Mobilizing the Marine Corps

Why the Service is incapable of repeating June 1950

When the Korea People’s Army stormed across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, the Republic of Korea Army and the U.S. Far East Command were caught off guard. The Marine Corps’ rapid response in July 1950 and the 15 September 1950 landing at Inchon are the pinnacle of Marine Corps history and lore. However, the tactical and operational victories in late 1950 were the ends of the lesser-known but critically important ways and means of Service-wide mobilization. Today, the Service is consumed by a focus on tactical-level technologies, experimentation, and endless pursuit of operations, activities, and investments while being hamstrung by years-long acquisitions, delays in production, and structure design based on how many things purchased and not the enemy. If the Marine Corps does not plan for total mobilization, the next large-scale, unexpected enemy attack will result in the Corps weathering the initial storm, then looking over its shoulder and finding nothing there to carry on the fight.

Tactical technologies and tactical-level victories are for naught if not woven into operational objectives to achieve strategic ends. The fundamental concept of massing combat power more quickly than the enemy and applying that combat power at a time and place of your choosing is how conflicts are won. When the size of the force in the conflict is insufficient, the force that can rapidly flow and sustain the most combat power seizes the advantage. Throughout the history of warfare, this is done via mobilization, defined today as “the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.”1 Often mistaken as the simple act of placing a reserve component (RC) Marine into an active-duty status, mobilization is in fact a whole-of-Service task tied to strategic and operational concepts and codified in the requirements of Title 10, U.S.C. §10208: Annual Mobilization Exercise.2 Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has lulled itself into the mistaken belief it is capable of mobilization because it has achieved battlefield successes over the last 85 years of modern conflict.

Marines with Golf Company, 2/24 Mar, 4th MarDiv, Marine Corps Forces Reserve, undergo a safety brief before a live-fire range event at Fort McCoy, WI, 21. (Photo by Cpl Maxwell Cook.)

The reality of the last 85 years is that the United States has delayed entry into every major conflict except one, the Korean War. World War II began in September 1939, with the United States not officially entering until December 1941. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam began in 1950 with advisors, the number expanding in 1962, with major combat actions not occurring until 1965. DESERT STORMsucceeded thanks to DESERT SHIELD, a five-month buildup of combat power that the enemy was kind enough to sit and observe. Finally, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), authorized on 16 October 2002 via Congressional Joint Resolution, did not see combat operations commence until 20 March 2003.3 Each of these conflicts provided the Marine Corps with the benefit of time. Time to plan, build, and position forces to assure the successful commencement of combat operations. When the Marine Corps looks around the globe today, time is not a benefit. The United States’ competitors are positioned to strike quickly and with significant combat power. It is for this reason that the initial stages of the Korean War must be the priority case study if the Marine Corps wishes to wake from its mobilization slumber.

An assessment of June 1950 and today reveals many similarities throughout the Corps. The 1946–1950 drawdown saw active component (AC) end strength decrease from 155,592 to 74,279 (52 percent decrease).4 Current AC end strength has also decreased from 183,417 in 2015 to 172,300 (6 percent decrease) in 2024.5 The Marine Corps Organized Reserve (Ground and Air) of 1950 totaled 39,869 personnel, with the 2024 Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) end strength equaling 32,000 personnel.6 In both eras, military technologies entered a new age of innovation. With Far East Command, the United States positioned itself forward under a unified combatant command to counter Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China. Today, unified commands around the globe campaign forward with modern technologies to deter competitor aggression, with Marines present in all theaters. Unfortunately, these surface-level similarities mask massive underlying contrasts and a glaring critical vulnerability for the Service.

Two critical factors are missing from today’s Marine Corps that existed in 1950. First, in 1950, there was a base mobilization plan.7 Today, the last signed DOD-level mobilization plan is dated May 1988, and the Service has no single-source plan, policy, or Marine Corps Order addressing how it will pick up the entire force, take it to war, while simultaneously preparing for protracted conflict. Second, as early as November 1947, studies of Reserve availability provided data for use in force flow planning in the immediate days and weeks following the surprise assault by the Korea People’s Army on 25 June 1950.8 When the commanding generals of Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton, and Camp Lejeune were given the warning order to expect 21,000 and 5,800 reserve Marines, respectively, the extensive surveys of facilities and supplies necessary were conducted. More importantly, the arrival of RC forces was integrated with the arrival of 3,600 AC Marines from 105 varying posts and stations and the movement of 6,800 Marines of 2d MarDiv from Camp Lejeune to Camp Pendleton, who arrived within a 96-hour window. 

The scope, scale, and timeline of execution for this effort are staggering and were made possible only because the Service deliberately planned in time of peace for mobilization in time of war. Following the 26 June 1950 authorization for the employment of military forces in Korea by the President of the United States (POTUS), the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) set sail from Camp Pendleton on 14 July. On 20 July, 22 RC units were ordered to active duty, with the entire Organized Reserve (138 units in total) ordered to active duty by 4 August. The first Organized Reserve (Ground) Marines arrived at Camp Pendleton on 31 July and reported for active duty through 11 September at a rate of 702 per day, seven days per week. The first of 1,392 Organized Reserve (Aviation) Marines arrived at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro on 1 August alongside the AC Marines of MAG-15 and VMG-212 from Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point to build 1st MAW to wartime strength. When the 15 September landing at Inchon began, seventeen percent of the force was from the RC.9

Cpl Cedrick Chan, of Weapons Company, 2/24 Mar, 4th MarDiv, Marine Forces Reserve, calls in a mortar strike during a fire support coordination exercise at Integrated Training Exercise 4-24, Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, CA. (Photo by LCpl Aaron TorresLemus.)

When viewed in relation to the two most recent large-scale conflicts, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORMand OIF, the gravity of the 1950 mobilization is evident. From 28 October 1990 to 13 January 1991, during Operation DESERT SHIELD, the SMCR activated 22,703 personnel.10 This process took 25 days (48 percent) longer than the actions of 1950 and included 9,411 fewer (-29 percent) personnel. From January to May 2003, in support of OIF, the RC activated approximately 17,000 personnel on top of the roughly 3,000 already activated between November 2001 and December 2002. This four-month spike was the largest during the entire conflict, took 98 days (185 percent) longer than the actions of 1950, and included roughly 15,800 fewer (-48 percent) personnel.11 In both conflicts, fewer RC personnel were activated over longer periods, with the enemy static in both cases. This makes clear that the Marine Corps should not evaluate its ability to mobilize against an actively advancing peer threat using either of these modern conflicts as a case study.

Were the Marine Corps to begin actively planning for the actions accomplished during the early days of the Korean War, detailed above, it would at best only achieve operational relevance within the Joint Force and the eyes of our Nation’s competitors. In the era of competition and campaigns to deter, strategic relevance for the Service is not made through quickly aggregating initial response forces but by demonstrating the ability to rapidly aggregate, grow, and sustain the force in protracted conflict against a peer.

To understand the strategic relevance the Service created during the Korean War, an additional layer of analysis beyond the process for aggregating forces for the 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW must be studied. As the Marines at Camp Pendleton and El Toro fulfilled unit requirements and built the foundational cadre necessary for additional unit creation, such as the 7th Mar, Headquarters Marine Corps actively planned and executed policy and long-term force flow decisions. United States policymakers moved quickly following the POTUS decision to intervene militarily. On 30 June, Congress approved the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, nullifying the guarantee that RC personnel would not be called to active duty except in time of war or national emergency.12 On 19 July, the day after the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Rein) set sail for Korea, POTUS authorized the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of AC end strength and call up RC personnel, and the Commandant, with the Secretary of the Navy’s approval, halted the discharge of RC personnel.13 The same day, the Division of Plans and Policies drafted a delay policy based on the mobilization force flow plan. One day later, those instructions were distributed across the Service. The Marine Corps’ strategic relevance had begun.

The Marine Corps’ strategic planning accelerated even as the operational planning hit the pinnacle of its fervor. As AC and RC forces flowed west within the continental United States (CONUS) from 20 July to 4 August 1950, policy maker decisions continued to unfold. The 25th of July saw the chief of naval operations authorize a 50 percent reduction in Marine security forces within CONUS. On 27 July, Congress passed Public Law 624, giving POTUS the authority to extend enlistments.14 The next day, the CMC directed the extension of one year for all enlistments set to expire before 9 July 1951, and Marine Corps RC members were prevented from joining another reserve or regular component of a sister Service. At the beginning of August, Headquarters Marine Corps established the Board to Consider Requests for Delay, which began meeting daily. These decisions not only supported the sourcing of combat forces over time but also set conditions for a critical next step.

This step came in mid-August 1950 with the decision to begin activation of the Volunteer Reserve and planning for that force to arrive at CONUS screening stations on the heels of the Organized Reserve (Ground and Air). This phase shifted the Marine Corps from operational to strategic-level importance. The Volunteer Reserve, which in today’s Marine Corps is best described as a combination of the Individual Ready Reserve and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program, held 89,920 Marines on 30 June 1950.15 On 15 August 1950, one day after the first attack transports carrying 1st MarDiv set sail from California and two days before the 7th Mar activated, all E-5 and below Marines of the Volunteer Reserve were ordered to active duty. Only two weeks prior, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had ordered the Marine Corps to bring 2d MarDiv to wartime strength and increase the number of flying squadrons. With Camp Lejeune already depleted of forces now sailing with 1st MarDiv, long-range building of forces was dependent on the RC.

Mobilization history was made on 15 September 1950, with the landing at Inchon, but the true benefits of mobilization planning would not be realized until the night of 27 November, when the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force attacked at the Chosin Reservoir. On 25 October, a month before the attack, the Commandant directed all Volunteer Reservists to be ordered to active duty with a 30-day delay. By 8 November, the Service, believing it was in a “short war,” adjusted those plans to include a four-month delay.16 Following the 6–11 December Chosin breakout, it was clear the short war was now a long war. Although the four-month delay policy was suspended on 6 January 1951, because of enemy action, the previously made mobilization decisions had already enabled a continuous flow of Marine Corps forces as the war took a new direction. 

Confident in its ability to continue combat operations despite an ongoing Chinese People’s Volunteer Force, which would last until April 1951, on 10 January, the Service approved RC enlisted members enrolled in officer candidate programs to continue, enabling long-term officer procurement. On 10 February, RC members with contracts expiring between 28 February and 9 July were not ordered to active duty. By March, the preliminary plan to release reservists from active duty was drafted, and by June, the plan was put into action. A largely RC effort now transitioned to a long-term Selective Service solution thanks to robust and detailed mobilization planning. 

It must be acknowledged that the Marine Corps of 1950 was not like the Marine Corps of 2025. The AC in June 1950 consisted of 74,279 personnel­­—just 43 percent of today’s authorized end strength of 172,300.17 Active component units in June 1950 were reduced in personnel numbers to a peacetime structure, with billets intentionally unfilled unless brought to wartime standing. A Marine division in peacetime had 45 percent fewer Marines and 41 percent fewer sailors than the wartime totals of 20,131 and 997, respectively. In June 1950, actual AC staffing meant that 1st and 2nd MarDiv combined could not produce a full wartime division.18 Today, there is no differentiation between peace and wartime structure. Marine Corps units, both AC and RC, are held to readiness reporting requirements in the areas of personnel, equipment supply and condition, and training.19 Within today’s RC, the SMCR, as previously mentioned, is 80 percent of the 1950 Organized Reserve (Ground and Air). The Individual Ready Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentee combination of approximately 57,000 personnel is 63 percent of the 89,920 Volunteer Reserve of 1950. By the numbers, the Marine Corps has reduced the size of its 1950 RC by approximately 40,000 (129,000 to 89,000) while increasing the 1950 AC by approximately 98,000 personnel. The surface-level, and incorrect, conclusion is that this shift of RC to AC manpower over the last 75 years has created a total force more capable of meeting mobilization requirements.

Analysis beyond the simple numerical increase of AC personnel reveals that today’s Marine Corps has less relative combat power than the Marine Corps of 1950. This is evident when comparing the two most powerful arms of the MAGTF, the infantry battalions and fighter squadrons. In 1950, the AC had three infantry regiments (2d, 5th, and 6th) with a wartime structure of three battalions each. The RC had 21 infantry battalions with an additional 16 individual rifle companies.20 Assuming three rifle companies form a battalion, the combined AC and RC infantry battalion strength of the 1950 Marine Corps was approximately 35. Today, the combined AC and RC infantry battalion strength is 28, including 3d Littoral Combat Team, or 80 percent of 1950. Fighter squadrons in 1950 for the AC totaled 15, with another 30 in the RC for a combined total of 45. Today, the combined AC and RC fighter squadron strength is 19, or 42 percent of 1950. In terms of the Corps’ most recognized form of combat power throughout history, the modern Marine Corps is lacking in both when compared to the Corps of 1950.

In addition to the 20 percent fewer infantry and 58 percent fewer fixed-wing strike aircraft than in 1950, the modern Marine Corps risks being out of position when the next conflict begins. Relentlessly pushed outside CONUS in campaigns to deter, repositioning the 45,000+ personnel of I MEF or the 22,000+ personnel of III MEF would be significantly more challenging than the movement of only 800 outside CONUS personnel to complete the 7th Mar upon their arrival in-theater in September 1950. If the enemy chooses to begin the next rapidly evolving peer conflict outside the location where the Marine Corps has hedged its bets, the mobilization planning of 1950 will be dwarfed in complexity by the next iteration as the Service attempts to mobilize and aggregate forces from around the globe.

The modern Marine Corps has further undermined its ability to mobilize by neglecting equipment modernization in the RC. Readiness of the AC and RC in 1950 was instrumental in the successful mobilization of forces. Although at peacetime strength, the material readiness of 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW was 98.3 percent and 95.6 percent, respectively.21 The delta for wartime tables of equipment was made up by using the 30-day replenishment stock, air and ground units arriving from Camp Lejeune bringing their equipment, a long-range policy for resupply with the Army and Air Force, and 30-day incremental resupply by Marine or Navy agencies for Marine-specific equipment.22 Most importantly, during the inter-war period of World War II and Korea, the RC “operated up-to-date equipment”23 when training. When the mobilization plan went into execution, the AC and RC were on a level playing field, enabling seamless integration into forces deploying forward and assignment of AC and RC personnel within CONUS to serve as cadre for newly activated units and training cadre for volunteers and those Marines requiring accession training. Today, the RC is consistently last, if included at all, in the fielding of modern equipment and trains with a training allowance, a lesser amount than a full table of equipment. If the RC were called upon again as it was in 1950, it would not arrive trained on modern equipment, and it would bring insufficient numbers of legacy equipment.

If the Marine Corps wants to be relevant at the operational and strategic levels of war in the next peer conflict, it must learn and apply the lessons from June 1950 and establish a base mobilization plan and a properly equipped RC. Planning must include how the Service will execute seamless transition between initial response, RC call-up, end strength increase, arrival of volunteers and/or Selective Service System inductees, and rotation considerations. More importantly, a total force mobilization plan must identify key policy decisions and be rehearsed and exercised under Title 10 requirements. This sends a message to strategic competitors that the Marine Corps is not a tactical-level force with a handful of exquisite weapons, but a strategic-level consideration capable of rapid expansion and prepared to seamlessly flow combat power in a well-orchestrated symphony of destruction.

“Without the reserves, the Inchon landing on September 15 [1950] would have been impossible.”

—MajGen Oliver P. Smith,
Commanding General,
1st Marine Division

>LtCol Toulotte is currently assigned as the Inspector-Instructor for 3d Civil Affairs Group. He is an Infantry Officer who has served in both the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and Active Reserve (AR). In his previous assignment as an Operational Planner to Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), he represented the command in both Service and Joint-level mobilization planning efforts.

Notes

1. Department of Defense, Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 2025).

2. Title 10, §10208: Annual Mobilization

Exercise.

3. H.J.Res.114-Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, 107th Congress (2002). 

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict 1950–1951 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1967). 

5. Nicholas Munves, “FY2025 NDAA: Active Component End-Strength 21 Oct 2024,” Congress.gov, October 21, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12449.

6. Nicholas Munves, “FY2025 NDAA: Reserve Component End-Strength 21 Oct 2024,” Congress.gov, October 21, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12448.

7. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict 1950–1951.

8. Ibid.

9. Staff, “History: Marine Forces Korea,” Marines.mil, n.d., https://www.marfork.marines.mil/About/History.

10. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Desert Shield/Desert Storm Employment of Reserve Component: Extracts of Lessons Learned (Fort Eustis: Joint Deployment Training Ctr, 1998).

11. Department of Defense, RC Support to GFM Operational Requirements (Washington, DC: January 2010).

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid; and “FY2025 NDAA: Active Component End-Strength.”

18. Ibid.

19. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCO 3000.13B, (Washington, DC: July 2020). 

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid. 

22. Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, Volume II (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1955). 

23. Ibid.

Patrolling Hill 55: Hard Lessons in Retrospect

A company grade officer’s memoir of duty in Vietnam and his reflections on how the Corps adjusted and responded to battlefield challenges quite different from those for which it was specifically organized and trained.

>Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, April 1994. Editor’s Note: The authors biography is available in the original edition.

We are taught by the book. That is, we are taught the basics of individual and unit discipline and movement under combat conditions. But some have said that we do this so that when the balloon goes up and the lead begins to fly we can throw out the book and play it by ear—but in a disciplined sense, a sense shaped and tempered by all that book learning and training. In Vietnam perhaps we ran across all too many occasions to throw out the book and play it by ear. We were, at least in the beginning, in a new kind of war for us, one for which the book had not been definitively written. But I wonder if we were wise to have thrown the book out with such regularity. On the other hand, I wonder if we had the flexibility—the professional sharpness—to reassess our course against what turned out to be an extremely resourceful enemy.

This article deals with some of the foolishness and perhaps the lack of flexibility that occurred in I Corps during the early part of the Vietnam War, and suggests lessons learned that may still have some application today. I was a first-hand participant in the events described, as the combat intelligence officer/briefer in the 3d Marine Division intelligence staff, and later as the commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. However, in order to reduce personal references as much as possible, I use third-person (e.g., “the company commander” and “the company”) throughout. The perspective and conclusions presented are the result of considerable reflection over time; by no means was the apparent interrelatedness of events clear at the time. That might be a lesson in itself.

By the spring of 1966, combat elements of the 3d Marine Division seemed to be carrying out two strategies at the same time: the strategy of counterinsurgency that had been developed recently by American forces in collaboration with the guerrilla-savvy British and French, and a hybrid offensive strategy featuring scattered deployment and saturation patrolling coordinated with elaborately plotted “H & I” (harassing and interdiction) artillery fires. This more offensive strategy received the most emphasis, understandably so since it was more familiar than the land-control, pacification-oriented strategy of counterinsurgency, which in a three-pronged approach employed population control and assistance simultaneously and equally with the more combative counterguerrilla effort. Perhaps saturation patrolling and H & I fires were emphasized also because the first major Marine effort of the war—Operation STARLIGHT in the Chu Lai tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) during the summer of 1965—had been a conventional offensive operation against Viet Cong (VC) forces that stayed to fight instead of employing the more elusive strategy they emphasized later, particularly in the Da Nang TAOR. That is, perhaps the patrolling and H & I strategy was employed in the anticipation that we would regularly meet or “catch out” larger, more-fixed enemy units like those encountered in STARLIGHT. Did our approach work? That is, did it allow us to accomplish our objective?

Whatever may have been the merits of either strategy, it was obvious that the VC were not fools; in fact, they seemed to be quite capable of keeping us at bay while they seemingly moved at will. We knew that the VC were intently and shrewdly watching us. Stories of sand-table mockups of Marine positions painstakingly fashioned by the VC began to be reported by intelligence sources and were also reflected in captured documents, which included precise sketches of our positions. To us, this indicated an impressive knowledge of our overall order of battle. It was soon obvious that the VC had both the means and the moxie to make mines and booby traps out of just about anything that could be induced to explode.

These and other capabilities were determinable very early in the war. Three stark events in the summer and fall of 1965 if examined together could have given a clue not only of particular tactical capabilities but perhaps something more ominous. In September, one of the battalions of the 9th Marines set up a command post on Hill 55, southwest of Da Nang, and began patrolling in the sector surrounding the hill. One morning—just before the daily 8 a.m. briefing of the division commander was to take place up in Da Nang—the battalion commander, during a short reconnaissance near the north slope of the hill, tripped a booby-trapped 155mm artillery shell that exploded with a roar and blew the colonel to pieces. The tragedy was immediately reported to division, and the intelligence desk officer ran the grim information over to the conference room just as the G-1 portion of the briefing commenced. The G-2 briefer hastily noted the information and silently slipped it to the commanding general immediately before taking his turn on the platform. The general was visibly shaken by the report. He read the note silently, then handed it to the officer beside him and bowed his head. There was utter silence in the room as the note moved up and down the table, then the general grimly nodded for the briefing to continue. Following that incident the division intelligence staff began a careful study of the incidence of mines and booby traps, and information on that aspect of the war became a priority feature in future intelligence briefings.

About a week later, a VC force of estimated battalion size snuck up on and assaulted the Marine company occupying a remote outpost on Hill 22, on the division’s defensive salient northwest of Hill 55. The VC penetrated the perimeter and got all the way to the command bunker before the Marines were able to beat back the attack in desperate hand-to-hand fighting. Later, it was reported that the VC had made an elaborately detailed sand-table mockup of the outpost, then had shrewdly attacked at about 0245 when they knew the Marines were least likely to be fully alert. Though repulsed, they came precariously close to overrunning the outpost. The episode sent a shock through the division. 

