Xi Jinping Thought and Implications for the Indo-Pacific Information Domain

Understanding the pacing threat

The dawn of a new year is a most appropriate and auspicious time to take stock of oneself, one’s goals, and one’s path forward for the next twelve months—a veritable fulcrum of reflection. And what better subject matter to consider in rectifying one’s ways than the governing ideology (to loosely use the term) of Chairman Xi Jinping, the paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over which he governs? 

Often framed as the “pacing threat” for the Marine Corps and broader Joint Force, the CCP-PRC Party-State under Chairman Xi has recommitted itself to an ideological nationalism formally termed “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), more commonly known as “Xi Jinping Thought.”1 First announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, “Xi Jinping Thought”2 now resides in the CCP’s constitution3 and serves as a guiding4 doctrine5 for all levels of the Party-State6 to “rejuvenate the nation” and achieve the “China Dream.”7

A key enabler for China’s “national rejuvenation” is victory in the information domain at home and abroad. Beijing’s recent efforts to manipulate domestic and foreign perceptions through digitally enabled hearts-and-minds campaigns are well-documented. Effective prosecution of the same will allow the CCP and PLA to shape battlefields to their advantage without a shot being fired. As those efforts begin on the PRC’s home front, it behooves practitioners of information operations within the Marine Corps and broader defense enterprise to develop familiarity with the Fourteen Commitments, or guiding principles, that form the heart of “Xi Jinping Thought.”

1. “Ensure the Communist Party leads over all forms of work in China.” Since Chairman Xi’s accession in 2012, the CCP has reasserted its control over state,8 academic,9 and private-sector institutions.10 This comprehensive approach to governance integrates Party leadership at every level of society, ensuring that the Party’s directives and ideology influence all aspects of governance and daily operations.11 By embedding its presence deeply within these sectors, the CCP aims to maintain ideological consistency and reinforce its authoritative role, effectively centralizing power and establishing a uniform policy execution across the nation.

2. “Commit to a people-centered approach.” The Party-state’s reassertion of influence in all facets of Chinese life is balanced with a focus on the social needs of the people. Xi Jinping emphasizes “common prosperity”12 to address13 the growing wealth gap14 in China, reflecting his intent to ensure equitable economic development. This approach seeks to temper economic policies with social welfare initiatives, striving to uplift disadvantaged communities and foster a more inclusive society. By prioritizing the well-being of the people, the Party aims to strengthen social stability and reinforce its legitimacy among the populace.

3. “Comprehensively deepen reforms.” Xi Jinping’s assertion that “only socialism can save China, and only reform and opening-up can develop China” underscores his commitment to evolving socialism and Marxism. Since 2012, Xi has championed reforms15 to fortify Party-State control16 over China’s economy,17 society,18 and military.19 These reforms aim to enhance governance, boost economic efficiency, and ensure social stability. By integrating socialist principles with pragmatic reforms, Xi seeks to modernize China while maintaining the ideological foundation of the Communist Party, thereby reinforcing its authority and guiding the nation’s development trajectory. 

4. “Adhere to new development ideas.” Xi Jinping emphasizes “scientific development” as the cornerstone for addressing China’s comprehensive challenges. This approach—characterized by coordinated, innovative, open, and green development—is designed to foster sustainable growth. Chairman Xi frequently frames20 CCP initiatives as “scientific”21 and “pragmatic”22 solutions, aiming to modernize the economy, enhance technological innovation, and promote environmental sustainability. By advocating for these development ideas, Xi seeks to ensure that China’s progress is both resilient and inclusive, addressing immediate needs while safeguarding future generations.

5. “Follow socialism with Chinese characteristics,” wherein “people are the masters of the country.” Chairman Xi frequently emphasizes23 that the development of the state24 should not take precedence over the people’s livelihood.25 Under this guiding principle, the CCP aims to balance state-led development with the well-being of its citizens. By advocating for socialism with Chinese characteristics, Xi stresses the importance of prioritizing social welfare, public services, and improving living standards. This approach seeks to ensure that the state’s economic and social policies are aligned with the needs and aspirations of the people, reinforcing the notion that the people are the true masters of the country.

6. “Govern through the Rule of Law.” Socialism with Chinese characteristics26 is safeguarded by laws that require deeper judicial27 reforms28 and the enhancement of national29 moral quality.30 Chairman Xi has emphasized the importance of judicial reform and national morality to ensure a just and orderly society. However, the CCP remains the ultimate31 authority32 in interpreting and enforcing laws. This governance approach aims to balance legal frameworks with the Party’s overarching control, striving to uphold legal standards while maintaining the Party’s central role in the administration of justice and societal governance.

