a specific task rather than another, we must be prepared to explain. If we tell the Marine to just follow orders, he may have lingering doubts as to its validity or appropriateness. Given time, these doubts could jeopardize his trust and confidence in his leader. On the other hand, by answering the question we clear up any doubts or misunderstandings and prevent any loss of trust. Additionally, the Marine’s question may reveal a weakness in the plan that a change in the order might remedy. As frustrating and distracting as it may be, this questioning behavior results in several other important benefits to the Corps.

First, when we take the time to encourage and answer questions, we show a Marine that we care about him and his opinions. Additionally, when we keep an open mind toward criticism, we allow a Marine to participate in the decisionmaking process. This practice is highly recommended by FMFM 1. which states that ” . . . until a commander has reached and stated a decision, each subordinate should consider it his duty to provide his honest professional opinions. . . . ” LtGen Louis Metzger, in his article “Some Thoughts on Leadership” (MCG, Jan93), concurs when he reminds us that “communication is a two-way street.” Finally, LtCol Jon W. Blades, USA. in his book Rules for Leadership also support (his two-way communication and suggests that this practice is good not only for morale, but for unit esprit and cohesion as well.

Second, in explaining the purpose or intent behind an order, a leader demonstrates the reasoning that went into his decisions; and that explanation assists a Marine in learning how he should think. If he understands how his leader’s mind works, then he will have greater trust and confidence in the leader’s decisionmaking ability. Over time, this increased trust will result in fewer questions and better understanding. Some might argue that many leaders don’t have time to be constantly answering the questions of Marines, but they’re wrong. In my experience, there is rarely a time when a leader can’t spare a few moments to explain his order or reasoning, particularly in peacetime. It is usually poor management on the part of a leader that creates the illusion of a lack of time.

Finally, a biproduct of the previous two benefits is the development of a certain rapport between the leader and those he leads. This is manifest in his ability to communicate implicitly with Marines-that is, communicate without the benefit of the physical transmission of information, but rather through a shared way of thinking. Thus, just as a less-educated Marine may instantly carry out an order, we can also expect instant obedience based on trust and an understanding of our reasoning from our educated Marines. It is this kind of response that enables Marines to adapt to changes and achieve our intent even if the assigned mission is no longer valid. It is this kind of response that is crucial for maneuver warfare, which requires implicit communication in order to achieve maximum results. This capability, in and of itself, is worth any frustration that might result from encouraging questioning from our Marines.

By way of an example, let me describe the events during which I first became aware of this questioning behavior among my Marines, and how I used it to my advantage. While on sea duty. I wrote the Marine detachment’s guard orders and most of the detachment’s standing operating procedures (SOPs). I had put a lot of effort into them and was quite proud of the result, but upon publication I was besieged with questions and comments. I listened to these questions and, in turn, explained the rationale behind my decisions. We then evaluated what would work best. Quite often, the recommendations I received improved the original orders and drove me to modify them accordingly.

This questioning behavior, however, was not limited to just orders and SOPs, instead it encompassed almost everything we did. I routinely took the time to explain my reasoning when a question arose and would not hesitate to make changes if a better alternative was proposed. This practice helped build a deep sense of mutual trust and confidence. Eventually, the detachment developed into a highly efficient organization in which implicit communication was self-evident. Later, when we went through the Nuclear Weapons Acceptance Inspection, we passed with flying colors, and I credit this to the inquisitive, questioning nature of my Marines. All this may seem like common sense to you, and you may wonder what this has to do with maneuver warfare, but the point is that if I had demanded silent obedience rather than encouraged questioning, the performance levels and degree of implicit communication we achieved would never have been possible, and that is a lesson that can be applied universally.

I admit that the idea I have presented isn’t new. To keep Marines informed is routine procedure for any good leader, as is the practice of providing subordinates with the maximum opportunity to exercise initiative and flexibility. What is new, however, is the depth and extent to which we must be prepared to explain our orders and decisions to our subordinates. If we are afraid to explain, or cannot articulate, the reasoning behind our orders, then perhaps the order should never have been issued. The key to keep in mind is that our Marines do not question orders or authority in order to be disruptive. They do so in a genuine effort to learn, to improve, and to achieve the goal, whatever it might be. It is our job, as leaders to ensure that they are equipped to do just that. If the price we must pay is to answer the questions of our inquisitive Marines, then it is a small price to pay for such a large reward.

On the Verge of a New Era: The Marine Corps and Maneuver Warfare

by Maj Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

As the dawn of a new century approaches, the Marine Corps is poised to employ a sophisticated, highly structured version of maneuver warfare as its principal tactical doctrine. The preparation of a formal doctrine heralds the beginning of a new age in Marine Corps tactical thinking: an age in which the philosophies of maneuver warfare, now accepted as the Corps’ style of fighting, gain structure through a variety of planning and combat systems. The sum of this is to lend precision and speed to combat, while supporting the tenets of maneuver warfare. To understand the significance of this change, it is necessary to journey back more than a decade to 1980 and follow the development of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps. This development occurred in two distinct periods, and a third period is currently struggling to emerge.

The First Period: Experimentation

The first period of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps was from 1980 until 1989. During this time of experimentation. Marines tried, adopted, and discarded tactics and techniques, seeking to find a measure of equilibrium between fire and maneuver on the battlefield. Competing philosophies of warfighting sparred, all explicitly rejecting the traditional primacy of fire over maneuver. This was a response to Army and Marine Corps doctrine of the 1970s, which reflected a firepower based outlook on war. rooted firmly in the American tradition of overwhelming strength and technological superiority. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War seemed to support this vision of a lethal, highintensity battlefield dominated by fire. Centralized control was more important than the possible positive effects of decentralized execution and decisionmaking. In the Army, this was the “active defense.” In the Marine Corps, suppression of maneuver in favor of fire was expressed through restrictive control measures, rigid reporting requirements, and an obsession with linear deployment.

The recurring credo of the 1970s was concentration. Mobility was a means to serve the end of concentration, which produced the superiority of firepower needed to overcome a numerically superior foe. If anything, a doctrine that emphasized fire over movement fit the Marine Corps better than the Army. The Marine division faced significant problems in attempting to maneuver on the battlefield because its table of organization did not provide adequate organic lift for sustained mobile land combat.

By 1980, criticisms of the firepower model coalesced around what seemed an inescapable fact: the doctrine did not offer a formula for decisive victory. Since attrition-a favorable exchange ratio-was the goal, it was difficult to shape battles to a larger purpose: the annihilation of the enemy.

Like a boiling pot, a spillover was inevitable. In a March 1980 article in the Marine Corps Gazette, “Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps,” William S. Lind sounded an overture to the birth of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps. In attacking the attrition model, he argued for:

. . . warfare on the model of Genghis Khan, the German blitzkrieg and almost all Israeli campaigns. The goal is destruction of the enemy’s vital cohesion-disruption-not by physical setpiece destruction. The objective is the enemy’s mind, not his body. The principal tool is moving forces into unexpected places at surprisingly high speeds. Firepower is a servant of maneuver. . . . Maneuver warfare is more psychological than physical.

