Building Decisionmakers

by Capt Arthur L. Glasgow

The Marine Corps has made great strides in implementing the doctrine of maneuver warfare. It has become accepted that the core of maneuver warfare rests in a mindset characterized by rapid decisionmaking, acceptance of risk, and bold initiative at the lowest level.

While maneuver warfare has been touted at the highest levels of our Corps, it clearly has not received the attention it deserves at the level that matters most-the Marine noncommissioned officer (NCO). Ask any infantry corporal or sergeant what the combat “bible” is and the answer you will most likely receive is FMFM 6-5 The Marine Rifle Squad. While this is a useful document based on sound tactical experience, it should be taken for what it is-a reference tool of techniques.

It does not address combat decisionmaking. If this is the source document by which we are training our small-unit leaders, then we are missing the boat. Rather than limit ourselves to a cribsheet of techniques, we must develop small unit leaders who are capable of thinking “outside the box,” leaders who understand that the decision is what is most important, not the technique. The goal is to train leaders capable of employing these time-tested techniques in innovative ways and at unexpected times.

The need for our Corps to be led by such men is critical considering the modern battlefield. Technological advances as well as the current world situation have dissolved the nature of war as we know it. The modern battlefield proves to be a nonlinear, high-tempo arena with combat and support areas intermixed. Actions will be dominated by small units operating in relative isolation, led by junior leaders taking advantage of fleeting moments of opportunity. It is paramount that we prepare our NCOs to win on this modern battlefield.

In order to produce this type of decisionmaker the Marine Corps must adopt a new attitude towards the way it trains NCOs. Capt Michael F. McNamara addressed the first step in his article, “The Price of Remaining Amateurs in the Field of Education.” (MCG, Feb94) Combat decisionmaking must be instituted at every formal school in our Corps.

This is necessary to ingrain the mechanisms of decisionmaking and standardize the language by which we define it at every stage of a Marine’s education. While these initiatives will take time and effort to implement, this article will address what can be done now, at the company and platoon levels, in order to better train our small-unit leaders as combat decisionmakers. The topics discussed are not meant to be an all inclusive formula, but rather an attempt to create an atmosphere and effect a change of attitude.

Creating the Image

It is vital that the newly promoted corporal be viewed in a different light by both himself and those around him. Every leader must maintain an image or position that lends credibility to his actions and decisions. This is especially important to the individual who finds himself suddenly transformed from being a Marine into a Marine leader. This, the hardest of all adjustments, must he aided bv the command, allowing the CO time to attune to his new anthority and responsibility. From moving him into an all-NCO room to a personal talk with the commander welcoming him into the ranks of Marine leaders, every effort must be made to instill within the new corporal an understanding of the gravity of his new position. The authority and responsibility he now holds must be as tangible to him as the rewards for attaining his new position of leadership.

All Marine leaders should be active in the study of our Corps’ history and all things military. The Marine NCO is no exception. The Marine Corps has defined professional military education (PME) requirements by grade to include the corporal. Outside of formal schooling, it is our duty as SNCOs and officers to ensure that the new NCO catches the “bug” of self`education; that he becomes fascinated with his profession. He must understand that every printed word he assimilates will better prepare him for the day he must lead men into combat. This means that a strong, relevant, and workable NCO PME program must be instituted at the company and battery level throughout the Marine Corps.

Throughout the first few months after pinning on his second chevron, the new NCO will be struggling to find his own niche in the unit’s leadership and develop his own personal style and priorities. This effort must be aided bv command attention through open displays of support and accountability. The NCO must be comfortable with the fact that when he speaks, he does so with a certain level of command authority and will be backed up. He must tinderstand completely that his realm of responsibility has expanded to more than just himself and that he will be held accountable for his Marines.

Establishing an “image” for the new NCO is crucial in lending credibility to his decisions. Before we can expect him to make sound decisions, we must first create the atmosphere that will allow him to do so. Once this is accomplished, we can begin to train the NCO, and help him train himself, to become a combat decisionmaker.

Making the Decision

The crux of maneuver warfare rests in the rapid decision made at the lowest level and the willingness and initiative to act on that decision. Contrary to what we may like to believe, the current atmosphere in our Corps today at the junior NCO level is not conducive to bold decisionmaking. Time dependent training schedules, the willingness of junior officers and SNCOs to do an NCO’s job, and the still present zero defects mentality are just a few of the factors that undercut the NCO initiative so necessary for maneuver warfare.

The first step in creating NCOs who are comfortable with decisionmaking is to force them to make decisions often and on demand. This can be accomplished within a semiformal structure regardless of the merit of the decision. The goal is not so much to induce sound decisions initially as it is to simply produce rapid decisions. When the process of making a decision begins to become a reflexive traiL, the ability to produce sound decisions can be taught. As an example, implementing a “tactical decision game a day” program within the platoon only takes a minimal amount of time to accomplish and sets the tone that some sort of tactical decision is expected of Marine leaders every day. Additionally, exposing our small-unit leaders to a steady diet of tactical scenarios will aid in building their ability to produce sound, recognition-primed decisions. Recognition-primed decisionmaking, vice analytical, is the fastest process by which the human mind assimilates and evaluates data. The ability to operate in this manner at the lowest level is central to successful implementation of maneuver warfare. The vast majority of decisions at the point of impact must be recognition-primed because of the time factors involved. There will seldom be time for analytical, stafftype decisions. And herein lies the dilemma, for the ability to derive a sound, recognition-primed decision rests in extensive personal experience or an educational regimen oriented towards producing such decisions. Newly promoted N(COs have neither the experience nor the luxury of this type of formal education. In the absence of either, the responsibility for building proper habits of decisionmaking rests almost entirely with the unit.

The next step is to allow the NCO more leeway in the training of his Marines, forcing him to plan and supervise properly. Look at your unit’s training schedule; chances are that every minute of every day is accounted for. This prevents initiative at the instructor (NCO) level. Adopting a mission order training schedule, whereby we set goals, objectives, and standards, allows the NCO to train to standard instead of time. He must make the decision whether remediation is needed. Hc must determine when his Marines are ready to be evaluated. As an example, instead of dictating 1.5 hours of weapons maintenance time, allow the squad leader to determine when his weapons have met standard. Rather than dictate 0530 reveille, let the NCO determine when he needs to wake his people in order to have them ready for the day’s training. This approach places the responsibility for planning and time management on the shoulders of the NCO and he must decide the appropriate method to accomplish the mission as well as validate his own instruction. It also makes it clear to the lance corporal and below that it is the Marine corporal who will have the most direct impact on their lives in garrison or combat. The cynic will say this approach will result in short work days, incompletely trained units, and general chaos. The trusting leader will see that if officers plan and set proper standards, and employ the SN(COs correctly, the result will be a more productive workday, better trained units, and a small-unit leader comfortable with responsibility and capable of making sound, timely decisions.

Conclusion

Finally, in order to make this work, we as officers must understand our role in the training process. There is a great moral commitment in maneuver warfare. Pushing authority and responsibility down increases the chance of failure. Senior leaders must see that although we can be, we are not the trainers. We set the standards, evaluate, and facilitate the training. Individual training standard (ITS) level training is the responsibility of the NCO with the SNCO providing guidance, direction, and reinforcement. It should be considered unacceptable for a junior officer to stand on the platform in front of his Marines and teach an individual or small-unit skills class. The challenge for us is not to teach these skills, but rather to teach the NCO how to instruct them. The reasoning behind this is clear. When the call comes to protect our country, we will go whether or not our NCOs have been prepared to succeed. If our small-unit leaders have not been educated in peace to employ our doctrine, how can we expect them to do so amidst the horror and carnage of` war? When the rounds begin to fly and the young Marine at the point is filled with fear and doubt, he will naturally turn for direction and reassurance to the individual who has guided him through training. When he turns to find that man, it will not be the lieutenant or the staff sergeant behind him. That spot is reserved for the Marine corporal.

The Marine NCO

by Capt Charles N. Black

“Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur. ”

-Giulo Douhet

The focus of this article is to address the necessity to devote more time and effort in the development of our small unit leaders, specifically our noncommissioned officers (NCOs), in order to win the threeblock war. The Commandant has challenged us in his planning guidance to question what we as an institution do right, what we do wrong, and what we can do better. I believe that currently our schools do a superb job of producing an NCO who can function technically on the battlefield, i.e., he has a basic understanding of weapons, tactical formations, and leadership skills. However, in future conflicts our NCOs must be tactically and technically as capable as our second lieutenants. In order to do this, we must train our NCOs how to think, communicate, and take action in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment. My intent is to promote thinking at the company level and to ignite professional debate on this fundamental issue: the training and education of our NCOs to fight and win the threeblock war.

Today we, as a Corps, stand on the brink of the next millennium, rapidly conducting a large-scale, friendly METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support availabletime available) evaluation of our capabilities and limitations to fight and win future battles for our Nation. We have come to live in a world that is more volatile, unstable, and more uncertain than any other time in the last century. Our Commandant describes this future battlefield as the “three-block war,” one in which Marine units will find themselves dispersed within the battlefield simultaneously conducting operations across the compressed spectrum of conflict. One squad may be involved in a combined arms engagement with threat forces, while another squad only one block away is conducting humanitarian assistance tasks (numerous examples of this can be found in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System reports on operations in Somalia). Squad and team leaders will continue to operate in an uncertain enironment with rules of engagement (ROE) under the ever present and watchful eye of the international media. Urban conflict requires decentralized execution by capable, small unit leaders, and future successes will depend more heavily upon our NCOs than anv other time in history.

In his 1887 Proceedings review of a pamphlet published by the USA’s Artillery School titled “The Tactics of Infantry in Battle” by Col Sir Lumley Graham, Lt Dennis Hart Mahan, USN, highlighted the importance of Graham’s prediction of the emergence of the captain as a tactical decisionmaker in future conflicts. Since that time history has shown that Graham was correct.

Change is constant. A New World Order was established in the early 1990s with the downfall of the Soviet Union and the rise of a fractional, multipolar world community. This new environment brings with it an increase in operational tempo and operations other than war. It has become the norm, rather than the exception, for lieutenant platoon commanders to make tactical decisions that have had numerous implications on both a political and social scale. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in 1994, 2dLt Palumbo’s actions in a firefight with Haitian police forces in CapHaitien directly impacted national security policy in that region. The level of tactical decisionmaking continues to be pushed further and further down the chain of command. The principles of commander’s intent and mission type orders increasingly become a requirement, not an option of local commanders. By 2010 the squad leader and possibly the team leader will regularly be required to make rapid tactical decisions in an uncertain situation without time to seek guidance.

Historically junior officers and NCOs have executed predetermined battle drills as a small part of a larger unit formation or maneuver. As we passed from close order to open order tactics, the focus of the NCO was primarily on the control of fires. Still, the squad and team leader were specifically trained to facilitate control of the unit and its fires-not to make tactical decisions. Our NCOs have proven their adaptability, inventiveness, and courage in every armed conflict. History is replete with examples of an NCO leading his men to close the last 100 yards; but nowhere was there a formal education process-learning and growth were purchased in blood and death on the battlefield.

The Marine Corps is not fully preparing its squad and team leaders to operate in chaos. Success in winning the three-block war requires junior leaders who are not only masters of techniques and procedures, but who are capable of making relevant and timely tactical decisions in concert with the commander’s intent. The current selection, training, and education of our combat arms NCOs are not consistent with this intent. The mandated professional military education (PME) courses, both resident and nonresident, provide only a start point. The PME and military occupational specialty (MOS)-related advanced schools focus on leadership and technical skills, with little time devoted to the development of tactical decisionmaking skills. These schools do a good job teaching the technical knowledge such as battle drills, weapons employment, gunnery, and other related small unit skills. Technical expertise is essential for success in maneuver warfare; but one must also have a fundamental understanding of theory and conduct of war. None of these schools have the underlying theme of teaching young leaders how to think and make decisions in an uncertain situation.

A good job is being done by many commanders who run in-house education programs due to a shortage in school quotas and the void in formal schools. Battalion Landing Teams 2/6 and 1/8 of FMFM are just two examples of units that conducted such inhouse programs. These programs, consisting of additional instruction in FMFM 1, Warfighting, and reinforced through sand table discussions, combat leadership guest lecturers, and tactical exercises without troops, were instrumental in the increased development and operational capabilities of these units at the NCO level. Majs David J. Furness and William H. Weber’s article “Leadership and Maneuver Warfare” (MCG, Apr93, p. 47) addressed a similar issue about inadequate NCO training and education. The education of our future small unit leaders must be improved.

Successfully applying maneuver warfare to win the three-block war requires an institutional NCO education program founded in excellence on the basics. The German Army of the 1930s effectively developed a professional NCO corps that was extensively educated in the theory and conduct of war, technical knowledge, and decisionmaking as evidenced by their superior performance during the Battle of Sedan in 1940. If NCOs are to retain their status as the “backbone of the Corps,” then we must infuse them with the skills necessary to win on any battlefield: to quickly evaluate a situation, make a decision, and then violently execute that decision. We must do better-our NCOs deserve more.

Today, only a few semiformal NCO schools exist for the newly promoted corporal. These schools successfully teach leadership, drill, and other troop handling skills. They fail to introduce the basic maneuver concepts that must be instilled and reinforced throughout a young NCO‘s time in service. Many argue that an NCO does not need to learn about maneuver warfare and decisionmaking. Decentralized and dispersed operations on urbanized terrain will require our Corps to implement maneuver warfare concepts at the lowest level. The only way to make warfighting a reality is if the young NCO understands and can successfully apply decisionmaking skills in an uncertain environment. The systems approach to training mandates a progressive building block approach to training. The education process must also be progressive, beginning with our basic warfighting principles.

The Marine Corps needs a new combat leader NCO school by restructuring existing PME and advanced MOS schools. This new school should focus its efforts on mastering techniques and procedures and, equally important, how to think. The end-state of the school must be to develop junior leaders with the will and knowledge to take decisive action in an uncertain environment within the commander’s intent-a goal identical with that of the Infantry Officer Course. The underlying tenets of this school must be the ability to make a decision, communicate that decision to his subordinates, and execute that decision. Additionally, developing excellence at techniques is essential. The decision process must be continually reinforced throughout all technical and tactical training.

I do not propose that corporals or sergeants become masters of doctrine or the operational art of war. Four basic concepts must be mastered in order to facilitate decisionmaking in uncertain situations. The first concept is commander’s intent. What is the final result desired by higher headquarters in relation to the enemy, friendly, and terrain? Second, the squad or team leader must be capable of working with mission orders. This is nothing new to most combat ready units. Third, give the NCO a tactical problem and mission statement and let him determine how to accomplish the assigned task. Fourth, the NCO must understand the concepts of main and supporting efforts. Mastery of techniques and the application of these four concepts will ensure success in the three-block war.

Selection to NCO rank must not be taken lightly. Because of the lack of formal schooling, today’s corporals are often little more than higher paid lance corporals. Selection must be based upon character, potential leadership ability (decisionmaking), and technical proficiency. Selection should not be determined by cutting score points accrued for time in service. Many Marines are great lance corporals, but do not have the ability or will to lead Marines as an NCO. Those selected for promotion would attend the combat leadership school, and upon successful completion be promoted to corporal. The new NCO would then return to his parent unit as a leader, willing and capable of leading Marines in combat. The new unit cohesion program established by Headquarters Marine Corps will facilitate those selected for NCO rank to attend the school during the down cycle of the battalion. To build cohesion among junior leaders, all those selected from a given unit would attend the course at the same time operating as a tactical unit throughout the course. The school will ensure consistent education and training. The NCO‘s further education and development would be left up to his chain of command until he attends an advanced combat leaders course developed for staff NCOs.

The future success of the Marine Corps depends upon our ability to fight and win urban conflicts. To fight and win hinges upon the ability of our smallest unit leaders to make prudent decisions in the face of uncertainty. Warfare is changing and so too must the education of the Marine NCO.

Mobility Requirements and the 21st Century MAGTF

by Maj Chris Yunker

Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), a concept paper reprinted in the June 1996 issue of the Gazette; postulates that among other principles, a Marine airground task force (MAGTF) may focus on an operational objective, generating overwhelming tempo, and pitting strength against weakness. Such a mission would require the MAGTF to maneuver/fight at both the operational and tactical levels. While fighting at the tactical level is very familiar to Marines, fighting at the operational level is not. This is certain to change because OMFTS, landing from over the horizon, ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), sea-basing, and other emerging concepts are exploring the most effective means of projecting combat power toward operational objectives. While significant study and dialog has occurred on required characteristics and tradeoffs in long-range fires, aviation, and communications, less attention has been paid to other initiatives required for long-range ground maneuver and mobility.

The purpose of this article is to stimulate thought on operational level mobility by explaining its contribution to OMFTS. It will then examine the capacity of current ground equipment and maintenance support philosophies to support OMFTS by measuring them against four cardinal elements of maneuver warfare; 1) tempo, 2) combined arms, 3) flexibility, and 4) decentralized command.

