Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations

by LtCol John A. Bass, USMC(Ret)

With the Commandant’s signing of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 (MCDP 1-0), Marine Corps Operations, in September 2001, the Marine Corps‘ inaugural series of capstone and keystone doctrinal publications was completed. This series of official Marine Corps publications has provided the top-level doctrine that has articulated the Marine Corps way of fighting in the early 21st century-from its warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare to application of that philosophy across the range of military operations and the warfighting functions.

MCDP 1-0 addresses how the Marine Corps conducts operations to support the national military strategy in naval, joint, and multinational operations. In the MCDP series, it serves to “operationalize” the philosophy. It does this by focusing and transitioning the philosophical discourse of the capstone-keystone MCDP series into an operations manual for the Marine Corps. MCDP 1-0 also provides the operational overview that influences the development of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) addressed in subordinate Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs) and Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs).

The MCDP Series

MCDPs provide higher order doctrine-the fundamental truths and broad philosophy about the nature, theory, and conduct of war. The MCWPs and MCRPs describe methods and TTP for the practical application of those fundamental truths and warfighting philosophy. The intent behind the MCDP series is to provide a body of high-quality, forward-thinking, intellectually rigorous knowledge about armed conflict that will help prepare the Marine Corps for the challenges of the 21st century.1 Although each manual might have a different center-mass audience, the MCDPs are written for all Marines. The doctrine contained in MCDPs represents the Marine Corps‘ most developed and innovative thinking on the nature, theory, and conduct of war. It is meant to project Marine Corps thinking well into the future. To Marines, doctrine is a teaching of the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war.2 As the authoritative basis for how Marines fight and operate, the doctrine and TTP form the foundation of Marine Corps education and training curricula.

The doctrine presented in MCDPs is meant to be enduring and universal. In the capstone-keystone publications above MCDP 1-0 (see Figure 1), the doctrine is not tied to any specific organization, structure, technology, type or intensity of conflict, or specific echelon of command. Subjects are described holistically, in their full complexity. Generally, the capstone-keystone MCDPs above MCDP 1-0 describe the nature of war as it applies to a particular subject, discuss the fundamental theories, and present the Marine Corps‘ philosophy on the subject.

While authoritative, MCDPs are descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature. The intent is to provide Marine leaders a common intellectual framework for applying judgment in solving the challenges they face-not to provide the solutions. The MCDPs above MCDP 1-0 describe key doctrinal concepts and considerations but do not provide specific methods and TTP. MCDP 1-0 does both. It provides a degree of “how to” with the “why” as it bridges the doctrinal publications to the MCWPs and MCRPs. It transitions the philosophical discourse of the capstone-keystone MCDPs into an operational summation that focuses on conducting Marine Corps operations.

MCDP 1-0

MCDP 1-0 broadly describes how Marine Corps leaders apply the maneuver warfare philosophy of warfighting across the range of military operations-from war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). The manual is larger and more descriptive than the other MCDPs. Its 11 chapters and 6 appendices describe how Marine Corps forces plan and conduct combat operations in war and how Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) operate daily in MOOTW around the globe. MCDP 1-0 presents today’s doctrine and introduces maturing expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW) concepts to guide the developing doctrine of tomorrow. This introductory methodology allows the manual to maintain relevancy through its 8-year life cycle.

MCDP 1-0 represents the combined efforts of the Operating Forces, Supporting Establishment, and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Its development was coordinated by MCCDC’s Doctrine Division while the preponderance of the writing was performed by the proponent MAGTF Staff Training Program team. MCDP 1-0 was rewritten, restaffed, renamed, and shifted from MCDP to MCWP status several times as other MCDPs were being written and the overarching joint visions and Service concepts were being developed. In its final form, this operations manual was written as an MCDP, vetted by the senior leadership of the Marine Corps, and signed by the Commandant. In his foreword, the 32d Commandant wrote that this publication represents how the Marine Corps‘ warfighting philosophy is codified in operational terms.3 As an MCDP it establishes vetted and accepted warfighting practices as today’s doctrine and simultaneously guides the Corps‘ doctrine development toward EMW.

MCDP 1-0 can be divided into three focal areas. The first (Chapters 1 through 3) presents the reader with a broad overview of the historical role of the Marine Corps in national defense; the character of modern conflict; today’s operational environment, national security structure, and unified action; and the roles, functions, organization, and structure of the Marine Corps. The intangibles of the Marine Corps ethos and the five Marine Corps core competencies are described and followed up with discussion of expeditionary operations requirements, force projection and forward deployed naval forces, and MAGTFs conducting expeditionary operations.

The overview of amphibious operations is “hooked” or linked to reference publications that address the subject in detail; i.e., Joint Publication 3-02 (JP 3-02), Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, and JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, etc. Recent changes in amphibious operations doctrine have been introduced in this first section; for example, five types of amphibious operations vice the previous four; supported-supporting vice the past commander, amphibious task force-commander, landing force command relationships; and the changed definition of the term amphibious task force (ATF) to designate only the Navy task organization. Now the ATF, when combined with the landing force, constitutes an amphibious force instead of the former ATF. Future maneuver warfare and amphibious operations are. addressed in sections titled “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW),” “Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS),” “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM),” and “Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Future.”

Deployment, Employment, and Sustainment

The second focal area (Chapters 4 and 5) addresses deployment, employment, and sustainment of Marine Corps forces at the operational and tactical levels of war. It links the discussion of Marine Corps expeditionary forces operating in the joint force commander’s campaign with the capstone doctrinal publication on the subject-MCDP 1-2, Campaigning. The second focal area takes the art of campaigning into understanding battlespace, in particular the joint battlespace at the operational level of war. It addresses the critical roles of the Marine Corps component commanders and MAGTF commanders in force deployment planning and execution. Employment is discussed in terms of the use of Marine Corps forces to conduct operations to achieve the joint force commander’s objectives. Arranging operations, combat power, effects, information operations, and the warfighting functions are discussed in relation to higher order doctrine linked to planning and executing successful operations. Redeployment focuses on the Marine Corps doctrine of reconstitution-the actions that commanders plan and take in reestablishing the force’s combat readiness as quickly as possible for subsequent redeployment and employment in new missions-in or out of theater.

MCDP 1-0 devotes a full chapter to the critical role of logistics in generating rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining, and flexible MAGTFs that can rapidly reconstitute. The chapter gives readers a good view of how and why the Marine Corps, in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of MAGTF expeditionary warfighting capabilities. Strategic, operational, and tactical logistics linkages are discussed down to the MAGTF combat service support element level and to the role of the Supporting Establishment as the “fifth element” of the MAGTF.

Conducting MAGTF Operations

MCDP 1-0’s third and principal focal area (Chapters 6 through 11) concentrates on conducting MAGTF operations-full spectrum from war to MOOTW. It describes how MAGTF commanders and their staffs apply Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy and doctrine (as described in MCDP 1, Warfighting, and its companion doctrinal publications) to planning and conducting expeditionary operations.

Chapter 6, “Planning and Conducting MAGTF Operations,” is the single most important chapter in MCDP 1-0. The chapter provides the foundation for MAGTF tactical operations because it discusses the importance of single battle, decisive and shaping actions, centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, main and supporting efforts, security, and the reserve. The chapter describes operational design and addresses how the MAGTF commander plans and conducts expeditionary operations. It also identifies the tactical tenets essential to succeeding on the battlefield.4

Chapters 7 through 9 describe conducting MAGTF operations in the offense and defense. Chapter 7 focuses on the offense as the decisive form of combat. Chapter 8 describes defensive operations conducted in conjunction with offensive operations to defeat enemy attacks and conducting MAGTF operations within the context of the single battle. Chapter 9 addresses other tactical operations that enable the MAGTF to execute offensive and defensive operations. These tactical operations include retrograde, passage of lines, linkup, relief in place, obstacle crossing, and breakout from encirclement. Reconnaissance and security operations are covered in Chapter 11. The warfighting functions and the enduring principles of war, relevant to all discussion of Marine Corps doctrine, are presented in appendices, as is a ready-reference list of MAGTF tactical tasks and their definitions.

MOOTW

MCDP 1-0 is the Marine Corps MOOTW doctrine. The MOOTW-unique considerations used in Marine Corps operations are discussed in Chapter 10, “Military Operations Other than War.” These MOOTW-unique considerations build on existing joint doctrine, addressing the joint, expeditionary nature of MOOTW. The chapter describes MOOTW embedded in operations doctrine because MOOTW typically involves elements of both combat and noncombat operations whether in peacetime, conflict, or war.

Conclusion

Most of what the reader will find in MCDP 1-0 is familiar to Marine Corps field grade officers and senior staff noncommissioned officers. Its usefulness is in codifying Marine Corps operations in doctrine for all to use as authoritative reference and to transition the warfighting philosophy into MCWPs and MCRPs. It discusses Marine Corps forces as a Service component under joint force command, and it doctrinally discusses MAGTFs as they exist and are employed today in joint and multinational operations. It’s the first doctrinal publication to address the fundamentals of how MAGTFs conduct tactical operations, and it concisely addresses the types of operations MAGTFs conduct to accomplish their missions.5 It also serves to introduce maturing concepts for further development in the MCWPs and MCRPs.

Notes

1. Commanding General, MCCDC 5000, C42 (Doctrine Division) did 1 April 1996, Letter of Instruction for Development of MCDPs.

2. MCDP 1, p. 55.

3. Jones, Gen James L., in his foreword to MCDP 1-0.

4. MCDP 1-0, p. 6-2.

5. Jones.

Proportionality in the Law of War

by Maj Gregory G. Gillette

Ever since Warfighting1 was published in 1989, the concept of maneuver warfare has defined and distinguished the way the Marine Corps fights. Maneuver warfare is a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.2 Our ultimate goal in maneuver warfare is panic and paralysis-an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.3 The effective warfighter is “ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness against which [he] will direct all available combat power.”4 Contrary to attrition warfare, maneuver warfare concentrates strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities in order to cause the greatest damage to our enemy’s ability to fight. For example, we are taught to bypass the enemy strength and strike the enemy weakness-employ our infantry company against the enemy platoon vice company against company so that we quickly and decisively defeat the enemy with overwhelming force.

Unfortunately, too many Marines, including a few judge advocates, misunderstand and misapply the law of war (LOW) principle called proportionality, mistakenly thinking that proportionality requires the commander to employ no more force than necessary to defeat the enemy and accomplish his mission. Not only is that idea contrary to maneuver warfare, it’s inconsistent with the LOW. It is legal and tactically sound to squash the proverbial enemy fly using a sledgehammer in order to accomplish the mission.

Understanding Proportionality

Proportionality is one of four basic principles in the LOW. The other three principles are military necessity, discrimination, and unnecessary suffering. To fully understand and properly apply proportionality, we need to understand the other three. The first principle, military necessity, justifies all measures that are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible and that are not forbidden by the law of war.5 In order to be a lawful target, the objective of the attack must offer a military advantage.6

Military advantage can include weakening the enemy-for example, destroying or degrading his troops and assets, creating confusion, limiting his mobility, or limiting his command and control capabilities by degrading his ability to “see” the battlefield. Alternately, military advantage can include strengthening our forces-for example, protecting our troops and assets, creating surprise, or enhancing our intelligence-gathering ability. Military advantage does not include killing civilians or destroying civilian objects.7

Objectives that offer military advantage are termed military objectives. Military objectives are targets that by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage to the attacker in the circumstances ruling at the time.8 People are military objectives if they are enemy combatants or if they directly or actively participate in hostilities.9 Things like tanks and artillery are military objectives because they contribute to military action by their very nature. Places like bridges or roads are military objectives if they provide a military advantage at the time-for example, providing a resupply route to the enemy. Conversely, objects that are purely civilian in nature offer no military advantage and are, therefore, not valid targets.

The second principle, discrimination-sometimes called distinction-requires that military forces distinguish between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects. We know from the above discussion of military objective that commanders cannot target civilians or civilian objects but can only target military objectives.10 In fact, commanders have an obligation to take reasonable precautions to spare civilian life and property during attacks against military objectives whenever possible.11 However, if civilians or civilian objects are used to contribute to the military action, they may lose their status as civilians or civilian objects and become valid military objectives. For example, if a civilian hotel is used to billet and train enemy troops, the civilian hotel becomes a valid military objective because it is now contributing directly to the military action.

The third principle, unnecessary suffering, states that parties to a conflict do not have unlimited right to choose methods of warfare.12 The employment of arms, projectiles, materials, or methods calculated to cause unnecessary suffering to enemy combatants is unlawful.13 This principle recognizes that suffering is an inherent consequence of armed conflict but humanely seeks to minimize suffering where possible. The principle of unnecessary suffering outlaws suffering for the sake of suffering. For example, it’s illegal to put glass inside grenades in order to prevent doctors from locating the glass shards with x-ray machines when they treat wounded combatants.

This principle often rests on the intention of the commander. Lawful weapons can be used unlawfully if the commander selects the weapon specifically to cause unnecessary suffering. For example, white phosphorus rounds are lawful and effective for many purposes. However, if the commander chooses to not use available high-explosive rounds in favor of white phosphorus rounds against enemy troops because he wants to burn, disfigure, and cause the enemy to suffer, he violates the principle of unnecessary suffering.

Finally, we get to proportionality. The principle of proportionality recognizes that some civilian life and property will be destroyed during armed conflict. Proportionality excuses collateral damage to civilian property or incidental civilian death or injury that occurs during an attack on a valid military objective, as long as the collateral damage or incidental civilian death is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.14 Thus, proportionality begins with identifying the valid military objective and identifying any collateral damage or incidental loss of life foreseeable from the attack. The commander then weighs the foreseeable collateral damage or incidental loss of life against the expected military advantage to determine whether the collateral damage or incidental loss of life is excessive. As long as the collateral damage and incidental loss of life is not excessive compared to the military advantage, then the attack does not violate the principle of proportionality.15 If there is no collateral damage, then proportionality has no effect on the size or type of weapons used against the enemy.

