MCDP 4 Approved

Recently the Corps published Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 4 Logistics. MCDP 4 provides a conceptual framework for the understanding and practice of effective logistics. Because logistics is an essential component of any military activity, this publication is meant to guide Marines at all levels of command in both the operating forces and the supporting establishment.

MCDP 4 recognizes that war is conducted in an environment of complexity, fluidity, disorder, and uncertainty, and it seeks to provide the commander with the physical means to win in such an environment. As such, MCDP 4 recognizes logistics as an integral part of warfighting. Logistics provides the resources of combat power, brings those resources to the battle, and sustains them throughout the course of operations.

Further, MCDP 4 describes Marine logistics capabilities that are based upon our warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. These capabilities are expeditionary in nature and naval in character.

They extend our operational limits and allow us to anticipate requirements while remaining flexible, adaptable, and responsive to changing conditions in the battlespace.

MCDP 4 is the second in a series of now 10 (originally 9) higher order doctrinal publications presently under development, the last of which will be completed by summer 1997 (MCG, Jan96, p. 9). MCDP 4 does not supersede any current doctrinal publications, however, it does provide the authoritative basis for the subsequent development of logistics doctrine, education, training, equipment, procedures, and organization.

Marine units will soon receive sufficient copies of MCDP 4 via the Marine Corps Publications Distribution System for all officers and SNCOs. In addition, the publication is available now for immediate electronic distribution from the MCCDC Doctrine Division Internet Homepage at http//ismo-www1.mqg. usmc.mil/docdiv or http//138.156. 107.3/docdiv.

If Not Synchronization, What?

by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR

There are two basic, rather compelling reasons why most Marines believe synchronization is not a valid approach for implementing maneuver warfare. First, synchronization is thoroughly systematic, linear, and quantifiable in its approach. These conditions make it incompatible with Marines’ view of the frictional, chaotic, and fluid battlefield. Second, the Soviet experience has shown that synchronization simply does not work well in practice.

So where does this leave us? We have reaffirmed the importance of coordination, cooperation, preparation, and planning to successful operations, but not to the extreme and inhibitive degree advocated by the synchronization enthusiasts-war simply does not work that way. Marines at all levels, however, continue to grapple with how to implement maneuver warfare theory. Just how do we put these concepts into practice? We are learning that this is something apparently more easily said than done. What practical form should maneuver warfare operations take? The purpose of this article is to pose an initial, partial answer to those questions.

Asynchronous Operations

In general, not only do we not want to move toward synchronized operations, we actually want to move in the opposite direction. We want to move toward asynchronous operations. Let me make it perfectly clear that I do not propose a new buzzphrase, “asynchronous operations,” to replace the old buzzword “synchronization.” The last thing we need to do is to make “asynchronous operations” an official term. I simply use the adjective “asynchronous” to describe one aspect of the operations we should conduct in order to implement maneuver warfare concepts:

Maneuver warfare operations are generally asynchronous. What does this mean? The American Heritage Dictionary states that to “synchronize” means “to cause to occur at the same time . . . to operate in unison . . to cause to agree exactly in time or rate.” An asynchronous operation, then, is an operation in which the different tasks that make up the operation do not need to occur at the same time, the various units do not need to operate in unison, and the various components of the operation to not need to agree in time or rate. Notice that I have described the operations as asynchronous rather than antisynchronous. Antisynchronous (if there were such a word) would mean that the operations are intentionally discoordinated or out of phase, whereas asynchronous means that the operations do not require synchronization to work. In an asynchronous operation, the timing of one unit’s actions does not depend on the timing of another’s. One unit’s accomplishment of its mission does not depend on another unit accomplishing its mission first. In short, an operation is asynchronous when each component of the operation-each “moving part,” each subordinate unit pursuing its assigned mission-can act independently, operating without constraint imposed by the requirement for close coordination with other components.

Asynchronicity Emergent

Actually, rather than say we want to move away from synchronized operations, it might be more accurate to say that we want to move past synchronized operations to asynchronous operations. As a concept, synchronization is already passe. Experts and researchers in a growing variety of fields-from computer programming to electrical engineering to genetics to economics-are recognizing the significant advantages of asynchronicity. Computer scientist David Gelernter, for example, talks of “asynchronous ensembles” as complex computer programs consisting of multiple, simpler programs that actually run independently of one another, yet in cooperation. Likewise, the telephone answering machine and E-mail have facilitated asynchronous communications: The receiving parties do not actually have to be present to receive your message and can respond (or ignore you) at their own convenience.

Or consider an example from everyday life. The inherent advantages of asynchronicity explain the boom in the video rental business and the corresponding decline of the television movie. With a video you do not have to make it a point to be sitting in front of the television precisely at the scheduled time for 2 uninterrupted hours (along with everybody else in America who is going to watch the movie). With a video you do not have to synchronize your trips to the refrigerator to correspond with the commercial breaks in the broadcast. A video gives you complete asynchronous freedom and convenience. You watch the video exactly when you want. You pause it when you want. You replay the good parts. The videotape is asynchronous; the broadcast is synchronous.

The basic appeal of synchronization is the unity of effort that it is designed to create. But we are beginning to learn that we can achieve effective unity with asynchronous systems, and we can do so without the loss of flexibility that synchronization invariably involves. Synchronization is based on the underlying assumption that the various moving parts of a system are “dumb”-meaning that they lack the internal intelligence necessary to allow them to act independently or in cooperation with one another. Synchronization assumes that each moving part will move only as the result of a force acting on it from the outside. In such a system, synchronization is in fact necessary to achieve coordinated action. The “logic” of the system must be imparted from the outside. However, a military operation, or a military unit, is hardly a dumb system. Rather, it has innate intelligence built into each moving part that is composed of numerous humans. The “logic” of the system builds up from the bottom.

Military units and military operations exhibit the characteristics of what scientists have come to call self-organizing, adaptive systems. The world around us is filled with self-organizing, adaptive systems (also known as complex systems). Examples include economies, many computer programs, ecologies, families, evolution, food chains, all living things (plant or animal), stock markets, the Internet, jazz bands, soccer teams. Consider the soccer team-Il players, each with assigned responsibilities but acting independently in relation to the situation on the field as it pertains to him. There is a team captain, but he rarely tries to move the other players around during the course of the game. The team plays according to certain offensive and defensive strategies, but rarely uses set plays. Yes, the team uses set plays off a penalty kick or corner kick-these equate to what we would call “deliberate” operations. But most of soccer and most of war (unlike American gridiron football) consists of what we would call “hasty” operations. The players react individually to the ball, and yet somehow the result is that they manage to work together as a team. The logic of the team’s play is innate in each player and not imparted by a coach maneuvering players from the sideline. Individual players may cooperate closely-as in demonstrating pinpoint passing and timing while mounting an attack against the enemy’s goal. But it is important to recognize that the cooperation is improvised and “local.” It occurs spontaneously between the individual players involved and is not the result of instructions from the captain or coach. A key feature of any self-organizing, adaptive system is that it is asynchronous; the moving parts do not act according to the instructions of some central “synchronizer,” but each acts independently, according to its own local situation. And yet, the parts somehow work together as a cohesive system.

The Critical Consideration: Harmony

The critical issue with regard to asynchronous operations is how to create focus of effort or cohesion if all the moving parts act independently. We know that synchronization seeks to achieve cohesion through close, coordinated control-that is, regulation-of each component in the execution of the operation. But with asynchronous operations, focus takes a different form. Focus is not imparted on the system from the outside. As with the soccer team, the logic (or “intent”) of the whole system is programmed into each part of the system so that the parts will cooperate spontaneously. Harmony is thus perhaps a better word than focus. The parts will operate in harmony, and the ultimate result will be what FMFM 1, Warfighting, calls “harmonious initiative.”

It is all well and good to talk about harmonious initiative, but what does this mean in practical terms? It means that units cooperate indirectly rather than directly, implicitly rather than explicitly, by the effects they achieve rather than by the way they operate in relation to one another. For example, Alfa Company supports the main effort, while Bravo Company keeps the enemy occupied north of the river however it can rather than by launching a supporting attack against a specified objective, at a specified time, after a scheduled preparation fire. In other words, the parts of the operation fit together, but “loosely” rather than “tightly.” (More about this later.)

The Advantages of Asynchronous Operations

Now, in reality we know that truly asynchronous operations are no more possible to conduct than are truly synchronized ones. It is important to recognize that we are talking about matters of degree. No commander can operate with complete autonomy, without the need for any coordination whatsoever with others. But we can say that a given operation is more asynchronous than synchronous, or vice versa. As a general principle, we want to conduct operations that tend to be more asynchronous than synchronous. Why?

First, asynchronous operations facilitate tempo. The synchronizationists argue that synchronization does not mean timetables and a lock-step mentality. But in practical reality we know better. Let us say that three companies are going to participate in a synchronized attack in which their actions are closely coordinated. In order to do this, each must arrive at the designated place at the prescribed time, ready to execute its assigned task. We know what will happen: One of the companies will arrive first at its designated place and will be waiting on the others. To avoid this problem higher headquarters may try to closely regulate the progress of each company to ensure that all three arrive at their designated places at the same time. Or else, as often happens, higher headquarters will establish a time of attack which is sufficiently delayed to ensure that all three companies have more than enough time to get into position-and all three end up waiting. In any case, we surrender tempo. No matter how we look at it, in practice synchronization involves waiting around to get all the assets marshaled so that we can carefully integrate them. Instead, the object should be to devise an asynchronous operation that allows each moving part to operate at its own best speed and without having to wait or slow down for others. A unit does not have to wait at a phase line for adjacent units to come abreast, but instead protects its own flanks and charges ahead. A unit does not have to hold up its advance for a scheduled air strike, but continues to advance and employs on-call air when needed. Bravo Company does not have to be standing by ready to fall in directly in trace of Alfa and directly in front of Charlie in the march column, but instead all three move separately to the common destination.

Second, asynchronous operations minimize the effects of friction, that bane of all military operations. Synchronization means that components are closely integrated, whether in space or in time; this is precisely how synchronization seeks to achieve optimal effect. In other words, the components are in close contact. In a military operation as in any physical system, where there is close contact between moving parts there is friction. The closer the contact, the greater the friction. The greater the friction, the greater the coordination required to make things work. The more coordination required, the slower the operating tempo. Asynchronous operations in effect minimize the direct contact between moving parts and therefore minimize the friction and increase the tempo.

Third, asynchronous operations maximize the opportunities for initiative. This is important since we recognize that the ability to exploit fleeting opportunities is vital to success. In synchronized operations, commanders are constrained by the requirement to maintain a certain relationship (spatial, temporal, or otherwise) with other units-to keep abreast of another unit, to guide off or maintain contact with another unit, to remain within supporting distance of another unit, or to wait for another unit to accomplish a given task before acting oneself. In other words, synchronization promotes an inward focus and limits freedom of action; commanders cannot act in any manner that could throw the other parts of the system out of whack. Less freedom of action means less variety of action, and less variety of action means greater predictability. Commanders not limited by the constraints of synchronization have greater freedom. They are more concerned with the requirements of the situation than with maintaining the proper relationship with other units. Not concerned with being at the designated place at the specified time, they have time to actually look at the situation and consider what needs to be done. Greater freedom of action implies the freedom to be unpredictable-obviously a good thing when it comes to dealing with the enemy. We want our commanders to act primarily in relationship to the enemy rather than in relationship to friendly units.

A Simple Example: Targeting

The synchronizationists have argued that opponents reject any sort of planning or preparation-that those opposed to synchronization insist on always “winging it.” This is untrue. We can clear up this point and also illustrate the distinction between synchronized and asynchronous operations using targeting as a very simple example. Prearranged targets and targets of opportunity are the two basic types of targets. Prearranged targets are planned in advance. These targets are given designators known both to firing units and the maneuver units that may request fire support. The firing data for these targets is calculated in advance, and the targets may even be registered by adjusting rounds to ensure the accuracy of the data. By contrast, targets of opportunity are targets that appear during combat and against which fires have not been prearranged. Opportunity targets clearly are not synchronized, but are done “on the fly.” To refuse to do any target planning and to rely only on targets of opportunity would definitely be to “wing it.” But opponents of synchronization are not opposed to target planning (or any other kind of reasonable planning), and target planning does not necessarily equate to synchronization. Prearranged targets may or may not be synchronized, as we will discuss.