In the tactical arena, we have the advantage of long experience in developing balanced, effective tactical combat units. On 4 January last year, the Commandant broadened the Corps’ doctrinal framework with the approval of the OMFTS concept that emphasizes focus at the operational objective. Parallel to the development of new OMFTS doctrine and organizational changes, we must develop hardware necessary to support the emerging concept. We must reassess the capabilities of our ground equipment and our approach to fuel-handling and maintenance support to ensure our measures and practices are relevant to the operational framework.

Mobility‘s Contribution to OMFTS Let’s consider the mobility characteristics a MAGTF’s ground equipment will need to (1) focus on the operational objective, (2) achieve a tempo superior to the enemy’s and (3) pit our strength against his weakness.

Achieving Reach to the Operational Objective: The operational objective of a campaign may be near the seabase area, making tactical mobility sufficient. However, we would expect a center of gravity to be adequately protected, by either force or distance or both. When the operational objective is not within the amphibious objective area, we will need the ability to maneuver directly to a fairly distant objective. If encumbered with the requirement for a refueling/rearming point en route, we expose a significant weakness for the enemy to exploit. Increasing this reach out to a range of 700 miles unrefueled is not unreasonable for properly configured vehicles. This long reach characteristic also supports ship-to-objective maneuver. A significant portion of the MAGTF will need the ability to conduct an extended continuous movement to the operational objective and then fight a combined arms engagement upon arrival.

Superior Tempo: Achieving superior tempo in a ground campaign requires the capacity to mentally cycle through the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop faster than the enemy, and then to execute those decisions faster than the enemy. When concerned with an operational objective, this requires the ability to reliably move outside the tactical area and engage the enemy more quickly than he can react, inviting him to shift forces from one tactical sector to another and back. Achieving superior destruction of enemy forces and material is not required (getting there in a degraded mode is better than not getting there), getting him to react is. By adapting more quickly to his countermoves than he adapts to ours, we will uncover a weakness. His ability to orient and adjust to the changing battlefield will unravel because he can’t keep up. We can achieve this through sustainable mobility that enables us to move faster and farther than the enemy. Getting inside his OODA loop contributes to a continuous sense of surprise and disorientation, creating a mental isolation and defeat. At that point we employ a third principle of OMFTS, pitting strength against weakness.

Pitting Strength Against Weakness: As we uncover a weakness in the enemy center of gravity, we’d like to put our force in a tactically advantageous position that will enable us to achieve an operational decision affecting a significant enemy force. The more pronounced the weakness, the greater potential for asymmetric results. The key to this is a force that gives priority to speed and flexibility rather than to destructive power or mass. A lightly armed force is acceptable, as long as it can overwhelm the enemy force’s OODA loop. If our force must stop frequently to refuel or repair and maintain equipment, the enemy’s OODA loop continues, and we lose our advantage. Understanding the mobility required to implement these three principles of maneuver at the operational level helps us define operational mobility.

What Is Operational Mobility?

Many current conceptual documents, including OMFTS and STOM, imply that ground hardware will have operational mobility if it can be hauled in an MV-22. Is this a correct assessment?

JCS Pub 1, FM 100-16, and FM 100-5 do not provide definitions of operational mobility. We all have a pretty good understanding of strategic mobility in a ground weapon system, and how to achieve it-make sure a system is compatible with ships, rail, and C5s. We also have a pretty good idea of tactical mobility-a system capable of traversing steep grades, soft soils, ditches, and water obstacles, capable of moving under fire.

If we define operational mobility within the context of its contribution to maneuver warfare as outlined above, we can use a specific set of metrics to assess it. As the operational campaign tends to unfold in a matter of days and weeks rather than hours, operational mobility can be measured in terms of sustainable miles per day, rather than miles per hour. As most ground weapon systems require refueling and some maintenance checks after 4 to 5 hours of continuous operation, we see that range, fuel consumption, maintenance ratios, and repairability are integral elements of a system’s operational mobility. Adopting these measures of operational mobility, we can provide starting points for the required capabilities of an operationally mobile system: exceptional unrefueled range; a capacity for recovering from failed internal systems through redundancy; a design that enables field repairs without replacement parts; a capacity to fire, move, and communicate in degraded modes; a relatively high sustainable speed when measured in miles per day; and a high commonality in vehicle parts within the unit to minimize parts inventories and enable cannibalization.

Now back to the MV-22 lifted equipment. If a system with 4 hours worth of fuel is lifted into an operating area, how many MV-22s will it take to move and then fuel the force long enough to out maneuver the enemy? If there are not enough airframes to keep the vehicles fueled and supplied with repair parts for the duration of the campaign, the force’s operational mobility will zero out pretty quickly.

Striking a Balance in Mobility Characteristics

The design of any weapon system strikes a balance among desirable capabilities. For ground systems that will be employed at the operational level, we can make conscious tradeoffs between capabilities that optimize the equipment for operational rather than tactical employment. Prime examples are the current light armored vehicle (LAV) and its planned successor, the future light combat vehicle (FLCV).

A mission need statement exists today in draft form for a program targeted for production during the latter part of the next decade. The draft operational concept report on the FLCV attempts to forecast the capabilities the FLCV will need to accomplish its mission. It obliquely mentions operational mobility, but perceives it only in relation to the FLCV’s air transportability. Required speed, payload, range, and planned maintenance practices remain optimized for the tactical framework. The perceived mobility requirements for this system should be reassessed to ensure adequate adjustments are made to accommodate the OMFTS framework. From the adjusted requirements, we can derive the desired characteristics of hardware and provide the manufacturer such critical metrics as maintenance ratios, meantime between failures, and fuel consumption rates while he is still in the design phase.

Adjusting to the operational framework may lead to some striking changes in design philosophy. For example, to achieve an extremely low failure rate, designers may overbuild a drive train, sacrificing something in weight, price, and fuel efficiency. We may decide that an operationally capable system needs high reliability, while a system optimized for the tactical battle should be striving for lowest possible weight, highest sprint speed, and maximum ammunition payload. A dialog on adjusting equipment to the operational framework between Marine Corps Combat Development Command and those interested in the full development of OMFTS as a fighting concept would include questions such as:

Can the unit increase its ability to fight operationally if the resupply requirement is reduced?

What can we change about replacement/repair practices and fuel/lubricants criteria to reduce resupply requirements?

Is it feasible to reduce quantities of replacement parts if the system is built with fewer line replaceable units and a higher percentage of repairable units?

Can resupply needs be reduced if cannibalization is planned by the unit throughout the mission?

Is a multifuel vehicle, capable of using seized fuels, useful if the performance is degraded?

Current Ground Equipment

Measuring current and planned equipment against these mobility characteristics reveals that current design practices were driven largely by concerns for strategic and tactical mobility. Equipment designed in this manner is exceedingly difficult to support when landed from over the horizon to strike an operational objective. Even with MV-22s, MAGTF aviation will be hard pressed to deliver adequate sustainment, particularly fuels and lubricants, to support ground units maneuvering in advanced assault amphibious vehicles (AAAVs), high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and trucks towing lightweight howitzers. Precision logistics, a vital element in seabasing the OMFTS force, offers to deliver only needed materials, but doesn’t reduce the material requirement of the warfighter. One of the major reasons for focusing on operational mobility is to design in a reduced need for materials to fuel and maintain our mobile equipment.

The AAAV design provides good water speed and ground mobility equal to the MlA1 tank, but a high powered engine is required, and advanced technology is used to achieve that power. When launched from over the horizon, the AAAV will require refueling prior to moving on to an objective 50 miles inland. Most ground equipment in the MAGTF today has mobility characteristics that are not particularly bad, but also not particularly designed to achieving a campaign of higher tempo than the enemy’s.

While amtracs and LAVs enable infantry to move about the battlefield, other elements of our combined arms team are not as well covered. Engineers, artillery, air defense, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance will, for the foreseeable future, possess a mixed bag of battlefield mobility assets. We would be wise to learn from some of our foreign neighbors who are taking a common chassis, making multiple variants, and achieving a combined arms team with balanced operational mobility.

Though not a consciously desired characteristic, our vehicles are undergoing a persistent reduction in flexibility. By flexibility we mean a capacity to adapt to circumstances without failing, maintaining an ability to return to a usable form. For example, we can no longer bump start a HMMWV as we could an M151. We can achieve flexibility in ground equipment by designing in redundancy, reducing specialization, and relaxing some engineering standards. An engine that can burn DF 2, kerosene, JP-4, 5, and AVGAS has the flexibility to forage for fuels on the battlefield, which can be desirable even perhaps at some cost in degraded performance. A manually adjusted fuel system rather than one electronically controlled by a black box is flexible enough for bailing wire repairs in the event of a field failure. Systems that can fire in a degraded mode and those that can fire several types of ammunition may both contribute to the ability of a system to operate consistently at a tempo superior to the enemy and are, under our definition, attributes of an operationally mobile system.

What Is Expected?

Maneuver warfare places different expectations on our ground forces and their equipment than previous doctrinal frameworks. Operational maneuver generates different requirement than tactical maneuver. If we expect the campaign to be decided in the first engagement, or if we believe we will have the luxury of stopping long enough to refuel and rearm as necessary, systems with simple tactical mobility will suffice. If we accept the OMFTS principles stated at the outset, we discover that the optimum ground equipment will have different characteristics for that style of warfare. Defining these characteristics is a starting point on the road to building a MAGTF that possesses the mobility to fight at the operational as well as the tactical level.

OMFTS: Innovation, deep maneuver, and aviation

by Col Gary I. Wilson, USMCR, Maj Chris Yunker, & Franklin C. Spinney

Gen Charles C. Krulak in his Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) Frag Order notes that in order to create the agile, adaptable, combined arms forces the Nation needs in the 21st century, the Marine Corps is focusing its efforts on three areas: Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), Innovation, and the Individual Marine. This article will outline several innovative concepts currently stirring in the Marine Corps’ “marketplace of ideas” and suggest that these concepts serve in part as linchpins for OMITS.

The Marine Corps’ capstone operational concept of OMFTS was established in January 1996. OMFTS does more than describe how Marines will conduct power projection operations in the 21st century. It begins a process of proposal, debate, and experimentation building on the foundation laid by “. . From the Sea” and “Forward. . . From the Sea.” As a naval concept developed by the Marine Corps for execution in concert with the Navy, OMFTS places unprecedented emphasis on the littorals and demands greater cohesiveness between naval warfare and maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps will meet OMFES challenges by coupling new ideas, force mix, hardware, and technology to improve our combat power. In order of importance, people, ideas, and hardware are the fundamental elements of combat power. The hard-learned lessons of history demonstrate that combat power is improved by the creative combination of these factors working together in harmony.

OMFTS seeks this creative combination through a marriage of maneuver warfare and naval warfare. Maneuver warfare provides an understanding of dynamic conflict and the requirement for skillful operations at a high tempo. Naval warfare demonstrates the advantages inherent in seaborne movement and seabased logistics. OMFTS capitalizes on naval forces’ ability to use the sea as a maneuver space. The intent in employing this concept is to achieve decisive objectives, selected from across the broad operational reach, and achieved in large measure through ship-to-objective maneuver, a major implementing concept of OMFTS. A key element of OMFTS is sea-basing the command and control, logistics, and the preponderance of fire support functions in order to maintain the use of the sea as maneuver space, and enhance the mobility of ground forces ashore. Sea-based, these functions also reduces the force’s “footprint” and vulnerability ashore.

Sea-basing allows combat service support (CSS) forces to concentrate on providing support to warfighters without rear area security concerns inherent in shore-based logistics operations. Furthermore, sea-basing provides the joint task force commander with the capability to maneuver combat forces seamlessly from the sea to decisive objective areas without the traditional impediment of securing the beach. Sea-basing thus allows putting the “teeth” ashore while leaving the logistics “tail” afloat, significantly leveraging land maneuver operations.

Change of this magnitude is not easy. While rising to the challenge of working out the mechanics of OMiTS, much of today’s combat development and operational thinking tends to be smothered by the quest for technology. Clearly technology influences operational concepts, but we must not lose sight of the relationship of new technology to true innovation in the conduct of war. Maneuver warfare recognizes that the activity of war can never be predictable, and that advances in technology alone do not master war. Any application of technology in a maneuver or operational context must be applied in a way which takes that into account. At the operational level, we strive to develop a tempo of activity that is superior to that of the enemy, throw our strength against his weakness, and leverage individual initiative and decentralized execution. In tactical engagements, combined arms are used to defeat an enemy who has been selectively engaged by attacking with unpredictable, swift, dilemmaproducing actions. While the Marine Corps has all the components needed to employ this doctrine robustly, our institutional structure, training, and equipment have not been adjusted sufficiently to enable its full implementation. Towards this end the Corps needs to take a serious look at increasing its operational potential based on OMFTS, innovation, current equipment and force mix.

Although the Marine Corps broke new ground both conceptually and technologically with the adoption of maneuver warfare and the acquisition of light armored vehicles (LAVs), the full merger and exploitation of the two initiatives has yet to occur. Today, however, interest in fielding an amphibious force that can carry out operational level mission is growing. The concept was outlined in three Gazettes last year and versions of it are now being tested in field exercises. The concept employs an operational maneuver element (OME), a force built around LAVs, to conduct deep maneuver operations. The OME is an organization and concept based on current equipment and forces that seem particularly well adapted to the threats and adversary orders of battle most likely to be encountered by our Marine air-ground task forces in the foreseeable future.

Changes in weapons technologies show potential to bolster the viability of this type of force, suggesting that large conventional armored combat formations are waning in significance. Larger combat formations are becoming more vulnerable as technology improves munition performance, spreads globally, and provides smaller forces the means to unleash as much destructive power as larger and easily targeted combat formations. Conversely, an agile light armored force with speed, range, communications, and precision munitions is increasingly capable of displacing mass as a principle characteristic for decisive ground engagement. These technologies also make light armored forces suitable for deep maneuver operations.

Rigorous thinking regarding OME and other concepts is taking place in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) as ways are sought to bolster and emphasize operational level doctrine. The FMF’s interest in deep maneuver was reported on in the article, “I MEF Eyes Deep Maneuver” (MCG, Feb97, p.6). The purpose of the I MEF’s Deep Operations Working Group is to examine current Marine Corps deep ground operations capabilities considering among other alternatives, the inherent mobility of the light armored vehicle. A unique series of exercises were born of this endeavor culminating in DEEP STRIKE, conducted in August of this year. (See accompanying article.)

DEEP STRIKE’S exercise goal was to explore the capabilities of a large LAV force operating without ground lines of communication and relying on fixed and rotary wing aircraft for sustainment. DEEP STRIKE successfully demonstrated long-range (air) sustainment and command and control of a 300-vehicle LAV-based task force. The concept of deep maneuver by light armored reconnaissance (LAR) units at the operational level was considered generally as viable.

In a separate but related experimental effort, Col Gary W. Anderson with III MEF is developing a battlefield shaping task force (BSTF) concept that is similarly focused on limited objectives at the operational level. Proposing a BSTF designed for battlefield shaping, it provides a framework for ground, fire support, and aviation to execute a faster observation-orientation-decision-action cycle.

A third parallel concept, one that relates specifically to sea-based aviation, has been proposed in the form of the aviation from the sea (AFTS) initiative that regards aviation primarily as yet another maneuver element of the ground force. AFTS seeks to use air (both Navy and Marine) in a maneuver context, integrating air (Navy and Marine) with ground elements at the tactical level in order to be employed optimally at the operational level. The combination of deep maneuver and AFTS, employed within the BSTF framework, represents an enhanced and innovative use of resources and force mix. The common theme of these efforts is to seek operational solutions supporting OMFTS.

A combination of an OME and AFTS, when correctly used to implement OMFTS, can provide our Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs) with a unique operational level capacity. These initiatives herald a move to closely integrate deep fires with a maneuver force of LAVs, Navy and Marine air, conducted against an OMFTS backdrop to prosecute the strategic objectives of a unified command.

During the HUNTER WARRIOR Experiment in March, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) experimented with technologies that could enhance these concepts. These experiments also generated healthy debate regarding aviation from the sea and operational maneuver capabilities. One of the more controversial issues involved .’S’s predecessor, Hunter or Jaeger Air, which was judged by some as ineffective and failing to present a credible force. Military journalist, Elaine M. Grossman, recorded part of the dialog within the Marine Corps on that portion of the experiment noting in Inside the Pentagon, (14 Aug 1997):

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory officials noted that. . ., among other `lessons learned’ from its March HUNTER WARRIOR experiment …. their use of T-34 trainer aircraft to test Jaeger’ or ‘hunter’ aviation tactics and techniques was ill-conceived and likely will not be repeated. Backers of the Jaeger aviation concept-using airpower more aggressively in concert with a ground commander’s objectives, as an arm of maneuver warfarehad proposed using the slow trainer aircraft…. because that might eliminate debates over “platforms” from the experiment, and instead allow for free-play tests of warfighting concepts alone.