A few days later, the VC ingeniously employed a mine ambush; that is, they wired together several mines in an elongated “L” shape, sat in wait, then simultaneously exploded all the mines—probably with a hand-operated electric detonator—when a Marine patrol walked into their trap. The ambush was quickly investigated and briefed, and once again a shock went through the division staff.

If nothing else, these incidents pointed to the fact that we were up against a smart, as well as vicious enemy. But had we been alert enough to see it, they also clearly indicated that the VC had developed a strategy of their own, one designed precisely to counter our scattered deployment and aggressive tendencies. “Strategy” is the “science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions.” Could these seemingly unprofessional VC commanders have developed such a “science and art”? Could they have assembled a “book” on our tendency to dash aggressively about the countryside in small units aching for a fight? It seems in retrospect that they had. Sad to say, however, the matter never came up for discussion at division intelligence, and over the next several months, Marines kept to their strategy even though they seldom if ever had a significant meeting engagement with a sizable VC force. While at the same time, fully 90 percent of our casualties were being caused by mines, booby traps, and ambushes.

Early in the spring of 1966, a platoon on patrol north of Hill 55 walked into a massive ambush and was annihilated with the exception of two wounded Marines who survived the slaughter by feigning death as the VC poked about among the bodies collecting weapons and ammunition. Investigation revealed that the platoon, by repeatedly patrolling over the same ground, had established a pattern that the watchful VC had been able to spot and for which they prepared a devastating response. By now it should have been painfully obvious that the enemy was employing effective countermeasures and that the aggressive patrolling strategy needed to be reassessed in that light.

In particular, the aggressive part needed to be rethought. Far too many officers were inclined to aggressively maneuver against every known enemy sighting. Even the commanding general had demanded that his intelligence briefings include reports of every contact with the VC, including, in his exact words, “one-shot misses.” Demanding exacting information about the enemy is one thing; blindly chasing after shadows is another. An aggressive strategy is one thing; an overly aggressive strategy under the conditions we experienced is another. In the case of I Corps in 1966, a one-shot miss, or even a fusillade from a tree line, should not have necessarily demanded an immediate frontal assault, especially in light of the knowledge that the enemy was taking advantage of such a proclivity. In conversations between officers, aggressiveness was often the topic of discussion. Not unlike Custer, some seemed to think that it was up to them to end the war then and there, and with dash and flair. In one conversation with a battalion commander the question was put: If a unit was to draw fire from the far side of a wet rice paddy, would he order an assault across the paddy? Without hesitation he said that he would. Not often discussed was individual and unit security, particularly individual dispersion and unit point and flank security. Although such basic concerns may have been taken for granted, failure of senior commanders to continually warn of the crucial nature of unit security in a strategy emphasizing constant aggressive movement was extremely shortsighted. These aspects of the early war—the strategy of saturation patrolling; the counterstrategy of mines, booby traps, and ambushes; the tendency to be overly aggressive; and underemphasis on individual and unit security—were sure to lead to trouble, and the Marines in I Corps continually walked into that trouble.

On 21 May 1966 several weeks after the above-mentioned ambush, another company was assigned to carry out a County Fair counterinsurgency operation at the little village of Thai Cam (2) also in the area north of Hill 55. The counterguerrilla aspect of the operation went off without incident, and by noon the troops had little or nothing to do as the attached medical and other relief and assistance people did their work. But gunfire began to crackle off to the west, and the company saddled up for possible action in that direction. Minutes later the battalion commander, who was located at his command post on Hill 55, radioed for a platoon to be detached and flown by helicopter to join the adjacent company, which had become engaged by fire with an enemy force across the river that marked the boundary between the two companies.

Now at least some of the company were perhaps going to have a taste of real war, the old-fashioned kind with which we were the most familiar. Two large cargo helicopters flew in and picked up the 3d Platoon (with a section of machineguns attached), and within the hour the entire company was ordered to move directly to the scene of the battle and engage the enemy in support of the other company. The troops climbed onto the two battle tanks and two amphibious tractors at hand (attached for use in the County Fair) and moved due west to the river, jumped off, formed a skirmish line with two platoons abreast, and proceeded to move north.

The company was no sooner organized and moving than it met headlong a large group of VC almost nonchalantly streaming south, obviously out of ammunition and unaware of what they were blundering into. A slaughter commenced during which every VC soldier was killed, most by the withering enfilade poured into them and some by hand-to-hand fighting. It was thrilling. For once it was hard-nosed Marines in a classic skirmish assaulting straight into and vanquishing the enemy—like at Saipan or Inchon. Somewhat ironically, the company, in its assault up the river, recovered from the vanquished foe the very M1917A4 machineguns lost in the ambush (described above) that had earlier annihilated the Marine platoon that had patrolled the same route once too often. (It was later determined that the VC unit involved in both incidents was the RC-20th Company.) But the story is not yet complete, nor is the irony.

As the company thus proceeded up the river bank doing its dirty work, a pathetic voice came over the battalion tactical net. “Help,” he pleaded weakly. “I’m dying, and I’m the only one left,” or words to that effect. The battalion commander broke in, told the company commander to concentrate on the battle at hand, and addressed himself to the caller. What followed was a wrenchingly sad but at the same time eloquent conversation between the two. The colonel, like a father talking to his injured child, soothingly began, “Now, son, we hear you, and we’re going to help you.” Thence proceeded the necessary communications between the commander and the badly wounded young Marine (his shoulder had been shattered by machinegun fire) to effect a rescue. The Marine had no idea where he was, but the colonel was able to ascertain that he had an unspent white-star cluster with which he could signal his location. With the colonel gently and patiently telling him what to do step by step, on the count of three the flare popped only a few hundred yards from the assaulting force’s position. The company commander, having heard the entire communication, entered the net and told the colonel that he had the position in sight, and since the battle was well in hand, he could move there immediately by amtrac. Worried about the 3d Platoon and anticipating that was where they were, he turned over command of the skirmishing force to the senior platoon commander, and with several slightly wounded men in the belly of the amtrack who volunteered to fight if they had to, moved off in the direction of the wounded Marine. The thrill of battle quickly evaporated.

The scene was sickening. There indeed was the 3d Platoon, or what was left of it. The two helicopters had landed in a large, dry rice paddy—right in the middle of the RC-20th. The battalion commander, the one who had shown such kindness to a single wounded Marine, had little more than an hour before ordered that Marine and many others straight into the fray by helicopter without any effort to secure a landing site. He put them, not behind or alongside the company to which they were to be attached, where security for the landing and at least some semblance of mission orientation could have been established, but across the river from that company where they were to operate as a separate maneuver element. Essentially, in his zeal to aggressively close with the enemy, the battalion commander chanced everything on a blind guess. Unfortunately, he could not have guessed more wrongly.

The RC-20th immediately turned its attention from the Marines across the river and poured fire point-blank into the 3d Platoon as the Marines desperately scrambled out of the helicopters. In the frantically confusing situation, the helicopter crews had only one option—to abandon the already scattering troops and escape as best they could. With the troops running in every direction to get away from the helicopters and many men falling from the hail of fire, regathering everybody proved impossible. Six Marines were killed outright—most as they attempted to exit the helicopters. An additional 25 Marines and corpsmen were wounded, among them the platoon commander. The irony was made complete by the fact that the VC had at least two “old” Browning M1917A4 light machineguns that fired well, and both of the 3d Platoon’s brand-new M60s had immediately jammed. (Marine infantry units had begun replacing their M1917A4s with M60s in the early spring of 1966.)

Marines from Company B, 1st Bn, 9th Mar recover the bodies of their comrades from the 3d Platoon who lost their lives during the action on 21 May 1966.

When the company commander and his party arrived, only two pockets of men remained unhurt. Eleven were cowering in one bomb crater, and five more were grimly awaiting the end in another nearby crater. Then there was the wounded Marine on the top of the ground by himself. No person in any group knew if anybody else remained alive. The platoon sergeant, who was with the group of 11, later explained that they had attempted to maneuver, but with their machineguns jammed, there was little chance of gaining a balance of fire. Further, every time someone lifted his head above the edge of the crater the VC raked him with fire. Neither the group of 11 nor the group of 5 had a radio, and with the platoon commander and his radioman being shot down, all command and control were lost. From the moment the platoon landed to the moment the wounded Marine finally made his feeble appeal, the platoon was entirely cut off. They never had a chance.

There were, fortunately, some magnificent displays of professionalism, courage, and compassion by individual Marines and Navy corpsmen—displays by young enlisted men that in a way saved the bacon for us supposed “professionals” who had precipitated this shameful affair. Splendid leadership and heroism were displayed in the group of five, for example. Upon interview, four of the Marines, all Caucasians, reported how, as they crouched there, a young black machinegunner calmly said he would take charge. Assuming that they would be assaulted and killed or captured, he ordered each man to inventory his ammunition and trade around so that each had an equal share; each man would save one round to kill himself if necessary, and all would stand at the ready, back to back, and await the expected assault on their hole. Then they would go down fighting, taking as many VC with them as they could. Melodramatic stuff, but the Marines who told the story were deadly serious.

Earlier, and at the height of the bedlam, one of the corpsmen ran to one wounded Marine and gave him lifesaving first aid, then ran to the next fallen Marine, then to the next, and on to the next. Surviving Marines told that the corpsman, while attending the fifth wounded Marine, was shot down, a bullet through his head. He had knowingly sacrificed himself to do his duty. (He was still alive when evacuated but probably died on the way to the hospital.)

Somehow, probably from information reported by the helicopter crews that had taken the 3d Platoon into the fray, a helicopter medevac team arrived on the scene while the situation was still in chaos. The crew flew into the bloody field seven times—several times directly into enemy fire. During the first sorties they took so many rounds into and through their helicopter that they had to replace it in order to continue. Just after the detachment with the company commander arrived, the medevac crew returned for the sixth time and picked up the remaining wounded, including the lone Marine who had called for help, and then came back once more to pick up the dead. Wanting every able-bodied man to concentrate on the possibility of another attack, the company commander ordered them to stick to their weapons and proceeded alone to help the corpsman/crew chief load the dead on the helicopter. It was a gruesomely difficult task: the dead Marines, their bodies drained of blood, handled much like what might have been large sacks of potatoes that had been smashed by a sledgehammer; like so much mush they flopped about heavily and awkwardly in the effort to half heave, half yank them up into the helicopter. The bodies filled the belly of the helicopter and the crew chief had to sit atop the mound of corpses for the return flight. As the helicopter lifted off, the two men’s eyes met. On the crew chiefs face was an unforgettable look of shock and anguish. He seemed to be expressing, though without words, how terribly sorry he was that he could not have saved them all.

More melodrama, perhaps, but these descriptions, at the risk of pushing too hard to make the point, are inserted here to convey a sense of the human tragedy that more likely than not occurs when officers throw out the book, play it by ear, and cavalierly hasten to order other men into terrible situations.

What foolishness! Under the conditions, there was no clear reason to have been so hasty and to have risked so much. Had the 3d Platoon been dropped into that horrible trap sooner it would likely have suffered far worse, since the VC company that engaged them would have had more ammunition with which to finish the platoon off. Those who survived were extremely lucky; the VC did run out of ammunition and withdrew—south down the river bank and to their destruction at the hands of the skirmish line moving north.

Chance destruction of the RC-20th aside, should we have been dashing about looking for a fight so recklessly? Should any unit be dropped into an unsecured landing site unless the situation is desperate? In the case of the company to which the 3d Platoon was to be attached, their situation was not desperate. They were merely exchanging fire with the enemy across a river and had plenty of room to maneuver. The words “was to be” are intentional. The 3d Platoon never saw, nor was it ever seen by, the company to which it was supposed to have been attached; nor is it apparent that anybody in that company attempted to establish contact beyond perhaps trying to contact them by radio. One has to wonder why, when that medevac crew kept coming in across the river in plain sight and hearing, somebody in the company did not at least warn battalion that the to-be-attached unit might be in trouble. On the other hand, why should they have? Technically, the 3d Platoon was not yet an attachment under the company’s responsibility; it was still a separate command under battalion responsibility. Did the other company commander even know they were there? Owing to the sensitivity of the episode, such things were not discussed later. Whatever the whole story might have been, obviously the 3d Platoon was sacrificed for no other reason than a chance that through aggressive maneuvering in the blind they might keep a VC unit in place. That is insufficient justification for blindly jeopardizing the lives of a reinforced rifle platoon and several helicopter crews. The entire incident simply should not have happened, and it would not have happened had we better balanced our stewardship to our men with our disposition to aggressiveness. But then Marines are always aggressive, and commanders had little time to learn their trade and make their mark.

Returning to the saturation patrolling strategy, the troops derisively called the incessant patrols “activities.” Although in a few instances a single “activity” probably flushed out an enemy unit, and a few others may have deterred an enemy attack, the continuous employment of patrols around the clock kept the troops in a constant state of exhaustion while at the same time offering easy targets for an enemy that, as already indicated above, had the capability and cunning to take advantage of the opportunities that the strategy presented them. Didn’t this strategy violate or misapply any number of the principles of war, those principles that are considered the “enduring bedrock of doctrine”? Arguably, such a strategy can be justified under the principles of objective, maneuver, and offensive. But what about mass, economy of force, unity of command, security, simplicity, and surprise? The enemy always knew right where we were, and they knew that we would constantly present ourselves in vulnerable little pieces and that those little pieces would wander about seemingly willy-nilly over the same terrain day after day and night after night. And complicating the issue, all patrolling had to be orchestrated, lock step, around those elaborately plotted and timed H & I fires. All the VC had to do was observe, plant mines and booby traps, and use the hit and run tactics that they often employed in coordination with deadly ambushes. That is, the Marines seemed to be employing a strategy that in violating most of the principles of war all-too-easily accommodated the strategy consistently being employed against them by enemy commanders who took advantage of every element as if they had conceived those bedrock principles themselves. Add to that a tendency on the part of Marine commanders to be overly aggressive and the conditions for disaster were ripe.

Moreover, still another factor mitigated against us—our general disdain of the enemy. Were the VC equal to the challenge? By all means they were. They probably were as adept at employing mine warfare as any military force in history. We saturated the battlefield with little patrols and chased after every burst of fire; they saturated the battlefield with traps, baited us with scattered fire, and waited for us in ambush. The VC were not merely a bunch of stupid little people in black silk pajamas, conical straw hats, and shower shoes made from old tires. They were intelligent, cunning, able, well trained, largely professional, and relentless. And they were fanatically determined killers. They hated us passionately and would never rest until we were gone from their homeland forever, dead or alive. Having no mass, no fighter planes, no artillery or tanks or naval guns or B-52s with which to pulverize the landscape with arc lights, they dug ditches, tunnels, and caves, and planted barbed wire, booby traps, and mines—all brilliantly and perfectly adapted to counter the strategy of aggressive saturation patrolling. The so-called ambushes we claim to have employed in tandem with patrols were nothing more than patrols that stopped longer at one of their checkpoints. In fact they were a joke; it is likely that Marines never closed a successful ambush against the VC, since the VC always knew where the ambushes were. Perhaps one of the lessons we seemingly never learned is that we were fighting a smart and dedicated—and sophisticated—enemy.

The RC-20th VC company made only one mistake on 21 May: It abandoned an extremely effective strategy and fought for too long in one place. Nevertheless, up to the moment of destruction it had been enormously successful; it annihilated one platoon and almost annihilated another in addition to killing several more with mines and booby traps (including a battalion commander) before succumbing to their own annihilation. Regardless of their relative success, the other VC in the region probably learned well from the RC20th’s one big mistake. We, however, seemingly never learned. Rather than learning, our revenge on the RC-20th and recovering our weapons may even have been seen as a vindication of our strategy, not a lucky stroke owing to a VC mistake that was not likely to be repeated.

In an engagement shortly before the action described in this article, Marines from 3d Bn, 9th Mar engage VC forces during Operation GEORGIA, south of Da Nang in April-May 1966.

After the incident of 21 May, the company took up defensive duty for the southern part of the battalion command post perimeter at Hill 55—with the usual additional responsibility of saturation patrolling. The company was so short of personnel that squad patrols (the commonly employed patrol was squad size) consisted mostly of about eight men under the command of a lance corporal or corporal. That is, those maneuver elements that were supposed to be able to fix and destroy a fanatic enemy were little more than glorified fire teams often led by newly arrived junior NCOs barely older and better trained than the youngest and least trained men under them. It seemed little short of suicidal to send these weak little units out on the extended “activities” expected under division policy. In early June the battalion commander at Hill 55 was urged by subordinates to beef up offensive patrols to platoon size for several reasons, among them leadership and experience, firepower, maneuver capability, and sheer size sufficient to resist an ambush. The battalion commander naturally hesitated making a decision that might be considered contrary to division policy, but on the other hand, he could not dismiss the rationale presented. On the merits, and possibly somewhat influenced by the tragic results of his decision of 21 May, he approved increasing the size of offensive patrols from squad to platoon.

What about troop strengths? In 1966 the 3d Marine Division was chronically short of personnel. The above-described company is a good case in point; it averaged about 150 men on any given day. Casualties totaled 100 between March and July, and 4 of them were lieutenants. These painful losses were in addition to the normal attrition that arised as a result of the single-year rotation policy that prevailed throughout the Vietnam War. This policy resulted in a steady drain of experienced men, often at times when units could ill afford to lose them. These endemic shortages in both numbers and experience, in combination with the requirement to saturate the operations area with patrols around the clock and the Marine Corps’ “can do” spirit, created an extremely dangerous, sometimes almost debilitating situation. It appears that the Corps’ personnel administration structure was not geared to keep up in 1966. Is it now? If not now, or if always fighting shorthanded is taken for granted, are field commanders prepared, either by
training or philosophy, to make the necessary operational adjustments to keep the fighting machine healthy enough to carry out the mission?

Combining enemy mines, booby traps, caves, tunnels, wire, dikes, ditches, ambushes and selected attacks with our willy-nilly “activities” carried out by exhausted and understrength units and the VC’s uncanny ability to orchestrate the mix to their advantage, the early part of the war was hell. It was nasty, humorless, exhausting, and terribly discouraging. In another kind of bitter irony, an awful incident occurred in late June 1966 that seemed to neatly but searingly bind up the whole ugly mess.

Near the river that flows past Hill 55 on the south, the rice paddies did double duty by yielding rice during the northeast monsoon and corn during the dry season. By June the corn stood about 7 feet high, just the perfect addition to the dikes, ditches, wire, and mines to present patrolling Marines with bad situations. Late one afternoon the 1st Platoon while on patrol entered one of those rice paddy/cornfields. At the far side of the field the point squad came abruptly upon a high dike behind a ditch and topped by barbed wire. The squad leader halted his unit and radioed the situation to the platoon commander, who decided to come up to see for himself. He unwisely brought with him the platoon sergeant, platoon guide, and the platoon’s complement of radiomen and corpsmen. They approached, then intermingled with the squad, which had already become badly bunched up—first because of the dense growth and then from piling up on the fenced dike. The platoon commander looked the situation over and ordered the squad to move around the obstacle and continue on the previously assigned heading. And to his credit he ordered everybody to spread back out since they were so dangerously bunched up.

It was too late. The first man to move tripped a large mine planted at the base of the dike. Two Marines, including the platoon sergeant, were killed instantly. The platoon commander was saturated with shrapnel, the man who tripped the mine had both feet blown off, and 14 others were also wounded, most of them seriously. It was probably the worst mine tragedy in the war up to that point.

The physical evidence of the tragedy was starkly clear upon inspection the next morning. Shrapnel had cut a swath through the com, and the broken stalks lay in an arc away from the point of the blast. Thick puddles of coagulated blood marked the place where every Marine had fallen, and the puddles were close together. When the report of the tragedy reached division, a formal investigation was immediately launched with both the company and battalion commander being named as parties. The investigating officer was a lieutenant colonel who had just arrived in country and was being assigned to the 9th Marines. Fortunately, before he came down to Hill 55 he took the opportunity to interview the wounded before they were airlifted out of country. Most or all who were able to speak reported that before the incident strong measures—to include a 10-pace minimum interval—had been consistently carried out to avoid just such a tragedy, and the investigation concluded without culpability being assigned. Not that this in any way ameliorated the tragedy that had occurred.

With the exception of the events of 21 May, every casualty suffered by the company between March and July 1966 was due to mines, booby traps, and VC ambushes while the men were carrying out “activities” during which they never saw the enemy.

Did our approach work? Did it allow us to accomplish the objective? Two years after returning home I bumped into a classmate from The Basic School at the Camp Pendleton post exchange. He had just returned from Vietnam. He had been a rifle company commander in the vicinity of Hill 55. He recalled that it was nasty, humorless, exhausting, and terribly discouraging. And his company suffered many casualties on mines and booby traps while hardly ever setting eyes on the enemy. His was at least the 12th rifle company to have patrolled Hill 55 (at least four battalions had been assigned in that vicinity between 1965 and 1967). How many more companies bled there and to what end? Was it all in vain?