Assume, for example, that your unit locates a squad of Iraqis in the desert. Also assume that there are no civilians or civilian property anywhere in the area that could be harmed from attacking the Iraqi squad. There will be no proportionality issue present regardless of the size or combination of weapons delivered because there will be no civilian death or damage to civilian property. The commander is free to select and employ any weapon or combination of weapons he chooses, and he cannot violate the principle of proportionality. The commander may violate the principle of unnecessary suffering or other rules in the LOW, but not the principle of proportionality.

Why, Then, Is Proportionality Misunderstood by So Many?

Proportionality is often confused with a similar sounding LOW concept called “proportionate response.” Unlike proportionality, proportionate response does concern the amount of force employed against the enemy. Proportionate response, however, is a principle relevant to self-defense, not mission accomplishment.16 It’s important to recognize that the LOW governing self-defense is different than the LOW governing offensive use of force to accomplish the mission. Fortunately, this is one area where the law makes practical sense.

The LOW recognizes that the commander’s objective in mission accomplishment is to offensively seize, break, destroy, or kill the objective. If we apply maneuver warfare we want to use overwhelming force to achieve our mission to physically defeat the enemy and destroy him psychologically. The good news is that, other than the principles discussed above that are designed to protect civilians and minimize unnecessary suffering of combatants, the LOW really doesn’t care whether we kill the enemy with a teeny, tiny bomb or use a really big bomb. Therefore, it’s legal, and consistent with maneuver warfare, to smash the proverbial enemy fly with a sledgehammer.

In self-defense, by contrast, the objective is to protect ourselves or protect others against a threatened or actual use of force. Accordingly, the rules for the use of force during self-defense require that we use the minimum amount of force necessary to adequately defend ourselves-a measure of force proportionate to the threat. Common rules of engagement (ROE) in self-defense state that:

Force used in self-defense to counter a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat.

Properly drafted ROE recognize the difference between the principles of proportionality during targeting for mission accomplishment versus the principle of proportionate response during self-defense. Properly drafted ROE recognize that while force used in sell-defense must be reasonable and proportionate in response to the hostile threat or act, force used in mission accomplishment can be overwhelming and unreasonable. Unfortunately, many ROE intermix and confuse these terms using the term proportionality when discussing self-defense or using the idea of proportionate response when discussing mission accomplishment.17

Why Should We Care?

Discussing the differences between proportionality during mission accomplishment and proportionate response in self-defense is not merely an academic debate. The real danger is that ROE that confuse these two principles unnecessarily limit the amount of force a commander can use to accomplish the mission. The confused ROE erroneously prevent the commander from decisively engaging the enemy with overwhelming force and unnecessarily restrict the commander to weapons and amounts of force that are “proportionate” to his enemy target.

Let’s revisit the Iraqi squad in the desert armed only with small arms. ROE that confuse these principles might erroneously state that a commander can only use proportionate amounts of force against the enemy to achieve his mission. The commander acting under these ROE would be limited to engaging the Iraqi squad only with small arms weapons. Therefore, instead of quickly destroying the Iraqi squad using overwhelming force, the commander gets bogged down in a proportionate firefight with the enemy unnecessarily risking time and men.

Although not acceptable, the confusion is understandable because the confusion starts at the very top. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (CJCS SROE) confuse these terms. For example, the CJCS SROE use the term proportionality to discuss both selfdefense and mission accomplishment. More recently, the ROE for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) erase all difference between these two concepts. The OEF ROE state:

If use of force is necessary for mission accomplishment OR to respond to a threat or provocation, that use of force will be proportional in that it should be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude. . . .18

Thus, documents like the CJCS SROE and the OEF ROE teach our Marines that proportionality and proportionate response are one and the same.

Another danger is that non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and international scholars increasingly confuse the principle of proportionality in mission accomplishment with the idea of proportionate response in self-defense. The confusion is sometimes innocent but other times intentional. These scholars incorrectly argue that international law requires warring nations to achieve military objectives using proportionate amounts of force. For example, after the first Gulf War, some NGOs and international scholars accused the United States of violating international law, erroneously claiming that we violated the principle of proportionality by using disproportionate force to accomplish the mission.

Some of these scholars honestly confused these two principles and ignorantly accused the United States of violating the principle of proportionality. Other scholars purposely confused these principles in an attempt to make the fight “fair” and reduce the United States’ ability to use overwhelming force upon the enemy. I expect that we’ll see the same allegations about the war in Iraq. Accordingly, Marines at all levels need to understand the principle of proportionality in order to effectively defend against these groundless allegations in the future.

The Fix

The only way to end the confusion is to first recognize the differences between these two concepts and secondly to strictly adhere to the established vocabulary to identify these two concepts. In the LOW arena, proportionality should only refer to balancing military objective against collateral damage during mission accomplishment. Likewise, the term proportionate response should only refer to the amount of force used during self-defense to respond to the threat. By using these terms precisely we can further the understanding of LOW and ensure that our commanders aren’t unnecessarily limited when they fight to accomplish the mission. By understanding and using these terms correctly we add the sledgehammer back to the commander’s arsenal when he fights the proverbial enemy fly.

Notes

1. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, (MCDP 1), Warfighting.

2. Fleet Marine Force Manual 6, Ground Combat Operations, Chapter 1.

3. MCDP 1, p. 74.

4. Ibid., p. 75.

5. Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Army, Paragraph 3a.

6. Hague Regulation No. IV, Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Article 23.

7. Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflict (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Article 51(1-3).

8. Ibid., Article 52(2).

9. Ibid., Article 51(3); Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.

10. Ibid., Article 48.

11. Ibid., Articles 57 and 58.

12. Ibid., Article 35(1).

13. Ibid., Article 35(2).

14. Ibid., Article 51(5)(b).

15. Ibid.

16. Proportionate response is also relevant to the concept of reprisals. However, reprisals are seldom used today.

17. There are times when the political leadership wants to limit the amount or type of force used during mission accomplishment in order to promote the strategic political goals.

18. CJCS, Washington, DC, 061130Z October 2001 ROE Authorization Serial One, OEF.

Digital Command and Control: Cyber leash or maneuver warfare facilitator?

by Capt Michael D. Skaggs

Since the beginning of mankind, mastery of tools has driven man’s conduct of war. The current explosion of communications technology has propelled contemporary man into the so-called Information Age. This ability to acquire and exchange information rapidly can equip battlefield commanders with the ability to gain immediate situational awareness of their battlespace. Armed with this awareness, commanders will be able to make decisions faster than before. The com mand and control personal computer (C^sup 2^PC), a digital map that offers realtime updates of friendly and enemy locations, offers commanders this enhanced situational awareness. Digital communications, if applied correctly, can finally unleash maneuver warfare in its true form. Unfortunately, with the introduction of the C^sup 2^PC the potential exists to use digital communications to centralize C^sup 2^ over subordinate units. If the Marine Corps is to adapt this new tool to its current maneuver warfare philosophy, this increased awareness should facilitate decentralization.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 (MCDP 6), Command and Control, suggests “command” as legal authority to direct action and “control” as feedback of the action taken. This feedback tells the commander what adjustments or commands need to be made in order to achieve the desired result.1 The C^sup 2^PC can offer commanders the ability to extend and refine this authority. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program C^sup 2^PC Users’ Guide describes C^sup 2^PC as follows:

Command & Control PC is a Windows-based software application designed to facilitate military command and control functions. When connected to a computer network, C^sup 2^PC has the capability of depicting the current locations of the friendly and enemy units that have been inputted into a tactical database, as well as instantly shar[ing] overlays and message traffic. With this electronic connectivity, C^sup 2^PC becomes a powerful tool for the commander by providing a Common Tactical Picture throughout his command.2

This “tactical Internet”3 serves as a self-updating map allowing the commander to be updated continuously on the positions of subordinate units. Digital feedback is the epitome of C^sup 2^ as described in MCDP 6. Instead of focusing inward on the location of subordinate units, the commander can focus his efforts outward on the enemy.

Historically, improved communications has contributed to increased centralization of C^sup 2^. The adoption of the telegraph by 19th century armies caused many “commanders to keep in touch with the rear at the expense of the front.”4 In Europe, Napoleon III, commanding the Crimean War from Paris, demanded constant updates from his generals.5 In 1899 the United States installed wireless radio sets in all major warships and shore headquarters. However, a contemporary military writer warned of:

. . . a fleet commander in a few years directing a battle at sea with his ear attached to a wireless telephone and repeating with [a] megaphone the order buzzed into his ears from some departmental head hundreds of miles away.6

In fact, since commanders at sea feared a loss of autonomy, radio use was not institutionalized until 1917.7 MajGen J.F.C. Fuller noted that generals commanded by telegraph and telephone during World War I, yet this required subordinate commanders in the trenches to be pulled from the line in order to remain responsive to superiors.8 In some cases leaders were prohibited from actually participating in attacks so they could keep higher headquarters informed of progress.9 By World War II (WWII), the field telephone and wireless radio saw service in armies of both belligerents. S.L.A. Marshall noted in Men Against Fire that many U.S. company commanders in the Pacific were under constant pressure from headquarters to report information. Worse yet, they were often ordered to take tactical action based on the headquarters’ estimates of the situation.10 In the west, the French Army’s “methodical battle” demanded complete centralization of authority and resources. Only command elements and vehicles were equipped with radios that allowed higher headquarters to synchronize the conduct of the battle carefully.11 In Vietnam, U.S. commanders used helicopters to manage the battle from above, often overriding decisions made by subordinates on the ground.12 In these historical examples, armies that favored a centralized style of command tended to use new communications technology to manage the battle more closely from echelons increasingly farther removed.

An exception to the centralization trend is the German Army. As early as the 19th century, Prussia’s von Moltke the Elder warned that a commander “with a telegraph wire connected to his back” would be without independence and initiative.13 In WWII the Germans used the wireless radio to enhance their tradition of decentralized mission tactics. The radio was not used to give orders or manage troop movement. Instead, operation orders were given orally at the division level and below. The radio was used by subordinate commanders to provide feedback on progress to higher headquarters.14 The radio gave them further freedom to exploit opportunities while updating the commander whenever possible. The use of the radio as a facilitator instead of a management tool illustrates the German tendency to use technology to enhance, not replace existing tactics, and tradition.

History suggests that military organizations that are naturally inclined toward a centralized C^sup 2^ system will use new technology to “improve” that system, thus moving toward greater centralization. Since the Marine Corps historically has been inclined toward a decentralized decisionmaking system, one should expect digital technology to further extend decentralization. However, there are external pressures to use the emerging technology to centralize. 15 As the Marine Corps approaches the digital crossroads, it must examine doctrine and determine which road to choose.

When Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was published in 1989, the Marine Corps officially embraced maneuver warfare. Elements of this doctrine are mission orders, establishment of a main effort, and commander’s intent. Mission orders specifically allow for decentralized decisionmaking, and main effort and commander’s intent give all forces involved the necessary focus of effort. The Marine Corps has done an excellent job of giving its leaders the education necessary to conduct this style of warfare. However, many attrition warfare ghosts remain at the tactical level making maneuver warfare difficult to execute. Many operation orders are suspiciously long and in excessive detail. In fact, once the operation begins, subordinates find themselves attached to a virtual “ball and chain” of tactical control measures. These measures, designed to synchronize resources and focus efforts, actually contradict the philosophy of maneuver warfare and allow for little initiative at lower levels. These countless phase lines, checkpoints, coordination lines, and axes limit initiative and creativity.

The reason for these measures is clear. This environment is created in an effort to build situational awareness. Tactical scenarios are often “canned,” and an orderly, synchronized battlefield is preferred. What better way to know where your forces are than to dictate to them beforehand where they will be at all times? This increases certainty of the friendly situation and reduces risk of fratricide, albeit at the expense of initiative. These attempts to bring order to battlefield chaos are natural; however, this focus inward and quest for certainty is counter to maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is difficult to execute while using the same pre-1989 attrition warfare control measures. Marine Corps doctrine speaks maneuver, but our tactical execution often demonstrates otherwise.

Digital communications technology provides the chance to break free from the chains of attrition warfare once and for all. Intellectually, the Marine Corps is there already. Marine leaders understand maneuver warfare. The C^sup 2^PC presents a window of opportunity to put doctrine into practice. Situational awareness provided by C^sup 2^PC allows for subordinate units to move without being bound by control measures. The digital technology allows commanders to “see” subordinate locations without tying them to graphics. In order to maximize the digital advantage, changes are recommended beginning with the following fundamentals that allow digital communications to facilitate maneuver warfare, not impede it:

* Reduction of restrictive movement control measures in the attack.

* Clarification of the term “objective.”

– Change operational term objective to “aiming point.”

– Label the enemy unit to be destroyed/defeated as the objective.16

Maneuver control measures could be limited to the direction of attack, unit boundaries, aiming points, and objectives. This would allow subordinates the freedom to determine how to maneuver from the line of departure to their attack on the objective. Measures used previously to “track the battle” did so at the expense of initiative. Now, C^sup 2^PC can track the battle and provide synchronized freedom to maneuver.17

Equally, C^sup 2^ relies on semantic clarity. The term objective18 clouds the thinking of subordinates. Some leaders try to clarify the true purpose by stating, “The objective is hill X, but what we want to do is destroy the enemy. The hill is just an aiming point.” This is fine, and the mission statement should include an “in order to” that clarifies the purpose. However, ask a squad leader what he is supposed to do, and he will most likely tell you, “Take that hill, Sir.” In a picture-oriented society, the pictures formed by his graphics tell him his purpose is to occupy that piece of ground. Instead, imagine the clarity of the following alternative:

At 0645, 1st Battalion attacks to destroy Objective A (motorized infantry company) operating in vicinity of aiming point 1 in order to support the main effort attack on Objective B (motorized infantry battalion).

This may seem simplistic, but these semantic changes allow the junior leader to walk away with an enemy unit circled as his objective, whether it is later sitting atop the aiming point or not.

With C^sup 2^PC an enemy unit once identified, is displayed for all. In the past, the Marine Corps used terrain objectives because they were easily identifiable and facilitated control. With a tool that helps the unit to orient on the enemy, why not make it the objective? It also makes the purpose more clear when the enemy refuses to remain on a piece of ground and absorb its enemies’ supporting arms and wait for their maneuver. With this method, a highly mobile enemy is the objective wherever it goes.