Not all that participated in the experiment shared that view. For example, during the segment involving deep maneuver operations, both Marine and Navy aviators worked in concert with the MAGTF commander to gain an intimate understanding of the commander’s intent. The aviators enabled the LAV-based OME to maneuver, in the words of the seasoned LAR company commander, “twice as fast and far more aggressively” than anything he had previously experienced.

Maj Lawrence Roberts (“Flying In Hunter Warrior” Proceedings, Sep97) notes that, despite the limited nature of the HUNTER WARRIOR experiment, he was excited about the potential capability of the AFTS concept and the possibility of getting carrier tactical aviation more involved in supporting troops ashore.

Dialog and debate such as this is healthy, exactly what we need in the current environment. It further serves to point out the importance of ensuring clear conceptual underpinnings are articulated and employed before embracing new technologies in combat forces. Regardless of one’s views on the concepts employed in HUNTER WARRIOR, DEEP STRIKE, or BSTF exercises, it is clear the experiments dramatically moved Marines beyond their comfort zones resulting in new views and broadening the dialog on expanding carrier aviation, integrating LAR operational level capabilities, and exploring them in support of fighting in the littorals.

Operational concepts and planning can play a critical part in military undertakings. They serve to establish favorable conditions for the subsequent introduction of the main force. They perform a shaping and enabling function designed to locate and identify the enemy, impede and paralyze enemy movement, and shatter enemy command, control, communications, and cohesion by striking critical nodes.

We propose that combining the AFIS capabilities with a task organized LAR battalion within the BSTF framework provides the MAGTF an ability to focus at the operational level to influence MEF objectives, shape the battle space to set up tactical advantages, and operationally shape the campaign without the commitment of the main force. Surprise is possible through a high tempo of operations, or by penetration to unanticipated depth attacking critical nodes.

An OME positioned within a naval expeditionary task force, working with AFTS would enable the ground commander to fight deep where naval aviation has for the last 30 years engaged targets as air interdiction or deep strike. Technology infusions to weapons continue to strengthen the light ground force and enhance both a ground and aerial combined arms action in the enemy’s rear, presenting an unacceptable risk to the enemy commander.

In short, the combination of AFTS and OME, organized around LAVs and employed within the BSTF framework, offers to provide the MAGTF a force that is:

Seaborne and therefore strategically and operationally mobile.

Heavy enough in air power to provide air strikes alone if required.

Heavy enough in ground power to provide an enabler for follow-on ground and air forces.

Forward deployed and therefore on the scene and operationally proactive, with robust combat power.

Experimentation with AFTS and OME deep maneuver concepts can enable the MAGTF to introduce changes in technology within a conceptual framework, and accept or reject technical applications based on an understanding of the implications of the technology. The essential element of these emerging capabilities is balance. In the long view, these ideas offer increased combat power through operational and intellectual insight rather than overreliance on technology.

Ongoing and well-coordinated limited object experiments like those taking place at I MEF (i.e. DEEP STRIKE) and III MEF (i.e. BSTF) are providing a field venue where the importance of people, ideas, and hardware is taken into account. Such experiments are consistent with the Commandant’s Planning Guidance Frag Order, articulating how the MCWL supports the combat development process. That support uses the Fleet Marine as the centerpiece for testing and implementing reforms, the MCWL as the conduit for operational reform within the Marine Corps, and the Marine University and schools as the idea factory. They have the potential of providing operational level solutions that could be invaluable in the emerging world.

These three efforts offer a jumping off point for exploring the relevance of technology to our operational repertoires. They can contribute, together with the Sea Dragon Experiment series, to developing the agile, adaptable, combined arms forces needed by the Nation for the 21st century. As Gen Krulak notes his Planning Guidance Frag Order:

We must be a forward-thinking, learning organization that strives, day in and day out, to improve our efficiency, to improve our effectiveness and to challenge the status quo.

Note

The Marine Corps Gazette has published each of the key documents/articles cited by these authors as well as other related concept papers:

“. . . From the Sea” Nov92

“Forward . . . From the Sea”Oct94

Commandant’s Planning Guidance Aug95

Operational Maneuver From the Sea Jun96

“MEU(JOC) and Operational Maneuver” Jun96

“MEU(JOC) Stage II: Growing an Operational Capability” Sep96

“An Operational Maneuver MAGTF” Dec96

Commandant’s Planning Guidance Frag Order Oct97

Future Operation on Urbanized Terrain Oct97

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Nov97

An Implementing Concept for Operational Maneuver from the Sea

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The armed forces of the United States require a force projection capability that will secure early and decisive advantages over their enemies. Forcible entry capabilities are a key element of joint doctrine for force projection. Applying the approach to naval warfare outlined in the Department of the Navy White Papers,… From the Sea (MCG, Nov92) and Forward . . . From the Sea (MCG, Oct94), U.S. Naval Forces use command of the seas to gain access and freedom of action in the world’s littorals. Taking the operational maneuver space offered by the sea, U.S. forces turn the sea and littorals into vulnerable flanks for potential enemies, assailable at the time and place of the naval commander’s choosing. The Marine Corps operational concept for maritime power projection, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (MCG, Ju196), establishes clear goals for accomplishment of the objectives of the White Papers. These goals are the foundation for the development of implementing concepts and capabilities. This paper presents one of the key implementing concepts, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, and initiates the Combat Development Process to provide the tools with which the concept will be realized.

Background

Marines operate from the assault ships of the U.S. Navy amphibious forces to perform forcible entry missions. Such ships provide the combat systems which facilitate amphibious operations. These combat systems include efficient operating platforms for launch, recovery, and maintenance of landing craft and aircraft; command, control, communications, and intelligence systems; logistical support; unit and staff accommodations; damage control; and offensive and defensive weapons suites. The ships of an amphibious task force (ATF) can transport, project ashore, support, recover, and redeploy Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). The critical forward presence role of Navy and Marine forces is most effective when MAGTFs are deployed on board amphibious ships supported by other Navy combatant forces. Such offshore concentrations of force are independent of requirements for bases, ports, airfields, or overflight. They provide the United States with a credible deterrent and immediately available combat power should deterrence fail.

Operational Maneuver From the Sea describes rapid maneuver by landing forces from their ships directly to objectives ashore, uninterrupted by topography or hydrography. Naval forces must dispense with previous amphibious methods in which operational phases, pauses, and reorganizations imposed delays and inefficiencies upon the momentum of the operation.

Technologies available during the early stages of modern amphibious warfare development-particularly in the areas of mobility, navigation, and command and control-dictated that the Navy provide both the means of landing force movement and its control. The result was frequently a slow buildup ashore as slow-speed water craft executed an intricate ship-toshore shuttle from ships operating close to the beach. The landing force was required to secure a lodgment until combat power could be built up sufficiently to allow maneuver to the actual objective. Practical considerations in establishing such a beachhead reduced the littoral area vulnerable to attack.

Emerging technologies represented by the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV), MV-22 aircraft, global positioning system (GPS), and developing command and control systems will radically alter the nature of amphibious operations. Landing force units will possess their own mobility systems and have the ability to independently navigate across the ocean surface to penetrate the enemy’s shoreline at points of their choosing. Freed from the constraints of securing a large beachhead, the commander will be able to focus on the enemy and begin the landing force’s maneuver from over the horizon. These new capabilities will enable tactical commanders to make decisions as the situation develops to exploit enemy weaknesses and maintain the momentum of the attack from the ship to the objective. This combination of maneuver warfare philosophy and emerging technologies will provide the naval force with enhanced combat effectiveness. This paper, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, describes this new tactical concept for conducting amphibious forcible entry.

The Battlefield

The requirement for forcible entry from the sea is enduring. Such operations will be accomplished by converting littorals into the enemy’s vulnerable flank, obtaining leverage against his operational center of gravity. Regardless of the presence of adjacent land bases, amphibious forces provide the joint force commander a credible and sustainable forcible entry capability.

Hostile combined arms forces supported by integrated air and coastal defense systems remain the greatest threat to landing forces. From mobile or fixed positions, defending forces may attempt to deny landing sites or counter friendly maneuvers ashore. Landing forces may face any combination of obstacles, mines, artillery, missiles, aircraft, submarines, small boats, air defense artillery, and mobile reaction forces. The enemy may attempt to defeat or disrupt the amphibious force by contesting control of the air, surface, or subsurface battlespace. He may attack the naval force at sea, attempt to repel the landing force during the assault phase, counterattack on land to eject the landing force, or any combination of the above. He uill employ an array of decoys, deceptive devices and electronic countermeasures to thwart efforts to identify and target his defenses.

The amphibious force and other elements of the naval force will offset these challenges by remaining over the horizon, using the expanded battlespace the sea offers to impede enemy targeting and provide more reaction time to defeat counterstrikes. From this tactically advantageous position, the landing force will be able to maneuver across an unmarked and inherently volatile surface to attack its landward objectives.

CONCEPT

General

Operational maneuver from the sea requires new tactical concepts for amphibious operations. Although the focus is on operational objectives ashore, the sea becomes essential maneuver space for the landing force. Successful execution of operational maneuver from the sea demands that the landing force maintain the momentum gained by maneuver at sea through ship-to-objective maneuver. The landing force generates overwhelming tempo and overmatches enemy weaknesses with its power and rapidity of execution. Tactical flexibility, combined with reliable intelligence, will allow it to bypass, render irrelevant, or unhinge and collapse the enemy’s defensive measures.

Ship-to-objective maneuver employs the concepts of maneuver warfare to project a combined arms force by air and surface means against inland objectives. Ship-to-objective maneuver takes advantage of emerging mobility and command and control systems to maneuver landing forces in their tactical array from the moment they depart the ships, replacing the ponderous shipto-shore movement of current amphibious warfare with true amphibious maneuver. Historically, reliance on Navy command and control during ship-to-shore movement and the requirement to establish a lodgment ashore worked counter to the principles of maneuver warfare (see Figure 1). By executing ship-to-objective maneuver, landing forces will exploit advanced technologies which will permit combined arms maneuver from overthe-horizon attack positions through and across the water, air, and land of the littoral battlespace directly to inland objectives (see Figure 2).

 

True ship-to-objective maneuver is not aimed at seizing a beach, but at thrusting combat units ashore in their fighting formations, to a decisive place, and in sufficient strength to ensure mission accomplishment. Landing forces will engage enemy units only as necessary to achieve the freedom of action to accomplish operational objectives.

Ship-to-objective maneuver provides the opportunity to achieve tactical as well as operational surprise, something seldom possible in past amphibious operations. Operations will begin from over the horizon and project power deeper inland than in the past, progressing with speed and flexibility of maneuver that will deny the enemy warning and reaction time. By requiring the enemy to defend a vast area against our seaborne mobility and deep power projection, naval forces will render most of his force irrelevant. If the enemy chooses to withhold a strong mobile reserve, he will be attacked with long-range fires. His thinly spread defenses will allow friendly forces greater freedom of maneuver at sea and ashore. Preassault operations will confuse and deceive the enemy, locate and attack his forces, and further limit his ability to react. Naval forces will take advantage of the night and adverse weather conditions, as well as the ability to control the electromagnetic spectrum. These capabilities will enable exploitation of known enemy vulnerabilities, create opportunities, achieve tactical surprise, and result in mission accomplishment.

PRINCIPLES

The key element of ship-to-objective maneuver adapts combined arms penetration and exploitation operations to the environment described in Operational Maneuver From the Sea. The result is littoral power projection that exploits significant improvements in tactical mobility to achieve enhanced combat power, and provides theater and joint force commanders a greater range of warfighting options. Ship-to-objective maneuver:

* Focuses on the operational objective and provides increased flexibility for landing force commanders to strike enemy critical vulnerabilities. No longer tied to phased operations and the cumbersome development of suitable beachheads, the landing force will concentrate on rendering the enemy ineffective.

* Treats the sea as maneuver space. For the force that controls it, the sea is both a protective barrier and highway of unparalleled mobility. Turning the enemy’s vulnerable flank, or exploiting gaps in his positions, the landing force thrusts combat units by air and surface deeply into his defensive array. Such maneuvers unhinge the enemy position, making his dispositions increasingly vulnerable and, finally, untenable.

* Emphasizes intelligence, deception, and flexibility to drive planning, option selection, and maneuver execution. Naval forces exploit preassault operations to deceive the enemy, determine his dispositions, attack his critical vulnerabilities, and initiate action to gain tactical advantage. They execute these operations specifically to find or create exploitable gaps. The common tactical picture provided to all commanders by advanced command and control systems, combined with the inherent flexibility of ship-to-objective maneuver, will allow the landing force to exploit such gaps.

Applies strength against weakness and projects combat power through gaps located or created in the adversary’s defenses. These gaps are not necessarily geographical; they may be exploitable weaknesses, such as limited night fighting capability, poor command and control, lack of endurance, or low morale. While the landing force will attempt to bypass the enemy’s defensive strength, it may be necessary to neutralize or destroy critical positions in the defensive array, including coastal strong points, in order to cause a rapid disintegration of the enemy force.

* Creates overwhelming tempo and momentum. Air and surface units maneuver from ships to inland positions faster than the enemy can effectively react. The landing force maintains the initiative and operates at a pace that allows it to dictate the terms of engagement. Operational surprise, through a combination of secrecy, deception, ambiguity, electronic warfare, lethal attack, and tactical successes, delays enemy recognition and disrupts his response. Complementary actions that fix, confuse, or neutralize the enemy support the rapid and uninterrupted thrust of combat power to decisive points ashore. The enemy will continually face dilemmas and a tempo of operations that denies him control of the battle and keeps him off balance and reactive.

* Integrates all elements in accomplishing the mission. Whether operating in a joint or combined environment, the naval forces will employ all available assets in support of ship-to-objective maneuver in order to maximize the effectiveness of the landing force.

OPERATIONS

Overview

Ship-to-objective maneuver applies the principles and tactics of maneuver warfare to the littoral battlespace. Specifically, it will allow for conducting combined arms penetration and exploitation operations from over the horizon directly to objectives ashore without stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones. Landing forces will conduct ship-to-objective maneuver by executing plans which are detailed, but flexible. A focus on the overall objective will drive planning and the scheme of maneuver ashore, allowing commanders to base decisions (such as the time and place of landing) on enemy gaps, movement of enemy reserves, or other events. Surface and vertical maneuver elements will be employed to accomplish the mission, producing a cumulative effect greater than the sum of the parts. Application of maneuver warfare principles in the execution of ship-to-objective maneuver (see figure 3) will require a number of changes to current doctrine, to include:

(1) Landing force maneuver will begin upon crossing the line of departure (LOD). The assembly areas will be the ships themselves, and attack positions will be well offshore.

(2) Assault elements will depart their ships knowing the plan in effect and will proceed from at-sea attack positions to the LOD.

(3) Movement parallel to the shore may occur at any point between leaving the ships and crossing the high-water mark. The shift from amphibious task force control to landing force control will occur at or before the LOD.

(4) At any point after reaching the attack position, tactical commanders on the scene may choose to vary their attack formations and axes and give other tactical directions based upon the changing situation and commander’s intent.

(5) Tactical commanders plan landing force maneuver options so that they can exploit up-to-date information and cross the beach at the most advantageous points. They would normally seek gaps in the enemy defenses but sometimes operational considerations may require a deliberate assault against a defended position.

Four new coordination measures will be needed to control maneuver forces in the expanded battlespace of ship-to-objective maneuver: littoral penetration area (LPA), littoral penetration zone (LPZ), littoral penetration site (LPS), and littoral penetration point (LPP).

These are defined in the adjacent diagrams:

As maneuver elements touch down on the shore, the transition from maneuver on the sea to land maneuver must be seamless, allowing the force to maintain momentum and tempo so as to conduct deep penetrations and reach inland objectives quickly. The landing force will attack enemy critical vulnerabilities, creating and exploiting new opportunities until achieving a decisive advantage. Vertical and surface maneuver forces bring complementary capabilities to the battle, permitting operations to continue unabated until the forces achieve their objectives. Vertical assault forces may attack key positions within the enemy defenses and continue to maneuver on the ground or repeat their vertical assaults on subsequent objectives. Surface assault units accomplish assigned missions and keep pressure on the enemy, either linking up or maneuvering in tandem with the vertical assault units.

The command and control system will provide the commander with the ability to see and influence the battlefield, while giving subordinate maneuver commanders the freedom to exploit fleeting opportunities. Plans will be based on accurate intelligence, but an understanding of the commander’s intent will permit maneuver unit commanders to adapt their actions to the changing situation.