Suffice it to say, in conclusion, that battle commanders should stick by the book (the basics) as much as they can—at least as regards individual and unit security—and play it by ear only when the conditions absolutely dictate. But at the same time we must be flexible enough to reassess and respond, intelligently and quickly, boldly even, to whatever strategy the enemy may employ to counter us. Battle commanders must be ever vigilant regarding the condition of their men, and allow that condition to influence their approach to the mission. It is true, whether we like it or not and “can do” spirit notwithstanding, Marines can easily be pushed to exhaustion and can absorb bullets and shrapnel just as easily as any other foot soldier. If they are killed or maimed because of constant exhaustion, or while on details that foolishly play into the hands of the enemy, it is not their fault; it is their commander’s fault. And surely, one of the deadliest ways to play into the hands of the enemy is to blindly drop troops into unsecured landing zones.

Lastly, the commander’s responsibility as the guardian of the welfare of his men must take precedence over any personal motive. How often are decisions on the battlefield entirely consistent with the real mission, and how often are they influenced by the urge, for example, to be dashing, aloof, and cavalier? In the final analysis, the best battle commanders, in addition to being highly competent, are—consistent with the mission—also highly dedicated to the welfare of their men. That any Marine’s vanity be the cause of another Marine’s death is more than tragic; it is criminal.

Mobilization as a Theory of Victory

Deploying all elements of national defense

Vignette
 On 1 August 2027—the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army—the Chinese Communist Party launches a preplanned invasion of Taiwan. The operation begins with covert special forces infiltrating Taipei, paralyzing communications, and severing Taiwan’s offshore internet cables. Simultaneously, the United States suffers from coordinated cyberattacks on its power grids, financial networks, and transportation systems, resulting in widespread disruptions. As Chinese stealth bombers and nuclear submarines posture for escalation, the United States mobilizes its Pacific forces. However, the United States struggles to project sufficient combat power across the 12,000-kilometer (7,456-mile) expanse of the Pacific amid domestic chaos. The crisis deepens as North Korea joins the fray, launching tactical nuclear strikes that incapacitate U.S.-South Korea command centers, raising the specter of a broader nuclear confrontation. Despite escalating threats, allied coordination falters and diplomatic avenues close under Chinese and Russian vetoes at the UN Security Council.

Facing strategic paralysis, the U.S. president issues involuntary mobilization orders under Title 10, but years of neglect toward large-scale mobilization planning quickly manifest. The U.S. military, particularly the Marine Corps Reserve, finds itself unable to respond with the necessary speed or cohesion in a contested homeland. Communication lines collapse, Reserve service members remain unreachable, and infrastructure buckles under pressure. Mobilization plans, long outdated and designed for permissive environments, falter as civilian contractors and logistical nodes are overwhelmed by chaos. Amid the turmoil, reserve units struggle to assemble beyond the company level or move toward embarkation points, hindered by fragmented staffs and command structures. The lack of deliberate, large-scale rehearsals leaves the force staggered at the outset—dangerously unprepared to project and sustain operations deep into the first island chain.

Marines with 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 2nd MarDiv inspect craters made by time-explosive charges during exercise AGILE SPIRIT 23 in Georgia. Exercise AGILE SPIRIT 23 is designed to support theater security cooperation and interoperability among NATO allies and partners to improve joint and multinational readiness, scale, and capabilities by exercising rapid mobility and posture combat credible forces across the European theater to the country of Georgia to bolster their defense efforts and deter aggression in the Black Sea region while exercising the enduring U.S. State Partnership Program with the Georgia Army National Guard. (Photo by Cpl Christopher Doughty.)

Purpose
The critical-case scenario reveals that large-scale mobilization is fundamentally an active component (AC) problem requiring a total force solution that integrates the reserve component (RC), contracted support (CS), and host-nation support. Without a practiced, coordinated mobilization framework, the United States risks being unable to project and sustain combat power in contested theaters. The objective of this article is threefold: first, to clarify key terms to establish a shared vocabulary; second, to highlight historical fallacies, such as the overreliance on peacetime structures or exquisite technologies at the expense of preparedness for mobilization; and third, to recommend conceptual frameworks and analytic approaches that help identify and close capability gaps in the Services’ current force generation models. 

A Marine with Golf Company, 2/24 Mar, 4th MarDiv, Marine Corps Forces Reserve, shouts to another machinegun team during a live-fire range event at Fort McCoy, WI. (Photo by Cpl Maxwell Cook.)

Marine Corps Today
The Marine Corps lacks doctrine, organizational structure, education and training frameworks, policy guidance, and funding to build the depth required for an organized, timely, large-scale mobilization. The present-day AC alone cannot meet the force demands of a sustained conflict against any single peer adversary without immediate augmentation from the Ready Reserve. This is exacerbated by outdated policy and infrastructure that do not allow for the rapid expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.1 Should a conflict become protracted, the Services lack a formal plan or policy to generate combat-ready forces from inductees processed through the Selective Service System. Within the Marine Corps, no unified command or logistical support structure currently exists to oversee the mobilization of reserve forces, Selective Service inductees, and CS. If left unaddressed, delays will likely occur in generating combat-capable, follow-on forces at scale. These gaps will severely jeopardize the tempo, momentum, and initiative required to sustain overseas campaigns and maintain the operational advantage in a conflict with a peer adversary. 

Baseline Concepts
Mobilization is a broad, total force effort encompassing far more than the activation of RC personnel.2 It involves assembling, organizing, and deploying all elements of the DOD—active and reserve forces, retirees, civilians, contractors, and host-nation support—to respond to national emergencies or contingencies.3 Activation, by contrast, is a legal and administrative subset of mobilization that places RC members on active duty under specific authorities.4 While activation is necessary, it is insufficient; mobilization integrates logistics, infrastructure, and command and control to generate and sustain combat power.5 Effective mobilization requires deliberate, synchronized employment of the entire total force following Total Force Optimization principles.6 

The Past Is Not a Prologue for the Future
World War II: 8 December 1941–2 September 1945
During World War II, the United States mobilized over sixteen million service members, an unparalleled effort in scale. The attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized bipartisan support and unified public opinion, enabling President Franklin D. Roosevelt to rapidly exercise sweeping war powers.7 The United States leveraged alliances and global outrage against Axis aggression to rally the Allied powers.8 Wartime propaganda and censorship preserved morale while the War Production Board repurposed America’s vast industrial base to produce war materiel at a record pace.9 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 established preemptive conscription, laying the groundwork for rapid manpower expansion.10 Strong institutional frameworks, a vast logistics network, including the Merchant Marine and national rail system, and an arsenal of democracy preserved national morale and cohesion.11 

Today, the conditions that enabled the mobilization for World War II have largely eroded. Diplomatically, the cohesion once found among Allied powers has given way to fragmented global alliances and a decline in trust in multilateral institutions. In the information domain, centralized control and narrative discipline have been replaced by media fragmentation and disinformation, making maintaining national morale and cohesion challenging. Economically, the U.S. industrial base no longer possesses the surge capacity of the 1940s. Infrastructure critical to mobilization, such as rail and sealift, has degraded. Militarily, the existing sustainment infrastructure is not optimized for large-scale, rapid deployment. As a result, the foundational elements that once enabled the United States to mobilize at scale are now fractured, posing significant challenges to replicating that success in a modern conflict.12 

Korean War: 27 June 1950–27 July 1953
The Korean War era presented a unique confluence of political, diplomatic, military, and economic conditions that no longer exist today. These conditions enabled swift legislative action to authorize reserve mobilization and extend enlistments.13 Diplomatically, the United Nations (UN) provided legitimacy, allowing the United States to quickly galvanize a coalition—an opportunity shaped by the Soviet Union’s absence from early Security Council votes.14 Today, the fractured state of great-power relations and eroded multilateral trust make such diplomatic cohesion far less plausible. Additionally, the Cold War’s clear ideological framework enabled a decisive narrative for U.S. intervention, whereas modern conflicts suffer from ambiguity.15 

Militarily and economically, the United States retained the industrial strength and manpower depth to remobilize quickly, even after significant post-World War II drawdowns. A large pool of World War II veterans, maintained stockpiles of supplies and equipment, and robust strategic sealift and airlift capacities supported rapid force generation.16 Reserve integration and political willingness to spend “large sums of money” further sustained mobilization despite doctrinal friction and inter-Service rivalry.17

The conditions that enabled rapid mobilization during the Korean War have deteriorated. Diplomatically, deepening great-power competition and weakened trust make coalition-building far less feasible.18 Strategically, the ideological clarity of the Cold War has given way to fragmented narratives, complicating public and international support for intervention.19 Militarily, reduced force structure, lack of practiced large-scale mobilization, and fragile defense supply chains hinder rapid force generation.20 Economically, minimal prepositioned stores, an efficiency-focused industrial base, and supply chain vulnerabilities undermine the Nation’s ability to sustain operations.21 The synergies that enabled successful mobilization in 1950—political unity, narrative clarity, and industrial depth—can no longer be assumed.

The Gulf War: 7 August 1990–28 February 1991
The Gulf War showcased the rapid assembly of nearly a million U.S. and Coalition forces following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but its success rested on conditions no longer prevalent. Diplomatically, the United States secured a UN mandate, rallied a 35-nation coalition, and received logistical and financial backing from Saudi Arabia, Japan, and others.22 The conflict was presented through a unified media as a just and necessary war, reinforcing public support.23 Economically, the Cold War-era defense structure and coalition burden-sharing offset much of the operation’s cost.24 These advantages—powerful diplomatic legitimacy, unified media narratives, and partner-nation financing—are less accessible in today’s increasingly fragmented global environment. Militarily, the Gulf War benefited from prepositioned stocks, robust host-nation support, and uncontested access to ports and airfields—none guaranteed to be secure during conflict with a peer adversary. Since then, much of the surge capacity, particularly in sealift, airlift, and industrial readiness, has atrophied.25 

Global War on Terror: 11 September 2001–30 August 2021
Mobilizations for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) were extensive but fundamentally different from those of past great-power wars. Politically, the 9/11 attacks briefly unified bipartisan support, which fractured as the wars dragged on and strategic aims became unclear.26 Diplomatically, the Afghanistan coalition unraveled during the Iraq invasion as key allies publicly opposed U.S. actions.27 In the information domain, prolonged conflict and media fragmentation eroded U.S. narrative control.28 Economically, the wars relied on deficit spending and outsourced logistics rather than large-scale industrial mobilization.29 

The OIF and OEF operations used the Global Force Management (GFM) model. This tiered readiness approach accepted non-mission capable units in the sourcing pool if they could meet operational timelines.30 After the height of OEF in 2011, the Marine Corps disestablished the Marine Corps Mobilization Command (MOBCOM), as part of a force structure realignment following heavy Ready Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve activations under various Title 10 authorities. While adequate for counterinsurgency and stability operations, the current GFM model, lacking a unified mobilization command, will most likely be paralyzed by the speed and scale required for a protracted, large-scale peer conflict, especially in a contested homeland environment. 

The erosion of bipartisan unity after 9/11 created an unstable policy environment that weakened institutional support for national mobilization. Diplomatic fractures isolated the United States, leaving it to shoulder logistics and sustainment largely alone. Militarily, modular rotations and contractor-heavy sustainment models emerged, unsuitable for protracted, high-intensity war. The GFM model, sufficient for counterinsurgency, is dangerously misaligned to the demands of peer conflict, yet persists as a critical strategic fallacy.31 The GWOT featured heavy reliance on the RC and CS, with contractors sometimes outnumbering U.S. troops, rather than rapid, force generation.32 Economically, deficit-financed wars left the defense industrial base untested for surge capacity.33 

Post-9/11 wars have featured smaller peak troop deployments sustained over far more extended periods than earlier conflicts like Vietnam, as shown in Figure 1.34 Unlike Vietnam’s mass-conscription model, which peaked at ~537,000 U.S. troops in 1968, OIF/OEF relied on a lean, all-volunteer force with repeated deployments, heavily supplemented by the RC and contractors (at a near 1:1 ratio, compared to 1:8 in Vietnam).35 These campaigns also saw a decline in Allied participation. The 2003 Iraq invasion was led primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom, unlike the 16 U.N. sending states in Korea or the 32-nation Gulf War coalition.36 Meanwhile, the United States maintained a constant overseas presence with tens of thousands stationed in Germany, South Korea, and Japan.37 

So what? The past is not a prologue. The shift from mass mobilization to prolonged, modular deployments has stressed the force differently. A future peer conflict will likely require rapid expansion of troop strength and industrial capacity exceeding today’s sustained deployment model, and demands renewed focus on preparedness, large-scale force generation, and industrial mobilization for a protracted, high-intensity conflict from a contested homeland.

Impact of Force Modernization on Mobilization Capacity
Since 2019, DOD investments have overwhelmingly favored advanced sensor-to-shooter technologies and high-end combat capabilities designed for a limited-duration, high-intensity fight. While these systems offer an advantage in early engagements, they are insufficient in number, and the Defense Industrial Base cannot sustain long-term campaigns. The winner of the first fight may be the loser as they expend too many resources and will not be able to reconstitute in time to be ready for a counterpunch.38 Marine Corps modernization efforts have emphasized long-range precision fires, small-unit lethality, reconnaissance-strike networks, and expeditionary advanced basing operations. However, these initiatives lack corresponding investments in mobilization infrastructure, large-scale mobilization training exercises, and force generation pipelines. The Marine Corps’ readiness for the opening salvo has improved, but its ability to absorb attrition, scale operations, and transition to strategic depth remains dangerously underdeveloped.

The absence of a deliberate strategy to sufficiently balance modernization with mobilization preparedness has created critical vulnerabilities. The Marine Corps must account for risk in forgoing investments in mobilization planning, deployment infrastructure, and the human capital needed to convert surge capacity into actual combat power. Without such scrutiny, technological overmatch becomes brittle when confronted by an adversary willing and able to contest in time and space over the long term.

Figure 1. U.S. active-duty military presence overseas is at its smallest in decades. (Figure provided by author.)

Conceptual Framework
A coherent conceptual framework must encompass five mutually reinforcing lines of effort to address the Marine Corps’ current mobilization deficiencies. These lines of effort are derived from existing policy gaps, organizational shortcomings, and the imperative to adapt force development for sustained competition and conflict. Collectively, they form the basis of a deliberate Capability-Based Assessment methodology and serve as a foundation for institutionalizing strategic mobilization as a core competency.

First, the Marine Corps must pursue comprehensive policy reform and synchronization. Reform begins with establishing a robust, Service-level, large-scale mobilization policy that reflects contemporary realities and aligns with ongoing doctrinal reforms. Critical to this effort is revising and integrating MCO 3061.1, Total Force Mobilization Deployment Plan, and MCO 1235.1A, Administration and Management of the Individual Ready Reserve to define clear authorities, roles, and responsibilities across Headquarters Marine Corps, the operating forces, and the supporting establishment. All commands must also identify and train to Mobilization Mission Essential Tasks (METs) to standardize and operationalize planning. For example, Schools of Infantry East and West should be assigned METs, such as be prepared to conduct combat refresher training for additional trainees throughout the conflict and be prepared to augment staff with additional instructors and contracted support to sustain increased student throughput. This will result in a coherent family of mobilization plans nested within the DOD and interagency structures.

Second, a modernized command-and-control architecture is essential for generating unity of effort and streamlining wartime force generation. This command should oversee the activation and integration of RC forces, Individual Ready Reserves, inductees, CS, and critical infrastructure. It would unify key mobilization nodes—such as deployment processing centers, regional support programs, and select inspector-instructor sites—under a framework optimized for scale and responsiveness. A general officer with delegated authority from the Commandant should lead this command to coordinate directly with the Joint Staff, Service component commanders, and supporting establishment leadership.

Third, a dedicated officer and enlisted talent structure is required to institutionalize total force integration. This entails creating a new military occupational specialty, the Total Force Integrator (TFI), within the 05XX MAGTF occupational field. The TFI would consolidate mobilization planners responsible for integrating the RC into the AC at all echelons. Officers and senior enlisted with RC experience are ideal candidates, particularly active-reserve officers (all of which hold a Title 10 mandate to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the RC).39 Selection should mirror the foreign area officer experience track board to ensure only high-performing candidates with the requisite attributes are selected. A formal education pipeline, such as at the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, would provide doctrinal expertise and joint operational fluency.40 Unlike MOBCOM’s past centralization, TFIs should be organized into cells under the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, led by an active reserve O-6 at a Mobilization Plans Branch, with integration into each MEF and MARFOR G-5 Plans section under AR-led TFI cells.41 

Fourth, the Marine Corps must integrate mobilization readiness into its training, education, and wargaming systems. Large-scale mobilization scenarios must be incorporated into Command and Staff College curricula, the Marine Corps War College, and other professional military education venues to build shared understanding across the Total Force. Mobilization METs must also be an inspectable item, reportable to the Commandant at a venue such as the Quarterly Readiness Board. The Marine Corps should conduct regular, large-scale mobilization exercises to validate force generation plans under contested conditions. Supported by a campaign of learning, these efforts will drive informed investment in mobilization requirements and foster a culture fluent in transitioning from crisis response to major combat operations.

Finally, force development and capability investment must be recalibrated to achieve a sustainable balance between initial lethality and strategic depth. While advancing critical high-end capabilities, the Marine Corps’ modernization must be paired with talent management, surge logistics, force generation, and sustainment investments. Iterative Capability-Based Assessment is necessary to identify and prioritize these gaps, aligning operations, activities, and investments across the Future Years Defense Program. Only through this dual-track approach—modernization paired with mobilization preparedness—can the Marine Corps build the resilient, scalable force needed to win a protracted conflict against a peer adversary.

The conceptual framework, Figure 2 (on the following page), is not intended as a prescriptive end-state or a comprehensive operational approach but as a reference model to guide the Marine Corps’ strategic transformation. By adopting these lines of effort in an integrated, sustained manner, the Service can recover its ability to generate and sustain combat power at scale, reinforcing its role as an effective contributor to the Joint Force in high-end conflict.

Figure 2. Conceptual framework diagram. (Figure provided by author.)

Conclusion
The United States Marine Corps stands at a strategic inflection point. The 2027 Taiwan Strait scenario underscores a fundamental vulnerability: the potential inability to execute an organized, large-scale, contested mobilization on pace with a peer competitor. Historical advantages in diplomatic consensus, industrial capacity, and military readiness no longer exist at reliable levels. Force modernization efforts have improved tactical lethality but at the expense of strategic depth.

To remain a credible contributor to Joint Force operations in great-power competition, the Marine Corps must reframe mobilization not as an afterthought but as a theory of victory if deterrence fails. The proposed framework provides a path to institutionalizing mobilization as a core competency of the Service. If implemented with urgency and sustained investment, the Marine Corps will regain its ability to scale, surge, sustain, and prevail in high-intensity, protracted conflict.

>Col Murata is an Active Reserve Infantry Officer currently assigned as the Director of the Office of Marine Corps Reserve within Headquarters Marine Corps. 

>>Maj Ryu is an Active Reserve Logistics Officer currently assigned as a Plans Assessment Officer, focused on the Korea Plans Set, within the War Plans Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, Policies, Plans, and Operations. 

Notes

1. Title 10, U.S. Code §8063(c).

2. Title 10, U.S. Code §129a, General Policy for Total Force Management. Total Force is the organization, unit, and individual that comprises the DOD resources for implementing the National Security Strategy. It includes DOD active and reserve component military personnel, military retired members, DOD civilian personnel (including foreign national direct-, indirect-hire, and non-appropriated fund employees), contractors, and host-nation support personnel. Total Force recognizes that no single component can generate or sustain combat power alone in protracted, high-end conflict.

3. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Total Force Optimization for Strategic Competition, Memorandum, (Washington, DC: October 2024). Total Force Optimization is the deliberate, synchronized use of all elements of the total force—AC, RC, contracted support, and host-nation support—to ensure maximum effectiveness, readiness, and resilience. This includes aligning human capital, capabilities, and resources to mission requirements over time, while preserving strategic depth and surge capacity.

4. Department of Defense, DOD Instruction 1235.12, (Washington, DC: 2017). Activation is the legal and administrative process by which members of the reserve component are ordered to active duty. Activation authorities encompass voluntary and involuntary mechanisms under various statutes (e.g., Title 10 §§ 12301, 12302, 12304, 12305) and necessitate coordination across multiple levels of command.

5. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, (Washington, DC: 2018). Mobilization is the process of assembling, organizing, and deploying personnel, units, and material in response to a national emergency or contingency. Mobilization includes the activation of reserve forces, the coordination of logistics, infrastructure, and command-and-control elements, and may extend to the broader industrial base and national resources. 

6. Total Force Optimization for Strategic Competition.

7. David. M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

8. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

9. Ralph E. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1964). 

10. Kent R. Greenfield, Command Decisions (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987).

11. Why the Allies Won; and The Army and Economic Mobilization.

12. Freedom from Fear: The Army and Economic Mobilization; and Command Decisions.

13. Headquarters Marine Corps, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 1967). 

14. Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010).

15. Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 

16. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951; and The Army and Economic Mobilization.

17. Command Decisions.

18. The War for Korea, 1950–1951.

19. Victory at High Tide.

20. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951.

21. The Army and Economic Mobilization.

22. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

23. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf War: Strategy, Air Power, and the Challenge of War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994).

24. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993).

25. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; and The Gulf War.

26. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). 

27. Kate Phillip, Shane Lauth, and Erin Schenck, U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation (Carlisle: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2006).

28. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Penguin Random House, 2013).

29. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: High-Level DoD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces (Washington, DC: 2006). 

30. Department of Defense, CJCSM, 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance (Washington, DC: 2019). 

31. Ibid.

32. T. Christian Miller, “Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq,” L.A. Times, July 4, 2007, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jul-04-na-private4-story.html; and David Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008). 

33. Kristen Bialik, “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas Is at Its Smallest in Decades,” Pew Research Center, August 22, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades.

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid.; and Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq (Washington, DC: CBO, August 2008).

36. Ivo H. Daalder, “The Coalition That Isn’t,” Brookings, March 24, 2003, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-coalition-that-isnt.

37. “U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas Is at Its Smallest in Decades.”

38. Col Kevin H. Hutchison, interview by authors, April 2, 2025.

39. Title 10, U.S. Code §12310 titled “Reserves: Duty with Organization of the Ready Reserve” authorizes members of the reserve components, including the Marine Corps Reserve, to be ordered to active duty to perform duties that contribute to the readiness of their reserve component. Subsection (a) provides that a reservist is activated under this authority to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, or train the reserve component. Subsection (b) provides that reservists activated under this authority are considered to be serving on active duty for all intents and purposes, and their duty may be performed full-time. MCO 1001.52K Management of the Active Reserve Program states that AR Marines are primarily assigned to inspector-instructor staffs, training commands, recruiting support, and mobilization planning billets (italics added).

40. The Eisenhower School, “Mission: Forging a New Generation of Strategic Leaders,” The Eisenhower School, n.d. https://es.ndu.edu/About/Mission. 

41. The Marine Forces Reserve Mobilization Command of the past was tasked to: (1) manage the Individual Ready Reserve accountability and readiness; (2) execute mobilization processing for involuntary and voluntary activations; (3) standardize mobilization procedures under Title 10 authorities; (4) develop and maintain mobilization plans and procedures in coordination with Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Corps Forces Reserve; (5) provide infrastructure and administrative oversight for mobilization processing centers. Mobilization Command centralized but professionalized mobilization efforts that had previously been handled in a more fragmented or ad hoc manner, streamlining readiness verification and improving the responsiveness of reserve force generation. The key distinguishing feature of the proposed framework is decentralizing mobilization planning from the Service. Ideally, the selected AR total force integrators disperse throughout Marine Corps Forces and the FMF, which are at the forefront of contingency planning in support of combatant commanders, to provide dedicated total force integration subject-matter expertise. 

>The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the authors and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Headquarters Marine Corps or the Service. 

On That First Day on Guadalcanal

Why so little Japanese resistance?

During the months after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and other Asian targets, the United States was driven from the Philippines, the British surrendered Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, French Indochina fell, and the Dutch lost the East Indies.  

This dire threat led to the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, where Japanese and U.S. Navy carrier forces fought to a tactical draw, resulting in a strategic victory, albeit temporary, for the United States and its allies. The Battle of the Coral Sea was also important for the subsequent Battle of Midway, which occurred the following month, as it diminished Japanese carrier forces available for the attack on Midway.

The Japanese also landed on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands in May 1942, and there they began to build an airfield. 

The location of this new Japanese airfield at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal was a serious threat to the security of Australia and New Zealand. So, the United States, as a matter of great urgency and despite not being fully prepared to go on the offensive in the Pacific theater, conducted its first amphibious landing of the war. The 1st MarDiv landed on Guadalcanal on the morning of 7 August 1942 and secured the Japanese airfield under construction without difficulty. 

However, holding this airfield—to become Henderson Field—over the next six months was one of the most contested campaigns in the entire Pacific war. The high stakes fight for control of Guadalcanal, along with the surrounding waters and airspace of the Solomon Sea, was an important turning point in the Pacific War. Ultimately, the U.S. victory at Guadalcanal completely halted further expansion of the Japanese defensive barrier and enabled the Allies to go on the offensive.1

Why did the 1stMarDiv face so little opposition during the first few days on Guadalcanal? It was not just luck, though there was some of that, too. A large part of the answer is provided by MG George C. Kenney in his book Air War in the Pacific.2 Here, Kenney, in a succinct, contemporaneous style, describes the U.S. Army Air Force’s (USAAF) actions against the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul, located on the island of New Britain, to coincide with amphibious landing operations on Guadalcanal: 

Twenty B-17s flew [from their Australian base] to Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea [on 6th August to refuel] and eighteen took off on the big strike on the morning of the 7th August. Twenty Jap fighters intercepted our bombers about twenty-five miles short of the target, but the kids closed up their formation and fought their way to Vunakanau [airfield at Rabaul] where they dropped their bombs in a group pattern that was a real bulls-eye. The Japs still had the same 150 planes lined up wing-tip to wing-tip on both sides of the runway. The [post-strike reconnaissance] pictures looked as though we got at least seventy-five of them, besides setting fire to a lot of gasoline and blowing up a big bomb dump on the edge of the field. In the air combat we shot down eleven of the twenty Jap fighters that participated.3

We lost one B-17 piloted by Captain Harl Pease …. During the combat coming into Rabaul, Pease was on the wing that bore the brunt of the [enemy fighter intercept] attack. By skillful handling of his airplane, in spite of the fact that the bad engine by this time had quit entirely, Pease held his place in the formation and his crew shot down at least three of the Jap fighters. Shortly after he had dropped his bombs on the target, another wave of enemy fighters concentrated their attack on his airplane which they evidently realized was crippled. The B-17 burst into flames and went down. No parachutes were seen to open.4

I recommended Pease for a Medal of Honor; General MacArthur approved and forwarded the recommendation to Washington. The next day, a wire came in from the War Department confirming the award. Carmichael [commanding officer, 19th Bombardment Group and the B-17 flight leader] was given a Distinguished Service Cross, while a number of lesser decorations were awarded to outstanding members of the group.5

The Marines landed at Guadalcanal with practically no opposition. Tulagi was also taken … There was no Jap air interference. Admiral Ghormley wired General MacArthur a congratulatory message on the success of our attack on Vunakanau and the fact that it had broken up the possibility of Jap air interference with his landing in the Solomons. General MacArthur added his congratulations and I sent both messages to the 19th Group with my own.6

During the day [of 7th August], we intercepted several Jap radios which were appeals by the Nips in the Solomons for help from Rabaul air units. The Jap commander at Rabaul replied that he couldn’t do anything for the boy[?] in the Solomons on account of our heavy air raid on his airdrome. The next day [8th August] we intercepted another message which showed that only thirty bombers were serviceable at Vunakanau [post attack]. Jap prisoners, taken at Guadalcanal airdrome (Lunga), confirmed our observation that the day before there were approximately 150 bombers at Vunakanau at the time of our attack.7

Following this highly successful early morning attack on Rabaul on 7 August by the USAAF’s 19th Group, the Japanese hurriedly reconstituted and managed to launch an attack of 27 G4M Betty horizontal bombers that arrived in the Guadalcanal area in the early afternoon. Fortunately, a heavy cloud cover in the target area disrupted these bombers’ aim, and all their bombs fell harmlessly into the waters off Guadalcanal. This flight of Betty bombers was met by eighteen U.S. Navy F4F Wildcat fighters attacking in two waves. A flight of eight Wildcats from the VF-5 squadron based on the aircraft carrier Saratoga attacked first. Then, a second flight of ten Wildcats from VF-6 squadron based on the carrier Enterprise joined the attack. Five Betty bombers fell to Wildcat guns. However, nine of the eighteen Wildcats fell to the seventeen superior-performing A6M Zeroes escorting the Bettys. Some of the downed Wildcat pilots were rescued from the waters off Guadalcanal.8 Later in the afternoon of 7 August, nine D3A Val dive bombers attacked. However, these aircraft managed only one bomb hit—on the aft deck of the destroyer USS Mugford. Again, F4F Wildcat fighters rose from the two USN carriers to shoot down five of the Vals, with the other four ditching during their return to Rabaul. Wildcats also bagged two of the escorting Zeroes.9

The next day, 8 August, the Japanese again sent a horizontal bomber force of 27 Bettys south to Guadalcanal escorted by 15 Zeroes. However, the U.S. Navy was ready. Wildcat fighters again launched from carriers Saratoga and Enterprise to meet this new attack, shooting down 22 of the Bettys while also downing two of the escorting Zeroes. The Bettys did severely damage a U.S. Navy destroyer and sink a transport ship; however, no American aircraft were lost, and no bombs fell on Guadalcanal.10 

Clearly, the USAAF’s perfectly timed, preemptive attack on the Japanese redoubt of Rabaul greatly spared the 1stMarDiv and U.S. Navy’s amphibious shipping off-shore Guadalcanal from far larger air attacks. Credit for this major accomplishment goes to MG George Kenney, who foresaw the need for a heavy, early morning surprise attack on Rabaul to coincide with Guadalcanal operations. 

Kenney, who had only arrived in Australia the month prior, vigorously assumed command of all Allied air operations in the Southwest Pacific Area theater under GEN Douglas MacArthur and insisted on quickly building up the combat capability of the 19th Bombardment Group. This foresight was crucial to staging a highly effective attack on Rabaul with its large concentration of heavy bombers based on the island of New Britain, located at the northern end of the Solomon Sea. 

Of course, the primary credit goes to the courageous 19th Bombardment Group. The eighteen aircrews flew their B-17s without fighter escort all the way to Rabaul and delivered a knockout blow to an enemy air threat. The 19th Group’s surprise attack destroyed or damaged roughly 80 percent of a Japanese bomber force that would have contested amphibious operations at Guadalcanal to a much greater extent.11

Subsequent Japanese air attacks on Guadalcanal were perforce significantly smaller. Indeed, the reduction in Japanese air power caused by this one USAAF attack enabled U.S. Navy fighters protecting Guadalcanal to counter the residual Japanese bomber aircraft that did attack Guadalcanal early on.

As a nod to the 1stMarDiv’s motto of “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy,” one can rightly say that in those first days on Guadalcanal, the 1stMarDiv had very good friends in both the USAAF and U.S. Naval aviation. On those fateful days, they went after the division’s worst enemy in a very big way. 

>Col Karch served from 1966 to 1992. A Naval Aviator, he flew the F-4 Phantom II operationally over three decades. He was also a Test Pilot, Advanced Flight Instructor, and a Ground Forward Air Controler with the South Korean Marines in Vietnam.

Notes

1. Wikipedia Editors, “Guadalcanal,” Wikipedia, n.d., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadalcanal.

2. George Kenney, Air War in the Pacific: The Journal of General George Kenney, Commander of the Fifth U.S. Air Force (N/A: P-47 Press, 2018). George Churchill Kenney (6 August 1889–9 August 1977) was a USAAF general during World War II; he is best known as the commander of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, a position he held between July 1942 and August 1945. He was the first commander of the Air Force Strategic Air Command.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. 

8. Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (New York: Random House, 1990).

9. Ibid. 

10 Ibid. 

11. Ibid. MajGen Kenney was soon promoted to the rank of lieutenant general upon the personal recommendation of MacArthur based on the excellence Kenney displayed in staging the Rabaul raid of 7 August and in subsequent SWPA air operations by the Fifth U.S. Air Force.

I Didn’t Sign Up for This

Civilian contractors in combat at Wake Island

To compete globally in the 21st century, the U.S. military must rely on civilian contractors to manage vital logistical systems. However, war does not discriminate between uniformed combatants and civilians. This tragic fact became all too real for the Marines and construction contractors on Wake Island in December 1941. The Battle of Wake Island offers valuable operational and legal lessons for civilian contractors in combat scenarios. 

At the outset of World War II, Wake Island was occupied by the understrength 1st Marine Defense Battalion, 46 Pan American (Pan Am) Airline employees operating the commercial runway, and 1,145 engineers contracted by the Navy to develop Wake into an advanced base.1 Hours after Pearl Harbor was attacked—2,000 miles to the East—the first Japanese bombs fell onto the tiny atoll of Wake.2 After two weeks of aerial and naval bombardment, the Japanese finally captured the island on their second amphibious assault.3 The defenders of Wake fought heroically, inflicting over 1,000 casualties, sinking two destroyers, damaging eight other ships, and downing 21 aircraft. The 1942 movie, Wake Island, memorialized the heroism of the Marines but downplayed the role of the civilians.4 However, dozens of civilian volunteers assisted the Marines in preparing defenses and directly engaged the Japanese in combat. Several Marine officers even recommended their attached civilian volunteers for decoration.5

This article examines how the civilians were incorporated into the defense of Wake Island. First, it will examine the command relationship between the Navy and contractors, then analyze how the Marines incorporated the civilians into the fighting, review legal considerations, and recommend lessons learned for contemporary military leaders. These lessons are: Account for combat situations in contracts, incorporate local contractors into combat contingency planning, and educate contractors on how the Law of Armed Conflict affects them. 

Military-Civilian Relationship on Wake
The Marines and civilians on Wake Island had functionally and legally unique, segregated roles. The first group to permanently occupy Wake was employees of the Pan American commercial airline, which used the atoll as a stop for its seaplane service ferrying passengers and mail to the Philippines. Although Pan Am had Navy approval to operate from Wake, the Navy exercised no control over its operations.6 After the initial assault from the Japanese on 8 December 1941, all but three of the Pan Am employees evacuated Wake on a civilian aircraft.7 The largest contingent on the island was the 1,145 civilian workers under the construction conglomerate, Contractors Pacific Naval Air Bases (PNAB), who started arriving on the island in January 1941.8 While PNAB was under contract to the Department of the Navy, the engineers were only legally allowed to perform the construction work according to Contract NOy-4173, which called for the construction of a naval air station.9 As shown in Figure 1 (on the following page), the PNAB workers directly answered to a naval responsible officer-in-charge of the 14th Naval District. However, much like a modern contracting officer representative, the responsible officer-in-charge could only ensure the workers were living up to the terms of the contract, not issue them orders.10 When the Marines of the 1st Defense Battalion, commanded by Maj Devereux, arrived on 19 August 1941, they were under strict orders to keep their activities separated from the civilian workers. In fact, the PNAB civilians were even prohibited from refueling military aircraft, taxing the understrength Marine Battalion even more.11 Navy CDR W.S. Cunningham was the Wake Island commander in charge of both civilians and military personnel, but his role was more like a modern-day garrison commander. CDR Cunningham had no authority to order the civilians into combat, and Maj Devereux was in charge of the defenses overall.12 Despite this strict segregation, a looming war against Japan forced the Marines to bridge this gap. 

Figure 1. Command structure on Wake Island, 1941. Full lines represent a direct operational control or tactical control relationship (by modern doctrinal terms), while the dashed line represents coordination for the contractors. (Source: LtCol R.D. Heinl, The Defense of Wake (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps), Appendix V.)
Figure 2. Defense installations on Wake Island. (Source: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division–U.S. National Park Service website A MAGNIFICENT FIGHT: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island.)

Civilians in the Defense
The Marines at Wake Island incorporated contractor volunteers into both non-combat and direct combat roles. Construction contractors fit more naturally into non-combat roles such as creating earthworks, aiding the wounded, and moving heavy equipment. Maj Devereux praised the efforts of the civilians in this regard, but it was too little, too late. The civilians only deviated from working on the construction stipulated in the contract after Wake was bombed.13 Aside from the more obvious engineering tasks, necessity demanded that the civilian volunteers directly engage in combat. The Marine 1st Defense Battalion only had about a third of its authorized manpower, which meant most of its heavy weapons and fighting positions did not have full crews.14 Figure 2 shows Wake’s defensive strong points and indicates unmanned weapon systems. All too aware of this shortfall, the Marines began training civilian volunteers on heavy weapons three months before the attack.15 Civilian volunteers helped to occupy some but not all of these vital strong points.16 Notably, Sgt Bowsher led an all-civilian crew of 16 volunteers on Battery D’s three-inch naval gun located on the island’s northeastern end.17 To coordinate the civilian volunteers, Maj Devereux coordinated directly with the contracting superintendent, Dan Teeters, a World War I veteran who organized requested civilian work parties.18 Often left out of posters and movies, the civilians on Wake Island who did volunteer to aid the Marines deserve just as much recognition. The Japanese certainly treated them the same.

Legal Considerations
Civilians engaging in combat alongside soldiers do so at their own legal risk. Although Japan did sign the 1929 Geneva Convention, the Japanese military became notorious for its mistreatment of prisoners.19 For a modern perspective, the currently in effect Geneva Convention III, ratified in 1949, is best for analyzing the legal status of the fighting contractors on Wake. Geneva Convention III stipulates that civilians accompanying combat forces, such as civil engineers, enjoy the same prisoner of war (POW) status as soldiers. This distinction is important because POWs are entitled to extra rights, such as limits on the type of labor they perform.20 However, if the civilians decide to fight, then only certain criteria grant them POW status. Article 4 states that militias must have a clear commander, have an insignia, must carry arms openly, and must respect the laws and customs of war.21 On Wake, one could argue that the contractor volunteers constituted a militia, but they lacked an official uniform or insignia distinct from the PNAB civilians who did not want to fight. The civilians did have a right to self-defense, but if they were captured after fighting instead of immediately surrendering, then under the Geneva Convention, they would not have to be treated as POWs. Furthermore, the civilian volunteers would not have combatant immunity, meaning they could be charged with murder by the government whose territory any killing took place in. Seeing how Wake Island was a U.S. territory, not surprisingly, no civilian ever saw their day in court. Although helpful for future cases, the Japanese did not weigh these considerations. The Japanese who captured Wake Island treated (and mistreated) all the civilians, even those not participating in the defense, the same as the Marine prisoners of war.22

Conclusion
The Marines and civilian defenders of Wake Island still have lessons to teach the force today. As contractors become increasingly enmeshed with soldiers in the modern operating environment, commanders should consider how to manage or even employ them in combat situations.23 First, unlike at Wake, military contracts should have some stipulation on when and how civilians report to commanders in a combat situation. Even if the contractors cannot fight, the commander should be able to keep their accountability. Second, military units should identify which civilians would be willing to assist in combat and provide necessary training. Contingency plans also should have provisions for how the contractors are either employed or protected. Then the commander should leverage the existing civilian chain of command as much as possible. Lastly, civilian contractors should be made fully aware of the legal repercussions if they choose to fight and be provided distinct insignia if they make that resolution. It is not a decision to be taken lightly, but as the experiences of Wake proved, the alternative could be worse. Out of the 1,145 contractors on Wake Island in December 1941, 34 were killed in battle, 98 were massacred on the island in 1943, and 114 died in Japanese POW camps.24 Contractors supporting the military cannot always choose if they are suddenly in a combat zone, but they can be more prepared by those who make preparing for war their profession.

>Maj Thomas is an Army Special Forces Officer with several combat deployments to the Middle East. He recently graduated from the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and is currently serving as a Plans Officer in I Corps. 

>>Maj Malapit is a Judge Advocate Officer who deployed to Latvia during her time as an Engineer Officer. She recently earned her LLM from the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School and is currently serving as the Chief of Justice for the 7th Infantry Division.

 

Notes

1. Bonita Gilbert, Building for War: The Epic Saga of the Civilian Contractors and Marines of Wake Island in World War 2 (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2012); and James Devereux, Report on the Defense of Wake Island (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Archives, 1945).

2. Report on the Defense of Wake Island.

3. Ibid. 

4. Devereux, The Story of Wake Island (New York: Charter, 1947).

5. Woodrow M Kessler, Battery B Report to LtCol Devereux (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Archives, 1945); and George Kinney, Report to Lt Col. Devereux (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Archives, 1945).

6. Building for War. See specifically, Chapter 2, “Opportunity Knocks.” 

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. 

9. National Archives, Federal Register Volume 6, Number 21 (Washington, DC: 1941).

10. R.D. Heinl, The Defense of Wake (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1947).

11. Report on the Defense of Wake Island.

12. The Defense of Wake.

13. The Story of Wake Island.

14. The Defense of Wake.

 

15. Building for War.

 

16. Report on the Defense of Wake Island.

17. Building for War.

18. The Story of Wake Island.

19. Utsumi Aiko, “Japan’s World War II POW Policy: Indifference and Irresponsibility,” The Asia-Pacific Journal May 2005, https://apjjf.org/-Utsumi-Aiko/1790/article.html. 

20. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. I, Federal Political Department, Bern, Section III, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949?activeTab=undefined.

21. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. I, Federal Political Department, Bern, Section I, Article 4; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949?activeTab=undefined. 

22. Building for War.

23. Mark F. Cancian, U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020: SOF, Civilians, Contractors, and Nukes (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2019).

24. Building for War. See specifically Appendix II.

Someone to Light the Path

Morals, ethics, and self-assessment

Whom Shall I Send?
“All around our society, you see immoral behavior … lying, cheating, stealing, drug and alcohol abuse, prejudice, and a lack of respect for human dignity and the law. In the not-too distant future, each of you is going to be confronted with situations where you will have to deal straight-up with issues such as these. The question is, what will you do when you are? What action will you take? You will know what to do—the challenge is, will you do what you know is right? It takes moral courage to hold your ideals above yourself. It is the defining aspect. When the test of your character and moral courage comes, regardless of the noise and confusion around you, there will be a moment of inner silence in which you must decide what to do. Your character will be defined by your decision, and it is yours and yours alone to make. I am confident you will each make the right one.”