There are also two basic types of prearranged targets-scheduled targets and oncall targets. This is where the distinction between synchronized and asynchronous comes in. Scheduled targets are those prearranged targets fired according to a predetermined timetable or schedule. The idea behind scheduled fires is to ensure that the fires occur at precisely the proper time to support another scheduled event, such as a deliberate attack scheduled to kick off at a specific time. In other words, the intent is to synchronize the two events through scheduling to achieve the optimal cooperative effect. But scheduled fires by their nature lack flexibility. In theory, if the attack is delayed, we can also delay the fires; or if the situation develops differently than we expected, we can change the fires but in practice, as we all know, these things are more easily said than done. On the other hand, on-call targets are planned in advance but are fired only when requested. The firing data is calculated in advance to ensure that the fires can be provided quickly when needed, and if the target is a priority target the firing unit may even lay its guns on that target, awaiting only the command to fire. But the firing of the mission is triggered by a request and not a predetermined schedule or causal event. Despite the fact that they are prearranged, on-call targets are by definition asynchronous. They are designed to be fired at any time for any reason, independent of any schedules or other events. Their execution is not linked to, and therefore not constrained by, any other action or event. They are not fired according to a synchronization matrix. On-call fires are thus inherently more flexible than scheduled fires. But this is not to say that they are necessarily any less coordinated. A unit can use on-call fires quite effectively to support an attack-hasty or deliberate. But the point is that the fires are not linked directly to the attack, so as the situation changes we can change the fires without disrupting the attack or can alter the attack without disrupting the fires. The fires and the attack are asynchronous.

This is not to say that all scheduled fires are bad. There will be some situations, namely the occasional deliberate operation (like the occasional corner kick in soccer), in which some scheduled fires can be useful. This is simply to make the point that in typical, fluid operations, we would do better to rely more on flexible, on-call targets than on scheduled targets. This is also to recognize that we cannot possibly anticipate all our fire support needs and must have the additional flexibility to engage targets of opportunity-sometimes we will have no choice but to wing it.

“Tight” and “Loose” Coupling

Another way to compare synchronized and asynchronous operations is by a discussion of “tight” and “loose” coupling. Coupling refers to how the components or moving parts of a system come together. Synchronized systems tend to have “tight” coupling, meaning that the various moving parts mesh together precisely. When they are working properly, tightly coupled systems are efficient and precise; there is little wasted energy. But tightly coupled systems also have little or no tolerance for deviation or friction. A tightly coupled system runs like a Swiss watch, an apt simile since we are talking about synchronization. The gears in a Swiss watch mesh with a jeweler’s precision. But a watch is a closed system that has no interaction with the outside environment. What happens to the Swiss watch when a piece of grit or sand gets inside the mechanism? The gears grind to a halt. The obvious problem is that war, unlike the Swiss watch, is hardly a closed system. It is an open system susceptible to countless outside forces-the enemy, the terrain, the weather, to name the most obvious-that will get in among and screw up the gears of a tightly coupled military operation.

Tightly coupled systems have difficulty compensating for problems. In fact, tightly coupled systems tend to compound those problems. Even a minor problem in one component of the system can cause a ripple effect that eventually leads to the catastrophic failure of the system – just as a driver who merely taps his brakes on a rush-hour interstate can bring all traffic to a sudden stop a couple miles back.

The more tightly coupled and complex a system is, that is, the more moving parts it has and the more tightly they mesh-the greater the potential for friction. Compare this with a system with “loose” coupling, in which the components fit together loosely. Loosely coupled systems have “slop” or “wobble” built into them. Consequently, they are generally less efficient than tightly coupled systems-efficiency defined as smooth internal functioning-but they have a greater capacity to cope with friction, and they have greater room for deviation and variation (initiative, in military terms). Loosely coupled military operations do not depend on precise timing, phasing, or close coordination. They allow commanders greater latitude to deviate from the original plan without fear of throwing the rest of the plan “out of whack.” Loosely coupled systems also tend to be selfcorrecting. When the above driver taps his brakes on a lightly traveled interstate (on which the following distance-“coupling”-between cars is much greater), it does not cause a traffic problem at all. The flow of traffic absorbs the momentary deviation in speed.

Or, let me give a military example. Consider the Blue Angels precision aerobatics team. The Blue Angles fly in a tightly coupled formation and execute closely synchronized maneuvers. The pilots must guide off the flight leader precisely; they have no freedom of action whatsoever. The flight leader is equally constrained: any improvisation or deviation on his part will upset the entire formation. The pilots’ entire focus is inward, on maintaining the proper relationship with the other planes. And, of course, it has to be this way: the smallest error can cause a disastrous midair collision. The Blue Angels do not have to worry about being shot down by enemy fighters-they constitute a closed system. But do we apply this approach to air-to-air combat? Of course not. For combat we adopt a combat spread that is more loosely coupled and therefore gives the pilots greater freedom of action and allows them to focus outward on the hostile situation rather than inward on maintaining the formation.

A Musical Analogy

As a further analogy, let us compare the music of an orchestra with that of a jazz band. The music of the orchestra is synchronized or, as the very name indicates, orchestrated. Each member plays his or her music exactly as scored on the music sheets (a sort of musical synchronization matrix) and in precise synchronization with the other members. The members answer to the precise, positive direction of the single, all-important conductor, often called maestro because of his preeminence and his ability to synchronize all the various instruments. Synchronization is absolutely essential. There is no room for improvisation, or any kind of variance at all for that matter. Each musician plays each note as composed. The orchestra must exactly rehearse each piece of music numerous times to gain the level of synchronization necessary to perform the difficult, refined, and complex symphony with any sort of competence. The orchestra plays in an acoustically designed concert hall under optimal conditions to achieve the optimal effect-the perfect sound. The audience listens in reverential silence. Without argument, when done well, the results can be spectacular-a finely meshed, delicate, and exact performance.

Now consider the jazz band, such as the Preservation Hall Jazz Band in New Orleans. Preservation Hall is a cramped storefront joint off Bourbon Street in the French Quarter. It is dark, dingy, smoke-filled, and noisy from both the crowd inside and the bustle outside. Not only does the audience not listen silently; it will sway to the beat, stamp its feet, clap and sing along, and the musicians will interact with and feed off that atmosphere. The band members will change from one performance to the next-a different piano player, a different sax player-never the same band. Although the band will play the same standards from one set to another, no two performances are remotely the same. Any given number will have a simple beat or baseline (or bassline, if you will), but the musicians will depart from it freely to improvise and experiment creatively, relying on their intuitive “feel” for one another rather than the music sheets to hold the sound together. The sound is anything but orchestrated; it is “loose” and “rough” and sometimes disjointed. Yet the results can be every bit as spectacular as with the orchestra in a raw, rather than polished, sort of way. The result comes not from the precise and refined synchronization of different musicians in the performance of a masterfully orchestrated symphony. Hardly. Rather, it comes from the soul (in military language we would call it coup d’oeil) and the improvisational skill of the members and the intuitive harmony they share with each other and with the audience.

I am not suggesting that one form of music is inherently superior to the other. That is a question of aesthetics. Each, in its own vastly different way, can achieve virtuosity. Each, in its own way, requires a high level of skill from its performers. Rather, the question that concerns us is which approach to music more resembles the reality of military operations and the battlefield? Do we want to adopt an approach that requires detailed and centralized orchestration and repeated exacting rehearsal to achieve a precise, synchronized, and optimal result performed without variation under optimal conditions? Or do we prefer a flexible approach specifically designed to work under far less than optimal conditions with continuously changing members-one that relies on improvisational skills and maintains its harmony through the shared understanding of its members?

Clearly, given the chaotic, frictional, uncertain, random, and unpredictable nature of war (as described in FMFM 1 and other places), we definitely want to be more like the jazz band than the orchestra. To carry the analogy further, the reality is that there will be very few situations (Operation DESERT STORM is an example) in which we will have the opportunity to compose, rehearse, refine, and perform an intricate military symphony. Rather, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the requirement will be for a comeas-you-are military jam session.

How Do We Devise Asynchronous Operations?

It is one thing to talk about asynchronous operations in theory; it is another to describe how to put them into practice. There are no simple techniques or procedures that make it easy. There is no process called “asynchronization.” You cannot “asynchronize” something. The ability to devise plans that are “loosely” coupled and that allow subordinates freedom of action while at the same time providing them with adequate focus is no mean ability. It is largely a matter of judgment and experience and falls under the heading of the art rather than the science of war. But several related techniques can help:

The first suggestion is to make extensive use of mission tactics or mission control. In mission tactics, the senior tells the subordinate what to accomplish but leaves the subordinate broad latitude in the manner of accomplishment. We all know the importance of commander’s intent to effective mission tactics. By explaining the intent behind his designs, the commander provides subordinates the essential logic on how to act as the situation begins to develop and change. Commander’s intent is a device designed specifically to enhance the broader quality that computer scientist Gelernter has called “topsight”-the ability to understand the big picture and to see how all the pieces fit. Topsight allows us to act with initiative yet in harmony with the other components of the operation. Mission tactics involve far more than simply assigning a mission with an “in order to” statement tacked on the end. If we subsequently issue lots of control measures, detailed coordinating instructions, and other restrictions, we have defeated the whole purpose.

The second suggestion is an organizational one that we can call the “unit principle.” If a senior is going to give a subordinate broad latitude in the accomplishment of a mission and is going to hold that subordinate responsible for the accomplishment of the mission, then he is obligated to provide the subordinate with the assets needed to accomplish that mission. By providing each “moving part” with all the assets it needs to perform its task, we create self-contained task forces (or “asynchronous ensembles” as Gelernter would say). In so doing, we minimize the need to coordinate and request support from external sources. In other words, we make each “moving part” as self-reliant as possible-because self-reliance allows independence of action.

The third suggestion is to simplify operations by minimizing the number of moving parts in each operation. The more moving parts a plan has, the more contact points it has-that is, the more points where parts contact one another. The more contact points a plan has, the greater the requirement for coordination. The greater the requirement for continuous coordination, the less the independence of action and the more time spent coordinating instead of executing.

The fourth suggestion is to minimize the number of control measures we need and use. We should seek to minimize the use of limits of advance, phase lines, coordinating points, contact points, restricted fire lines, “on-order” missions, and so on. In short, we should avoid any measure that requires a commander to stop and request permission to continue or to coordinate before continuing. This is not to suggest that we simply eliminate the use of control measures because control measures wisely used serve an important purpose. However, we should eliminate the widespread overuse of restrictive control measures. We sometimes have a tendency to draw boundaries or phase lines where they serve no purpose other than to allow the commander to delude himself into believing that he is really in control. But there is more to this than just that. Rather, the object is to devise tactics and operations in which such control measures are not necessary. Given the choice between a scheme of maneuver that would require two units to coordinate closely to avoid interfering with each other or one in which the two units move in such a way that there would be little risk of interference, we should chose the latter, all other things being equal.

The fifth suggestion is to consciously design operations that allow each “moving part” to focus first and foremost on the enemy. As I have discussed earlier, synchronized operations are by their nature inwardly focused; the emphasis is on being in the designated place, in the proper sequence, at the prescribed time in relation to other friendly units. That is precisely what it means to be synchronized. What does it mean in practice to devise enemy-oriented operations? It means that as a rule we express the mission, intent, tasks, concept of operations, and other guidance and instructions in terms of the enemy rather than in terms of other friendly units. We minimize the use of tactics that require instructions such as “guide off 1st Platoon on your right,” “follow in trace of Echo Company but in advance of Golf,” or “Keep contact with 1st Squad on your left flank and 3d Squad on your right.”

The final suggestion is that we should leave many details of coordination unspecified. This goes against our training. We are trained that a good order provides instructions for every possible requirement and covers every conceivable detail. If the concept of operations creates the requirement for two subordinate units to coordinate, then higher headquarters will slap down a control measure between them-a boundary, contact point, whatever. That control measure then often becomes an imposition for both subordinate units. Higher headquarters are like big government in this respect. Getting the Federal Government involved is rarely the best way to work out local issues, yet the Federal Government seems to think that any worthwhile program should be a Federal program. In general it is not a bad idea to leave the details of coordination to the parties involved: “Bravo, remember you’ve got Charlie operating on your right flank; make sure you coordinate.” Consider again the pinpoint passing between the soccer players mentioned earlier. How effective could it be if the coach tried to synchronize the passes from the sideline? Trained subordinates gifted with topsight will see where the “moving parts” meet and, if they are one of those “moving parts,” will recognize the need to coordinate and will effect that coordination in the most expeditious manner.

Aviation’s Maneuver Doctrine

Questions about how Marine aviation should respond to the Corps’ adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine first arose more than a decade ago. Would this change in doctrine affect the operational concepts, training, and focus of effort of Marine aircraft wings-perhaps even their organization and aircraft mix? Early discussion of the issue centered primarily on the possibility of using the aviation combat element (ACE) as an independent maneuver element and assigning it missions, such as guarding a flank or seeking out and interdicting the movement of enemy ground reserves. These ideas, however, never really impacted exercises or aviation activities in major way, and the basic questions remained unresolved. Earlier this year discussion of Jaeger Air seemed to renew interest in the topic (see MCG, May, Jun, Sep96). The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory now plans to include tests of Jaeger Air in the first advanced warfighting experiment (AWE) to be conducted early next year (see CMC’s discussion of AWEs on p. 15) Now in this issue (pp. 21-23) Maj Richard M. Rayfield revisits the discussion of the aviation–maneuver warfare relationship.