7. “Practice socialist core values, including Marxism, Communism, and Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Chairman Xi has consistently emphasized that confidence in China’s political culture33 is a profound driving force34 for the nation’s development.35 By promoting the core values of Marxism, Communism, and Socialism with Chinese characteristics, Xi aims to strengthen ideological commitment and national identity. This confidence in political culture serves as a foundation for social unity and resilience, supporting the Party’s vision of a prosperous, stable, and progressive society. Through these values, the CCP seeks to inspire and guide the nation’s development path.

8. “Improving people’s livelihood and well-being is the primary goal of development.” Drawing inspiration from Sun Yat-Sen,36 Xi Jinping emphasizes that public contentment is essential for domestic stability,37 peace, and order. By stressing “common prosperity,” Xi aims to reduce the wealth gap and ensure equitable economic growth.38 This focus on improving livelihoods highlights the Party’s commitment to social welfare, healthcare, education, and employment opportunities. By prioritizing the well-being of all citizens, the CCP seeks to foster a harmonious and stable society, reinforcing the legitimacy of its governance.

9. “Coexist with nature.” Xi Jinping emphasizes the importance of basic national policies for environmental protection39 and energy conservation,40 believing they contribute to global ecological safety and safeguard China’s priceless natural assets. This commitment is reflected in Xi’s efforts41 to position China as a leader42 in green technology.43 By promoting sustainable practices and investing in renewable
energy, the CCP aims to mitigate environmental degradation and support global efforts to combat climate change. This approach underscores China’s responsibility to both its own environment and the broader global ecosystem.

10. “Strengthen national security.” Under Chairman Xi’s administration, major principles for national safety include coordinating development and security, strengthening awareness, and preparing for crises in times of peace.44 This strategic approach is reflected in the PLA’s focus on combat readiness.45 Xi emphasizes the importance of integrating national security into all aspects of governance, ensuring that China is well-prepared to address both internal and external threats. By enhancing military capabilities and fostering a culture of vigilance, the Party aims to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty and maintain stability in an increasingly complex global environment.

11. “The Communist Party maintains absolute authority over the People’s Liberation Army.” Chairman Xi’s reforms have reinforced the Party’s control over the military through comprehensive political education,46 continuous reforms,47 and advancements in science and technology.48 By enhancing legal management49 within the PLA, these reforms ensure that Party authority50 remains unchallenged. The focus on ideological indoctrination and modernization of military capabilities aligns the PLA closely with the Party’s objectives, maintaining its loyalty and readiness to serve the state under the absolute command of the Communist Party.

12. “One Country – Two Systems for Hong Kong and Macau; One-China 1992 Consensus and Eventual Taiwan Reunification.” Xi Jinping maintains the Party’s flexible, patient,51 yet dogged determination52 to assert its governing authority over all of China.53 The “One Country, Two Systems” principle allows Hong Kong and Macau54 to retain distinct administrative and economic systems, while the One-China 1992 Consensus55 underscores the Party’s commitment to eventual reunification with Taiwan.56 Xi’s approach reflects a strategic balance of firmness and adaptability, aiming to ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity while accommodating regional differences.

13. “The Chinese dream is inseparable from a peaceful international environment and a stable international order.” Chairman Xi has promoted China’s system57 as an alternative58 to Western liberalism,59 advocating for a model that emphasizes state sovereignty, non-interference, and mutual respect. This approach contributes to the concept of a global “shared destiny,”60 wherein countries cooperate to achieve common goals while respecting each other’s unique development paths. Xi’s vision seeks to position China as a leader in fostering international stability and cooperation, aligning with the broader goal of realizing the Chinese dream in a harmonious global context.

14. “Enforce Party Discipline.” Chairman Xi’s anti-corruption campaign61 is the most visible62 sign of his belief in the importance of the Party’s internal supervision, political purity, and close ties with the masses.63 Xi has emphasized that the Communist Party must uphold strict discipline to maintain its legitimacy and effectiveness. By targeting unhealthy tendencies64 and corruption,65 the campaign seeks to strengthen the Party’s internal culture and ensure that its members adhere to high moral and ethical standards. This focus on discipline and integrity is essential for reinforcing public trust and achieving the Party’s long-term goals.

Insights for the Marine Corps
The above Fourteen Commitments provide a valuable framework for scoping and understanding the often expansive and nebulous nature of “Xi Jinping Thought.” They provide insights into enduring priorities for Xi Jinping as he seeks to maintain the CCP’s monopoly on political power at home and avoid the always-possible spectre of a Soviet-style collapse in the future. Themes that come to the fore include the pervasiveness of Communist Party authority in broader Chinese society, the populist need to frame Party activities as “serving the needs of the masses,” and the importance of maintaining “ideological rigor” and “internal unity” within the party and military, the better to secure the loyalty of the latter for the former. “Xi Jinping Thought” likewise provides a template for the type of authoritarian governance model that Beijing would gladly export abroad, the better to nurture a group of like-minded nations to help “make the world safe” for CCP-style authoritarianism. The Marine Corps’ continued operations, activities, and investments in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific can be more effectively calibrated via an understanding, outlined by Xi Jinping Thought, of how Beijing seeks to incrementally undermine that same order in the hearts and minds of its neighbors’ citizens.

