The Attritionist Letters (#3)

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard – and one might suggest some contempt – for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting – and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

Capt Wormwood, I received your last letter some time ago, but you must understand that someone of my stature has far more important things to do. Furthermore, it took me some time to compose an adequate response to your misguided and – quite honestly – almost insolent comments suggesting that “mission tactics” and “commander’s intent” have redeeming value. Put such thoughts out of your feeble mind this instant! I will tell you exactly what I want you to do. You will not have to wonder, nor will you have to burden yourself with thinking about it. And as for my intent, my intent is for you to do exactly what I tell you to do! It is time for you to grow up and leave such foolish notions behind. Wormwood, I must admit that at times I suspect that you may actually be in league with these maneuverists, and then I realize that it’s just the naïveté of a young captain. It is critical that you understand that the trend toward centralization precludes the need for Marine leaders to indulge in such archaic and ambiguous concepts as commander’s intent and mission tactics.

As a relatively recent graduate of The Basic School, you no doubt will recall the terms introduced above. Long heralded as part of the “triad of maneuver warfare,” these two elements of Marine warfighting philosophy are proving to be increasingly obsolete in today’s operating environment. According to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication I (MCDP I), Wirfiglwng.

The purpose of providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative – to depart from the original plan when the unforeseen occurs – in a way that is consistent with higher commanders’ aims.’

We must remind ourselves that commanders have been forced to use commander’s intent and mission tactics because of limits imposed upon them by chaotic battlefield situations and limited technological capabilities. Neither of these limits exists any longer. Further, we must admit that so few junior leaders on the battlefield possess that coup d’oeil – the intuitive grasp of what is happening on the battlefield. Thus, it is absolutely nor in the interest of higher echelon commanders to allow subordinate leaders to demonstrate initiative and independence.

As we further our agenda, we can clearly imagine a combat operations center (COC) 5 years from now:

A batta J i on commander walks into his COC and sees a ‘troops in contact” unfold on the plasma touch screen operations moni tor. The zoomed in li ve sa teilt te teed provides him eag}c-cyed observa don ot the situation unhiding in realtime. He sees the blue icons displaying his fri endlies – thanks to global positioning system tra eking devices embedded in the rifles – moving north along a road. He also sees die enemy pia toon a txempting to flank liis lea d units. Rea lizing the gra vity of the situation, the battalion commander double taps on the trace squad leader’s icon and slides it approxima tely 200 meters north. The commander selects an ambush graphic icon from a dropdown menu and double taps the screen a t the desired loca – don. Almost immediately, he sees the squad leader halt his movement, glance downward – no doubt a r the liquid crystal display screen strapped to the squad leader’s forearm – and make a few blurred hand gestures directing his men toward the identified ambush position. The battalion commander looks on with satisfaction as he sees the squad set out.

Wormwood, you know that the technologies to allow us these capabilities are currently available. If we adhered to the tenets of commander’s intent and mission tactics, we would have to rely upon subordinate commanders to receive, evaluate, analyze, and execute our guidance. Each or these steps introduces potential error into the process, error that – although once necessary to assume – can now be avoided.

A second reason for shifting our philosophy is that both commander’s intent and mission tactics demand that a commander trust his subordinate commanders. In todays more interconnected and globalized world, the penalties for wrongly trusting subordinates are no longer confined to a court-martial or conference room deliberations among military professionals. We attritionists must continually leverage today’s commanders who are held accountable in a court of national and international opinion, and due to the 24-hour news cycle, immediately. Thus, a results-oriented (and dare I say career-minded) individual assumes tremendous risk if he leaves subordinate commanders to interpret his guidance. MCDP 1 falsely claims that “trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates”2 is essential. In fact, I hope you will agree that it is far better for a senior to eliminate all doubt and ensure that subordinate commanders execute guidance as passed rather than risk mistakes. Ideally, subordinate commanders should be relegated to being nothing more than simply “managers” of the personnel assigned them. Wormwood, how easy would your job be if someone told you not just “what” to accomplish but “how” to do it as well?

You may be wondering what your role would be in such a system. Not to worry, my dear Wormwood, there would still be a need lor a few exceptional officers to be trained for higher command. Junior officers would spend their formative years learning and developing not by trial and error, not by attempting to achieve dazzling results and succeeding or failing, but as they ought, by simply following the orders of their wiser seniors. They would always succeed, and success would be their teacher. The maneuverists would certainly complain, “You will teach them obedience and they will never learn initiative!” This is absurd. When officers and NCOs are young, they are like children and should be treated as such. We will teach them initiative at the proper time, if it is necessary, but we will be very careful about giving them this tool. It is unpredictable and difficult to control, much like giving fire to primitives.

Even at the simplest levels, we must continue to centralize decisions and remove the possibility that subordinates will misinterpret orders. Wormwood, I cannot remember when you last deployed to a combat zone. No doubt you saw firsthand the emergence of attritionist policy with regard to the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) in theater. Commanders intent and trust in subordinates have been usurped by the centralized dictates of an attritionist culture, and rightfully so. While some higher echelon commanders have suggested that perhaps PPE requirements are situationally dependent and based upon subordinate commanders’ battlespace assessments, several battalion commanders have indicated that such decisions were not delegated but rather made by a senior commander at a forward operating base far removed from their daily operations. It is clear that senior commanders cannot trust subordinates to make independent decisions. And this lack of trust is justified! After all, who will be held responsible if a Marine is killed and his death might have been prevented?

Capr Wormwood, you must realize that in order to be more effective as a 21st century fighting force, we must halt our dependence upon archaic characteristics, such as commander’s intent and mission tactics. Although such practices may have seemed to work in years past, they now work against us. (It is more likely that maneuverists have simply exploited such successes by claiming credit for maneuver warfare when in fact some other rationale was responsible.) Quite simply, senior officers make better decisions than junior officers, as we have seen both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Commander’s intent and mission tactics only serve to reduce the speed and precision with which a senior commander can make necessary decisions. Subordinate commanders should be relegated to the more appropriate role of “personnel manager” focusing primarily on the human resource concerns of the force rather than on the leadership and decisionmaking so espoused in eras past. The subordinates must understand that their role is twofold: to execute the orders they have received and to report back to higher headquarters.

While this may not sound terribly exciting, Wormwood, please remember that it is for the good of the Corps. I am looking forward to your next letter and until then, I remain,

Gen Screwtape

Notes

1. MCDP I, Wtrfiglning, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 89.

2. Ibid., p. 58.

The Attritionist Letters (#1)

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard – and one might suggest some contempt – for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwood’s in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting – and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

Capt Wormwood,

From your lessons at The Basic School (TBS), you no doubt recall the great 1989 victory won in Quantico by those who called themselves “maneuverists.” Then-Commandant, Gen Alfred M. Gray, arrayed his forces against us – we the noble “attritionists” – to do battle over the philosophy upon which the Marine Corps would operate. Gen Gray’s forces attempted to redefine the Marine Corps with a new interpretation of military theory, that of “maneuver warfare.”

For the past two decades, these maneuverists have touted their victory. But as you know, young Wormwood, we are far from dead. In fact, attritionist forces have long waged a surreptitious insurgency on all fronts of the Corps. Now, even as those maneuverists celebrate the 20th anniversary of their victory, it is increasingly evident that they have all but lost the war. As the Corps has quiedy transitioned from a “maneuver-centric” philosophy back to a more attritionist one, you will note that Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Vfàrfìghting, has remained anchored in the past, dated and inadequate. It should be quite obvious that the Marine Corps in no way conducts itself in accordance with this document. What is more, very few Marines realize this . . . and fewer still even care! It is now almost useless as a reference upon which to base action. As a young Marine officer, you can appreciate the importance of ensuring doctrine is kept current. This is the sign for which we have been waiting! In order to accurately reflect those attritionist methodologies we have striven so hard to implement and currently employ, MCDP 1, Wirfigfating, must be revised.

We must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities.

The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based upon incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

You will recognize the previous excerpts from the current version of MCDP 1, Wirfighting. While they could have been uttered by Sun Tzu, Moltke (the elder, of course), Clausewitz, or even Patron, they represent the most dangerous line of thinking to our Corps. Military philosophers have long suggested that uncertainty and disorder are inherent attributes of war. Clausewitz said that:

. . . the commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.

You, my dear Wormwood, being at the dawn of your career, are perhaps most familiar with the traditional Marine Corps position on this line. Since 1989 Marine schoolhouses have attempted to familiarize the student with an environment of intentionally diminished situational awareness while simultaneously demanding decisive action. This was intended to create tolerance for uncertainty and simultaneously discourage the expenditure of energies in seemingly fruitless attempts to ascertain certainty. Surely you can recall that most horrific utterance from an overzealous TBS instructor, “What now, Lieutenant?”

“But to what end?” I have long asked. Wormwood, you will note with zeal that over the past several years, we have succeeded in finally convincing Marine commanders that they can no longer tolerate the uncertainty and disorder traditionally characteristic of battlefields from time immemorial. No longer must we attempt to appease our cüscomfort at an unruly battlefield in which we lack complete and clear situational awareness. Quite the opposite, we can no longer tolerate uncertainty. We must ensure that primacy of effort lies with pursuing certainty.

As a mere captain of Marines, there is no need for you to clutter your mind with military theory. However, if you feel so inclined, there is an author who claims:

When confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to perform that task, an organization may react in either of two ways. One is to increase its information processing capacity, the other to design the organization, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information.

It is obvious that maneuverists would rather accomplish the latter while we attritionists have long sought to pursue the former.

You will note with pride that fellow attritionists have worked ever so diligently to ensure that billions of dollars are invested to procure the latest technologies with the primary objective being the elimination of disorder and uncertainty on the battlefield. C2PC (command and control personal computer), CPOF (command post of the future), AFATDS (advanced field artillery tactical data system), and other like systems (as well as their interface) promise an unparalleled clarity on the current battlefield. Similarly, intelligence preparation of the battiespace is becoming extraordinarily focused on product development in order to provide the commander with the answers for any possible data requests. From your reading of Napoleon, you will recall that he would implore intelligence staffs to find “any information I might find of interest” and subsequently leave it to their initiative. How pathetic! Today’s commanders can – and therefore do – rightfully demand ever-increasing amounts of quantitative information with which to eliminate uncertainties and disorder on the battlefield. For only when the highest echelon commanders are provided all ofthe information can they determine the appropriate course of action and issue forth appropriate tasks for subordinates. You can see that current technology has eliminated Clausewitz’s “fog of war.”

I cannot recall when you last deployed to CentCom (U.S. Central Command). Was it earlier this year? Last year? Either way, you must have observed that our movement is gaining significant assistance from military contracting firms. Even in a recent issue of the Marine Corps Gazette – that forum for discourse among our Corps’ best – one firm actually published an advertisement clearly identifying “uncertainty” as the primary enemy and offering the military extensive command and control system capabilities in order to resolve the problem. I have seen similar advertisements from other companies, both offering elaborate (although expensive) information and command and control systems that seek to “increase information-processing capability” rather than to pursue the useless objective of allowing the commander to become comfortable with uncertainty. These advertisements are, of course, not targeted at junior officers like you, Wormwood, but rather they are intended to connect with our Corps’ decisionmakers. I must admit that upon seeing the advertisements, I was flooded with an immense sense of relief … relief that our position, so long banned from respectable circles, is now firmly entrenched and even valued at the highest levels.

I have no doubt that we are achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq primarily through increased use of technologies that seek to efiminate uncertainty on the battlefield. Deluded maneuverists will argue that these new technologies can actually introduce more confusion into the operating environment. They will also try to argue that rather than attempt to banish uncertainty from the battlefield, Marines should train more extensively in such unpredictable environments in order to develop confidence in their abilities. By clinging to such dated ideas, the maneuverists are proving their ineptitude by their refusal to accept the obvious: technology has eliminated the need to be comfortable in chaos. After all, one of our most esteemed fellow attritionists, retired MG J.F.C. Fuller, wrote, “Weapons, if only the right ones can be found, form 99% ofthe victory.”

Capt Wormwood, I am cognizant of your contribution – albeit a small and almost meaningless one – to this cause. At times, however, you strike me as almost rambunctious and unpredictable. How many times must I tell you? Take no unnecessary risk! Make no unnecessary decision! You would do well to simply pay attention and emulate those seniors (such as myself) who are kind enough to have assumed the responsibility for your leadership development as we proceed in our most worthy cause. Stay vigilant, for just as victory is near, it can also be seized away at the last. Until then, I remain,

Gen Screwtape

Maneuver Warfare in the Cognitive Domain

by the U.S. Marine Corps Strategic Communication DOTMLPF-P Working Group*

In recent years the term “strategic communication” has experienced a significant rise in relevance. No doubt this is due in part to revelations about the huge disparity between the cultures either engaged in, or peripheral to, the current global struggle. A renewed interest in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, a recognition of various kinds of hybrid threats, and the explosive spread of the Internet, cell phones, and other communications-related technologies have also certainly contributed. While increased recognition of this important concept is definitely a good thing, there’s a downside. Its use has outpaced the work necessary to truly define it, understand it, and apply it effectively. The net result is that, beyond the basic, high-level definition by the Department of Defense1 at the department and joint levels, there are almost as many definitions, perceptions, and opinions about what constitutes the term as there are people throwing it about. The risk in this is multifaceted. Misunderstood, strategic communication (not communications – referring to the mediums or means of communication; e.g., radio, television, Internet) can lose operations and tactical relevance. Senior leadership could undervalue strategic communication supporting capabilities. Planners and commanders might not appreciate its true importance as an operating philosophy and fundamental guide for MAGTF operations. Its major tenets might not be applied at every level or integrated seamlessly into every operation. If acknowledged at all, strategic communication practitioners could be relegated to a functional support role in a manner similar to the way we thought about supporting arms before the advent of the term “combined arms.” True strategic communication is not just the purview of public affairs, psychological operations, civil affairs, or information operations specialists alone. It is not just a support activity cataloged in Annex Y of the operations plan and performed by subject matter experts in an ancillary, supporting role.

The term strategic communication, in fact, represents a way of thinking and operating that transcends even maneuver warfare philosophy. Or, better said, it represents the next logical step in the evolution of maneuver warfare theory. For, if the essence of maneuver warfare is to impose our will on an enemy, directly or indirectly, the essence of strategic communication is to do something vastly more difficult – namely, to influence the thoughts and actions of not just “the enemy” but of all those who either physically occupy the contested area or who are affected by the outcome of actions within it.

As Gen Alfred M. Gray, 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, so eloquently stated in his preface to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication J, Vfärßghting (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997):

Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated.

Subsequent Commandants have often echoed these remarks. Whether one sees strategic communication as a replacement for maneuver warfare theory or an extension of it is immaterial. The point is that the theories and concepts that undergird the term are an almost perfect match with those that undergird success in the kinds of operations our Marines and MAGTFs face in the current fight – and in those anticipated for the indefinite future.

Major Tenets

So, what are the major tenets of strategic communication when viewed as an operating philosophy? Much has been written recently about the nature of strategic communication. This article will not attempt to summarize or restate this voluminous amount of information. We believe that all of those ideas can be grouped under one of several major tenets or principles. In effect, they represent the first-level subfunctions if one were to do a functional decomposition of the term. The first principle is to have as complete an understanding as possible of the operating environment – its history, culture, geography, and future potentials must all be completely understood and continually appraised. Second is the principle of effective listening. Even a perfect understanding of the operational environment will prove useless unless it can be placed in a wider context that can only be attained by very careful listening. Third is the principle of effective communication. Unless every member of the force understands how to communicate effectively, rhe ability to act consistently within both a preconceived plan and the exigencies of the immediate circumstances that result from the plan’s execution will occur only randomly. Arguably, the fourth and final high-level principle is the heart and soul of effective strategic communication. It is the creation and maintenance of critical relationships. Every activity within the MAGTF should be conceived and executed with this in mind. Whether it is with an identified enemy force, the inhabitants of a local village, or the random bystanders present as a resupply convoy transits a busy intersection, each engagement between the MAGTF and the other occupants of the operating environment must be treated from the point of view of a “critical relationship.” Critical relationships are characterized by possessing consequences, potential or otherwise, that will exist after the actual physical engagement concludes. Unless the MAGTF has the ability to operate at this very cognitive level, success is potentially jeopardized. When the term strategic communication is perceived in this context, the connection between it and other operational philosophies is readily apparent. Just as maneuver warfare evolved from rhe “firepower/attrition” models that preceded it, a new philosophy based on the principles of strategic communication is the natural extension of maneuver warfare. While maneuver warfare can be considered to be a refined method for applying, or threatening the application of, kinetic force against an enemy, strategic communication is a refined method for creating a “win-win-win-win-lose” situation in which all of the occupants of the contested area realize a victory, except the actual enemy – not an easy proposition, but an achievable one if the MAGTF has the right operational philosophy to guide it and the capabilities and training necessary to carry it out.