Ship-to-objective maneuver calls for rapid projection of combined arms teams ashore, but emphasizes sea-based command and control, logistics, and fire support. Improved information connectivity allows the landing force command element to remain at sea, capable of effective command, but better protected from enemy attack. When afloat, the headquarters retains direct influence upon naval support operations, but does not drain scarce landing force combat and logistic resources. The seabasing concept calls for ships of the amphibious task force to serve as floating combat service support platforms to resupply the combat units rapidly and directly, fully exploiting the lift and mobility offered by landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. By seabasing most supporting fires, landing force vulnerability and footprint ashore are significantly reduced, greatly improving freedom of maneuver and enabling the naval force to project ashore combat formations which are leaner, lighter, and more effective.

In ship-to-objective maneuver, the distinction between advance force operations and the assault fades. Historically, amphibious operations have relied on successful preassault operations. A dedicated advance force which preceded the main body of the amphibious task force conducted deception operations, mine clearing, fire support, and obstacle reduction in the objective area. While such tasks remain critical to the success of ship-toobjective maneuver, it may no longer be desirable to establish a separate advance force to perform them. Reconciling the contradictory requirements of preassault operations and surprise requires a change in our concept of advance force operations. The benefits of surprise are so important that, with the exception of deception, those functions which cannot be executed by clandestine means must be performed “in-stride” by assault units. Thus, future operations will emphasize clandestine efforts to determine enemy strengths and weaknesses by locating and identifying mines, obstacles, fire support units, critical command and control nodes, and force dispositions. Breaching, preparatory fires, and obstacle clearing-traditionally preassault tasks-will become an integral part of the assault phase.

As the phasing of the assault changes, so does the organization of the landing force. The separation of the landing force into the five traditional movement categories of scheduled waves, on-call waves, prepositioned emergency supplies, remaining landing force supplies, and nonscheduled units disappears in shipto-objective maneuver. By task organizing landing units into combined arms teams, the requirements for specialized units in on-call waves are reduced.

The amphibious operation does not terminate with the transfer of command ashore, but rather with the accomplishment of the mission. The MAGTF may then either transition to subsequent operations ashore, or reembark on board the ships of the amphibious task force to prepare for further force projection operations. A general unloading of the landing force will not take place.

Surface Maneuver Force

The surface assault force consists of self-contained combined arms teams. After leaving the ship, these teams maneuver in AAAVs and LCACs over the sea under the direction of their tactical commanders, much as land forces maneuver across a desert. The rapid movement of this force inland to their objectives reduces landing force vulnerability to enemy beach defenses and creates a tempo of operations that will outpace the enemy’s ability to react. The combined arms teams include supply and maintenance capabilities that will be replenished and augmented as required from the seabase.

The flexibility offered by the combination of AAAVs and LCACs will provide multiple penetration options for each maneuver element. Overwhelming combat power will be concentrated from several directions using organic firepower of maneuver units and sea-based fires. High-speed amphibious mobility will enable friendly forces to reinforce success quickly by redirecting their efforts toward gaps found or created in enemy defenses. Given the range and speed of the AAAV and LCAC, these forces might penetrate the enemy’s coast outside the area they intend to control, and then attack back into the vital area (see Figure 2). Subsequent surface elements may not penetrate at the same points as initial elements. As defenses are turned and impediments destroyed, subsequent elements will be able to penetrate at the points most advantageous to their mission, rather than simply follow in trace.

Vertical Maneuver Force

A deep vertical envelopment presents the enemy with a dilemma. If he reacts to the vertical assault force, he risks increasing his vulnerability to other vertical assaults, to the maneuver of the surface assault force, and to supporting fires. If he ignores the vertical assault force, it can cause significant damage and seize objectives facilitating the surface assault, creating other opportunities for exploitation. The MV-22 and CH-53E offer mobility which enables the vertical assault force to attack from over the horizon and strike rapidly at deep objectives, reembark, and strike other objectives before the enemy can react.

As with the surface elements, vertical assault units will operate on multiple axes and not be restricted to the same littoral penetration points previously used. Furthermore, the endurance and speed of the MV-22 permit multiple lifts and extractions of the same unit, providing a flexibility of maneuver seldom before achieved in vertical assault operations. The ability to insert deep and then conduct bounding maneuver will allow the vertical assault force to maintain a rapid tempo, exploiting freedom of maneuver, destroying the enemy’s forces through supporting fires, without allowing the vertical assault force to become decisively engaged.

PLANNING

While detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures will evolve, ship-to-objective maneuver planning will follow the basic doctrinal principles established in Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. Forces will focus planning on mission objectives and the scheme of maneuver ashore, culminating in a landing plan. The major differences between traditional and future amphibious power projection planning are the elimination of the requirement for a force beachhead and the need to plan for several schemes of maneuver, all of which must be supported by a single embarkation plan. Future landing forces will attack through littoral penetration points that best support accomplishment of the operational mission. The best option might not be the shortest route, but the one that best takes advantage of gaps in the enemy defenses. Some situations will require creating a gap by destroying enemy forces.

Several factors will influence planning for ship-to-objective maneuver. First and foremost is the objective. Operational maneuver from the sea envisions the accomplishment of a significant operational or strategic objective. It is not an assault to seize a beachhead. All decisions will be based upon this overall objective, from landing force missions to the degree of risk acceptable to the force as a whole. The practical implications for the landing force include assembly areas and attack positions that remain miles offshore. While this change complicates pre-H-hour unit actions and coordination, these challenges can be overcome through exploitation of increased maneuver space, improved command and control, and precision location and navigation systems. Launching the attack from over the horizon will enhance security while expanding the potential for surprise.

The second major factor involves the execution and timing of preassault tasks, such as minefield and obstacle breaching. If such obstacles cannot be avoided, surface assault forces must time their landing to coincide with the successful completion of breaching operations. This requires an in-stride breaching capability.

The third factor which influences planning for ship-to-objective maneuver is task organization and embarkation of the landing force. Since landing forces, especially Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), will often deploy prepared and embarked to accomplish a variety of missions, the doctrinal sequence of planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault (PERMA) might often become EMPRA, with embarkation and movement occurring prior to the planning, rehearsal, and assault phases of an amphibious operation.

A fourth and closely related factor deals with distances, cycle times, and lift availability for the landing. For the task-organized assault force, launch and coordinated movement from widely dispersed ships will require the use of precision location and navigation systems to achieve appropriate arrival at the LOD. Tactical commanders of landing force units must coordinate movement of combined arms teams embarked in AAAVs and LCACs to maintain unit integrity and combat power. Different launch distances, varying craft and vehicle speeds, and the potential requirement to divert critical lift assets to alternate ships as losses occur will complicate coordination.

Ship-to-objective maneuver requires tactical commanders of individual landing units to control their own unit’s movement. This must include the authority to divert through alternate LPSs or LPPs, as the situation dictates. Those permissive tactical control measures used in ground operations will be extended seaward and applied to the amphibious assault.

While less precisely defined than the factors listed above, operations conducted with dispersed forces maneuvering over extended distances will impact planning. Concentrating combat power, providing fire support, sustaining the landing force, and conducting mutually supporting attacks will require extensive planning, training, and shared situational awareness.

EXECUTION

Landing force surface maneuver will require careful coordination between elements of combined arms landing teams. These teams, generally embarked in a mix of AXAVs and LCACs, will deploy from a number of dispersed amphibious ships (see Figure 4). Initially, the amphibious task force commander will vector units to attack positions seaward of their planned LPSs. As in a combined arms attack ashore, units will use attack positions to complete final preparations by assuming tactical formations, confirming orders, and accomplishing any “last minute” tasks. Attack positions can also serve as decision points for selecting a course of action from multiple options supporting the scheme of maneuver.

Different missions, movement rates, and survivability factors will determine the sequence and timing of each element through the attack positions. After crossing the LOD, landing elements will begin their run at their LPPs and inland objectives. Amphibious task force and landing force commanders will continue to monitor progress, though the landing unit tactical commanders will now have the authority to maneuver as required, depending upon the tactical situation. Attack helicopters may escort the AAAV and LCAC-mounted surface force to provide added capability against hostile watercraft during the long transit to the objective. Careful coordination by individual unit commanders will ensure that units cross LPPs with tactical integrity and cohesion intact, ready to prosecute the scheme of maneuver.

Resistance at the beach is always possible. The leading elements of the landing force, mounted in AAAVs, will provide supporting arms and direct fire to overcome resistance in the vicinity of the LPP. Leading assault elements u ill maneuver to clear sufficient space, laterally and in depth, to ensure secure offloading of LCACs, while continuing the rapid inland penetration uninterrupted.

In concert with the surface assault, the vertical assault force will maneuver inland, using evasive routes, feints, and alternate approaches to confuse enemy defenses. Commanders will coordinate vertical assault and surface assault times to achieve maximum enemy disruption. Timing of the landings is designed to maintain tempo and overwhelm local defenses. The number of vehicles or aircraft in each element and the time between elements will depend on the mission, enemy situation, and characteristics of the LPZ. Each landing team may embark on different ships in order to facilitate near simultaneous launching as cohesive units. While such dispersion is not ideal for administrative purposes during the movement phase of an operation, it will speed the landing of cohesive combat units during the assault phase. With all of its nonamphibious vehicles loaded in LCACs, a tactical commander can maneuver his unit so that it will be able to land as a combat team regardless of the number of ships upon which it was embarked.

KEY CAPABILITIES

Successful implementation of the ship-to-objective maneuver concept will require improvements in mobility, command and control, intelligence, fires, sea-based logistics, organization, doctrine, training, and education. Specific capabilities that we must achieve through the combat development process are outlined below.

Mobility

The landing force must maneuver from attack positions well offshore through LPPs and rapidly to inland objectives. This requires surface and vertical assault systems with the speed, range, precision location and navigational capabilities, protection, and firepower to launch from over-the-horizon positions, maneuver toward any LPP, and crack the environmental and defensive shell of the LPA while maintaining the momentum of the attack. The technologies required to provide these capabilities are under development, and the combat systems implementing these technologies are the highest acquisition priority in the Marine Corps. These include AAAV, MV22, and surface craft and aircraft to deliver equipment and supplies throughout the littoral region. A force properly equipped with the AAAV, LCAC, MV-22 and CH-53E, and supported by sufficient numbers of amphibious and support ships, will provide the required operational capabilities in the early 21st century.

The landing force must also locate, identify, and overcome both natural and manmade impediments to mobility. Mines, obstacles, adverse terrain, and built-up areas can all impede the mobility of the landing force. Just as in land maneuver, the surface assault force must be able to penetrate obstacles between the LOD and final objectives either through preexisting gaps or by breaching. To accomplish these tasks, robust mine reconnaissance and rapid in-stride breaching capabilities are essential.

Command and Control

Command and control provides the mechanism by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and communicates those actions required to ensure mission accomplishment. Maneuver warfare emphasizes decentralized execution with subordinate commanders exercising the maximum possible latitude in performing assigned missions. Command and control systems must provide landing force commanders at all echelons a common operational picture and the connectivity to monitor execution and to influence events when necessary.

Intelligence

Satisfaction of intelligence requirements is critical. The most immediate intelligence priority for ship-to-objective maneuver is locating and identifying enemy forces and impediments to mobility. The landing force will exploit this intelligence throughout the operation using “reconnaissance pull” tactics to take advantage of gaps while avoiding obstacles and strong points. Commanders at all levels require timely access to all-source intelligence relevant to their immediate needs. They must be able to request and receive specific, real-time, and near-real-time information in a usable format, whether they are embarked, maneuvering toward objectives, or conducting subsequent operations ashore.

Fires

Fire support of ship-to-objective maneuver must provide immediate and responsive high volume suppression and neutralization fires in support of all landing force elements. Unit commanders at all levels will call for and control the fires of organic and supporting arms. Fire support systems must be capable of providing highly accurate and lethal long-range fires to simultaneously satisfy the needs of both the vertical assault and the surface assault. Furthermore, these fires must be available “around the clock” and in all weather conditions. Fire support agencies must respond to calls for fire with sufficient speed and accuracy to support landing force maneuver.

Information Operations

Ship-to-objective maneuver relies on surprise, deception, and ambiguity to create exploitable gaps in the enemy’s dispositions and reactions. Friendly forces must not only have the capability to gain knowledge about the enemy, but also the resources to develop and execute convincing deceptions. Having “painted a picture” for the enemy, they must then be able to selectively disrupt and degrade his command and control systems to delay his recognition of the actual situation. The capability to defeat the enemy’s command and control system while protecting its own will give the naval force an important edge.

Sea-Based Logistics

Sustaining deeply inserted vertical assault forces and rapidly penetrating surface assault forces from a seabase presents a critical challenge. The alr sence of dumps ashore, limited resupply delivery means, and rapidly maneuvering combat forces combine to make “logistics push” techniques undesirable and infeasible. Maneuver units will operate under a “logistics pull” concept, drawing support from the floating combat service support areas. This will require total asset visibility and selective offload capability within the seabase, and systems for delivering tailored logistic packages directly to the using element.

Organization, Doctrine, and Training and Education

The human element is as important to the implementation of ship-to-objective maneuver as are materiel improvements. Placing responsibility on the landing force commander for controlling movement from the ship to the objective is a significant departure from current doctrine. The organization and coordination agencies of the naval force must adapt to fully exploit the advantages offered by new technology. Tactical maneuver unit commanders will now direct ship-to-objective maneuver from attack positions located beyond the horizon all the way to objectives located deep inland, coordinating movement with higher and adjacent units, calling for fires, and making rapid decisions to achieve the commander’s intent. Preparing future naval leaders to deal with the challenges and opportunities of conducting maneuver warfare in the littoral battlespace will require that:

* Naval sen-ice schools impart a common understanding of this emerging doctrine and its underlying philosophy.

* Navy and Marine units develop and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures through unit, staff, and task force exercises.

* Realistic naval power projection simulations stimulate and encourage initiative, imagination, boldness, and rapid decisionmaking in exercises and in operations.

SUMMARY

Ship-to-objective maneuver is a tactical concept for the conduct of amphibious operations in support of operational maneuver from the sea. It applies maneuver warfare concepts to the littoral battlespace. By doing so, a landing force will be capable of seamless maneuver from over the horizon directly against objectives deep inland. Through application of the tenets contained in this concept paper, the principles of operational maneuver from the sea are integrated with those of maneuver warfare, as described in MCDP-1, Warfighting.

Ship-to-objective maneuver and operational maneuver from the sea mark a major evolution in amphibious warfare. These concepts take advantage of innovations in technology to enhance the capability of naval forces to conduct amphibious operations in the 21st century. Ship-to-objective maneuver directly links maneuver at sea to maneuver on land, enabling naval forces to fully apply the principles of maneuver warfare in support of operational maneuver from the sea. The improvements in doctrine, organization, training and education, and equipment outlined above will result in unprecedented operational flexibility and a greatly improved capacity to project power ashore.

Unified Effort in Support of Dominant Maneuver on the Joint Battlefield

by Col John A. Clauer

In September of 1994, as part of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, U.S. forces prepared to conduct forcible entry combat operations in the small Caribbean nation of Haiti. After planning and testing a number of options, the U.S. Atlantic Command settled on a concept that would involve the following: Seizure of targets in Port-au-Prince by airborne elements of the 82d Airborne Division and by helicopterborne elements of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) operating principally from the USS America.

Seizure of targets in the Cap Haitian area by Marines of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) operating from U.S. Navy amphibious shipping.

Combat support operations by 300-plus aircraft under the command of the airborne joint force air component commander (TFACC).

Post H-hour peace enforcement operations by the 10th Mountain Division.

Thus at H-hour on D-day, four commands would be employing combat forces in an area no larger than New Jersey. Yet unlike a similar operation in Grenada over 10 years earlier, this operation had all of the trappings for being successful. It was commanded and controlled by a single entity, the commander of the Joint Task Force drawn from the XVIII Airborne Corps, using newly forged joint doctrine to employ forces from all four Services and the U.S. Special Operations Command, and planned to employ operational maneuver to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through unexpected actions. Since the combat operations were never executed as planned, it is difficult to pronounce this operation a success in joint combat warfare. However, it can be used as a model in examining joint doctrine and to specifically observe command, control, and maneuver from the operational level.

The commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, as commander of the Joint Task Force, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (CJTF) maintained firm overall operational command. Although the JTF Headquarters was an ad hoc organization built around the Corps Headquarters (with limited participation from the other Services until shortly prior to execution) it, nonetheless, qualified as ajoint command element. The chain of command was well defined, and the joint force organization was within the guidelines of joint doctrine. Maneuver was the planned method for getting a variety of forces deep into the enemy’s defenses in order to break up his cohesion and force quick capitulation of the Haitian forces. Because movement of forces would be rapid and widely dispersed, control was, by necessity, decentralized. While CJTF was aboard the USS Mount Whitney exercising overall command, he was not in a position to function as the on-scene commander. Consequently, at H-hour on D-day, the following command and control (C2) arrangements would have existed in the area of responsibility:

The JFACC would be airborne over Haiti exercising C^sup 2^ over fixed-wing aviation but not over rotary-wing aviation.