Maj Rayfield’s basic thesis is easily summarized: He recognizes that the strength and success of the Corps’ MAGTFs stem from the combined arms team concept and believes “the adoption of maneuver warfare as the Corps’ warfighting philosophy signals a need for a reevaluation of Marine aviation.” He examines how the capabilities of the ACE relate to maneuver warfare principles and finds that, potentially at least, the match is good. The ACE can provide “a newly realized dimension of flexibility, firepower, and mobility to add to the commander’s tools,” but unless we train and employ aviation properly “we will be unable to effectively maximize it inherent capabilities.”

To put Rayfield’s thesis in different terms, the ultimate goal of maneuver warfare is to bring about the collapse of the enemy, a goal that is to be accomplished not by attacking and destroying his strengths but by confronting him with a tempo of unexpected actions he cannot match and by disrupting capabilities essential to his functioning. Aviation plays a critical part in achieving this. It not only must provide critical close air support for engaged ground units but also must contribute directly to the collapse-a condition that is most likely to occur when enemy commands are stripped of their electronic surveillance means, unable to communicate reliably with their own or external units, unable to obtain direct fire support, unable to move or resupply their forces, and experiencing the psychological effects of this uncertainty and helplessness.

As Marine aviation strives to improve its contributions to a Corps employing maneuver warfare doctrine, locating and destroying or neutralizing the nodes and processes that allow the enemy to function should become a primary goal. Obviously, Marine aviation has always sought these targets, but arguably they have not been central objectives in its operational concept, nor have the means for doing so been available. This is now changing. Aviation intelligence can make the location of nodes critical to the enemy’s surveillance, targeting, fire support, communications, and logistics subsystems a more important focus in its collection/analysis efforts.

Such a shift should further facilitate the functional collapse of enemy regiments, divisions, or corps confronting the MAGTF and could conceivably lead to aviation structure changes driven by the need for increased reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, additional command and control warfare assets, and for closer integration with Joint STARS, E-2C Hawkeye, or other outside assets. Maximizing aviation‘s contributions to the implementation of maneuver warfare remains an important goal, and we would welcome your ideas on this matter.

J.E.G.

MAGTF Aviation and Maneuver Warfare

by Maj Richard M. Rayfield

Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) have one purpose-to achieve success on the battlefield. Maneuver warfare provides the basis for the Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine. FMFM 1 Warfighting codifies this philosophy and outlines the basic principles of maneuver warfare. These principles capitalize on use of the main effort; focus and speed; surprise, unpredictability, and boldness; lethality; and effectiveness. Maneuver warfare requires opportunistic maneuver in time and space to gain a positional advantage over the enemy. It concentrates on those actions that present the enemy with a hopeless situation-a dilemma.

The Marine Corps uses aviation as an integral part of our naval expeditionary air-ground team. As Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., former Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated:

Marine aviation units are an integral element of an air-ground combat system. They are not merely joined at the top when the time comes to fight. They are fully integrated from top to bottom, and they train that way full time.

As part of this combined arms team, aviation extends and expands the MAGTF‘s warfighting power. Combined arms, with aviation as one of the key players, has guided Marine Corps force structure decisions for most of this century. It has long been a hallmark of the Corps. Combined arms is a method of fighting; maneuver warfare employs fire support systems not as just supporting arms, but as combined arms. Combined arms strike the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously in such a way that whatever course he takes leads to devastation.

Marine aviation units, like the other elements of the MAGTF, conduct operations using this maneuver warfare and combined-arms doctrine-or do they? From 1989-1992 use of Marine air as an independent maneuver element was discussed in more than a dozen Gazette articles and letters. Officially, the Marine Corps has stated, in writing, that Marine aviation, task organized into the aviation combat element (ACE) of the MAGTF, can provide a separate maneuver force (in support of the MAGTF). These statements have appeared in such documents as the Commandant-approved Marine Corps Long Range Plan (1989) and MAGTF Master Plans (1991 and 1993); and Marine Corps doctrinal publications that include FMFM 5-50 Antiair Warfare (1994); FMFM 5-60 Control of Aircraft and Missiles (1993); FMFM 5-70 MAGTF Aviation Planning (1995); and Maline Corps Warfighting Publication 3-2 (Coordinating Draft) Aviation Operations (1996). The commanding general of the 1st Marine Division during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, MajGen James M. Myatt, stated, “Sometimes Marine air can be a maneuver element on its own, with a ‘mission-type’ order . . .”

Ample evidence exists, past and present, to verify the validity of the ACE as a maneuver force, but the Marine Corps seem-ingly continues to be paying only lip service to a potentially lethal punch capability. Aviation is a key player in the MAGTF‘s ability to conduct maneuver warfare. Aviation broadens the MAGTF commander’s ability to gain a decisive advantage and create a dilemma for the enemy. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to aid and reinforce his maneuver by attacking the enemy’s ability to maneuver. If the enemy moves rapidly to counter ground actions, he becomes vulnerable to aviation. If the enemy moves to counter aviation actions, he cannot react quickly enough to thwart ground actions. Whichever course the enemy takes, disaster awaits. Task Force Cunningham during the Persian Gulf War serves as a prime example of present day use of aviation as a maneuver force. Initially, this all-helicopter force was given a mission-type order to act as a screening force designed to fight a delaying action; subsequent evolutions developed it into a fixed and rotary-wing force with a mission to attrite and force Iraqi forces into fire sacks established by the Marine division, where fixed-wing aircraft would attack along the long axis and rotary-wing along the flanks of the Iraqis.

Marine aviation, task organized into the ACE, operates in support of ground maneuver forces or provides a separate maneuver force within the MAGTF. These employment options for Marine aviation give the MAGTF commander added combat power and flexibility to shatter the enemy’s will to fight. The MAGTF commander has two combat arms to employ-the ACE and the ground combat element (GCE)-to help him achieve a decision. The MAGTF commander can rapidly shift his main effort between them, focusing against critical enemy vulnerabilities that lead to the collapse of his center of gravity. Aviation can pin down the enemy while ground forces attack; it can decimate an enemy that ground forces have cornered; it can strike when the enemy is unprepared.

Virtually every training exercise continues to revolve solely around the GCE first developing a scheme of maneuver or concept of operations, with the ACE subsequently developing a plan to support the GCE. Consideration of the ACE’s employment as either the main effort or a maneuver force never surfaces. Perhaps the reason for this is three-fold: the misguided notion that maneuver warfare means you must occupy or maneuver on terrain, that aircraft or aviation cannot be designated the main effort, or the fear of the ACE becoming a “separate Service” within the MAGTF or the Marine Corps.

The idea of maneuver warfare being restricted solely to ground forces maneuvering to gain positional advantage in respect to the enemy places an unnecessary limitation on the MAGTF commander’s options. To maximize the usefulness of maneuver, maneuver in time must also be considered. More accurately, FMFM 1 defines maneuver warfare as:

The employment forces within the battlespace through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in time or space in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

Aviation clearly allows us to generate a faster operational tempo, thus gaining the upper hand on the enemy. The use of mission-type orders, vision, intent, desired end state, and ability to focus on the enemy play a major role in the conduct of maneuver warfare. These concepts can be equally applied to Marine aviation, organized as the ACE. Unity of effort and designation of a unit or force as the main effort by the commander integrates these concepts towards the common goal-success in war.

The MAGTF commander may designate any element of the MAGTF, including the ACE, as the main effort. The main effort may be associated with battlespace dominance, power projection, or force sustainment. The main effort is focused where it will affect the enemy the most and where the best opportunity for success exists. The commander stakes the success of each phase of the operation on the main effort’s performance; the main effort can be shifted, as required, to reinforce success or exploit an opportunity. The action of the main effort seeks to achieve a decision; everything else remains secondary. The main effort focuses on a critical enemy vulnerability, enemy capabilities that prove both susceptible to attack and crucial to the enemy’s success. These vulnerabilities lead to the enemy’s center of gravity, the destruction of which achieves the objective of defeating the enemy forces or shattering their will to fight.

The ACE can be designated the main effort through mission-type orders and the air apportionment process. The ACE assumes a supporting role when another unit or element of the MAGTF is designated the main effort in the same manner. If the GCE is the main effort, the air apportionment (approved by the MAGTF commander) of ACE assets will reflect a priority (normally by percentage, converted to sorties) of aircraft tasked to support the GCE. Specific units can also be assigned a mission of direct support to the GCE. Direct support is defined as “a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance.” The goal remains to exploit success, not reinforce failure. Those units not designated as the main effort assume a supporting role. It is not always necessary to weight the ACE as the main effort in the traditional manner that the GCE is weighted when it is the main effort; supporting attacks, priority of fires, or priority of force sustainment may suffice. Organization of task forces, with aviation assets providing the predominance of forces, can occur. Supporting units weight the main effort by ensuring their actions either directly assist the main effort, or provide the main effort as much freedom as possible.

The MAGTF commander normally designates the ACE as the main effort to gain air superiority. The GCE and combat service support element (CSSE) can provide critical support to weight the ACE as the main effort in this role. When the ACE establishes forward operating bases (FOBs) ashore to extend their reach and increase sortie generation rate, the GCE can provide security for the FOBs against ground attack. This allows the ACE to conduct offensive antiair warfare to gain the air superiority necessary for the MAGTF to conduct operations without prohibitive interference. The CSSE can support the ACE as the main effort by aiding in the force sustainment of the ACE, i.e., construction of aviation facilities and buildup of supplies required by the ACE. The ACE can also be designated the main effort to shape, prepare, and isolate the battlespace for follow-on decisive operations. The MAGTF commander can designate the ACE as the main effort to quickly exploit an opportunity or pursue a fleeing enemy. The GCE can support, or weight the ACE as the main effort in this instance, by establishing a blocking position to channel the enemy into an “aviation fire sack.” Like the commander’s intent, the main effort harmonizes the various actions of the force, allowing all parts to act as a whole. The MAGTF commander uses aviation at the tactical and operational level to achieve a decision that realizes strategic results. Marine aviation capitalizes on its inherent speed, surprise, and unpredictability, focusing its lethality and effectiveness on a critical enemy vulnerability to achieve a decision.

The fear of the ACE becoming an entity unto itself is unfounded. Marine aviation makes the Marine Corps unique. To understand Marine aviation, we must understand maneuver warfare, combined amis, and the MAGTF. The fundamental difference between Marine aviation and other aviation forces is that Marine aviation is part of a combined arms organization-the MAGTF. MAGTF aviation never operates independently-it remains an integral part of the MAGTF. Aviation cannot win alone, but its inherent capabilities as a combat anil of the MAGTF must be maximized-whether in a supporting role or as the main effort. As T.R. Fehrenbach stated:

You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life-but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

Historical failures of aviation operating alone abound, just as successes of aviation integrated with ground forces and combined arms are numerous. Aviation can be crucial to victory, as it was against Iraq in 1991, but as noted in the Department of Defense’s Final Report to Congress on the Persian Gulf War, “Air power alone could not have brought the war to so sharp and decisive a conclusion.” Marine aviation, as the ACE, is a complementary part of the larger whole-the MAGTF. It must remain integrated with all other forms of combat power, part of the MAGTF combined arms team, focused on one goal-to achieve success. Marine aviation functions as an inseparable element of the MAGTF; employment of each element requires cooperation of the others. Only when the MAGTF is employed as a whole can it fight and win. This basic concept outlines the very purpose of Marine aviation and subsequently provides the framework that guides its employment. As MajGen Myatt stated, “The MAGTF is more powerful than the sum of the parts, where a Marine’s most sought after privilege is to be able to fight for another Marine.”

The adoption of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy signals a need for a reevaluation of Marine aviation. The emergence of the Marine expeditionary force as the warfighting MAGTF, focused on the operational level of war, contributes to this reexamination of the ACE. The MAGTF commander retains the option of weighing the ACE’s effort in support of any one aspect of his total effort, yet seeks to employ aviation to create conditions for decisive results. The MAGTF commander may use the ACE in support of ground maneuver forces or employ the ACE (or any elements thereof) as a supported force. MAGTF aviation contributes significantly to all forms of maneuver-in support of, or as part of-a frontal assault, flanking attack, envelopment, or turning movement. If not designated the main effort, the ACE functions in a supporting role to the offense, defense, reserve, or security operations. For example, the MAGTF commander may task the ACE to conduct deep shaping operations that isolate the battlespace for future operations, using aviation to discover the enemy’s operational intentions; delay reinforcements; degrade critical enemy command, control, and logistics capabilities; screen his intentions; and manipulate the enemy’s perceptions. The MAGTF commander can also direct the ACE to support the CSSE’s force sustainment operations.