—Remarks for Pepperdine University Convocation Series, Gen Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 14 October 1998

There is No Superman
Imagine yourself as a unit leader locked in kinetic engagement with a peer enemy force. Your support is too far away and too heavily engaged to provide adequate assistance at this time. Enemy artillery is creeping closer and closer to your position as their troops close in behind it.  It seems that the entire world is beginning to crash down around you. The shockwaves and blast overpressure are rolling over you and taking your breath away. The small-arms fire and machineguns shooting at your position make loud snaps as the bullets pass by you and overhead (it sounds just like when you were pulling pits at the rifle range), and you can hear them ricocheting off metal objects, walls, and other things around you. The entire time, you are being pelted with pieces of dirt, debris, and bullet fragments. The day-to-day cares of normal life—paying bills, eating right, working out, getting to work on time, saving up for retirement—all of these things seem trivial and meaningless in the din of this moment. The thin veneer of civilization is stripped away, and your worries and cares have been reduced to a single primal instinct: to survive. The lives of you and your Marines are teetering on the precipice. You realize that existence beyond this moment is not guaranteed. It is time to make a decision and give your orders.

What kind of leader have you been up to this point, now that your own life and the lives of your Marines are at stake? Have you been a leader who has been hands off in the development of your unit, allowing the lower leadership to make all the decisions on training objectives and readiness, trusting that all will pan out well in the end? Have you been a leader who sought acceptance and popularity by catering to your Marines’ creature comforts, drinking alcohol with them during downtime and being cool, allowing training rosters to be pen-whipped, fitness tests to be inflated, and readiness requirements to be falsified—and now you and your Marines find yourselves significantly unprepared for the situation at hand? Rather, have you been a leader who has continuously led from the front with a strong work ethic, shared the common burden, and relentlessly enforced and adhered to our training standards? Have you held yourself and your Marines to the moral and ethical standards that we have sworn ourselves to, setting the example both on and off duty? Have you done your best to adhere to our code of Honor, Courage, and Commitment? Given the current situation, do you believe in yourself to make a recognition-primed, correct decision? Do you believe in your Marines’ ability to fight out of this situation? Do your Marines believe in you? What sort of leadership is more reliable and trustworthy when the time comes to put ourselves to the test in actual combat? Are you currently empowering those Marines who constantly strive to keep the standards of honor, courage, and commitment, or are you hindering them? Are the voices of reason being drowned out by those voices who prefer the easy road and do not take training seriously? What kind of leader should be calling the shots when everything is at stake? Is it someone like your current leader? More importantly, is it someone like you, or is this a job for Superman?

The central purpose of this article is to provoke the drive for self-assessment and recall the line of thinking that spurred us to join the Service. We should recall the frame of mind that originally put us on this path and, if we have found ourselves straying too far from that original line of thinking, that this piece will prod you to self-correct, readjust, or, if you need to, hit the reset button and start over. I would like us to contemplate the values that prompted us to join, the moral and ethical obligations that our country demands of us, and enforce those same obligations to which each of us has sworn a sacred oath to honor and uphold both within ourselves as well as within our ranks. My aim is to fortify our trust and confidence in each other and to empower and strengthen the dedication, resolve, and bias for action of those voices among us whose honor and character have withstood the furnace, the hammering, and the quenching of the forging process to become the true bearers of our battle standards and the uncompromising stalwarts of Semper Fidelis.

The Ovation from the Depths of Hell Itself
From the time when I was young, I have always felt like I was meant to do something great, like I had a higher purpose in life. I grew up extremely poor. My brother and I made do with a few worn-out toys and three sets of clothes each that we had to wear to school two days in a row every week. That was all we had. My family saw to it that we were educated and had a solid moral foundation, but I never felt as though I had the means to be something more. After high school, I went to college and worked a couple of jobs. I even owned a small construction business, but nothing seemed to satisfy my desire to do something that would truly make a difference in this world. Then 9/11 happened. At the time, I was working for the State of Alabama’s Department of Human Resources, going with our social workers as contracted security doing in-home investigations and mentoring ill-behaved state-custody kids who were attending public school. It was meaningful work, and we made huge differences in the lives of the children we helped—but it was also extremely disturbing at times because of what I found that parents were capable of subjecting their own children to. One day, while sitting in a high school with one of our state-custody kids, the teacher suddenly stopped the class and turned on the TV. We all saw the first tower burning as the second plane hit live on the air. The film crews on scene were shooting live footage of people jumping to their deaths. The high-pitched clapping sounds of average American citizens hitting the pavement at terminal velocity still haunt me to this day. When the President came on television and told us that our Nation had been attacked and that we were going to war, I knew deep down that I had to do something. That day, I quit my job at the Department of Human Resources and found a job at a local gym so I could get myself in shape for military service.

Through this Portal
I am, and have always been, what some would call a true believer. When I joined the Marines, I believed in everything that I read in the pamphlets and saw in the commercials on TV. I believed in everything that my drill instructors shouted at me about integrity, discipline, and the pride that is inherent in being the world’s most elite fighting force. I was grateful for the opportunity to endure the forge that would shape me into a Marine. Then, finally, one hot summer morning after an intense and grueling three months at Parris Island, an Eagle, Globe, and Anchor was placed in my hand. With tears rolling down my face, I was honored to be joining this battle-hardened organization that holds our rich and storied history in high regard and, above all else, holds in high regard the moral and ethical standards that, throughout my entire life, have been imprinted upon my soul. There was no work that I could put my hands to that could ever honor myself and my family more than serving as a Marine. I was hooked for life.

The Horns of a Dilemma
All of us, at one time or another, have been faced with some sort of moral or ethical dilemma while wearing the uniform. To level the playing field and be honest with ourselves, we must ALL acknowledge that none of us is beyond reproach in these matters. Nevertheless, in order to fight entropy, keep good order and discipline within our ranks, and to protect our most precious commodity—special trust and confidence—we must relentlessly strive to uphold and enforce the moral and ethical principles that sustain that trust and confidence. Both up and down the chain of command, mutual trust and confidence are the currency that enables us to execute our missions. Without mutual trust and confidence, we assume enormous amounts of risk and gamble the welfare of our Marines, the accomplishment of the mission, and—most importantly—the love for each other that holds it all together.

Omnia ergo quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis.

“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

—The Golden Rule

This well-known adage has been restated in multiple ways, such as treating others the same as you would like to be treated, not treating others in a way that you would not want to be treated, or providing to others the same dignity, honor, and respect that you expect in return. No matter how you interpret it, all these variations have the same result: reciprocity in how we deal with each other. We all want to be surrounded by people that we can trust, but this trust and confidence is not, and should never be, a one-way transaction. That being said, I am not suggesting that we should ever lie, cheat, or steal from those who do these things to us (as can sometimes be misinterpreted from the Latin translation), but that we stay on the positive end of the spectrum with our morals and ethics and correct, as efficiently and effectively as possible those who treat us and others unjustly. This will preserve our honor and dignity both as individuals and as a force. We must relentlessly seek justice and ensure that the standards that we create and enforce among ourselves apply to everyone equally, regardless of rank or station, even when it means that those who are expected to enforce the standards are the very ones who require correction. There should be no double standards. Everyone should be held equally accountable to the same set of principles. By living by this maxim, we create and sustain an environment where mutual trust and confidence can thrive, we preserve the honor of our Service, and we have the opportunity to guide, mentor, and preserve those certain voices among us from destroying themselves as well as our organization.

Trust and Confidence
Mutual trust and confidence come at a very reasonable price—that you put forward your best effort and treat those around you with the same honor, fairness, and dignity that you expect in return. Lying, cheating, and stealing are all unjust actions that no one wants to have done to them; therefore, you should hold yourself to this basic standard: that you do not impose the injustices upon others that you would not want imposed upon yourself. As Marines, I would venture to say that we should not only use these axioms to guide ourselves individually but that we have all been bound in oath together to enforce these axioms amongst ourselves, and as expeditionary forces in readiness, that we are meant to enforce these axioms against any unjustified and tyrannical entity that has born itself into existence, in whatever clime and place that our attention has been directed.

“Trust is an essential trait among leaders—trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure. Trust is a product of confidence and familiarity. Confidence among comrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and a common professional philosophy.”

—MCDP 1, Warfighting

“A great man doesn’t seek to lead. He’s called to it, and he answers.”

—Dune, Warner Bros. Entertainment, 2021

Trust, and the confidence that it brings in tow, is the invisible glue that holds all our relationships together. From our brotherhood and esprit de corps to our effectiveness as fighting units, trust in each other is what ties our spirits together, and hence makes us extremely effective as a team. In keeping with this, performance on demand is the standard that must be maintained. It is our intrinsic responsibility to each other to hold the line, enforce the standards, and keep each other sharp and ready for employment at a moment’s notice.

When missions come down, commanders look at what they have available, based on the Defense Readiness Reporting System and then decide which units get tasked to do the job. The Defense Readiness Reporting System report is published by each unit and requires that the leaders within each unit report correct numbers to accurately depict their unit’s readiness to meet our Nation’s requirements. If they fail to do this accurately, units may get tasked with missions that they have not been manned, trained, or equipped to accomplish. Doing so would create unbalanced tasking, which would lead directly to the reckless risking of Marines’ lives, potentially for nothing more than unit leaders selfishly wanting to look good in readiness briefs. It is not fair to the other units that are doing business honestly, nor is it fair to the Marines who are being held to a higher mission standard than what they have been trained to accomplish. Readiness is what commanders assess when war comes, so it must be done accurately and honestly for the sake of the mission and the Marines.

Mission Accomplishment and Troop Welfare
Mission accomplishment and troop welfare are the two principles that guide every unit in the Marine Corps. These two ideals of mutual expectations between leaders and led are built on the foundations of mutual trust and confidence. Without mutual trust and confidence between leaders and the led, neither mission accomplishment nor troop welfare can survive. Leaders must be able to trust that their Marines will pursue mission accomplishment in the most efficient, effective, and honorable way possible, while their Marines must in turn be able to unquestionably trust that their leaders have employed all options available to ensure their safety and troop welfare.

This trust is built over time by the repeated meeting of expectations by both leaders and led. If we want our leaders to trust us, we must prove to them that their priorities are our priorities and line up our objectives, whether in training or combat, to best address them. We must prove time and time again that we are highly capable and can be trusted both on mission and on liberty. We must be frank and honest and find out what concerns them. Then we take action to address and quell those concerns. The end state is a leader who has the utmost trust and confidence in their unit and the peace of mind necessary to employ their Marines with mission-type orders. This focus on the concerns of the leadership should be the ultimate goal of the led.

As leaders, if we want our Marines to trust us, it is simple—we love and care for them as we would our own children. We reward them when they do well, always reinforce their positive behavior, and provide fair and reasonable correction when necessary. We must train and mentor them as a teacher would their students. Above all else, we must share their burdens and never task them to do anything that we are not willing to do ourselves. We must prove to them that we are willing to sacrifice for them as they are for us—that we love them as we love ourselves. This can be proven via the sacrifice of your time, blood, and sweat to endure the same burdens alongside them. Make time to know them. Make time to suffer alongside them. This self-sacrifice shows that you genuinely care about them, proves that you have their troop welfare at heart, and builds unquestionable trust from your Marines. This relationship between leaders and led—mission accomplishment and troop welfare—is the unspoken trade-off that lives within every hierarchy in the Marine Corps. This relationship should be well-maintained and be the ultimate goal of the leaders on behalf of the led. When this relationship is properly cared for, trust flourishes, and the unit performs tremendously. When this relationship is not maintained with mutual trust, confidence, respect, and dignity, the seeds of destruction have been sown.

“Destroy the seed of evil, or it will grow up to your ruin.”

—Aesop

Seeds of Destruction
Every ordered system undergoes entropy. It is a natural part of existence. Things break down when left unmaintained, and, at times, maintenance may not be enough to restore their proper functioning. It may be necessary at times to rebuild the entire system to adequately address new requirements in line with what it was ultimately designed to do. For us as Marines, the functions of our Service and the relationships that control them are that system. For this article, I will avoid discussing big-picture Force Design and attack from the little end—the day-to-day functioning of small units and the individual Marines within them. The bottom line is this: if we do the small things right, the big things will take care of themselves. These small things are simply the basics that you were taught at boot camp and Officer Candidate School. Treat your fellow Marines with respect and dignity. Always be honest. Moral courage and integrity are virtues to be sought after and respected. Calibrate and follow your moral compass. Hone your honor. Muster your courage. Uphold your commitment to stand up for what you know is right.

The author (left), Naim Mohammad (right), and James “Jim” Cathey Jr. (center). Jim’s father was a mentor to the author and was killed by an IED during their 2005 combat deployment to Iraq. (Photo by author.)

So, what causes entropy within our Service? It starts small. It is the everyday things that we let slide when we know they should be done correctly. Maybe we slack on pushups when the squad leader is not looking. Maybe we let someone else do our annual training. Maybe we lie about why we showed up to work late. Maybe my team leader lies for me, so I do not get in trouble. Maybe I inflate my numbers on the crunches during the PFT. Maybe my team leader inflates everyone’s numbers. As entropy goes unchecked, we may begin submitting morning reports without accountability of the Marines, pen whipping training rosters, plagiarizing or stealing credit for someone else’s work, stealing gear and supplies, stealing issued gear from another Marine, stealing ammunition from the range, falsifying unit readiness reports, cheating on your spouse, committing adultery with someone else’s spouse, using your position to get sexual benefits, sexually harassing or assaulting another Marine—the list could go on. The bottom line is that we all have the responsibility to engage and destroy these seeds of destruction as soon as they present themselves, before they grow out of control. It is on each of us to be the sentries of good order and discipline. Never ignore your inner voice. Never accept that standing up for what is right is an obstacle that cannot be overcome.

The Obstacle Is the Way
Think back to when you graduated boot camp or got commissioned. Remember how proud you felt. Remember how proud your family, friends, and loved ones were of you. Imagine them seeing you now and knowing what you know about what kind of Marine you have become. Would they still be proud of you? Compare your mindset then to who you are now. After all this time, are you still proud of yourself? If not, it is time for self-assessment and self-correction. When you fail to do it yourself, it is on us as your fellow Marines to help you assess and correct. By wearing the uniform, you represent us all. You have sworn an oath to our ethical principles, and we have in turn sworn an oath to help keep you sharp and on the path.

You do not have to be a Marine of higher rank to be a moral and ethical leader. All of us are equally capable of guiding our fellow Marines, no matter what their rank or station. All it takes is moral courage. Hold honor and integrity higher than your comfort. Fight all these fights and do your best to win each one. These short-term victories will support long-term resilience and will be realized in the indomitable strength you will gain from overcoming countless obstacles and hardships. Strength is gained by opposing a force. Confidence is gained by overcoming these obstacles. Some might say that the obstacles in your life are exactly what you must seek out. The obstacles are where you find opportunity. That the obstacles are, in fact, the way.

Beyond Corruption
The ultimate point is that we all must first be loyal to the same common standard—something fair and just and beyond corruption. People are human and fallible. They are imperfect. They have lapses in judgment and make mistakes. Loyalty to people will always have the chance of failing or backfiring on you. However, loyalty to a common set of principles will always be incorruptible given that the members of the organization see to it that its commonly agreed upon principles are always kept. Some of us will be strong when others are not and vice versa. Some of us will see the path while others do not and vice versa. Some of us will have the moral courage to stand up for what is right when others do not—and vice versa. We hold each other accountable, and by doing so, we build trust and confidence among us and ensure both mission accomplishment and troop welfare.

Conclusion
My grandfather, having served as an infantry platoon commander and company commander during World War II, taught me that leadership is built on mutual respect and dignity. My father, echoing my grandfather’s teachings, taught me that hard work is good for the soul and that honesty is always the best way forward, even if it seems to be personally harmful in the moment. Above all else, the Golden Rule is the essence of an honorable way of life. Treat others how you want to be treated. Be honest. Work hard. Recognize and honor those who do the same while having the strength and moral courage to hold accountable those who do not. Never be too proud or arrogant to allow yourself to be corrected, sharpened, and guided back to the path. Take the improvement in stride and appreciate your chance to become a stronger Marine—and a better human being—than you were before. Be appreciative and allow the detrimental parts of yourself to be identified and cut away. We all need pruning from time to time.

It is my deep and sincere wish that this article helps us all to identify the areas in which we need to improve ourselves both morally and ethically as Marines. I hope that we can make ourselves better and more honorable human beings than before—to become guides to our leaders, peers, and subordinates. To be flares who light the path of honor, courage, and commitment. This path embodies the principles and promises of all our pamphlets, commercials, and publications. This path ensures that we maintain the tremendous reputation of those who have gone before us and puts us all on the best possible trajectory to being the greatest versions of ourselves and, therefore, the finest Marine Corps that we can possibly be. Instill trust. Radiate confidence. Be loyal to our common ethical principles. Enforce our core values. Hold the line. Do not allow the seeds of destruction to take root. Do not contribute to the darkness. Each and every one of us who holds our common values near and dear—and defends them—is a light to those Marines around us. Do not let them wander in the darkness. Correct them, sharpen them, and most importantly, love them. Be someone to light the path.

>Maj Fountain enlisted in the Marine Corps in 2003 and served three combat tours to Iraq, a MEU to CENTCOM, and two deployments to the Black Sea Rotational Force. At the time that this article was written, he was deployed and serving as the Combined Task Force 61/2 Space and Special Access Programs Operations Officer in support of U.S. Sixth Fleet objectives in EUCOM. He is currently at II EOTG and retiring from the Marine Corps.

First to the Fight in Acquisition Reform

Equipping Marines better and faster: a proactive approach

The new administration’s call for a revitalized military demands a fresh look at defense acquisition reform. The DOD has wrestled with the complexities of acquiring and fielding advanced military capabilities for decades, generating a mountain of studies, reports, and recommendations in the process. Yet, a crucial question remains: how can we navigate this complex landscape to best equip Marines for the 21st-century battlefield? This question takes on even greater urgency as the character of warfare continues to evolve at an unprecedented pace, driven by technological breakthroughs, the proliferation of advanced weaponry, and the emergence of new domains of conflict, such as cyberspace and space. Our role as the stand-in force within the acquisition weapons engagement zone provides us with a unique perspective on balancing reform needs with crisis response. Every decision we make hinges on one essential question: will it result in sustainable, superior capabilities delivered to Marines faster?

This question drives acquisition professionals at the Program Executive Office, Land Systems (PEO-LS). Tasked with equipping the Marine Corps with the groundbased weapons systems and equipment necessary for success in modern warfare, PEO-LS occupies a critical position within the defense acquisition ecosystem. As the stand-in force in the acquisition world, PEO-LS must constantly balance the need for modernization and innovation with the urgency of delivering capabilities to Marines rapidly and efficiently.

3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d MarDiv, fire a Stinger missile from a Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. The MADIS Mk1, pictured, and Mk2 form a complementary pair and will be a force multiplier for the low altitude air defense battalions’ ground-based air defense capability. (Photo by Jim Van Meer.)

The PEO-LS recognizes that success in this challenging arena requires strong partnerships across the Marine Corps and the broader DOD. The organization collaborates closely with entities like the Deputy Commandants for Capabilities Development and Integration and Programs and Resources, Marine Corps Systems Command, and fellow program executive offices to ensure aligned efforts and a cohesive approach to acquisition reform. These partnerships are essential for breaking down bureaucratic silos, fostering shared understanding, and promoting unity of effort across the acquisition enterprise.

Evolutionary Versus Revolutionary Reform: Forging the Optimal Path
The debate surrounding defense acquisition reform often hinges on the appropriate balance between evolutionary and revolutionary change. Proposals for reforming the Defense Acquisition System span a broad spectrum, from evolutionary tweaks within existing frameworks to revolutionary overhauls aimed at redefining processes and structures. This debate is not merely academic; it has real-world implications for the ability of the U.S. military to maintain its technological edge and prevail in future conflicts.

Evolutionary reforms target incremental improvements to existing processes and structures within the traditional pillars of requirements, resources, procurement, and sustainment. The 2020 Adaptive Acquisition Framework, with its emphasis on tailored pathways for different types of acquisition programs, exemplifies this approach. However, as highlighted by a recent Government Accountability Office assessment, these efforts have yet to significantly reduce the average delivery time for weapon systems.1 While such reforms can generate positive results, they often fail to keep pace with the rapid technological advancements and evolving character of warfare. Critics argue that evolutionary reforms, while well-intentioned, often amount to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic: they may improve efficiency at the margins, but they fail to address the systemic issues that plague defense acquisition.

Revolutionary reforms demand a fundamental reimagining of the Defense Acquisition System. These proposals advocate for disruptive changes to processes, organizational structures, authorities, and even the underlying culture of defense acquisition. Proponents of revolutionary reform argue that the current system, rooted in a bygone era of industrial-age warfare, is simply not equipped to deal with the complexities and challenges of 21st-century defense acquisition. They call for a fundamental shift in mindset from a culture of risk aversion and bureaucratic inertia to one that embraces innovation, experimentation, and rapid iteration.

Marines with 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, II MEF, discuss the events of ISLAND MARAUDER as part of BOLD QUEST ‘24 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC, 30 October 2024. BOLD QUEST ‘24 is a joint staff sponsored, multinational venue designed to enhance and develop interoperability. (Photo by LCpl Weston Q. Lindstrom.)