Critics of maneuver warfare exist. Some are even bold enough to contend that “there is no such thing as maneuver warfare below the battalion level.”19 So too, critics of using digital communications as a tool for maneuver warfare will emerge because of the uncertainty it will create.20 According to MCDP 1, War-fighting, maneuver warfare is “trust tactics” and implies individuals are competent to judge the best action given their understanding of commander’s intent.21 Because of C^sup 2^PC, subordinates have access to more and better quality information, creating a truly self-regulating environment. The challenge will be for commanders to exercise the discipline not to interfere or override subordinates’ actions. The only way a functioning digital network can fail is if commanders impose archaic attrition warfare controls. To do so would be micromanaging instead of independent decisionmaking “within the framework of the general plan.”22

Digital communications and C^sup 2^PC are here to stay. They can be used either to push tactical units through control measure “wickets” or to facilitate maneuver. As an organization the Marine Corps has to choose which path to take. To date, discussion about the C^sup 2^PC has been dominated by the technical experts (S-6, communications). As the C^sup 2^PC is introduced to the end user, the relationship between operational and tactical C^sup 2^ must be reassessed. Time and training will be required to ensure that C^sup 2^PC becomes an effective tool for the Operating Forces.23

The Marine Corps must continue the tradition of using technology to enhance the way it fights and harness this new ability to pull the maneuver warfare chariot even faster. The Marine Corps must embrace the technology as a vehicle for its maneuver warfare doctrine; otherwise, it will be enslaved by the technology and impotent without it. The arrival of digital communications is a unique opportunity to add the finishing touches on decentralized mission tactics. Let junior leaders welcome the technology as freedom to maneuver instead of a cyber leash.

Notes

1. MCDP 6, Washington, DC, 1966, p. 40.

2. MAGTF Staff Training Program, C^sup 2^PC User’s Guide.

3. Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network. This term is used by the Army to describe “Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below,” the Army’s version of C^sup 2^PC.

4. Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, p. 108.

5. Beamont, Roger, The Nerves of War, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association International Press, Fairfax, VA, 1986, p. 9.

6. “Wireless Control of the Fleets,” Army and Navy Journal, 9 May 1908, p. 965 as quoted by CAPT James R. FitzSimonds, USN in “The Cultural Challenge of Information Technology,” Naval War College Review, Volume LI, Number 3, Sequence 363, Summer, 1998, available at <http:www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review>.

7. Ibid.

8. Fuller, MajGen J.F.C., Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1936, p. 61.

9. Van Creveld, p. 167.

10. Marshall, S.L.A., Men Against Fire, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1947, pp. 93-94.

11. Doughty, Robert Allan, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939, Archon Books, Hamden, CT, 1985, pp. 9-13.

12. Van Creveld, p. 255.

13. Hughes, Daniel J., editor, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1993, p. 77.

14. Von Mellenthin, F.W., Armored Warfare in World War II. Conference featuring F.W. Mellenthin, Generalmajor, German Army, Battell Columbus Laboratories Tactical Technology Center, Columbus, OH, 1979, p. 34.

15. Evidenced in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Exercise HUNTER WARRIOR.

16. As suggested by Col Michael Wyly, USMC(Ret) in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1985, pp. 123-125. Also see Hans Gotthard Pestke, “German Training and Tactics: An Interview With Col Pestke,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1983, pp. 63-64.

17. As long as actions support the main effort and operate within the parameters of intent.

18. Field Manual 101-5, Operational Terms and Graphics, United Stales Army, Washington, DC, 1997, states that the objective can be an enemy unit or terrain. However, I have not witnessed a single exercise in 15 years where the objective was not a piece of terrain.

19. Spoken by a battalion commander to his battalion at the beginning of a Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) in 1999.

20. This article has discussed control measures for maneuver only. Fire control measures will have to be considered.

21. MCDP 1, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 88.

22. Liddell-Hart, B.H., editor, The Rommel Papers, De Capo Press, New York, 1953, p. 77.

23. This was evidenced during CAXs 3 and 4, 2002 when MAGTF 6 integrated C^sup 2^PC into its operations. See Maj Laura Little, “The Digital Combat Operations Center,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 2002, pp. 42-43.

Maneuver Warfare Revisited

by Leon EngelbrechT

This is a belated reply to “Maybe It’s Time to Reconsider Maneuver Warfare” by Maj Michael S. Chmielewski (MCG, Aug02). Surface mail takes a while to arrive in this part of the world and, consequently, so does the arrival of my Gazette.

I read the article with interest as our forces also have a rich history of maneuver warfare (the Zulus and the Boers) and since the ability to maneuver in mind, time, and space was one major advantage U.S. forces enjoyed over its enemies in Afghanistan.

It is strange that some now want to throw away this advantage. From my point of view as a (Reserve) infantry officer in southern Africa who has read Clausewitz in part and studied Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs) 1 and 6 in full, you seem to have the right recipe. We, I believe, have yet to master command and control here to the extent you have doctrinally in MCDP 6. One reason is that the heresy of complete situational awareness is as alive and well here as it seems to be in your sister Services. It would be foolish to adopt any doctrine- or technology-based approach to war that was not based on an acceptance of fog and friction as normal battlefield conditions.

As MajGen Perry Smith put it in last December’s issue, decisionmakers seldom have more than 60 percent of the information they need to make a choice. And as GEN George S. Patton, Jr. put it, “The best is the enemy of the good.” A good decision now is better than a perfect decision next week (with apologies to Patton).

Maybe It’s Time to Reconsider Maneuver Warfare

by Maj Michael S. Chmielewsk, USMCR

While the discussion about a revolution in military affairs (RMA) predates the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, it has recently become the center of attention in the Department of Defense (DoD). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has created an Office of Transformation, headed by retired VADM Arthur Cebrowski, with responsibility for identifying innovative systems and concepts that could significantly change the way we fight.1 My purpose is to review some of the current trends in thinking about the future of warfare and whether we should reconsider our warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare in light of DoD’s emphasis on transformation.

With the publication of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting in 1989, the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as our warfighting philosophy. Subsequently revised in 1996 as Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Ww)fighting is strongly influenced by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and it emphasizes uncertainty and friction as fundamental characteristics of warfare.

Maneuver warfare… seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.2

Maneuver warfare, however, stands in stark contrast with other theories of warfare currently embraced by the other Services and DoD, which appear to be developing a more attrition-oriented warfighting philosophy; the pursuit of:

victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower . An enemy is seen as a collection of targets to be engaged and destroyed systematically.3 By the nature of their methods of power projection, the Navy and the Air Force have emphasized their ability to systematically destroy enemy forces by projecting long-range precision guided firepower. Even the Army’s Objective Force will rely heavily on precision fires, closely aligning the Army with the Navy, Air Force, and DoD.

Transformation is fundamentally about creating “differences in kind, as opposed to differences in degree.”4 It is about taking the military out of the industrial age of the 20th century and moving it into the information age of the 21st century, radically changing the way we will fight in the future. In fact, this effort began several years ago with the publication of Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) in 1996, which described high-tempo military operations enabled by information superiority.5 Updated in 2000 and renamed as JV2020 it reaffirmed this emphasis on information superiority.6 While he was President of the Naval War College, VADM Cebrowski developed his concept of network-centric warfare based on his observations of:

. . fundamental changes in American society, in particular the co-evolution of economics, information technology, and business practices and organizations …. By shifting to modern digital technology, we can increase battlespace awareness to yield increased combat power, with more targets destroyed.

While much has been written about the RMA, network-centric warfare, and transformation, the Marine Corps has for the most part remained silent.

At a time when ‘military transformation’ reigns at the Pentagon, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is distinguishing itself as a service that does not plan on changing. USMC structure and weapons are not outdated instruments of the Cold War and therefore the service does not need to redefine itself around the absence of a Soviet threat, argues Maj Gen Robert Magnus, the USMC’s Director of [Quadrennial Defense Review] QDR…. Because the force has always had to be ready for an adverse, chaotic environment on arrival, ‘we’re pretty relevant right now,’ Magnus added. While the rest of the military is striving to become, in some ways, more like the Marines, the USMC is emphasizing its differences from the other services.8

Unfortunately, this approach may not work for much longer. While some might argue that the publication of Warfighting over a decade ago represents a transformation in the Marine Corps, this is clearly not what Secretary Rumsfeld has in mind. Transformation into a force enabled by information superiority has become so important that Cebrowski has warned the Services that weapons systems and concepts of operation that are not designed to implement the Pentagon’s transformation goals will be subject to elimination.9 For example, the Marine Corps may have to show that the MV-22 Osprey is more than simply a new way to conduct vertical envelopments. We may soon be required to demonstrate how it will fundamentally change how we fight. Of course, the development of the Marine Corps’ big-ticket acquisition programs-the MV-22, advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV), Joint Strike Fighter, and lightweight 155mm howitzer-were all conceived in the 1980s, before the end of the Cold War. Like the Army’s much maligned Crusader self-propelled howitzer, it is not enough to justify how we would employ these systems to accomplish our missions better and with fewer casualties in a post-Cold War environment. We will have to show how they enable entirely new ways of fighting, using innovative warfighting concepts like HuNTER WARRIOR.

Individually, a handful of Marines have voiced concerns over the years about the emerging RMA and its emphasis on information superiority. LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC(Ret) chastised those who believe that:

* If you see the battlefield, you win the war.

* If we had today’s sensors, we would have won in Vietnam.

* In the near future we will be able to find, fix, track, and target-in realtime-anything of consequence that moves or is located on the face of the earth.

* Technology now provides the ability to identify virtually everything of military significance, in realtime, in any kind of weather, at any time.10

Van Riper also criticized JV2010 as “inconsistent with Marine Corps doctrine, especially Warfighting and MCDP 6, Command and Control.”11 Col TX. Hammes disagreed with Cebrowski’s analogy of warfare to business and the conclusion that network-centric warfare would change the fundamental nature of war.12

Institutionally, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) was responsible for designing and conducting experiments with new systems and concepts to enable new ways of fighting. The guiding idea behind the concept for their first experiment, HUNTER WARRIOR, was the use of long-range precision fires enabled by small teams of Marines using networked communications. The mission of these teams was to accurately locate enemy forces for destruction using precision guided weapons while avoiding direct fire engagements. There was no maneuver, and fires were intended to be decisive. The HUNTER WARRIOR concept was criticized in the Marine Corps Gazette by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR, the principal author of FMFM 1, as “inconsistent with existing doctrine, requiring reconsideration of one or the other.”13 It was, however, clearly an early effort to implement the tenets of JV2010. MCWL conducted a subsequent experiment with the use of handheld computers and networked communications down to the squad level to determine whether information superiority could reduce friendly casualties in an urban environment. The results of URBAN WARRIOR, however, were not very promising. Randy Gangle, a retired Marine colonel working with the MCWL said that information technology “wasn’t an enabler, it was a disabler.”14 Following URBAN WARRIOR, MCWL was refocused, and while they continue to participate in joint warfighting experiments and conducting their own limited objective experiments, they now concentrate their efforts on accelerating the development and fielding of promising technology to the Operating Forces.

Perhaps information technology will improve in the future to a degree that it might eventually “lift the fog of war,” a phrase used by retired ADM William Owens, former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.15 Owens has long been an advocate for the use of information technology to create a “knowledge umbrella” for pinpointing and attacking enemy forces. 16 In fact, determining the exact location of all enemy forces has become so important that VADM Cebrowski foresees the “emergence of sensorbased warfare.”

The sensor has moved to a position of primacy. In some areas of warfare, they’ve always been important, now they are universally important. This is a feature of the information age, and we have to start thinking in terms of sensors as elements of maneuver force.17

Like us, the Navy is also struggling with DoD’s recent emphasis on transformation. One of the Navy’s programs that was of great importance to the Marine Corps was DD 21, the next-generation “land attack” destroyer. This surface combatant program was originally intended to fill the void in naval gunfire created by the retirement of the Iowa-class battleships. Based on Marine Corps requirements for sustained volume of fire in support of maneuver, the Navy planned to build 32 ships, each armed with 2 155mm advanced gun systems and a total of 1,200 to 1,500 rounds per ship, as well as 128 to 256 vertical launch system cells for missiles. Last summer, however, this ship program was not seen as transformational and was replaced by DD(X).18 While the requirements remain the same, DD(X) will likely be smaller, with a lot fewer rounds in the magazines. While the Navy has not yet determined how many of these destroyers to build, it appears likely that they will build far fewer than 32 ships. The Navy is currently getting beaten up by those in DoD who don’t see a need for volume of fire and believe that this ship will be able to destroy more targets with fewer precision guided projectiles. The Marine Corps has chosen not to get involved in this food fight, and as a result the Navy will likely end up satisfying DoD’s desires. Meanwhile, the real priority for the Navy is their next-generation cruiser, CG(X), which will be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. The Navy is also spending $1.7 billion to convert the first two Ohioclass ballistic missile submarines into attack submarines, each capable of carrying special operations forces and launching approximately 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles.19 These efforts are viewed by many as truly transformational capabilities.

If the Marine Corps is to thrive in this era of transformation, then perhaps we should be conducting more experiments with innovative concepts like those used by the MCWL in HUNTER WARRIOR. We shouldn’t try to fool ourselves. Operational Maneuver From the Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver are almost a decade old now and were produced primarily to justify our need for the AAAV and MV-22 in the post-Cold War downsizing of the military. While they may appear to be “transformational,” they’re really intended to simply apply the principles of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations. If we were really serious about transformation, we would experiment with the AAAV and MV-22 using HUNTER WARRIOR concepts to see just how transformational they really are. Maybe we don’t really need them after all. In the future maybe we’ll only need to insert small teams of reconnaissance Marines whose sole mission is to acquire targets for destruction by long-range, precision guided weapons delivered by the other Services. If so, then maybe we won’t need the lightweight 155mm howitzer to provide close supporting fires in support of maneuver. And if we’re not going to have to conduct forcible entry amphibious assaults against defended beaches, then maybe we won’t really need the AAAV or naval gunfire from surface combatants. Maybe we won’t even need a large Marine Corps with infantry and artillery regiments, force service support groups, and Marine air wings. Maybe we’ll just need a couple of reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition units to acquire targets for attack using Tomahawk missiles launched from subs. With the strong push being given to unmanned sensors lately, these Marines could eventually be replaced by robotic sensors. It’s not very hard to see a day when our Nation may no longer require a Marine Corps.