The ACE provides a newly realized dimension of flexibility, firepower, and mobility to add to the MAGTF commander’s tools for victory. The traditional concept of the ACE as solely a supporting arm of the GCE expands to that of a combat arm in support of the entire MAGTF. If we do not train to use the ACE as a maneuver force or employ it as the main effort as part of an integrated combined arms MAGTF, we will be unable to effectively maximize its inherent capabilities in combat. The ACE packs a lethal punch; let’s not just pay it lip service.

How TQL Should Have Been Introduced To the Marine Corps

by Capt Roger S. Galbraith, USMCR

The Department of the Navy and Headquarters Marine Corps Total Quality Leadership (TQL) visionaries have done the Corps a disservice. Traditional Marine Corps leadership, maneuver warfare, and TQL are not mutually exclusive as most Marines have been led to believe. Instead, those concepts can be combined to make a more effective, more efficient fighting force.

For over 220 years now, our Corps has been fighting and winning wars without TQL or maneuver warfare. The backbone of the Corps’ success in its honored past has been the ability of junior leaders to put the 14 Leadership Traits and 11 Leadership Principles to work for them. These pillars of traditional Marine Corps leadership work. Even after close review from leadership and behavior experts, one is hard pressed to find any way to improve upon their simplicity and effectiveness for outlining the character of a combat leader. The introduction of TQL can be compared and contrasted in many \vays to the introduction of maneuver warfare several years ago. The Department of the Navy (DoN) and Headquarters Marine Corps either misinterpreted or failed to interpret many possible barriers to the acceptance and implementation of TQL. One has only to observe the difference in reactions to a maneuver warfare discussion and a TQL discussion to see which topic draws the most interest.

The Introduction of Maneuver Warfare

All proposed change will be resisted. That is a rule of psychology, management, leadership, and a plain fact of life. Statements such as “We’ve never done it that way before” or “You’re new, you’ll realize things don’t \vork like that around here” become common when Marines are faced with new regulations, ideas, or philosophies. The philosophy of maneuver warfare was no different.

Even though from where we sit now, maneuver warfare makes so much sense as to be second nature, there was initial resistance to the change in warfighting philosophy upon its introduction. Suddenly, juniors fresh out of school were closer to experts than their seniors. The old timers remarked that the Corps did just fine without it for so many years, so why do we need this now? However, the resistance was overcome, and maneuver warfare was adopted as the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy. The resistance to this change was overcome with two significant factors: Maneuver warfare was taught by the Corps’ formal schools immediately upon its introduction. This lent the legitimacy of the formal school structure to the new philosophy. Second, maneuver warfare makes sense, it saves firepower and lives, and relates directly to our mission of fighting and winning wars.

The Introduction of TQL

We are now in the middle of another thought revolution. Similar to the introduction of maneuver warfare, this time, the new philosophy is TQL. We are also faced daily with conserving our peacetime resources. Spare parts, ammunition, material, money, and manpower are all scarce. The Marine Corps is begging for total quality, but Marines would be the last to admit it.

Why would there be so much resistance to a concept that makes so much sense? First of all, TQL should never be confused with the traditional Marine Corps leadership traits and principles I spoke of earlier. By calling this new philosophy “Total Quality Leadership” DoN unwittingly is implying to most Marines that they didn’t know how to lead before TQL. TQL is really a method for managing resources to produce results that meet the needs of customers.

That word “customer” is the second obstacle facing TQL. Marines just don’t like it. Even though many Marines, especially those assigned to bases, stations, administration or supply shops may actually have customers, we still hate that word. DoN made the mistake of giving the Navy and Marine Corps a total quality philosophy that was oriented towards a civilian organization. Every civilian organization that has attributed success to total quality has customized the philosophy for its own needs and culture. The Marine Corps should have done the same. We can start by rewriting the lesson plans-call them units, end users, recruits, Marines, whatever-just don’t call them customers.

Third, the leadership of the Marine Corps has not taken TQL as seriously as it has maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare instruction first started in the formal schools. The Basic School, Amphibious Warfare School, and the staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) academies, both resident and nonresident, involve a great many Marines. It would make sense to introduce all Marines to the new philosophy here and, at the same time, save the money involved with starting unit-level schools. In addition to saving money and time, teaching the new philosophy at a formal school-and explaining its relationship to leadership traits and principles-would have legitimized TQL in a way that no amount of civilian instructors could have accomplished.

Fixing the Damage

TQL can be taught effectively in the Marine Corps, and even accepted by Marines. It makes sense, and it is the right time to start examining the way we do everything. Now, more than ever, we need to get more bang for our buck. I believe TQL could receive more acceptance if it is taught with the following guidelines:

* First, teach that TQL is a management method. Students must be told this. It does not deal with inspiring Marines in the face of danger. It does give us a philosophy of examining what we do to improve something or to save time, effort, and money.

* Second, TQL and maneuver warfare can coexist. Maneuver warfare promotes a focus on an outside force-the enemy. It also encourages initiative from juniors as well as mission-type orders. TQL does the same. The only difference is instead of focusing on the enemy, TQL focuses on the customer as the outside source (who may seem like the enemy at times).

* Third, TQL can only survive if seniors let go of a zero defects mentality. Promotion boards, reenlistment boards, office hours, etc. must all reflect the same acceptance of mistakes. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, hero of the Pacific Campaign, was court-martialed as a lieutenant (junior grade) for a mistake he made. Someone recognized his abilities and figured they had an officer who would never take seamanship short cuts again.

* Fourth, full TQL implementation means accepting risks. Seniors must be willing to try something different if they think they can improve their unit’s effectiveness-even if it does not absolutely guarantee the avoidance of failure. At Tarawa, LtCol (at the time) “Red Mike” Edson was disappointed to see that so many of his contemporaries had lost the ability to take risks through years of peacetime service. Marines pride themselves on taking chances in war. Let’s take some chances in peace-when the cost of failure is merely poor statistics.

The Future

From my previous perspective aboard Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, the Marine Corps is improving its total quality education and implementation. Several years ago when I attended the TQL fundamentals course, there was no mention of how a TQL tied into other Marine Corps philosophies. Now, when you sit in on an introduction course to TQL, the instructor (a Marine instead of a civilian) specifically addresses the fact that this does not replace leadership traits and principles, it merely enhances them.

The original TQL visionaries made the mistake of giving the Marine Corps the same training the Navy and many civilian organizations received. The Marine Corps is very different from both those groups. We currently practice many TQL concepts, particularly those pertaining to personnel management and leadership. The Marine Corps must move into the second generation of total quality education and custom fit its lesson plans to the audience. The Corps must also break the subconscious stereotype that “Marines are not managers.” Unfortunately, more of our time is taken up with management than leadership-in areas such as maintenance management, training management, etc. Marines have always been the world’s best leaders and warfighters. Now, in these times of scarce resources, we must endeavor to be the world’s best managers as well.

Let’s Put Jaeger to the Test

by Maj L. Ross Roberts

The article “A Review of Jaeger Air” (MCG, Jun96) by Majs Robert L. Gardner and James S. Robertson states that Jaeger Aviation merely “reinvents the wheel” when compared to current joint and Marine aviation doctrine. The authors write:

Marine aviation as a whole has trained in these areas [close air support and battlefield air interdiction, or CAS/BAI] for many years, and we submit that these are not significant shortfalls in Marine air operations.

But they fail to realize that Marine aviation does not train to the doctrine they claim Jaeger Aviation replicates. We agree with the authors that the Navy and Marine Corps perceive the importance of the CAS/BAI missions differently. The commander, Naval Air Force Pacific (CNAP) initiative clearly articulated the need for Navy air to move closer to the CAS/BAI missions but also correctly indicated that Marine and Navy aviation have not kept pace with maneuver warfare theory in terms of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^sup 4^I) and aerial fire support. Jaeger Aviation will attempt to build upon the uniqueness of the Marine airground team and develop a naval aerial fire support initiative that will function in the highly chaotic and fluid battlefield inherent to nonlinear warfare. It is this premise that separates Jaeger Aviation from current joint and Marine doctrine.

We propose a high-initiative offensive aerial fire support that does not separate itself from the maneuver element. The impetus is placed on the man (pilot to grunt, grunt to pilot) in the loop, not on the C^sup 4^I loop itself. Although Jaeger Aviation may appear to replicate current doctrine, it proposes a new way of thinking. The plan is to discover answers the system is not providing with respect to integrating air into the mission order, decentralized context of maneuver warfare. We believe the Jaeger concept has a potential for enhancing the close cooperation required between maneuver element and supporting aviation-a concept current doctrine ignores. Jaeger advocates will hope to prove that well trained knowledgeable pilots can operate within close proximity of offensive ground forces, as well as beyond the next ridge or deeper, by using streamlined C^sup 4^I that can take advantage of rapid developments. We want to test this concept of filling a critical gap between defensive fire support and offensive fire support in a free play, maneuver warfare context, where our opponents are given maximum freedom to prove us wrong.

Our critics justifiably are concerned with fratricide. But current Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS) methods (heavily weighted in C^sup 4^I and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) programs preceding a time on target) have not prevented fratricide. Finely honed, knowledgeable pilots specializing in Jaeger Aviation may do better. Jaeger Aviation proposes that by eliminating the overburdening C^sup 4^I, the Jaeger pilot will be able to employ his weapons systems more efficiently. He can tailor his tactics to the mission and threat, making him more survivable.

The authors seem to believe that burdensome layers of C^sup 4^I are required to prevent the fratricide. “This idea (Jaeger Aviation) turns a blind eye to lessons learned through bloodshed in past conflicts.” How many pilots reading this have bypassed the C^sup 4^I and directly switched to the tactical air control party frequency in order to provide the required support? I submit that extensive layers of C^sup 4^I will be outrun by maneuverists, further complicating the intended purpose of C^sup 4^I. We need a flexible system that can function in the nonlinear battlefield while not suppressing the dynamic affects of aviation. DESERT STORM provided good examples of this. A-10 pilots are cited in William J. Smallwood’s book, Warhog, Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War, for their simple coordination procedures when relieving another section of A-10s. “They passed the fighter to fighter handoff without going through the ABCCC [airborne battlefield communications, command, and control] which was nice,” he wrote. The subsequent mission accounted for more than 12 tanks destroyed or damaged. The same A-10 section flew two additional missions working with Marine F/A-18Ds and amassed a total of 33 tanks destroyed or damaged. This is the type of decentralized “man in the loop” aerial fire support Jaeger Air proposes. We hope to prevent instances when the C^sup 4^I can be a contributor to fratricide, such as occurred during the Gulf War when an AH-64 fired on a British armored personnel carrier.

Marine aviation provides excellent examples of effectively linking the aviation element to the ground forces. But through outdated, multimission training and readiness (T&R) requirements (the current threat makes it hard to justify the air-to-air training requirements of an F/A-18D squadron) there is not enough time or money to make pilots of Jaeger caliber. Navy aviation is even further away and needs to embrace the Jaeger concept if it is serious about littoral warfare.

Current Marine training and the new Navy Strike Fighter Weapons and Tactics (SFWT) program tends to make pilots jacks of all mission areas and masters of none. Marine tactical air will probably still have to provide all six functions of Marine aviation, but in the current joint environment it is becoming increasingly clear it must be weighted (particularly the F/A-18D community) in offensive aerial fire support in close proximity to maneuver forces. We hope to avoid the learning-as-you-go type scenarios that were described continually in Smallwood’s book.

Current CAS doctrine is primarily defensive and stifles aviation’s dynamic effect on the battlefield. Warriors continually expend limited training time and dollars exercising the C^sup 4^I in support of static ground forces and not training to doctrine that enables pilots to support maneuver forces with fire. We often use the C^sup 4^I system to make up for the aviators’ lack of knowledge in supporting the ground scheme of maneuver. The nine-line brief of curent CAS tactics followed by an artillery/laser mark are purely defensive tactics and would be extremely difficult to employ in maneuver warfare. SEAD programs fired by artillery in support of CAS missions are extremely complicated, waste limited ammunition, require flawless intelligence, and virtually preclude additional calls for fire from being prosecuted. I don’t know of many ground commanders who would risk losing the initiative by tying up artillery and aviation assets on one target. The defensive CAS tactics we employ have not changed since the days of Vietnam, where remote fire bases and cut-off units had to be defended by non-Inertial Navigation System/Global Positioning System equipped aircraft in heavily forested terrain. These tactics have no place in offensive oriented maneuver warfare and have proven to fail in recent combat, even under ideal desert conditions. Again, Smallwood describes A-10 pilots coping with their lack of training with nonlinear battle:

In the traditional CAS scenario, the army moves a distance, stops and consolidates, and moves again-always with reasonably well defined positions and doctrine-dictated lines where CAS aircraft work and are subject to control . . . in this war the doctrine rarely got past the textbooks where it was printed.