A second, and equally important, reason for accepting strategic communication as an underlying operational philosophy is the dichotomy represented by the employment of 21st century military technologies in an environment that has more in common with the first millennium than the current one – or even the last one. What are the most important attributes of a successful third millennium force conducting a “four block war” in a first millennium world? One thing seems certain. It’s not just the ability to apply overwhelming force, or even the ability to apply that force with great precision and discretion. Even the most sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance targeting and weapons delivery capabilities will be largely ineffectual if the force employing them is insensitive to the cultural environment in which they are employed. Unless all of the Marines in the MAGTF are instilled with an understanding of the culture in which they are operating, and given the skills and tools necessary to allow them to operate effectively within it, operating concepts like strategic corporal and enhanced MAGTF operations, and the tactics and techniques associated with independent, dispersed, small unit operations over vast geographic areas, are at risk. The psychology of operations of this type, in environments of this type, against threats of this type, with both enemy and nonenemy using communications technologies, channels, and tactics as effectively as we do (or even more so) is not the psychology of force-on-force warfare against a peer competitor. Modern Marines operating in first and second millennium environments, dispersed over vast areas in small groups, have more in common with the Marines of a Vietnam-era civic action team than they do with the Marines in a line company engaged in a World War II- or Korean-style amphibious assault with subsequent operations ashore. Accordingly, we need to adapt not just our small unit tactics, equipment, command and control methods, and other tools and techniques of war, but also the very philosophy from within which our Marines categorize and engage all of the human beings who occupy the contested area.

Institutional Understanding

The fundamental skills and tools associated with strategic communication as an operating philosophy – effective listening, meaningful communication, and creation and maintenance of critical relationships – warrant much more treatment in our formal schools, training institutions, and operational doctrine. It’s time to advance our institutional understanding of maneuver-based operations in the cognitive domain to the next step.

Consistent with its long history of innovation and adaptation, the Marine Corps is doing just that. Experienced Marines now serving in education and combat development assignments are expanding our intellectual envelope, thinking through the details and complexities of these kinds of operations. While much of this adaptation begins with a review of the small wars tactics and techniques made famous by earlier generations of Marines, new concepts are being written that document and build on experiences gained in recent operations. Capability developers at Marine Corps Combat Development Command are teaming with strategic communication practitioners from across the Marine Corps to develop a strategic communication functional concept that should have DOTMLPFP (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy) implications across the entire set of Marine Corps operating concepts and capability development scenarios. New organizations, like the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, the Marine Corps Information Operations Center, and the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, have been established for the express purpose of advancing capabilities fundamental to effective strategic communication. Advanced technologies and new techniques for employing them, and for thinking about the way they contribute to operational success at every level, are being continually developed. Even though the Marines involved might not presently describe them as such, all of these activities fall under the conceptual umbrella now being recognized as strategic communication.

Strategic communication, as a descriptive term for an overarching operational philosophy, might not be as appealing as maneuver warfare with its obvious emphasis on combat and bias for action. The term strategic communication carries with it an obligation to act, but also an obligation to listen, to think, to be creative, to be influential, and to be consistent in both word and deed. Whether it’s called strategic communication, communication integration, maneuver warfare II, or any number of proposed conventions, the MAGTF needs the ability to think and to act in an environment not entirely envisioned by current maneuver warfare theory.

The articles that will follow in the April issue of the Gazette describe various aspects, subfunctions, and organizations devoted to advancing the MAGTF’s ability to strategically communicate. They have been written to inform and to inspire additional thought and discussion. The defining characteristic of all Marines is a bias for action. Strategic communication enables that characteristic and adds to it a bias for thought. The members of the U.S. Marine Corps Strategic Communication Working Group, who authored this article, are hopeful that the ideas contained here and published in future Gazette articles on this topic will do just that.

Note

* The MAGTF Strategic Communication DOTMLPF-P working group’s mission is to identity, develop, and integrate ioint. Marine Corps, and MAGTF warfighting strategic communication capability requirements and advise the MAGTF command element advocate (Deputy Commandant, Capabilities Development and Integration (CD&l)) how to best provide this capability to the MAGTF commander. The working group is comprised of representatives from Washington, DC, CD&I’s Capabilities Development Directorate, G-3 (Operations)/G- 5 (Plans) Division; MAGTF Staff Training Program, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning; Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations, Information Operations and Space Integration Branch; Marine Corps Information Operations Center; the Division ot Public Affairs, HQMC; and Marine Corps Systems Command.

1. The definition is from Joint Publicwon 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, p. II – 2. “Focused US Government efforts to understand and engage key authences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of US Government interestes, policies, and objectives through the use or coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”

Embrace Maneuver Warfare

by Capt Andrew J. Graham

In the opening throes of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW) employed its helicopter gunships in a unique manner for aviation assets, but a manner that the infantry battalion is very familiar with; a section of H-Is was tasked with direct support (DS) of a Marine battalion. Unlike a joint tactical air request (JTAR) time on station (TOS), the DS section was attached to the battalion landing team (BLT), and the aircrews’ 12-hour crew day was dedicated to DS of the battalion. Adapted to aviation counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the DS section multiplied the combat power of Marine ground combat units.

The DS pilots and crew stood their strip alert at the battalion combat operations center (COC), awaiting tasking. If there was no tasking or if the unit was in a consolidation period, the aircrew returned to their base at the end of their crew day. However, if there was tasking, their physical presence allowed the battalion commander to instantly call on his own air support, without delaying the request through the JTAR process.

To clarify: the delay in support is not a problem when trying to get close air support (CAS) assets; this becomes an issue when requesting nonkinetic support. The battalion commander attempting to investigate time-sensitive intelligence beyond the reach of his ground units will be unable to compete with the more pressing requirements of troops in contact (TIC) situations, convoy and assault escort, or other CAS engagements in neighboring areas of operation (AOs).

In addition to giving the commander another tool to use in the MAGTF, the DS section allows Marine aviation units to support the MAGTF COIN effort in accordance with our Service philosophy of mission-based orders or individual initiative through commanders intent. An expansion of the JTAR process, and the next generation of four-bladed utility and attack helicopters, will enhance the utility of the light attack helicopter (HMLA) community and allow the supported element commander to greater dictate the tempo of his AO. This is achieved not through a change in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) but by applying our doctrine of maneuver warfare in a more flexible manner.

To start with, we must ask, how does the Marine Corps apply aviation in maneuver warfare? And how do we apply maneuver warfare to aviation COIN operations? Filling the assault support and offensive air support roles of the six functions of Marine aviation, HMLA squadrons respond to requests for support either through preplanned or immediate tasking. The preplanned tasking takes the form of the JTAR to the tactical air command center (TACC), while immediate tasking is requested from the direct air support center (DASC). This is similar to a fire truck scrambling after the alarm bell rings at a fire department.

In both high- and low-intensity COIN operations, CAS plays a vital role in supporting the ground combat element (GCE). But in order to allow greater freedom for section leaders to influence the batdefield, the pilots need to be empowered through their other missions. (Independent action by aircrew requires detailed knowledge of the atmospherics of the local AO, friendly and enemy schemes of maneuver, and a list of actions automatically approved by the ground commander.) In the TTP outlined in the UH-I Navy TTP 3-22.3, UH-Is already teach tactics that allow intelligence collection and analysis. What they do not do is enable the pilot on the scene to act on that intelligence based on commander’s intent.

Even more than mechanized and motorized maneuver elements, aviation is perfectly suited to rapid retasking, taking advantage of shifts in tempo before the enemy can react. Currently the DASC performs this role and, under guidance from the TACC, will shift assets based on ground unit requests.

Ground forces spread across an AO have a lighter footprint the farther they push from the forward operating base (FOB). Air support multiplies their fire and maneuver, also providing direct responsiveness to the GCE commander, executing his intent. This completes our forces’ total orientation on the enemy and their state of mind. WTiat the DS section provides is an infantry patrol mindset in the skies, always searching to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. The true fruit that a DS section bears is in investigating time-sensitive intelligence. In a tenuous border region, the DS section allows the commander to investigate reports of smugglers crossing boundaries or guerrillas infiltrating the area of operations, without having to declare a TIC situation.

Philosophy

If maneuver warfare is a state of mind, how is our MAW adapted to maneuver warfare? Instead of applying mission type orders, are we just a combined arms force, essentially flying artillery and semitrailers? If I tell the subordinate what the commander wants, do I really allow him to determine how to accomplish it? At what level do I stop that? And what is my role in the overall plan? Providing utility support is not good enough; we must be able to identify what the enemy wants most, and then take it from him. If maneuver warfare’s goal is to shatter the physical and moral cohesion of the enemy, this goal can only be realized with an increase in operational tempo that the preplanned JTAR process slows.

In order to target the mind of the enemy, we must destroy his center of gravity, a concept in COIN that is one area with many nuances. For example, a guerrilla force survives with the support of the people either willingly or unwillingly. If the people are culturally xenophobic, and both the insurgent and counterinsurgent present bad alternatives, the people will support the local area leadership. Creative leadership at the junior officer level can affect this in innovative ways.

Maneuver warfare requires a shared responsibility for the success or failure of an operation. By giving the DS section to the BLT commander, the HMLA squadron becomes even more invested in the success of the ground unit. By working closer with the ground unit, the pilots will participate in the mission analysis and be able to recognize when the situation fundamentally changes. When it does, the pilots must be able to recognize that and provide the BLT COC with new courses of action.

Maintenance and Readiness

The DS section concept raises some unique logistical questions. Unlike DS support of tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, light armored vehicles, or artillery, aviation assets cannot perform their own operational-level maintenance. Does the battalion commander then require to be briefed by the maintenance material control officer on the status of the aircraft in phase maintenance? No. If fuel is available at the FOB, there is no footprint requirement that cannot be satisfied by returning the aircraft to the parent airfield at the end of the crew day, being replaced by another section with fresh pilots and aircraft. At the end of the DS JTAR, the DS section returns to the parent squadron, and operational-level maintenance is performed by the squadrons maintenance section.

The DS section concept does not necessarily need to be provided entirely by helicopter gunships. The proposed armed variant of the MV-22 will supposedly be capable of self-escort, allowing the maneuver battalions greater freedom and speed of movement on the battlefield. A DS section of F/A-18s cannot provide the quick reaction force (QRP) capability, but it can still provide dedicated forward air controller (airborne); nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR); counterimprovised explosive device (IED) search; and CAS beyond the limitations of a JTAR requested TOS.

Marine Corps Wirftghting Pubi i cation 3-2 (MCWP 3-2), Aviation Opera rions, states that:

. . . with the designation of an aviation unit to the direct support role comes the requirement to establish direct liaison, direct communications to receive critical information, coordination of local security, and logistic support from the supported unit.1

These requirements are easily fulfilled by using the pilots to establish direct liaison and by normal communications between the aircrew, the COC, the BLT, and the squadron commander. Local security is provided by perimeter security at the FOB, and logistical support comes in the form of food, water, and aviation fuel. All ordnance and maintenance is provided at the parent squadron’s headquartered airfield once ordnance has been expended. Some ordnance can also be prestaged at the FOB, but this would likely exclude precision guided munitions (PGM).

The forecast impact of DS section requirements on maintenance and readiness is minimal. In Iraq an HMLA with an 18 Cobra/9 Huey mix was commonly responsible for a main body at the larger airfield and a detachment at the smaller FOB. The detachment provided a CAS section and medevac chase 24 hours a day, continuously. The main body of the squadron provided two mixed sections for CAS and three Cobras for the medevac chase, again 24 hours a day, continuously. The pilots and aircrew maintained 12-hour shifts, flying between two and four JTARs per shift. Shifting the CAS responsibility from one section and sending them to provide DS would have no impact on the maintenance requirements for the aircraft, provided that the DS section is sourced from the main body and not from the detachment. The DS section can always be diverted to CAS in case of emergency; however, with low-intensity COIN operations, retasking the second CAS section to DS aids the BLT commander in shaping his battlespace. Squadrons in Iraq have proved that this level of operations can be maintained, with very few exceptions, for the duration of a 7-month deployment. Based on this model, I present the following scenario.

Scenario

A BLT commander has a large AO, almost 50 square miles. The area includes 1 town of 15,000 people, 3 villages of 6,000 people, mountainous terrain over riie southern portion, and large open desert between the northern towns. The local population varies from accepting the American presence to indifference to overt hostility. There is an experienced and aggressive guerrilla force conducting a grassroots insurgency campaign. The BLT has been tasked with eliminating their influence in the AO in order to spread the a uthority of the legitimate host-nation government. There is low threat to air and high threat to ground forces from IEDs. The BLT commander allocates his forces as follows:

* Company A is responsible for the main town.

* Company B opera tes from the pa trol base sending out squa d-sizedpa trois for 1 to 2 days at a time in the northern desert.

* Company C divides the pia toons between the three villages and runs combined action platoon patrols in and around the area with the local national police, sometimes (but not always) winning hearts and minds but providing constant presence and pressure on the enemy grassroots campaign.

* Weapons company (QRF/combined antiarmor team (CAAT) Aight armored reconnaissance section) actsasa maneuver element but provides mounted patrols covering the open areas between the towns.

* Reconnaissance platoon/surveillance target acquisition section provides an independent maneuver element, conductingraids based on actionable intelligence but, except for extreme circumstances, does not participa te in QRF opera tions.

* DS strip section provides two 12-hour shifts to provide 24-hour support outside die JTAR process. One AH- 1 and one UH-I provide PGM, armed reconnaissance, assault support, NTISR, urgent casevac, and CAS capabilities within 50 nautical miles.

Now, without a JTAR, the DS section provides the BLT commander with NTISR, on-call leader’s reconnaissance, movement, aeroscout-type QRF capability, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief Un capability, and ail other aspects of the six functions of Ma ri ne aviation.

Here, is a bad day. After days of heavy fighting, weapons company is down to 20 percent of its mortar reserves, and PFC Jackson from Company A needs a root canal. Early in the morning, the DS section transports Jackson to trie BLT headquarters and the battalion aid station, and Jackson and the mortar resupply are returned to the field before the end of the day without the trouble of putting a convoy together and risking IED a tracks.

After die DS section returns PFC Jackson to Company A, they support Company B with aerial reconnaissance, until Company A encounters a TIC situation. This causes the Company A commander to con ta a the fire support coordination center to request air. While Company A conducts a firefight with guerrillas in the town square, t/ie battalion air officer (Air O) redirects the DS section from Company B to Company A. The section will have faster reaction rime than a strip alert section beca use they will a I rea dybea irborne. While the DS section finishes its fuel and TOS, the Ai fO coordinates with DASC (or follow-on support. When the DS section runs out of gas, a preplanned on-call section relieves it. Meanwhile, the DS section returns to the FOB to refuel and rearm, and if Company A still needs air support, they can relieve the CAS section or remain at trie FOB for follow-on tasking.

While on pa trol, a pia toon from Company C finds a child with a broken leg. The injury is not life threatening but is painful and devastating to me child’s parents in the village. Sgt Smith, the patrol leader, contacts the compa ny FAC who requests the DS section from the AirO. The DS section arrives; the child and her parents are loaded onto the Huey. They are taken to the battalion aid station where she is treated and then all are returned to die village. This would be painful and nearly impossible to do by ground transport. If the villagers respond in a positive way it is a bonus. Helping the locals is the morally responsible thing to do and supports the saying, “first, do no harm.”