So, maybe it’s time to reconsider our warfighting philosophy. If the fog and friction of war are incompatible with DoD’s transformation, then maybe we need to scrap MCDP 1 and start over. Maybe it’s time to “get with the program” and adopt a philosophy of attrition warfare using long-range, precision guided weapons enabled by information technology in order to destroy more targets more quickly, like the rest of DoD. Or, maybe it’s time to tell the emperor he has no clothes, and that JV2010/2020 and DoD’s transformation goals are inconsistent with our understanding of the fundamental nature of warfare. Maybe maneuver warfare isn’t such a bad idea after all. Maybe.

Notes

1. “Cebrowski Appointed as Director of Force Transformation,” DoD News Release No. 599-01, 26 November 2001.

2. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, 20 June 1997, p. 73.

3. Ibid., p. 36.

4. Kaufman, Gail and Amy Svitak, “Pentagon Develops New Transformation Criteria,” Defense News, 11-17 March 2002, p. 4.

5. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JV2010, Washington, DC, July 1996.

6. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JV2020, Washington, DC, June 2000.

7. Cebrowski, VADM Arthur K., USN and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998, pp. 28-35.

8. “QDR 2001: The Battle Begins,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 May 2001.

9. Kaufman and Svitak, p. 4.

10. Van Riper, LtGen Paul K., “Information Superiority,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1997, pp. 54-62.

11. Van Riper, LtGen Paul K., USMC(Ret), “More on Innovations and Jointness,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 1998, pp. 55-57.

12. Hammes, Col TX., “War Isn’t a Rational Business,” Proceedings, July 1998, pp. 22-25.

13. Schmitt, Maj John F., USMCR, “A Critique of the HuNTER WARRIOR Concept,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1998, pp. 13-19.

14.Freedman, David., “Killed at Their Keyboards,” Business 2.0 Magazine, February 2002.

15. Owens, ADM William A., “The Emerging System of Systems,” Proceedings, May 1995, pp. 35-39.

16. Graham, David E., “Retired Admiral Advocates Smarter Forces, Restructure,” San Diego Union Tribune, 30 January 2002.

17. Hodge, Nathan, “Transformation Boss Sees `Sensor-Based Warfare’ Era,” Defense Week Daily Update, 5 February 2002.

18. McCarthy, Gen Jim, USAF(Ret), Chairman, Transformation Study Group, “Transformation Study Report,” Prepared for the Secretary of Defense, 27 April 2001.

19. Fahey, Michael, “Transforming the Trident,” Newport News Daily Press, 3 March 2002.

Combat Service Support in Transition

by Capt Robert S. Burrell

With all the changes and proposed changes to combat service support (CSS) in the past decade, the development of the force service support group (FSSG) has made some jagged turns. Although proposals are adopted and modified, the future structure of the FSSG remains unclear, and there seems to be no consensus on its evolution. Without a unified vision, the 1st, 2d, and 3d FSSGs continue to test new ideas-which often differ from each other. CSS is currently in transition, but some of the changes being made at the operational and tactical levels appear contrary to maneuver warfare principles of task organization, decentralized control, simple and flexible planning, mission tactics using mission type orders, and initiative-based direction.

Doctrine and Conceptual Employment

Since World War II (WWII) the success of the Marine Corps can be attributed to its combat readiness, technological superiority, and logistical might. After the Cold War, budgetary restrictions forced the Marine Corps to reexamine its way of doing business. The emphasis on technology remained, but Congress considerably diminished the Corps’ capacity to purchase, store, maintain, and transport large quantities of material and equipment.1 CSS compensated for shrinking resources through a philosophy of “precision logistics.” The term precision logistics has been used to encompass such a diverse assortment of changes to the Armed Forces that the phrase has lost much of its original meaning. In this article I refer to precision logistics as the solution the Corps embraced for its decreased resources-in essence, the cliche of “doing more with less by fighting smarter.” It is important to note that precision logistics was not introduced because of its superiority to the time-proven lessons of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, but because financial constraints made change necessary.

In the current environment of budgetary and manpower constraints, FSSG headquarters develops comprehensive operational plans that manage every aspect of CSS down to the last Marine and smallest piece of equipment. Essentially, current contingency plans fragment the FSSG into minute pieces and then glue it back together again for its wartime employment. This is the case for both contingency plans 5027 and 1003. In time of war the FSSG expects these blueprints to be meticulously implemented. It makes perfect sense for logisticians to plan as precisely as possible, but as I will demonstrate, the limitations of an exact logistical solution do not complement maneuver warfare.

Support of a rapidly maneuvering ground combat element or aviation combat element should primarily rely on the principles of speed, decentralized command, and multiple capabilities rather than precision. For example, maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) demonstrate a reliable logistics methodology in support of maneuver warfare. MPS revolutionized amphibious capabilities by its ability to convey a diverse assortment of logistical assets when and where they are needed. MPS can employ singularly or in groups, but they do not offer a specific remedy for any situation, and it would entail a lengthy process to do so. Instead, the ships are preloaded in several configurations and stationed at multiple locations. The Marine Corps justifies the enormous expense of MPS by demonstrating its ability to project logistical support worldwide at a moment’s notice. Of immense importance to the combat elements, MPS supports maneuver warfare because it employs fast and delivers the most essential items. However, it does not offer a precise (or economical) logistical solution.

In an organizational sense, the slimming and trimming of precision logistics have made rapid employment of the FSSG impractical. If anyone needs evidence of the FSSG’s current dilemmas, they need only study the table of equipment (T/E) and table of organization (T/O). In actuality, these Headquarters Marine Corps (HQ,MC) documents run contrary to the FSSG’s wartime employment. To compensate for peacetime responsibilities, the three FSSGs assign the majority of military occupational specialties (MOSs) and their respective equipment to single units. Hence, units such as transportation support battalion consist of most transportation assets; engineer support battalion retains engineer assets; the majority of administration is placed in one company, food services in another, communications in another, and so forth. This process occurs for nearly every MOS and its respective equipment.

So how does the FSSG function with a peacetime organization that is incompatible for war? Shortly stated, the FSSG has responded to the challenges of minimized available assets by creating a new unit for each assigned mission. The process of organization begins when the FSSG is assigned a supporting role in an operation. When this occurs, representatives are gathered from each major CSS field to conference until the manpower and equipment required to support the operation are established. Essentially, the FSSGs create a new T/O and T/E for each deploying unit from scratch without any regard for the group’s current administrative organization. Through this process the FSSGs intend to specifically tailor the force required while conserving their available assets for garrison functions.

The current FSSG system of creating new units for operations has frequently been referred to as “task organization.” However, that term has been inappropriately applied and needs correction.2 Task organization requires a standing base unit that subsequently absorbs reinforcement. In contrast, the notional CSS detachments (CSSDs) in FSSG contingency plans do not currently exist in any form. Far different from task organizing, contingency plans create entirely new CSS units for employment.

Creating a new unit to explicitly meet the requirements of an operation may be feasible, but this attempt at precision makes the employment of CSS complicated, slow, and inefficient. Depending on the size of the operation, the process of organization could take weeks and probably should take months. Each section within the FSSG takes the newly created manpower allocation table and fills those line numbers as best they can. The process simply picks Marines at random and pulls them from their current units. Now, imagine assembling thousands of personnel who have never worked together before and demanding that they accomplish a CSS mission within a short period of time! The determined nature of the Corps has made such efforts possible in the past, but this approach should be one of last resort-not one of choice.

History demonstrates the foolishness of rearranging personnel structure for wartime employment. I could discuss the adverse experiences of the Germans in WWI or MajGen A.A. Vandegrift’s difficulties in preparing for Guadalcanal in WWII, but I believe common sense alone can prevail on this point.3 Simply stated, a thorough knowledge of one’s subordinates is a prerequisite to the mission orders that make maneuver warfare possible. That begs the question: how can implicit trust be formulated with strangers who have been immediately thrown into the chaos of deployment?

In regard to equipment, dictating the needed vehicles and principal end items in support of a given operation is relatively easy, but assigning the numerous smaller items can be a daunting task. A finalized equipment table could consist of hundreds of thousands of items. Even after the generation of the initial list, an extensive process of revision needs to be implemented so that commanders, and others with expertise within the FSSG, can make suggestions. Making a T/E for a unit of any size is a timeconsuming process, but the FSSG hurries to implement extensive equipment tables for contingency plans by slapping them together in a matter of weeks.

Despite Herculean efforts, the current process of rearranging the entire FSSG in contingency plans does not produce the desired result of a precise logistical solution. The manpower and equipment tables that the FSSG creates for its plans remain questionable because the notionally designed units are untested. If the history of warfare has taught us anything, it is that untried units will have both excesses and shortages in critical manpower and equipment that will not be discovered until employment. Furthermore, when the time comes to rapidly support an expeditionary operation, the FSSG will be forced to implement whatever existing contingency plan that most closely resembles the realworld situation. Consequently, the force that the FSSG finally employs will not provide a precise solution to the actual CSS requirements. Because of time constraints, the intent of creating the “just right” CSS package is not achievable by the current system. And, I would argue that the exactness being pursued is not necessary or even a desirable aim of maneuver warfare. For unless the force commander can determine his route of advance, fuel requirements, equipment losses, repair parts, expended ammunition, and casualties in advance, it will remain impossible to “precisely” support a rapidly maneuvering combat element in the chaotic environment of war.

In the effort to conserve resources, the FSSG has sacrificed maneuver warfare on the altar of precision logistics. Mission orders have little relevance or importance in FSSG planning. Because the organizations that the FSSG will deploy in war do not actually exist, there is no scrutiny of mission orders and, in my experience with contingency plans, mission orders have frequently been overlooked altogether. Instead, wartime employment emphasizes the time– phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) needed for the FSSG to reorganize itself. The TPFDD has become more than the product of planning-it has become the sole purpose of it. To effectively support maneuver warfare, preparation for CSS should underscore personal relationships and training rather than imposing strict order on manpower and equipment.4

Reorganization

The three FSSGs should take a second look at the purpose of HQMC’s Tf O and T/E. Equipment and personnel should be assigned to standing subordinate units that are already task organized to accomplish designed combat functions. In other words, the administrative organization of the FSSG should be tailored to rapidly respond in support of the five basic types of Marine air– ground task forces (MAGTFs). To quote Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP-1), Warfighting, “Operating forces should be organized for warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than visa versa.”5

Similar changes have been proposed to the structure of the FSSG over the last two decades.6 In October 1991 Carlton W. Meyer wrote an article in the Marine Corps Gazette, entitled “The FSSG Dinosaurs,” in which he proposed a three-tier partition of the FSSG into brigade service support groups (BSSGs).7 Meyer envisioned the following for Ist FSSG: BSSG-7 would be stationed in Twentynine Palms and be tailored for MPS operations and support the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX); BSSG-5 would be stationed at Camp Pendleton in overall support of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF); the third brigade would encompass Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group 11 (MSSG-11), MSSG-13, and MSSG-15. Although some may argue that the brigade emphasis in Meyer’s plan is outdated, several aspects of his pitch are worth noting. Principally, by giving depth to the organization of the FSSG, Meyer’s proposal enhanced rapid deployment, combat readiness, unit cohesion, training, and redundancy.

In 1992 Maj William S. Aitken wrote a prophetic thesis entitled “Increase the Size of the FSSG: An Evolutionary Idea.”8 At a time when the Marine Corps was beginning its force reductions, he stated that:

… current plans for the draw-down envision combining many of the battalions within the FSSG. By mixing the functions of combat service support, the FSSG will have trouble rapidly responding to contingencies.

He went on to state that in the fast-paced expeditionary operations of the future:

… units will need to be prepared and organized for deployment in a manner that lends to rapid mission accomplishment … there will not be time for reshuffling of staffs and troops and commands.

Opponents to restructuring the FSSG often point to the Gulf War as an example of its flexibility.9 CSS accomplished its mission in Southwest Asia, but the Gulf War is a poor historical case to justify the status quo. First, CSS had 6 months of preparation to work through the chaos of deployment and reorganization before ground combat occurred. The United States can no longer depend on the long periods of preparation that its global location in North America has afforded it in the past. In order to support the fast-paced expeditionary operations of the 21st century, CSS should organize before deployment becomes necessary. Second, the Gulf War exemplified the United States’ ability to overwhelm the enemy with its massive logistical might. With the drawbacks in manpower, material, amphibious shipping and, especially, airlift, CSS needs to become more proficient which requires innovative changes to the FSSG’s decades-old design.

In the May 2001 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette Col Thomas X. Hammes released the results of a symposium that discussed the lessons learned in the Gulf War.10 In spite of the Marine Corps Association’s commendable efforts to convene the seminar, many of the conclusions in regard to CSS and the FSSG appear understated or misunderstood. Although the conference recognized that the FSSG was not adequately prepared to provide operational CSS in the Gulf War, it appears to have accepted that these problems have been resolved through the creation of a notional Marine Logistics Command (MLC) in contingency plans. In reality, the MLC is an untested and untrained ghost. Even Col Hammes expressed some doubts in regard to the MLC, but a serious debate on the issue remains sorely lacking. In addition, the conclusion that the FSSG was, and still is, fully prepared for the tactical support of the MEF is questionable. The notional CSSDs in FSSG contingency plans are just as transparent as the MLC. In truth, the current organization of the FSSG supports neither operational nor tactical CSS but rather its peacetime responsibilities. Furthermore, the symposium faulted the FSSG for not fully understanding MPS but did not criticize its lack of proficiency in supporting large-scale operations. The reason why so much logistical effort was duplicated during the war had more to do with an FSSG that was not organized, prepared, or trained to employ in support of a MEF than with an ignorance of MPS.11 Unfortunately, these problems appear unresolved.