The JSOTF on the USS America would exercise C^sup 2^ over his forces and rotary-wing aviation from an airborne platform and would have a backup EC-135 in the air over Haiti as an alternate C^sup 2^ cell.

The commander of the 82d Airborne would exercise C^sup 2^ over his forces and aviation assets through the commanders inserting with the force.

The Marines near Cap Haitian would be under the command of the MAGTF commander and under the control of the onscene ground combat element (GCE) commander.

The JTF Headquarters would have a jump command post insert at H-hour, but it would exercise little influence over actions until some time after the initial assault.

The JTF Headquarters also planned to have a EC-135 in the air over Haiti to act as a “deconfliction” command element (however their primary mission, due to limited communication nets, was to monitor and in exigent situations deconflict).

With four different element commanders controlling their forces in the air and on the ground at H-hour on D-day, the plan for coordination and control along the “seams” of the battlefield involved the intricate use of synchronization measures. Obviously, these synchronization measures needed to be coordinated. However, with no designated onscene commander, one miscue or mistake in the preplanned flow of forces and fire support clearly had the potential to be fatal. Everything seemed to depend upon precise execution to prevent fratricide and to accomplish the CJTF’s intent.

Problem

While CJTF was organizing, planning, and preparing to fight his forces in accordance with current joint doctrine and attempting to achieve a “seamless” unity of effort, his operational concepts for command, control, and maneuver appeared to be on a collision course.

All three of the operational concepts outlined in Figure 1 are firmly established in joint doctrine and are essential to successful combat operations. However, based upon the situation identified in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, it is apparent we either have an inadequate organization for combat, a misunderstanding of the concepts and terms of command/control/maneuver, or there is some other method necessary to achieve harmony between the three concepts. I believe that as we seek the answer to this problem we will find that it lies not with our organization for combat, nor with our terms or doctrine, but with the method of achieving the often misunderstood and overlooked concept of “harmonious initiative.” This essay will attempt to analyze command, control, maneuver, and harmonious initiative and present an operational concept that enables integration of the four terms.

History

One of the results of DESERT ONE and Grenada was the changes made to U.S. law concerning the organization and employment of U.S. forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was Congress’ attempt to fix the problems identified by these operations. Specifically, they were attempting to strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, streamline the warfighting authority of the unified commanders (CinCs), and remove the Service parochialism and rivalry from the battlefield. Congress’ intent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act was clearly articulated by Senator Sam Nunn:

These changes are designed to correct problems that have been evident in the Department of Defense for many years. These problems include lack of interservice cooperation, poor quality of collective advice from the Joint Chiefs, cumbersome chains of command, inadequate authority of the warfighting commanders in the field and excessive bureaucracy at every level.

Clearly, the single greatest problem that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was trying to address was the lack of unity of command. Responding to the military history of the postWorld War II period, Congress was attempting to force unified effort among the separate Services and correct problems that led to combat inefficiency and, in at least one case, to combat failure. While the efforts of Congress to mandate “jointness” were admirable, the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been mixed. While it has strengthened the Chairman and Joint Staff and resulted in the development of joint doctrine, it has created more CinCs, more components within the combatant commands, and as a result increased the potential “seams” on the battlefield. In essence, the legislation fixed many problems but in the process created more complexity for the warfighter.

Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the Services each had their own method for dealing with the seams and coordination necessary for unity of effort. The Army had its AirLand Battle, the Navy had Composite Warfare, and the Marine Corps had Amphibious Doctrine. All were designed to ensure efficient command and control, unity of effort, and maximum combat power at the point of main effort. Problems ensued, however, when multiple Service forces had to operate together on the same battlefield. Clearly, unified command, doctrine, and unity of effort were necessary for the emerging joint battlefield of the late 20th century. The issue was how to achieve this unity of effort during joint operations. This is the question that the combatant commanders and other joint force commanders had to answer.

Reorganize

The principal approach, as modified and utilized in DESERT STORM, was to organize and fight by component commands. This method created at least six organizations (Army Forces, Marine Forces Ashore, Coalition Forces, Air Forces, Special Operations Forces, and Naval Forces afloat) with multiple seams on the battlefield. While this method was effective for DESERT SHIELD, Gen Merrill McPeak in testimony to Congress on roles and missions recommended a new concept for the battlefield of the 21st century. He envisioned reorganizing forces along three functional lines with a reduced number of seams and establishment of firm centralized control. His presentation specifically recommended:

Reduce seams to the lowest practical number. The fewer seams the better.

A reasonably competent opponent attacks seams. Have strong seams.

Seams management (“integration,” “coordination,” “interface”) should be the responsibility of commanders who have full authority over all the organizational entities operating on both sides of the specified boundaries.

He further recommended that battlefield activities be divided into three categories: The Close Battle should be fought by ground forces (including organic aviation and air defense) under the command of a joint forces land component commander (JFLCC), either Army or Marine, depending on who supplies the preponderance of forces. The Deep Battle should be fought by air forces under command of the JFACC, either Air Force or Navy, depending on who provides key force elements and has appropriate C2 capabilities. The High Battle should be fought by air and naval forces under the command of a joint forces air defense commander (JFADC), whether Air Force or Navy, depending on the scenario. Normally, the JFACC is dual-hatted as the JFADC.

Gen John H. Cushman, USA(Ret), in a Military Review article (Mar-Apr95) takes an even more radical force consolidation approach. Gen Cushman states:

While this command structure (Component Commands) suffices for personnel management and administration, to fight using these component commanders as operational commanders alone simply will not work. For fighting, the forces must be mixed in a task organization that is designed for the specific mission and situation.

In support of enhancement for the purpose of conducting maneuver warfare, he proposes a command organization that has five or more maneuver formations, the JFACC/ JFADC consolidated under one commander for air/missile defense and deep fires, joint/unified communications, and joint logistics and intelligence supporting commands (see Figure 2).

The Navy, on the other hand, in its draft document on integrated battle order, creates a naval expeditionary task force (whose commander could function as a joint force commander) that has seven subordinate commanders and two commander/coordinators as illustrated in Figure 3.

It is clear that there are a multitude of concepts on how to organize the joint force for combat. While many may take exception with some of the concepts presented above, the authority to effect such reorganization of combat forces is clearly articulated in both federal law and in joint doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provides that a combatant commander has authority for “prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command…. organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.”Joint Publication 0-2 further specifies that “JFCs [joint force commanders] have the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission,” that “Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of the joint force,” and “the JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations (joint force land, air, maritime, and special operations component commanders are examples of functional components).” The three restrictions specified by the joint doctrine are that (1) a functional component’s staff that employs forces of more than one Service must be joint, (2) the MAGTF commander will retain operational control of organic air assets, and (3) “JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed.”

Clearly, there is a great deal of latitude given to a JFC to reorganize the forces within a JTF. We can expect, as the U.S. military becomes smaller and more specialized, that we will see more and more creative ways of organizing the joint force. However, it is also clear that many of these reorganizations will not simplify command but actually create more seams on the battlefield. If reorganization does not necessarily create unity of effort and reduce the seams and battlefield friction, then what other tool does the JFC have to achieve harmony of his forces?

Centralized Control

Many commanders turn to the concept of control to achieve unity of effort on the battlefield. Anyone who has served in the U.S. military for any period of time recognizes the importance of control. Control is the glue that holds combat organizations together and “allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout the operational area.” A major function of the JFC is to ensure the proper execution of the synchronization of forces plan. By doing so, he ensures that his intent or concept of operations is achieved, fratricide or friendly firefights are reduced, and the seams of the battlefield are protected. But is there a cost to be paid by too much synchronization or too much control? Capt Robert T. Muise, in discussing synchronization (Proceedings, Nov94), states:

The Army manuals describe it as `arranging activities in space to mass at the decisive point.’ To achieve the appropriate timing, all players must be operating from the same sheet of music. The concept of synchronization elicits the image of an orchestra, all elements of which must operate from the same score at precisely the same instant. To achieve the desired results, a central coordinator-the conductormust ensure strict adherence to the score. The armed services are not in the business of playing concerts, but the music analogy is valid. In Operation DESERT STORM, for example, the main effort-the Army’s VII Corpsdid not achieve decisive results. In his article, “Pushing Them Out the Back Door,” Col James G. Burton, USAF(Ret), links the VII Corps failure to their incessant quest for synchronization. Col Burton states, ‘Clearly, Franks’ [LtGen Frederick M. Franks, Jr., commanding officer of the VII Corps] failure to cut off the Republican Guard’s escape can be traced to his strict adherence to the synchronization element of the Army’s new doctrine.’

While it is true that there were other factors that facilitated the escape of the Republican Guards, it is also correct to say that reliance on strict synchronization and control slowed the advance of the VII Corps and impacted the achievement of the much publicized requirement to destroy the Republican Guard.

While control certainly may “glue” the force together and ensure management of the battlefield seams problem, it also may degrade the combat power of the force by depriving it of surprise, flexibility, and the ability to conduct effective maneuver. It appears, as stated earlier, when operational maneuver is used, there is a great deal of friction that cannot be resolved by simply reorganizing the force or exercising stricter control.

What Is Maneuver?

Maneuver warfare is defined as operations that seek to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. Maneuver is achieved by the use of decentralized control, mission orders and directives, and a well-communicated commander’s intent and end state.

Decentralized control, by definition, takes the control of forces on the battlefield and places it in the hands of the maneuver elements within an operational command. It does not mean, however, that the operational commander relinquishes all responsibility for his subordinate elements. While the object is to have subordinate commanders make decisions on their own initiative, they must also keep the operational commander aware of changes on the battlefield. The key is that the operational commander does not use his situational awareness of the battle to stifle the initiative of his subordinates.

The second method for achieving maneuver is to rely on mission orders. This is the art of assigning a subordinate a mission without specifying in excruciating detail how the mission must be accomplished. From the operational commander’s perspective the operational concept must plan for movement of forces and attack of objectives by use of maneuver. Orders to subordinates to support this concept must be specific enough to accomplish the objective and ensure coordination between friendly forces but general enough to allow the subordinate to take advantage of the constantly changing situation on the battlefield.

The third way of enhancing maneuver is to articulate a clear statement of the commander’s intent. The intent is a vision that conveys what the commander wants to do to the enemy. It is the desired end state on the battlefield-what the commander wants the enemy to look like when the mission is accomplished. It should not be confused with how the commander wants to accomplish his mission; that is contained in the concept of operations.

Capt Muise goes back to his music analogy for a description of how maneuver warfare works:

A proper understanding of the military concept (of maneuver) has been compared to a jazz improvisation session: where the whole band works to one broad harmonic framework or direction, but each individual player improvises upon it harmonically, melodically and rhythmically, introducing new shades of colour and new tensions and resolution to intensifyor relax-the sense of pace over the underlying progression. It is the adaptability of the individual initiative to emergent opportunities. It is easy to see that such an exercise of maneuver, while essential to combat success, will put pressure on the seams of a battlefield. Additionally, the more complex a command or the greater the disparity of military forces on the battlefield (typical of the operational level of war), the more likely we are to incur problems with the seams while executing maneuver. Consequently, with the requirement for maneuver established, and force reorganization and centralized control exposed as counterproductive to seams management, where does the commander turn for tools to ensure unity and focus on the battlefield? I believe we must examine the frequently overlooked concept of harmonious initiative and lateral communications.

Harmonious Initiative

Harmonious initiative is a term that would not appear to have a place in military jargon or warfighting doctrine. Harmony, as defined in the dictionary, is a pleasing combination of the elements that form a whole. Initiative is defined as action without prompting or direction from others. It appears that the two terms contradict one another. However, if we harken back to the example of the jazz session, we can get a sense of how harmonious initiative works. It is initiative that seeks to complement the end state of the group. It is accomplished through training, intuition, and practice. But, most of all, it requires communications between the musicians. By their eyes, ears, and through the feel of the music, they communicate with one another and ensure a harmonious effort. Indirect and lateral communications/coordination between the musicians is the key to the success of the group as a whole. MCDP 1, Warfighting, the Marine Corps doctrine on warfighting, also recognizes this need for harmonious initiative and lateral coordination:

It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various efforts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek unity, not principally through imposed control, but through harmonious initiative and lateral coordination within the context provided by guidance from above.

The key, then, to achieving this harmonious initiative is to have effective lateral coordination (or in the case of the operational commander, communications and coordination) between his subordinate maneuver elements. This is the “new glue” that helps us achieve unity of effort on the complex and technical battlefield of the 21st century without falling back on the old and wornout methods of reorganizing the chain of command or centralizing control. But what constitutes lateral coordination and communications? Is it simply having electronic radio and telecommunications between adjacent commanders? Military history provides abundant examples, such as the Battle of Leyte Gulf, that illustrate the misunderstandings that can arise from overreliance on electronic communications. But there are other measures that help avoid this danger.

Liaison: A Concept

Liaison is a tool that has received little attention at either the tactical or operational level of war. The task of being a liaison officer for a command often falls to a less experienced or less competent officer who has failed in other assignments. On the other hand, a wise commander will recognize that a competent liaison officer greatly assists in seams management, builds harmony of effort with higher and adjacent commands, and enhances the command’s ability to exercise the initiative necessary on the modern fluid battlefield. In addition to experienced and mature officers, liaison teams must include the best communications equipment and personnel available in order to ensure effective and continuous coordination across the seams of the battlefield. So critical is this type communication to the success of war at the operational level that it is essential that the “liaison channel” be dedicated and continuous. In other words, the communications officer must give as much priority to the liaison net as he does to the command net. Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States reinforces the importance of this concept:

Experience shows liaison is a particularly important part of command, control, communications, and computers in a joint force. Recalling Clausewitz analogy of a military force as an intricate machine, ample liaison parties, properly manned and equipped, may be viewed as a lubricant that helps keep that machine working smoothly.

It is certainly true that there are other methods that commanders may use to communicate with higher and adjacent commands. There is, of course, no substitute for face-to-face communication between commanders. Today that is available not only through meetings, but also through video teleconferences. However, these methods do not replace nor negate the need for the competent liaison officers/liaison teams.

The cost in manpower and equipment for this concept is not cheap. To dedicate a handful of mature and competent field grade officers and communications specialists to liaison teams that are often not provided for in tables of organization is a hard decision for the commander to make. However, if the proper personnel are assigned, trained, and equipped for the job, the payoff to the commander can be the freedom to exercise harmonious initiative.

Liasion in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

We now need to return to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and complete the analysis of that operation. What was the “glue” that ensured the seams for the planned invasion of Haiti were managed and coordinated? The answer was an intricate and comprehensive network of highly skilled liaison teams provided by the JSOTF to the adjacent and higher headquarters. These teams were positioned at the CinC’s headquarters, with the JTF commander, with adjacent commanders, at key shore installations, and in airborne C^sup 2^ platforms. They became a two-way street for the flow of information and intent that quite often gets lost in the communications channels and centers or inappropriately filtered by layers of command. Their value can be demonstrated by the absence of a liaison cell in one location. There was, for a number of reasons, no liaison team from the JSOTF with the U.S. Marines in Cap Haitian. They were the one element left out of this information grapevine. Consequently, the Marines had to rely on message traffic and radio communications via several layers of command. What resulted was friction when JSOTF elements planned to operate near or in the area of the Marine forces. Additionally, while other commanders in the organization enjoyed the benefit of receiving near realtime orders and commander’s intent from the CJTF, the Marines relied (at least early in the planning cycle) on message traffic filtered through the naval component commander. If the plan had been executed as planned, this is the one seam that potentially could have provided problems due to a lack of liaison/coordination.

Information Superiority

Over the past 18 months,Joint Vision 2010 and its key enabler, Information Superiority, have matured and taken on greater significance in the joint community. One of the concepts being pursued under Information Superiority is Network Centric Warfare. This concept envisions fused information, sensor, and engagement grids. The information grid is designed to give the commander dominant battlespace awareness, which is defined as achieved when the level of information possessed by the joint force concerning friendly forces, enemy forces, neutral forces, and the environment in which they are deployed reaches a sufficient level. Clearly the technology exists to “network” the battlefield of the 21st century and to achieve the level of information awareness envisioned by Network Centric Warfare. Consequently, some argue that the JFC will no longer have problems with the seams of the battlefield and will not require extensive liaison capabilities. But this view is by no means unanimous throughout the joint community and the Services. While this level of information awareness may be achievable, without changes in how we push/pull and process data, the JFC may be totally overwhelmed by this new level of information. Additionally, there are also concerns about reliance on an information system, which without significant technological enhancements in protection, is subject to interdiction and damage.