In the late afternoon, guerrillas storm the police station in the large town, executing the policemen and taking their weapons and equipment. As weapons company launches the CAAT team and the ground QRF, the battalion AJrO launches tAe DS section to provide overhead on the scene. After pushing overhead, the DS section spots a convoy of civilian vehicles exiting the town at a high rate of speed. The convoy consists of several vehicles with covered equipment in the back lea ving the town toward the open desert. The DS section sees the men in the vehicles and suspects their covered vehicles contain the stolen police weapons. The Cobra pulls into a hover hold, halting the convoys departure, while the Huey establishes a position to the rear of the convoy to prevent any escape. The a i reran remain on the scene until the ground QRF arrives to search the convoy. (With a Yankee Huey, the DS section can execute NTISR with a fire team on board, providing instant QRF.) Finding the police weapons, the QRF takes all of the drivers prisoner but does not ha ve room for all of the prisoners in its HMMWVs. The QRF loads several prisoners in the DS Huey and destroys the vehicles in place. The DS section returns to the FOB with the prisoners to pick up reinforcements for the QRF or resets as directed by the ba ttalion AirO.

This scenario shows the BLT spread thin, not uncommon in realworld COIN operations. Yet the battalion’s varied operations, and the speed and maneuver provided by the mechanized and aviation assets, deny the enemy a center of gravity and afford him no place to rest or retrofit in the open. It forces the enemy to react to our will.

Command Relationships

The DS section will be under tactical control (TaCon) of the BLT commander, because the squadron commander retains command over squadron aircrew and airframes. (The squadron commander retains operational control.) However, TaCon still provides the BLT commander with the authority to direct the DS section for the duration of that 12-hour JTAR.

MCWP 3-2 defines DS as:

. . . a mission that requires a force to support another specific force and authorizes it to directly answer the supported force’s request for assistance (e.g., an attack squadron in direct support of one subordinate unit of the GCE).2

DS differs from close support in that close support is:

. . . the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force. This close proximity requires detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force (e.g., aviation units providing CAS to units in contact).3

DS is preferred over close support because the tasking is not based on a specific target or mission set but because the fluidity of COIN operations necessitate taking advantage of the varied capabilities of the aviation platform.

As a whole, Marine Corps aviation is usually in general support of the GCE because there are usually finite aircraft to meet infinite requests for support. General support:

. . . allows Marine aviation to fight or to provide support throughout the MAGTF area of operations and allows the most efficient and effective allocation of aircraft to the MAGTF. This process is orchestrated through the air tasking cycle, allowing flexible and prioritized tasking.4

MCWP 3-2 clearly states that:

. . . the command support relationship established for the ACE [aviation combat element] by the MAGTF commander is almost always in general support of the MAGTF. . . . Since availability of aviation assets for mission tasking rarely meets the demand, the MAGTF commander keeps the ACE in general support of the MAGTF. . . . By using and completing the air tasking cycle, planners can ensure that finite aviation assets are allocated to achieve maximum effect with correct prioritization based on the main effort.5

If aviation assets are finite, how do we find enough to make the DS section a supportable concept? While there are limited assets available, they are often augmented with joint and allied aircraft. The decision to dedicate a DS section for 12 hours to one battalion’s AO is made with the knowledge that the force multiplication given to one BLT’s AO provides more benefit to the overall mission end state than by spread-loading aviation assets in general support across the theater.

Conclusion

The DS section would still be requested using the JTAR process; however, instead of a specified TOS, the JTAR would request 12-, 24-, or potentially 48-hour support. The aviation squadron commander is responsible for the maintenance and safety of his pilots and aircraft, while the battalion commander would have launch authority under very specific guidelines. As a component of the air tasking order, the DS section is not a revolutionary concept. However, as far as driving the aviation capabilities and decisionmaking process further toward the ground commander, it is a vast departure from the normal process.

Real application of maneuver warfare requires courage and acceptance of risks. In the infantry this means empowering the junior noncommissioned officer to make important decisions, literally the “strategic corporal.” The aviation battlefield equivalent is the pilot, usually a captain or major, senior to the corporal but still a Marine whose actions can have both tactical and strategic consequences. In the MAW this means more than acceptance of risk; real acceptance means that we will take battle damage, lose airplanes due to hostile fire, and suffer casualties alongside the Marine ground units we support. Current safety climates are opposed to these as a metric for a successful command, but if battlefield success is the metric by which we judge a successful command, then we need to accept the risk that might lose a garrison safety award. A commander who accepts this risk will allow his people greater freedom to operate and succeed based on their initiative. The DS section allows our ground commanders greater flexibility and dominance in their AOs. Adapted to aviation COIN operations, the DS section will multiply the combat power of Marine ground combat units.

Notes

1. MCWP 3-2, Aviation Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC. 9 May 2000, p. A-A.

2. Ibid., p. 4-2.

3. Ibid., p. 4-3.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 4-4.

A New View of C2 Systems

by Capt Eric H. Larsen

No command and control (C^sup 2^) systems will ever remove the uncertainty associated with the battlefield. At times these systems introduce more friction than they were designed to reduce. More systems require more operators, more communications bandwidth, and more organizational overhead. C^sup 2^ systems arc moving the Marine Corps away from maneuver warfare because these systems lead to explicit control, centralization, and the mitigation of creativity.

Background

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 (MCDP 6), Command and Control, describes C^sup 2^ as “the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.”1 C^sup 2^ is composed of three elements – people, information, and the C^sup 2^ support structure.2 C^sup 2^ systems are part of the support structure. Most systems are designed with the intent of assembling information into a common tactical picture in order to allow a commander to make a decision, get feedback as the order is carried out, and then evaluate the results.

The Marine Corps’ philosophy of maneuver warfare is characterized by decentralized C^sup 2^ and rapid decisionmaking. However, the advanced C^sup 2^ systems used today allow commanders at all levels to see much more information about the battlefield than before.3 This leads to a tendency to exert more control over maneuver units, which slows the operational tempo as the common picture is assimilated. The following example, along with Figure 1, illustrates the type of control possible with modern C^sup 2^ systems and the negative effects that it can have.

Passing through a crowded market- place on a security patrol a squad leader is distracted from his surroundings when his personal data assistant (PDA) beeps. Looking down, he sees a message from his company combat operations center (COC) to speed up his patrol be- cause he is falling behind the timeline associated with his patrol route. He was told that the battalion COC wants the patrol to finish the published route on schedule or else the patrol will be recorded as late. Speeding up his patrol, the squad leader is interrupted by his PDA again when the COC tells him to find the current market prices for char- coal and motor oil. Preoccupied with answering these messages, the squad leader walks by a key insurgent leader eating at a small café in the marketplace and loses an opportunity to capture the man and his associates.

Explicit and Implicit Communications

Fundamentally two types of communications exist, explicit and implicit. Explicit communications involves telling someone specifically what to do in a step-by-step approach. Implicit communications relies upon the knowledge, understanding, and mutual trust that two individuals have in one another. Communicating implicitly conveys much more information in a shorter period of time than explicit communications. However, implicit communications requires commanders and subordinates to invest a great deal of time and effort in developing a close relationship. The Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare philosophy is based upon implicit communications.4

Nevertheless, the current systemsbased approach of C2 encourages explicit communications with the belief that if a concept is not briefed, the subordinate must not understand that aspect of the task. The systems remove the initiative of the subordinate leaders as their progress is monitored on wide screen monitors. Instead of being accepted, delays and deviations from planned routes and overlays generate more questions from higher levels of command and slow tempo as the subordinate takes his mind off of the tactical situation to answer questions. Opponents will justify the myriad of reports, overlays, and documentation as critical to the commander’s decisionmaking process. Yet, too many reports and overlays inhibit the fundamental trust and understanding that a commander should have with his subordinates.

Rather than being utilized simply for the creation of overlays for senior leaders’ decisions, modern C2 systems can be used for implicit communications if they are used as tools for building a shared situational awareness. In keeping with maneuver warfare, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 states:

The emerging operational environment requires that we increase the shared situational awareness of small unit leaders to support decentralized decision-making. This investment not only enhances the capabilities of these small units, but also increases the quality and quantity of shared situational awareness across echelons. In environments where human intelligence and tactical information reign supreme, we must acquire and convey information rapidly and accurately to facilitate timely decisionmaking.

These systems can implicitly build the commander’s situational awareness and cut down on radio traffic.

Centralization

Throughout history, advances in communications and technology have pushed commanders toward centralized control with the misconception that they see the bigger picture and thus are better placed to make tactical decisions. This belief is in opposition with the tenets of maneuver warfare. GEN Helmut van Moltke, a famous Prussian military strategist, commented in 1892 that “no commander is less fortunate than he who operates with a telegraph wire stuck into his back.”6 Modern systems enable commanders to control their subordinates not just through wire but also through satellite datai inks and numerous other devices from farther away than ever before. For example, the U.S. Central Command is headquartered not in the Middle East but in Tampa, FL.

A recent example of how high-technology C2 systems can lead to centralization can be seen in the 2006 IsraelLebanon conflict. Matt Matthews, a professor at the Army War College, writes that the Israeli high command employed a doctrine of systemic operational design that relied upon “superior knowledge and command and control capabilities”7 to direct its armed forces in action against Hezbollah. Matthews continues:

[T] he Israeli Defense Force (IDF) attempted to orchestrate the strategic cognitive collapse of Hezbollah through the use of air power and precision firepower-based operations. When this failed, the IDF sought to produce the same effects by using its ground forces to conduct limited raids and probes into southern Lebanon.8

Almost all of the operational decisions in the campaign were made at the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv, detailing timelines, targets, and troop sizes to the ground brigade commanders.9 Matthews further writes, “According to an Israeli source, out of 1 1 IDF brigade commanders, only one ever crossed the border into Lebanon by war’s end.”10 Some opponents herald the technological advances of C^sup 2^ systems that put immense amounts of information at the commander’s fingertips, but they neglect to mention that a dependence on these systems leaves a commander tied to his command post and leading his troops in the field.

The Israeli leadership in Tel Aviv used their high-technology C^sup 2^ systems as a basis for making and evaluating their operational- and tactical-level decisions. However, this centralization led to numerous problems with information flow. Matthews writes of one instance:

IDF monitors picked up several reports of contact along the electronic border fence near milepost 105. Shortly after these movement reports, an IDF reserve patrol reported 20 Hezbollah fighters near the same location. Amazingly, it appears this information never filtered down to the reserve soldiers preparing to conduct the day patrol.11

The information about the Hezbollah fighters made its way to the commanders in Tel Aviv, but it was never relayed to the soldiers on the ground. Proponents for advanced C^sup 2^ systems neglect to mention that the same detailed picture that is assembled for a commander may cut his subordinates completely out of the information loop because they do not have access to the same resources. The problems that Israel had in its last conflict clearly indicate the dangers of centralization that are inherent in C^sup 2^ systems.

Creativity

One of the fundamental concepts behind maneuver warfare is that it capitalizes on the creativity of individual decisionmakers at the lowest levels. Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 states:

We believe that the human dimension of war is the most critical element, and that boldness, creativity, intelligence, and the warrior spirit are prime attributes.12

These attributes allow Marines to seize fleeting opportunities and take advantage of enemy weaknesses. Unfortunately, computerized C^sup 2^ systems cannot adequately capture and convey this creativity and spirit.

Some opponents will argue that C^sup 2^ systems, such as C^sup 2^ personal computer, can be utilized to produce excellent graphics and overlays for an operation. While these digital measures can accurately convey a concept of operations, they cannot capture concepts central to maneuver warfare like commander’s intent. Upon first contact with the enemy, these carefully prepared computerized plans no longer accurately reflect the intentions of subordinate commanders and cannot be quickly adjusted.

For example, a squad leader getting ready for a patrol has to submit a patrol overlay graphic to his company and then to the battalion in order for them to be able to track his movements. During the course of the patrol, if the situation changes and the squad leader deviates from his intended route, more often than not, the first question asked is why the squad leader deviated from his route. The more important question of how can the organization support the squad leader is never asked. This takes the initiative away from the squad leader because he is restricted by lines on an electronic map and the amount of explanation required to change the lines.

A better use for C^sup 2^ systems is to present a picture to the same squad leader of the assets that are available for him to utilize. The squad leader can see the aircraft, mounted patrols, and other assets that are in the area that he can synergistically combine to accomplish his mission. Rather than enabling senior commanders to control their subordinates, the system should be used in reverse, allowing decisionmakers at the lowest levels access to resources and a picture they would not have had under the current paradigm. The following example, along with Figure 2, illustrates how C^sup 2^ systems can be employed to this effect.

A squad leader is patrolling through a crowded marketplace with his attention outwardly focused. He sees a man whom he vaguely recognizes from the high-value individual (HVI) posters around the company command post. He pulls out his PDA and asks for the company intelligence cell to send him the picture while he orders his squad to detain the HVI and his associates. He consults his PDA to pull a feed from an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) overhead to look for any insurgent forces en route to the area. After the man is detained, his identity is confirmed using the biometrie data obtained from the battalion’s database. The squad leader then uses his radio to coordinate with an adjacent mounted patrol for a linkup to transfer the detainee to their custody for transport. Alerted to the capture, the battalion COC ensures that the mounted patrol has movement priority out of the city. All of these actions were completed before the enemy had time to regroup and mount a rescue.

Conclusion

Modern C^sup 2^ systems can be a double-edged sword to the commander. The true benefits that these systems bring are the shared information, resources, and intelligence picture. Instead of enabling senior commanders to control subordinates, C^sup 2^ systems should be used to facilitate maneuver warfare by empowering all decisionmakers. In keeping with the tenets of maneuver warfare, the goal of C^sup 2^ systems employed in the Marine Corps should be to give leaders at the lowest levels access to all of the resources that the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) can bring to the fight.

Notes

1. United States Marine Corps, MCDP 6, Command and Control. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 37.

2. Ibid., pp. 48-51.

3. Robinson, Clarence A., Jr., “Advances Boost Tactical Nodes.” Signal Magazine, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, Fairfax, VA, June 2007, p. 50.

4. MCDP 6, p. 109.

5. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Vision and Srnitegy 2025, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 39.

6. Van Creveld, Martin, Command in Wir, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 1 985, p. 146.

7. Matthews, Matt M., We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-lsradi Wa\, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2008, p. 24.

8. Ibid.. p. 61.

9. Ibid., p. 47.

10. Ibid., p. 55.

11. Ibid., p. 33.

12. Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, p. 10.

Unmanned UF-35B Lightning II

by Col L. Ross “Migs” Roberts

It is summer, 2020. Maj “Rump” Snyder relaxed a bit behind the UF-35B “remote crew station” while watching the unmanned Lightning II effordessly make contact with the tanker. He took a long sip of his black coffee, which reminded him that he had to pick up a gallon of milk on the way home tonight. War is hell. The UF-35B he was monitoring was in perfect formation taking on fuel. He thought, “Just 30 more minutes over Somalia and I’ll dick che ‘return to base icon sending this aircraft back to the carrier for rearming and maintenance.”

It was just 8 years ago that he finished joint F-35B pilot training at Eglin Air Force Base. Rump fondly reminisced about his “nugget” tour in Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 332, the first Marine F-35B squadron. When he joined the “Moonlighters” in 2013 there were more jets than pilots. Back in 2010 the almost “shovel ready” F-35 program received a substantial injection of money, which was good news for the Marine Corps. At that time the aging F/A-18 aircraft inventory required significant modifications, and a new ßghter was extremely welcome. By the time Rump arrived at the Moonlighters, the squadron had plenty of flight hours and planes to fly, and fly they did.