Training

In an April 2001 Gazette article by Capt Michael D. Grice entitled “Train Like We Fight,” Grice pointed out the many shortcomings of CSS training in support of CAX.12 However, he fails to mention that the deficiencies in CSS training primarily stem from the structure of the FSSG. With the short period of time allocated to a CSSD’s organizes tion, it takes a great deal of effort for the unit to support CAX, let alone participate in the training. For a newly organized CSSD, there are no such things as standing operating procedures (SOPs). Consequently, detailed plans must be made to accomplish nearly every task. And, Marines who are unfamiliar with each other must implement those details. CAX imparts beneficial experience to CSS personnel, but the CSSD loses most of that knowledge when the unit disbands. The next time a CSSD forms, lessons are learned the same way they were the year before-trial and error. The current system results in CSS units that support training exercises but rarely operate in accordance with the efficient performance required to win wars.

Assigning standing FSSG units to support exercises like CAX would provide a more thorough response to CSS and impart superior experience to the personnel assigned. A unit operates more proficiently when the personnel have a history together. High levels of loyalty, cooperation, and morale often characterize such organizations. A fixed unit can also incorporate the necessary changes to its SOPs so that the same mistakes do not occur year after year. Furthermore, the command and staff are readily familiar with their unit’s capabilities allowing CSS the time to fully participate with the air and ground elements during the planning process and throughout the exercise. Rotating a number of CSS units to support routine exercises creates a healthy spirit of competition. CSS could actually improve after each operation-the goal the FSSG should be striving for.

Culture

To quote MCDP-1, “Because war is a dash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war.”13 When the basic philosophy, organization, and training of CSS fail to support maneuver warfare, cultural aspects are not far behind. For example, take a look at most FSSG battalions and prepare to be awed by the number of desktop computers. In fact, it is a rare occurrence to see a Marine using a laptop, and those that do usually make a considerable effort to attain one. The FSSG has neither the embarkation material nor the necessary lift to transport all those desktops. Even if transportation were available, shipping computers makes them unusable until after debarkation. Conversely, a laptop can be packed in a briefcase in less than 3 minutes, carried by its user via sea or air, and be ready for employment at a moment’s notice. Furthermore, the user is already familiar with the software required to perform the mission since it is the same computer that Marine uses daily. The FSSG should be using the platforms that are compatible with maneuver warfare, especially since doing so is cost-effective and takes little effort. The present preference toward desktops can be attributed to the fact that FSSG battalions are not organized for employment and rarely embark on large exercises. This creates an environment in which combat requirements become unanticipated.

A Solution

I believe the FSSGs should employ a handful of completely functional, yet flexible, CSS packages. One such configuration is illustrated in Figure 1. In this diagram, the FSSG is structured in accordance to its operational– level support, direct tactical support, and general tactical support functions. The General Support Command (GSC) concentrates on providing general support to all organizations within the MEF, while the Direct Support Command (DSC) trains and employs for the direct support of designated operations. I have labeled the four subordinate elements of the DSC by their more commonly known designation of CSSDs, but these units would actually be permanent. These CSSDs would have most of the inherent assets to support operations the size of a CAX or a MEU and could rotate to support both. However, the GSC could reinforce a CSSD to provide direct support to a special purpose MAGTF, or the DSC could employ multiple reinforced CSSDs to support a brigade or MEF forward. By maintaining a flexible infrastructure that can be easily reinforced, the CSSDs could support mobile, vertical lift, or landing support operations. In other words, the FSSG can task organize the direct support required for MAGTFs around the base units in the DSC. Ultimately, the standing organization of a DSC allows for the flexible, proficient, and speedy projection of CSS, which will more effectively support the Marine Corps’ expeditionary needs.

In essence I am suggesting that the FSSG create a handful of standing units similar to the MSSG. HQMC disbanded the standing MSSGs years ago, but the structure of the MSSG remains basically the same today. The MSSG can be viewed as a standing FSSG battalion that has been designed for a tactical purpose. (It simply has a 1 1/2-year tour of duty and a borrowed T/E.) What makes the MSSG operationally proficient is the time allowed for personnel to train together before deployment. The MSSG’s organization also permits sailors and Marines to conduct adequate turnovers with incoming personnel. Additionally, the equipment necessary to perform the MSSG’s mission has been correctly identified through years of operational experience.

Equally important, the creation of an intermediary command between the FSSG and its battalions, as illustrated by the GSC, is long overdue. As a consequence of centralization, group headquarters directly supervises a number of CSS capabilities (consolidated personnel administration, consolidated food services, and numerous others). These additional tasks force the commanding general’s staff to focus inward instead of outward. At the operational level of logistics, resources need to be coordinated with our sister Services, the Department of Defense, civilian agencies, and host nations. The deficiencies in training and planning for these operational-level requirements were recognized as early as 1990 and still remain in doubt.14 By giving the FSSG organizational depth, CSS efforts can be distributed along the lines of Figure 2; in terms of a boxing analogy, MLC is the brain, DSC is the jab, and GSC is the power punch. By reorganizing in this fashion, group headquarters can better synchronize operational-level logistics in support of the MEF instead of expending precious energy micromanaging all of its CSS assets.

The proposed organization in Figure 1 is not all that original. It has many similarities to FSSG contingency plans as well as the structure of the FSSG during the Gulf War.15 Just as in the division and air wing, any organization of the FSSG must remain flexible. But, by establishing operating forces now, the FSSG can assign mission orders to standing subordinate units in time of war. If shortfalls are identified in the DSC, a general support unit can simply reinforce the deploying unit. If shortfalls exist in general support units, they can be filled by Reserves. This process allows the basic organization of the FSSG to remain intact upon employment.

Organizing the FSSG for rapid employment allows for genuine task organization in larger-than-MEU-sized operations. Should a contingency need several CSSDs, the DSC can quickly be augmented with additional CSSDs from other FSSGs. Or, one MLC could employ two, or maybe even three, DSCs. The point to be made here is that it is possible to establish the command, personnel relationships, and infrastructure that will support all five types of MAGTFs without recreating an entirely new FSSG every time wartime employment becomes necessary. For all intents and purposes, establishing an administrative organization that is designed for task organized employment makes for more thorough combat preparation, which is why most of the Marine Corps already operates in this decentralized manner.

Beyond aspects of organization, CSS needs a doctrine and culture that aligns with maneuver warfare philosophy. The FSSG must embrace decentralized decisionmaking and initiative-based mission orders rather than detailed and centralized planning. CSS units should annually conduct both large- and small-scale training exercises in an aggressive, realistic, and time-competitive environment. Furthermore, units should train in a manner that supports their combat employment, which means programs like combat skills training need to be eliminated or seriously adjusted. In short, the importance placed on preparing for war should take precedence over the routine and demanding tasks of garrison.

Impact on Force Structure

Forecasting the impact of FSSG’s reorganization on force structure is difficult. To begin with, I am not convinced that the solution presented is the only-or the best-one. Additionally, FSSG has reorganized under the constraints of manpower limitations and garrison requirements for far too long, which produced many of the current deficiencies. Instead, FSSG needs to create a completely revised T/O and T/E in accordance with a detailed examination of its wartime requirements. That task should be patiently and thoroughly completed before looking at the impacts on force structure, which may be significant or may be negligible. With a renewed brigade emphasis, perhaps the FSSG should review Carlton W. Meyer’s 1991 proposal. Conversely, Figure 1 depicts a flexible model that basically realigns existing units and current resources instead of creating original ones.

Although the purpose of this article is to stimulate the perception of the need to change, I will generally outline the force structure issues one could expect in a proposal along the lines of Figure 1. In this example the GSC is the only novel unit proposed. Basically, creation of this intermediate unit requires a reshuffling of the staffs in headquarters and service battalion and group headquarters. Although some new staff-level positions will need filling, I believe much of the GSC’s personnel could derive from group headquarters since the MLC would no longer need to manage all of its battalions.

As far as four permanent MSSG-type units are concerned, I have made the assumption that three CSSDs of the DSC could be made permanent based on the current manpower levels of the FSSG. Today’s MSSGs (equaling roughly 300 Marines each) are “temporary” organizations. Making them permanent implies that the FSSG’s battalions would lose roughly 900 line numbers on their T/Os. That may seem awfully hard to swallow, but the battalions already operate without these personnel on a daily basis. Those battalion line numbers considered essential for combat employment, but not necessary in garrison, could be filled by Reserves. Optimally, FSSG battalions could place entire platoons or companies in this reserve status, which preserves unit integrity.

The fourth CSSD proposed in Figure 1 provides the DSC with the flexibility to support the MEU as well as other CSS operations simultaneously, but it may require as many as 300 new line numbers. Combining the needs of 1st and 2d FSSG totals 600 additional Marines. Where will those Marines come from? Either the Corps can increase its size by 600 (which may be possible in today’s political climate), or (as blasphemous as it may sound) the air and ground forces could be reduced by a small fraction. The question that begs answering: does the Marine Corps want to be relegated to MEU-sized operations in the future, or do we desire the ability to rapidly respond in support of larger contingencies? In a Corps of over 150,000, increasing the manpower of the FSSGs by 600 Marines seems a small price to pay for flexible, proficient, and speedy CSS projection.

Summary

Currently, the FSSG is continuing to consolidate resources into MOS-specific units from which personnel and equipment can be reorganized to fit wartime situations. But, micromanaging the numerous CSS assets from FSSG headquarters is simply too large a task to accomplish effectively. The fixation with finding the exact requirements for any given operation wastes valuable time and, because of the nature of war, is unattainable anyway. The time required to create a perfect plan is exactly what the Marine Corps is attempting to avoid with maneuver warfare. Moreover, establishing peacetime garrison battalions that do not properly coincide with combat employment is precarious. The most dangerous aspect is that FSSG’s wartime requirements may not be correctly identified. Moreover, quickly organizing untested units defeats the benefits of training Marines in peacetime like they will fight in war. By establishing battalions that cannot be employed as they are organized, a “garrison-mentality” permeates the culture of the FSSG.

Recognizing the need to improve CSS is relatively easy, but implementing a solution will take strong leadership, force of will, collective cooperation, and patience. The Marine Corps is fond of using cliches like “. . . professionals think logistics” and “. . . logisticians win wars.” If the Corps adheres to its jargon, then it needs to take a second look at where the evolution of CSS is leading and ensure that it corresponds with maneuver warfare philosophy. If the FSSG cannot rapidly and efficiently employ in direct support of all five types of MAGTFs, then how can CSS effectively sustain the maneuver warfare doctrine being implemented by the air and ground forces?

Notes

1. For a historical perspective on the United States’ logistical changes, see Clayton R. Newell, “Logistical Art,” Parameters, March 1989, pp. 32-40.

2. For more information on the requirements for task organization, see Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-1, Command and Staff Action.

3. Renowned veteran Erick Von Schell stated that the German Army transferred many of its officers to new positions when WWI broke out. Schell believed this to be a mistake and maintained that “the heavy burden occasioned by the new impressions of battle would have been considerably lessened had there existed that feeling of unity and that mutual understanding which long service together engenders among officers and men.” Erick Von Schell, Battle Leadership, (Fort Benning, GA: The Benning Herald, 1933), pp. 20-21. For an outstanding review of the lessons learned while planning for the Guadalcanal operation, see Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal, (New York: Random House, 1990).

4. See MCDP-1, pp. 61-65. William S. Aitken discusses the necessity of personal relationships for proper CSS performance in his thesis “Increase the Size of the FSSG: An Evolutionary Idea,” Individual Research Paper, Marine Corps University, 1992, pp. 13-15.

5. MCDP-1, p. 55.

6. The need to organize CSS for rapid deployment while maintaining flexible employment has been recognized in the Army as well. See Leon E. Salomon and Harold Bankirer, “Total Army CSS: Providing the Means for Victory,” Military Review, 11 April 1991, pp. 3-8; or Wayne C. Agness and others, “Task Organizing CSS,” Infantry, September-October 1992, pp. 40-42.

7. Carlton W. Meyer’s idea was not unique; he borrowed it from a 1984 2d FSSG study. For Meyer’s proposal, see “The FSSG Dinosaurs,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1991, pp. 32-36.

8. Aitken, William S., “Increase the Size of the FSSG: An Evolutionary Idea,” Individual Research Paper, Marine Corps University, 1992, pp. 1, 5-6.

9. Woodhead, John A., Col, “Reorganization of the Force Service Support Group,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1991, pp. 37-38.

10. Hammes, Thomas X., Col, “DESERT SHIELD/DEsERT SToRm-Ten Years Later,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 2001, pp. 73-79.

11. Aitken, p. 12.

12. Grice, Michael D., “Train Like We Fight,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 2001, pp. 49-50. The problem of not integrating CSS into the training and evaluation portion of exercises occurs frequently. For an Army perspective, see Calvin R. Sayles, “Are We Ready: Combat Service Support Integration,” Armor, May June 1990, pp. 33-36. Also see Gilbert S. Harper and Robert J. Ross, “Managing CSS Unit Training,” Army Logistician, January-February 1990, pp. 6-10.

13. MCDP-1, p. 13.

14. For more information on how CSS could prepare for its theater-level responsibilities, see Jerome P. McGovern, “Combat Service Support at the High End of the Spectrum,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1990, pp. 50-52.

15. O’Donovan, John A., “Combat Service Support During DEsERT SHIELD and DEsERT SToRm: From Kibrit to Kuwait,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1991, pp. 26-31.

Terminology and Graphics

by the MSTP Staff

‘The mission, in particular, must be unmistakably clear so that once units become engaged all subordinate commanders can act with a unity of effort.’

-Capt Adolf Von Schell Battle Leadership

In his book, Battle Leadership, Capt Von Schell expressed the essence of mission tactics in maneuver warfare. When we assign missions to subordinates we must provide a task with a purpose and then provide the subordinate the necessary resources and time to accomplish the mission. Mission orders are only effective if they are clearly understood by the commander issuing them and, more importantly, by the subordinates executing them. Therefore, it is imperative that the mission and tasks are clearly understood and that the purpose endures contact with the enemy. Additionally, units must clearly understand the freedom of action and restrictions available within their delineated battlespace.

Words and graphics matter. Without the use of proper military terminology and symbology during planning and execution, the “unmistakable clarity” described by Capt Von Schell becomes impossible to achieve.