As a supporter of Joint Vision 2010, I believe in the power of information as an enabler. However, I also share the concerns expressed above. Consequently, the ideas expressed in this paper, in my opinion, take on even greater relevance on the 2010 battlefield. Effective liaison will become a powerful way for the commander to deal with an explosion of information. Liaison teams will assist in information validation, information fusion, and in understanding the all important “intent” element of information management; ultimately turning information into knowledge. They will also assist in coordination and interface with multinational partners and Reserve components that may possess a lesser capability with their information systems (also to assist in sharing of classified information among allies). Finally, they will provide an all important redundant and backup capability for retention of dominant battlefield awareness by the JFC in the event of loss of the “network” capability.

Conclusion

The implications for the Marine Corps in joint warfare are clear:

First, forward deployed MAGTFs will nearly always function as part of a naval component in support of a JTF during contingency operations. If the MAGTF wants to have its capabilities properly understood and employed, wants to minimize friction along the battlefield seams with other land forces, and wants to respond quickly to changes in the JTF operational concept, it will need to provide field grade level liaison cells to adjacent and higher organizations.

Second, with a standing JTF headquarters within II MEF, the Marine Corps will need to maintain a strong liaison capability in its force structure and an aggressive liaison role in its operational concept.

Third, all Marine task forces, regardless of size, assigned to a JTF or as part of a naval component within a CinC’s area of responsibility will need to plan for deployment of competent liaison cells early in the planning/deployment phase of operations.

Liaison is clearly the glue for management of the seams of the battlefield and effective coordination between higher and adjacent commands. It is the operational concept that harmonizes command, control, and maneuver. In the Chairman’s Joint Vision 2010, the battlefield of the 21st century will become deeper, faster, and significantly influenced by new technology, and will require “new operational concepts-dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.” In this type of dynamic joint environment, Marine combat organizations can ill afford to wait for dissemination of information/coordination across the seams of the battlefield. Liaison with higher and adjacent organizations will be critical to combat success.

MCDP 2 Approved

Recently the Corps published Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence. MCDP 2 provides all Marines with a conceptual framework for the understanding and practice of effective intelligence. In doing so, it provides a framework for the planning and execution of intelligence operations in peace, in crisis, or in war.

MCDP 2‘s view of intelligence is based upon a common understanding of the nature of war and the Corps’ maneuver warfare philosophy. MCDP 2 builds upon this doctrinal foundation by describing the relationship of intelligence within the context of other warfighting activities. In particular, MCDP 2 emphasizes that:

Intelligence is a fundamental component of command and control that is inseparable from operations.

Intelligence provides not just information but knowledge of the enemy and the environment that is used to support decisionmaking.

Effective intelligence shapes operations by uncovering enemy vulnerabilities that may be exploited to provide a decisive advantage. Intelligence also aids in protecting friendly forces against the effects of enemy actions by identifying the enemy’s capabilities and potential courses of action.

Given the inherent uncertainty of war and the fact that intelligence deals directly with the hostile, independent will of the enemy, intelligence provides estimates and probabilities, not certainty.

The commander’s direct involvement is necessary to provide effective conduct of intelligence operations. MCDP 2 points out that intelligence is every Marine’s responsibility. All Marines must see themselves as collectors, protectors, disseminators, and users of intelligence.

MCDP 2 is the third in a series of nine higher order doctrinal publications presently under development; the series is on schedule to be completed by the end of this summer. MCDP 2 does not supersede any current doctrinal publications, however, it does provide the authoritative basis for the subsequent development of intelligence doctrine, education, training, equipment, procedures, and organization.

Marine units will soon receive sufficient copies of MCDP 2 via the Marine Corps Publications Distribution System for all officers, SNCOs, and unit libraries. In addition, the publication is available now for immediate electronic distribution from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Doctrine Division Internet Homepage at http//ismo-www1.mqg.usmc.mil/docdiv or http//138.156.107.3/docdiv/.

MCDP 1 Approved

On 20 June 1997 the Commandant signed Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. MCDP 1 replaces FMFM 1, Warfighting, as the Marine Corps’ capstone doctrinal publication. It provides the authoritative basis for how Marines fight and prepare to fight, and defines a way of thinking that guides our approach to duty.

Since FMFM 1 was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. In effect it has changed the way Marines think about warfare. However, doctrine is not stagnateit evolves based on new operational experiences, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself.

MCDP 1, with a foreword by Gen XM. Gray-the architect of FMFM I-retains the spirit, style, and essential message of the 1989 document. The majority of the text has been carried forward from the original Warfighting with only minor revisions. The new publication contains three major enhancements:

First, the description of the nature of war has been expanded both to emphasize war’s complexity and unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account for the expanding forms of conflict in the modern world.

Second, the descriptions of the styles of warfare have been clarified.

Third, important maneuver warfare concepts such as commander’s intent, main effort, and centers of gravity/critical vulnerabilities have been refined.

Marine units will soon receive their initial allocation of MCDP 1 via the Marine Corps Publications Distribution System (MCPDS). Additional copies may then be ordered from MCPDS or via the Doctrine Division internet homepage at http://ismowww1.mqg.usmc.mil/docdiv or http://138.156.107.3/docdiv.

Information Superiority

by LtGen Paul K. Van Riper

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me begin by expressing my appreciation for having this opportunity to speak to you today. This may be my final visit to Capitol Hill to testify on future warfare requirements, since I plan to retire from the Marine Corps this summer after more than 40 years of Active and Reserve service. During these years, I have had many opportunities to consider the fundamental aspects of war. Some of this time I spent reflecting on warfare in the quiet solitude of a library. At other times, the sounds of the battlefield punctuated my “study” time. From these experiences, I have drawn a number of observations and conclusions that I want to leave with you. I realize that, given the distinguished Representatives present today, I do not have a monopoly on combat experience, but because I believe strongly that we are at a significant juncture in history, I welcome the chance to offer my comments for the record.

I would like to begin by providing my perspective on the so called Revolution in Military Affairs-or RMA-and then transition to an outline of the Marine Corps view on the nature of war. I will then discuss the Marine Corps’ basic philosophy for command and control, which provides an overarching approach to the use of information systems and the technologies needed to win battles. Finally, I will finish with a brief description of the programs the Corps is pursuing, within a joint context, for future applications. With an appreciation for how the Corps looks at war today, you will be able to better understand how Marines intend to march ahead into the next century.

The Nature of Revolutions in Military Affairs

Our success in the Gulf War in 1991 and the explosive growth of information technologies over the past decade have resulted in a number of extraordinary claims about the future of war. Some of these claims have gone so far as to argue that technology will allow us to see and understand everything in the battlespaces of the future-even to eliminate the “fog” and “friction” of war. There are indeed great changes that are occurring with civilian and military technologies. But our view in the Marine Corps is that these changes will only allow us to improve our capabilities, they will not alter the fundamental nature of war. This is the argument that we insist should be central to any effort to provide effective military capabilities for the defense of our national interests.

I believe the current period is analogous to the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. That was an era where threats were uncertain, where technological advances occurred steadily, and where defense resources were limited. In that interregnum, military organizations matched a number of innovative operational concepts with new doctrines and emerging technologies. These efforts resulted in the development of carrier aviation, armored blitzkrieg, amphibious doctrine, air defense, and strategic bombing. What occurred was the culmination of a number of RMAs. They occurred simultaneously during a period very similar to our current situation. Today as then, we do not know whom we will fight, where we will fight, and how we will fight. To decide now that we know and understand the coming revolution (or revolutions) in military affairs will more than likely close down a number of potentially significant options.

There are important lessons to be gained from the interwar period that are relevant to thinking about RMAs. First, success in developing advantageous capabilities does not always go to those with the most sophisticated technology. History suggests that technology has played only a relatively small part in past RMAs. Success appears to be the result of the combination of different organizational structures and innovative operational concepts to solve specific problems. Second, success is the result of serious intellectual effort that focused, not on near-term, but long-term advantage. Finally, success follows those who have anchored their combat development on a solid and honest historical analysis and on realistic experimentation. Those who ignored history got lost. Those who followed narrow paths, espoused dogmas, or placed undue faith in ungrounded assumptionsthose who failed to use a painstaking process of experimentation-paid a harsh penalty in the early days of World War II. To protect U.S. national security interests in the 21st century, we should heed these lessons and plan accordingly.

During the interwar era the Marines saw opportunity in amphibious operations, where others, because of the disaster at Gallipoli, saw only failure and limitations. The Marines anticipated the upcoming changes in the strategic environment and envisioned a need to seize and defend advanced naval bases in the Pacific. They translated this vision into concepts that prepared the Corps for amphibious assaults to support the emerging Pacific strategy. Despite a lack of resources, the Marines worked through the problem. With serious study of history, they developed a number of innovative concepts and technical applications. These were eventually tested and refined in experiments with the Navy near the island of Culebra.

Getting the most out of revolutions in military affairs requires an approach perhaps best characterized by comparison with a set of automobile headlights. What the American military needs as it travels towards the next millennium is to use a set of high beams with halogen bulbs. Our Nation needs to extend its vision and peer far down the road into the future by asking the right questions. Driving too fast with only the limited illumination of parking lights is simply unsafe. Using too narrow a beam or insufficient visionary illumination will only limit how fast and how far we can travel. Above all, the military must conduct its preliminary moves in light of a study of history. The microchip has not made Thucydides, Clausewitz, or Mahan irrelevant. In fact, all the trends in modern science, evolutionary biology, nonlinear mathematics, and quantum physics underline that Clausewitz’s fundamental belief that we do not live in a predictable universe was right on target.

The Nature of War in the 21st Century In addition to understanding the historical parameters of revolutions and military innovation, the American military must address the changing character of war. Unfortunately, the RMA debate has distracted some experts from an open-eyed assessment of the character of future conflict. Our national security cannot be preserved solely by being able to destroy targets from a great distance. Simply put, the destruction of greater quantities of things more efficiently will not help the United States accomplish its political objectives in the next millennium. Its Armed Forces must prepare for the complex, dynamic, and asymmetric threats of “the day after tomorrow,” not simply create and field forces that can fight DESERT STORM more efficiently. In the next century, we will confront thinking and adaptive opponents who have studied our systems and configured their tactics to defeat ours. To address lethal and flexible adversaries, the American military must radically reduce its current vulnerabilities, those key nodes that make easy targets for an enemy possessing only limited technical capabilities. The United States has the time today to take advantage of the current “strategic pause” to explore and experiment, before rushing towards substantive investments.

Much of the RMA debate over the past few years has centered on investing in a set of platforms or in acquiring more information systems. There are valid modernization requirements among all the Services, but that should not be the focus today. Ultimately, national security is not about platforms, software, or hardware, but about the capabilities the United States needs in an uncertain world. A narrowly defined threat will result in an equally narrow set of defense capabilities. The real issue is far broader and more complex than measuring and quantifying our ability to strike a specific threat from great distances. The United States will confront a great number of threats from the high end of the spectrum to the low; consequently, it must prepare its forces to adapt against a wide variety of challenges. The forces designed this year for the day after tomorrow must be capable in a range of operating environments, from deserts to foliage, to densely populated urban centers with embedded antagonists. Not all of these environments are conducive to “information dominance.”

Preparing to Fight in the 21st Century The Marine Corps efforts to prepare for the 21st century rest on a solid appreciation of the fundamental nature of war. This understanding has shaped our central philosophy about warfighting and is the basis for a cohesive doctrine that shapes all our combat development efforts. FMFM 1, Warfighting, our capstone doctrinal publication, sets out our basic understanding of war.

War possesses elements that are both timeless and ever changing. We view the basic nature of war as immutable. It is a violent clash between opposing wills to seek to impose their own will on the other. This interaction occurs cyclically in a series of actions and counteractions between two independent and irreconcilable forces. Our view of the nature of war captures a number of factors including friction, chance, and disorder. Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central to our views about conflict. Fusing war with intangible factors beyond calculation, prediction, or rational analysis is an absolute necessity, for war is shaped by human nature, the complexities of human behavior, and the limitations of human mental and physical capabilities. These human and moral factors shape our understanding and preparation for combat. Any view of war that fails to consider fear, danger, and exhaustion is extremely suspect, if not irrelevant. Any doctrine or theory that neglects the human element neglects the central dimension of warfare.

Yet for all of its immutable nature, the means and methods used in war vary continuously. Changes in the way wars are fought can occur in an evolutionary manner or in rapid flashes. Technological advances can be a major catalyst of change. The employment of the stirrup, the longbow, the rifled musket, and the railroad had a measurable impact on warfare and induced changes in both organizational and operational terms. As the physical hardware of war improved through new developments, so did the tactical, operational, and strategic use of those means adapt to new capabilities offered by technological change.

War in the future will be characterized, as always, by friction and uncertainty and the ensuing chaos. Where, why, and how we fight will undoubtedly change. The epicenter of instability will be in the world’s littorals where 70 percent of the world’s population now lives. By 2010, that percentage will have increased. Unfortunately, this environment will negate much of our technological edge.

The conflicts of the future are not likely to have much in common. In all respectsgoals, organizations, armaments, and tactics-conflict in the coming decades will be distinguished by its great variety. For that reason, it is imperative that the United States resist the temptation to prepare for only one type of conflict. To focus on one threat increases the danger that the American military will be surprised, and perhaps defeated, by another. The chaos of the future requires that the Nation maintain the capability to project power ashore for a variety of potential tasks, ranging from disaster relief to countering armed threats in high-intensity urban combat. In the future, such threats will not array themselves neatly on a chessboard or subject themselves to attrition from afar. Any examination of the revolution in military affairs must consider a wide array of threats and threat environments.

But we also have to be realistic about the nature of warfare and the limits of technology. I have in my military career commanded a platoon, a company, a battalion, a regiment, and a division; and some of those commands were on the terrifying and frictionfilled battlefield. I have also been the assistant chief of staff for the Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence Department for the Marine Corps. Consequently, I have a combat commander’s perspective on the issue of communications, information, and intelligence; but I also understand the technical side of the equation. Without a doubt information is important, but all the information in the world is useless unless it contributes to effective decisionmaking in battle. The U.S. military possesses a plethora of systems today to gather, store, and retrieve information. It has numerous programs in place to improve its capacity to manipulate and handle pixels and imagery. Yet information is not knowledge. Our command and control needs to focus, above all else, on providing the combat commander with understanding in a form that allows professional judgment and experience to be rapidly applied.

Given the pervasive nature of uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction on the battlefield, it is natural that the U.S. military focuses on command and control and information superiority. At the same time, however, we should temper our enthusiastic rush to embrace the Information Age. As Mahan once observed, “It will be better to offer certain considerations for reflection, rather than make sweeping dogmatic assertions.” However, much of what one hears today is sweeping assertions and dogmatic platitudes. For example, a cursory review of recent comments in defense publications provides these examples:

* “If you see the battlefield, you win the war.”

* “If we had today’s sensors, we would have won in Vietnam.”

* “In the near future, we will be able to find, fix, track, and target-in realtime-anything of consequence that moves or is located on the face of the earth.”

* “Technology now provides the ability to identify virtually everything of military significance, in realtime, in any kind of weather, at any time.”

These assertions do not square with the Marine understanding of the nature of warfare or my personal experience. In fact, they represent a considerable ignorance of war and a certain arrogance. Vietnam represents a failure of flawed strategy and operational concepts that no amount of sensor data could solve. “Seeing” things and designating targets is not the same as wisdom. Warfare is more than systems; it is fundamentally and ineluctably an interactive contest of human wills. Information superiority, as an enabling element in a command and control system that includes the appropriate doctrine and professional education, is vital. But information superiority in and of itself will not win any wars.

I think that a useful way to visualize this point is to look at a glass of water. You and I would both agree that this glass is half full. The difference between winning and losing battles is not in the half that is full, but in being able to deal with the half that is empty. There will always be uncertainty and ambiguity on the battlefield. We may be able to visualize 80 percent of the battlespace, and we might even believe that we can target everything that we think is militarily important. But the battle will be lost or won in the portion of the glass that is empty due to enemy deception or the limits of our own technology. Trying to fill the glass with more technology, more systems, and greater investment will not eliminate the existence of uncertainty or friction. Our approach to command and control addresses this critical factor and defines how we hope to function effectively despite the confusion, uncertainty, and ambiguity of war.

Command and Control

The Marine Corps published its fundamental command and control doctrine last year in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control (MCDP 6). It provides the authoritative basis for subsequent development of command and control technologies, procedures, organizations, facilities, training, and professional military education. The doctrine is descriptive rather than prescriptive; that is, it provides guidance in the form of principles and concepts rather than specific instructions. It requires broad judgment in application.

The Command and Control Environment

The two fundamental factors that drive the Marine Corps’ approach to command and control are uncertainty and time. Of these, uncertainty is dominant. In the words of Clausewitz:

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.

Simply put, uncertainty represents what we do not know or understand about a given situation. From a practical point of view, we can think of uncertainty as doubt which threatens to block action. It is not simply the result of gaps in information. It is a fundamental and inevitable attribute of war, and no amount of information technology, no matter how powerful, will eliminate it or even reduce it to the point that it becomes a materially easier problem.