Presciently, Lind’s article used as an example a future war in which Marines were employed to assist Saudi Arabian forces in thwarting an Iraqi invasion. Lind’s maneuver warfare thinking was based on the “Boyd Theory,” the work of Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret). The Boyd Theory proposed the reiterative cycle of “Observe, Orient, Decide, Act,” or the “OODA loop,” as a practical model of military decisionmaking in battle. It followed that the side that could execute its OODA loop faster eventually could paralyze enemy decisonmaking. The publication of this article provoked a virtual explosion of writing and thinking on the subject.

MajGen A. M. Gray assumed command of the 2d Marine Division in 1981. An aggressive innovator and maneuverist, he soon transformed the 2d Division into a virtual cauldron of bubbling, evolving doctrine. Gen Gray published a “Battle Book” for subordinate commanders that codified maneuver warfare principles by functional area. He identified four ideas as key: the OODA loop, mission tactics, commander’s intent, and the point of main effort. Within the division, his highest priority became the creation of an atmosphere that nurtured mission tactics, or decentralized execution, under the rubric of commander’s intent.

To spread these principles, the 2d Marine Division Maneuver Warfare Board was established, to act as a clearinghouse for ideas on maneuver warfare. Many of these ideas percolated to other Marine formations. The 1st Division established the Junior Officer’s Tactical Symposium, roughly comparable to the 2d Division’s Maneuver Warfare Board.

Throughout the 1980s, ideas about maneuver warfare were unevenly applied within the divisions of the Marine Corps, and its concepts were bruited about within the Corps’ school system. Local commanders partook as much or as little as they desired, with no “top down” resolution or guidance. Despite this, a single fundamental principle colored Marine Corps thinking everywhere on maneuver warfare. The global outlook and spectruin of potential adversaries an expeditionary force might be required to face seemed to dictate a certain broadness in the cast of its doctrine. To retain this flexibility, diffusiveness and imprecision found their way into maneuver warfare thinking. The Corps was particularly resistant to the elaborate architectural structure that accompanied AirLand Battle, the Army’s maneuver-based response to the dilemma of firepowerattrition.

The doctrinal debate became personalized and emotional, and suffered from overidentification with Lind and the 2d Division. Who wanted to be labeled an attritionist with all the bloody baggage of Passchendaele, static warfare, and heavy casualties? Conversely, to be called a “maneuverist” implied a giddy, carefree vision of flitting about the battlefield-moving for the sake of movement alone. The overexuberant and confrontational arguments advanced by proponents of maneuver warfare tended to further polarize the issue.

Maneuver warfare thinking in the Marine Corps followed the rise of its most vocal proponent. Gen Gray. When he became Commandant in 1987, few doubted that the maneuver revolution was complete. He wasted little time in spreading the gospel, this time from the top down. The publication of OH 6-1, Ground Combat Operations in January 1988, explicitly reflected maneuver warfare thinking both in the offense and the defense. Additionally, OH 6-1 affirmed for the first time the innate consistency and congruence of maneuver warfare and AirLand Battle principles.

The Second Period: Acceptance and Employment

The appearance of FMFM 1, Warfighting in 1989 as Marine Corps doctrine marked the beginning of the second phase of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps: the period of institutional acceptance and employment that has lasted until today. Gen Gray’s “little white book,” the Corps’ capstone doctrinal publication, was intended to set forth a broad philosophy of warfighting in the manner of the Army’s FM 100-5, Operations. In it, maneuver warfare was formally adopted as the Corps’ doctrine, and was given this definition:

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.

The subsequent publication of FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, and FMFM 1-3, Tactics, in 1990 and 1991 respectively, completed the doctrinal trilogy of maneuver warfare manuals, and provided the Marine Corps with broad conceptual guidance on how to fight. It was now Corps-wide doctrine, pushed from the top down.

Despite the institutional acceptance of maneuver warfare theory, it still remained more a philosophy than a doctrine. It was applied unevenly throughout the Corps, since it still remained largely an insurgent interloper, linked too closely to the personality of Gen Gray, in the minds of many commanders. Despite the support of Headquarters Marine Corps, an aggressive Commandant, and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), it became apparent that maneuver warfare thinking in and of itself did not lend adequate analytic precision to combat operations. A philosophy of war did not automatically yield a comprehensive doctrine. Something was missing: a framework for the consistent application of maneuver warfare theory.

While maneuver warfare might be fine as a philosophy, or as a vision, there was precious little in print about how to translate resolution-so ably provided in Warfighting and its sisters-into directed, coherent, consistent action. Warfighting was inarticulate about how to allocate air sorties, how to prepare and command a deep battle, how to organize a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) headquarters, and virtually all of the myriad other critical enabling tasks of maneuver warfare. It was a crippling omission for a doctrine. Talk of centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and Schwerpunkt might be fine for theorists, but such flowery prose provided little guidance on how to organize a MEF to fight a maneuver-based engagement.

In 1990 and 1991, the need for an architecture of the battlefield grew, and became the object of detailed studies at MCCDC. The answer to these analyses was found in the Army’s AirLand Battle, which had taken a different approach in the 1980s to arrive at the same maneuverist end. The Army’s complex hierarchical model organized all aspects of combat under a series of master concepts for employment. As part of this, the Army had always recognized that AirLand Battle doctrine at the battalion/task force level was maneuver warfare. Now, the Marine Corps began to realize that integrating the aviation combat element (ACE) of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) in a controlled deep interdiction capacity was, by any name, AirLand Battle doctrine. This recognition signalled the birth of a dialog and debate that sought to seek the best way to impose structure as an enabling tool of doctrine.

The Birth of the Third Period: A Mature Doctrine

The ongoing preparation of FMFM 2-1, known variously as MEF Doctrine. Fighting the MEF, and Sustained Operations, may signal the culmination of maneuver warfare thinking in the Marine Corps, the movement into a third era. Although still evolving, this developing concept features the dissemination of a mature, balanced doctrine that for the first time systematically articulates the philosophies of maneuver warfare thinking in clear, logical, enabling tactical terms and techniques. Theory is matched to techniques, and philosophies are shaped into reality in an overarching plan for MEF-level tactical employment.

The draft of FMFM 2-1 introduces the Marine Corps to a set of precise terms and techniques that can be used to describe and control combat. Built around the largest MAGTF, the MEF, it stresses expeditionary, joint, and combined operations. Despite this, its principles are applicable to any size MAGTF. In many ways, it is a close cousin to FM 100-15, Corps Operations, an Army manual that describes a Corps-level operational environment. Basically, FMFM 2-1 introduces three concepts fundamental to AirLand Battle Corps-level planners, but new to the Marine Corps, at least as formal doctrine: (1) battlefield geometry, (2) the battlefield operating systems/battlefield activities (BOS/BACT), and (3) top-down planning (TDP).