The training focus directed by the squadron commander, LtCol “Nomo” Hanchet, was on air superiority, secondary focus was on tactics assodated with the new technology of the F-35. The squadron took great pride at not only holding their own against U.S. Air Force F-22 squadrons, but they also trained in employing the F-35B to its maximum capability in complex high threat training environments. The Air Force RED FLAG exerdses were optimized for this kind of training and during his tour with the Moonlighters the squadron participated in three RED FLAG events.

The remaining “blue collar” squadrons (F/A-18 and AV-8B squadrons) supported Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) training events like the new combined arms exerdses (CAXs) or “CAX IIs” along with the Marine unmanned aircrañ support squadrons (VMUs). Rump heard Nomo say many times that air-to-air skills are much more perishable than air-to-ground skills. “Good fighter pilots are made in the higthy dynamic air-to-air realm, and I don’t want to be a ‘training aide’ for the grunts. ” The F-35B training and readiness (T&R) requirements are vast, and “there just isn’t enough time in the day or flight hours to train to all of the missions delineated in the T&R.” Besides, the “North Koreans are about to move south and the Moonlighters have to be ready for the ‘first day of the war’ missions. ”

Rump found it hard to argue with that logic, particularly since the aviation portion of the CAXII syllabus focused on combined arms and low-altitude, high-threat dose air support (CAS). He heard the blue collar pilots say that all they needed was a target coordinate and time on target; the rest was just boring holes in the sky. The F- 35 didn’t have to go “low” or operate under the cover of suppressive fire combined arms tactics to conduct high-threat CAS. The F-35 exclusively employed global positioning system-guided munitions from standoff ranges at medium to high altitude. Flying in CAX II was like asking far a midair with an unmanned aircraft system (UAS). The farmer F /A-1 8D weapons and sensors officers now manning the VMU squa drons checker blocked the airspace with UASs performing CAS and even acting as airborne forward air controllers (FAC(A)s).

After Rumps fieet tour in 2016 he attended Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). While at EWS Rump was introduced to modern maneuver warfare theorists like Boyd, Van Crevdd, andCanby, in addition to the seminal works of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, all in the context of a warfighting philosophy based upon maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps concept for the conduct of war. Both a philosophy and method of warfare emphasizing an indepth understanding of commander s intent and mission type orders, maneuver warfare naturally leveraged tactical a viation far success but only if strong air-ground rda tionships existed. He intendy studied Ue wartime experiences of Guderian, Rudel, Patton, and Quesada pioneers in the integration of airpower with maneuver during World War II (WWII). It was ironic that ne Marine Corps was the only Service in the world tha t still practiced the “tactical air force” model perfected in WWII. Yet, through these pioneers writings, he contrasted his experiences as an F-35B pilot and saw himself- a product of F-35 B multimission training – as well equipped but poorly trained far the maneuver warfare now practiced by the MAGTF.

Through interaction with other servicemembers in his seminar, Rump relearned that the Marine Corps culture was indeed unique. Many of his contemporaries from the rotary-wing and F/A-18 andAVSB communities were eager to serve as battalion FACs and as air officers during their careers Not only were mese tours professionally rewarding many Marine pilots considered FAC tours essential for gaining the ground perspective. Yet, despite the fact that the other Services had tactical aviators, Rump learned that very few ever served on ground tours with the infantry The Air Force F-35A pilot in his seminar said that he joined the Air Force to fiy, not to be an air liaison officer with the Army. The Navy and the Army also didn’t send any of thier aviators to ground units as air liaison officers or as FACs. This seemed particularly odd for Navy F/A-18F aircrew qualified as FAC(A)s; they earned FAC qualifications as part of thier FAC(A) syllabus. Given this context he questioned the current institutional emphasis on the F-35B as the sole tactical aviation (TacAir) platform in Marine aviation capable of supporting five of the six functions of Marine aviation as if the Marine Corps would have to “go it alone.”1

As he studied joint warfare he dearly saw that the Marine Corps was missing an opportunity to facus its ever-decreasing TacAir community to specialize more in MAGTF operational art. The Marine Corps model was continuously contrasted by postwar historians with battlefidd failures where ground and aviation integration failed. He read about the success of this careful integration of ground and aviation under a single command during all of the major conflicts fought since a viation became a force on the battlefield. “Well,” he thought, “that’s all water under the bridge now, ” as he snapped back to the task at hand Rump subconsciously rubbed the leather patch on his flight suit as he dicked the “disengage” icon and then dicked the “IP (initial point) Delta” icon sending the UF-35B back to the CAS stack.

There is no doubt the F-35 B as a function of joint Service priorities and procurement economies will be the most advanced and capable multimission TacAir platform Marine aviation has ever procured. But just because the F-35 can do it all, doesn’t mean the Marine F-35 B pilot should. As part of a naval and joint team, Marine F-35 B squadrons should focus their training specifically in support of the MAGTF and rely upon the Navy and Air Force to maintain the multimission capabilities of the F-35. Our challenge is to train the Marine pilot to employ the F-35 B in a way that transcends his ability to land it vertically.

The MAGTF model is unique and envied. As the F- 35 enters service, Marine Corps leadership has set a high bar for the single-seat F-35 B pilot – more missions, fewer squadrons, fewer aircrew.2 So, as we embark upon achieving this lofty goal the challenge is do we train Marine F-35 B pilots to be “jacks” of all missions supporting five of the six functions of Marine aviation, or do we reinforce our core process of cross-pollination with F-35B training focused on Marine air-ground integration core competencies? The purpose of this article is to argue for the latter and deliberately tailor a Marine F- 35B pilot’s training to specific MAGTF missions within the context of limited funds and time available and cede other core skill missions to F- 35 squadrons of the naval and joint force.

For those of you who have served “combat time” in the Pentagon you may be thinking, “Migs, that’s not the way things work inside the beltway; what you are proposing won’t sell on Capitol Hill.” So with this admittedly Pollyannaish preamble, I want to express an operator’s perspective on what should be marketed on Capitol Hill as the future of Marine TacAir as it is transitioned to the F-35B.

Over the past 25 years Marine aviation has necked down from about 30 squadrons of largely single-mission Vietnam-era aircraft, such as F-4s, RF-4s, A-4s, A-6Es, AV-8As, OV-10s, and EA-6Bs, to 19 squadrons of multimission aircraft (F/A-18s, AV-8Bs) and 4 squadrons of the single-mission EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft. By approximately 2024 Marine TacAir will consist of about 21 squadrons of a single type/model/series aircraft, the F-35B (short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) variant) or possibly some yet to be defined mix of F-35Bs and F-35Cs (carrier variant), in addition to more unmanned aerial support squadrons.3 Concurrently we’ve seen the emergence of joint warfare and unified action that has nearly eliminated the Service-sector approach to warfare (except perhaps in the Pentagon). The challenge for Marine aviation given this environment will be training the Marine F-35B pilot in an aircraft now being advertised as uniquely capable of performing five of the six functions of Marine aviation. This “remarkable breadth of employment allowing the Marine Corps to decrease its TacAir inventory” into a potentially all-STOVL force and “revolutionize air warfare and Naval Aviation into the 21st Century” has placed an “all in bet” on the F-35B redefining the very relevance of Marine TacAir.4

For the sake of argument, let’s as- sume that the Marine Corps’ vision concerning the value of the F-35B meets expectations and revolutionizes air warfare and naval aviation so much so that, by the year 2020, the F-35B STOVL variant is now the most widely produced fighter of the three variants and is procured by all three Services and our coalition partners. This pres- ents an interesting dilemma for the Marine Corps. The STOVL argument alone may not be sufficient to stand up against the ever-present pressure to re- duce seemingly redundant TacAir ca- pability within the Department of Defense, particularly in light of future reductions in defense spending. Using the multirole F/A-18 experience as a template for the future, training an F-35B pilot to be competent in the “remarkable breadth” of missions (de- spite the advanced fusion of sensors, mission systems, and advanced simulators) will dilute the “Marine” that makes the F-35B worthy of carrying the banner for Marine TacAir. Therefore, basing the very future of Marine TacAir on the F-35B without the proper context of why it’s a requirement for the MAGTF to have a Marine in the cockpit in the first place is placing the cart before the horse.

The culture of cross-pollination between air and ground is what makes the MAGTF unique across the spectrum of warfare. Therefore, at a minimum, it is of utmost importance to clearly and unequivocally state that, first, the Marine pilot is the guarantor of the relevance of Marine TacAir. And second, the platform is simply the means by which he does his “Marine pilot stuff.” Preserving and perhaps even enhancing the Marine F-35B pilot’s reason for existence should be first and foremost when defining the future relevance of Marine TacAir as we transition to the exponentially more capable F-35B. The T&R manual of a Marine F-35B pilot should be the foundation for leveraging the institutional cross-pollination that is the sole source of his unique contribution to the warfighting functions of the MAGTF. Just as the Marine Corps saw the strength in the justification for an F-35 variant with the hardware to support our unique operating environment (F-35B), it should also recognize the validity to operate the F-35 B in a joint environment in a way that leverages the unique nature of the Marine pilot from the first lieutenant to the colonel group commander.

To do otherwise would negate the deliberate career length cultivation of Marine TacAir pilots. Hard choices regarding F-35 B pilot training must be made in the context of limited funds and time available The primary factors we should use in those choices are Marine mission skills that reinforce our cultural ethos and training as MAGTF officers instead of aviators trained in the “breadth of employment” of the F-35 B. As evidenced by Marine F/A-18 squadrons, F-35 B squadrons will struggle with the “Marine generalist or Marine specialist” training dilemma.

The Multimission Marine Pilot: What’s Past Is Prologue

The Marine Corps will be engaged in conflict for the foreseeable future. When engaged across the spectrum of conflict, the Marine Corps will be part of a joint force flying fewer TacAir fighters than we have today. As evidenced during Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) and especially Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Marine aviators operating throughout the depth of the Marine expeditionary force battlespace heavily employed armed reconnaissance and strike coordination and reconnaissance tactics – missions F/A-18 pilots rarely trained to before the conflicts. As a result, flight leads and wingmen well trained in antiair warfare perfected armed reconnaissance and strike coordination and reconnaissance mostly through on-the-job training. Marine aircrews fortunately leveraged their unique MAGTF culture and operated as extensions of Marine FACs and air officers connecting Marines in the command and control (C^sup 2^) centers to coordinate and control a tremendous amount of “unbriefed” joint air to support Marine ground forces, all in accordance with commanders intent. As OIF progressed, Marine F/A-18 squadrons returning to the United States were faced with a training dilemma. Do we focus our training for the inevitable deployment to Iraq, or do we revert to pre-war training and expend limited resources and time to train in accordance with the broad mission sets as delineated in the F/A-18 T&R manual?

The accomplishments of Marine TacAir in ODS and OIF offer a glimpse of what may be in store for multimission aircraft like the F-35B. In both conflicts the multimission F/A-18 and single-mission AV-8B performed the large preponderance of Marine TacAir support for the maneuver commander. F /A- 18D aircrews qualified as FAC (A) s were a much smaller subgroup of Marine aircrews uniquely trained and deliberately scheduled throughout a 24-hour period to help control and coordinate Marine TacAir and a tremendous amount of joint TacAir in support of commander’s intent. Compared to single-seat F/A-18 and AV-8B squadrons, the training requirements to earn FAC(A) qualifications – a core mission essential task list (METL) for the F/A-18D – came at the expense of aircrew proficiency for other missions. Since OIF I the single-seat F/A-18 and the AV- 8B squadrons now train to single-seat FAC(A) missions and are faced with the same dilemma of balancing core capability in critical MAGTF support missions like FAC(A) with maintaining capability in antiair warfare missions. Therefore, as Marine TacAir necks down to a single TacAir platform flown by fewer squadrons, training should maximize Marine machine interface to leverage joint “unbriefed” air to support the MAGTF.

The F-35B Pilot: Marine TacAir Specialist

Only the Marine Corps, through its purposely designed culture of integration and dependence upon its aviation arm, can redefine the training of Marine aviators to better leverage aerial forces in cooperation with ground forces. The size of the Marine TacAir force when compared to the Navy and Air Force can be a combat multiplier if not diluted with requirements to maintain on-par skills in missions not directly supporting ground maneuver. Just as the joint process yielded unique Service variants of the F-35, the current joint warfighting environment, as evidenced in the examples cited above, allows for specialization of the Marine pilot.

The leadership of the Navy and the Marine Corps should move forward under a combined strategy that links Marine and Navy aviation under a mu- tually enabling naval aviation vision built upon a deliberate alliance that be- comes closer under budgetary pressure not wider. Leveraging the F-35B/C joint acquisition experience, its time to mandate more specific and mutually dependent functions for the Navy and the Marine aviator. Within this con- struct the Navy and Marine Corps should construct the “functions of naval aviation” and then delineate sub- functions for Navy aviation and Marine aviation that encompass opera- tions at sea, on land, and combinations of the two. Each Services air arm should be given the lead in aviation functions directly related to its Service culture, similar to a supported-support- ing relationship. Once this is agreed to, the Services can write T&R documents delineating the training necessary for Marine and Navy aviators to support those functions. The end product should be a Navy F-35C T&R broadly focused but with specific and defined roles to maintain maritime and air su- periority, and a Marine F-35B T&R that is focused on air supporting ground maneuver. The combined Navy and Marine T&R should reflect the ability for the naval force to operate from both carrier and amphibious shipping as well as expeditionary airfields while delineating specific and deliberate reliance upon individual Service expertise that leverages Service culture.

To illustrate this concept, the Navy would be named the supported Service for antiair warfare and therefore responsible to maintain leadership in air-to-air and air defense tactics development and proficiency. The Marine Corps would be supported in offensive air support in MAGTF operations and therefore responsible to maintain leadership in tactics and proficiency. This would enable Marine pilots to achieve and maintain mastery in missions, such as CAS and deep air support (FAC(A)), armed reconnaissance, strike coordination and reconnaissance, airborne tactical air control, and to train the pilot to leverage the F-35B in supporting maneuver warfare. Core METLs for Marine F-35B squadrons would be focused on creating an aerial force completely at ease with operating with ground commander’s intent as if it were their own on the first day of the war. Training to the supporting roles or noncore METLs of each Service would require fewer sorties in those areas but also provide a “surge” capability if an overweight in a mission area was required. For example, a six plane F-35B detachment operating from an expeditionary strike group would be a force multiplier in helping the carrier strike group establish maritime supremacy yet be the catalyst in employing airpower from a carrier strike group in accordance with ground commander’s intent once forces move ashore.

Once this supported-supporting Navy-Marine Corps employment architecture is in place, Marine aviators can focus on enhancing Marine TacAir’s support to facilitate maneuver and thereby avoid the MAGTF on-the-job training that occurred in ODS and OIF. Through the adoption of a more focused Marine F-35B T&R manual, Marine squadrons could train more pilots earlier in their tours to become organic airborne partners with ground forces, not just additional TacAir pilots who service a target on time. The importance of the armed reconnaissance, strike coordination and reconnaissance, FAC(A), and tactical aircraft controller (airborne) missions as functions of maneuver warfare needs to be heavily emphasized during Marine TacAir training. Marine TacAir’s ability to conduct coordinated and well-planned and executed reconnaissance missions is based upon training the Marine pilot to know what to look for and why and is often not emphasized in today’s F/A-18 squadrons due to other multimission training priorities. This capability is a distinct benefit to our ground forces engaged in the less distinct or “hybrid challenges” characterizing today’s conflict. The additional trust engendered by this training focus, combined with the interoperable network capability of the F- 35B with other Service variants, has the potential to flatten C^sup 2^ further increasing Marine TacAir’s contribution to maneuver in ways yet to be discovered.

The current joint C^sup 2^ system for CAS is useful for processing “unbriefed air,” but the control measures slow the speed and tempo and by design reduce initiative. Marine C^sup 2^ operating as a subset of joint C^sup 2^ is unique and has the potential to better support maneuver warfare and irregular warfare. Yet trends indicate that Marine air C^sup 2^ is migrating to a more centralized electronic joint format that doesn’t leverage Marine aviators in ways commensurate with their experience real-time in the airspace over the batdefield. For example, Marine air group and squadron commanders rarely function as “commanders” airborne and often fly as flight leads and even as wingman on missions that junior pilots can perform. Conversely, young pilots are conditioned to answer the CAS mission with a bomb on time on target; their thoughts and observations are not part of the normal combined arms training process. The networking capability combined with the “flying sensor” qualities of the F-35 could equate to information overload to maneuver forces if not leavened by pilot perspective operating with commander’s intent, or worse, further disaggregate the F-35B pilot or the more seasoned squadron commander from the “fog and friction” and tempt commanders to remain in the operations center.