>Mr. Jensen is a recognized expert in Sino-Russian relations and information operations. He is the author of the “Shanghai Weekly” and related pacing threat-focused products widely distributed throughout the U.S. and Allied maritime forces. He currently consults as the Senior RED (Russo-Chinese) Subject-Matter Expert for the Marine Corps Vandegrift Team, a coordinating tiger cell under the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Information focused on optimizing the broader U.S. maritime force and key partners for Great-Power Competition in the Information Domain.

Notes

1. China Central TV-1, “His Own Words: The 14 Principles of ‘Xi Jinping Thought,’” BBC Monitoring, October 24, 2017, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dmwn4r.

2. Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping Thought Explained: A New Ideology for a New Era,” The New York Times, February 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html.

3. Jarek Grzywacz, “How Xi Jinping Used the CCP Constitution to Cement His Power,” The  Diplomat, January 26, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/how-xi-jinping-used-the-ccp-constitution-to-cement-his-power.

4. Charlotte Poirier, “Xi Jinping Thought: Xi’s Struggle against Political Decline,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2021, https://www.isdp.se/publication/xi-jinping-thought-xis-struggle-against-political-decline.

5. Mercy A. Kuo, “The Political Aims of ‘Xi Jinping Thought,’” The Diplomat, November 21, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/the-political-aims-of-xi-jinping-thought.

6. Congressional Research Service, “China Primer: China’s Political System–CRS Reports,” Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2025, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12505.

7. Timothy R. Heath, “Xi’s Cautious Inching Towards the China Dream,” RAND, August 11, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP70200.html.

8. Michał Bogusz and Jakub Jakóbowski, “The Chinese Communist Party and Its State. Xi Jinping’s Conservative Turn,” OSW Report, April 2020, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/REPORT_The-Chinese-Communist-Party_net.pdf.

9. William Zheng, “China’s Top Universities Told to Stop Slacking off on Communist Party Ideology,” South China Morning Post, September 7, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3147779/chinas-top-universities-told-stop-slacking-communist-party.

10. Scott Livingston, “The Chinese Communist Party Targets the Private Sector,” CSIS, October 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-communist-party-targets-private-sector.

11. Nis Grünberg and Katja Drinhausen, “The Party Leads on Everything,” Merics, September 24, 2019, https://merics.org/en/report/party-leads-everything.

12. David Bulman, Cui Wei, Mark Frazier, Mike Mike Gow, Yujeong Yang, Guoguang Wu, and Mary Gallagher, “Xi Jinping Says He Wants to Spread China’s Wealth More Equitably. How Likely Is That to Actually Happen?” ChinaFile, March 3, 2023, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/common-prosperity-China-wealth-redistribution.

13. Thomas Hale and Leila Abboud, “Xi Jinping’s Call for Wealth Redistribution Threatens Luxury Groups’ China Boom,” Financial Times, August 27, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/4cf59a34-cd03-48a1-b5d0-0c71922ef9b3.

14. Josephine Ma, “My Take: Why China Needs to Mind the Earnings Gap,” South China Morning Post, January 30, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3250334/why-china-needs-mind-earnings-gap.

15. Yew Lun Tian, “Unleashing Reforms, Xi Returns to China’s Socialist Roots,” Reuters, September 9, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/unleashing-reforms-xi-returns-chinas-socialist-roots-2021-09-09.

16. Maya Wang, “China’s Techno-Authoritarianism Has Gone Global,” Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/08/chinas-techno-authoritarianism-has-gone-global.

17. Laura He, “China’s ‘unprecedented’ Crackdown Stunned Private Enterprise. One Year on, It May Have to Cut Business Some Slack,” CNN, November 3, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/02/tech/china-economy-crackdown-private-companies-intl-hnk/index.html.

18. The Associated Press, “China Bans Effeminate Men on TV,” NPR, September 2, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/09/02/
1033687586/china-ban-effeminate-men-tv-official-morality.

19. The Economist, “Xi Jinping Is Obsessed with Political Loyalty in the Pla,” The Economist, November 6, 2023, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/xi-jinping-is-obsessed-with-political-loyalty-in-the-pla.

20. Yu Jie, “China’s New Scientists,” Chatham House, July 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/07/chinas-new-scientists.

21. Ben Murphy, Rogier Creemers, Elsa Kania, Paul Triolo, Kevin Neville, and Graham Webster, “Xi Jinping: ‘Strive to Become the World’s Primary Center for Science and High Ground for Innovation,’” DigiChina, March 18, 2021, https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/xi-jinping-strive-to-become-the-worlds-primary-center-for-science-and-high-ground-for-innovation.