While the importance of proper terminology and graphics appears self-evident, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP) often sees terminology loosely applied without an understanding of resource implications, use of nondoctrinal terminology, doctrinal terms “morphing” between higher and subordinate operations orders (for example, a tactical task to “seize” in a Marine expeditionary force order becomes “secure” in the division order), and the failure to use graphic control measures to clarify functional responsibilities.

References

Like any profession, the military possesses a unique vocabulary to address the complexity of the profession of arms. Similar to a lawyer or doctor, a military professional must have an understanding of some basic references as he applies his craft. These references form the foundation of our professional military vocabulary and must serve as “ground truth” in any discussion of tactical or operational planning. These publications include:

Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines the approved terminology for general use by all components of the Department of Defense (DoD). In DoD Directive 5025.12, the Secretary of Defense has directed the use of JP 1-02 throughout the DoD to ensure standardization of terms. JP 1-02 should serve as the “first stop” in any search for doctrinal definitions.

Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-12C (MCRP 5-12C), Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, supplements JP 1-02 and contains definitions of Marine Corps terms, abbreviations, and acronyms not found in JP 1-02. MCRP 5-12C is designed to be used in conjunction with, JP 1-02.

MCRP 5-12A, Operational Terms and Graphics, is a dual-designated publication with the U.S. Army (Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols). This publication has terminology, acronyms, operational graphics, and symbology. The definitions in this reference are annotated where they are unique to one Service (Army or Marine Corps).

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 (MCDP 1-0), Marine Corps Operations, provides us with definitions of military terms and doctrinal explanations associated with Marine Corps operations. This publication is particularly useful because, unlike alphabetical order dictionaries, MCDP 1-0 organizes terms into subject matter areas: tactical tasks, types of operations, forms of maneuver, etc.

Tasks and Resources-Words Matter

Tactical tasks define the actions that commanders must take to accomplish their mission. They are relative to the enemy, terrain, and friendly forces. The following examples are not all-inclusive, but instead highlight tasks that are often used interchangeably or otherwise misused. Consider the difference in time, risk, and resources involved in each case.

Destroy or defeat? Destroy and defeat are each tactical tasks that focus on an enemy force. Destroy is “a tactical task to physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective unless it is reconstituted.” The definition clearly focuses on inflicting material damage and/or casualties on the enemy force. The level of damage required to meet the criteria of rendering a force combat ineffective has many variables. Unit size, composition, disposition, training, tactics, logistics, and morale are some of the variables that must be considered and assessed. Destroy is a difficult task to achieve and very difficult to assess, especially if a percentage of destruction is specified (50 percent of a named brigade, etc.). Collection assets and analysis must be allocated for the commander to know when he has accomplished this task.

Defeat is a tactical task to:

. . . disrupt or nullify the enemy commander’s plan and overcome his will to fight, thus making him unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action and yield to the friendly commander’s will.

Like destroy, this tactical task relates to enemy forces, but in the doctrinal definition of defeat, the key phrase is that the enemy is unwilling or unable to continue his adopted course of action. Instead of pure physical destruction, the aim is to apply enough resources to affect the mind of the enemy commander or the capabilities of the enemy force relative to the friendly force or terrain. The friendly resources applied to defeat the enemy could come in a variety of ways. For example, denying the enemy the ability to cross a particular bridge could nullify his ability to attack along an avenue of approach.

In summary, it normally requires less time and resources to defeat an enemy force than to destroy the same force.

Secure, seize, or clear? Secure, seize, and clear are all tactical tasks that focus on terrain. There frequently is confusion over the differences between these distinctive tasks. Secure is defined as:

. . . to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area.

Seize is “a tactical task to clear a designated area and obtain control of it.” This definition illustrates “a task within a task.” The definition of seize, “to clear a designated area,” leads us to the definition of clear. Clear is defined as:

. . . the removal of enemy forces and elimination of organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission.

While all three tactical tasks relate to terrain, to secure an area potentially requires far less time and resources than does seizing with its imbedded requirement to clear enemy forces from an area.

Screen, guard, or cover? Security operations are designed to provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection to friendly forces. The three types of security operations– screen, guard, and cover-are often misunderstood. While all three tasks focus on the friendly force, they differ greatly in their resource implications. Screen is a task “to observe, identify and report information, and only fight in self protection.” A unit with a task to guard must “protect the main force from attack, direct fire, and ground observation by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information.” A unit with a task to cover operates apart from the main force to “intercept, engage, delay, disorganize, and deceive the enemy before he can attack the main body.” These three tasks are often misused. They are all oriented on protecting a friendly force, but again, the level of resources committed escalates from screen through guard to cover. Additionally, guard specifies a level of mutual support while screen and cover do not.

Purpose

In the context of maneuver warfare words take on a new importance. In assigning a tactical task to a subordinate unit, we effectively tell that unit “what to do.” We also need to tell them the purpose-“the why.” This is most clearly expressed as the object of the phrase “in order to.” The purpose provides the common understanding that facilitates unity of effort. It focuses resources on the commander’s end state-the vision of success. Together, the task and purpose form the subordinate unit’s mission. The purpose (with method and end state) makes up the commander’s intent-the key tool of maneuver warfare that promotes initiative in mission accomplishment.

To be effective in these three roles the purpose has to be unambiguous and must endure beyond contact with the enemy. Figure I is a sample of words that may be effectively used to express the purpose of tactical tasks. The list is drawn from various sources and is not comprehensive.

The crucial point regarding the purpose of tactical tasks is that they must be clearly understood by all concerned. If the stated purpose is confusing-it must be clarified. Clarity can be added through an explanatory statement, “By deny I mean. . . .” The goal is shared understanding; common terminology is a tool to achieve this goal. To ensure this understanding the commander may want to add a glossary to the operation order or plan when nondoctrinal terminology is used.

Graphics

Precise terminology should be complemented by well-thought-out and understood graphics. Military symbology serves as our professional “shorthand.” Properly used, these graphics are a powerful tool for the commander and his staff. Graphics visually portray intent, tasks, and responsibilities. The old saying that “a picture is worth a thousand words” holds true in the area of military symbology. Consider the task of “attack along Axis Sword.” (See Figure 2.) While the words clearly portray the task, the visualization of this task is incomplete without graphically tying the task to the terrain.

The power of military symbology is often diluted by a lack of attention to detail. MSTP commonly sees incomplete development or understanding of basic control measures such as boundaries and fire support coordinating measures, failure to properly label control measures with the establishing agency and date/ time/group when the measure takes effect, and the improper depiction of on-order control measures. As a result, the fog and friction of war often starts with the operations overlay.

Conclusion

Tactical terms and the related graphics associated with military operations are our tools for communicating and directing the activities of our subordinates. As such, these words and symbols control resources and time and incur different levels of risk. As leaders and planners we are obliged to know what effects we want to have upon the enemy, the amount of resources we are willing to expend, and the risk we are willing to accept. We must then communicate this vision and direct our subordinates during execution. To accomplish this we have to properly articulate our vision by using doctrinally correct military terms and supporting graphics.

Precise terminology and graphics can help the commander generate tempo in planning and execution because subordinate commanders have a clear end state. On the other hand, improper terminology and graphics undermine unity of effort, generate confusion, and may take away from a common understanding, thereby degrading tempo and increasing the risk to the force.

Notes

>This article is part of a series of articles by the MSTP staff that addresses MAGTF operations and lessons learned- Readers may download copies of these articles on the MSTP web site <www.mstp.quantico.usmc.mil> under Publications/Team Positions.

1. Each of the publications identified in this article can be accessed and downloaded from the Internet. Marine Corps publications are available at <www.doctrine.usmc.mil/> and joint publications may be found at <Www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare

Our new capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), moves us down the path outlined in Marine Corps Strategy 21, and provides the foundation for the way the Marine Corps will conduct operations within the complex environment of this new century. EMW is the union of our core competencies; maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary heritage; and the concepts by which we organize, deploy, and employ forces. It emphasizes the unique capabilities the Marine Corps provides the joint force commander JFC) and the synergy created when leveraged with the complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies. These capabilities translate into power projection designed to shape the global security environment, assuring our friends and allies while dissuading, deterring, and defeating potential adversaries. The elements of EMW will guide the process of innovation, change, and adaptation to ensure the Corps continues its role as the Nation’s total force– in-readiness.

J.L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

EMW is the Marine Corps’ capstone concept for the early 21st century. It is built on our core competencies and prepares the Marine Corps, as a “total force,” to meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world. Capitalizing on our maneuver warfare philosophy and expeditionary heritage, the concept contains the enduring characteristics and evolving capabilities, upon which the Marine Corps will rely, to promote peace and stability and mitigate or resolve crises as part of a joint force. EMW focuses Marine Corps competencies, evolving capabilities, and innovative concepts to ensure that we provide the JFC with forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, antiterrorism, and warfighting.

The purpose of this document is to articulate to future JFCs and contemporary joint concept developers the Marine Corps’ contribution to future joint operations. EMW serves as the basis for influencing the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Process and the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System. It further refines the broad axis of advance identified in Marine Corps Strategy 21 for future capability enhancements. Joint and Multinational Enabling Marine forces possess the capabili

ties to provide the means or opportunity to make joint and multinational operations possible. Enabling operations may be as basic as establishing the initial command and control (C2) system that the assembling joint or multinational force “plugs into,” or a complex as physically seizing forward operating bases for follow-on force Other examples of enabling opera tions include defeating enemy antia( cess capabilities and serving as an operational maneuver element to exploit joint force success or open new fronts. Marine forces are ready to serve as the lead elements of a joint force, act as joint enablers, and/or serve as joint task force JTF) or functional component commanders (i.e., joint force land component commander, joint force air component commander, joint force maritime component commander).

Strategic Agility

Marine forces will rapidly transition from precrisis state to full operational capability in a distant theater. This requires uniformly ready forces, sustainable and easily task organized for multiple missions or functions. They must be agile, lethal, swift to deploy, and always prepared to move to the scene of an emergency or conflict. Operational Reach

Marine forces will project and sustain relevant and effective power across the depth of the battlespace. Tactical Flexibility

Marine forces will conduct multiple, concurrent, dissimilar missions, rapidly transitioning from one task to the next, providing multidimensional capabilities (air, land, and sea) to the joint team. For example, tactical flexibility allows the same forward deployed Marine force to evacuate noncombatants from troubled areas, conduct antiterrorism/force protection operations, and seize critical infrastructure to enable follow-on forces.

Support and Sustainment

Marine forces will provide focused logistics to enable power projection independent of host-nation support against distant objectives across the breadth and depth of a theater of operations.

These capabilities enhance the joint force’s ability to reassure and encourage our friends and allies while we deter, mitigate, or resolve crises through speed, stealth, and precision. Strategic Landscape

U.S. interests will continue to be challenged by an array of national and nonstate actors posing conventional and asymmetrical threats. These threats are made more complex and lethal by the increased availability of militarily applicable commercial technologies. As the technological gap between the United States and its potential adversaries narrows, our leadership, doctrine, and training will be fundamental to maintaining our continued military advantage. We expect potential adversaries to adapt their tactics, weaponry, and antiaccess strategies to confront us on terms of relative advantage. Specifically, adversaries will seek to engage us where they perceive us to be weak. Aware of our ability to degrade complex systems, the thinking adversary will opt for the use of sophisticated but autonomous weapons. Knowing our thirst for information, they will promote uncertainty, confusion, and chaos. This is the venue where our most persistent and determined adversaries will choose to operate. Our Nation must be prepared to fight– worldwide-against adversaries who will seek to engage us with asymmetric capabilities rooted deep in the human dimension of conflict. The Marine Corps, with our philosophy of maneuver warfare and heritage of expeditionary operations, is ideally suited to succeed in this challenging landscape. Expeditionary Advantage

The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from combining our maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary culture; and the manner in which we organize, deploy, and employ our forces. EMW capitalizes on this combination, providing the JFC with a total force-in– readiness that is prepared to operate with other Ser-Oces and multinational forces in the full range of military operations from peacetime engagement to major theater war.

Maneuver Warfare

The Marine Corps approach to warfare, as codified in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, is the product of years of conceptual development, innovation, and experience. Maneuver warfare, the philosophical basis for EMW, acknowledges the timeless realities of human conflict and does not attempt to redefine war on more humane or less risky terms. The fundamental nature of war-a violent struggle between hostile, independent, irreconcilable wills characterized by chaos, friction, and uncertainty-will remain unchanged as it transcends advancements in technology.

What has changed is the gradual shift in reliance from the quantitative characteristics of warfare-mass and volume-to a realization that qualitative factors (speed, stealth, precision, and sustainability) have become increasingly important facets of modern warfare. Maneuver warfare stresses proactive thought and action, elevating the operational art beyond the crude simplicity of attrition.

It combines high-tempo operations with a bias for action to achieve advantage-physical, temporal, or conditional-relative to an adversary. The aim is to shatter an adversary’s cohesion, succeed in other operations by rapid action to mitigate damage, or resolve a crisis on favorable terms. Maneuver warfare encourages decentralized decisionmaking, enabling Marines to exploit the chaotic nature of combat. Decentralizing decisionmaking allows Marines to compress the decision cycle, seize fleeting opportunity, and engage enemy forces from positions of advantage, which empowers us to outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight our adversary.

Expeditionary Operations

For Marines the term expeditionary connotes more than the mere capability to deploy overseas when needed. Expeditionary is our ethos-a pervasive mindset that influx ences all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping by acknowledging the necessity to adapt to the conditions mandated by the battlespace. Expeditionary operations are typically conducted in austere environments from sea, land, or forward bases. They will likely require Marines and other naval forces to be brought to bear without reliance on host-nation or outside support. As a tangible representation of our national interest, forward deployed and forward based Marines remain both a key element of America’s expeditionary advantage and are critical to the regional combatant commander’s or commander in chief’s (CinC’s) overall strategy.

The regional CinC will set the broad conditions for shaping the battlespace through engagement, forward presence, and the application of a full range of response options. As a critical component of each regional CinC’s Theater Engagement Plan, forward deployed Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and forward based Marines execute multinational training exercises, conduct mobile training teams, and participate in military-to-military exchanges. Through these activities, Marines develop invaluable regional expertise, cultural and situational awareness, and an appreciation of the interoperability required for successful joint and multinational operations.