Battlefield geometry divides the battlefield into three areas: deep, close, and rear. By assigning clear responsibilities, this geographic division has the effect of making commanders-at all levels-extend their horizons to encompass areas of interest as well as areas of influence. It greatly extends the arena of combat. Hand in hand with this geometry is an emphasis on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), a sophisticated analytic approach to templating various enemy courses of action, frontages, speeds, and options. It is a tool to aid the commander in making rapid decisions, often based on incomplete information, using operations analysis techniques. IPB requires a revolutionary leap forward for Marine intelligence officers. Well-done IPB can resurrect Marine Corps tactical intelligence. The sum of these principles is to ensure that proper organization of the ground subtly shapes and speeds the flow of the commander’s thinking.

Organization in this manner also emphasizes the importance of the deep battle, fought largely by Marine aviation. The ACE, for the first time, has a consistent doctrine for its application and synchronization as a coequal partner in the MAGTF. The Marine Corps has always talked of its unique air-ground interactive team, but now there is a possible doctrine that provides a framework for fully integrating the effects of the MAGTF’s aviation element.

The introduction of the BOS/BACT concept of organizing combat functions is also a new approach for the Marine Corps. When grouping combat activities by function, instead of by tradition or emotion, planners are forced to think rationally, always seeing and considering the requirement to coordinate. FMFM 2-1 recognizes seven primary operating systems: command and control, maneuver, engineer operations, aviation, fires, intelligence, and combat service support. The hidden goal of these ideas is synchronization, naturally reinforced by the BOS/BACT and battlefield geometry. Synchronization permits combat and combat support systems to obtain seamless coordination in time and space, creating opportunities for agile forces to achieve decisive results.

To employ the BOS/BACT as an orchestrating tool on a complex battlefield requires a top-down approach to planning. Alien to many Marines, who equate it with the over-control of previous eras, TDP actually is a tool that enables the MEF commander to allocate scarce and decisive assets-usually intelligence systems and fire support-while preserving decentralized execution. TDP is not incompatible with maneuver warfare principles, and in fact tends to support maneuver by rapidly and efficiently defining the main effort.

The force of these arguments will be to resurrect the MAGTF headquarters as the “warfighter.” Through decades of neglect, it has fallen into the slipstream of the ground combat element. Now, if we accept a doctrine that calls for the simultaneous capability to fight deep as well as close, it may enjoy a renaissance. Indeed, the Marine Corps’ long neglected MAGTF doctrine seems better designed for the principles of AirLand Battle than the uneasy alliance of Army and Air Force.

With the debate over FMFM 2-1, maneuver warfare doctrine in the Marine Corps has moved beyond the partially formed visions of its founding enthusiasts and is close to becoming a workable nuts and bolts doctrine. From the complementary but separate concepts of maneuver warfare and AirLand Battle, the Marine Corps is fashioning a doctrinal synthesis. This synthesis is the maneuver warfare thinking of the 1980s, now codified and weighted with precision by the structural organization of battlefield geometry, the BOS/BACT. and TDP. Two successive classes at Command and Staff College have studied the various versions of these new idea, and they carry its teachings with them into the Fleet Marine Force.

Maneuver warfare is close to maturation, and is entering the third period of its existence within the Marine Corps. Vague and partially formed philosophies are being translated into discrete, manageable systems that permit commanders and staffs to function through the friction of war. It has taken the Marine Corps some 10 years to approach the leap from vision to complete, comprehensive doctrine. The reasons for the delay have been political and historical, driven by normal organizational resistance to change and a misplaced xenophobic reaction to borrowing Army doctrine. The slowness of adoption was also due to the Corps’ maritime outlook, which, because of a need for global utility, tended to reject doctrines that were founded upon specific threats.

Maneuver warfare, practiced within the organizing envelope of FMFM 2-1 and supporting publications, provides the doctrinal advantage the Marine Corps needs to fight effectively in its traditional expeditionary role into the next century. Marines of today are the intellectual heirs of Pete Ellis and John Archer Lejeune, men who with great courage and foresight redefined the future of the Marine Corps in the first half of this century. We now live in equally turbulent and exciting times. The same opportunities and responsibilities are being met by this generation of Marines.

Maneuver Warfare Articles

Over the past 15 years the Gazette has been at the forefront of the discussions on maneuver warfare. Few topics have engendered such a lively debate and many articles and letters hare been published that cover maneuver warfare from every aspect. Below is a listing of the more notable of these.

1979:

  • Miller, Capt Stephen W. “Winning through maneuver part I” Oct pp., 28-36
  • Miller, Capt Stephen W. “Winning through maneuver part H” Dec pp., 57-63

1980:

  • Lind, William S. “Defining maneuver warfare for the Marine Corps” Mar pp., 55-58

1981:

  • Wilson, Capt Gary I., LtCol Michael D. Wyly, William S. Lind, and MajGen Bernard E. Trainor “The Maneuver Warfare Concept” Apr pp., 49-54
  • Lind, William S. “Tactics in Maneuver Warfare” Sep pp., 36-39

1982:

  • Robinson, Capt Lee A. “Intelligence and Maneuver Warfare” (letter) Jan p. 16
  • Wilson, Capt Gary I. “Maneuver/Fluid Warfare: A Review of the Concepts” Jan pp., 54-61
  • Lavender, CWO-2 Bryan N. “Current Training and Maneuver Warfare” Feb pp., 63-67
  • Voight, LtCol Richard H. “Comments on Maneuver Warfare” Mar p. 20
  • Batcheller, LtCol Gordon “Reexamining Maneuver Warfare” Apr pp., 22-23
  • Brown, Col Bruce G. “Maneuver Warfare Roadmap Part 1” Apr pp., 42-47
  • Brown, Col Bruce G. “Maneuver Warfare Roadmap Part II” May pp., 80-85
  • Wyly, LtCol Michael D. “Defending the Maneuverists” (letter) Jun p. 12
  • Wilson, Maj Gary I. and Maj William A. Woods “Defending Maneuver Concepts” Aug p. 34
  • Burke, Maj James D. “Manever Warfare and the MAGTF” Sep pp., 67-71

1983:

  • Wyly, LtCol Michael D. “Thinking Beyond the Beachhead” Jan pp., 34-38
  • Wyly, LtCol Michael D. “War Without Firepower?” Mar pp., 17-18
  • Leader, Capt Charles D. “Maneuver Tactics and the Art of War” Mar pp., 52-57
  • Wyly. LtCol Michael D. “Those Confusing Ms” Sep p. 30

1984:

  • Lind, William S. “Preparing for Maneuver Warfare” Jun pp., 47-55
  • Brown, Maj Ronald J. “Maneuver Warfare at Tinian-1944” Jul pp., 51-63
  • Commentary “Preparing for Maneuver Warfare” Sep pp., 18-20

1985:

  • Anderson, Maj Gary W. “Maneuver, Attrition, or the Tactics of Mistake” Sep pp., 73-77

1986:

  • Hanifen, Capt Timothy C. “The Airmobile-Mechanized Task Force” Aug pp., 56-60
  • Robeson, LtCol Edward J. IV “Forrest War: Pulling the Fight Back . . .” Aug pp., 61-65

1987:

  • Gray, LtGen Alfred M. Jr. “Training the Fleet Marine Force” Jul pp., 14-15

1988:

  • Lind, William S. “Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare” Jan pp., 16-17
  • Clover, Capt Kevin R. “Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?” Feb pp., 54-59
  • Moore, Capt R. Scott “Bridging the Doctrinal Gap” Apr pp., 47-49
  • Extract from OH-1 Fundamentals of Maneuver Warfare Apr p. 50
  • Wyly. Col Michael D. “Operational Handbook 6-1 Ground Combat Operations” Jul pp., 30-31

1989:

  • Moore, Maj R. Scott “The Art of MAGTF Warfare” Apr pp., 24-29
  • Anderson, LtCol Gary W. “When Maneuver Fails” Apr pp., 57-59
  • Lind, William S., et al. “Combined Arms Warfare” Apr pp., 59-60
  • Lind, William S. “Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation” May pp., 57-64
  • Anderson, LtCol Gary W. “Enemy Oriented Operations. What Makes Them Hard?” Jun pp., 22-24
  • Saxeman, Maj John B. “The Role of Aviation in Maneuver Warfare” Aug pp., 58-63
  • Donnell, Steven B. “The ACE as a Maneuver Element” Aug pp., 64-66
  • Menton, Capt Richard A. “Airpower on the Maneuver Battlefield” Aug pp., 67-69

1990:

  • Krulak, LtGen Victor H. “Warfighting” (letter) Jan p. 10 Steen, Col Kent “Artillery in Maneuver Warfare” Jul pp., 31-32
  • Schmitt, Capt John F. “Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for a Doctrine” Aug pp., 90-99

1991:

  • O’Neill, Maj Gordon C. and Maj Daniel A. Driscoll, Jr. “Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt This Philosophy of War?” May pp., 76-83
  • Wilson, LtCol Gary I. “The Gulf War. Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art” Jun pp., 23-24
  • Walker, Maj Andrew D. “An Alternative to Maneuver Warfare” Nov pp., 48-51

1992:

  • Dixon, Maj William H. Jr. “The ACE Is Not a Maneuver Element-Yet!” Feb pp., 58-63
  • Hammes, Maj Thomas X. “Air as a Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” Feb pp., 64-73
  • Medina, Maj Joseph V. “Employing the Defense in Maneuver Warfare” Oct pp., 68-70

1993:

  • Weber, Capt William H. IV and Capt David J. Furness “The NCO and Maneuver Warfare” Apr pp., 47-49
  • Lauer. LtCol George S. “The Theory of Maneuver in USMC Doctrine and Force Structure” Apr pp., 55-56

Tactical Decision Games

by Capt Nicholas Ferencz III

It was with great interest that I read Maj Marietta’s somewhat tongue-in-cheek assessment of TDG #92-10. (MCG, Jan93). As a former artilleryman turned aviator, I look forward each month to matching wits with your talented TDG staff as a means of refining my own understanding of maneuver warfare while remaining abreast of current tactical thinking.

I was however, a little perplexed by the scenario, solution, and subsequent explanation set forth by the author of TDG #92-10. As Maj Marletto’s clever and candid examination of the engagement revealed, there appeared to be several subtle oversights in the regimental commander’s otherwise bold plan which may ultimately have cost him the victory.

While it is certainly not my intention to suggest any shortcomings on the part of the TDG author (after all, creating controversy can be extremely healthy-especially when discussing tactics), I would like to offer the observation that the majority of MCG readers are probably better served by more fundamental TDGs that tackle plausible scenarios involving elements no larger than the battalion/MEU. Nevertheless, as there still exists a need to study the far more complicated nature of wargaming at higher echelons, perhaps it could prove worthwhile to occasionally print a “strategic decision game” or even a “staff decision game.” Such games would intentionally afford those interested the additional planning time needed to wrangle with any number of collateral considerations which are more meaningfully and appropriately addressed somewhere other than the commander’s 10-minute frag order.

by Capt Eric M. Walters

Being a fan of your tactical decision game (TDG) series, I thoroughly enjoyed Maj Maretto’s entertaining yet thoughtprovoking article (MCG. an93). He brought up a point that both fledgling tacticians and TDG designers would do well to remember-you can’t expect to win by “winging it.” Good concepts need time to be put into practice.

This would seem to mean that the time limit so prevalent in the Gazette TDGs is unrealistic and should be discontinued. Not so. Time limits are essential to the value of the TDG experience, as it orces the participants to make sound military judgments conidently and quickly. What needs to be done is that TDGs hat are written dealing with iigher level decisions, such as hose at battalion level or above, have suspenses that accurately reflect the pressures to ie found at that level. Instead of posing a situation where a regimental commander must formulate a plan that is to be implemented by his unit in less than an hour, wouldn’t it be more realistic to cast the TDG player in the role of an overworked S-3 faced with a concept brief to the boss on the next morning’s operation, and only can afford to spend 10-15 minutes to sketch out his courses of action? Such a scenario sidesteps the problem Maj Marietta raises.

Terrence C. Walker’s article “Ask ‘How,’ ” (MCG. Jan93) reminds us that, despite the focus on the more cerebral aspects of doing maneuver warfare, there is no substitute for technical expertise in doing routine tasks. I hope that TDG designers also begin to experiment with posing problems that give the player an imperfectly trained or equipped force-too often TDGs assume that the troops can do anything asked of them, and they possess their full authorized table of equipment. Sometimes the unit you want to do that fancy maneuver just may not be up to snuff-do you try to swap it out for a unit that can? Or do you find another way? How about the impact of subordinate leader personalities/ skills on these kinds of decisions? Battles are clashes of men, not just abstract collections of weapons. Let’s start seeing situations that look less like they come from a text book and more like what we find in a history book.

by Capt Michael L. Ettore

I read the various solutions to the TDGs in each issue, and I am impressed with the obvious skill utilized by those Marines offering their solutions.

One point continues to disturb me, however. More often than not the fragmentary orders do not adhere to some basic tenets of maneuver warfare. I am referring to the frequent absence of a designated main effort or focus of effortwhatever one chooses to call it-the commander’s decisive alow. Next comes the general lack of a specified commander’s intent statement illustrating the desired final result in relation to enemy forces, friendly forces, and terrain. Finally, many mission statements are incomplete, failing to fulfill the still valid five Ws.

I am offering these comments not to snipe at those who at least take the time to participate, but rather to reinforce current instruction given at our various schools. Specifically, all orders at a minimum must contain a clearly defined mission statement, the commander’s intent, and an assignment of main effort status to one of the subordinate units.

None of these three items can be left to implied understanding or partial understanding from senior to subordinate. In reality, maneuver success absolutely depends on total and uniform understanding by all elements of the units participating in the upcoming action.

The Theory of Maneuver in USMC Doctrine and Force Structure

by LtCol George S. Lauer

1992 Chase Prize Essay Contest Honorable Mention

Is the theory of maneuver warfare the proper lens through which to view modern tactical combat? The answer to this question has great implications for how the Corps builds its future doctrine and the force structure to fight according to that doctrine.

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects. to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry.