22. Marina Rudyak, “Cooperation/合作,” Decoding China, March 26, 2023, https://decodingchina.eu/cooperation.

23. William Langley, “Xi Jinping Framed as Man of the People and the Party in New Year’s Speech,” South China Morning Post, January 1, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3116129/xi-jinping-framed-man-people-and-party-new-years-speech.

24. Joe C.B. Leung, “Common Prosperity: A Conundrum for China,” AsiaGlobal Online Journal, October 21, 2021, https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/common-prosperity-conundrum-china.

25. Mimi Lau, “Xi Declares Extreme Poverty Has Been Wiped out in China,” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2021, https://www.scmp.
com/news/china/politics/article/3123174/xi-jinping-declares-extreme-poverty-has-been-wiped-out-china.

26. Ethan Paul and Lea Li, “What Is ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’?” South China Morning Post, June 26, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3138788/socialism-chinese-characteristics-explained. 

27. Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, “Xi Jinping Emphasized Strengthening the Development of the Legal System Related to Foreign Affairs and Creating Favorable External Environment and Rule of Law Conditions during the Tenth Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo,” CSIS Interpret: China, November 28, 2023, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/xi-jinping-emphasized-strengthening-the-development-of-the-legal-system-related-to-foreign-affairs-and-creating-favorable-external-environment-and-rule-of-law-conditions-during-the-tenth-collective-st.

28. The Economist, “Why China’s Government Is Hushing up Court Rulings,” The Economist, January 15, 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/01/15/why-chinas-government-is-hushing-up-court-rulings.

29. Michael Schuman, “Xi Jinping Is Fighting a Culture War at Home,” The Atlantic, December 20, 2023, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/12/xi-jinping-china-culture-war/676896.

30. Delia Lin, “Morality Politics under Xi Jinping,” East Asia Forum, August 1, 2019, https://eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/01/morality-politics-under-xi-jinping.

31. Chris Buckley, “‘Drive the Blade in’: Xi Shakes up China’s Law-and-Order Forces,” The New York Times, August 20, 2020, https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/08/20/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-communist-party.html.

32. Thomas Hale and Xueqiao Wang, “China’s Court Database Reform Stokes Fears for Transparency in Legal Sector,” Financial Times, January 7, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/665a48d5-2ce0-4661-91c9-6dbebe2e4b9b.

33. Zhuoran Li, “The Sixth Plenum and the Rise of Traditional Chinese Culture in Socialist Ideology,” The Diplomat, November 19, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/the-sixth-plenum-and-the-rise-of-traditional-chinese-culture-in-socialist-ideology.

34. News Desk, “Xi Jinping Calls on Writers, Artists to Contribute to National Rejuvenation,” The Global Herald, December 14, 2021, https://theglobalherald.com/news/xi-jinping-calls-on-writers-artists-to-contribute-to-national-rejuvenation.

35. Agence France-Presse, “‘Ode to the New Era’: Chinese Communist Party’s Historical Resolution Explained,” France 24, November 17, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/
20211117-ode-to-the-new-era-chinese-communist-party-s-historical-resolution-explained.

36. Benjamin Carlson, “Tug of War over China’s Founding Father Sun Yat-Sen,” Yahoo! News, November 9, 2016, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/
tug-war-over-chinas-founding-father-sun-yat-
045718797.html.

37. Ananth Krishnan, “Domestic Considerations Always Come First for China’s Communist Party: Rana Mitter on the CPC at 100,” The Hindu, July 1, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/domestic-considerations-always-come-first-for-chinas-communist-party-rana-mitter-on-the-cpc-at-100/article61448303.ece.

38. Mercy A. Kuo, “China’s ‘Common Prosperity’: The Maoism of Xi Jinping–Insights from Ming Xia,” The Diplomat, September 23, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/chinas-common-prosperity-the-maoism-of-xi-jinping.

39. AsiaNews, “Xi Jinping Now Wants Economic Growth to Respect the Environment,” AsiaNews, February 11, 2019, https://www.asianews.it/
news-en/Xi-Jinping-now-wants-economic-growth-to-respect-the-environment-46216.html.

40. Helen Adams, “President of China, Xi Jinping, Declares an End to Coal Use,” Sustainability Magazine, September 22, 2021, https://sustainabilitymag.com/renewable-energy/president-china-xi-jinping-declares-end-coal-use.

41. Dominic Chiu, “The East Is Green: China’s Global Leadership in Renewable Energy,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy 13 (2017), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/171011_chiu_china_Solar.pdf?i70f0uep_pGOS3iWhvwUlBNigJMcYJvX.

42. Erin Black, “Why China Is so Far Ahead of the U.S. in Electric Vehicle Production,” CNBC, March 24, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/24/why-china-is-so-far-ahead-of-the-us-when-it-comes-to-ev-production-.html.