Marine forces, as a part of the regional CinC’s engagement strategy, will focus on access operations or other assigned missions as a part of the right mix of joint/multinational forces. These operations may be as basic as establishing the initial C^sup 2^ system that the assembling joint or multinational force “plugs into” or as complex as physically seizing forward operating bases for follow-on forces. Throughout the conduct of operations, Marines will seek to leverage the unique and complementary capabilities of other Services and agencies in order to provide the JFC with a fully integrated force.

Seabasing

Marine forces, as an integral component of a larger naval force, will be prepared to influence events within the world’s littorals using the sea as maneuver space and as a secure “base” from which JFCs can project power to impact the early stages of a potential crisis. Seabasing supports versatile and flexible power projection. Seabasing enables forces to move directly from ship to objectives deep inland and represents a significant advance from traditional, phased amphibious operations. Seabased operations maximize naval power projection and enhance the deployment and employment of naval expeditionary forces by JFCs. More than a family of platforms afloat, seabasing will network platforms and promote interoperability among the amphibious task force, carrier battle group, maritime preposition force, combat logistics force, and emerging highspeed sealift and lighterage technologies. Seabased operations will capitalize on the maneuver space afforded by the sea, rapid force closure through at-sea arrival and assembly, and the protection assured by the U.S. Navy’s control of the sea. C^sup 2^, combat support, and combat service support capabilities will remain at sea to the maximum extent possible and be focused upon supporting expeditionary air and land operations ashore. Forward deployed naval forces will have access to a responsive worldwide logistics system to sustain expeditionary operations. Seabasing will allow Marine forces to commence sustainable operations, enable the flow of follow-on forces into theater, and expedite the reconstitution and redeployment of Marine forces for follow-on missions.

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

Marines typically deploy and employ as scalable, tailorable, combined arms teams known as MAGTFs. All MAGTFs, regardless of size, share four common organizational elements that vary in size and composition according to the mission: command element, ground combat element, aviation combat element and combat service support element. Organic to each MAGTF, regardless of size, are specialized antiterrorism and force protection capabilities that are available to support the JFC. Fully interoperable, each MAGTF will have the ability to serve as a JTF headquarters or as a functional or Service component commander of a JTF.

In partnership with the Navy, Marine forces will use the capabilities of bases and stations and selected naval platforms as “launch pads” to flow into theater. During deployment, Marine forces will conduct collaborative planning and execute en route mission training and virtual rehearsals. They will capitalize on shared situational awareness that is developed in support of the JFC and processed and distributed by the Supporting Establishment. These enhancements will revolutionize the otherwise timeintensive reception, staging, onward movement, and integration activities, allowing increased operational tempo and seizing early opportunities as the enabling force for the JFC. Forward deployed Navy and Marine forces will continue to be the JFC’s optimal enabling force, prepared to open ports and airfields and to establish expeditionary airfields and intermediate staging bases in either benign or hostile environments.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)), in close partnership with the Navy, will continue to be the onscene/oncall enabler for follow-on Marine or joint forces. Operating forward deployed from the sea, the MEU(SOC) is unconstrained by regional infrastructure requirements or restrictions imposed by other nations. Because of its forward presence, situational awareness, rapid response planning capability, and organic sustainment, the MEU(SOC) will continue to be the JFC’s immediately employable combined arms force of choice.

The MEU(SOC) initiates humanitarian assistance, provides force protection, conducts noncombatant evacuations, enables JTF C^sup 2^, and facilitates the introduction of follow-on forces conducting limited forcible entry operations when required. These early actions shape the JFC’s battlespace, deter potential aggressors, defuse volatile situations, minimize the damage caused by natural disasters, and alleviate human suffering. Increasing mobility, speed, firepower, and tactical lift will enable this seabased, self-sustained, combined arms force to conduct expeditionary operations across the depth of the battlespace, in adverse conditions, day or night.

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) is optimally scaled and task organized to respond to a full range of crises. Strategically deployed via a variety of modes (amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift) and poised for sustainable power projection, the MEB will continue to provide a robust seabased, forcible entry capability. It will use organic combined arms and the complementary capabilities from the other Services-such as netted sensors, seabased fires, and advanced mine countermeasures-to locate, counter, or penetrate vulnerable seams in an adversary’s access denial systems. The MEB will then close rapidly on critical objectives via air, land, and sea to achieve decisive results. It can be used to enable the introduction of follow-on forces (joint and multinational) or be employed as an independent operational maneuver element in support of the JFC’s campaign plan. The MEB constitutes a multidimensional, seabased or landbased, operational “capability in readiness” that can create its own opportunities or exploit opportunities resulting from the activities of other compo, nents of the joint force.

Marine Expeditionary Force

As a crisis escalates, smaller MAGTFs and supporting units are deployed until a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) is in place to support the CinC. The MEF, largest of the MAGTFs, is capable of concurrent seabased operations and sustained operations ashore, operating either independently or as part of a joint warfighting team. The MEF can be tailored to meet multiple joint requirements with its inherent sustainability.

Specialized Marine Corps Organizations and Capabilities

Special purpose MAGTFs are non- standing organizations temporarily formed to conduct specif ic missions for which a MEF or other unit is either inappropriate or unavailable. They are organized, trained, and equipped to perform a specific mission such as force protection, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacetime engagement activities, or regionally focused exercises. While the MAGTF construct will remain the primary warfighting organization of the Marine Corps, not all situations will require it to operate as a combined arms unit. Should the situation warrant, distinct MAGTF elements and capabilities may be employed separately in response to critical JFC requirements.

For example, the 4th MEB (Antiterrorism (AT)) is a unique organization with specialized antiterrorism capabilities. This unit consists of Marines and sailors specifically trained to respond rapidly-world– wide-to threats or actual attacks by terrorists. The 4th MEB (AT) contains the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion (fleet antiterrorism security teams), the Marine Security Guard Battalion, the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, and an infantry battalion specially trained in antiterrorism operations.

Supporting Establishment

Marine Corps bases and stations provide direct and indirect support to the MAGTF and other forward deployed forces and are the means by which Marine forces are formed, trained, and maintained. These bases and stations are platforms from which Marines project expeditionary power while supporting the quality of life of Marines and their families.

The Way Ahead

Marine Corps Strategy 21 identifies capability enhancements required to continue the evolution of the MAGTF. These capability enhancements include joint/multinational enabling, strategic agility, operational reach, tactical flexibility, and support and sustainment, which create a Marine force that provides the JFC with expanded power in order to assure friends and allies or dissuade, deter, and defeat adversaries. In accordance with our expeditionary culture and warfighting ethos, our doctrine, organization, education, and training must contribute to producing Marines and organizations that thrive in the chaos of conflict by:

* Producing leaders who have the experience to judge what needs to be done; know how to do it; and exhibit traits of trust, nerve, and restraint.

* Developing leaders and staffs who function in an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty and make timely and effective decisions under stress.

* Developing leaders by improving their capacity to recognize patterns, distinguish critical information, and make decisions quickly on an intuitive basis with less than perfect information.

* Enhancing leaders’ decisionmaking skills with investments in education, wargaming/combat simulation activities, and battespace visualization techniques within a joint or multinational framework.

We will see a convergence of transformation and modernization capabilities in our MAGTFs that will revolutionize expeditionary operations when currently planned programs mature. Realizing EMW’s full potential will require a developmental effort focused on improving C^sup 2^, maneuver, intelligence, integrated fires, logistics, force protection, and information operations. Achieving these improvements will require integration of both Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, systems, and acquisition strategies.

Organization, Deployment, and Employment

Changes in operational and functional concepts may necessitate changes in the integrating concepts of organization, deployment, and employment. Organizationally, EMW emphasizes the MEB as the preferred midintensity MAGTF and the role of the Supporting Establishment in di- rect support of forward operations. Organizational structure must be mission oriented to ensure the effective deployment, employment, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces. The Marine Supporting Establishment must be postured to facilitate situational awareness of worldwide operations, leverage information technologies, and exploit modern logistics concepts in order to anticipate and respond to MAGTF requirements.

Marines will deploy using any combination of enhanced amphibious platforms, strategic sealift and airlift, prepositioned assets, and self deployment options to rapidly project force throughout the world. By virtue of their en route collaborative planning and virtual rehearsal capability, Marine forces will arrive in theater ready for immediate employment. While Marines achieve great operational synergy when employed as fully integrated MAGTFs, the Marine Corps can provide specific forces and capabilities according to the needs of the JFC. Continuing our tradition of innovation, we must strive to enhance our concepts and technologies to organize, deploy, and employ the force.

Maneuver

Maneuver in all dimensionsland, air and, uniquely, operational maneuver from the sea-enables commanders to exploit enemy weakness at the time and place of their choosing through the use of the operational mobility inherent in naval forces. Maneuver seeks to achieve decisive effects during the conduct of a joint campaign. It is the means of concentrating force at critical points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and momentum, which drives adversaries into untenable situations. Maneuver can deny the enemy the initiative, reducing his choices to either defending the length and depth of the littorals, thereby dislocating his forces to the JTF’s advantage or exposing critical vulnerabilities to exploitation. Enemy forces reacting to MAGTF maneuver generate opportunities for the JFC to concentrate the complementary capabilities of other maneuver forces. Maneuver, integrated with fires, will be linked to and influenced by the JFC’s battlespace shaping operations and directed toward achieving operational effects. Innovative technologies will provide Marines enhanced mobility to cross greater distances and reduce the limitations imposed by terrain, weather, and access denial systems. The result will be an expanded maneuver space, both seaward and inland.

Enhancements in our

maneuver capability will compel adversaries to develop innovative anti- access strategies and systems. Proactive joint efforts to anticipate and counter current and future antiaccess systems will be criti- cal to ensuring freedom of action.

Integrated Fires

Fires involve more than the mere delivery of ordnance on a target. The psychological impact on an adversary of volume and seemingly random fires cannot be underestimated. The human dimension of conflict entails shattering an enemy’s cohesion through the introduct on ot tear and terror. Marines, applying the tenets of maneuver warfare, will continue to exploit integrated fires and maneuver to shatter the cohesion of an adversary.

We will increasingly leverage seabased and aviation-based fires and develop shorebased fire support systems with improved operational and tactical mobility. Streamlining our fire support coordination procedures and enhancements in combat identification techniques will support rapidly maneuvering forces while decreasing the risks of fratricide. Forces afloat and ashore require the ability to immediately distinguish friendly forces from others and to then deliver lethal and nonlethal fires with increased range and improved accuracy to achieve the desired effect. Volume and precision of fires are equally important. The continuous availability of high-volume, all-weather fires is essential for suppression, obscuration, area denial, and harassment missions. We will use fires to support maneuver just as we use maneuver to exploit the effects of fires.

Intelligence

Intelligence is a command function that optimizes the quality and speed of decisionmaking. EMW requires a thorough blending of the traditional domains of operations and intelligence. Commanders and their staffs must make decisions in an environment of chaos, uncertainty, and complexity, and they must be prepared to act on incomplete information. The goal of intelligence is to enable the commander to discern the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and exploit them.

Intelligence must support decisionmaking by maintaining current situational awareness, monitoring indications and warnings, identifying potential targets, and assessing the adversary’s intent and capabilities at all levels of operations. This requires establishing an intelligence baseline that includes order of battle, geographic factors, and cultural information, all contained in universally accessible databases.

Deployed Marine forces will enhance their organic capabilities by accessing and leveraging national, theater, Service, and multinational intelligence through a comprehensive intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance network. The informed judgment of well-trained, educated, and experienced Marine analysts and collectors will remain the most important intelligence asset.

Logistics

Marines must access a worldwide infrastructure of distribution systems to support expeditionary operations. The integration of naval expeditionary logistics capabilities with joint information and logistics systems will provide total asset visibility and a common relevant operating picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies. Marines must explore ways to reduce the logistics footprint ashore through expeditionary support bases, seabased support, in-stride sustainment, reduction of consumables, improved packaging, better visibility over distribution, and development of alternafive ordnance variants that are smaller and lighter, but retain equivalent lethality.

Command and Control

EMW promotes decentralized execution providing subordinates latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with the commander’s intent. Organic and supporting C^sup 2^ systems and processes must be adapted to function in any environment, whether afloat, transitioning ashore, or on the move. C^sup 2^ must facilitate decentralized decisionmaking and enhanced situational awareness at all echelons. Concurrently, C^sup 2^ must provide the MAGTF commander the ability to direct joint and multinational task force operations when required.

EMW requires adaptable and intuitive C^sup 2^ architectures and systems that are fully interoperable with joint assets and compatible with multinational assets. Expeditionary forces will be able to access, manipulate, and use information in near realtime, developing a common tactical and operational understanding of the battlespace. They will have connectivity to theater and national assets and the ability to disseminate information throughout the force. This will support fully integrated collaborative planning efforts during both deployment and employment.

C^sup 2^ initiatives must address limitations in the capabilities of all amphibious platforms. Key factors include accelerated technological advances and rapid changes in equipment and capabilities. Flexibility, adaptability, and interoperability are paramount in the design and development of systems and platforms. Particular attention must be made to providing commanders with seamless C^sup 2^ capabilities throughout the battlespace.

Force Protection

Force protection is those measures taken to protect a force’s fighting potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. Force protection will rely on the integrated application of a full range of both proactive and reactive capabilities. Multidimensional force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of layered active and passive measures within all domains across the range of military operations-or warfighting functions-with an acceptable level of risk.

We will pursue improvements in the families of technologies and doctrine to enhance force protection capabilities. Marine forces will enhance security programs designed to protect servicemembers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations. These enhancements will be accomplished through innovative technological and nontechnology-based solutions combined with planned and integrated application of antiterrorism measures, physical security, operations security, personal protection, and incident response.