Three recent efforts are notable. First, the Atlantic Commission report on the Commission on Defense Innovation offered many proposals that adopt the private sector’s rapid innovation best practices.2 The Commission also proposed modernizing acquisition and budgeting processes to foster increased collaboration with nontraditional companies to get advanced technology to warfighters sooner. Second, the NDAA FY 2022 Sec. 1004 Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform final report recommended that the DOD should adopt a new resourcing system.3 The proposed Defense Resourcing System, in the commission’s view, would preserve the strengths of the current PPBE process while also better aligning strategy with resource allocation and allowing the DOD to respond more effectively to emerging threats and technological advances. Finally, a recent Bloomberg Strategic Edge study, chaired by the former Commandant, Gen Berger, highlighted the urgency of rebuilding the industrial base, using non-traditional innovators, and unlocking private capital to accelerate the fielding of emerging technologies.4 Differing from the other studies, this report recommended the DOD carry out these acceleration efforts by divesting fifteen percent of its budget for some of its aging legacy systems to fund a new parallel track for fielding high-technology capability quickly and at scale. 

These diverse yet interconnected proposals share common threads: a focus on accelerating innovation, streamlining resource allocation, embracing organizational agility, and fostering closer collaboration with the private sector. The challenge lies in determining which specific reforms, and to what degree, will deliver the greatest benefit for the Marine Corps and the broader defense enterprise. This requires careful analysis, a willingness to experiment, and a commitment to continuous learning and improvement.

PEO-LS: A Dual Approach to Driving Transformation
The PEO-LS recognizes that successful reform requires both strategic vision and tactical execution. The organization actively implements strategic revolutionary changes while simultaneously driving tactical innovations within the existing framework. This dual approach enables PEO-LS to pursue both incremental improvements and more transformative changes, maximizing its impact on the defense acquisition process.

Strategic Reorganization and Process Optimization
The PEO-LS has undertaken a series of organizational realignments designed to enhance efficiency and better align its internal structure with the evolving needs of the Marine Corps. For example, we have reorganized program offices to enhance alignment and efficiency, merging key capability areas to better support Force Design aims. Notable examples include:

  • MAGTF Command and Control (C2): By combining ground and aviation command and control programs, we are developing an integrated, scalable MAGTF Command and Control solution. This initiative ensures interoperability across naval, joint, and coalition forces.
  • Intelligence and Cyber Operations: We have merged intelligence and cyber programs to use their unique network warfare capabilities, enhancing our ability to address emerging threats.

These integrated capability areas streamline decision-making processes, reduce redundancies, and foster greater synergy between related programs. This approach recognizes that the nature of warfare is increasingly interconnected, requiring a more integrated and holistic approach to capability development.

These examples show how we are continuously implementing acquisition reform while working within the bounds of the current process. We are stretching those bounds by adapting strategic-level changes, such as assigning several of our program managers to also act as capability acquisition managers, looking beyond their specific programs to see how they can improve key capability areas supporting Force Design outcomes, including integrated C2, counter unmanned systems, and integrated air and missile defense.

Recognizing that overly bureaucratic processes can stifle innovation and slow down acquisition timelines, PEO-LS has implemented a range of process improvements aimed at reducing administrative burdens and streamlining procurement activities. These efforts include eliminating redundant tasks, automating workflows, and delegating responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level. The PEO-LS has placed a particular focus on reducing procurement administrative lead time, particularly within the contracting process, where delays can significantly impact program schedules. This focus on streamlining processes is essential for enabling the rapid acquisition of emerging technologies, which often have shorter lifecycles and require a more agile approach.

Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion, II MEF, test out the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) Driver Training System (ACV DTS) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC. The ACV DTS replicates the ACV’s driver’s station, complete with more than 50 unique functions, to include a driver’s display panel with realistic and accurate vehicle and engine performance displays. The simulation also creates a first-in-the-field complex and realistic surf zone with multiple wave types, variable wave heights, littoral currents, randomized wave periods, and directions all controlled by a physics-based simulation engine. (Photo by David Jordan.)
Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion, II MEF, test out the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) Driver Training System (ACV DTS) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC. The ACV DTS replicates the ACV’s driver’s station, complete with more than 50 unique functions, to include a driver’s display panel with realistic and accurate vehicle and engine performance displays. The simulation also creates a first-in-the-field complex and realistic surf zone with multiple wave types, variable wave heights, littoral currents, randomized wave periods, and directions all controlled by a physics-based simulation engine. (Photo by David Jordan.)

Tactical Success: Rapidly Fielding Advanced Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS) Capabilities
Blending strategic-level revolutionary changes (such as the FoRGED Act or Gen Berger’s “Blueprint for Defense Innovation”) to the tactical changes, the Marine Corps acquisition professionals have and will continue to spearhead improved capability delivery. The results are impressive across several portfolios, but none more so than CUAS. Just five years ago, the only CUAS capability any Marine formation had was a Stinger missile and a Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball for detection. This year, PEO-LS’s Ground-Based Air Defense Program will complete the development or fielding of five programs of record and one urgent capability acquisition: MADIS, L-MADIS (replacing a Joint Universal Needs capability), installation defense of small CUAS (replacing a Joint Urgent Operational Need system), Medium Range Intercept Capability, and organic CUAS for dismounted formations.5 

These successes highlight the importance of close collaboration between PEO-LS and key partners such as the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Deputy Commandant for Capabilities Development and Integration. By working together, these organizations have successfully begun to better bridge the valley of death that often hinders the transition of promising technologies and capabilities from development to deployment, ensuring that Marines receive the tools they need without delay. This collaborative approach is essential for overcoming the stovepipe nature of traditional defense acquisition and fostering a more integrated and responsive approach to capability development.

The Road Ahead: Embracing Continuous Improvement and Empowering the Workforce
While PEO-LS has made significant strides in advancing acquisition reform, the journey continues. The organization recognizes that reform is not a destination, but rather a continuous process of adaptation, innovation, and improvement. In a rapidly changing security environment, the defense acquisition system must be able to adapt and evolve to meet new challenges and seize new opportunities.

To guide its ongoing efforts, PEO-LS must continuously ask critical questions and challenge the status quo:

  • How can we better integrate emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and directed energy, into existing and future acquisition programs? The PEO-LS must be proactive in identifying and evaluating emerging technologies, and in developing innovative acquisition strategies that enable the rapid fielding of these game-changing capabilities.
  • How can we foster deeper and more impactful collaboration with the private sector, particularly with non-traditional defense companies that bring new ideas and innovative solutions to the table? The PEO-LS must be proactive in engaging with these nontraditional players, leveraging their expertise and innovation to deliver cutting-edge capabilities to the warfighter.
  • How can we strike the right balance between the need for speed in acquisition, particularly in response to rapidly evolving threats, with the imperative for accountability and responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars?

The PEO-LS must continue to refine its processes and procedures to ensure that it can acquire capabilities rapidly while maintaining the highest standards of fiscal responsibility and accountability to the American taxpayer.

By continuously asking these questions and engaging in a robust dialogue with stakeholders across the defense acquisition community, PEO-LS ensures that its reform efforts remain relevant, effective, and responsive to the evolving needs of the Marine Corps. This requires a commitment to continuous learning, a willingness to experiment, and a relentless focus on delivering results for the warfighter. 

Conclusion: An Unwavering Commitment to Delivering Capabilities and Equipping Marines for the Future Fight
While the journey toward acquisition reform is fraught with challenges, it also presents significant opportunities. Recent workforce reductions will align to process improvements reducing non-value-added tasks. Our optimized workforce remains our greatest asset The PEO-LS acquisition professionals bring unparalleled ability and dedication to the mission, making them well-equipped to implement both strategic and tactical reforms.

At PEO-LS, acquisition reform is not simply an abstract concept or a box to be checked. It represents a fundamental commitment to delivering the best possible capabilities to Marines as quickly and efficiently as possible. As the stand-in force within the acquisition weapons engagement zone, Marine Corps acquisition professionals are best positioned to lead the way in evolutionary and revolutionary acquisition reform efforts. Ultimately, the true measure of success will be our ability to deliver sustainable, superior capabilities to Marines faster. By keeping a steadfast focus on this goal, we can lead the charge in acquisition reform, ensuring the Marine Corps stays at the forefront of innovation and readiness. By staying true to our mission and embracing a culture of continuous improvement, we can ensure that the Marine Corps stays ready and capable in an ever-changing world.

>SES Bowdren is the Program Executive Officer Land Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command.

Notes

1. Government Accountability Office, DOD Acquisition Reform (Washington, DC: December 2024). 

2. Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Matthew MacGregor, and Eric Lofgren, “Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption,” Atlantic Council, January 16, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/atlantic-council-commission-on-defense-innovation-adoption. 

3. Commission on Planning, Budgeting, and Executive Reform, Defense Resourcing for the Future (Washington, DC: March 2024). 

4. David H. Berger, Kirsten Bartok, Yisroel Brumer, Nathan Diller, Matt George, and Clint Hinote, Strategic Edge (Washington, DC: January 2025). 

5. Morgan Blackstock, “PEO Land Systems Fields Advanced Air Defense System to 3D LAAAB,” Marines.mil, December 13, 2024, https://www.peols.marines.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4000903/peo-land-systems-fields-advanced-air-defense-system-to-3d-laab; and David Jordan, “MRIC Complete Quick Reaction Assessment,” Marines.mil, October 24, 2024, https://www.peols.marines.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3947926/mric-completes-quick-reaction-assessment.

Closing the Gap for Integrated Casualty Evacuation

Logistical operations in a contested environment

Operational forces in future wars must be small, agile, and have a low signature to survive the Miniaturized Sensor and Precision Weapons Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This will have transformational effects on both peer and asymmetric conflicts.1 When combined with the scale and ferocity of peer conflicts, the RMA will generate casualty volumes not seen since World War II and Korea.2 This especially holds true in a maritime conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, where the tyranny of distance and timeframes of protracted conflict impose significant challenges on health service support (HSS) operations. Successful casualty evacuation is a particular vulnerability because a crucial gap exists between ongoing innovation efforts at the tactical level and well-established treatment facilities at the strategic level.

For operations inside the first island chain of the South China Sea, and the INDOPACOM area of operations more broadly, our naval forces have developed a doctrinal architecture for a future fight against China. These concepts include Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) by our fleets and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) by our FMF.3 The two concepts converge with Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE), where Navy and FMF medical operations will have to be integrated and synchronized with theater-wide logistical operations to maximize the survivability of the critically wounded. 

The challenge of medically supporting the Marine Corps during contested EABO and LOCE is formidable. The Navy and Marine Corps are redesigning their medical force packages to increase their survivability within the enemy’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ).4 However, the medical concept of operations and requirements for the littorals are underdeveloped and present a particular friction point between the HSS capabilities supporting the naval force with DMO and those supporting the Marine Littoral Regiments executing EABO.5 

Medical forces will need to care for larger casualty volumes during sustained operations while minimizing the targeting risk that HSS operations pose to maneuvering forces. Bridging EABO and DMO requires new medical enablers within the contested littorals who can perform patient staging, and patient holding and coordinate numerous disparate evacuation elements spread over large distances.

EABO HSS Adaptations Lack Operational-Level Integration Component for LOCE
Navy Medicine is adapting to China’s steadily increasing ability to contest the sea domain by investing in smaller, faster next-generation afloat medical capabilities, and smaller ashore expeditionary medical capabilities to support the mass casualties likely to occur at sea and on land.6Within the FMF, it is now widely accepted that traditional Role 1 battalion aid stations lack the holding capability, and traditional Role 2 shock trauma platoons lack the agility and scalability to meet the needs of the modern battlefield such as EABO.7 Marine Corps Combat Development Command has identified these gaps and is developing prolonged casualty care (PCC), damage control resuscitation (DCR), damage control surgery (DCS), and en route care capabilities that can maneuver and support the ground elements during contested EABO.8

Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment describes the “integrated application of Navy and Marine Corps capabilities to overcome emerging threats within littoral areas that are rapidly expanding in operational depth, complexity, and lethality.” The new medical capabilities that will support the Marine Littoral Regiments during contested EABO and the new, smaller afloat surgical capabilities supporting the maritime force all share the same limitations: they cannot hold mass casualties, regulate patient movement, and exercise the medical command and control (C2) necessary to coordinate and stage patients for rapid evacuation through the Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System (TAES)—particularly at logistical nodes used as aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs).9

The LOCE medical force—blue naval, and green FMF medical personnel—must collaborate to resolve these limitations and create a unified survival chain that offloads casualties from the maneuvering elements, stabilizes them for transport, integrates them into the TAES, and moves them outside the WEZ and ultimately to military treatment facilities (MTFs). 

Optimal Casualty Care Requires Greater Control over Casualty Flows
Medical operations must be entwined with logistical operations for the contested environment in a future maritime fight, especially for EABO and LOCE. The Navy and Marine Corps have no dedicated fixed or rotary MEDEVAC capabilities and have previously relied upon Army, Air Force, and allied assets for short-range evacuation during an era when air supremacy and overflight clearance were assured.10 The Air Force also provides the long-distance aeromedical evacuation (AE) capabilities which will be necessary in a war in the East and South China Seas, given the time and distance challenges there. 

There is also no indication that the Navy and Marine Corps’ reliance on combined and joint theatre-level evacuation capabilities can be significantly reduced or that an abundance of organic short-range MEDEVAC options can be created in a reasonable timeframe. Military Sealift Command and flattop vessels do offer additional options beyond Air Force AE to evacuate casualties out of theatre; however, their mobility and survivability constraints are significant, and getting casualties aboard them still requires separate short-range MEDEVAC or CASEVAC assets. Therefore, the most likely outcome is the frequent re-tasking of platforms (particularly rotary ones) primarily designed for sustainment operations as lifts of opportunity.

The challenges to ad-hoc CASEVAC include the limited total number of airframes, vehicles, and small boats—all with competing tasking priorities—as well as evasion of an advanced enemy’s kill chain. Whenever CASEVAC can be tasked to patients, the next challenge will be to find a destination. Higher levels of care will likely be out of range, necessitating intermediate holding and staging locations. Intermediate medical units within the WEZ will also be distributed over larger areas and will have to become smaller to maintain mobility and survivability, in turn reducing their patient capacities and placing greater demand on casualty holding at other locations. 

In other words, casualty evacuation at the scale of future conflict will be an extraordinarily complex undertaking with many failure points. We risk thousands of preventable deaths due to casualties not being efficiently stabilized and evacuated outside the WEZ. If bogged down by these casualties, combat arms units will become combat-ineffective.

Historically, the failure to create robust medical C2 frameworks for casualty evacuation has been a consistent feature of post-Vietnam conventional conflicts.11 These failures significantly worsened medical outcomes in conflicts that were very one-sided in the United States’ favor.12 In a true peer conflict, poor medical C2 implementation could cause catastrophic levels of preventable deaths and widespread breakdown of combat effectiveness due to the inability to extract large volumes of casualties engaged in kinetic operations. This would ultimately lead to a cascade of failures from the tactical, to the operational and then strategic levels.13 Our concern must therefore not just be that inefficient casualty management will cause preventable deaths, but that it can cause us to lose the war. 

The silver lining is that there are low-cost, low-footprint opportunities for the Navy and Marine Corps to connect the dots and create a comprehensive operational medical system. These new medical C2 and staging capabilities will mitigate the current casualty evacuation constraints and gaps associated with a contested maritime environment.

A Crucial Air Force Template for Medical C2 and Logistical Integration
To complete the survival chain and decompress maneuvering forces engaged in DMO and EABO while maintaining tight accountability over injured personnel, the Navy and Marine Corps will greatly benefit from adapting Air Force aeromedical evacuation liaison teams (AELTs) to their own purposes.14

Aeromedical evacuation liaison teams are designed to provide on-the-ground AE coordination in the combined, joint environment to steer casualties into the TAES. An AELT is composed of a flight nurse, a Medical Service Corps officer, and a communications expert trained and equipped for critical decisions necessary to
coordinate patient movement requests and build requirements for lifts of opportunity. Operating for up to 30 days without resupply, AELTs do not provide direct patient care. Instead, they embed with tactical units, command centers, or logistical nodes to coordinate patient flows to move patients out of theater. The AELTs decide on the optimal allocation of evacuation assets, balancing clinical conditions versus lift requirements. 

One of their key liaison functions is to enter casualties into the Transportation Command Regulating Command and Control Evacuation System for accountability and tracking of personnel until arrival to military treatment facilities in the United States.15 This complex liaison function also necessitates equipping AELTs with redundant secure and unsecure communications systems through a standardized communications package.16

At present, no Navy or Marine Corps HSS elements possess the necessary structure, training, skillsets, and organic communications equipment of the AELTs. Without a counterpart to AELTs, the medical C2 aspect, initiating and coordinating patient movement on ad-hoc and dedicated medical lifts, will fall on tactical commanders. A Navy and Marine Corps version of AELTs would also need to coordinate afloat and long-range ground evacuation (e.g. via allied nation rolling stock).17 Such a complex regulation and evacuation function cannot be foisted upon combat leaders who are already cognitively saturated by the demands of kinetic operations. Navy and Marine Corps capability modeled on the Air Force AELTs is therefore not a nice-to-have but an absolute requirement to ensure patient accountability and prevent mission failure 

Air Force Model for Patient Holding and Staging Would Enable Rapid Integration with Logistical Operations
Another crucial gap capability for bridging EABO with DMO and medical with sustainment operations in the contested environment is a patient holding and staging system to hold patients behind the forward line of troops for rapid embarkation of wounded service members on lifts of opportunity. Traditional Role 2 enhanced and Role 3 units have the capacity to treat and hold many patients but are too large and static to survive inside the WEZ. The Air Force En Route Patient Staging System (ERPSS) is a model capability to fill this gap. 

The ERPSS can provide modular configurations for staging patients at SPODs and APODs. Teams have a holding capacity between 10 and 250 beds, and a holding time between 6 and 72 hours.18 Each ERPSS “provides patient reception, complex medical/surgical nursing, limited emergent intervention” and, crucially, ensures patients are medically and administratively prepared for extended travel on AE platforms.19 In addition to performing this vital medical regulation function, they create an efficient patient loading environment that minimizes the time that aerial platforms are vulnerable to detection and targeting on the ground.20 

The ERPSS is a modular concept that can be scaled up or down based on operational conditions or lift requirements, both afloat and ashore. The smallest block is the ERPSS-10, so-named because it organically comprises ten patient beds. Its thirteen personnel care for a maximum of 40 patients per 24-hour period, with supplies for a minimum of 72 hours of continuous operations (the associated logistical package provides 7 days of supplies).21 There are no credentialed providers (i.e. physicians/physicians assistants) in the ERPSS-10 configuration. Patients are instead expected to be triaged, resuscitated, and stabilized by DCR and DCS capabilities with the goal of force preservation to keep forces in the fight. 

A Navy and Marine Corps version of the ERPSS-10 could be the foundation piece to address the current patient staging and holding gap. As with the broader responsibilities of Navy and Marine Corps-adapted AELTs, an adapted ERPSS model will also have to package and hand off patients for maritime and ground-based evacuation platforms, which significantly increases mission complexity compared to the Air Force ERPSS. For instance, packaging a patient for high-altitude transport requires different steps than packaging a patient for heavy seas. 

Carrying over the modular ERPSS design would enable setups from 10, 50, to over 100 beds with predictable logistics and favorable conditions. Equivalent modules prepositioned at key APOD/SPOD locations with efficient, compact packaging sets will avoid the need for the Navy and Marine Corps version of ERPSS to co-locate with MTFs and make them self-sufficient. Switching from the fixed capabilities of traditional Role 2 and Role 3 units that previously supported ground operations to a scalable patient staging model based on ERPSS provides the means to rapidly prepare and package injured warfighters for egress based on theater conditions including adversary anti-access/area-denial capabilities, casualty volumes, and specific threat level at SPOD and APOD locations. 

New LOCE Medical Capabilities Will Maximize Warfighting and Patient Care Outcomes
The 37th Commandant, Gen Robert Neller, stated that “[Marines’ and Sailors’] ability to think critically, innovate smartly, and adapt to complex environments and adaptive enemies has always been the key factor we rely on to win in any clime and place.”22 As the Marine Corps makes major organizational changes to enable our combat arms brethren to maximize the use of that ability on the modern battlefield, Navy Medicine must adapt its organization and mindset to give our sailors the ability to maximize casualty survival.

We are already taking steps to enhance the ability of tactical-level providers to provide point-of-injury Tactical Combat Casualty Care and Prolonged Casualty Care in tandem with pushing DCR and DCS capabilities forward. The missing link in the survival chain are operational-level/LOCE adaptations that bridge casualty movement from the tactical EABO/DMO level to definitive care and recovery outside the enemy’s WEZ. By adapting the proven Air Force AELT and ERPSS concepts, the Navy and Marine Corps will empower our sailors to be agile and proactive, creating key nodes in the survival chain that decompress the tactical level, maximize the use of numerous long-distance evacuation modalities, and ultimately maximize our ability to keep casualties alive and maintain combat effectiveness.

The Air Force AELT and ERPSS templates will still have to be tailored to optimally support contested EABO and LOCE. The expectation of PCC within the tactical constraints of DMO and EABO is mirrored at the LOCE level by scarcity of Class VIII supplies and evacuation assets as well as the constant need to lessen vulnerability to enemy sensors and precision fire. We must recognize, though, that even as the enemy’s detection range and WEZ has expanded greatly because of the RMA, the requirements of operational-level medical teams such as Navy and Marine Corps AELT and ERPSS adaptations are distinct and separate from tactical-level medical assets such as DCR/DCS and strategic assets like MTFs. 