43. Gang Chen,“China’s Quest for Global Climate Leadership,” East Asia Forum, June 24, 2021, https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/24/chinas-quest-for-global-climate-leadership.

44. Aadil Brar, “‘Prepare to Fight,’ China Tells Citizens. Xi Jinping Has Big Plans for Party and Security,” ThePrint, November 22, 2021, https://theprint.in/opinion/chinascope/prepare-to-fight-china-tells-citizens-xi-jinping-has-big-plans-for-party-and-security/769639.

45. Ananth Krishnan, “China President Xi Jinping Signs Mobilisation Order for PLA Training,” The Hindu, January 4, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-president-xi-jinping-signs-mobilisation-order-for-pla-training/article38118147.ece; and  Catherine Wong, “Xi Tells China’s Military ‘be Prepared to Respond’ in Unstable Times,” South China Morning Post, March 9, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military

/article/3124733/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-military-be-prepared-respond-unstable.

46. Derek Solen, “Right Thinking and Self-Criticisms: Military Modernization with Chinese Communist Characteristics,” The Diplomat, September 29, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/right-thinking-and-self-criticisms-military-modernization-with-chinese-communist-characteristics.

47. William Zheng, “PLA Targets Top Brass in Loyalty Education Campaign after High-Level Purges,” South China Morning Post, February 8, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3297783/chinas-pla-targets-top-brass-campaign-touting-political-loyalty-xi-jinping.

48. Elsa B. Kania, “In Military-Civil Fusion, China Is Learning Lessons from the United States and Starting to Innovate,” The Strategy Bridge, August 27, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/27/in-military-civil-fusion-china-is-learning-lessons-from-the-united-states-and-starting-to-innovate..

49. James Mulvenon, “‘Comrade, Where’s My Military Car?’ Xi Jinping’s Throwback Mass-Line Campaign to Curb PLA Corruption,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 42 (2013), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM42JM.pdf.

50. Mathieu Duchâtel, ed, “The PLA Reforms: Tightening Control over the Military: Foundation for Strategic Research,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2016, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/others/pla-reforms-tightening-control-over-military-2016.

51. Xin Ge, “Why ‘one Country, Two Systems’ Is Successful in Hong Kong and Macao?” Modern Diplomacy, January 14, 2024, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/01/14/why-one-country-two-systems-is-successful-in-hong-kong-and-macao; and Ezra Cheung, Lo Hoi-ying, and Willa Wu, “Hong Kong Governing Principle to Be Permanent Feature, Top Beijing Official Says,” South China Morning Post, February 26, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3253216/beijing-attaches-great-importance-hong-kong-countrys-global-finance-hub-xia-baolong-tells-local

52. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Xi Jinping Pledges Reunification with Taiwan in New Year’s Message,” USNI News, January 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/01/01/xi-jinping-pledges-reunification-with-taiwan-in-new-years-message; and William Zheng, “Xi Jinping’s Firm Hand on Hong Kong and Taiwan Backed by Communist Party,” South China Morning Post, November 12, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3155755/chinas-communist-party-backs-xi-jinpings-firm-hand-hong-kong.

53. Colin Clark, “New Chinese 10-Dash Map Sparks Furor across Indo-Pacific: Vietnam, India, Philippines, Malaysia,” Breaking Defense, September 4, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/09/new-chinese-10-dash-map-sparks-furor-across-indo-pacific-vietnam-india-philippines-malaysia.

54. William H. Overholt, “Hong Kong: The Rise and Fall of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’” Harvard Kennedy School, December 2019, https://ash.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/overholt_hong_kong_paper_final.pdf; and Sophie Williams, “Macau: China’s Other ‘one Country, Two Systems’ Region,” BBC News, December 19, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50832919.

55. Alyssa Resar, “The 1992 Consensus: Why It Worked and Why It Fell Apart,” The Diplomat, July 18, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart.

56. Helen Davidson, “China and Taiwan Are Destined for ‘Reunification’, Xi Tells Former President,” The Guardian, April 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/10/china-taiwan-destined-for-reunification-xi-jinping-tells-ma-ying-jeou.

57. Dylan Levi King, “Wang Huning: The Man behind Xi Jinping,” The Spectator, July 27, 2021, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-man-behind-xi-jinping.

58. Christopher Colley, “The Fallacy of a Chinese Alternative to the Western Order,” Wilson Center, January 18, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fallacy-chinese-alternative-western-order.

59. Scott Foster, “The Chinese Communist Party vs Western Liberalism,” Asia Times, December 25, 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/12/the-chinese-communist-party-vs-western-liberalism.

60. Robert A. Manning, “China’s Developing World Promises Are Smoke and Mirrors,” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/05/china-developing-world-bri-global-development-initiative-hegemony.

61. William Zheng, “‘No Mercy’ in Anti-Corruption Drive, Xi Warns Communist Party,” South China Morning Post, January 12, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3163016/xi-jinping-his-top-leadership-no-mercy-fight-against-corruption.