“Proven” CAS tactics/doctrine were never employed in DESERT STORM, nor are they being employed in Bosnia.

Instead of training to encumbering tactics that hamstring aviators, Jaeger Aviation proposes to train pilots to not only operate in dynamic environments, but thrive and become an airborne extension of the ground combat element. The complexity of CAS/ BAI is folly appreciated by the authors of Jaeger Air. They also recognize the fact that Jaeger aviators must be mission specialists in order to excel in aerial fire support and survive on today’s maneuver battlefield. Our familiarity with “proven” CAS/BAI tactics lead to the conclusion that current tactics will not support maneuver warfare. The authors imply that technological innovations are required to move current CAS tactics forward. We disagree. We need to move the pilot into maneuver warfare and then develop the technology, not vice versa.

Current multimission requirements make it difficult for squadrons to train for CAS other than when required by the “group frags,” Combined Amis Exercises, etc. More often, pilots become the training aids for the C^sup 4^I system, running at the same static targets and simulating a threat to a defensive position. This is just the type of unimaginative, unrealistic, irrelevant tactical training we propose avoiding.

The authors state that “Marine aviation as a \vhole has trained in these areas (CAS, BAI) for many years,” but fail to point out that Marine aviation does not train for armed reconnaissance, precisely what they compare to Jaeger Aviation. The authors would be hard pressed to find six sorties in the F/A-18 community where pilots flew a mission dedicated to armed reconnaissance within the last year. F/A-18Ds had good success in DESERT STORM with restrictive (kill box) armed reconnaissance. Why has the Marine tactical air community not trained more in this area to further refine these tactics? Equally important, the authors point out Navy aviation’s lack of interest in CAS/BAI. Jaeger Aviation is an attempt to refocus carrier groups to supporting ground forces in the littorals.

Marine aviators who attend The Basic School do get exposed to the ground perspective. But this hardly substitutes for the level of training required for pilots flying Jaeger Air in a high-initiative, self-adaptive form of carrier-based aviation, and teaches the prospective Marine pilot nothing about maneuver warfare theory. Marine pilots serving in ground exchange tours as forward air controllers and air officers (many of whom are not tactical air pilots) still only train to defensive, linear CAS tactics. Jaeger Aviation proposes to expand upon what the Marine air-ground team currently employs via their exchange programs. We foresee a Jaeger squadron of Marine and Navy pilots, as well as infantrymen via a robust exchange program. Not only will the Jaeger pilot learn the special requirements of the supported maneuver element, but Jaegers attached to ground units would teach them how to employ aviation to its maximum capability.

Recommendations

Current CAS/BAI tactics do not support maneuver warfare. Fifty years of “experience” has frozen Marine and Navy aviation in attrition warfare CAS/BAI tactics. We must seize the initiative started in the late 1980s and validated in DESERT STORM with respect to maneuver warfare theory. Specific recommendations include:

* Specialize squadrons in the aerial fire support mission. The Jaeger Squadron (X) will verify/nullify this concept. If verified, then we recommend the Harrier and naval F/A-18 communities be the starting point to implement the lessons learned after tactics have been developed.

* Reinstitute a program similar to the supporting arms coordinator (airborne) ground exchange officer in a flying status, and make it an integral part of the F/A-18D community. Follow-on ground exchange programs for Navy and Marine aviators should be implemented. Use MAG-31’s example of making aviators who return from ground tours the squadron pilot training officers, one of the most sought after billets for junior officers.

* Invite the Jaeger Air board to a MAWTS course to help validate the experiment within a modified Marine air-ground task force concept.

* Train the carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and maritime propositioning ships together, as we currently train MEU(SOC)s, and deploy them together to enhance their interoperability.

* Rewrite the F/A-18D training requirements syllabus. The current weapons sensor officer (WSO) training track is a holdover from the F-4 days, when the training is heavily weighted in the air-to-air mission. The WSO should leave the Fleet Replacement Squadron with night vision goggle, air officer, and airborne forward air controller, or FAC(A), qualifications. Currently he is exposed to both the air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, but only as a watered down version of what the pilot is trained to. Follow-on fleet training should be highly specialized in aerial fire support, special weapons, and target recognition.

* Make the military occupational specialty of F/A-18D pilots unique to signify their skills in aerial fire support. Even though the F/A-18D is a more capable airframe in the air-to-air mission than the F/A-18A (AMRAAM vs AIM-7), its capability to thrive in the maneuver battlefield is infinitely enhanced by a well-trained crew of two. This would prevent the current practices within the F/A-18D community of having to abide by a training syllabus that is essentially identical to that of the F/A-18C community, but which includes the missions of FAC(A)/ TAC(A), or airborne tactical air controller. Additionally, crew coordination would be enhanced immensely while preventing the revolving door policies currently employed to keep pilots cross pollinated among the F/A-18A/C and D communities.

Jaeger Aviation should not be seen as a threat to Marine air. Instead the CNAP initiative should have been welcomed and nurtured as an improvement to the way naval aviation can better support maneuver forces. It is obvious that the initial phases of operational maneuver from the sea will be supported primarily by Navy pilots.

Either MAWTS gets on board and helps move naval aviation toward a truly naval (Navy and Marine) air force supporting ground maneuver forces, or Marines will find themselves going ashore without the kind of air support they deserve and should have. The authors missed the boat by not attending followon planning conferences for Jaeger Air. By doing so, MAWTS is abrogating its responsibilities as the “CAS/BAI” experts within naval aviation.

The Packaged Maneuver Trilogy

reviewed by Arthur J. Bredehoft

WARFIGHTING: Maneuver Warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps. Edited by LtCol H.T. Hayden. Greenhill Books, London, and Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1995, 208 pp., $29.95. (Member $26.95)

FMFM-1 Warfighting, the first of three Marine Corps field manuals on maneuver warfare, was first released in 1989. In 1994 Currency Doubleday published Warfighting: Tactics for Managing Confrontation, the U.S. Marine Corps Book of Strategy-the same publication as the first field manual that Gen A.M. Gray had authorized 5 years prior but with an editor’s forward included. In 1995 another new edition of the warfighting manual hit the street-Warfighting: Maneuver Warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps, edited by LtCol H.T. Hayden.

The LtCol Hayden edition neatly packages for the serious “hunter” the three basic field manuals: FMFM 1 Warfighting, FMFM 1-3 Campaigning, and FMFM 1-3 Tactics. This edition could replace the three manuals as the official reference for Marines. Maneuver warfare, as a philosophy of warfighting, has been a difficult concept for many to understand. Now here is a single source that explains the concept and contrasts maneuver warfare \vith the Army’s philosophy of synchronization. LtCol Hayden’s Warfighting also includes new informational footnotes that improve upon the original publications.

LtCol Hayden’s work contains other improvements as well. Among them are numerous well-researched and insightful “notes” strategically placed throughout the book (in addition to the above mentioned footnotes). These notes provide the reader with the editor’s views on maneuver warfare from a theoretical and combat experience point of view. Also included and enhancing the book’s value are a preface, introduction, epilogue, and extensive bibliography.

The preface offers several points that will be of interest to the progressive thinker. For instance: “It must be emphasized that Maneuver Warfare, to the U.S. Marine Corps, is more than just a new doctrine. It is a way of thinking.” Also:

Synchronization has long been a basic tenant of the U.S. Army doctrine. Since the publication of FMFM 1 Warfighting, the U.S. Marine Corps has debated the extent to which synchronization concepts apply in Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine.

The editor objectively clarifies the point that the Army’s approach to warfare is different than the Marine Corps’ without arguing one approach over the other. He is correct to avoid this debate, as it is better suited for journals such as Proceedings, the Marine Corps Gazette, and the Army’s Military review.

The introduction likewise contains useful material, including a history of the development of maneuver warfare. Here again, the editor takes up the maneuversynchronization contrast by offering William S. Lind’s thoughts on the matter and then a few of his own comments on Lind’s thoughts. I encourage the reader to focus on these pages because of Lind’s contribution to the development of the maneuver concept. It is in this section, however, that the edition’s one significant shortfall can be found. LtCol Hayden discusses the contributions made to maneuver warfare by Lind, Air Force Col John R. Boyd, Col Michael D. Wyly, and Capt John F. Schmitt. He fails, however, to mention here or in the bibliography the significant contributions that have been made by numerous others.

The three official field manuals make clear the following 11 maxims of maneuver warfare:

* Mission Tactics

* Focus of Effort

* Speed and Surprise

* Reconnaissance Pull

* Surfaces and Gaps

* Firepower

* Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception

* The Concept of Reserve

* Command and Control Systems

* Center of Gravity

* Combat Service Support

Col Wyly, while not refuting these maxims, is quoted in LtCol Hayden’s edition as saying: “Every new structure begins the process of erosion and decay the moment it is formed.” He added that if you want principles for maneuver warfare, there are two-speed and focus. That notion is just one more example of how maneuverists have developed and refined their concept since 1989 and one more reason for reading the newer edition.

The LtCol Hayden edition is drawing some attention from outside military circles as well. Among those looking at broader implications for the concept is George Gendron, editor-in-chief of Inc. Magazine, who wrote in February 1995 that the chapter on “The Conduct of War” has more to say about general leadership than most books on the subject. The LtCol Hayden book offers much for the business professional who is engaged in commercial combat. Watch out Harvard, the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare is a tool the commercial combat warrior will seek out.

Perhaps, the words of LtCol Hayden best summarize the spirit of his book:

There are some men who will never be comfortable with maneuver warfare. Some people like a structured life. They learn it from birth. Maneuver warfare theory and doctrine will only be fully grasped by a certain personality-aggressive, independent, intuitive, curious, intellectual, and a man who knows that you go for the kill. It is not a game.

Planning the Battalion Attack: A new paradigm for an old process

by LtCol Paul A. Hand

The philosophy of warfare that is defined in FMFM 1 implies the need for new command and staff procedures that enhance the operational tempo. This article outlines the planning and decisionmaking process now being taught at the Marine Corps University-a process more in line with the new style of warfare.

The Battle of Loos, which occurred September-October 1915, was a 3 1/2 hour frontal attack that resulted in the loss of 385 officers and 7,861 men. As the British withdrew from the battlefield, the Germans stopped firing out of compassion. Siegfried Sassoon would later write the following lines that not only captured the spirit of that debacle, but are a message for all who would lead men into battle.

‘Good-morning; good-morning!’ the General said,

When we met him last week on our way to the line.

Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of ’em dead,

And we’re cursing his staff for incompetent swine.

He’s a cherry old card, grunted Harry to Jack,

As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack . . .

But he did for them both with his plan of attack.

FMFM 1 trumpeted a new era in the art of war for the Marine Corps. It is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to disrupt the enemy’s cohesion through the use of maneuver-both physical and mental. It seeks to identify and strike the enemy’s critical vulnerability. With our new style of warfare, however, we continue to use our old paradigms for planning an attack. To fully realize the advantages of maneuver warfare we must reevaluate our planning process and develop a system more in step with FMFM 1. This article is an attempt to describe the process that we must go through to apply this new style of warfare.

Currently, the Army and the Marine Corps use the acronym METT-T to describe the estimate of the situation. As a review, the letters stand for:

* Mission

* Enemy

* Terrain and weather

* Troops and fire support available

* Time available

While you have, no doubt, studied this as far back as The Basic School, looking at it through a new FMFM 1 filter will help you understand how to apply it. A common misconception is that METTT is a sequential process. In fact, many of the steps in METT-T will occur concurrently. We will start with the last T, time available, instead of the first M.

Time Available

Before you can begin the planning process you must first determine how much time is available. To a large extent, this will determine what method of decisionmaking you will use. Starting from most time required to least time required, the various methods would be:

* Deliberate planning process (using the 15 command and staff planning steps).

* Rapid planning process (as currently practiced by our Marine expeditionary units (MEUs).

* Team recognitional decisionmaking (wherein the staff works together to quickly identify and wargame a course of action).

* Commander only decisionmaking (the commander makes the decision using his own recognitional ability).

The planning process selected will be dependent on numerous factors:

* How much time do you have.

* How much time does the enemy have to react.

* The enemy dispositions.

* How much time do your subordinates need for the operation.