If approached correctly the F-35B may pave the way for airborne warfare qualifications for Marine TacAir commanders operating within the joint environment from irregular warfare to major combat operations underpinned by the maneuver warfare warfighting philosophy. In this role commanders could leverage the advanced mission systems and networking capability of the F-35 B to operate as more than just mere extensions of the tactical air operations center and direct air support center. Perhaps they could finally be a part of the Marine air C^sup 2^ system airborne, over the battlefield, fusing ground commanders intent with their years of aviation expertise acting as airborne commanders. This layered approach to aviation C^sup 2^ would increase the tempo of Marine air C^sup 2^ and form the basis for a pilot training model that reinforces initiative and thinking in a fluid environment and in the more static irregular warfare environment. Manned Marine TacAir limbered by the advanced capability of the F-35 B and a MAGTF training vision will thrive in both environments.

Conclusion

The acquisition of the F-35B mandates a review of Marine aviation doctrine to ensure that the aircraft best supports Marine Corps warfighting doctrine through the maximization of the most important sensor in the aircraft, the Marine pilot. This is a temporal shift away from the ever-present problem of managing the impact of CAS frags on maintaining pilot core competency in other missions. Flying with ground commanders intent in support of maneuver is warfare art borne in our Marine culture and only honed through specific pilot training. Perhaps this is the only airborne mission that cannot be replaced by a UAS. When the F-35 B is branded with “Marines” on its fuselage, it must mean more than vertical landing.

Notes

1. Marine aviation is task organized to support the MAGTF as the aviation combat element by providing six functions: assault support, antiaircraft warfare, offensive air support, electronic warfare, control of aircraft and missiles, and aerial reconnaissance.

2. Transition to the F-35 will eliminate F/A-18D weapons and sensor officers and EA-6B electronic countermeasures officers. Additionally, the Marine Corps will see an aggregate decrease in TacAir inventory.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps Concepts and Prcgrams, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 145.

4. Ibid.

Good Decisionmakers Are Not Enough

by Capt Matthew Van Echo

The current training focus on decisionmaking is insufficient for developing Marines capable of making creative decisions consistent with our maneuver warfare philosophy. A disproportionate amount of focus is placed on teaching Marines how to make a decision and execute tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). These skills are important in developing effective Marines and units, but they must not displace an emphasis on teaching creativity. Current training does address decision- making. Trainers must facilitate an educational environment that encourages independent learning and self-evaluation, tolerates mistakes and teaches how to cope with failure, and uses doctrine, not TTP, as the intellectual foundation for a cooperative and socially dynamic training environment to develop creative decisionmakers.

Where Are We Now?

A quick look at the current training focus will demonstrate a shortfall that exists in training Marines to be creative decisionmakers. Each entry-level institution (boot camp, Officer Candidates School (OCS), and The Basic School (TBS)) doesn’t employ effective decisionmaking methods. Boot camp and OCS primarily focus on indoctrinating recruits and candidates into the Marine Corps. While indoctrination is an important concept, little of maneuver warfare doctrine has found its way into the training fundamentals of the Marine Corps’ entry-level training institutions. Maneuver warfare demands decentralized decisionmaking, initiative, and boldness, yet boot camp and OCS seem to emphasize rote memorization and instant obethence to orders in a highly centralized environment. It is difficult to comprehend how close order drill, a staple of first-generation warfare, is an effective indoctrination tool for the Marine Corps, which increasingly is finding itself engaged with a fourthgeneration enemy. Even TBS, which prides itself on producing decisive lieutenants and warrant officers, does litde more than teach new officers to accept making decisions in an ambiguous setting. Instead of being rewarded for effective solutions to tactical problems, students are encouraged to apply techniques learned in a class, whether or not they are appropriate for the situation. Staff members are advised to discourage “out of the box” solutions to tactical problems. Both situations discourage innovation in favor of the “safe” and predictable solution to tactical problems.

The focus of training in the Operating Forces does little more to encourage creativity. The Marine Corps’ obsession with synchronizing fires as the pinnacle of training does little to emphasize creativity. At no point in this type of training does innovation factor into a unit’s success. This type of training gets bogged down in the second-generation warfare concept of synchronization and doesn’t properly address decisionmaking and creativity.

One example of where decisionmaking and creativity connect is Exercise MOJAVE VIPER, which does incorporate long-accepted methods for training a maneuver warfare force like using force-on-force exercises and detailed debriefs. These both help develop creative decisionmakers, but units traditionally execute MOJAVE VlPER immediately before deploying to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. However, the timing for this type of training is a case of “too litde too late.” One possible explanation for this training shortfall (from the training institutions and Operating Forces units) is that there is a prevailing misunderstanding of what creativity is and how it enables maneuver warfare.

Creativity and Decisionmaking

Training should be rooted in decisionmaking with creativity as a constant thread throughout. The fluid nature of war makes this imperative. Decisionmaking skills alone might not properly address a tactical situation because there is always the potential for making a decision that is completely inappropriate to the situation. Additionally, a predictable action, either through initiative or reaction to the enemy, can have detrimental effects. In his book, Creativity: In Education and Learning Arthur J. Cropley argues that:

Genuine creativity requires a further element over and above mere novelty: a product or response must be relevant to the issue at stake and must offer some kind of genuine solution, i.e. it must be effective.1

From that position it is clear to see that trainers must move beyond merely developing decisionmakers and also work to develop Marines who can orient on a problem that ultimately produces an effective decision. Too often in training, decisionmaking is neglected in favor of the “right” answer. This is what Cropley describes as convergent thinking:

Convergent thinking is oriented towards deriving the single best answer to a question. It is effective in a situation where a ready-made answer exists and needs simply to be recalled from stored information, or where the answer can be worked out from what is already known by conventional and logical search, recognition, and decision making strategies. . . . but it focuses on recognizing the familiar, reapplying set techniques and preserving the already known and thus does not preserve novelty.2

Trainers should aim to develop divergent thinkers who would lead to more creativity. Cropley defines divergent thinking as:

Divergent thinking, by contrast, involves processes like shifting perspective, transforming or producing multiple answers from the available information and thus favors the production of novelty.3

With Cropley’s explanation it is clear that the result of training should be the development of divergent thinkers as opposed to convergent thinkers because a divergent thinker is more likely to develop a creative and appropriate response to a tactical problem where a convergent thinker will likely produce a predictable response.

Marine Corps doctrine provides a good starting point to examine how training can be structured to develop creative decisionmakers within the maneuver warfare philosophy. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3 (MCDP 1-3), Tactics, describes the Boyd cycle or what is commonly referred to as the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop. MCDP 1-3 further explains that the better one can orient on a situation, generally the better his decision will be. The primary goal of training should be to improve a Marine’s abilities to orient on a given situation. A divergent thinker is capable of looking at a problem from multiple perspectives and arriving at multiple solutions. These characteristics of divergent thinking, in essence, describe how a Marine orients in the context of the Boyd cycle. If a Marine observes a fixed stimulus then the recognition of patterns and potential solutions becomes how the Marine orients on the problem. Training should examine and develop how Marines interpret their observations, to see why some items standout more and thus have a greater impact on the decision. This process generates dialogue, debate, and discussion that will engage more Marines and result in more education than if TTP were the only focus.

Understanding how the Boyd cycle should frame the goals for training helps one see the connection to recog- nitional decisionmaking. MasteringTac- tics: A Tactical Decision Game Workbook (Marine Corps Association, 1994), by Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR, set the intellectual framework for understand- ing the value of tactical decision games and their role in developing recogni- tional decisionmaking skills. It highlights the need to increase exposure to tactical scenarios with requisite participation and discussion to increase one’s exposure to decisions. The true value of the method is discussing which factors one uses to develop his solution. These drills enhance one’s abilities to recognize similar combinations of variables and improve decisionmaking by providing an additional experience to orient on future problems. This ability to recall similar situations or patterns enhances decisionmaking and begins to open the door to developing creativity. It is impossible to predict every tactical situation in which a Marine might find himself. It is just as impossible to try to create a playbook of tactical responses to every potential situation. It is possible though to predict that Marines will always find themselves faced with making a decision in a friction filled environment. It is this very reason that makes it obvious that to properly execute maneuver warfare, the development of creative decisionmakers must be the core element of all training.

Implementing Change to Develop Creativity

Much can be done to develop creativity without significant changes to training schedules. The most important change is to simply accept the idea that Marines must develop more creative decisionmaking skills. The next step is to incorporate the following ideas into existing training programs. Units will have different degrees of tolerance for change, but the more change is embraced the more successful the training will be.

Independent learning and self-evaluation. It is generally accepted that one learns better when self-motivated. This is especially true for adult learners who must recognize the value in what they are learning to achieve the greatest retention of what is being taught. When learning accompanies initiative, the path of discovery is limited only by the individual. The learning experience is broadened and enriched, unlike the externally directed learning experience. Learning is usually greater when students are engaged in the subject material. A more engaged learner exhibits higher retention and assimilation of material taught. Through a self-motivated education one is more likely to evaluate the worth of his pursuit and the quality of his work. This self-evaluation becomes important during the Boyd cycle because Marines will be more critical of their thought processes thus ensuring that important pieces of information are not overlooked, resulting in faulty orientation on the problem. Achieving this level of self-education requires leaders to not only encourage self-education but also to provide guidance for how to pursue it. Just like any attitude a commander wants his unit to adopt, this idea must be regularly addressed and, more importantly, practiced by the leadership.

Mistakes must be tolera ted and failure learned from. Most adults learn best by doing or performing a particular action. This is because performing a multiple process function involves more parts of the brain resulting in greater retention of knowledge. Using more areas of the brain where knowledge can be stored increases the potential recall of information. By creating an environment that tolerates honest mistakes, Marines will be more willing to be proactive and thus attempt to do more things on their own, which then leads to increased experiences. This idea should not sound new. MCDP 1, Warfighting, addresses this issue, explaining that successful after-action critiques require commanders to be willing to tolerate mistakes by subordinates. By being willing to accept mistakes there will be a greater willingness to offer new or alternative ideas. As Marines become comfortable with this practice they will become better problem solvers and ultimately provide more creative decisions.

An important aspect of this approach is to teach Marines how to deal with failure. Simple methods include analyzing a mistake to determine the cause of failure. This analysis should be used as a learning opportunity to expose the flaw in the Marines thought process, to see why that flaw caused negative results. Marines who are trained to see failure as an opportunity for growth will be more willing to seek innovation rather than the predictable solution and will be better suited to handle failure caused by uncontrollable factors. This increased adaptability will enhance their abilities to function in fluid environments.

Doctrinal principles must form the foundation of a cooperative training style Principle-based training, which provides more natural and instinctive responses to externally imposed forces than attempting to apply techniques and procedures, is a superior method of training than using TTP. From this style of training, unit TTP can develop but not at the risk of becoming the only solution to different problems exhibiting some similar characteristics. Training and, more importantly, education should focus on warfighting principles, understand Marines’ abilities to recall similar situations, and foster and encourage creativity.

What About the Basics?

It is easy to confuse the above argument with the idea of tossing the Training and Readiness Manual (TScR Manual) out the window resulting in each unit (platoon, company, and battalion) having very différent tactics, but a further examination is needed to see that this is simply not true. The T&R Manual is a good tool to justify training requirements like ammunition and targets. It is good for explaining performance steps using the “task, condition, standard” template. If one were to look at it within the three levels of war – moral, mental, and physical – as described by Col John R. Boyd, USAF(Ret) in his Patterns of Conflict (unpublished manuscript, 1986), he would quickly realize that the TôcR Manual only touches on the physical level of war. Training to develop creativity is not intended to replace a solid foundation in the science of war. It is intended to use these ideas with training in the science as a vehicle for providing opportunities to study decisionmaking and develop creativity.

Conclusion

Using creativity as the centralized focus with individual education as the decentralized method, a unit can create an environment conducive to improving the application of maneuver warfare. Training to make Marines decisionmakers can be a daunting task. Success is not easily quantified. However, by not applying creativity to our decisions, we may be simply playing into the hands of a highly adaptable enemy. Creativity is one of the best skills the Marine Corps can impart on its Marines to be more effective on today’s battlefield.

Notes

1. Cropley, Arthur J., Creativity in Education and Learning, Kogan Page Limited, London, UK, 2001, p. 15.

2. Ibid., p. 32.

3. Ibid.

Is Warfighting Enough?

by Col Chet Richards, USAF(Ret) & MAJ Donald Vandergriff, USA(Ret)

What are military forces going to be doing in the 21st century? Marines and the other members of America’s Armed Forces train to go to war. This seemingly bland statement actually holds the key to resolving practically all of the arguments about doctrine, training, counterinsurgency, and stability operations that we have all been reading about recently. The reason is that it is not immediately obvious that there is going to be much need for fighting wars or even deterring them in the future.

The great strategists, from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, may not have agreed on much, but the one opinion that they held in common was that “war” is something special: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin.”1 Clausewitz insisted that one of the defining characteristics of war is that it “is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds,” restrained only by one’s intelligence and the counterproductive nature of too much violence. So if what you’re engaged in doesn’t look like this, it is at the very least a strange form of war.

Is It War?

A Clausewitzian conflict among nuclear powers is likely to achieve not only the age-old dream of every pacifist-the elimination of war-but unfortunately, also the elimination of the human race. And as a range of strategists from Thomas P.M. Barnett to Martin van Creveld has observed, real “province of life and death” wars have ceased even among minor powers, once the antagonists acquired nuclear weapons.

Although it may not be entirely obvious from looking at the defense budget and, in particular, the vast sums still spent on weapons to fight large-scale conventional war, American military doctrine is beginning to accept this fact. As the new counterinsurgency manual, Field Manual 3-24 (FM 324)/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency, puts it, “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is,”2 which is a statement that would have puzzled Clausewitz to no end. In the types of conflicts we are likely to be engaged in, however, the struggle is not to defeat another military force but to reestablish a government that the vast majority of people will regard as “legitimate.”3 Once such a government is in place, it can use its own resources to mobilize the people to put an end to insurgencies of either the domestic or the transnationalfourth generational-variety. Tactical success by U.S. forces on the battlefield, the manual explains, guarantees nothing.4

This is all very strange. One is tempted to believe that Clausewitz would have concluded that what we’re engaged in is not war at all and then launched off to write another 500-page treatise on legitimacy or whatever. It is already starting to happen. The recently retired British officer, Sir Rupert Smith, like Clausewitz a successful commander of his day, begins his exploration of the utility of military force by observing that such forces are often used nowadays for purposes for which they were not originally intended.5 Even a casual reading of Sir Rupert’s book strongly suggests that the further away from their original purpose, the less successful the application.

Boyd and the nonwars of the 21st century. What all this means is that for the first time since the founding of the Republic, there is no way to tell what American military forces will be used for and, therefore, should be trained for in the future. For that reason, late U.S. Air Force Col John R. Boyd may turn out to be the most influential strategist of the 21st century. Marines know Boyd primarily through the orientation, observation, decision, action (OODA) loop concept and from his influence on maneuver warfare. But Boyd’s impact on the Corps runs much deeper, and when Boyd died in 1997, then-Commandant Charles C. Krulak wrote, “I, and his Corps of Marines, will miss our counselor terribly.”

Fortunately, for all members of the U.S. Armed Forces, Boyd’s concept of strategy offers ideas for resolving 21st century conflict that might prove useful to avoiding future impasses like Iraq. Probably every Marine understands that the essence of maneuver warfare is to create chaos and exploit it faster than the other side can sort it out. These Boyd-type strategies will have not only physical but also mental and moral effects on opponents, degrading their abilities to function as harmonious teams. Physical effects are things like surfaces and gaps; mental effects are related to confusion, disorientation, surprise, deception, and ambiguity; moral effects are the strongest of all because they govern whether the opponent will even retain the will to continue the fight.