-Clausewitz

The word theory, for most of us, brings to mind visions of endless debate over the interpretation of this or that quote from Clausewitz, Jomini. or the maneuverists of today-great for classroom aetivities, but of little immediate relevance. Given the current investigation into Service roles and missions, theory may soon take on a whole new and personal interest for Marines. Whether we realize it or not, theory performs a basic role in how we develop doctrine and how we build force structure to apply that doctrine.

Theory acts as a lens through which we view all aspects of warfighting. The lens focuses our view of combat experience, technology, and potential adversaries. That view then guides the development of doctrine and force structure. The theory, or lens, must be chosen carefully. It must be ground to provide a true focus on the fundamental nature of war, or it will lead to a flawed warfighting doctrine and force structure.

In today’s environment in which the cry for ever greater and deeper cuts in the Defense budget drives the debates over Service roles and functions, the need for clear insight into the fundamental nature of war becomes dramatically important. We are called upon today to justify our force structure decisions based on the perception of reduced threat in the post-Cold War world. There are calls to reevaluate not only the need for Marine Corps aviation, but also tanks and heavy artillery, infantry force structure, and indeed, the Corps itself.

Up until a very few years ago, the Corps had adopted no formal theory of war. On what did we base the analysis that provided the doctrine and force structure used to fight so successfully throughout this century? Where was the description of this lens, or theory, transcribed for us so that we spoke with one voice on matters of tactical combat?

The Marine Corps theory of war was our own institutional experience in battle. Our experience of combat ground the lens, giving the Corps a clear view of the requirements of land tactical combat. That view then shaped our doctrine and the force structure we built to carry out that doctrine.

Warfare for the Marine Corps was intensely personal: a “brutish, inglorious” experience against strong enemies ill-disposed to moral disruption or surrender. In our experience, victory over an enemy occurred as the result of his annihilation. The nature of war demanded the crossing of no man’s land. Marine Corps doctrine stressed the practical nature of war, combining fires and movement to close with an enemy. Our enemies did not collapse morally or physically until we closed with them and killed them.

Closing demanded high technical knowledge of weapons (ranges, effects) and skill at combining the movement of individuals and units in close coordination with fires. Our type of warfare demanded high personal skill and courage. The Marine Corps practice of war demanded great imagination and the innovative application of the tactics, techniques, and procedures to successfully close with and destroy an enemy at the least cost to ourselves.

In the premaneuver Marine Corps, combat experience provided the institutional lens through which warfare requirements were evaluated, justified, and codified into doctrine and force structure. Today, the Corps has formally adopted the theory of maneuver. In contrast to our past, maneuver theory proposed a radical change in the fundamental nature of ground tactical warfare. Based on a revision of World War II German Army combat methods, and the application of air-to-air combat observations to land combat, this theory postulates that modern combat does not require forces to close with an enemy in order to break him physically and morally. Physical destruction is considered to be wasteful, slow, and unimaginative. Moral disruption is the key to victory, and physical destruction has little part to play. Through quick movement and the selective application of fires, movement against critical enemy command and control nodes (or other key areas) can present the enemy with an ever-increasing series of events with which he cannot cope, thereby causing his moral collapse. It is this maneuver inside this decision cycle which is the real cause of victory-a victory that belongs to the force which is light, imaginative, and moves quickly.

Let me give just one comparison of how radically different the solutions to the needs of tactical ground combat can be when viewed through these two very different lenses.

Prior to DESERT STORM, why did the Marine Corps have a force structure. Active and Reserve, that included 5 tank battalions and over 700 tanks? The Corps had never fought a major tank battle. Certainly, we had never fought a tank battle which would, on its own, justify the need for so many tanks. In our premaneuver warfare days, employing a theory based on combat experience, we determined that to successfully prosecute modern land tactical combat, the doctrinal need existed for relatively large numbers of mobile protected firepower systems. Tanks were necessary to provide the tempo of destruction; they were capable of crossing either through or around no man’s land, then closing quickly to destroy an enemy. Despite the cost, we successfully fought to put that force structure in place. Hence, the doctrine and force structure necessary to fight the war against Iraq were ready when needed.

Under a theory of maneuver, the Corps made force structure decisions to reduce the actual tank force from over 700 to just over 200 tanks (albeit with a structure goal of 490). Tanks are heavy and firepower intensive; they need large maintenance structures and extensive logistics support; they can slow the tempo of movement. In a warfare theory in which the definition of tempo is speed of movement, the tempo of destruction, for which protected, mobile firepower is required, is of greatly lessened consequence. Therefore, tank force structure can be radically altered. There is no need to justify the high cost of relatively large numbers of unnecessary tanks. The maneuver lens radically changes what is needed to prosecute land combat.

Similar arguments can be applied for any other firepower-intensive asset, whether they be the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), fighter/ attack aircraft, or line infantry. With the adoption of the theory of maneuver, we now view war through a fundamentally different lens-a lens that is not ground on Marine combat experience. In the maneuver Marine Corps, that experience became an invalid criterion on which to judge land combat. Marine practice of war was incorrect-too slow and methodical. We accepted as our own a theory of war that implies that our insistence on the destruction of enemy forces (who did not have the good sense to surrender) was wasteful in lives and time, and that Marine combat experience in the past involved the unimaginative application of faulty combat doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures based on an attrition style of warfare.

If approved theory tells you that fighting is not essential, you need only justify and maintain enough transport in the form of helicopters, trucks, and light armored vehicles (LAVs) to move your minimum infantry to occupy the few critical enemy nodes that will cause that enemy to collapse like a house of cards. A couple of tanks, a few airplanes, and some light artillery would seem to be all that is required for the prosecution of war in the maneuver Marine Corps.

The theory of maneuver, however, is a flawed lens. It focuses the Marine Corps on dangerously unproven concepts and tells us that our previous doctrine and force structure were fundamentally unsound. The force structure in place for DESERT STORM still represented a premaneuver doctrinal compromise between heavy and light. The key to understanding the success of our premaneuver doctrine is that it represented the best compromise between the need to get the force to the beach and the need to fight once there. We are called “soldiers of the sea” because our task is to “soldier” in land combat once ashore or, when necessary, to “soldier” our way inland by fighting across the beach.

We do not have the luxury to choose where, when, or at what intensity we will fight. As in DESERT STORM, we cannot dictate that we be given the room to practice the doctrinal demands of our maneuver theory and its tenets of psychological disruption. Maneuver theory concepts provide little comfort to a force that must breach a fortified defensive line. When fighting an enemy whose dependence on centralized command and control is minimal, or an enemy with the discipline to continue to fight when cut off and surrounded, the maneuver theory offers little insight. Our lighter Marine Corps-the Corps of our maneuver theory future-departs far too radically from our exoerience of combat.

How does the Corps avoid being unprepared by doctrine and force structure to fight the battles of the future? How do we justify the need for a force that can fight under any conditions and at any intensity? How do we answer the questions about why we need our aircraft wings, our own tanks, our own heavy artillery and the MLRS, sizable infantry units, and sufficient amphibious lift?