Moreover, we must remember that speed is a weapon in its own right. Speed provides its own security. Therefore, when selecting a method you must carefully evaluate the need for speed. Will an immediate or near-term attack provide a distinct advantage over expending the time to plan a detailed attack? Finally, we must allocate adequate time for our subordinates to prepare for the operation.

Mission

Upon receipt of the mission you begin mission analysis. First, you must determine the specified tasks. Specified tasks are those tasks stated in the higher headquarter’s order. Examples are:

* Clear Regimental Objective B.

* Be prepared to conduct passage of lines with the regimental reserve.

* Coordinate with 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion for forward passage of lines.

Next, we ascertain implied tasks. Implied tasks are not specifically stated in the order, but must be accomplished in order to satisfy the overall mission or to satisfy any of the specified tasks. Implied tasks come from:

* Analysis of the higher headquarter’s order.

* Commander’s intent (two levels up).

* Enemy situation.

* Friendly situation.

* Requirement to maintain the security and integrity of the force.

Examples of implied tasks are:

* Clear obstacles along Highway 60.

* Seize high ground at 456347.

* Establish blocking position vicinity of 467389.

* Coordinate with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines on the left flank (where it has not been specified).

Next, we consider constraints (things we must do) such as “Attack no later than 0645″ as well as restraints (things we can’t do) such as “Do not destroy bridges.”

We identify mission essential tasks. Mission essential tasks are those (specified or implied) that the commander considers critical for mission accomplishment. Some examples of mission essential tasks are:

* Seize Obj B (from our specified tasks).

* Clear obstacles along Highway 60 (from our implied tasks).

Finally, the overriding concern of the commander is the accomplishment of the intent of the higher commander. Where the specified tasks become inconsistent with the commander’s intent, the bold commander must deviate from his specified tasks and modify them to bring them in line with this intent.

The mission analysis and the next step, analysis of the enemy, are conducted concurrently whenever possible. Always look for ways to economize on your time.

Enemy

The ultimate objective of tactics is the destruction of the enemy and his will to fight. Any plan that does not focus on the enemy is doomed to fail from the start. Moreover, if the enemy’s disposition changes, so does our plan.

A first step is to gather as much information as time allows by developing and implementing the reconnaissance, surveillance and counterreconnaissance (RS&C) plan. At the same time we begin the offensive intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. The RS&C plan and the development of the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) are designed to yield the following information to the commander and his staff (FM 71-2, page 3-19):

* Enemy positions and orientations

* Location of existing and reinforcing obstacles.

* Enemy intent based on his dispositions.

* Avenues of approach to exploit known enemy weakness.

* Likely courses of action for employment of enemy reserves, counterattacking forces, and combat support assets.

The early identification of enemy vulnerabilities is predicated on an aggressive reconnaissance effort. Vulnerabilities will rarely be obvious and may, in fact, be well concealed.

During the IPB process, the S-2 develops an enemy situation template. Ideally, the MCOO and the enemy situational template are developed concurrently. The S-2 plots known enemy positions on his map. The S-2 then plots suspected enemy positions on his map by “templating” those positions based on his knowledge of the enemy’s tactics, the current terrain and weather conditions, and his best guess. Once both known and suspected enemy positions are ternplated, he draws range fans for all major enemy weapons systems. These include:

* Antitank guided missiles

* Mortars

* Tanks

* Artillery

* Rocket systems

The S-2 uses his MCOO when drawing range fans so that he can get a more accurate picture of terrain masking. When possible, the range fans are drawn so as to reflect its effects. Finally, the S-2 has to begin filling in the information gaps by helping to develop information requirements.

Once the commander has evaluated the current intelligence picture, he must decide what other critical pieces of information he must have. These are transformed into essential elements of information (EEIs) on the enemy situation and disposition, and terrain. For example, if no assailable flank is readily apparent to the commander, he may decide to commit reconnaissance assets to locate a gap or soft spot. The area to which a reconnaissance or surveillance asset is committed to gather information is called a named area of interest (NAI). Within the NAI, we wish to confirm or deny:

* The existence of enemy forces.

* Absence of enemy forces.

* Enemy dispositions.

* Location of specific enemy \veapons systems (air defense assets, artillery, etc.).

* Terrain favorable to our plans.

The S-2 places the NAIs on his map and begins to develop the intelligence collection plan. He uses the intelligence collection worksheet (see Annex E, FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations) to assist him in this planning effort. It should be noted that while assets at the battalion level are limited, other assets are available at the regimental or MEB level.

As the commander and his staff continue the planning process, a list of enemy vulnerabilities should begin to emerge. These vulnerabilities might include:

* Poor or faulty dispositions.

* Exposed flanks.

* Insufficient defense in depth (inviting an envelopment or turning movement).

* Poor morale.

* Poor logistics system (easily cut off, for example).

* Lack of critical supplies or ammunition.

* Too few forces on a wide front (inviting a penetration).

* Poor training.

* Poor command and control systems or procedures.

* Poor commander.

Where no apparent vulnerability exists, the commander must aggressively and boldly intensify his reconnaissance effort to find a vulnerability. The commander may, in this situation, have to create a vulnerability through skillful application of supporting arms and maneuver. In the case of penetration, the commander, by massing combat power along a narrow front, attempts to create a vulnerability that can be exploited. Once the commander and his staff have compiled a list of vulnerabilities, the commander must select the critical vulnerability.

The commander analyzes those identified vulnerabilities and determines which of them, “if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his ability to resist us” (FMFM 1). Moreover, FMFM 1 enjoins us to “compare the degree of criticality with the degree of vulnerability and to balance both against our own capabilities.” This vulnerability then may become the critical vulnerability. The plan of attack is designed to attack the critical vulnerability. Everything else becomes secondary and designed only to support this attack.

The evaluation of the enemy situation and his vulnerabilities will continue throughout the attack. We must recognize that the enemy’s situation is not static.

Enemy defensive positions, terrain critical to our scheme of maneuver, and critical avenues of approach into the enemy’s position must be kept under observation during the planning phase in order to ensure that the enemy does not change his defensive disposition. If the enemy situation changes significantly, then the plan may have to be modified.

Terrain and Weather

In current parlance it is popular to look at the acronym OAKOC. As a review, the letters stand for:

* Obstacles

* Avenues of approach

* Key terrain

* Observation and fields of fire

* Cover and concealment

Remember that METT-T is not necessarily a sequential process but, in most instances, will be an interactive process. Terrain and weather are considered when the MCOO is evaluated. Additionally, key terrain is designated on the MCOO. The S-2, when he prepares the enemy situation template, has also considered the effects of terrain and weather on enemy weapons systems. However, it will be useful for the commander and his staff to review again those aspects of terrain that will affect the enemy’s scheme of maneuver as well as his own.

Weather must also be considered regarding its possible impact on weapons systems, aircraft, visibility, and survivability. Bad weather is not always good or bad from a tactical viewpoint. Rommel needed and waited for a rainy night to conduct his raid against Pine Tree Knob. Gen Slim pushed his men and equipment to their limits in order to capture Rangoon before it rained. What Americans traditionally refer to as bad weather can be a great ally.

Troops and Fire Support Available

Concerning the final T, the commander must carefully consider all those forces available to him. This includes organic assets, attachments, and assets available in direct support of the battalion. Additionally, the commander considers other assets that could be requested if a need arose. Then the commander considers all the supporting arms agencies that are available to him. These include (but are not limited to):

* Naval gunfire

* Mortars

* Artillery

* Fixed wing close air support (FWCAS)

* Rotary wing close air support (RWCAS)

* MLRS

* Electronic warfare support

Once the commander has analyzed those troops and fire support available to him, he and his staff conduct a relative combat power analysis. This process involves a comparison of major weapons systems, troops, and fire support assets between his forces and the enemy’s. This analysis may consist of a matrix that lists our assets against the enemy’s comparable assets. For example:

If either the enemy or our own forces are at less then 100 percent, then this factor should also be figured in to our relative combat power analysis.

In addition to the tangible assets, the commander also must consider the intangible considerations. These include:

* Morale of the enemy

* His moral certitude (fighting for homeland or cause?)

* His state of training

* The ability of his commanders

While these things are difficult to quantify, they can play a significant role in development of the plan of attack.

Once the commander and his staff have completed the initial estimate of the situation (the estimate of the situation is a continuous process), then they are ready to begin developing courses of action that will ultimately become a concept of operations. Since the critical vulnerability has been identified by the commander, he and the staff look for ways that they can attack that critical vulnerability. This, in turn, will drive the selection of a form of maneuver. For example, if the commander identified an open flank as the enemy’s critical vulnerability it is likely that the flanking attack will be the desired form of maneuver. If the commander identified the enemy’s critical vulnerability as weak, extended lines then a penetration may be the desired form of maneuver. If no particular form of maneuver is indicated by the critical vulnerability, then several forms of maneuver can be wargamed for suitability.

In any event, the commander articulates his point of view in his commander’s intent. He may have to give an initial commander’s intent that will be fleshed out later. The reason for this is that the commander and his staff cannot begin wargaming courses of action (COAs) unless they have a critical vulnerability to attack. All courses of action must attack the critical vulnerability.

Once a form of maneuver is selected, then we must identify task groupings that could execute portions of that plan. An example of a COA might be:

3/6 will conduct a flanking attack against Regimental Objective A. The main effort, a mechanized company, will attack along avenue of approach #1 into the flank of the enemy position and seize Regimental Objective A in order to open Route 1 for follow-on forces. Supporting Effort #1: One motorized company will attack along avenue of approach #2 to seize Battalion Objective 1 in order to support by fire the attack on Regimental Objective A. One mechanized company will occupy an assembly area at 456345 as the reserve.

Another example, this time using a penetration, might look like this:

2/5 will conduct a penetration, seizing Battalion Objectives 1, 2, and 3. Supporting Effort #1: Team Mech will attack along avenue of approach #1 and seize Battalion Objective 2 in order to create a gap that Team Tank can pass through. Supporting Effort #2: One mechanized company will attack along avenue of approach #2 to seize Battalion Objective 1 in order to support Team Mech’s attack on Battalion Objective 2. The main effort, Team Tank, will pass through the gap created by Team Mech, attack along avenue of approach #1 to seize Battalion Objective 3 in order to prevent enemy reinforcements from attacking in the battalion‘s zone of action.

An example for a frontal attack might read something like this:

1/3 will conduct a frontal attack to seize Battalion Objectives 1 and 2. Main Effort: one foot-mobile infantry company will attack in zone to seize the left half of Battalion Objective 1 in order to prevent enemy reinforcements from attacking along Route 4. Supporting Effort #1: a footmobile company will attack in zone to seize the right half of Battalion Objective 1 in order to control the critical road junction at 234567. Reserve: one motorized company will occupy assembly area vicinity of 234545.

It is, once again, important to note that each COA must attack the critical vulnerability that the commander identified during the estimate. In general, there are five criteria that should be met when developing COAs:

* Suitable: Does it attack the critical vulnerability and lead towards mission accomplishment?

* Feasible: Do we have the required resources?

* Acceptable: Is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses?

* Variety: COAs should give the commander several viable options, with different levels of risk, that he can choose from.

* Completeness: All units tasked with performing actions that lead towards mission accomplishment.

Once a COA is developed, it should be graphically displayed on a suitable map. Worksheets are useful for some aspects of developing COAs, but they do not replace seeing the COA graphically displayed on a map.

One technique to use when writing COAs is to include the purpose of each action within the COA itself. This ensures that the commander and his staff have a clear idea of the purpose of each element of the operation and, consequently, can more effectively evaluate the suitability of that COA. This is particularly true during the wargaming process.

Once the COAs have been developed, the commander and his staff wargame each one. Wargaming will help:

* Identify areas of risk in each COA.

* Identify gaps in supporting arms coverage.

* Help develop the fire support plan.

* Show the time-space relationship for all maneuver units.

* Determine suitability.

* Indicate modifications to the basic COA that will make it workable.

Wargaming may be a formal process conducted by the staff or it may be a mental process performed by the battalion commander. The difference will depend primarily on the time available. The three methods of wargaming are the box, the avenue of approach, and the belt. In the box technique, the staff focuses only on critical events, such as breach of an obstacle. The box technique is used when time is limited. In the avenue of approach method, the staff wargames all the critical events that occur from the line of departure to and through the objective along an avenue of approach. Similarly, in the belt method the staff wargames all those critical events that occur within a certain belt (such as a phase line). The last two methods are used when more time is available.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to present all the wargaming schemes currently used, in general we follow the format of friendly action-enemy action-friendly counteraction. The S-2 plays the enemy. The S-3 and the rest of the staff describe actions as they would occur using the above three categories. The fire support coordinator and the S-4 must be key players in this process as well. Once wargaming is complete, the battalion commander makes his decision to accept, modify, or choose a completely new course of action that developed out of the wargaming process.