In creating his theory Boyd was able to incorporate ideas from an enormous body of science unavailable to Clausewitz, particularly the second law of thermodynamics, relativity, quantum mechanics, the “new sciences” of chaos and complexity, and advances in the biological and social sciences, such as the theory of evolution by natural selection, experimental psychology, genetics, neurophysiology, and the epistemology of science. The result is a truly new and original synthesis that is based as much on destroying the other side’s ability to function as a coherent system as on improving our own capacity to work effectively under conditions of stress and uncertainty.

The destructive side-the OODA loop. Fundamental to applying Boyd’s concepts is the realization that the OODA loop isn’t really a loop at all. Boyd, in fact, never drew it that way. Instead, the loop is better considered as a way of thinking about conflict based upon the concept of keeping our orientations better matched to reality than our opponents’. Boyd demonstrated, by combining examples both from military history and modern science, that the side that can do this will not only respond to changes more quickly, but can also shape the situation to its liking and then exploit it before the opponent can react. Another key is, through training and experience, to assemble an arsenal of potentially effective actions that will flow intuitively, smoothly, and quickly from orientation. The end result is, as Boyd called it, to “operate inside an opponent’s OODA ‘loop'” and thus produce rapid, jarring changes that disorient and demoralize the opposition.

The constructive side-attracting the uncommitted. This is all well and good, but it sounds like a better way to fight wars, which we may not be doing that much of in the future. The other, lesser appreciated, half of Boyd’s work provides tools and concepts more suited to such nonwar purposes as restoring legitimacy. First, it is important to recognize, as the new counterinsurgency manual emphatically does, that there is a limit to what military forces can be expected to accomplish. As the manual notes, “Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy” and only the symptoms because “political factors are primary.” The important point, as Boyd insisted, is that the “good guy” military force-our coalition, for example-must operate in such a way as to:

* Support our national goals.

* Pump up our resolve, drain away adversary’s resolve, and attract the uncommitted.

* End the conflict on favorable terms.

* Ensure that the conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict.6

By operating inside the opponent’s OODA loops, we:

. . . permit real leadership to avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick victory. This combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime makes it appear corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern.7

The same is true if we can quickly and efficiently eliminate the military component of an outside or illegitimate organization. In other words, by operating according to the principles that underlie maneuver warfare, we not only win the armed conflict, but we make it more likely that we, and the affected population, win the subsequent peace. Boyd’s analysis, by the way, suggests that the coalition military did exactly what militaries are supposed to do by quickly occupying Baghdad, with relatively few casualties on either side, and thoroughly discrediting the Ba’athist regime. What happened next provides yet another argument for considering occupations and perhaps even counterinsurgencies as something other than war.

But Carry an Effective Stick

Perhaps Boyd’s most powerful contribution to the 21st century lies not in better ways to fight, even ways to fight that don’t make the political situation worse, but in putting the focus on the positive elements of conflict. Thus his magnum opus, Patterns of Conflict, ends not with the OODA loop and sowing deception, ambiguity, and chaos, but with the “theme for vitality and growth.” In other words, our focus should always be on attracting people around the world to engage peacefully with us and our way of life, while we, in partnership with our allies, retain the capability to deal quickly and elegantly with those who would use force to gain their objectives.

Perhaps the strongest reason for recommending Boyd to those who must deal with the strangeness of the 21st century is the equally strange fact that Boyd was not primarily concerned with warfare. Although he is recognized as a father of maneuver warfare, nowhere in the 300 or so pages that he left does he use the term. He would certainly have agreed with both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz that warfare must serve a higher purpose or it is just brutal savagery. So throughout his work, he emphasized destruction and creation, coercion and attraction, chaos and harmony, isolation and interaction. These principles apply to the rifle squad just as they do to national policy, which, if you stop to think about it, is what Gen Krulak’s notion of the “strategic corporal” is all about.

Creating strategic corporals (and strategic colonels). So, how do we create strategic corporals, strategic lieutenants, strategic majors, and strategic colonels? The trick is to instill a culture like the one embodied in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP1), Warfighting, and MCDP 6, Command and Control. Boyd once called it the “principles of the blitzkrieg,” but dropped that description in favor of “an operational climate for organizational success.” The essence of this approach is to ensure that we lead through auftragstaktik, a German word that implies that once everyone understands the commanders’ intent (two levels up), then people are free to, and indeed dutybound to, use their creativity and initiative to accomplish their missions within the intent. Within such an environment, teams will largely self-organize within the doctrinal framework to accomplish the mission. Marine Maj Gen James M. “Mike” Myatt once summarized this command philosophy as not being “centralized decision and decentralized execution. It’s centralized vision and decentralized decision making.” It is the climate that enables “strategic” soldiers at every level.

It is the mission of every military organization to create leaders and units that can operate under this concept. As one speaker at a recent Boyd conference at Quantico noted, in the 21st century, the other side has to operate this way. Centralized control isn’t an option for them.

Adaptive leadership is key. How do we create cultures and leaders capable of auftragstaktik, or as Boyd called it, “operat[ing] inside opponents’ OODA loops”? Some interesting work is now taking place. In its adaptive leaders course (ALC), for example, the Army is experimenting with bold new techniques in some of its precommissioning and junior officer training programs. One of the elements in this approach to developing adaptive leaders is the innovative use of tactical decision games (TDGs), a technique popularized by LtCol John F. Schmitt, USMC(Ret). The ALC combines TDGs with other approaches through experiential learning, scenario-based education, 360-degree evaluations and, most importantly, outstanding teachers.

The essence of the ALC is not to arrive at the school solution, or even to teach the students to go down a prescribed checklist of steps. For an era where we cannot predict what leaders will be doing-or even if it should be called war at all-the checklist mentality is irrelevant at best. Instead, the method requires instructors to put students into increasingly complex and disorganized scenarios. A good scenario employing TDGs gives students a tactical problem and then puts them under stress-often a time constraint-but there are other means limited only by the instructor’s imagination. The students must present not only their solutions but also explain why they did what they did. The instructor and the other students will critique, pro and con, the solution as well as the explanation and the technique for solving the problem. Did the students, for example, use an effective balance of written and verbal instructions? Why did they micromanage their noncommissioned officers? Did the local population think better of the coalition as a result, or did the “favorable” body count just help recruit more insurgents?

The impact of the training can be magnified by combining TDGs with the study of military history (the best TDGs are based on historical examples) and intensive fieldwork that includes free play exercises. To be most effective, these teaching approaches must take place under the cultural umbrella of what is called a “learning organization.” In contrast, today’s approach to developing leaders is still focused on a top-down memorization of processes, which is not going to help future leaders achieve mastery of Boyd-type principles.

Training adaptive groups. Recent research out of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (RNoNA), where many of their graduates will serve in the Third World under conditions of transnational or fourth-generation warfare, reinforces the ALC philosophy. In particular, the Norwegians, who briefed their findings at the Boyd conference, emphasized that if we want to develop leaders who can be effective in unstructured, politically charged environments, then instructors must provide such environments to the students as part of their training. In other words, to learn to use OODA loops (they use that terminology), you have to be in an environment where OODA loops make a difference.

In all of the Boyd-like approaches to training, students are continually observed, evaluated, and forced to analyze how they arrived at their decisions under stress. Uniquely, the RNoNA has developed and statistically validated ways to quantify the “maturity” of groups, which defines their readiness to operate in fourth-generation-type environments. The academy can then apply the appropriate “interventions” to help those groups that are lagging in their development.

Conclusion

OODA loops are still the answer. From the standpoint of Boyd’s strategic concepts, the 21st century is moving in a favorable direction. Although large-scale warfare among developed states is increasingly unlikely, conflict, the real subject of Boyd’s investigations, is eternal. As the world approaches 9 billion people by the end of the century, competition for increasingly scarce resources is going to make conflict, including the use of large-scale armed forces in the developing world, even more likely.

As Boyd insisted, successfully resolving future conflicts so that we don’t again become bogged down in multiyear insurgencies will very much be a “carrot and stick” affair, where the emphasis is not so much on “unconditional surrender,” or other 19th and 20th century notions, as on persuading people not to offer support to dangerous groups. A component of this approach may be that we have to discredit those who would use organized violence to achieve their ends. When this becomes necessary, Boyd’s timeless concept of operating inside their OODA loops provides the mechanism for achieving this goal rapidly and with minimum damage to our coalition, to enemy forces, and to friendly and uncommitted populations.

Providentially, as the 21st century breaks, we and our likely allies are developing training and leadership development methods that can be proven to achieve the level of proficiency needed to make Boyd’s concepts live. So operating inside the OODA loop can be as realistic a concept for ending the tragic conflicts of the developing world as it was for achieving victory in the skies over Europe, Korea, and Iraq.

Notes

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, Oxford, NJ, 1963, p. 63.

2. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 127.

3. Ibid., p. 128.

4. Ibid., p. 122.

5. Smith, GEN Sir Robert, British Army (Ret), The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin, London, 2005, p. xii.

6. Boyd, Col John R., USAF(Ret), Patterns of Conflict, unpublished briefing, December 1986, p. 139.

7. Ibid., p. 142.

On the Conduct of War

by 1stLt Mauro Mujica III

Maneuver warfare is defined as a:

. . . warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.1

The theory is simple in its idea yet complex in its application. It is possibly the first thing that every second lieutenant is taught-and is certainly the most valuable. It has proven over the years that the Marine Corps as a military force is in a league of its own. The idea itself is not new. Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, described similar principles. They are as true today as they were 2,000 years ago. In order to be successful in Iraq and in future operations, maneuver warfare must not only be emphasized in theoretical discussions and the classroom, but it must be ingrained into the way we conduct our operations.

In March 2003 coalition forces barreled across the Iraqi border to liberate a nation under a tyrannical government and advance our national security. We again demonstrated that U.S. military forces engaged in conventional operations are unmatched. It should be no shock then that the enemy forces that remained would begin utilizing unconventional methods to inflict maximum casualties.

The improvised explosive device (IED), a rather simple concoction, has become the ideal weapon to employ against occupying forces with predictable main supply routes. One can immediately see the “surface” that has caused such devastating casualties, yet we have done little to find the “gap.” The numbers themselves highlight the effectiveness of the enemy’s principal weapon against coalition forces.2 While we train our Marines in the classroom to find gaps to maneuver on the enemy, the continuing course of action in Iraq has been to bolt more armor onto our vehicles and develop more sophisticated electronic countermeasures. These actions contribute to a cycle in which we develop new ways to protect ourselves from IEDs while the enemy evolves more sophisticated IEDs, as witnessed by die implementation of the pressure or motion switches that are being seen today.

We have in fact been practicing the opposite of maneuver warfare. We have found the enemy’s surface and have pushed even harder into it. We allow our enemy to completely control the tempo of the fight by controlling the who, when, and where of contact. During 4 months in Ramadi our battalion didn’t catch one confirmed triggerman in the aftermath of an IED attack. With all of the capabilities that the Marine Corps has, we are long overdue to reorient and act.

The use of IEDs has created a central problem that is compounded when given the nature of this war; it grants the enemy anonymity. Coalition forces can’t orient on an insurgent force that can’t be identified. Given the amount of emphasis our doctrine places on orienting on the enemy, it should be obvious that drastic action is required if we are to succeed in defeating this very stealthy foe.

We should try to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy function so that we can penetrate the system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. We should seek to identify and attack critical vulnerabilities and those centers of gravity without which the enemy cannot function effectively.3

The insurgent’s center of gravity is his capacity to camouflage himself within the general population and therefore dictate the tempo of battle. He decides when to attack while quickly withdrawing before coalition forces can acquire positive identification. The enemy is only allowed such privileges because he hides within a population that either actively or passively supports him. There are three courses of action that will allow coalition forces to orient on the enemy. The first is to place a far greater emphasis on information operations (IO). The second is to augment the intelligence community with additional capabilities. Finally, the third is to nullify the IED and draw the enemy into small arms engagements where it is easier to acquire positive identification.

Far too often operations have been run in Ramadi without a detailed or well-planned IO component. It was often a cursory check in the box that equated to the Marines handing out leaflets with a generic statement appealing to the people’s national pride. The Marine Corps takes great pride in its ability to give subordinates the commander’s intent allowing for decentralized execution. We tell the Marine the “why,” but we rarely afford the same courtesies to the Iraqis caught in the middle of this war. It is not out of benevolence that we need to inform them of why we are running operations; it is in order to begin driving a wedge between insurgent groups and the populace. We can attack the decentralized enemy itself with a powerful IO campaign. Within Ramadi we identified rifts between various factions that made up anticoalition forces. Now is the time to exploit them. Currently, IO is extremely centralized, and company commanders are not given the authority to produce their own IO effort. This situation is utterly contrary to the way the Marine Corps does business. We must give the commander guidance and allow him to use his specific knowledge of the area of operations in order to effectively shape the battlefield through IO developed at the company level.

While the insurgency can be likened to organized crime, the Marine Corps is certainly not the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We have completely different missions, yet we agree that intelligence drives operations. When fighting an insurgency, intelligence often is the operation. Thorough intelligence sheds light on a darkened enemy and allows units to develop target packages that subsequently lead to raids. Logically, therefore, the better the intelligence is the more precise the raids will be. Human intelligence in fourth-generation warfare is the most productive due to the enemy’s lack of technological dependence, unlike so many of our former and possibly future adversaries. Human exploitation teams (HETs) are extremely valuable, but they must be augmented. The Marine Corps currently lacks the personnel to gather the amount of intelligence needed. We attempt to address the problem through phrases and concepts, such as “every Marine a collector.” While this statement is true and has proven useful, the inability to allow commanders to field interrogate within a very specific set of guidelines is prohibiting them from developing informants, which in turn is hampering our intelligence efforts. Again, we are not Central Intelligence Agency case officers and do not need to run sources. But, with strict guidelines, allowing commanders to handle low-level informants would immediately bolster the intelligence community. A clear line needs to be drawn distinguishing an informant from a source, which would clarify which people would necessitate HETs. The potential for turf wars to begin within the Marine Corps exists, but defeating the enemy is a common goal. Human intelligence is vital for successful operations in Iraq. With the HETs current manning level, platoon commanders and above should be authorized to field interrogate and handle low-level informants.

The Marine Corps derives its historical combat supremacy from our ability to strike from the land, air, or sea. Every second lieutenant can remember the lectures at The Basic School and learning about the Corps’ history. In Iraq today we must utilize all of the assets that the Marine Corps has to offer’ in order to create an unpredictable atmosphere in which enemy forces can no longer dictate the pace of contact. If insurgent forces are laying IEDs along our main supply routes, then why not fly over them? If Iraq is the land of two rivers, why don’t we use them to float around the IEDs? The argument of a high risk to benefit ratio is already moot. It goes without saying that helicopter or boat operations require more planning than normal vehicle operations, but the benefit of these operations far outweighs the burden of the planning. It is already clear that the majority of insurgents spend far more time planning their extract than their ambush. At this stage, we have made ourselves predictable and have continually invited ambushes. By using helicopters and small riverine craft, we invalidate the enemy’s principal weapon. Vehicles are extremely useful and powerful assets that should continue to be utilized in Iraq. The ability to provide a powerful communications platform, their substantial firepower, and their protection against small arms makes them an invaluable combat power multiplier. Yet, to rely on them as we do in Ramadi, and I suspect across Iraq, is much like giving the star football player the ball on every down. Very quickly the opponent will adapt and begin to double- or tripleteam his efforts. When using vehicles, we must do so deliberately.