62. Fatoumata Diallo, “Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Struggle: Eight Years On,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, April 9, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20211216205930/https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2021/04/Xi-Jinpings-Anti-corruption-Struggle-IB-09.04.21.pdf.

63. Perry Link, “The CCP’s Culture of Fear,” ChinaFile, October 21, 2021, https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/ccps-culture-of-fear. Cheryl Teh, “China Punished More than 600,000 Officials in 2021 amid Xi Jinping’s Clampdown on Corruption and Misconduct,” Business Insider, January 23, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-punished-over-600000-officials-amid-xis-corruption-clampdown-2022-1. Eva Fu, “Chinese State Media Orders US Workers to Maintain ‘political Purity,’ Not Practice Falun Gong: Internal Document,” The Epoch Times, December 2, 2021, https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/chinese-state-media-orders-us-workers-to-maintain-political-purity-not-practice-falun-gong-internal-document-4135242; and James Griffiths, “Analysis: Xi Jinping’s Culture War Comes to China’s Campuses as Communist Party Prepares to Mark 100 Years,” CNN, April 20, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/china/xi-jinping-universities-intl-hnk/index.html; and Katsuji Nakazawa, “Analysis: XI Aims to Mobilize the Masses with Populist Crackdowns,” Nikkei Asia, August 12, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-aims-to-mobilize-the-masses-with-populist-crackdowns.

64. Reuters, “China Culture Crackdown a Sign of ‘profound’ Political Change,” Reuters, August 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-culture-crackdown-sign-profound-political-change-commentary-2021-08-31.

65. Jacob Fromer, “Xi’s Iron Grip on Power Brings New Form of Corruption, US Panel Is Told,” South China Morning Post, January 28, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3165022/xi-jinpings-iron-grip-power-brings-new-form-corruption-china-experts. 

So, You Want to Influence a Foreign Government?

Messaging for competition and crisis

It is no secret that the Marine Corps wants to influence Russia, China, and other foreign governments. Like the rest of the Joint Force, the Corps is working to optimize information capabilities for competition and crisis—as described in the 2022 National Defense Strategy—to deter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) aggression against the United States, Taiwan, the Philippines, and others. Washington is concerned with a host of other PRC behaviors—not least of which is its massive and continuous malicious cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure. But so far, the DOD has prioritized warning against the consequences of seizing Taiwan.

The clearest messaging has come from the top. More than once, President Biden publicly stated that the U.S. would intervene to defend Taiwan if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked.1 Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks made clear that the Replicator Initiative is intended to counter China in a Taiwan Strait contingency, and ADM Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has said he wants “to tum the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.”2

What effect, if any, do these messages have on Xi Jinping and his few trusted subordinates with any real power? Power matters here because the purpose of these messages is to change Beijing’s behavior, and thus, the intended message recipients must have the power to affect state-level behavior. Within the influence community, there is debate about how to answer that question and even whether it is answerable. The fact that there is an influence community suggests that most influence capabilities and operations are not so highly visible as declarations from combatant command (CCMD) commanders, deputy secretaries of defense, or presidents. Less visible and less potentially escalatory—but also less potentially effective—influence operations may produce smaller effects that are harder to identify.

Purported effects typically assume—rather than demonstrate—causal connections. The PLA is investing in countering unmanned aerial vehicle swarms; they must be responding to ADM Paparo and Secretary Hicks, obviously. However, the PLA has been researching and investing in creating and countering drone swarms for years. How do we know their latest research and development is not what they would have done anyway—or had even planned to do before those public comments were made?

The trouble with giving up on assessing the effects of influence operations is that without them, you cannot get better. You cannot learn anything, determine what works, what does not, what produces unintended consequences, or even whether your actions are undermining your own goals. The PRC’s wolf warrior diplomacy is a prime example. That overly aggressive, bullying style of international diplomacy almost entirely backfired. It was intended to force compliance with Beijing’s foreign policy, view of its borders, ownership of the South China Sea, and the reach of its economic leverage. Instead, it pushed South China Sea claimants, South Asian, Pacific, Central and South American, and African nations closer to the United States.

Given the time, tax dollars, personnel, and other resources invested in the Joint Force’s influence capabilities, failure to develop precision measures of those capabilities would be akin to fraud, waste, and abuse. So, it is worth asking some basic questions to understand what the influence endeavor is based on, how to determine if it works, and what kinds of outcomes one would expect it to produce.

The first question the Marine Corps must answer is whether it can, in fact, influence any adversarial actors who meet two criteria: the actor is engaged in some behavior the Corps wants to affect, and the actor has the power to change that behavior. Behaviors of interest, to be more specific, can refer to intentions to take certain undesirable actions in the future (e.g., to invade or blockade Taiwan)—behaviors the influence specialist wants to change—or desirable behaviors the influence specialist wants to reinforce and maintain. In either case, these are typically state behaviors that express a nation’s foreign policy. When adversarial nations have autocratic regimes, the actors in question are a small number of national state, party, and military decision makers and the cadre of trusted advisors who can influence them.