Completing the Concept of Operations

Once the COA has been accepted, the S-3 rewrites it to correspond to the commander’s wishes. When writing the concept of operations, the same general format is used for the COA. That format includes:

* Overview: At H-hour 1/6 conducts a frontal attack to seize Regimental Objective A and Battalion Objective 1 with two reinforced companies forward and one reinforced company in reserve.

* Main Effort: One company will attack along Axis Blue to seize Regimental Objective A.

* Supporting Effort #1: One company will attack in zone to seize Battalion Objective 1.

* Reserve: One company follows in trace of the main effort and will be prepared to exploit success.

* Priority of fires: Priority of artillery and air to the main effort. Priority of mortars to the supporting effort.

Note that we no longer say “avenue of approach number 1” but, instead, we have either designated an axis of advance, a zone of action, or a direction of attack.

Once the concept of operations is completed, we must draft appropriate task statements for each subordinate element. These task statements and their attendant purpose will flow from the concept of operations, the previous COA statement, and the wargaming and/or wargaming matrix. The important points that must be included in a task statement are:

* The main task that the unit must perform (seize Objective A, clear Route 610, etc.).

* The purpose of the main task (in order to clear Route 610 for follow-on movement of the regimental reserve, in order to cut off any forces attempting to reinforce, etc.)

* Actions to take upon consolidation (establish blocking positions in the vicinity of 345343).

* All be-prepared missions.

While numerous techniques exist for the presentation of task statements, the most prevalent notation list tasks sequentially. An example might look like this:

Company B:

1. Attack and seize Battalion Objective A in order to create a gap in the enemy lines that can be exploited by the battalion reserve.

2. After passage of the battalion reserve, attack to the west to seize Battalion Objective B in order to widen the gap and to hold open the shoulder of the penetration.

3. Consolidate Battalion Objective B, orient to the northwest in order to protect the battalion‘s western flank.

4. Be prepared to conduct passage of lines with the regimental reserve.

5. You are Supporting Effort Number 1 and have priority of air and artillery initially.

Once again, note that a task is incomplete without a purpose statement.

At this point in the planning, the commander should begin to develop the deception plan. That plan can range anywhere from camouflaging vehicles to a full scale feint or demonstration. The important thing to point out, at this juncture, is that our brilliantly conceived plan will come to naught if the enemy learns of our intentions and counters them. One technique is to use one of the discarded COAs and make that a deception plan. The four methods of planning a deception are:

Normal: The deception is planned by the commander and his staff as they would any activity.

Ad hoc. A special staff is established to plan and/or implement the deception. Personnel for this staff may be drawn from within the unit, from outside, or a combination of both.

Close hold: The commander uses selected subordinates only (could be the S-3, S-2 or S-3A). This provides for better operational security, but some of the other subordinates may inadvertently undermine the operation.

Commander only. The commander plans the entire operation. This has good operational security, but the only person who even knows the deception plan is the commander. Subordinates may inadvertently compromise the plan. Regardless of the method used, this is a vital part of planning our attack.

Next, the fire support plan is the commander’s plan for incorporating all his organic and inorganic fires in support of his scheme of maneuver. It is the utilization of combined arms. Said in another way, it is our plan for combining our fire support and maneuver assets so that the synergistic effects of all our assets are greater than the sum of their individual parts. While it is, once again, beyond the scope of this article to go into detailed fire support planning, the philosophical underpinnings of developing a fire support plan are contained in FMFM 1:

We use assault support to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements. Targets which cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must reinforce quickly with his reserve. But in order to avoid our deep air support, he must stay off the roads, which means he can only move slowly, he cannot reinforce in time to prevent our breakthrough. We have put him in a dilemma.

On selection of a COA and the subsequent development of the concept of operations, the commander and his staff must decide how to allocate their assets. In is not enough to say that you are going to “weight your main effort” or that you are going to “conduct economy of force operations” elsewhere. You must decide how best to weight the main effort with overwhelming combat power so that the mission is accomplished. Supporting efforts must be given adequate assets in order to accomplish their mission. These requirements should be developed throughout the planning process. Specifically:

* During COA development, major attachments such as tank platoons and assault amphibious vehicle platoons will probably surface.

* During wargaming, enemy capabilities can be countered by judicious allocation of combat power.

* Requests from subordinate commanders who will execute the tasks.

After completion of tasks, we will draft coordinating instructions. Any instructions that are pertinent to more than one unit can be included in coordinating instructions. However, coordinating instructions should not be a catch-all for everything you can think of. Rather, those things not covered in the unit’s standing operating procedures and that are important “tactical” instructions should be included.

Logistics planning is not the final step, but a continuous process that begins on receipt of mission. JCS Pub 1-01 defines logistics as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.” The S-4 must begin planning the things he knows about, such as MREs and water, and he begins making estimates of bow much ammunition and other commodities he is going to need. While the S-3 draws the sweeping arrows on his map, the S-4 must confine himself to the practicalities of how he is going to support this operation and, in the process, be prepared to support the subsequent operations. During wargaming, the S-4 highlights those aspects of the plan that can or cannot be supported. If one aspect of the plan cannot be supported then the S-4 must say so or, at the least, offer an alternative fix to that COA.

In conclusion, planning an attack is not a checklist but a process. Part of the process includes products such as the MCOO or the enemy situational template. Part of the process centers around making judgments about the enemy and the friendly situation. In the end, a well-trained staff quickly pushes information to the commander who quickly makes initial decisions that culminate in the selection of a course of action and, ultimately, in a plan of attack. In closing, Napoleon wrote:

If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long hours and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius that reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and meditation.

Information Enhancement on Today’s Battlefield

by Maj Robert S. Walsh

The information available on today’s battlefield is driving decisionmakers to new approaches to tactical decisionmaking. Battlefield decisions rely on the quality and speed of the information received, and today’s information explosion permits rapid and accurate decisions never before dreamed of. Information enhancement, which includes such activities as surveillance, reconnaissance, and data fusion, seeks to provide timely and accurate, pertinent information to commanders. Its purpose is to get the right information to the right person at the right time-to provide the information needed to know when, where, and how to act. Commanders must be able to detect changes on the battlefield, determine whether those changes represent a threat or target of opportunity, and effectively direct friendly forces to alleviate the threat or take advantage of the target of opportunity in near real-time.

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Adm David E. Jeremiah, USN, stated in the June 1994, Armed Forces Journal, that “. . . [information] drives doctrine and tactics, and to a major degree drives strategy.” Martin C. Libicki and Cdr James A. Hazlett, USN. in the Autumn 1993, Joint Forces Quarterly, went even further to show the value of information by stating:

… the traditional relationship between information and force will be turned on its head. Information no longer serves units of force-rather units of force are fire support for information systems.

The ground commander with the most information will have the most tactical options. Information dominance will give him the capability to decide, act, and stay ahead of his enemy before his enemy can react. The goal is to exploit information dominance and create a decisionmaking sequence in which decisions are made quickly and decisively before the enemy can react. This action denies the enemy access to information and degrades his ability to make timely and accurate decisions. Units become isolated, and command and control degenerate. The isolation results in lower morale and the desire to quit fighting. Many regard it as a major factor in the performance of Iraqi soldiers in February 1991. Fleet Marine Forces Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting, clearly states the advantage of information to the ground commander:

Whoever can make and implement his decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. . . . We should spare no effort to accelerate our decision-making ability.

Although information has been applied in war throughout history, sometimes to decisive effect, modern information technology offers an opportunity to achieve a degree of information dominance in war that can enhance the combat power of smaller forces in a consistently decisive way on today’s maneuver battlefield. Today’s information technologies go hand and hand with the maneuver warfare doctrine of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The Army in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and the Marine Corps in FMFM 1, Warfighting, each state their commitment to maneuver warfare. The Army defines maneuver as:

. . . the employment of forces through offensive or defensive operations to achieve relative positional advantage over an enemy force to achieve tactical, operational, or strategic objectives.

The Marine Corps defines it as:

… a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.

Using maneuver warfare, U.S. ground forces will strike rapidly with overwhelming force and combined arms at decisive points. The objective is rapid movement and the destruction of enemy forces versus holding terrain.

Information has transformed the essence of how we view combat power. In the past, combat power has equated to firepower plus maneuver. Information dominance now requires information power to be included in the combat power equation. With information power, the ground commander will act quicker, at decisive points, and with overwhelming force. The advantage of adding information power to the equation is evident in FMFM 1 Warfighting, in the following statement:

Force enhancement through information allows the commander to concentrate forces in superiority at the decisive time and place, with the speed necessary to seize the initiative, and to achieve surprise striking in a manner for which (the enemy] is unprepared.

Focused generation of information from data should result in enhanced awareness with minimized overhead to ensure the decisionmaking cycle is as short as possible, enabling control of operational tempo. The ground commander must be given the necessary information to dominate the enemy and thus decisively win each engagement and battle.

Problems

Though information technologies exist to exploit information dominance, we are still out of cadence with providing this force enhancement capability to the ground commander and his warfighters. A significant change in reconnaissance and surveillance emphasis is necessary in order for information warfare to realize the critical battlefield impact that is possible. Air Force reconnaissance and surveillance systems tend to be more strategically rather than tactically dedicated. Their tendency is to use a limited number of platforms that generally are not designed to work well with the systems of other Services. This strategic emphasis has resulted in support for the strategic or operational levels of war but not the tactical level. Support to the tactical warfighter on the ground has been the result of trickle-down vice dedicated support. The problem will continue in the future since most U.S. reconnaissance systems were not designed to support the tactical ground commander.

This strategic emphasis is critical because the ground commander does not have organic systems capable of seeing “deep.” As a result, he must rely on Air Force and national systems for information relative to the enemy’s second echelon. This has become even more significant with the introduction of weapons having a “deep” capability by the Army. The Army, with its Army Tactical Missile (ATACM), now has the capability to affect the deep battlefield but is unable to see its targets. The Marine Corps’ ability to target deep with organic fixed-wing assets is hampered in the same way. This situation exists because most Army and Marine Corps collection systems support the close-in battle and do not have the range to see enemy second echelon forces. Gaining access to information from Air Force and national assets will be a concern for the ground commander since control of these assets is normally held at the theater or national level. A further problem exists in that the ground forces would like to deploy larger numbers of relatively low-cost, smaller systems down to the battalion level. The Air Force tends to develop large, centrally based, fixed sites that are not advantageous to rapid maneuver operations. All of this has resulted in scarce reconnaissance support to the ground commander.

The end-state has been a centralized control of reconnaissance and surveillance information that fails to support the tactical ground commander adequately. The centralized system in DESERT STORM was often able to see battlefield targets but was unable or late in getting the information to the ground units requiring the targeting data. As Maj James P. Marshall, USAF, explains in his recent book:

We provide centralized reconnaissance that tends to emphasize support to the air component at the expense of the ground forces. This emphasis led to the perception among the other services that the Air Force does not adequately support the ground commander’s intelligence requirements … the result is that the senior leadership of the Army has lost confidence in the Air Force’s resolve and ability to provide timely intelligence support to the tactical ground commander.

Requirements

The first requirement in solving the above problems will be to achieve a “congruent view” of the battlefield by all friendly forces. This requires a coordinated effort by all components to provide an accurate picture, using near-real-time information, on all enemy and friendly locations. A system that effects this congruent view of the battlefield must share common data bases, compatible collection and reporting systems, and standardized displays between all ground and air forces. All users must be able to push information into the information system where it can be processed, fused, and integrated as part of the congruent view. Of critical interest to a standard picture is our ability to reduce and prevent incidents of fratricide. By sharing a common view of who is friend and foe such incidents can significandy be reduced.

The next step after achieving a congruent view of the battlefield will be to speed this information to the decisionmakers and shooters. Past problems have resulted from many layers of command existing between the sensors and shooters. Information processing and fusion must be centralized; however, the ability to access the system and receive timely accurate information has to be decentralized. The required picture must be capable of being “pulleddown” by any desiring ground unit. The end-state should be the dissemination of continuous, time-sensitive information in near real-time, under all-weather, all-terrain, and day-night conditions.

The final step for the ground commander will be to attack targets both inside and outside the fire support coordination line. Maneuver warfare doctrine results in fluid situations in which the close and deep battles shift rapidly, requiring the ground commander to see and attack enemy forces far to his front and rear. What once was the deep battle requiring air interdiction may soon be the close battle requiring close air support. The current intelligence cycle is far too slow to support the rapid and deep thrusts into the enemy’s rear that are essendal to maneuver warfare.