Imagine inserting a raid force with small boats while having a few support gun trucks moving parallel along a cleared supply route that has been under observation for 24 hours. IEDs would prove useless against the primary raid force, and therefore, the enemy would be forced to use small arms to inflict damage. Now the enemy is forced into a dilemma. Does he choose to attack with small arms knowing that vehicles could vector in on his position within moments? By examining this scenario we see that it is indeed risky but far less threatening than continually driving on unpaved roads where we can be certain to continue being hit by IEDs. Taking the scenario further, let us assume the enemy engages our force. The mobile units could cordon the house or block and fire upon the enemy. Dismounts can move in and begin interrogating those present as well as the surrounding neighbors. The IO component is utilized with the neighbors by informing them that they have been disrupted because anticoalition forces have been operating in their neighborhood. Another mobile section could launch, allowing the commander to continue with the raid. A combined arms effect has been created that sets up a favorable atmosphere in which to gather intelligence, conduct successful operations, and force the enemy to divulge his location.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, is our doctrine. It is the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy. Its principles must be fully utilized if the Marine Corps is going to be successful in Iraq. Maneuver warfare is an ongoing process, and we must continue to assess the enemy’s center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. But the act is meaningless if we do not reorient and execute on our new conclusions. We must train and use our sea and air capabilities to create an unpredictable environment to decrease the effectiveness of the IED. Furthermore, decentralize execution and allow the commanders to create their own IO and field interrogate low-level informants. To maintain our status as the elite of the world’s military forces we must continue our scholastic analysis of the theoretical principles of warfighting but also begin to apply them practically.

Notes

1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, United States Government, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 73.

2. To date there have been 2,444 U.S. deaths as a result of hostile fire. IEDs are responsible for 1,105 of those killed in action, accounting for 45.2 percent of all hostile fire fatalities. Information is available at http://www.icasualties. org/oif, accessed on 19 January 2007.

3. MCDP 1, p. 76.

Millennials Merging

by LtCol Wayne A. Sinclair

‘The human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to war.’

-Frederick the Great

If war is truly a young man’s occupation, then the tactical struggle to bring order and stability to Afghanistan and Iraq certainly depends on an admired but little understood generation of Americans. In a war that transforms totalitarian societies and rebuilds failed states, great discernment, adaptability, and virtue are especially essential in its junior participants. Understandably, when older Americans consider the complexities of counterinsurgency operations and the delicate nature of cross-cultural communications in the global war on terrorism, many privately wonder how such a seemingly naïve and insulated population is faring so well. Research on the character of America’s youngest generation offers some reassuring answers. America’s youth may actually be better prepared to prevail in the irregular conflicts of the early 21st century than any previous generation. The challenge for the two previous, and decidedly different, generations still in uniform lies in recognizing and realizing this tremendous potential. This recognition and realization takes more than sound leadership; it requires an appreciation of generational differences and the skill to turn this perspective into inspiration. America’s generation gap is further widened by a military culture that commends pragmatism and independent decisionmaking while promoting the doctrinal precepts of maneuver warfare-all conceptually inconsistent with the strengths, vulnerabilities, and leadership needs of a generation rapidly making its presence felt.

In spite of America’s fondness for quick, technology-driven results in warfare, blood and sweat-rather than machines and microchips-are proving the greater value. Yet as technology gives mankind ever greater powers, it gives men ever less significance. New operational concepts and promising material solutions attract far more high-level attention than studies on how people change or generations interact. Given the asymmetric character of the long war against terrorism, the American public’s deep-rooted faith in its uniformed citizenry is vital and must never be taken for granted. Although segments of the U.S. military have explored generational shifts for recruiting and marketing needs, the ability to connect with a new generation of young Americans may be completely overlooked.1

Generations

They are known as “Millennials“-the first generation to reach adulthood in the new millennium. This American cohort-born between 1981 and 2002-has other names and like-aged counterparts around the world: the Net Generation, Generation Y, the Google Generation, and Echo-Boomers. Since the dawn of civilization, people have identified generational cycles as a force of history and the master regulators for social change.2 A generation is composed of a society-wide peer group shaped by older generations, historical events, and shared experiences. It is considered as the average period between the birth of parents and the birth of their offspring-about 21 years. Within a common culture, pivotal historical events (e.g., the Pearl Harbor attack, the Cuban missile crisis, the Challenger explosion, the 11 September 2001 attacks, etc.) affect and shape different age groups’ outward and inward perceptions differently and inspire collective behaviors toward common goals.

Generational identities are also formed by the preceding generations based on what phase of life they are in, their own unique characteristics, and their intergenerational relationships. Since the exact birth dates of American generations are subjective and there is no formal naming convention per se, it is best to think of these timespans as eras. That said, the common names and approximate birth years of the six living generations of Americans are listed below:

* The GI (Government Issue) or Veterans Generation (1901-24).

* The Silent Generation or Traditionalists (1925-42).

* The Baby Boomers (1943-60).

* Generation X or the 13th Generation (1961-81).

* The Millennials (1982-2001).

* The Homeland Generation (2002-?).

Since generations are made up of people, they have many of the same characteristics. Collectively, generations have prevailing moods, temperaments, personalities and, most importantly, a distinct sense of direction and purpose. For Millennials, a brief look at their origins and traits reveals some potential strengths and weaknesses in modern war. First, however, the stage must be set by an overview of maneuver warfare doctrine and why it appeals to every serving generation except the Millennials.

Maneuver Warfare and the Human Dimension

Maneuver warfare has served as the philosophical basis for the Marine Corps’ approach to warfighting for nearly 20 years and is the cornerstone of the Marine Corps’ future concept, expeditionary maneuver warfare.3 As crafted in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting (the watershed booklet first published in 1989), maneuver warfare begins with a thought process that stresses how, not what, to think. Accordingly, it is intended to exist not so much in prescriptive formulas or methodologies but in the minds of all Marines, where it guides their actions across the spectrum of conflict at all levels of war.4

Beginning in the mid-1970s, post-Vietnam hand wringing over the condition of the U.S. Armed Forces fueled intense debate about the American way of war. Military reformers in and out of uniform placed much of the blame on America’s “fire-power and attrition” style of warfare. Faced with the monolithic Soviet threat, and inspired by the stunning Israeli victories fighting out-numbered against Egypt and Syria in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, they sought less direct approaches to battle that promised quicker victories at lower costs using psychology as a principal defeat mechanism.5 Both linear and methodical battle reflected the prevailing military culture of order. In contrast, the principal goal of maneuver warfare is speed-at the expense of order and control if necessary-in order to make faster decisions, gain positional advantage, and leverage chaos* on the battlefield.6 In execution, this becomes what is known as tempo.

A great deal of this all-important tempo is generated by decentralized decisionmaking. Through “mission-type” orders and adept handling of “surfaces and gaps,” maneuver warfare draws its power mainly from opportunism-the calculated risk-and the exploitation of both chance and circumstances.7 Flexibility, creativity, and initiative are not just desirable in junior leaders; they are indispensable. Today, all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces embrace the precepts of maneuver warfare, and it remains the doctrinal cornerstone of the Marine Corps’ professional military education system.

* Indicative of the maneuverist mindset, “Chaos” was the radio call sign of MajGen James N. Mattis, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I.

Enter the Millennials

As a whole, the general direction of Millennials is surprising many members of the typically cynical Generation X and materialistic Baby Boomers. Millennials appear to be a more civic minded, morally grounded, and selfless generation than any in the past 40 years-maybe even longer.8 They are reversing a vast array of negative youth trends from criminal activity to drug use, from teen pregnancies and abortion to test scores and future goals.

What accounts for this change? Research suggests that a primary factor in the development of generational cycles is the oscillation between the overprotection and underprotection of children.9 While dual-career or single parents raised the “latchkey” kids of Generation X, Millennials began arriving when childbearing and rearing became a national priority once again. Childfriendly minivans with “baby on board” signs became the fashion, abortion and divorce rates ebbed, the socioeconomic tide rose, birth rates soared (at about 76 million, they are twice the size of Generation X), child abuse prevention and safety were hot topics, and several books that taught virtues and values to children became bestsellers.10 For many parents, educators, and lawyers, the goal became not to prepare children for life’s risks, but to remove as many risks as possible. By design and with the best intentions, Millennials became the most protected generation in history.11

Public education was a major influence on Millennial development and serves as the dividing line between Generation X and the Millennials.12 The reason was national school reform. After almost two decades of decline in their children’s elementary and high schools, Americans had had enough. Parent and teacher frustration with poor student performance, a lack of classroom order, and substandard public education resources led to massive school reforms during the second half of the 1980s. Changes were everywhere as parents became passionate about their kids’ education. Higher academic standards, “zero tolerance” policies, school uniforms, and formalized teacher accountability were widely instituted. By the mid-1990s, U.S. public education had moved from an “age of lament” to an “age of accountability. “13

With Millennial parents so highly invested in their children’s goals and outcomes, any sign of mediocrity in their children is met with professional “coaching” (not counseling-even the best have coaches) or expert advice. In contrast to Generation Xers, parental relationships and opinion are considered crucial to young people’s well-being and decisionmaking calculus. Accustomed to center stage, they are more than willing to work hard to meet the high expectations of the audience. For many, life revolves around organized activities. As the most over-scheduled generation in history, Millennials thrive in a multitask environment.14 To help cope with demanding schedules, technology is an enabler on a scale never before imagined. They expect light speed and interactive communications tools and are comfortable conveying and receiving information in sound bytes and cryptic keystrokes. When one considers that Millennials have never known life without cell phones, instant messaging, and fingertip access to ideas and information from around the world through the Internet, their conceptions of time, communications, and space are easier to understand.

Millennials and Maneuver Warfare

As Millennials mature, distinct traits, core values, and groupthink characteristics solidify and can be linked to positive military virtues. There is a flip side however; these much-admired assets imply expectations and propensities that can have troubling implications for many tenets of maneuver warfare. They are contrasted in Figure 1.

So are Millennials inherently better suited for methodical battle than maneuver warfare? With Generation Xers most known for self-reliance, pragmatism, and go-for-broke risk taking-tailormade characteristics for the maneuverist mindset-one may conclude that the basic concepts of maneuver warfare have a distinct generational bias. Furthermore, Millennials inherent qualities appear to have special contemporary value. Generation X decisionmakers who “just want the facts”-preferably the “bottom line up front”-to find the right “decisive” action or high-value target to accomplish the mission or destroy an enemy’s will to resist would do well to take advantage of the more introspective nature of their young warriors. Their generational propensity to impose order, seek the greater good, take the role of protector vice conqueror, build structure, and seek clarity of direction or consensus in their actions are not necessarily liabilities in the irregular three block wars and nation-building predicaments in which Marines will find themselves for decades to come. Still, one must understand their capacity for creativity and self-regulation. In contrast to their more independently minded Generation X predecessors, the Millennial small unit leaders need and expect tailored solutions (e.g., tactics, techniques, and procedures), structure, oversight, teamwork, methodology, and a cause that gives them the opportunity to make a difference for something greater than themselves. Given these ingredients, they will show a willingness to fight and, if necessary, a readiness to die that will shatter even the most negative stereotypes assigned to young Americans.

Bridging the Gap: Leading and Mentoring Millennials

Millennials look to their leaders to create an environment that respects individuals yet promotes collaborative problem solving. Hence, organizational climate is as important as organizational culture. Whereas military culture represents the sum of ingrained values and pursuits, a command’s climate develops the members’ attitudes and perceptions with respect to human interaction in several key areas: leader engagement, group cohesion, trust and respect for individuals, ethical behavior, and fair recognition for good performance.15 Millennials are not enamored by position or title. They count on experienced hands-on leaders who earn their respect by recognizing their potential and teaching them by showing them how to increase their performance. They yearn for open communications and the mentor imposed “reality check” through unembellished but entertaining “war stories” of real life challenges that focus not on a leader’s skill or stamina but on what was accomplished and learned.

In doing so, leaders must recognize that for many Millennials, sheltered affluence, communications technology, and a lifelong conditioning to virtual reality have dulled their responsiveness to the “sit and listen” lecture style of teaching. Not surprisingly, Millennials prize practical experience and the chance to “take the wheel” and learn by trial and error. Since Millennials are accustomed to structure, direction, explanations, protection, and engagement, the importance of mentoring cannot be overstressed. To this end, mentoring in a coach/partner role should seek to:

* Explain why and how things must be done-at least initially.

* Establish boundaries of conduct and behavior explicitly.

* Clarify the value of their roles in any venture. (Perceived “busy work” is despised.)

* Enforce accountability to standards through peer mentoring.

* Show how opportunism and risk taking can be balanced.

* Teach self-assessment techniques (answers truthfully, “How am I doing?”).

* Teach project and time management to include sequencing of implicit tasks.

* Provide frequent and accurate feedback in a small, interactive group.

This style serves to offset their “blindspots” and develops their decisionmaking skills before entering the chaotic environment of combat.

Finally, Millennials are exceptionally attuned to sincerity in their leaders. Leaders perceived to promote an image to intimidate, gain acceptance, or to compromise their moral authority will be suspected of fraud regardless of their levels of competence.16 Millennials may forgive many shortcomings in their leaders, but hypocrisy is the unpardonable sin.

Conclusion

As in the past, careful investments in the Marine Corps’ human capital will continue to pay the highest dividends in war. While human nature remains much the same, human behavior changes with values. In order to leverage the many qualities of the Millennial Generation, military leaders must successfully merge the best of the past with the requirements of the future.17 With three generations of Americans in uniform today, the United States is engaged in a war-predicted to last a generation-that will continue to place extraordinary demands on the character and capabilities of its servicemen and women. In a few years, virtually every company grade officer and noncommissioned officer will be a mature Millennial who entered service after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. These will be America’s “strategic” corporals and captains. They will fight and win the long and arduous campaigns of this war. The mandate for leaders at all levels is clear. For the Nation to be assured that its rising generation will be the country’s greatest source of military strength in its hour of need, they need only leaders prepared to show them the way.

Notes

1. The Marine Corps Recruiting Command began to focus on understanding Millennials for marketing purposes in 1999. Other U.S. recruiting services have since followed suit. Apart from recruiting and a presentation given to newly selected Marine Corps general officers, I can find no evidence that the newest American generation has been officially recognized by the military. Regarding how they should be trained or led (compared to past generations), numerous requests to military training organizations went unanswered, or in two cases, they replied that they were not informed on the matter. Requests for official positions or informal opinions on this topic were sent electronically to members of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command, the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, the Citadel, and the Virginia Military Institute.

2. Strauss, William and Neil Howe, The Fourth Turning, Broadway Books, New York, 1997, p. 58.

3. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare: Capstone Marine Corps Concept Handbook, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, November 2001, p. 5.

4. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, June 1997, p. 96.

5. Bolger, Daniel, “Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered,” in Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1993, pp. 1, 21.

6. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 6 March 1989, p. 1.

7. Antal, John F., “Thoughts About Maneuver Warfare,” in Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, p. 64.

8. Strauss, William and Neil Howe, Millennials Rising, Vintage Books, New York, 2000, p. 19.

9. Strauss and Howe, The Fourth Turning, p. 82.

10. William Bennett’s Children’s Book of Virtues published in 1995 is one such example.

11. Howard, Philip, The Lost Art of Drawing the Line, Random House, New York, 2001, p. 65.

12. Strauss and Howe, Millennials Rising, p. 145.

13. Toch, Thomas, “Outstanding High Schools,” U.S. News and World Report, 18 January 1999, p. 48.

14. Phalen, Kathleen, “Teaching in a Millennial World,” Virginia Education, Fall 2002, available at <http://www.itc.virginia. edu>, accessed 20 November 2003.

15. Fortune, Dan, “Commanding the Net Generation,” Australian Army Journal, December 2003, p. 105.

16. “Culture and Generational Change,” Chatanooga Resource Foundation, available at <http://www.resourcefoundation.org>, accessed 5 January 2004.