Creation of the proposed medical C2 and staging and holding teams to enable LOCE integration can easily occur within the existing force structure. These small new teams will require relatively modest dedicated budgets for training and communications equipment. Experimentation with the initial teams could then lead to a wider rollout of LOCE integration solutions to yield maximal combat effectiveness and casualty survival outcomes that will greatly benefit the Navy and Marine Corps as a whole.

>LCDR Keeney-Bonthrone is a General Medical Officer and the Lead Instructor of 4th MarDiv’s experimental Prolonged Casualty Care team. 

>>CDR Jaiswal is an Intensivist with 4th Medical Battalion. 

>>>CDR Ibikunle is a General Surgeon with 4th Medical Battalion. 

>>>>CAPT Delk is an Emergency Medicine Physician and the current the Commanding Officer of 4th Medical Battalion.

Notes

1. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Washington, DC: 2020); Kristen D. Thompson, “How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 16, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict; and Caitlin Lee, “Countering China’s Military Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region,” RAND Corporation, March 2024, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CTA3200/CTA3273-1/RAND_CTA3273-1.pdf.

2. Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2023).

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 2nd Edition (Washington, DC: 2023).

4. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Surgeon General Campaign Plan 2028, (Washington, DC: 2023).

5. Headquarters Marine Corps, Littoral Operations in the Contested Environment, (Washington, DC: 2017).

6. Navy Surgeon General Campaign Plan 2028.

7. LCDR Benjamin Chi and ENS Duncan Carlton, “The Role 2 Light Maneuver Element” in Marine Corps Gazette 105, No. 3 (2021).

8. Johannes Schmidt, “Expeditionary Medical Systems: Increasing Warfighter Survivability in Littoral Combat,” MCSC Office of Public Affairs and Communication, Marine Corps Systems Command, December 28, 2023, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3627576/expeditionary-medical-systems-increasing-warfighter-survivability-in-littoral-c. 

9. Littoral Operations in the Contested Environment.

10. Dion Moten, Bryan Teff, Michael Pyle et al., “Joint Integrative Solutions for Combat Casualty Care in a Pacific War at Sea,” Joint Force Quarterly, July 24, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1913091/joint-integrative-solutions-for-combat-casualty-care-in-a-pacific-war-at-sea.

11. Arthur M. Smith and CAPT Harold R. Bohman, “Medical Command and Control in Sea-Based Operations” in Naval War College Review 59, No. 3 (2006), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1931&context=nwc-review.

12. Ibid. 

13. Andrew S. Harvey, “The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis,” Military Review, November 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2021/Harvey-Levels-of-War.

14. Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-42.54: Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team, (Washington, DC: 2020); and Rachel S. Cohen, “46 Hours: How Airmen Fought to Save Lives After the Abbey Gate Bombing,” Air Force Times, August 30, 2022, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/08/30/46-hours-how-airmen-fought-to-save-lives-after-the-abbey-gate-bombing.

15. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-42.54.

16. Ibid. 

17. Stig Walravens, Albina Zharkova, Anja De Weggheleire et al., “Characteristics of Medical Evacuation by Train in Ukraine, 2022” in JAMA Network Open, June 23, 2023, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2806503.

18. Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 4-02: Health Services, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2019). 

19. Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-42.57: En Route Patient Staging System, (Washington, DC: 2016).

20. Ibid. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Headquarters Marine Corps, The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, (Washington, DC: 2016).

PPBE Reform

Legislative action to speed innovation

Under constraints in current programming and budgeting processes, the Marine Corps cannot match adversaries’ speed of innovation in today’s rapidly changing, technologically advancing environment. Many complain that the biggest problem with the Corps’ budget is it is too small. A bigger problem is that legislative requirements prevent us from properly allocating funding to new, emerging technology that advances capabilities. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process is how the Marine Corps plans for, requests, allocates, and spends the funding received from Congress. The Marine Corps must seek legislative reform in the programming and budgeting process to facilitate more timely acquisition of emerging technologies to remain competitive with adversaries. Many service members and civilians in the DOD recognize problems in this process. After a recent commission on PPBE reform, some in Congress now recognize the problem, too. It is a long, drawn-out process full of inefficiencies and restraints that create waste. Our Nation’s adversaries do not face these same bureaucratic hurdles in resource allocation and subsequent acquisition of goods. They have governments that try to facilitate the building of more lethal forces with modern technology. Because they have governments who try to streamline these processes instead of inadvertently hampering them, their military forces will be technologically superior to ours if we do not move to effect change now.

There are steps the Marine Corps can take with Congress to enact changes that facilitate innovation and allow the Corps to allocate resources more appropriately. Change like this requires transparency with Congress and continued good stewardship of taxpayer dollars, but the payoff will provide flexibility in resource allocation and a dramatic reduction in wasted funding.

The Marine Corps and DOD allocate resources against requirements through the PPBE process. The Marine Corps uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Assessment (PPBEA) Process. Because this article draws heavily from DOD policy and discussions at the congressional level, it will refer to the process as the PPBE Process. 

The full PPBE Process is typically a three-year cycle that begins with the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) conducting strategic and capabilities planning based on authoritative strategies at the national, departmental, and Service levels as well as the Commandant’s guidance. This is followed by the programming and budgeting phases, where funds are more specifically tied to requirements that support necessary capabilities. The process, for this article, ends in the execution phase when we spend congressionally appropriated funds against the requirements we began planning for years ago.1

The current process allows for civilian oversight of DOD spending through congressional control over the defense budget. It has permitted Congress to look at DOD needs as a whole and align resources to best support national security. At least, it has best supported national security in this manner up until the technological revolution we’re experiencing. A significant problem in this process is that to conform to this process the Marine Corps must begin identifying requirements three years before the year of execution. By the time the year of execution arrives, the technology looks completely different than it did during the planning process, and we have insufficient flexibility in realigning funds toward emergent requirements that did not exist during the planning phase. Thankfully, many of the shortfalls in the current process have already been identified.

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2022 called for the creation of a commission to evaluate the PPBE Process. The commission identified many issues with the current process that prevent it from supporting the DOD and national security in the current, ever-changing environment. Some of the issues identified are that it takes too long to distribute funds, it is challenging to make modifications or upgrades to current assets, the process makes Services slow to react to new threats, new starts are prohibited under a continuing resolution (CR), and the speed of innovation is slowed.2 During the planning portion of PPBE, DC CD&I aligns strategies and guidance to capabilities that will support this guidance.3 However, “the budgets presented to Congress and what is appropriated cannot be tied easily to the overall defense strategy since the budgets are presented to Congress in terms of appropriation title and agency … rather than by capability areas.”4 There is a misalignment between how the Marine Corps plans and how Congress resources those plans. This misalignment, and many other issues identified in the commission’s final report, cannot be remedied without widespread legislative and procedural change. However, there are more minor modifications to the current process that the Corps can work with Congress to change while we wait for more far-reaching action. Before looking at these less sweeping changes, it is worthwhile to look at how our adversaries approach resourcing their military forces to get the full picture of the problems we face. 

Our adversaries do not face the same bureaucratic hurdles as our own. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intentionally creates competition for the benefit of the People’s Liberation Army and increases its bargaining power with corporations in the defense industry.5 The CCP has split and merged defense industry corporations several times in the past to better foster innovation in technology and try to overcome its very different set of hurdles regarding military procurement.6 Based on U.S. values, the CCP’s example does not provide a model worth emulating. China’s government does not have the checks and balances in place that the United States does to prevent this kind of abuse of power. 

It is also worth mentioning that the system the CCP is implementing has not yet been effective in producing the desired results. None of the widespread reforms the CCP implemented have yet to get to the root of the procurement problems faced by their military, and the more current military-civil fusion it is implementing is focused more on research and development and less on procurement.7 For that reason, this brief comparison is not intended to be alarmist in nature. It is intended to show the sharp contrast to that of the U.S. Government, whose multi-year budgeting process and strict restrictions on funds availability drastically slow down military innovation. 

On 20 March 2024, the Commission on PPBE Reform presented its findings and recommendations to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Service. While some committee members viewed the findings favorably and realized the need for reformation in the PPBE process, there was also strong pushback and harsh criticism. The DOD was criticized for overspending, failing to track where its money went, and never having passed an audit. However, it was noted in the hearing that the Marine Corps is the only branch of the DOD to receive an unmodified audit opinion.8 Due to the size of the DOD’s budget and other governmental departments that also feel like they desperately need additional funding, it is no surprise that the DOD’s inability to account for taxpayer dollars is preventing Congress from giving its military more flexibility to seek innovative solutions to modern problems in preparation for a peer-to-peer conflict. 

Based on the feedback received from the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Marine Corps should seek legislative change allowing branches within the DOD that have passed the audit to receive benefit from some of the recommendations in the committee’s final report. This allowance requires transparency and open communication between the Marine Corps and Congress. The Marine Corps’ clean audit opinion goes a long way toward displaying transparency and building trust with Congress. We have proven that we can account for taxpayer dollars while adhering to applicable laws and regulations. 

The committee’s final report contained 28 recommendations to Congress, many of which would streamline acquisition, reduce waste, and permit innovation. Many of these recommendations need to be implemented in the entire DOD or they are simply not feasible. These changes will likely take years to come to fruition, assuming they do at all. The Marine Corps may already find itself engaged in the next conflict by this time and will have missed out on years’ worth of opportunities waiting for Congress to effect change to the PPBE Process. However, some recommendations could realistically be applied to only portions of the DOD and could be contingent upon a clean audit opinion. Congress can grant branches that receive an unmodified audit opinion greater flexibility in managing financial resources provided they can maintain their unmodified opinion. 

The Marine Corps receives funding through appropriations, which provides funds for a specified time based on the length of appropriation. Military Personnel (MILPERS) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds are single-year appropriations, which means they must be completely used by the end of the current fiscal year and are no longer available for use after 30 September of each fiscal year. Many Marines are likely familiar with the end-of-year funds dump, in which all the funding that was set aside at various levels for emergent requirements or additional budget cuts during the year of execution is hastily spent on whatever requirements can still be executed at the end of the year, regardless of the priority or capability provided. While it is necessary to ensure funds are available for emergent requirements, it goes without saying that this is an inefficient use of funding and a waste of taxpayer dollars. The commission recommended that the DOD should be allowed to carry over five percent of its Military Personnel and O&M funding each year. This would enable branches to maintain a reserve for unexpected end-of-year bills, short-notice permanent change of station orders, and overseas medical evacuation needs without potentially wasting that money at the end of each fiscal year.9 Instead, those funds could be carried over and applied to needs that more directly contributed to supporting warfighters and enhancing capabilities. This is the first recommendation from the commission that Marine Corps leadership should ask for Congress to implement immediately based on a clean audit opinion. Because the Corps has proven it is a good steward of taxpayer dollars, let us further stretch those dollars by carrying over five percent of these single-year appropriations. 

Below-threshold reprogramming (BTR) allows the Marine Corps “to realign, within prescribed limits, congressionally approved funding” without congressional approval.10 The BTRs are important since the year of execution in the PPBE cycle happens years after planning for that year began. Undoubtedly, unexpected requirements will arise that were not resourced by Congress. The committee’s final report made several recommendations regarding BTRs, one of which is to increase BTR thresholds.11 This is a relatively minor adjustment for Congress to implement, but when coupled with other recommendations in the committee’s final report, it will probably take years to implement. The Marine Corps should ask Congress to immediately permit BTRs up to the threshold recommended in the commission’s report. 

Continuing resolutions have become a painful and standard part of every fiscal year. Annual appropriations bills, which provide our funding for the new fiscal year, are supposed to be signed into law by 1 October of that year. The CRs were created as a safeguard to provide temporary funding until the new year’s budget can be signed, but they have turned into an expected norm for every year. Unfortunately, expecting them does not do anything to mitigate the consequences of them. “Standard CR prohibitions on new starts and increased production quantities delay the start of innovative new programs and the acquisition of essential capabilities.”12 Based on some of the comments in the hearing on the commission’s final report, it is unlikely Congress will be quick to remove all the restrictions in CRs, but some allowances can be made. Congress should allow new starts and increased production quantities during a CR for military branches that have and maintain an unmodified audit opinion. 

These changes would not only help the Marine Corps foster innovation but also allow us the flexibility to more properly align taxpayer dollars to higher priority requirements. They would also incentivize a clean audit opinion in other branches of the military and the DOD, which benefits Congress and all taxpayers. These changes will not solve all the Marine Corps’ problems in the PPBE Process as it relates to acquisition and proper resource allocation, but they will help. They are also realistic. Congress has acknowledged these problems exist. Because the Marine Corps has set itself apart from the rest of the DOD by proving it can pass an audit, it should seek Congressional relief from these known, documented problems.

The current PPBE process is too slow-moving to support the war‑
fighter in today’s rapidly evolving environment. Current policy is allowing technological advances to outpace the DOD while our adversaries are actively trying to capitalize on these advances. The DOD has not received a clean audit opinion and that is hurting us. This is understandable because the DOD, as the largest piece of the government’s budget pie, owes it to the people we serve to be good stewards of their dollars. The Marine Corps must lily pad off our unmodified audit opinion and work with Congress to seek relief from bureaucratic constraints in the PPBE process, or we will be outpaced by technology and our adversaries.

>The author’s bio was not available at the time of publication.

Notes

1. Commandant of the Marine Corps, MCO 7000.1, Marine Corps Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Assessment Process, (Washington, DC: August 2022).

2. Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform, Defense Resourcing for the Future (Arlington, VA: 2024).

3. Marine Corps PPBEA Process.

4. Defense Resourcing for the Future.

5. Yoram Evron, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion and Military Procurement,” Asia Policy 16, No. 1 (2022).

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Final Report of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform Commission: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 111th Congress, (2009), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-final-report-of-the-planning-programming-budgeting-and-execution-reform-commission.

9. Defense Resourcing for the Future.

10. Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 3: Budget Execution–Availability and Use of Budgetary Resources, Chapter 6: Reprogramming of DoD Appropriated Funds (Washington, DC: 2000).

11. Defense Resourcing for the Future.

12. Ibid.

2025 Aviation Plan Executive Summary

Balancing crisis response and modernization

The Deputy Commandant for Aviation’s (DC A) 2025 Aviation Plan (AVPLAN) was signed and released this past January. The AVPLAN intends to communicate to the FMFs, our industry partners, and Congress, the DC A’s priorities and direction over the next five years, guided by the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance and his priorities. Notably, the Commandant’s priority of “Balancing Crisis Response and Modernization” lies at the forefront of this AVPLAN and has guided Marine Aviation’s strategy to maintain a ready and lethal force.

Project EAGLE outlines DC A’s strategy to modernize Marine Aviation across multiple future year defense programs. The Project EAGLE initiative focuses on expanding interoperability with the Joint Force and allies, evolving the Marine Air Command and Control Systems, and incorporating new functional concepts such as Distributed Aviation Operations and Decision-Centric Aviation Operations. We will transform Marine Aviation to meet future operational needs by focusing on unmanned platforms, logistics, digital interoperability, and manned-unmanned teaming, ensuring a competitive advantage in future conflicts and supporting both the naval and Joint Forces across all domains.

To accomplish this, Marine Aviation must be ready. Therefore, operational readiness is the DC A’s number one priority. The challenge is to maintain a high level of readiness and remain lethal to respond to crises while also modernizing aviation capabilities. As we maintain this balance between crisis response and modernization, the DC A will ensure Marine Aviation remains lethal, naval at its core, and ready to respond to crises with the warfighting edge necessary to support our Marines, sailors, and the Joint Force.

Marine Aviation will also pursue a demand-based sustainment strategy, improving fleet readiness through better collaboration and efficient resource delivery. Efforts are being made to reduce variability in aircraft readiness through optimized maintenance, tooling, and logistics. Sustainment solutions will focus on three lines of effort: improving fleet readiness, enhancing sustainment for distributed aviation operations, and reducing equipment variability. This includes modernizing aviation supply packages, enhancing logistics information systems, and developing a replacement for aging aviation logistics vessels. This comprehensive approach ensures Marine Aviation can effectively support the MAGTF throughout the full range of military operations.

Qualified Marines also remain the key to our ability to meet operational requirements. While each type, model, and series of aircraft is in a different phase of lifecycle and inventory management, Marine Aviation will remain focused on managing aircrew and maintainer inventories by building properly-sized populations in grade, qualifications, and experience levels. To realize these goals, Marine Aviation will first reestablish a manpower management branch within Marine Aviation.

Marine Aviation Capabilities and Commodities
Marine Aviation aims to maintain a powerful and responsive air combat element for the MAGTF. This includes transitioning to an all-5th generation tactical air (TACAIR) fleet and modernizing the air combat element to be ready for combat today and tomorrow. The DC A’s intent is to maintain the current F-35 and CH-53K transition plans while also ensuring each community employs the most ready, safe, and lethal aircraft. 

First, the F-35 B/C provides advanced sensors, air-to-air missiles, and air-to-surface strike weapons, which are crucial for the MAGTF and Joint Force mission globally. By 2025, the Marine Corps will have received 183 F-35B and 52 F-35C aircraft. The F-35 program aims to support 12 F-35B squadrons and 8 F-35C squadrons, with a total of 420 F-35 aircraft. Fleet squadrons will be increased to 12 primary aircraft authorization by fiscal year (FY) 2030. The F-35B/C modernization includes Technical Refresh-3 upgrades, APG-85 radar upgrades, advanced countermeasures, and electronic warfare improvements. The program is focused on Block 4 capabilities, weapons integration, and site activations.

The F/A-18 Hornet provides vital maritime strike and air interdiction capabilities, with ongoing modernization ensuring its effectiveness in the Marine Corps’ TACAIR Transition Plan and global operations. The Marine Corps operates 161 F/A-18 aircraft, transitioning squadrons annually until FY29, with aircrew training now conducted by the Fleet Replacement Detachment at VMFA-323. The Hornet’s increased lethality with the AN/APG-79(v)4 radar and AESA technology, alongside upgrades in electronic warfare, extended-range weapons, and communications. Funding priorities focus on integrating advanced weapons, improving beyond-line-of-sight capabilities, enhancing electronic warfare systems, and supporting precision approach capabilities.

The AV-8B Harrier provides critical Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing capabilities for the MAGTF, offering precision strike, escort, and rapid deployment for MEUs with advanced targeting and missile systems. The Marine Corps operates 39 AV-8B aircraft across two VMAs, with plans for VMA-231 and VMA-223 to transition to F-35B. The AV-8B will continue supporting training and combat operations for forward air controllers and joint tactical air controllers, providing flexible deterrence and combat capabilities to combatant commanders. Funding will focus on T402 engine readiness, full LINK-16 integration, fleet replacement squadron support, and weapons upgrades.

The KC-130J is a vital enabler for MAGTF success, providing global mobility, logistical support, and aerial refueling across multiple regions with increased capacity in the Indo-Pacific. Four Marine aerial refueler transport squadrons operate 75 KC-130J aircraft with the full transition expected by 2027, which includes a program of record of 95 aircraft. The aerial refueler transport team is working to integrate more effectively with the MAGTF and joint forces by enhancing capabilities like realtime data transmission and adjusting training devices to support expanded training needs. Funding will focus on hardware and software upgrades, integrating MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link, procuring infrared countermeasure kits, and expanding backup aircraft inventory to maintain operational capacity.

The MV-22 Osprey provides critical medium-lift assault support with unmatched speed, range, and payload, ensuring rapid response for global crisis and humanitarian missions. The Marine Corps has a program of record for 360 MV-22Bs, organized across 16 active squadrons, 2 reserve squadrons, and several test and executive transport detachments, with VMM-264 reactivating in FY26. Ongoing efforts focus on improving configuration management, increasing fleet sustainability, modernizing flight control systems for degraded visual environments, and enhancing interoperability with the MAGTF Agile Network. Funding focuses on safety instrumentation for predictive maintenance, technology replacements to mitigate obsolescence, improved nacelle reliability, and new flight control systems to increase aircraft capability and safety.

The CH-53K King Stallion offers three times the range and payload capacity of the CH-53E Super Stallion. It can transport heavy equipment, troops, and supplies over long distances, ensuring forces remain agile and supported. Operating from both land and sea bases, including austere sites and amphibious shipping, it provides essential flexibility to the MAGTF. The Marine Corps plans to procure 200 CH-53Ks, equipping six active squadrons, one reserve squadron, and various test and fleet replacement detachments, with the full transition expected to be completed by FY32. Key efforts for the CH-53K include focusing on aircraft inventory, sustainment, and capability, with the first MEU detachment expected to deploy by FY27. Funding priorities for the CH-53E include sustainment, safety, and interoperability upgrades, while the CH-53K focuses on supply chain capacity, testing, sustainment, and warfighting capability expansion.

The H-1s are essential to the MAGTF, providing multi-role attack and utility capabilities that enhance lethal and non-lethal options, bridging gaps in low-altitude attack and strike operations. The H-1 Program consists of 349 aircraft, with a total active inventory of 301 aircraft across five squadrons and a planned increase to 314 by FY31. The H-1 modernization plan focuses on improving digital interoperability, survivability, lethality, and electrical power capacity, ensuring the fleet remains versatile and capable of future conflicts. The program’s key funding priorities include digital interoperability, power upgrades, survivability, sensor optimization, and aircrew systems enhancements.