Uncertainty is not merely an initial environmental condition resulting from a lack of data solved by gathering and processing more information. It is a natural and inevitable product of the dynamics of war. Any action in war-friendly, enemy, or neutral-necessarily generates uncertainty. Because there will always be a significant amount of uncertainty we cannot eliminate, the ultimate requirement is to operate effectively in spite of uncertainty.

The second factor that drives command and control is time. War is a tempo-based, interactive phenomenon. Theoretically, we can always reduce uncertainty by gaining better knowledge of the situation. However, to gain better knowledge takes time. We reduce uncertainty at the expense of time and so risk surrendering the initiative to the enemy. It is axiomatic that effective command must strive to generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy. This dual desire to operate effectively despite widespread uncertainty and to generate a higher operating tempo than the enemy is the fundamental conceptual basis for all aspects of Marine Corps command and control.

We view war as a highly complex interactive system characterized by friction, unpredictability, disorder, and fluidity. It is not a mechanistic system amenable to precise, positive control mechanisms or synchronized, centralized schemes. War has more in common with biological and ecological systems than with closed, mechanical systems. It is an open system interacting with its external environment (which includes the enemy) and characterized by complex feedback loops and nonlinear dynamics.

As a result, one cannot control a complex system like war. We should not think of command and control as a coercive form of mechanistic control-the way an operator operates a machine. The object of mechanistic command and control is for the top of the organization to be “in control” of the bottom, and for the bottom to be “under* the control of the top. The worst thing that can happen is for a commander to “lose” control of the situation. But given the reality of war, it is a delusion to believe that a commander can really control the enemy or the situation with certitude or precision.

The prevailing metaphor for military command and control is a chess player moving chess pieces. We are all familiar with the rules for moving chess pieces across the board. In fact it is a poor analogy for describing the potential range of options for military operations. The turbulence of modern war suggests a need for a looser form of influence, one that provides the necessary parameters for control in an uncertain, disorderly, time-competitive environment without sacrificing flexibility or stifling the initiative of subordinates.

Command and control should not impose precise domination over details because the details are inherently uncontrollable. Rather, it should aim to provide a broad, meaningful structure to the roiling chaos and complexity of the battlefield. War defies microscopic command and control and instead requires macroscopic command and control which “controls” the system by influencing the system parameters and boundary conditions. “Command” and “control” are not coercive measures imposed on the bottom of the organization by the top. Instead, “command and control” is a process of reciprocal influence-give and take-in which all parts of the organization contribute action and feedback.

The Purpose of Command and Control

Popular literature today is replete with talk about “dominance”: command and control dominance, information dominance, dominant battlespace awareness, dominant battlefield knowledge, dominant maneuver, dominant fires, etc. Command and control is not fundamentally about dominance; information is not a medium anyone or any organization can dominate the way the air or sea can theoretically be dominated. Instead, in the Marine Corps’ view, the fundamental purpose of command and control is, first, to recognize what needs to be done in a situation and, second, to see to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control is thus essentially about effective decisionmaking and effective execution. The sole measure of effectiveness of any command and control component-technology, organization, procedure, whatever-is whether it facilitates timely decisionmaking and execution. Stripped to its essentials, this is what command and control is all about.

The Command and Control Process: The Observation to Action Loop

We use a simple model to explain the Marine Corps view of the command and control process. Developed by the late Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), it is known as the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop. The OODA loop essentially describes command and control as a continuous, cyclical process of adaptation to a changing situation. It applies to any conflict, whether the antagonists are individuals in hand-to-hand combat or large military formations.

Engaged in any conflict, we first observe the situation-take in information. Having observed the situation, we next orient to it-make certain assessments, estimates, and judgments about the situation and the possibilities. Based on our orientation, we decide what to do. Then we put the decision into action. Having acted we have changed the situation, and so the cycle begins again.

Importantly, the OODA loop reflects the significance of generating tempo. In any conflict, the antagonist who can cycle through the loop faster-who can maintain a higher operating tempo-gains an ever-increasing advantage with each cycle. The slower antagonist falls farther behind with each cycle and is increasingly unable to cope with the deteriorating situation. In short, speed is an essential element of effective command and control.

The Information Hierarchy.

One way or another, command and control is about information: getting it, judging its value, processing it into useful form, sharing it with others, acting upon it. We view information not as a medium to be dominated but as a control parameter. It allows us to provide structure to our actions. But to be useful, information must be converted into knowledge, into an understanding of what the massive amounts of bits and bytes really mean.

MCDP 6 defines uncertainty as a function of the lack of knowledge or understanding rather than of data. The distinction is important because not all information is the same; there are different classes. The lowest class of information is data. Data are the most quantifiable and tangible class of information. They are the easiest to gain. However, they are the least useful as the basis for effective decisionmaking. Data must be turned into knowledge through the process of cognition, by which humans add meaning and value through analysis, evaluation, integration. Technology may assist, but cognition remains primarily a process of human intellect. The highest class of information is understanding-knowledge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situation to gain a deeper level of awareness that allows us to make projections about the future. True situational awareness, what Napoleon would call coup d’oeil, is a function of understanding.

We should not confuse having masses of data with understanding what it represents or what to do with it. By nature, data are significantly easier to generate, identify, quantify, reproduce, and transmit than are knowledge and understanding. But commanders need knowledge and understanding to make effective decisions. Likewise, subordinates need not merely data, but knowledge and understanding of the commander’s concept and intent. The goal in command and control should not be collecting, processing, and communicating vast amounts of data-and increasing the danger of information overload in the process-but approaching understanding as closely as possible. However, we cannot simply provide the commanders with readymade wisdom and understanding. They will have to make the final judgments themselves. Unfortunately, the “information revolution” is primarily a “data revolution.” The Marine Corps believes that this emphasis on data is misplaced and that there is no substitute for the judgment and intuition of experienced and properly educated commanders.

Mission Command and Control

Marine Corps doctrine calls for mission command and control-a relative term which describes a loose, decentralized form of command and control based on deciding and acting out of an understanding of the requirements of overall mission rather than out of compliance with detailed, coercive direction from above. Every situation is different and some require greater control than others, but MCDP 6 calls for mission command and control to the extent that each situation permits. Mission command and control is preferable because through decentralization it:

* Provides greater flexibility for adapting rapidly to changing battlefield situations-to deal with unforeseen problems and exploit fleeting opportunities.

* Generates a higher operating tempo. Subordinates do not have to pass reports up the chain and wait for instructions to be passed down; they act on their own initiative.

* Deals better with the friction, uncertainty, and disorder that are pervasive in war.

In mission command and control, commanders assign missions and explain their underlying intent, but leave subordinates as free as possible to choose the manner of accomplishment. Commanders frame guidance in such a way as to provide subordinates sufficient understanding to act in consonance with their desires, while not restricting freedom of action. They reserve the use of close personal supervision for exceptional cases. And they use restrictive control measures and prescribe the manner of execution only to the degree required to provide coordination they cannot achieve by any other method.

Mission command and control relies on initiative from subordinates who must act on their own authority without waiting for instructions. Mission command and control requires a knowledge of the commander’s intent so that when the situation changes subordinates can exercise initiative in consonance with the commander’s desires. This intent is an essential device for providing harmony of effort in a decentralized and adaptive system. Finally, mission command and control rests on mutual trust throughout the organization, as well as a sense of implicit understanding and communication. This latter requirement describes the ability of people familiar with each other to understand one another and communicate with minimal information having to be expressed explicitly. It is essential in a decentralized system. Command and control based upon implicit understanding and communication is less vulnerable to disruption and attack than command and control relying on explicit communication.

Our philosophy provides a command and control doctrine that accepts war for what it is: an uncertain, tempo-driven, disorderly, and complex phenomenon. It seeks to provide a philosophy of command and control that will allow commanders to make and implement effective military decisions faster than the enemy in any type of conflict, in any setting, on any scale. It relies on mission command and control to provide the flexibility and responsiveness to deal with uncertainty and generate the tempo that is a key to success in war. It seeks to provide a workable balance among people, procedures, and technology, but recognizes that ultimately there is no substitute for human judgment and understanding.

Realizing Command and Control The preceding sections have described our vision of the future, our philosophy of maneuver warfare, and the profound impact that both have had on the Marine Corps doctrine of command and control. This final section will describe the intent, if not the methodology, behind our approaches to realize the elements of the command and control system. In doing so, many terms familiar to our warfighting concepts-balance, innovation, and jointness-have analogous representatives in the effort to transition command and control from concept to a reality.

Underpinning our approach is a single belief. It is the central thread which weaves throughout our efforts. Ultimately people, not machines, define success in war. Accordingly, we will equip our Marines, not man our equipment.

Balance

“Equipping Marines” is the fulcrum for a balanced approach to realizing effective command and control. By focusing in this way we establish the right mix of people, the doctrine, and technical systems. This balance ensures that the human dimension complements the technical element of information systems. Using this approach, our definition of a robust command and control system does not simply refer to spare equipment and alternate circuit paths, but also includes those training and education programs oriented toward enhancing rapid decisionmaking skills at all levels of command.

The Marine Corps uses this balanced approach in meeting command and control deficiencies identified through its Concept Based Requirements System. The process is not predisposed toward equipment solutions for command and control deficiencies. Rather it produces solutions involving new training procedures or updates to doctrinal publications as readily as it does acquiring new radios. With this approach, the Marine Corps pursues a balance of educational and equipment solutions for successful command and control.

Our command and control training and educational pursuits reflect the depth of commitment which the Corps makes towards its most valuable resource, the Marine. Our goal is to equip every Marine with the thinking ability to win on the battlefields of the 21st century, where the junior enlisted Marine may well need and use more information than a battalion commander does today. The changes are Corps-wide, from the transformation of recruit training to the many steps taken to improve the Corps’ entire Professional Military Education Program. The entire Marine Corps University serves not only to educate Marines but also to interact with our operating forces and the Warfighting Lab so that real thinking and innovation take place. Some of this is accomplished by exposing our Marines to classic military theorists such as Clausewitz, as well as the unique writings of historians such as John Gaddis, Alan Beyerchen, and Williamson Murray. Other of our initiatives are literally on the “edge of chaos,” involving the emerging nonlinear sciences such as chaos and complexity. These “new sciences” are the object of research at Quantico and are also being introduced into the curriculums of our schools.

Innovation

The ability to generate and harness innovation is too important to be left to chance. We believe that innovation is best achieved through experimentation. This is particularly significant during a time when the United States-without a peer competitor-can effect a “strategic pause.” The Marine Corps believes experimenting with command and control will support the innovation and agility necessary to recognize, respond, and adapt to fleeting opportunities. The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory is our most visible indication of this approach.

Just as the Corps used its schools at Quantico and the fleet exercises to redefine the science and art of amphibious operations during the 1930s, so the Warfighting Laboratory now helps us chart our future course. At the forefront of this effort is the “Sea Dragon” process of experimentation, which reflects our commitment to innovation. It is a model for future thinking and exploring, where ideas are born, evaluated, bear fruit, or die.

While the Laboratory is our engine of change, we expect innovative ideas and approaches will come from many sources; from Marines throughout the Corps, from combat developers and defense academics, as well as industry. The seeds of innovation have been planted in our logistics community, our training and education establishment, in our personnel management programs, and in the operating forces. Many ideas are being brought forth to be evaluated by the Warfighting Laboratory. Some will be of immediate benefit to the Fleet Marine Force. Others will be tossed aside or taken back to the drawing board. Results from our most promising experiments will be fed into the Marine Corps Combat Development System at Quantico.

The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory’s recently completed Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) HUNTER WARRIOR exemplifies Marine Corps command and control experimentation. The operational concept required the linking of individuals, teams, and information technology assets together in new organizational structures far different than the classic Napoleonic model. The objective for the command and control concept was to create an information management system that supported a reduction in decision process times from hours to minutes and a reduction in deliberate planning times from days to hours.

To support the operational concept, the experiment’s command and control system supported parallel decisionmaking, rather than time-consuming and inflexible sequential decisionmaking. A new network with “expert agents” was employed for HUNTER WARRIOR to represent knowledge within the system as facts and relationships of these facts, thus providing a structure for organizing and accessing this knowledge. Communications was based on Internet technology, to support the new information flows and decision processes. Cellular communications extended the network from the Enhanced Combat Operations Center to dispersed Marine forces across the noncontiguous, extended battlefield.

The results of the AWE execution phase were exciting. While detailed analysis of the results will take time, the feedback from participants and observers thus far has supported continued commitment to command and control experimentation for the Marine Corps. Just after his visit to the HUNTER WARRIOR AWE, Dr. Marvin Langston, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Space Programs, commented:

I visited the Marine Corps/Navy HUNTER WARRIOR demonstration/experiment this Saturday and found myself completely overwhelmed by the significance of what was quietly taking place. This exercise (small dispersed force supported by remote fires opposing large force) says much about the extent to which we are actively searching for profound new ways to sustain our mission. I am not saying that this set of systems operated seamlessly or even close to flawlessly, but I am saying that by this one exercise we have proven that warfare can change dramatically.

This quote captures my own feelings about HUNTER WARRIOR and my enthusiasm for the work in which our young Marine and Navy warfighters are engaged. They are throwing the full weight of their creativity into this effort.

Joint Solutions

Critical to our approach to realizing command and control is to seek and support joint solutions for command and control. We recognize the Marine Corps will not retain its warfighting edge by simple product improvements of today’s technology and thinking. Our commitment is to get the most out of equipment and at the same time integrate technology properly with related Marine Corps and joint systems. We are fully committed to a joint solution and the Chairman’s vision, C41 for the Warrior. We will achieve it through implementation of the joint standards and common operating environments of the Defense Information Infrastructure.

We have mirrored our joint approach after the tenants outlined in the Defense Information Infrastructure Master Plan. From the perspective of command and control, we do not view ourselves as mere users of an external Defense Information Infrastructure. We consider the Marine Corps’ command and control infrastructure, whether in garrison or deployed, as the Marine Corps segment of the infrastructure. While the benefits of jointness are most often described in terms of interoperability and integration, the Marine Corps views jointness as a means to leverage our limited resources. Each dollar we spend on joint command and control solutions opens up greater potential. Dollars spent otherwise run the risk of ending up in stovepipe systems.

One of our most significant efforts to date under this joint approach has involved the migration of legacy command and control systems to the Global Command and Control System’s common operating environment. Ultimately, all our automated systems will transition or be developed to use the core services of the Global Command and Control System. This will provide commanders and their staffs the capability to send, receive, process, filter, and display data to aid their decisionmaking. With the first 15 of our legacy systems to migrate, we will reduce the associated code from 4.4 million source lines to an estimated 1.5 million lines.

Conclusions

The foregoing has provided a macro perspective of how the Marine Corps views revolutions in military affairs, the immutable and fundamental nature of war, and how the American military should approach the current age of uncertain threats and rapid technological change. Technology permeates every aspect of war, but the science of war cannot account for the dynamic interaction of the physical and moral elements that come into play, by design or by chance, in combat. War will remain predominantly an art, infused with human will, creativity, and judgment.

Technology will undoubtedly assist the commander faced with a massive variety of data in an environment of ambiguity. But to focus solely on the technological side of information superiority would be a major mistake. Effective command and control, as the Marines understand it, relies just as much on a shared understanding of the commander’s intent, doctrine, teamwork and mutual trust, and extensive investment in professional military education. The use of mission command and control seeks to give subordinates sufficient understanding of the situation and the commander’s intent before the battle, while encouraging initiative and creativity once the fight is joined.

The Marine Corps sees great opportunities and great challenges in the coming decades. We are working energetically in many places to address these challenges. The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory is just one example of the Corps’ interest in melding innovative concepts with appropriate technical capabilities. The Commandant has planted the seeds of innovation and encouraged fresh thinking throughout the Corps, and I can assure you that our speed of innovation will remain high. But experimentation and evidentiary-based processes should be preferred over unfounded assertions. We have the time today to explore across a broad range of solutions to tomorrow’s problems.

I would like to leave you with a quote from a wonderful classicist on how the early Greeks thought about preparing for the future:

The early Greek imagination envisaged the past and the present as in front of us-we can see them. The future, invisible, is behind us . . . paradoxical though it may sound to the modern ear. This image of our journey through time may be truer to reality than the medieval and modern feeling that we face the future as we make our way forward into it.

As we in the American military make our way into the 21st century, we need to keep a solid anchor in the past to understand what is possible and what is not. One path leads from analysis and experimentation toward knowledge of the real world, the other toward ignorance and thus peril.

You Say You Want A Revolution?

by Maj John M. Jansen

Since the end of DESERT STORM, there has been an intense, if not confused, discussion over the current condition and future direction of close air support (CAS). The discussion has been fueled by uncertainties created by changing roles and functions, and by a heightened competition for diminishing assets among and within the Services. Concurrently, as the Marine Corps has been seeking new operational effectiveness by merging new technologies with concepts of maneuver warfare, questions have arisen regarding the role and validity of Marine and Navy tactical aviation (TacAir) on future battlefields. This rather loosely knit discourse has taken place in an environment where change is considered good. This dialectic has produced many recommendations for changes in doctrine, tactics, and even force structure, as well as a few recommendations that no change is required at all.