It is essential for the ground commander in maneuver warfare to locate, target, and destroy enemy forces using air interdiction and close air support. His ability to destroy enemy forces in the deep and close battles or to disrupt or delay enemy forces from being committed to the battle is crucial to his success. Therefore, air interdiction and close air support are critical to maneuver warfare and must be responsive to the ground commander’s needs. As stated by LtCol Price T. Bingham, USAF, formerly of the Airpower Research Institute, “Air interdiction must be planned and controlled to be responsive to the dynamics of ground maneuver.” All efforts on the battlefield by the ground and air components must ensure maximum synergism and economy of force for the battle and the campaign to be a success. This synergy has proven successfully in all conflicts since World War II using the synchronization of combined arms to attain maximum combat power.

Recommendations

The combat information system of the future must support the ground commander and his warfighters. To this end, there should be commonality with all Services in order to provide the timely fire support vital to the execution of the ground scheme in future maneuver warfare execution. The system must provide constant surveillance of the battlefield and accurate and timely targeting information to everyone. This continuous surveillance and reporting will allow the ground commander to see, decide, and act quicker than the enemy by providing critical near real-time targeting information.

As stated earlier, the system of tomorrow must support the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Maneuver warfare requires sensors linked with battlefield decisionmakers and shooters that create the ability to operate inside the enemy’s decision cycles. For maneuver warfare to be successful, the ground commander must be able to view the deep battlefield accurately since it may only be moments before the same terrain and enemy forces become his close battlefield. The ability to see and attack follow-on forces must be decentralized, and we must provide relatively small, low-cost systems for this purpose down to the battalion level. All echelons need a common view of the battlefield and the ability to coordinate the targeting of threats with the appropriate weapons system. This common view should be electronically displayed on a horizontal situation display that allows the ground commander to and display desired information from an integrated sensor tasking and fusion system.

Creating a joint combat information system that allows warfighters at all echelons to share a common view of the battlefield will enhance our ability to dominate information and use it in a way that creates information gaps for our enemies and allows us to wage short, violent wars with less death, destruction, and collateral damage.

Among the sources used in preparing this article were three works published by the Air University Press at Maxwell AFB in Alabama: Robert F. Futrell’s Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, Vol 2, 1961-1984; LtCol Price T. Bingham’s Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art; and Maj James P. Marshall’s Near-Real Intelligence on the Battlefield.

Aviation and Maneuver Warfare

In April 1989, nine years after the discussion of maneuver warfare began in earnest, the Gazette published its first article about how FMFM 1 ‘s maneuver doctrine might impact the employment of the aviation combat element (ACE) of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). Its author, Maj R. Scott Moore, envisioned the ACE doing more than close air support, deep air support, interdiction, or air superiority functions. He foresaw it acting as a separate maneuver element, perhaps with other elements of the air-ground team attached, seeking to “exploit breakthroughs, conduct pursuits, screen flanks, act as a MAGTF reserve, or even control terrain.”

Four other major articles explored and expanded the subject later that same year and three more followed in 1991 and 1992. Some authors perceived the new role as something akin to “armed reconnaissance.” Others stressed how aviation must focus on the whole battle not just the mechanics of getting bombs on target. The idea that the ACE’s role would change significantly, that under maneuver doctrine it must do more than provide close air support and assault support for the ground combat element, seemed to be widely acknowledged. Maj William H. Dixon, Jr., noted (Feb92) that “To fight the ACE only as a supporting element is to fight with one hand tied behind the back.” He listed nine aviation missions for possible use in MAGTF planning: gain and maintain air superiority, isolate enemy units on the battlefield, shape the batttlefield, screen GCE’s flanks, destroy bypassed strongpoints, pursue and destroy retreating enemy, delay enemy during a withdrawal, provide rear area security, and provide a reserve force. Maj Thomas X. Hammes, writing in the same issue went further. He put aviation‘s role in true maneuver terms emphasizing that “Air must contribute to the MAGTF commander’s ability to identify, locate, and attack key enemy vulnerabilities . . . and focus on disrupting [the enemy’s] command and control to a point where he cannot function.”

All eight of these articles contain well-argued, useful discussions, and they are worth careful reading today. They raised an issue of vital importance: As the Corps continues to develop and refine its maneuver warfare doctrine, what will emerge as the principal roles of Marine aviation? It is a question that has yet to be clarified. Over the past 3 1/2 years since the last of these “ACE as a maneuver element” articles appeared, the aviation community has continued to focus on its traditional support responsibilities and on the six functions of Marine aviation. What is needed now is a clear understanding of the most productive courses of action for aviation operating under maneuver warfare doctrine. Aviation‘s traditional supporting tasks will remain important, but beyond them lie the hope and possibility that aviation can contribute, as Hammes suggested, directly to the objectives sought by the maneuver warfare ground forces. Unless there is a clear picture of what Marine aviation is to do, it cannot be properly structured, equipped, and trained to realize its full potential under the Corps’ current style of warfare.

In dealing with this issue, the much debated air campaign of the Gulf War is instructive. It demonstrated at the strategic level what can be done to paralyze a complex, integrated national structure. Effective military organizations at every level, like nations, have similar structure and critical centers of gravity. Their directing authorities, command and control mechanisms, communications and logistics networks, intelligence collection means, infrastructure, etc., are crucial to their unctioning. Maneuver doctrine calls for identifying these critical nodes and disrupting the functioning of those most vulnerable. The goal is to collapse the enemy. It is reasonable to believe that in many cases Marine aviation can help directly with this task by locating critical centers of gravity at the operational and tactical level and destroying their effectiveness. Recent operations in Bosnia may provide new insight into the capabilities and techniques needed if aviation is to help locate these centers and disrupt their functioning. Planning and executing an air campaign that contributes directly to collapsing an enemy is a complex task. The ability to carry it out successfully demands extensive preparation and training.

J.E.G.

Warfighting: A leap of faith

by LtCol G. Stephen Lauer

1994 Chase Prize Essay Contest Honorable Mention

A ‘modern’ infantry may ride sky vehicles into combat, fire and sense its weapons through instrumentation, employ devices of frightening lethality in the future-but it must be old-fashioned enough to be iron-hard, poised for instant obedience, and prepared to die in the mud.

-T. R. Fehrenbach

Tactical ground combat requires a certain type of training; the creation of a certain mindset, pride, and toughness; the willingness to obey orders intelligently, flexibility of mind in leaders; and the ability to adapt to the environment presented in each combat situation. Historically, Marines have fought and won this way-without the practical need for a theory of battle. We looked with confidence to our own experience.

Our institutional vision was simple-the Corps exists to fight on the ground. Whatever equipment was added to the inventory, whatever method of entry or transport was provided to us, the vision for its employment remained that of usefulness in the successful prosecution of tactical ground combat. In 1989, the Corps adopted a theory of war as its own, the theory of maneuver warfare. Thus enlightened, we now move towards a future, defined not by our institutional experience of combat but by the tenets of our theory.

What did we do before the “enlightenment”? How did the Marine Corps find its way through the wilderness and the fog of war to adapt itself to the warfighting requirements of the 20th century before seeing the true light? In what way were we so unsuccessful in the prosecution of war? How many battles did we lose? What catastrophe on the order of Cannae, or Dien Bien Phu, did we suffer to bring about the need for a complete redirection of our tactical theory and practice? This enlightenment was accomplished by dictate in the publication of FMFM 1, Wafighting.

In the past we relied upon an institutional vision born of battle experience. This experience led to a commonsense approach to the requirements of ground combat. Our officer and staff noncommissioned officer forebears were schooled in the realities of war and battle, and they were uniformly victorious. They looked at our own history of battle and viewed the battles fought by others to devise a doctrine and force structure needed to win in close combat. The history of the Corps in World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam sees us victorious on the battlefield, fighting with common sense, within political constraints, against enemies that did not surrender. We suffered no defeats, nothing invalidated how we prepared our Marines to fight. We adapted to the changing battlefield environments of “every clime and place” to win. Even Vietnam, which has been used as the justification for this change, was successfully fought by Marines on the ground within the political constraints defined for us.

Until the maneuver age, we articulated no theory of war except that of experience. Our institutional experience of war in the 20th century was one of close combat against enemies who did not surrender, even when disrupted or surrounded. The lens through which we viewed war was experience at warfighting. We are a ground combat force. We developed a uniquely effective entry technique-amphibious warfare. Our doctrine sought to describe ways to engage an enemy first through assault from the sea and then to destroy him in close combat ashore. The force was structured to obtain maximum firepower and mobility. Commanders were expected to improvise. We became a powerful combined arms force-agile and flexible. This led to the practice of building force structure that sought balance between mobility and firepower and doctrine that maintained the need for few rules.

The maneuver theory is not a basis for doctrine but is now the basis of our tactical dogma. It is a theory built upon our acceptance by faith in the inductive leap demanded by the logic of the theory of maneuver. That dogma espouses the cult of maneuver. It is based on faith in an interpretation of the history of warfare that tells us that battles are won by the disruption of an enemy in the face of our quicker movement, that battle is no longer essential, that war is fundamentally different than we believed or experienced, that we are no longer slaves to our attrition past.

The terms of the debate have been defined for us. We have been handed a dogmatic requirement for belief. Dogmatic debate demands that any debate simply reinforce the creed. Dogmatic debate is self-feeding, endlessly circular, and politically correct. Who wants to stand up today and be seen to be in favor of attrition or destruction? The connotations of attrition are all negative, reflecting darkness and backward or wrong-headed thinking. Maneuver connotes light and forward or right-headed thinking. Maneuver theory rejects experience that does not conform to the tenets of its dogma. It requires us to teach war as we wish it were-battle without violence, hatred, enmity, or bloodshed. The dogma of maneuver teaches wishful warfare.

What is the effect of this on the Marine Corps? In the institutionalization of wishful warfare, we run the profound risk of not preparing our next generation of leaders for the horror and violence of death and their absolute need to face that reality and continue to lead. By teaching that they can, and indeed must, avoid battle in order to win, we are not preparing them for the truth. The end results of the tactical dogma of maneuver include the following:

* Loss of institutional vision, i.e., the common vision that defines the ethos of being a Marine.

* Denial of the value of previous combat experience that does not conform to the dogma.

* Creation of force structure built on false analysis of the requirements of modern ground combat.

How can these effects be limited? First, rewrite FMFM 1 to reflect our experience and the primacy of combined arms. The primary lesson of our combat history is the effectiveness of combined arms. To the extent that we need a theory of war, a theory of practical experience that views battle as it is, not as we wish it to be, would seem to fit our needs best. Where does such a theory come from? Clausewitz is a good start. Modifications to his writings are best found in our experience with combined arms battle during the 20th century.

Second, place the maneuver theory in the school house and take from it what is applicable, discarding what is unrealistic. It is no better and of no more use than any other theory that fails to reflect what our experience tells to be true.

Third, take all references to theory out of our tactical manuals. Tactical manuals must be written to reflect our experience of war, in other words, they reflect our institutional experience of battle. Faith in theory has no place in an organization whose sole purpose is warfighting. We do not have the right to risk the lives of our Marines on the basis of faith. Let’s write tactical manuals to reflect the reality of war, not wishful warfare. As T. R. Fehrenbach wrote in This Kind of War, “The problem is to see not what is desirable, or nice, or politically feasible, but what is necessary.”

Finally, we need to understand the effect the adoption of any theory has on the Corps’ future ability to fight and win in battles. The accompanying diagram describes how theory becomes the lens through which we view battle and the requirements to fight with the forces ultimately derived from that theory.

In effect, the lens you use creates a cascading effect throughout the Marine Corps. We derive warfighting requirements from analysis of our own experience in battle and from the vicarious experience gained through the critical analysis of history and recent accounts by others. Our view of battle is fundamentally changed by the choice of lens or theory that serves as a guide to that analysis. From that analysis comes the creation of doctrine that drives all aspects of training, organization, and equipment. The Corps procures equipment and builds force structure to fight that doctrine, and when that force goes to war, experience is then analyzed again through whatever theory lens has been chosen. If you choose the lens incorrectly, the effect may only be discovered on the battlefield and paid for in the blood of young Marines. We do not have the right to be wrong.

In conclusion, maneuver warfare is not simply “a mindset, or way of thinking about war,” it is the theoretical basis for tactical doctrine and force structure. It is this connection to doctrine and force structure that is profoundly misunderstood by many Marines. Instead of a theory built upon the practical experience of war- war in which enemies, though cut off, surrounded, and thoroughly disrupted, would not surrender; war in which enemies had to be brought to close combat before either their death or capture-the Marine Corps embraced maneuver warfare. We abandoned our history-the lens of practical experience which guided us through our first 200 years-in favor of a lens based on faith in the theory of maneuver and the dogma derived from that theory.