Like the rest of the Joint Force, the Marine Corps must identify these actors, which of them have the power to influence state behaviors of interest to the Corps and defense policies the Corps supports, and which of them—if any—care about and pay attention to the Marine Corps and its capabilities. The conclusion is not foregone. Beijing may be preoccupied with deep concern over Space Force, Air Force, and Navy capabilities. Of course, Beijing’s leaders could both discount the role and effectiveness of the Marine Corps in a Taiwan contingency and be mistaken in doing so. It could be the case that they discount the Marine Corps when in fact, given China’s goals and capabilities, Beijing should give due weight to the role of Marines in future combat. In this case, it would fall to the Marine Corps to reshape those judgments to garner greater influence.

Combatant commands, which have unique information capability authorities, face practical limitations that may prevent them from ever leveraging Marine Corps capabilities for information effects. Combatant command information staffs, J3Xs, and J39s have limited capacity. If they determine that adversarial leaders are most concerned with, and most responsive to, messages about air, space, and naval capabilities, they will prioritize those messages, perhaps justifiably excluding Marine Corps systems from influence messaging content.

Figure 1. Steps in the logical process of identifying an influence target who both has the power to influence state behavior (or influence another actor who does) and is susceptible to the Marine Corps’ influence. (Figure provided by author.)

Whether adversarial state actors care enough about the Marine Corps to change national policy and state behaviors is a straightforward intelligence question. If the intelligence community can answer it in the affirmative, the Corps then confronts whether, how, and who should carry out a campaign of influence.

Whether to take any specific national security action, or program of actions, is too big and important a question to address here. It requires fuller treatment. American history includes catalogs of actions taken because they could be—without due diligence of whether they should have been. Deterrence is the best justification for strategic information operations—influence with the goal of preventing warfare—so one might reasonably ask, “What is there to lose by trying to avoid war?” Executed in ignorance, though, deterrence efforts can make warfare more likely—as when demonstrations of advanced capabilities produce an arms race that makes accidents more likely. 

Figure 2. Steps in the CCMD’s decision-making process for prioritizing finite influence resources for greatest effect. (Figure provided by author.)

There is a logical, commonsense process for how to proceed with influence operations, and a scientific process for how to make the endeavor successful. The former is straightforward. National security organizations like the Marine Corps and its subordinate commands have missions and directives from higher echelons. Some of these organizations have guidance and orders to influence adversaries’ behavior. These are likely the first units in the chain of command to have the subject-matter experts capable of answering the questions above—whether there are potential influence targets who can affect state, party, or military behaviors and whether those actors care about Marine Corps capabilities enough to be influenced by them. These subject-matter experts are intelligence analysts; linguists and cultural experts; experts on the PLA, CCP, and PRC organizations, structures, decision making, and policymaking; red teams; psychologists; other social and behavioral scientists; strategic communication experts; influence planners; and sometimes technical subject-matter experts. 

The essential question above is whether there is a specific, individual human who both 1) has the power to change state behavior (or has influence on someone who has such power) and 2) can be influenced by a given U.S. command (given its specific capabilities and authorities). Every command, whether a Service headquarters or a CCMD, is limited by its authorities in who and how it can influence—and further limited by its influence capabilities. This latter limitation encompasses the
organization’s knowledge of the information environment, inclusive of its understanding of the specific individuals who could be influenced to some effect, together with its skill at wielding influence. Thus, there are more individuals who satisfy condition 1), who have the power to change state behavior (or influence someone who does), than there are who satisfy condition 2), who can be influenced by a given U.S. command. 

This question is too rarely asked and more rarely answered. It is more often replaced with questions like, how can we influence China? or the PLA? or Russia? or only slightly better, PRC and PLA leadership? Worst of all, it is often replaced by the question how can we leverage the exercises and other activities we are already doing to influence unidentified individuals in these groups? Imprecise questions like these undermine measurement and refinement. 

Of the skilled professionals listed above, then, two are key. Psychologists who know how to influence individuals and how to design and assess measurable influence operations, and intelligence professionals who gather and interpret the information on which psychologists rely. 

Complementing the logical process is the scientific process used to test influence operations—in scientific parlance—to detect effects and measure effect sizes—and in military parlance—conduct assessments using measures of effectiveness. In doing this, scientific methods should be (but typically are not) employed to establish whether association, correlation, and causation are present. Such methods are key to ruling out alternative explanations by controlling for the influence of other variables and the influence of chance. To uncover relationships between independent and dependent variables, experiments must be designed (i.e., operations must be planned) using proven experimental design methods that can detect such relationships.