This debate over the future of CAS is actually a debate over future roles and functions within the larger context of offensive air support (OAS). Many of the recommendations made in this regard unknowingly impact our ability to engage in the operational art of combined arms warfare, which is an enduring concept, critical to the Corps’ future warfighting strategy. This concept is characterized by the calculated orchestration of firepower and maneuver elements that produces a ferocious synergy on the battlefield. The retention of the combined arms warfare capability is the litmus test that must be used when considering any proposed changes to doctrine and/ or force structure.

Combined Arms and Maneuver Warfare

Is the concept of combined arms relevant within the construct of maneuver warfare? It is not only relevant, it is critical. To give up on combined arms within the framework of maneuver warfare merely trades in one brand of three-dimensional warfare for another, rather than going for a brand of operations that is truly four dimensional. Conventional combined arms tactics are three dimensional in that weapons are brought to bear from a three-dimensional battlespace. The fourth dimension-timeis a critical element of maneuver warfare. Ideally, it is brought into play by rapid movement on the battlefield to engagement points of our choosing, while creating shock and confusion within the enemy. Many of the proposed changes to our doctrine and force structure appear to be offered for the sole purpose of gaining the element of time/rapid movement on the battlefield. The advocates of these “advancements” recommend the use of various weapons systems as independent maneuver elements to capitalize on their respective characteristics of speed, firepower, or observation. The advertised benefits are the expansion of the battlefield and confusion within the ranks of the enemy brought on by multiaxis attacks. What is gained in the dimension of time/rapid movement, however, may be sacrificed in the area of density. We risk the loss of the synchronized employment of complementary weapons systems and, at the same time, provide the enemy with better predictability as to what he needs to defend against, depending on the position and ranging of our various maneuver elements. These proposals risk losing the capability to produce the kind of shock and confusion that the synchronicity of combined arms warfare brings to the equation. As we examine some of the schools of thought we will see a common tendency to simply trade one dimension for another.

Schools of Thought

Four groups have emerged out of this free flowing debate, each with its own view of the future. These groups include the Airpower Strategists, the Evolutionaries, the Traditionalists, and the Revolutionaries.

The Airpower Strategist asks: “Is not the concept of combined arms and the resultant need for Servicespecific air arms antiquated, given a national strategy of executing a sustained air campaign prior to the introduction of ground forces? Based on our success in DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, can’t we rely largely on a ground-based air force for the execution of the air campaign, with minor mopping up operations to follow on?”

The downfall of this strategy is that it hinges on having an opponent willing to provide the time required to execute a sustained air campaign. Given a scenario of a rolling invasion, sustained in its own right, into a sovereign state by a committed aggressor, we will not have the time needed to execute a pure, ground-based air campaign. Absent this ability, ground forces will have to engage concurrently with air forces to counter the sustained enemy thrust. At that point you will want a force that is capable of sustaining itself, a combat-ready force trained in the principles and tactics of combined arms.

The Evolutionary asks: “Quantum leaps in laser-guided missile technology, as well as the newly acquired ability to self-laser designate, have turned the attack helicopter into a formidable offensive weapons platform. Given their performance in Southwest Asia, should we not evolve into an all-helicopter attack force? Are they not perfectly suited to maneuver warfare with their ability to easily liaise with the ground combat element and the ability to act as independent maneuver elements?”

Like the Airpower Strategist, the Evolutionary relies almost solely on experiences in DESERT STORM to make his case. An all-helicopter attack force assumes a clear air, foliage-free environment where the primary target is armored vehicles, and there is a relatively defined forward line of troops. Given an environment of heavy foliage or triplecanopy,jungle or where the threat is massed infantry, the case for an allhelicopter attack force is more difficult to make. (The Pacific Rim and North Korea come to mind as locations/scenarios where the benefits of laser-guided weapons will not be as profound as in a desert environment and where the survivability of helicopters will be more difficult to guarantee.) It is hard to tell whether this offering has greater implications for force structure or doctrine. However, it is clear that you cannot make a case for added synergy by removing the benefits of fixed-wing platforms from the equation.

The Traditionalist asks: “Do we not now have the right mix of doctrine and tactics suitable for the future? We teach a doctrine born of many years of development in combat and training, and we see no reason for fundamental change. Also, while we realize that our command and control system is cumbersome and restrictive, it is a necessary evil that prevents friendly fire incidents from occurring in the heat of battle. Much of what is offered in the way of change arises only from the need to create or protect a rice bowl, for which we have no time. We have training to accomplish.”

This position is obviously short sighted. While it is the one school of thought that is solidly grounded in current doctrine, it fails to acknowledge a great many dynamics that simply cannot be ignored. Even though this position is doctrine-centered, it may ultimately lead to changes in force structure as those who espouse this point of view will become irrelevant and fade away.

The Revolutionary asks: “Is not our current system of employing fixed-wing aerial fire support outmoded? Aren’t we sacrificing capability by restricting naval TacAir with our cumbersome command and control system, as well as by current close control tactics of CAS? Could we not gain capability on the modern battlefield by scrapping the only system entirely and creating a new breed of aviator, one trained to hunt and kill on his own volition? It is time for a change and we offer something completely different.”

There is nothing wrong with those sentiments. Our command and control system is too cumbersome and our repetitious training in close control CAS does raise questions about underutilized capability. So this school of thought holds some promise. We will see that while the problems that the Revolutionaries identify are right on target, the direction of their conclusion is off course. Yet, by bringing this issue to the fore, the Revolutionaries find their greatest utility. We are provided the impetus to examine our current doctrine within the context of maneuver warfare, which is exactly the direction that we want to head.

Each of these groups is making its own recommendations, based on its own set of assumptions. Ironically, the different assumptions used to proffer vastly divergent concepts of warfighting all tend to find their birth in recent experiences in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and even Somalia. Generally given, the assumptions are that our experience in DESERT STORM is readily transferable to potential conflicts in other regions of the world, and that events such as Bosnia and Somalia are the defining models of future conflicts. These assumptions are shaky pillars on which to build a warfighting model for the future.

You Say You Want a Revolution?

What are the different methods that we can use to analyze a “revolutionary” idea? One is simply to judge it on its own merits, acknowledging the potential benefits and exposing potential problems. Another way is to judge this new idea relative to the reality that it seeks to replace. However, it is important to determine if the reality that this new idea seeks to replace has been misrepresented, and if the direction in which this new idea seeks to take us is as revolutionary as claimed. For starters, the synergistic potential of tactical aviation has been simplified, trivialized, and marginalized by conducting the discussion under the headings of CAS and, to a lesser extent, battlefield interdiction (BI). Col Michael Wyly, USMC(Ret), and Cdr Daniel E. Moore, USN, do a fine job of painting a picture of the problem in their article published in the December 1995, Proceedings. In this article, they produce a “Theory for warfare in the littorals,” built around a “new” brand of air support that they call Jaeger Aviation. In their attempt to provide us with insight, however, they use the stereotypical, narrow definition of CAS to deride its usefulness as they seek to create a new flavor of aerial firepower. An examination of their concept reveals the dangers we submit ourselves to when we are not fluent in current doctrine and why it is critical that we use current doctrine to establish a common language as a frame of reference.

The common denominator with which we must become familiar is FMFM 5-40, Offensive Air Support (OAS). It can only be through discussion of the limitations and functional benefits of OAS in its entirety that we can productively debate the support that fixed-wing tactical aviation will provide to our future endeavors. Our doctrine not only accounts for the concept of Jaeger Aviation in the form of guidance on deep air support (DAS), but also increases five-fold the possible uses of CAS in the form of offensive employment of CAS. Yes that’s right, there is an offensive side to CAS that engages the enemy based on commander’s intent. Fires before the preparation, fires in preparation of the attack, fires in support of the attack, fires in support of exploitation and pursuit, and fires in support of consolidation and reorganization are all subtasks of CAS that are underutilized in current fleet training as well as in the current debate.

The article by Col Wyly and Cdr Moore is a good example of the dangers we can subject ourselves to when we don’t understand our own doctrine. They make a case for their revolutionary brand of warfighting that supposedly “will bring an entirely new dimension to warfare:”

Understanding the force’s intent and the friendly scheme of maneuver on the surface and familiar with the enemy’s predisposition, hunter aviation separates friend from foe and attacks on its own initiative. It probes and ranges outward ahead of the force and to its flanks, seeking to destroy or pin down the enemy before he can slow us down.

Compare their thesis with selected definitions from the FMFM 5-40 and it becomes clear that this “new dimension” of warfare is provided for under the two missions of DAS known as armed reconnaissance (AR) and air interdiction (AI):

Deep Air Support requires a complete understanding of the MAGTF Commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. Air Interdiction and Armed Reconnaissance are DAS tasks . . . (A)rmed reconnaissance missions can be used as a covering force. These aircraft will patrol open, extended flanks of the main axis of movement not covered by scout or reconnaissance forces. Air Interdiction can neutralize, destroy, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it is brought to bear against friendly forces.

The Jaeger Group’s definition of hunter aviation almost perfectly mirrors the concepts of DAS, AI, and AR.

Can’t We All Just Get Along?

Is this a simple matter of talking about the same concepts using different terminology? No. At the very least, the danger of such an argument becomes manifest in the degree to which it consumes valuable resources creating a system that, while new, is qualitatively no better than the system or culture that it replaces. In the worst case, the danger lies in the degree to which the new doctrine provides us with a net decrease in capability or a doctrinal mindset that does not match the tactics that it is supposed to spawn. For instance, when we examine the specific examples given by the Jaeger Group to flesh out its proposed general philosophy, we are confronted with serious logical inconsistencies that stand a good chance of producing negative unwanted consequences on the battlefield. While we have seen that the general construct of hunter aviation is provided for by our current understanding of DAS, the two examples used by Wyly and Moore to demonstrate this “new” capability actually sound like offensive CAS missions.

Enemy forces retreating in disarray is the first scenario used to flesh out their concept. Such a situation will require close and/or deep support missions based on the degree to which the enemy forces have managed to disengage and, more importantly, the degree to which friendly ground maneuver elements have decided to pursue. If the bad guys have disengaged from ground-based direct fire weapons but are still being ranged by indirect fires, this would be a CAS mission defined by current doctrine as fires in support of exploitation and pursuit. Even if the enemy forces have retracted out of range of all groundbased fires but the ground maneuver elements are on the move in pursuit, this would still be a CAS mission as a high degree of coordination will be required to ensure containment and efficient destruction of enemy forces as well as deconfliction to inhibit friendly fire catastrophes. This does not necessarily mean that TacAir would be controlled by a FAC or an airborne FAC (FAC(A)). It does mean however, that a coordinated game plan should be constructed to define the roles and assign areas of responsibility. For example, will the mission and priority of fires for the aviators be to limit the advance of the retreating forces? to allow the advance but canalize enemy forces? or to simply engage targets of opportunity?

The second example given by our Jaegers is definitely a CAS mission even though a single aircraft may never be brought to bear under the close control of a FAC or FAC(A). Their illustration offers the potential of airborne weapons platforms as a maneuver element in a “one-two punch” where the “two” is armor and mobile infantry. This is certainly a viable tactic that leans toward the decentralized nature of maneuver warfare and is a departure from our peacetime training that generally puts all of our firepower assets in the same target area. I submit, however, that there is a level of integrated planning and detailed coordination required that goes beyond the concept of having aviators roaming the flanks, armed with nothing more than years of experience and commander’s intent. Absent this close coordination, we should expect a less than synergistic effect on enemy forces and a higher rate of “blue-on-blue” opportunities.

The Jaeger initiative asks all of the right questions: What limitations are inherent in past and present practices vis-a-vis the employment of naval TacAir in OAS? How best to tailor future organizational tactics and training to maximize the lethality and flexibility that aerial trigger pullers bring to future battlefields? How do we mate that flexibility and lethality with emerging concepts ot maneuver warfare in the littorals-for example-infestation tactics? How do we take advantage of emerging technologies such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the forward observer/FAC, or FO/FAC? (For more on FO/FAC, see articles appearing in MCG, Apr, Jul, & Oct96, and on pp. 47-53 of this issue.) While their questions are right on target, their “theory of warfare” misses the mark. Their general concept of freeing the attack birds from a perceived paradigm of close control by the ground combat element has brought them to a place that strongly resembles the detached, disassociated employment of fixed-wing assets practiced by the U.S. Air Force. It tends also to lean in the direction of those who believe that future battlefields will consist almost solely of remote and/or airborne weapons platforms to the exclusion of ground combat elements. A movement in this direction is not in the best interest of our warfighting capability. Because it ultimately seeks total pilot autonomy in the cockpit, it is not supportive of what continues to be a highly lethal and valid concept of combined arms warfare. However much these pilots are supposed to be air-to-mud, maneuver warfare ninjas, the disassociated nature of the aviation combat element in their paradigm renders it just one more three-dimensional proposal.

Summary

If the Revolutionaries have asked so many good questions, but come up short on good answers, what are the fill-ins? I believe that a truly fourdimensional battlefield must be the goal. If the goal of maneuver warfare is to cause the collapse of the enemy by inflicting violent, measured blows to critical nodes within his system (rather than causing defeat by utter obliteration through force-on-force engagements), then the role of aviation is to be part of a firepower “package” that is delivered at a time and place of our choosing to one of the bad guy’s critical nodes. At times, that package will consist, exclusively, of aviation assets. At other times, the targets will be engaged by a coordinated attack from an air/ground team. The method of engagement will be determined by the nature of the target and by the desired results. And the degree to which coordination is required between air and ground elements will determine whether or not the mission is a combined arms attack or simply simultaneous attacks, mutually supporting by presence, that supports the overall intent of the commander.

Communications will be the key to success on the four-dimensional battlefield. In order to engage in those communications, we must speak the same language. If we want to speak the same language, we must read the same book and, for now, that book is titled Offensive Air Support. This doctrine may change a little or a lot. The degree to which it changes will depend upon such things as the level of incorporation of new tactics, like infestation, as well as modifications based on evolutionary operations in the joint environment. It will also change by the degree in which concepts of CAS and DAS are developed to optimize their impact on a fast-paced, coordinated, four-dimensional battlefield. Communications will be characterized by a much higher degree of premission planning and coordination between the ground element and aviation commanders. As a result, the operation order for a combined arms attack will look much more like a present day, premission brief for a deep air strike with coordinated times on targets, suppression plans, electronic warfare plans, etc., as opposed to the current method of simply fighting the air war off of an air tasking order. And communications technologies using datalink, satellite communications, and Global Prepositioning Systems will be used for command and control rather than routing elements through various agencies.

The days of training to defensive CAS-nine lines, terminal control, and “cleared hot,” over and over again-must come to an end. Aviators train to it because we think that is what the grunts want. The grunts ask for it because they are not sure what else to do with the assets. There is so much more out there. The clues (not the answers) lie in our current doctrine. We must capitalize on the beneficial concepts of maneuver warfare as well as on the benefits of emerging technologies without losing our ability to provide the Nation with a skilled airground team capable of meting out destruction using a combination of maneuver warfare and advanced principles of combined arms. We must actively define our own futureor someone else is going to come along and define it for us.

Response to “If Not Synchronization, What?”

by Maj Irvin E. Evans III

Synchronization is a path for moving toward the maneuver warfare ideal. Flaws emerge; but, as a way to drive home the importance of coordination, cooperation, preparation, and planning, it has merit by capturing modern battle in the mind’s eye. Unfortunately, Maj Schmitt has committed the error attributed to “synchronizationists”-limited mechanical thinking. His descriptions of synchronized planning do not reflect the techniques, tactics, and procedures being taught today. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, matrices for battlefield operating systems, commander’s intent, and mission and main effort nesting are dynamic, enemy focused, command and staff processes that generate decisive force at the critical place and time within the constraints of politics and resources.

Asynchronous operations, while appearing worthwhile, pose significant risk. The level of operational independence where “each subordinate unit pursuing its assigned mission can act independently, operating without constraint imposed by the requirement for close coordination with other components” seems utopian. Today’s world is one of growing operational constraints-campaign design requirements, logistical shortfalls, fire support coordination, C4I, political guidance, and changing social values. Synchronization responds with a selection of tailoring devices to shape courses of action for national security interests. Where “truly asynchronous operations are no more possible than are truly synchronized ones” synchronized planning offers battlefield and campaign solutions that are realistic and within immediate reach of the joint force commander.

We applaud the brainstorming of future doctrine illustrated by the caliber of this essay; however, for the immediate future, synchronization offers the commander the most precise application of force, the best use of available resources, the highest dexterity to political guidance, the lowest force risk profile and the greatest likelihood of mission accomplishment.