Discard the Maneuver Warfare Theory

Marine Corps doctrine and force structure should be focused through the same lens which guided us throughout most of this century-our own combat experience. Rather than encouraging our Marine intelligentsia to try and justify the theory of maneuver, let’s bring them together and put them to work on composing a theory of combat based on our own experience. An analysis based on that combat will enable our officers to go before Congress and the Nation and fight for what we need to win and survive on the modern tactical battlefield. I submit that the experience needed to justify the MV-22 Osprey, sufficient tanks, LAV-105s, MLRS, fighter/attack aircraft, and sufficient infantry strength will come from this analysis.

Return The Basic School to the study of basics. Let’s teach our lieutenants the value of solid grounding in tactics, techniques, and procedures. Evaluate our leaders on their ability to use their imaginations to innovatively employ the technical and human materiel at their charge.

Provide rigor in the use of terms. Drop pseudo-psychological references to mental disruption and train to ensure that the enemy’s moral collapse occurs through a doctrine that stresses closing with and destroying the enemy.

As with the knights of legend searching for the Holy Grail, we need only see that the goal of our quest lies in the journey itself. Our answer, our grail, lies in our own institutional combat experience. Through the lens of that experience lie the answers to questions of doctrine and force structure. In the end, the task of the Marine Corps is to provide tactical combat forces to the warfighting commanders-in-chief. Let’s return the focus of the Marine Corps to its appropriate place-tactical ground combat. Abandon the theory of maneuver in favor of one tested by timeour own experience of combat in this century.

Examining Our Warfighting Doctrine

reviewed by Capt Cory D. Hoggatt, USMC

THE ART OF MANEUVER: Maneuver Warfare Theory and Airland Battle. By Maj Robert Leonard, USA. Presidio Press, Navato, CA, 1991, 310 pp., $24.95. (Member $22.45)

The close of the last decade and the start of this one witnessed an amazing resurgence of thought in military circles concerning strategy and the operational art. The concept of the “indirect approach” has been reborn in the creation of what the Marine Corps has coined “maneuver warfare” and the U.S. Army has renamed “AirLand Battle” (ALB). During this same time. America has been involved in major military actions in Panama and in Southwest Asia. How much of our victory in both conflicts can be attributed to this “new” style of warfighting? Have the principles of maneuver warfare been validated by fire, or have we been unable as yet to grasp them firmly enough to apply them in these recent conflicts? Does our current doctrine fully embrace the fundamental approach to warfare embodied in maneuver or are we still clinging to the last vestiges of our traditional approach to waging war? These questions form the basis of this masterly analysis of where we stand today and where we are going with respect to our style of fighting. Although the focus is on the U.S. Army’s doctrine as expressed in FM 100-5 Operations, this commentary on warfighting is of value to any student of warfare, especially with our current emphasis on the importance of joint and combined operations.

Maj Leonard has been a commissoned officer in the U.S. Army since 1978. He has served most of his career as a mechanized infantryman and has commanded a rifle company. Currently, he is a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has written a number of articles for both Infantry and Army magazines. These assignments and his previous duties drafting doctrine at the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, prepared him well to be the author of this work.

The book has two major parts. In the first, the author performs an extensive analysis of maneuver warfare theory and develops criteria that help us judge doctrine as either “attrition-oriented” or “maneuver-oriented.” He describes the evolution of maneuver theory and its fundamentals and surveys the framework of ideas that define the theory. While similar to both the Marine Corps and Army approaches to warfare, his maneuver concepts differ from accepted thought in several significant respects. His descriptions and examples provide the most coherent explanation of maneuver warfare I have read, and any Marine who took the time to review just this section alone would benefit from it.

Maj Leonard has clearly developed many of his ideas in terms of the strategies of chess. Most Marines, when asked to identify the chess piece most closely reflects the opponent’s “center of gravity,” would select the queen. As the author writes:

When I first considered the question. I hastily concluded with my friend that the center of gravity in a game of chess must be the strongest piece, the queen. Remove the queen, and the opponent has suffered a terrible reduction in his ‘warfighting capabilities.’ And indeed, as my friend pointed out, usually when he captured my queen, he won the game-but not always. Greater reflection revealed our flawed thinking. We had both come to the wrong conclusion, because we had incorrectly defined the characteristics of the opponent’s center of gravity. The enemy’s center of gravity is not his source of strength: it is his critical vulnerability. Destruction or neutralization of his center of gravity must not result merely in reduction of his capabilities, but rather in the paralysis of his forces. The answer then becomes obvious: the opponent’s center of gravity is the king. By no means the strongest piece, the king is the one piece whose neutralization wins the war.

His analysis of maneuver theory is quite comprehensive, including discussion of the psychology of war, force dichotomy, combined arms tactics, the “means of defeat” (preemption, dislocation, and disruption), command and control, and risk in warfare. His section on the “physics of war” is amazingly concise and quite comprehensible. Of particular note is his comparison of the U.S. and (former) Soviet approaches to maneuver warfare.

In the second part of the book, Maj Leonard subjects ALB to critical scrutiny and finds it wanting in many areas. His careful study of its tenets reveals an impressive depth of thought on the subject. His commentary boils down to a fundamental disagreement with ALB’s focus on maneuver for the sole purpose of winning an inevitable attrition-style battle. While not specifically analyzed in this manner, FMFM-1 is quoted often, and the author’s opinions provide some valuable insights on our own doctrine. The author goes on to describe the Army’s forays into future doctrinal developments, such as Airland Battle-Future (Heavy), with no less critical an eye.

The author completes his work by describing and analyzing the salient aspects of Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, and how we applied or failed to apply these principles. His summary is cogent, complete, and accurate. While necessarily brief, he makes a strong argument that our actions in Panama reflect the essence of maneuver: speed, surprise, timing, and a focus on a critical vulnerability. He entitles his appendix on DESERT STORM “arguing with success,” which reveals his views on our performance there (in terms of applying maneuver theory). Primarily, he cautions us against drawing invalid conclusions based on a unique set of circumstances.

This is an intelligent, thorough, and well-researched work. The author’s knowledge is demonstrated amply throughout, and his ability to express maneuver warfare concepts in simple terms is unequaled. Any Marine would benefit from his clear descriptions of the terms and ideas we continue to grapple with today. Our maneuver warfare instructors could easily incorporate his style of teaching to ease the absorption of concepts that can often be ambiguous or misleading.

This book is an important milestone in the evolution of the maneuver style of warfare. Read it!

The Decline of the Mission/The Rise of Intent

by Capt Eric S. Downes, USMCR

One of the vital keys to maneuver warfare is the concept of commander’s intent. Unless commander’s intent is clearly stated, understood, and respected, maneuver warfare cannot succeed. This article discusses the concept and outlines specific steps that should enable us to use it more effectively.

In the past few years, maneuver warfare doctrine has caused us to reconsider everything we do. We study it, talk about it, write about it, test it, succeed at it, and sometimes fail at it. Change, chance, and uncertainty surround its implementation. For some Marine officers, the doctrine becomes quite difficult for them when they try to move from the realm of philosophy to the realm of practicality. The challenge of making it work is like the challenge of eliminating the zero-defects mentality: We know both require the release of decisionmaking power to subordinates, but we also know who shoulders the responsibility of those decisions.