17. Fortune, p. 108.

MCDP 1, Warfighting, Revisited

by Maj Adam T. Strickland

As anyone serving with or under the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) umbrella can confirm, concept development consumes a considerable portion of our limited resources, as countless personnel are tasked with ensuring that our force remains ready and able to face any global challenge-present or future. To this end, commands, such as U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCom) and MCCDC, employ hundreds of contractors (most of whom are retired military)-in addition to active military personnel-to develop concepts addressing issues such as seabasing, effects-based planning, and distributed operations. While this type of forward thinking is necessary to ensure that we remain the finest fighting force, it tends to unnecessarily take us further away from our foundation in small wars and warfighting-maneuver warfare that is the bedrock of our current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and needlessly hemorrhage limited resources trying to reinvent ourselves. As the saying goes, “dance with the girl you brought,” and for the Marine Corps, this means maneuver warfare.

Reinventing the Wheel

While the U.S. Army has just produced a 150-page manual on countcriiisurgcncy and the brightest at USJFCom worked on a stability operations operating concept-both of which consumed thousands of man-hours and countless thousands of dollars-and were only able to produce such insightful recommendations as develop local intelligence, emphasize information operations, and concentrate on elimination of the insurgents and not terrain objectives, as Marines, all we need to know is found in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting. The answer to “what ails us” is not always as elusive as it may seem; however, it may simply be obscured by those unwilling to admit that technology, expensive toys, and new joint concepts cannot eliminate the nature of warfare and the validity of maneuver warfare in any environment, to include a nontrinitarian or fourth-generation warfare scenario.

From cover to cover MCDP 1 outlines operational considerations for conducting small wars, counterinsurgency operations, and information operations. When reviewed with the 1940 Small Wars Manual or 2003 Addendum, one finds critical information necessary for effective operations in environments such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti, the Philippines, Chad, and Niger and, thus, can accurately conclude that many of the current/ongoing projects on asymmetric warfare concepts simply try to reinvent the wheel and waste limited resources. We need “how-to guides,” not more of the avalanche of concepts, equations, or theories in line with confrontation analysis or complexity theory. If one is familiar with the Small Wars Manual, MCDP 1, and military operations other than war principles, then one is equipped with the “know how” to conduct operations in Iraq and not in desperate need of further theory. This is not to say that continued professional military education (PME) is not valuable; it is essential. In fact, those who have a fundamental understanding of Mao Tse Tung, the civil operations revolutionary development support (CORDS) program in Southeast Asia, Operation PHOENIX, and the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s tend to have a different understanding and perception of the merits and shortfalls of current U.S. operations. When discussing scenarios such as the asymmetric threat that presents itself in Iraq and Afghanistan, MCDP 1 states:

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is the warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial. Especially important is maneuver in time-we generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage.

A “rapid, flexible, and opportunistic” (three block war) response is certainly consistent with Marine Corps policies in Iraq, as well as our attempts to exploit the insurgents’ inability to sustain a high operational tempo. Through superior technology and overwhelming advantage in resources available, Marines were quickly able to exploit gaps by conducting precision strikes in conjunction with psychological maneuvers pursued through speed, violence, humanitarian assistance (drinking water/subsistence items), and civil affairs, satisfying basic human needs, such as generating a feeling amongst the Iraqis of being safe in person and property, thus denying insurgents much needed popular support; supporting information operations (IO) goals; and satisfying a critical counterinsurgency principle of keeping as many indigenous personnel as neutrals or procoalition as possible. Unfortunately, this rapid response can and did lead to a “revolution of rising expectations” amongst the Iraqis, but that is the product of success and high expectations.

Our ability as Marines to see maneuver warfare in nonspatial terms is exactly what makes us different from others and in step with organizations such as the British Royal Marines. While other forces do many things exceptionally well, counterinsurgency and small wars in general are not amongst these, with the notable exception of certain British and French units. Many have unfortunately learned the hard way that vehicle assets provide mobility and spatial maneuver but don’t always equal maneuver warfare. While motorized and mechanized assets provide increased mobility and firepower, their widespread utilization adversely impacts IO by sending the wrong message, influencing the population in a manner that is unwanted, and keeping troops who are desperately needed to interact with locals cocooned in vehicles. These vehicles have become the target of increased attacks and are further signs of an occupation-not a sign of cooperation when used for routine policing and patrolling-a lesson learned previously by the British in Northern Ireland and the Israelis in the West Bank. In Iraq, this rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver allows Marines to influence and inform (IO basics) indigenous personnel, whether friendly, neutral, or hostile, and thus shape the battlespace in a manner consistent with our commander’s intent. This type of maneuver by small units, led by capable company grade officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers, allows Marines to develop intelligence, develop census information necessary for properly understanding our battlespace, and influence the populace in a manner consistent with themes such as “no better friend, no worse enemy.” In fact, MCDP 1 dedicates entire sections to shaping operations (IO) and the combined arms effects (IO). Thus, while IO has become the new “cure-all,” it is certainly not a new process or idea.

Again, MCDP 1 warns us that we must influence and address human needs when combating asymmetric threats in order to successfully prosecute the campaign. Was capturing Fallujah tactically significant because of the terrain, or was it because of the message it sent other or potential insurgents throughout the area of operations (AO)? Destroying the insurgency in Fallujah is significant for many reasons, not the least of which is the impact it had on the “moral and mental” forces in Iraq. Other than through conventional operations, one does this through influencing the population through civil-military operations by achieving a unity of effort with other agencies, to include private volunteer organizations. Immediately after the regime change in Iraq, 150 nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations were operating within the country, thus the coalition had a wealth of resources to assist in achieving this end. Utilizing nonmilitary or nonstandard organizations requires our warfighters to remain flexible.

As Marines, MCDP 1 tells us that mental flexibility is essential. “We should not assume that every enemy thinks as we do, or has the same values or objectives.” While some may disagree, this tends to be the one warning that most non-Marines and nonservicemembers ignore. MCDP 1 warns us that words that are clearly defined to us may not be accurately defined when utilized in other cultures, to include Middle Eastern environs. What may be considered lawful or legitimate to us may not be so to Sunni Albu Issa tribesmen operating in Ramadi and Fallujah. What we may perceive as a show of restraint may be perceived as a sign of weakness among indigenous peoples in Najaf. What some consider unacceptable collateral damage in the battles in Fallujah may be perceived by indigenous persons as the acceptable and natural reaction to an overt hostile act by insurgents. Our warfighters must be pseudopsychiatrists and understand the mindset of those affected.

As Col Christopher C. Conlin (former Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)) writes in his article, “What Do You Do for an Encore?” (MCG, Sep04), “Marines must be prepared to influence the battlespace by serving as civil administrators, public affairs spokespersons, police forces, and humanitarian assistance workers.” Since every Marine is a rifleman and expected to understand basic infantry fundamentals and the need for human interaction in postconflict environs, the Marine Corps is more capable of transforming personnel that normally serve as artillery or tank personnel into infantrymen, where others continue to find difficulty finding tactical success with noninfantry troops.

MCDP 1 tells us that “war is an extreme test of will,” and Marines know, based on their PME and familiarity with the Southeast Asian conflict, that conflicts are more than conventional fights. We understand that you can win the battle and still lose the war. Marines understand Vo Nguyen Giap’s assertion that “you will kill ten of mine for every one I kill of yours, but in the end, it will be you who tire of it.” Because of this we understand that the most committed in a conflict wins. We train to operate at a marathon runner’s pace through our warfighting fundamentals, not a sprinter’s pace, and thus are able to gain a psychological and temporal maneuver advantage.

Because of these things, the Marine Corps, like the British in Northern Ireland, have been able to sustain casualties, yet separate the part from the whole and not punish all Iraqis for the acts of the insurgents. This is why we are able to walk down the same stretch of road day after to clear improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and show the insurgents that we are patient, will outlast them, and impose our will-that will being a secure environment.

While technological resources and joint operating concepts/doctrine should be explored, it should be done in a manner that seeks to augment our current warflghting capabilities and not by reinventing the wheel. While casualties in OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have turned many into risk-averse champions of technology and a new way of thinking, in the end, the nature of warfare has not changed and so maneuver warfare remains the correct course of action. New technologies and publications have not been able to magically locate IEDs in Iraq, detect potential car bombs at Iraqi police stations, or help the Israelis locate suicide bombers; however, maneuver warfare can do all three.

A Sample of ‘How To’

In an attempt to demonstrate what we need more of, I provide the following how-to list for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense. These are but some of the many ways to operate that satisfy both the blue and green forces’ need for security and further counterinsurgent activities.

Establish appropriate expectations. This is the essential first step to any successful counterinsurgency. Failing to establish appropriate or measurable expectations can create a situation in which no matter how well one’s forces are doing, they appear to be failing due to unrealistic expectations. Should one have expected people who had been beaten, tortured, and intimidated for 34 years suddenly to be infused with a spirit of invention, initiative, and cooperation? If one has no realistic expectation that citizens of the United States living in “rougher” inner-city neighborhoods will cooperate with law enforcement officials by providing human intelligence, should we expect foreign nationals with no civil law enforcement protection to do so? When utilizing nonactive duty components of our Services, one must establish appropriate expectations for them. Should we expect the same outputs and utility from National Guard and Reserve units that train 24 to 36 days a year as we do from our active duty units? If these are appropriate expectations, why have a large active duty force?

Remember the basics. Too often our leaders do feel as though they have not been properly trained to succeed in an insurgency. What all need to recognize is that insurgencies are less about some “skill set” that can be taught and more about leadership and influence. Counterinsurgencies require that leaders utilize their leadership more than in any other type of conflict. Counterinsurgencies demand professional leaders capable of outmaneuvering opponents in other than spatial terms. You must be able to outthink your opponent.

PME. As noted above, PME is essential and, for the most part, an integral part of training. Where we continue to fail is in the manner in which we absorb or modify our behavior based on lessons observed. Lessons observed or insights never become lessons learned until we achieve a change in behavior. In the counterinsurgency environs in which we operate today in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is much discussion about the need of interagency coordinating groups and civil affairs, and how these should affect our military operations. While we continue this debate, we neglect the example of past lessons and examples, such as CORDS in Southeast Asia. While most officers have digested works on Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and MG Thomas J. Jackson, few have read Mao or Ho Chi Minh, and thus are not in a position to recognize the phases of the insurgency they face. They continue to pursue operations in an attempt to force a decisive action, yet they fail to understand that in an insurgency, insurgents dictate decisive points and engagements. Ho and Mao would argue that insurgents only become engaged in decisive acts if it is on their terms. In addition, students of counterinsurgency utilize works by General Sir Frank Kitson, Roger Trinquier, and Sir Robert Thompson, which are all 20 to 40 years old, and further acknowledge that the British and French are much better at these operations than the United States. These students understand that patience is the key. They are fully aware that the Vietnamese and Chinese fought insurgencies that lasted over 30 years and thus do not have unrealistic expectations. Those who best understand counterinsurgency are those who also best understand certain social phenomena, and understand how best to influence behavior.

Determine security needs. This determination should be made by the unit leader on the ground, and no one elsewhich might put it at odds with higher headquarters. The unit leader will determine both physical and psychological security needs for both host nationals and blue forces. We must answer the questions, do the people feel safe, and if not, what will make them feel safe? From this sense or perception of security all else grows. Determine how to influence peoples’ sense of security. Metal detectors are a very good way when the threat is hidden weapons and bombs. Whether they work or not is not as important as making people think that you are out looking with an advanced technology. The key is to try to be in as many different places as possible from day to day and week to week, thus giving people the impression that you could always be right around the corner. Always maneuver in a dispersed fashion, which gives people the impression you are much larger than you truly are. Always remember that their security needs are no different than U.S. citizens living in the continental United States. Why won’t those afflicted by threats of physical violence and intimidation in our urban settings come forward to tell police who has threatened them? The answer is that they don’t feel safe. This perception or sense of security is the same in Detroit as it is in Najaf.

To what will the people respond”? As a sign of good faith, unit leaders must decide what need is not being met that if met would greatly improve the level of cooperation between blue and green forces. In underdeveloped nations these needs could be abundant; however, subsistence needs usually are the first to be satisfied. By providing the basics, such as water, or basic cooking implements, such as flour or rice, one’s security situation is greatly enhanced. The old saying is “don’t bite the hand that feeds you.” Violence associated with humanitarian assistance is also a good indicator of the level of resistance or character of the resistance in an area. When providing subsistence items, such as water bottles, have labels printed with a procoalition message or information that will be useful to the host nationals, such as how much money is being offered for information or weapons turned over. Families tend to respond to things like family pictures or clothes/shoes. Children obviously respond to items like soccer balls. People do not respond to armored HMMWVs in a manner consistent with their needs, but do respond to foot-mobile infantry. Remember that security and occupation are not congruent. In addition, remember the old saying, “ring the doorbell with your elbow,” meaning always have something in your hands to give to the locals.

Establish metrics or measures of effectiveness. How do you know that you are winning or that the people are responding to you? These metrics need to be based on the individual unit and not absorbed from some higher headquarters list. Fewer casualties or enemy engagements are not sound metrics.

Establish a lawful/legitimate security presence. It is imperative that all actions taken are done so in a lawful manner and as honest brokers. Clearly demonstrate that the ladder of law has no top or bottom and that all are to be treated equally and with the same respect that we would treat U.S. citizens. Establish rules-that all host nationals know they will have to abide by-through whatever civil administration may be present. Avoid empowering individuals, such as tribal elders or sheiks, while remaining culturally sensitive. However, as noted earlier, what is legitimate may not be lawful, and what is lawful may not be legitimate. While Operation PHOENIX and the utilization of paramilitaries in El Salvador remain very controversial and misunderstood, both proved to be highly effective. While both were/were not entirely lawful when viewed through a Western liberal democracy prism, they were legitimate acts that achieved the desired effects. For young men who have witnessed 34 years of violence, violence is seen as a legitimate way to achieve goals. This phenomenon is no different in many U.S. urban settings.

Create local “yellow/white pages ” or a census. A unit leader cannot effectively provide security if he does not understand who he is securing. Set up nonevasive operations, such as vehicle checkpoints, where the main object is not searching vehicles but rather collecting information. To keep a steady flow of traffic, limit interaction to two questions-what’s your name, and what do you do for a living? On another occasion ask, where do you live, and who is your sheik or leader? On a third occasion ask, where do you attend religious services (mosque), and who is your Imam? One can quickly establish a sound picture of the AO. During these stops provide water and take pictures. If possible, have a generator with a printer hooked up to provide prints from past family photos to “regulars” whom you see daily. On advanced searches, have interpreters speak with host nationals simply to “listen for inappropriate accents” denoting either foreign fighters or folks not from that area.

Always remember the hierarchy of needs: security, subsistence, infrastructure, and interpersonal wants/needs. Be mindful that all flows from security; therefore, one cannot try to meet the other needs first because they are easier. In addition, providing infrastructure needs to people who cannot feed themselves is insensitive and adds fuel to the fire that, as Westerners, we think money and material possessions are the answer to everything. School supplies are great influencers, but you cannot eat them. These items quickly find themselves sold or traded for subsistence needs. Guard against a revolution of rising expectations by not promising what you cannot accomplish. Always promise less and deliver more.

When engaged by enemy personnel, remain sensitive to the locals and do not treat all as hostiles. It is essential that you remain respectful of persons and property at all times. Make appropriate compensation payments for damaged property or harm done to local nationals. If engaged, it is essential that one maintain the ground. Never pull back once engaged, only move forward. A unit leader must demonstrate that his will is the strongest.

Money does not solve every problem. We must understand that money is not a cure-all, and in fact, it tends to create more problems. Host nationals working aboard U.S. installations and witnessing numerous sport utility vehicles, air-conditioning, chow halls, and trailers with porcelain toilets are sure to wonder why they have no electricity, water, or health care. U.S. efforts to continue to provide school supplies are well-received; however, people require basic necessities like food. Remain sensitive to the fact that everything shapes the battlespace and insurgency.

MCDP 1 gives us all of the guidance we need and, therefore, makes many of the ongoing projects at places such as USJFCom or MCCDC unnecessary, or at a minimum in need of a serious rudder change. It is imperative that we do not try to reinvent ourselves in a manner that takes us further away from that which we do better than all others-warfighting. Our positions in Iraq and Afghanistan are difficult; however, we are prevailing. Hopefully, our commanders will not decide that the positions cannot be held.