The Marine Unmanned Expeditionary Medium Altitude Long Endurance unmanned aerial systems provide critical capabilities such as airborne early warning, maritime domain awareness, and electronic warfare support. The Marine Corps currently operates 10 MQ-9A Block 5-20 aircraft and plans to field a total of 20 Block 5-25 aircraft with ongoing efforts to establish additional unmanned aircraft squadrons. The MQ-9A program focuses on sustaining operations through contract logistics support and the activation of Unmanned Aerial System Maintenance Squadron 1 (UASMS-1) by FY26 to manage maintenance and sustainment for MQ-9A Reapers. Key funding priorities include Marine Unmanned Expeditionary Medium Altitude Long Endurance unmanned aerial systems procurement, capability spirals, UASMS-1 establishment, and improvements in lethality, survivability, and expeditionary deployability.

The F-5 N/F provides essential adversary training for TACAIR, assault support, groundbased air defenses, and Marine air control squadrons, enhancing combat readiness for Marine aviation and ground units. The Marine Corps currently operates F-5s assigned to Marine Fighter/Attack Training Squadron 401 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma and Marine Fighter/Attack Training Squadron 402 at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, with plans to acquire eleven more aircraft over the next four years to meet growing adversary training requirements. The F-5 fleet is undergoing upgrades, including glass cockpits and Red Net integration, while exploring new solutions like LVC capability and commercial air services to address adversary training gaps.

Marine Corps Operations Support Airwing provides critical air transport for high-priority passengers and cargo, ensuring timely logistical support for forward-deployed MAGTFs. The Marine Corps Reserve Operations Support Airwing squadrons, including Marine Transport Squadron 1, Marine Transport Squadron Belle Chasse, and Marine Transport Squadron Andrews, support active-duty Operations Support Airwing operations and lead the management of UC-12W, UC-35D, and C-40A aircraft. The top priority is the recapitalization of non-deployable UC-12F/M and UC-35D aircraft, with plans to procure additional UC-12W aircraft to meet the program of record. The funding priorities include procuring nine UC-12W aircraft and modernizing UC-12W with digital interoperability capabilities.

The HMX-1’s mission includes worldwide transportation for the President and key officials, supporting high-level travel and operational test evaluations for presidential lift aircraft. The HMX-1 began transitioning to the VH-92A in 2022, with the Marine Corps declaring its initial operational capability in December 2021 and having since integrated the aircraft into operational missions. With a total of 23 aircraft in the program of record, the VH-92A is set to fully replace the VH-3D and the VH-60N, with ongoing improvements in performance for high/hot environments and expanded communication capabilities.

Marine Aviation is advancing new weapon systems to address evolving threats, integrating capabilities that enhance fighter and attack aircraft for global operations. The focus is on munitions with greater range, speed, and lethality to dominate both air and surface domains. Recent efforts have concentrated on integrating net-enabled weapons into the F-35B/C and improving long-range maritime strike capabilities. Key developments include the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range entry into low-rate production, safe separation testing for the GBU-53 SDB II, and the addition of the Long-Range and Maritime Strike to the F-35B/C roadmap.

The AGM-158C Long-Range and Maritime Strike is a long-range, precision-guided anti-ship missile designed for semi-autonomous engagement of maritime targets. Its integration with the F-35B/C enhances Marine Aviation’s strategic maritime capabilities.

The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile program is undergoing operational testing on the AH-1Z. Its dual-mode seeker and multi-purpose warhead provide enhanced strike precision while its countermeasure resistance and fire-and-forget capability improve survivability in diverse conditions.

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II, integrated across platforms carrying 2.75” rockets, offers significant improvements over unguided rockets, particularly in precision targeting. The Single Software Variant, fielded in FY22, provides increased range and accuracy, enabling common use across fixed and rotary-wing platforms.

The AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder introduces lock-on-after-launch with data-link for 360-degree engagements, and its Block II+ variant will support F-35B/C in FY19. The AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, with its ability to engage multiple targets simultaneously, is further enhanced by the AIM-120D variant, featuring GPS, improved data link, software, range, and speed.

The evolving electromagnetic environment necessitates advanced electromagnetic spectrum operations capabilities to ensure the MAGTF maintains superiority and can effectively deny the enemy’s electromagnetic spectrum use while protecting its own. Marine Aviation is integrating the electronic warfare family of systems with a focus on platforms like the UH-1Y, MV-22, and KC-130 while developing capabilities for unmanned systems through collaboration with the Marine Corps Spectrum Integration Lab.

The goal of MAGTF Digital Interoperability/MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link (DI/MANGL) is to deliver timely, efficient, and secure information across diverse systems to enhance situational awareness, accelerate the kill chain, and improve survivability. The DI/MANGL program is modernizing to align with Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control standards, advanced tactical data links, and zero-trust architecture, with funding efforts planned for FY26. The DI/MANGL integrates sensors, processors, interfaces, and radios to improve interoperability and situational awareness across the MAGTF, joint, and coalition forces while ongoing efforts expand tactical relevance and mobility.

The goal of aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) is to equip all aircraft with advanced systems that enhance survivability and situational awareness to detect, identify, and defeat anti-aircraft threats while integrating into the MAGTF C2 ecosystem. Current ASE systems include various missile warning systems, radar warning receivers, and countermeasure systems, all aimed at improving threat detection, situational awareness, and survivability across multiple aircraft platforms. Future efforts will focus on integrating multi-spectral sensors and evolving. 

The ASE systems, such as the Next Generation Pointer/Tracker, meet emerging threats and enable interoperability with future platforms. Continued science and technology investments will drive the development of ASE capabilities, ensuring seamless integration into digitally connected networks like the MANGL.

Marine Aviation Enablers
The Marine Air Command and Control System is undergoing significant modernization with new equipment like TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar, Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S), and Marine Air Defense Integrated System to enhance air battle management, integrated air and missile defense, and multi-domain C2 capabilities. The CAC2S processes and integrates data from sensors and aircraft to support Marine, Naval, and joint aviation operations, while the CAC2S Small Form Factor variant and the Theater Battle Management Core System provide scalable, modern capabilities for distributed command and control.

The Marine Corps is expanding its groundbased air defense capabilities through systems like MADIS, Light-MADIS, and the Medium Range Intercept Capability to defend against a range of aerial threats, supported by the growth of the low altitude air defense community and future participation in the Army’s interceptor development efforts.

Aviation ground support ensures Marine Aviation’s expeditionary capability, providing essential services like airfield construction, aircraft recovery, and refueling at austere locations, supporting advanced base operations and distributed aviation.

The AC2GS funding priorities focus on improving air traffic control and aircraft launch and recovery capabilities, including precision landing systems, inter-facility communications, and airfield lighting. Additionally, funding is directed toward sustaining and enhancing green-dollar air C2, air defense programs, and aircraft rescue and firefighting equipment to ensure readiness and interoperability across joint and naval operations.

4th Marine Aircraft Wing
The 4th MAW plays a vital role in enhancing the MAGTF’s global readiness and flexibility by providing a reserve aviation force capable of responding to emerging threats. This force ensures that the Marine Corps maintains operational depth, which is critical for addressing the evolving demands of modern warfare.

The 4th MAW works closely with active components, strengthening aviation readiness through ongoing support and collaboration with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd MAW units. By transitioning to advanced platforms like the F-35C, KC-130J and tiltrotor aircraft, and integrating rotary, unmanned, and expeditionary aviation enablers, the wing ensures a unified and adaptable force structure ready for global missions.

Expeditionary & Maritime Aviation-Advanced Development Team (XMA-ADT)
The XMA-ADT, established in August 2023, accelerates the acquisition of technologies for Force Design by coordinating with stakeholders and employing operational prototypes to address critical capability gaps in Marine Aviation. In 2024, XMA-ADT focused on enhancing capabilities for Marine Aviation, including MUX TACAIR, Airborne Logistics Connector, Precision Attack Strike Missile, and H-1 Next, with key milestones such as UAS Manned-Unmanned Teaming and successful flight demonstrations for each project. In 2025, XMA-ADT will refine capabilities for MUX TACAIR, continue Airborne Logistics Connector demonstrations with plans for Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course 1-26, and further develop the Long-Range Attack Missile toward achieving a maximum range live-fire shot by the end of the year.

In summary, Marine Aviation continues to be forward deployed and operate from expeditionary sites, joint locations, Navy ships, and strategic main operating bases. As we actively campaign, our focus on balancing today’s readiness with tomorrow’s modernization is critical as we continue to compete, assure our allies and partners, and deter our adversaries. This balance cannot be achieved without direct investment in our Marines, sailors, and aircrew. Their training must be relevant, realistic, and accomplished in the best aircraft and equipment available. Marine Aviation stands ready to fight and win today and into the future.

Approachability: Overlooked but not Unseen

2025 Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest: First Place

Approachability is a bridge that connects you to your Marines. You are either paving the way, building barriers, or cutting off access. In the Marine Corps, trust and communication are paramount in candid conversations that can save lives and resources, making the difference between mission success or failure. The Marine Corps is a maneuver warfare organization that relies on trust built up and down the chain of command.1 Commanders owe their Marines clear intent and the resources to accomplish the mission. Followers owe their leaders accurate feedback, clarifying questions, and the trust to operate within the confines of the arena.

However, a culture of silence stifles creativity and hinders mission readiness. When senior leaders lack approachability, they struggle to gain a clear insight into what occurs at the lowest levels of their organizations. As leaders ascend through the ranks, their responsibilities expand, and their influence increases, yet their familiarity with the junior leaders and their troops decreases. An unintended consequence inflicted by overly busy schedules and competing priorities is a mounting difficulty for junior Marines to relate to their senior leaders. There is a direct correlation between increased rank and perceived harshness and limited interactions between senior and junior leaders often lead to the misperception that senior leaders are unrelatable and unapproachable.2 As leaders, assessing one’s level of approachability helps bridge the gap between senior leaders and junior Marines, leading to increased trust and effectiveness in the Marine Corps. 

The Challenge of Relatability
The mask of command, like body armor on a deployment, does not have to be worn at all times and in all situations.3 At its core, the perception of approachability is amplified by military traditions of customs and courtesies and by increasingly busy schedules that leave minimal time for senior leaders to troop the lines. Senior leaders’ intent on maintaining their war face—a stoic and authoritative demeanor—may unintentionally reinforce the divide between leader and led.4 While maintaining this demeanor has a time and place, such as formal ceremonies or leading troops in combat operations, it can be counterproductive in day-to-day interactions. Knowing when, where, and with what level of formality shows a mature leader willing to adapt to their position and circumstances. Striking a balance when visiting Marines sends one of two messages: either you are never there and do not care, or you are there too much and do not trust them to operate without strict supervision. 

Figure 1. Being unapproachable guarantees defeat. (Figure provided by author.)

Marines build trust through the process of “Forming, Storming, Norming, and Performing,” especially while operating at the company level or below.5 Unfortunately, due to competing commitments, senior leaders do not have the freedom or time to be as involved with junior leaders during the trust-building process. Oftentimes, the context of decisions is lost while troops on the ground focus on the down and in of the tactical level, while senior leaders focus on the up and out at the operational and strategic levels. However, there must be a common ground in which information is shared from the bottom up and the top down to create a shared consciousness and culture. All levels of leadership should have ownership in this process; however, it is up to senior leaders to build a climate of approachability and trust that drives this process. It is the responsibility of leaders to link the purpose of tactical actions with strategic context while fostering unit morale and working to achieve common goals. 

The Power of Approachability
Being an approachable leader is not a sign of weakness; it is a powerful tool that enables senior leaders to gain the trust of their subordinates and access to the unvarnished truth. Approachable leaders foster an environment where junior Marines feel valued and empowered to speak openly, which helps to identify and address problems before they escalate. There are several ways a senior leader can display approachability and build two-way communication. Senior leaders can increase their approachability by being conscious of their demeanor and communication style, prioritizing face-to-face interactions, attending training, visiting deployed forces, and holding regularly scheduled town halls. 

Leadership Tools for Approachability
Effective communication promotes a sense of purpose, trust, and collaboration that is essential for senior leaders when engaging with junior leaders. Senior leaders must ensure their messages resonate and inspire action by self-reflecting on, “Who is my audience? What’s the best method to reach them? How long do I have? What methods are available to me?”6 For junior Marines, effective communication must be clear, concise, and relatable to compete with their limited attention span, which is often divided among various work responsibilities and entertainment distractions. Communication must be tailored to reach your intended audiences while fostering trust and rapport. Additionally, feedback from trusted advisors and previous “gray beards” provides leaders with both wisdom and wasta.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps demonstrates effective communication by using social media platforms to communicate short, impactful video clips that deliver key messages such as reminders to complete the annual Combat Fitness Test.7 These videos, tailored to the Marine ethos, use straightforward language and relatable scenarios to connect with Marines at all levels, fostering trust, unity, and approachability. By leveraging modern technology and brevity, leaders ensure that critical guidance and values are shared effectively, empowering junior Marines to act decisively and confidently. 

Figure 2. Ask questions, listen, and succeed. (Figure provided by author.)

Demeanor plays a crucial role in shaping how others perceive us and directly influences our ability to build relationships. While it may seem minor, demeanor has significant leadership implications. A large portion of communication is non-verbal, meaning even small adjustments in bearing can greatly enhance approachability and effectiveness in leadership.8 Leaders who smile, engage in casual conversations, and show genuine interest in their Marines’ lives create a sense of camaraderie. A leader who smiles more appears relatable and less intimidating. This does not mean that leaders should forgo professionalism or adopt a perpetual grin, but rather, they should be mindful of how their expressions and body language impact their Marines’ perspectives. A sideways glance of displeasure during a brief can leave some Marines questioning their abilities and willingness to speak their minds. 

In-person communication should be prioritized to ensure non-verbal body language is used to convey your meaning, especially when controversial or complex ideas need communicating. Senior leaders can cultivate approachability by prioritizing face-to-face interactions. Whenever possible, communication should be delivered in the most personable way possible, especially if it is sensitive or personal, such as the loss of a loved one or corrective action. Communication priority should start with face-to-face, followed by video, then voice calls, and lastly, written messages.9 

Visible presence could include visiting the companies, walking the lines, eating meals with your Marines, casual meetings, planned mentorship sessions, and unit social events. During these interactions, leaders should practice active listening, demonstrate empathy, and refrain from passing immediate judgment. Senior leaders should leverage informal settings to foster candid conversations. These small actions signal that the senior leader is not just an authority figure but also a mentor and an ally.10 When Marines see their leaders as approachable, they are more likely to share their honest perspectives. 

To learn what is happening on the ground requires being on the ground. By visiting in person, listening, and then sharing context for Marines wondering about policy or strategic changes that impact them, an approachable connection is much more likely. Often, a unit’s dynamics might go unnoticed without taking the time to visit the troops. Battlefield circulations can seem like an excuse to get out of the office or rack up frequent flyer miles, but the message it sends to the troops and the insights gained by observing and listening to Marines cannot be replicated by storyboards or situation reports. Battlefield circulations can provide an opportunity for a senior leader to be approachable, and they must be willing and able to provide context to things their Marines care about. All decisions are made in context. If someone does not understand the decision, they likely do not understand the context. Leaders who share context find their formations less resistant to change, and therefore, approachability is invaluable during times of innovation and change. 

Senior leaders’ participation in mess nights, warrior nights, and the Marine Corps Ball might seem like trivial matters, but they provide Marines of all ranks and specialties an opportunity to commune and share in a setting that fosters relationship-building and transparent communication. By breaking down the barriers of rank and formality in these settings, leaders create an environment where ground truth can flourish as everyone takes part as a family of warriors. As trust increases, the speed of actions and decisions will also increase, creating a tempo Marines strive for in maneuver warfare.11 

The last method is the inclusion of town hall meetings. A good method to assess the trust built between senior and junior leaders is the presence of challenging questions and two-way dialogue in public forums. If senior leaders are practicing the aforementioned approachability skills, town halls should provide insightful feedback. While approachability fosters open communication and trust, it also necessitates guiding interactions to remain productive and respectful, especially in public forums where poorly framed questions can undermine credibility, distract from the discussions, and hinder unit morale. By setting the tone for what constitutes thoughtful inquiry, leaders can encourage dialogue while maintaining professionalism. 

Dumb Questions Exist, a Litmus Test: Arrogance, Ignorance, or Agenda
While senior leaders should take the mantle when developing approachability, junior leaders also hold responsibility for their demeanor and actions. For example, a senior leader should encourage open and candid dialogue, but that does not mean all questions are appropriate. Most Marines have heard questions that were not well thought out, in which the audience rolls their eyes and the chain of command grumbles under their breath. There is a three-part self-diagnosis everyone should ask before asking a question in a public forum: 

One: Am I demonstrating arrogance? Everyone has met over-eager people who know the answer to the question but wish to grandstand while citing their litany of achievements and knowledge. 

Two: Does this question show ignorance? Ignorance is measured within the context of the experience, rank, and length of service of the person asking the question. A junior Marine with limited experience has more room to ask foundational questions as opposed to someone who clearly should know the answer to what they are asking yet is demonstrating holes in their professional education out of laziness, immaturity, or low IQ.

Three: Does this question display an agenda? For example, when the Marine Corps controversially decided to divest of tanks, many tankers stood up in public settings with questions to senior leaders designed to point out their agenda to retrieve the steel beasts from the scrap heap of history.12 

Junior Leader Responsibility—Moral Courage
Approachability for senior leaders has utility, however, that does not negate junior leaders from displaying moral courage in the case of unapproachable leaders. George C. Marshall offers a case study on courage in the face of unapproachability. As a junior officer, George C. Marshall demonstrated significant moral courage in the face of adversity. Marshall served on the staff of a historically unapproachable leader, GEN John “Blackjack” Pershing. Equivalent to a six-star general, Pershing was known for his blistering tirades and blunt demeanor.13 However, long before Marshall became the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State responsible for the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. He first stood up to his unapproachable leader with honesty and humility while deployed to France in World War I.14 Although initially taken aback, Pershing respected Marshall as a man he could trust to give the painful truth instead of the pleasing lie.  

Figure 3. Facing senior leaders with courage. (Figure provided by author.)

Conclusion
Approachability is a cornerstone of effective leadership, yet it is often overlooked as leaders climb the ranks. By smiling, engaging with Marines on a personal level, and fostering open communication, senior leaders can bridge the gap that separates them from their subordinates. This connection not only builds trust and morale but also provides access to the ground truth needed to make informed decisions. In a profession where lives depend on effective leadership, the importance of approachability cannot be overstated. Senior leaders must embrace this trait, recognizing that genuine connection with their Marines is the foundation of mission success.

>LtCol Mitchell is the Marine Raider Regiment Operations Officer. He began his Marine Corps career as an Infantry Officer before becoming a Marine Raider. He holds a master’s degree from Air Force University, specializing in Russian proxy warfare, and another from the Naval Postgraduate School, focusing on the Stand-In Force concept in Indo-Pacific conflict. Throughout his career, he has been deployed globally on a range of assignments.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1997).

2. Eric Wendt, “DA3900 Command & Leadership: Perceived Harshness and Positivity Model,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 10, 2023).

3. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988).

4. Full Metal Jacket, directed by Stanley Kubrick (Warner Bros, 1987). 

5. Admin, “What Is Forming, Storming, Norming and Performing?” Six Sigma Daily, August 17, 2020, https://www.sixsigmadaily.com/what-is-forming-storming-norming-performing.

6. David Grossman, “6 Steps for Effectively Connecting with Your Audience,” Your Thought Partner, July 18, 2022. https://www.yourthoughtpartner.com/blog/6-steps-for-effectively-connecting-with-your-audiences.

7. GEN Eric Smith, “Commandant of the @USMC (@CMC_MarineCorps)/X,” X, November 27, 2024, https://x.com/CMC_MarineCorps?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1861876810738483360%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftaskandpurpose.com%2Fculture%2Fmarine-cft-commandant-eric-smith%2F.

8. Chris Voss, “How to Use the 7-38-55 Rule to Negotiate Effectively,” MasterClass, June 7, 2021, https://www.masterclass.com/articles/how-to-use-the-7-38-55-rule-to-negotiate-effectively.

9. Eric Wendt, “DA3900 Command & Leadership: Communication Hierarchy Model,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 10, 2023).

10. Director, Marine Corps Staff and Administration and Resource Management Division, HQMC Mentoring Guide, (Washington, DC: n.d.).

11. Stephen M.R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York: Free Press, 2008).

12. Matt Gonzalez, “Force Design 2030: Divesting to Meet the Future Threat,” Marines.mil, December 1, 2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2857680/force-design-2030-divesting-to-meet-the-future-threat.

13. Public Broadcasting Service, “Black Jack Pershing: Love and War,” PBS Learning Media. n.d., https://www.pbslearningmedia.org/collection/black-jack-pershing-love-and-war.

14. GEN George C. Marshall, “I’m Sorry, Mr. President, But I Don’t Agree With That At All,” The George C. Marshall Foundation, February 4, 2021, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/articles-and-features/im-sorry-mr-president-but-i-dont-agree-with-that-at-all.