The central issue in this philosophical conflict is control. What you command you will want to control, and that which you cannot control you would rather not be responsible to command. Unfortunately for our comfort level, it does not always work that way. Consider, for instance, the realities of the battlefield-call it the “fog of war,” Murphy’s Law, or whatever you like-once any battle begins, control over a unit is more of a fading dream than a concrete reality. If you study most conflicts in which Marines have fought over the years, chaos and loss of control are the norm, not the exception. In fact, we have won more often by the preparations made before battle than by any efforts to exert control once the fighting has begun. Challenging training, continuous education of our leaders, and proficiency in planning have ensured our combat successes in the past. The initiative and innovation of individual Marines play a role in winning a fight, to be sure, but even these are unrelated to control.

Maneuver warfare is not the first philosophy to purport that proper preparations reduce the consequences of losing control. The Marine Corps has been the master at preparations since our first involvement in amphibious operations, long before our adoption of maneuver warfare. What makes our latest doctrine unique, however, is that it openly acknowledges that loss of control is inevitable. To do battle effectively by the theory requires decentralized control, which means giving subordinates the authority to plan and execute their own actions, since centralized control is predictably ineffective and quite possibly detrimental.

For the commander, one of the primary steps of battle preparation is planning. His goal is to communicate a plan that will endure loss of control as well as unexpected changes in METT-TSL (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and fire support available, time, space, and logistics). To begin with, the plan requires a format for issuing instructions in a clear and concise fashion, which for us is the operations order.

Every good commander is concerned with effective order-writing skills, and he should be. Once the order is issued, contact between commander and subordinate may be broken completely until the next lull in the fight. Therefore, the order must state what the commander wants in enough detail so that subordinates can follow the plan without him, but also with enough freedom of decision for them to act on their own initiative. To put it another way, the order should be written so that the subunit commander has the freedom to out-OODA-loop his opponent (i.e., complete the observe-orientdecide-act cycle faster), while ensuring that his OODA-loop still supports the master plan of the commander. For this purpose we have “commander’s intent.”

Commander’s intent is one of a short series of elements in the middle of the operations order that is the creation of the ordenvriter himself. All of the elements that precede this are factual in nature and are provided mostly by the next higher command. Of all the created elements, this is the most important, and also the most troubling for commanders to write. Consequently, many such statements fail to serve the purpose they should. I believe this is true, not because of a lack of commitment to maneuver warfare by commanders or because of their lack of understanding of the purpose of the statement, but rather because we lack a prescribed method for creating it.

Good commanders have little difficulty devising schemes of maneuver, fire support plans, tasks, etc.; tactical experience and the study of warfighting make these routine. Articulating intent, however, involves something more than just experience. Each situation requires a unique mental picture spanning much more than what one can see at any given moment. It requires a conceptual outlook of the factors of the battlefield-something that is mentally more difficult to produce than are the other details written in the order.

Some commanders have a tendency to accept a mission and never broaden their perspective beyond that point. By not doing so, they skip a golden opportunity to see the bigger picture. The remainder of the order-writing process is a series of microscoping steps, ending in the assignment of tasks and coordinating instructions. Once this process is in motion, it is frustrating and complex to develop an adequate intent, since intent should be a broader view in terms of space, time, and other factors than the mission itself. To broaden perspective, once it has been narrowed, requires the commander to actually go backward mentally. Rather than force this retrograde of thought, many find it easier to write intent statements that “fit” their schemes of maneuver, rather than the other way around.

Commander’s intent is not a restatement of the mission, and it should not focus solely on friendly action. It is also not a byproduct of the mission, nor is it necessarily parallel to it. It should not suggest how to accomplish the mission, and it should not specify the intensity of that action. Making any of these mistakes will create a meaningless redundancy that does nothing to support the concept of maneuver warfare.

True commander’s intent is a statement of what the commander intends to do to the enemy-with a concept of how his action will cause the enemy to behave in a particular way. Its purpose is to communicate to subordinates a goal that should be utmost in their minds as they execute the order. The mission, scheme of maneuver, fire support plan, and tasks are all fickle elements; one major change in the situation could render these outdated. Intent, while not impervious to change, remains a constant element in comparison. While doing battle, should a subordinate realize that the assigned mission will accomplish nothing, or may even ensure disaster, he can mentally page back to the intent in order to regain focus and momentum.

Imagine that you are a commander facing a particular foe. You have determined through your analysis that to force him to move in a certain direction will give you a decisive advantage. There are several possible courses of action that could make this happen, but you have chosen the one you feel is the best. If all you articulate to your subordinates is that one course of action, and then suddenly, in the confusion of the battle, the situation changes making that course untenable, they will be at a loss as to how to continue supporting your plan. If, however, you also tell them what your plan means in terms of the enemy, then they will be able to think their way to another viable course of action. By presenting them with both your plan for the maneuver of friendly forces and what behavior you want to elicit from the enemy, your subordinates will have a complete understanding of the plan, rather than just half of it.

The writing of intent requires a broad overview of the factors influencing the potential battle. The commander must, in a sense, step backward after receiving an order so that he can widen his view from the mission assigned. He needs a more comprehensive picture of the enemy’s possible actions, what may happen over time, what terrain might influence movement, and so on. If by old habits he immediately narrows his view instead of widening it, he will most likely skip the opportunity to look over these factors and include instructions for friendly maneuver without true regard for the enemy perspective. Instead, he must consider the high likelihood of changes in METT-TSL and write his order to survive those changes. Only by writing a statement of intent, with the enemy as the object of focus, can this survival occur.

What I propose to simplify the perplexing challenge of formulating intent is a methodology of thought to be used during the maneuver warfare order-writing process. It includes a set of mental steps for the creation of Paragraph 3, placed in the order in which the mind most naturally flows-from broadest to narrowest focus. To describe the thinking involved in each step. I will use the model of a telephoto camera lens, referring to broadening one’s view as “zooming out” and narrowing it as “zooming in.” It is important to note the type of thinking necessary in each step:

Step 1: Receive the order from your superior. This is his best assessment of what must be done to accomplish the intent of his superior, given the current METT-TSL. Pay particular attention to the intent of both your commander and the commander above him. Crystal-clear understanding of the rest of the plan without the same understanding of intent could prove disastrous: even slight changes in METT-TSL could render all but intent irrelevant. These two intent statements will therefore become the central theme for your own actions.

Step 2: You have received your mission from your commander’s order. Many commanders typically zoom in from this point and begin developing their schemes of maneuver. Remember that METT-TSL components are all subject to instantaneous change: developing your scheme by focusing only on the mission assigned is likely to produce an incomplete or even outdated plan. Resist the temptation to zoom in and instead zoom out; see more than what is visible at the present moment. Picture the possible outcome of your action from your perspective and then turn your map around and picture it from the enemy’s perspective. To write your intent, consider several key items. Conduct a thorough analysis of METT-TSL and, most important, the enemy situation. Much of this intelligence will come from the order you have received; the rest must come from your own observations and reconnaissance. In studying the enemy, consider his vulnerabilities and determine which are the most critical. Decide, among all the intelligence gathered, which factor is the most critical on the battlefieldthe one which, if you were to control it. would give you the decisive advantage over your foe. This critical factor and the enemy’s most critical vulnerability are most often the same: in any case, both must be analyzed as preliminaries to the formulation of intent. Just as you consider the intent of the commanders two levels up from you, your subordinates will be doing the same with your intent. It must be the first creation in your order.