Information Operations

Information operations involve actions taken to affect the adversary’s decisionmaking processes and information systems while ensuring the integrity of our own. The integrated components of information operations have always proven applicable across the full range of military operations. Information operations will be used to shape the strategic environment or impart a clearer understanding and perception of a specific mission and its purpose. Information operations will be a force multiplier-reducing the adversary’s ability to effectively position and control his forces-and prepare the way for the MAGTF to accomplish future missions. We must leverage information operations and ensure they are synchronized with the JFC’s campaign plan to achieve the desired operational effect.

Summary

EMW describes the Marine Corps’ unique contribution to future joint and multinational operations. As the Nation’s only seabased, forward deployed, air-ground force in readiness, Marines stand ready to support the JFC. Marines, intrinsically linked with naval support, maintain the means to rapidly respond to crises and respond with the appropriate level of force, MAGTFs are the JFC’s optimized force that will enable the introduction of follow-on forces and prosecute further operations.

EMW focuses our warfighting concepts toward realizing the Marine Corps Strategy 21 vision of future Marine forces with enhanced expeditionary power projection capabilities. It links our concepts and vision for integration with emerging joint concepts. EMW will guide the process of change to ensure that Marine forces remain ready, relevant, and fully capable of supporting future joint operations.

What if…? The Essence of the COA Wargame

by the MSTP Staff

The Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of swift, focused, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. The course of action (COA) wargame embodies this philosophy of maneuver warfare by testing our COAs against those of an enemy, represented by the intelligence section or red cell, that thinks and acts with an independent will.1 Wargaming allows the commander, his staff, and planners to gain a common understanding of friendly and enemy COAs. It helps identify the advantages and disadvantages of each friendly COA in relation to enemy actions.

Throughout planning and wargaming we must maintain a focus on the enemy. Focusing on the enemy allows us to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy’s system function so that we can penetrate it, tear it apart and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. Achieving this goal requires us to “get inside” the enemy’s thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself. It is essential that we understand the enemy on his own terms-we should not assume that the enemy thinks, fights, or has the same values or objectives that we do.

What Is a Wargame?

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines a wargame as:

A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.

A good definition, yet three additional concepts should be considered when thinking about wargaming — scalable, time dependent, and adversarial.

A wargame is scalable in the sense that the personnel (battalion through Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level) conducting the wargame can adapt the methodology to meet their particular circumstances. Wargaming is time dependent in that the thoroughness of the wargame is based on how much time is available to conduct the wargame. If time is short, the wargame may be no more than a “what if . . . ” drill done by the commander and his staff on the hood of a HMMWV. However, if time is not as crucial, the wargame may be a week-long, full-scale, computer simulation conducted by the MEF and their major subordinate commands. In keeping with the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare philosophy, the wargame should be adversarial in nature by using a thinking and reactive enemy to fight the enemy COA.

What Are the Benefits of Conducting a Wargame?

We conduct a wargame to refine our COAs and to develop the best possible COA within the timeframe available. The staff evaluates the effectiveness of friendly COAs against both the enemy’s COAs and the commander’s wargaming guidance. Each friendly COA is wargamed against selected enemy COAs. COA wargaming helps the commander determine how best to apply his strength against the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities while protecting his critical vulnerabilities. Wargaming pits friendly COAs against enemy COAs-it does not compare friendly COAs against each other. The commander and his staff may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems. They also identify branches and sequels that may become “on order” or “be prepared” to missions. The wargame assists the commander in developing his vision for success-his operational design. Wargaming helps the commander:

* Fight the single battle.

* Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.

* Build common situational awareness.

* Build common expectations of anticipated battlefield events.

* Determine conditions and resources required for success.

* Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities.

* Focus the intelligence collection and analysis effort on enemy strengths, vulnerabilities, and desired end state.

* Identify the coordination requirements that produce synchronized results.

* Determine the most flexible COA. It’s not good enough to just test the friendly COAs or just identify their strengths, weaknesses, associated risks, and shortfalls. We must capitalize on what we have identified by strengthening the weaknesses, mitigating the risks, and eliminating the shortfalls to improve the COA. The improvement of each COA by the planners, based on the results of the wargame, provides the commander the best possible COAs from which to make his decision during the next step in the planning process — COA comparison and decision.2

What Are the Results of Wargaming.

The wargame produces many planning and execution tools. It also generates professional discussion about the feasibility and flexibility of the COAs being tested. It is these professional discussions that allow the commander and his staff to react quickly to unforeseen battlefield developments faced during execution. It facilitates:

* Identifying and refining the enemy’s most likely and dangerous COAs.

* Identifying likely times and areas for enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and friendly nuclear, biological, and chemical defense requirements.

* Testing the enemy reaction to planned deception efforts.

* Refining the commander’s critical information requirements and incorporating them into the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

* Finalizing the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

* Developing the intelligence collection and dissemination plan.

* Refining location and timing of the decisive actions.

* Identifying key terrain and determining how to use it.

* Identifying critical events.

* Estimating the duration of the operations and its critical events.

* Projecting the outcome of each critical event.

* Determining the timing of force concentration and initiation of the attack or counterattack.

* Identifying the location and commitment of the reserve.

* Identifying or confirming the locations of decision points, named areas of interest, targeted areas of interest, and the information needed to support the decision points.

* Identifying tasks the unit must retain and tasks to be assigned to subordinate commanders.

* Refining task organization, to include forces retained in general support of the command.

* Allocating resources to subordinate commanders to accomplish their missions.

* Identifying additional requirements for support.

* Developing a synchronization matrix and decision support template.

* Developing fire support, engineer, air defense, information operations, and combat service support plans.

* Determining movement times and tables.

* Integrating the targeting process, to include identifying or confirming high-payoff targets and determining attack guidance.

* Identifying the location of the commander and unit command posts.

* Refining command and control requirements, to include control measures and updated operational graphics.

* Identifying additional hazards, assessing their risk, developing control measures to reduce risk from all identified hazards, and determining residual risk.

The wargame is an essential tool for the honing and testing of COAs. When conducting a wargame, the commander and his staff must bear in mind one of the critical tenets of maneuver warfare-focus on the enemy. The commander relies on his staff for their professional opinions and judgment. The wargame provides a venue for the staff to validate their positions and justify their opinions — all to facilitate the commander’s decisionmaking process.

Notes

> This article is part of a series of articles by the MSTP staff that addresses MAGTF operations and lessons learned. Readers may download copies of these articles on the MSTP web site <www.mstp.quantico.usmc.mil> under Publications/Team Positions.

1. For an indepth discussion on the red cell, refer to draft Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP) Pamphlet 2-0.1, The Red Cell, available at the MSTP web site <www.mstp.quantico.usmc.mil>.

2. For further discussion on the details and methods of conducting the wargame, refer to Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, Chapter 4 and Appendix E.

On Planning

by LtCol Steven Donnell, USMC(Ret)

This letter refers to Mr. William S. Lind’s commentary in the October 2000 Gazette, “Missing the Boat: A Response to Generals Knutson, Hailston, and Bedard. What began as promising discourse closed with a predictable refrain of maneuver warfare apathy within our Corps. As if the combatant commanders would choose a Marine-centric course of action based on our ability to translate the nonlinear tenets of the complexity theory into asymmetric applications. Desirable, but not probable.

The “absurd” idea that planning is more important than the plan is discussed in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning (p. 84) not Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1 as Mr. Lind asserts. However, the 5-1 does support the concept that planning is more important than the plan, for planning is a learning process that develops situational understanding to shorten decision cycles in execution. Faster, informed decisions lead to tempo-a viable antidote for the uncertainty inherent in all two-sided conflicts. Further, the understanding gained through planning prevails long after the plan itself supposedly succumbs to the line of departure.

As for the methodical “French-way-of-war” planning process, Mr. Lind lacks an appreciation for the volume of planning required at higher echelons, particularly during preexecution-deliberate planning when the Marine Forces and MEFs must incur the cost of overhead by populating the battlespace with sufficient structure to promote subordinate success. Additionally, Mr. Lind equates speed with maneuver warfare. While speed is a weapon and a genuine source of combat power (MCDP 1, Warfighting, p. 40), in war, it is relative speed that matters. I don’t have to outrun the bear; I only have to outrun you.

Lest we believe MEFs can cycle as fast as companies, we must be careful applying the lessons learned from free play, small unit exercises at The Basic School to larger commands.

Detailed planning for 90,000 Marines better not be easy. Level 4 TPFDDs (timephased force and deployment data), assault wave landing tables, and air tasking orders are not the result of serendipity and happenstance. The fact that the time required for detailed planning at the component or MEF surpasses the life cycle of most insects does not defy the principles of maneuver warfare. Even the company commander experiencing coup d’oeil as a result of “high ground intuition” needs frequencies, call signs, and airspace control measures to orchestrate his combined arms effort.

Perhaps Mr. Lind’s efforts might have been better served had he focused on why the MEFs continually exercise large-scale, conventional scenarios that drive staffs to laborious levels of detailed planning, particularly in light of the more likely scenario of military operations other than war. An examination of this issue and underlying causes-programmatics, force drawdowns, quality deficiency reports, theater engagement plans, and a lack of a Joint Chiefs of Staff single battle-would tie in better with Col Mark F. Cancian’s concern (“Still the Nation’s 91-1 Force?” MCG, Apr0) of dispersion versus concentration, which was the pretense for Mr. Lind’s comments in the first place.

Commander’s Intent: Easy to understand, tough to articulate

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning, states that “the commander is probably the single most important factor in effective planning.” The central role of the commander in planning is also doctrinally codified in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process. The commander draws on his experience to visualize the relationship between friendly forces, enemy forces, and the battlespace. The commander envisions the interaction of these elements over time and how he will achieve a decision that leads to the desired end state. He initiates planning by communicating this vision through the most important element of the commander‘s battlespace area evaluation (CBAE)-the commander‘s intent.

MCWP 5-1 discusses CBAE in detail. This article focuses on the commander‘s intent and the difficulties that the MAGTF (Marine Air– Ground Task Force) Staff Training Program (MSTP) has observed in commanders crafting this critical element that drives planning and provides the implicit communications necessary to execute our warfighting doctrine of maneuver warfare.

According to MCDP 1, Warfighting, the purpose of a commander‘s intent is: to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative-to depart from the original plan when the unforeseen occurs-in a way that is consistent with higher commanders‘ aims.

As Marines, we have long recognized the importance of commander‘s intent in execution. We have not always been as effective, however, in applying commander‘s intent in planning.

MCWP 5-1 defines commander‘s intent as:

the commander‘s personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear, concise, and easily understood. It may also include how a commander envisions achieving a decision as well as the conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose.

The following are some common observations and potential solutions that may assist commanders in the communication of their intent:

The intent is too wordy or lacks focus. When a commander develops an intent that is several pages long, it is difficult to discern his intent (purpose). If the commander‘s intent is to be of value to the planners, it must be clear, concise, and easily understood. It may also include how (the method) the commander envisions achieving a decision as well as the conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose of the operation (end state). Commander‘s intent expressed in terms of “purpose– method-end state” is more easily understood and facilitates planning. This format is not only being used in the Marine Corps, but it is also widely used in joint operations.

* The intent focuses on the “how” or “what” vice the “why.” Often commander‘s intent mistakenly focuses on defining what must be done (the task) and how it should be accomplished. In these cases, intent takes on the form of initial guidance. The commander‘s initial guidance should provide the battle staff and subordinate commanders with his view of what his force is to do and the resources he will need to accomplish the mission. The initial guidance may be based on the six warfighting functions and/or how the commander envisions the sequence of actions that will cause his force to arrive at the desired end state. Subsequent guidance may also provide preliminary decisions to focus planners on the commander‘s conceptual vision of the operation. For example, the commander may issue guidance on phasing, forms of maneuver, or task organization. Whereas guidance may be comprehensive and detailed in nature and is aimed at planners, commander‘s intent is intended for both the planners and the executors. Commander‘s intent focuses on the enduring portion of any mission by clearly stating the purpose (the why), which will continue to guide our actions in execution while the how or what (tasks) may change as the situation develops. As the commander proceeds through planning, and his situational awareness grows, he may refine his intent by describing how (method) he envisions achieving a decision and reaching a desired end state.

* The commander does not always write the commander‘s intent. Many times the commander‘s intent is not the commander‘s personal expression of the purpose of the operation. This personal expression of purpose drives the planning process and ensures unity of effort in execution. As such, its development should not be left solely to the staff. The commander may direct his staff to provide a recommended intent for his review, but the final product must reflect his own vision of the purpose of the operation. Field Marshal Viscount William J. Slim, British defender of India and liberator of Burma in World War II, says of the commander‘s intent:

It is the one overriding expression of will bv which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in the army must be dominated, it should, therefore, be worded by the commander himself.1

* The terminology used to describe commander‘s intent is inconsistent or confusing. To make the commander‘s intent clear and concise, it is critical that the commander uses precise military terminology. By using accepted doctrinal terms to express key points, his subordinates focus on those things that are critical to mission accomplishment, saving time and allocating the appropriate forces and resources. Correct terminology aids subordinates in understanding the commander‘s intent by reducing confusion through the use of a common vocabulary. Additionally, the commander can add clarity to his intent by explaining the terms he uses-“by defeat I mean. . . .”

Issued as an element of CBAE during commander‘s orientation, the commander‘s intent is critical to the planning process and in subsequent mission execution. A clear, concise, and easily understood intent focuses the staff and serves as a basis for consistency’and continuity in developing a concept of operations, allocating resources, and making other planning decisions.

An effective technique for expressing commander‘s intent is the purpose-method-end state format. Using this format, a commander can issue and refine his intent ensuring that subordinates understand the purpose of the operation, how he envisions achieving a decision, and what conditions must be met to achieve the purpose. Properly issued and applied, the commander‘s intent will lead to unity of effort throughout planning and execution.

Here is an example of the commander‘s intent:

* Purpose. Restore the Blueland border.

* Method. Maneuver through existing or created gaps to bring our combined arms combat power to bear against the Orangeland 102d and 103d Armored Brigades and the 401st and 402d Artillery Regiments.

* End state. The Northern Operations Group defeated. Our forces positioned along the Orangeland/Blueland border prepared to continue offensive operations in Orangeland, if directed.

Notes

1. Field Marshal Viscount William Joseph Slim, Defeat Into Victory, Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945, Cooper Square Press, 2000, p. 211.