Step 3: Write your intent using the following guidelines:

* Make the statement oriented on the enemy, not on friendly action.

* Make clear what you intend to do to the enemy.

* Consider strongly how what you intend to do will cause the enemy to behave in a particular way. Remember that you want to “out OODA-loop” your foe, so plan how to influence his behavior to your advantage.

* Keep your intent broad; do not specify or guide particular actions to be taken or the intensity of these actions.

Step 4: Zoom in, back to your mission. Double check your intent against your mission, the intent statements of the commanders two levels up, and all other METT-TSL elements. Your statement should be clear enough that even if your subordinates have no contact with you, they will still know how to serve the overall command most effectively.

Step 5: Zoom in. Develop your scheme of maneuver and fire support plan to support your intent, given the current METT-TSL. If your superiors have remained maneuver warfare minded, you should have nearly free rein to create this plan in the way that you feel you can best support their intent.

Step 6: Zoom in. Develop task statements for the execution of the scheme of maneuver. Be mindful of providing the same freedom of action to your subordinates that was given to you. From this point, your subordinate commanders should follow the same process you did as they develop their orders.

There is nothing magic about the steps shown here. In order for the methodology to work well, it is essential that commanders up and down the chain follow it; otherwise, more junior commanders will have to develop statements of intent that only support their best guess about what higher commands really want. Maneuver warfare suffers due to weak links in the chain of operations orders-those where subordinates are told what to do, without being told the intent that should drive their initiative.

For our doctrine to become a reality, we actually need to change more than just the way we write orders. We also need to more fully define the term “mission-type order” by subsequently redefining our objective from a maneuver warfare perspective. Most officers, when asked, would describe mission-type orders as ones that state what will be done, without specifying how. While this is a good start, commanders are again likely to focus only on mission accomplishment unless they have a fuller understanding of mission-type orders. Commander’s intent is crucial.

If we continue to teach our Marines that mission accomplishment is the most important objective of leadership, and in the chaos of the fight that mission loses its viability, then only those smart enough to disobey the order and lucky enough to find an alternate way to win on their own will prevail. When we have a clear statement of the commander’s intent, it seems archaic to continue to call mission accomplishment our objective. The most important objective on the battlefield in the age of maneuver warfare is the support of commander’s intent, not the accomplishment of the mission. If we can grasp that concept as a Corps, then we will finally realize the benefits that maneuver warfare and thinking Marines can provide.

Commander’s Intent Defined

by Capt Michael L. Ettore

Several years ago the U.S. Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its primary warfighting philosophy. The general concepts of this philosophy were outlined in FMFM 1 Warfighting, a publication intended to provide broad guidance on how the Marine Corps prepares for and conducts combat operations. While most of the content of FMFM 1 can legitimately be labeled as purely common sense, there are several concepts which at the time of publication were new, unfamiliar ideas.

One of these new concepts was that of commander‘s intent. While most Marines have heard of this concept, it is extremely rare to find two individuals with the same perspective as to what commander‘s intent really is. Any student of maneuver doctrine will agree that to be successful in this style of warfighting, subordinate leaders must be encouraged to use initiative during the execution of any mission. Commander‘s intent is designed to provide these leaders with the ability to deviate from a specific plan of attack if necessary, yet still accomplish the ultimate desires of their commander. This initiative is properly focused by a crystal-clear expression and understanding of the commander‘s intent.

Recently, the Marine Corps University conducted a Quarterly Curriculum Review Board which was attended by representatives of the various schools within the University system, as well as from other commands. One of the topics discussed was the concept of commander‘s intent and the need for a standard definition of the subject as well as specific guidance for its use during the conduct of Marine Corps operations worldwide. The following definition of commander‘s intent was forwarded to the President of the Marine Corps University and has subsequently been approved:

* The commander‘s intent statement will be depicted in a formal operations order in paragraph 3a (1) followed by the concept of operations in paragraph 3a (2). The higher unit commander‘s intent will be depicted in paragraph 1b.

* The commander‘s intent statement must include a statement of the end state of the battlefield as it relates to his force, the enemy force, and the terrain. Additionally, this statement may include:

– The purpose of the operations.

– The enemy’s actions and intentions.

– An identification of the enemy’s critical vulnerability or center of gravity.*

Currently, the entire Marine Corps University is adopting this definition of commander‘s intent. Once implemented, these changes will result in the substantial enhancement of the orders process and will reduce confusion as units and individuals are reassigned. Graduates of the staff noncommissioned officer academies. The Basic School. Infantry Officers Course, Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Control Systems Course. Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting, and the Marine Corps War College will have the same understanding and will utilize the same techniques.

Some important points to remember:

* Every Marine must know the commander‘s intent two levels up.

* During most infantry battalion operations order briefs, the battalion S

* Center of Gravity. The characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force derives its freedom of action, military power, or will to fight. (FMFM2-1 Draft)

Critical Vulnerability. A weakness in an opposing military force’s assets, tactics, or strategy that can result in that force’s defeat if that weakness is exploited. (FMFM 2-1 Draft) 3 actually issues the majority of the order. It is highly encouraged that the battalion commander issue his intent statement for clarity and emphasis.

* The commander‘s intent statement is intended to be written in narrative form, not by listing elements 1 through 5. It is a statement, not a format.

* During the preparation of the vast majority of operations orders, whether formal or fragmentary, the shortage of time usually will result in the commander‘s intent statement being limited to the statement of the end state of the battlefield as it relates to friendly forces, the enemy forces, and the terrain.

* A technique used to describe the end state of the battlefield is to begin the statement with, “Final result desired is.” The following are some examples:

– Final result desired is to block the enemy north of Route 1 in order to allow the unimpeded movement of Company C to BLT Objective Alpha.

– Final result desired is to destroy the enemy radar equipment at Objective Bravo in order to prevent early detection of subsequent coalition air attacks.

* The commander‘s intent statement is not a duplication of the scheme of maneuver paragraph; not where missions or tasks are assigned to subordinate units; and not the place for useless statements such as “we will attack vigorously.” “we will utilize supporting arms to stun the enemy.” or “try not to get bogged down.”

* A short, concise commander‘s intent statement is easier to send via radio or messenger and is more easily remembered by subordinates once they come under extreme stress.

The most important thing for a young lieutenant to remember if he must suddenly assume command of a rifle company in a rapidly changing combat situation is the concept of commander‘s intent.

Finally, it is incumbent upon every leader to adopt and enforce these changes with enthusiasm. The result will be the standard interpretation and usage of this key concept throughout the Marine Corps. Additionally, it will put an end to the friction and confusion that happens all too often today.