This is done by constructing operations as experiments that can disconfirm specific hypotheses. To take an example from above, one might hypothesize that ADM Paparo’s hellscape comment had some effect on Beijing’s behavior—but such a hypothesis is too broad to be disconfirmed. What the influence effects specialist wants to know is not whether Beijing responded to Paparo, used the word “hellscape” in its own public messaging, or even changed its behavior and claimed that it was doing so in response to Paparo—but whether, in fact, Beijing made a specific, desired behavior change—the change the operation was designed to bring about—in response to Paparo’s message, and that had Paparo not communicated his message, the behavior change would not have occurred.

To answer this question, the influence professional must have and investigate more specific hypotheses. Typically, these are formed when an operation is initially designed. Disconfirmable hypotheses—hypotheses that can be disconfirmed through empirical experimentation—in this case take the form, “Influence act a will cause influence target t to take response action r.” In practice, such a hypothesis is built on other hypotheses about groups of adversary actors (e.g., PLA officers with the power to affect cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure). Specific influence acts typically include specific messages, messengers, and contexts. They are delivered to specific target audiences to achieve specific behavioral outcomes. Specificity makes measurement possible. Imprecision in target audience identification (e.g., operations to influence “PRC” or “PLA”) muddies measurement  and results in failure to demonstrate operational outcomes.

Through careful design, measurement, repeated experimentation, and data analysis, influence practitioners can—in theory—discover how to get foreign leaders to take desired paths, but those findings will usually be relative to the specific uses, leading to findings of the sort: Xi is movable on topics t1, t2, and t3, but not t4, t5, and t6. Xi is receptive to messages m1, m2, and m3 on topic t1, but not persuaded by those messages on topics t2 and t3. Message m1 is persuasive 20 percent of the time when delivered through messenger d1 and 31 percent when delivered by d2. Message m2 is only persuasive 22 percent of the time when delivered through d1, but d2 is effective 34 percent of the time with m2. Message m3 is a military action not delivered by a specific messenger, but it has proved 10 percent effective.

Neither the Marine Corps nor the DOD has such findings or the data on which to reach them—and that is not only because influencing foreign leaders is historically a State Department task. Currently, no one in the U.S. government has such data because no one has embarked on the whole-of-government research program necessary to produce it.

Whether the Marine Corps, DOD, and other government departments and agencies will develop the necessary data infrastructure and measure influence activities—rather than just doing things—remains to be seen, but neither current budgetary priorities, institutional inertia, nor the short tenure of American military and civilian leaders bode well for research-driven statecraft. On the plus side, advanced data capture and analytics for foreign influence may be tools too powerful for any government to wield responsibly.

>Dr. Bryant is a veteran Army Intelligence Officer, Psychologist, and Neuroscientist at Headquarters Marine Corps DC I where he works as an Information Operations Effects Specialist. He has written on institutional and policy challenges facing DOD’s information and influence efforts, and proposed solutions in Proceedings and the Journal of Information Warfare.

Notes

1. Frances Mao, “Biden Again Says US Would Defend Taiwan if China Attacks,” BBC, September 19, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62951347. 

2. Jim Garamone, “Hicks Discusses Replicator Initiative,” DOD News, September 7, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3518827/hicks-discusses-replicator-initiative; Joel Wuthnow, “Why Xi Jinping Doesn’t Trust His Own Military,” Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/why-xi-jinping-doesnt-trust-his-own-military.

Core Tasks

Mission essential to the stand-in force

The Marine Corps must actively pursue the stand-in force’s (SIF’s) purpose to sense and make sense in joint and combined operations to provide relevant support the fleet and combatant commands (COCOMs), allies, and partners. Doing so means embracing the warfighting function of intelligence in all its permutations, including intelligence collection as a core competency of the Service and its units. Further, to align these core competencies to resourcing, the Service must seek out and define itself as the executive agent for joint expeditionary reconnaissance. The Marine Corps has a proud history of executing operations in support of the intelligence community (IC), which required the daring, but disciplined, operational execution unique to the Marine Corps. The Service’s intelligence resources, however, are increasingly misaligned and appear to be moving away from the key capabilities and characteristics that would position the Service to undertake the missions outlined in its own operating concepts. At the most fundamental level, the Service does not task its units to perform intelligence for any purpose other than to support local Marine Corps commanders. The Service has systematically dismantled its intelligence architecture to divert the resources to other functions. For the Marine Corps to achieve the vision of the SIF and provide a unique capability to the Joint Force, it will have to address the internal contradictions regarding resources and use of its intelligence capacity and effectively task and align itself to fill the intelligence gaps of joint and combined forces. 

Force Design Mandates
Service leadership has declared that Marines will be “positioned forward, shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies and partners, leveraging all-domain tools as the eyes and ears of the fleet and joint force [emphasis added].”1 This statement implies that the Marine Corps will undertake intelligence tasks for joint commanders. The concept further states:

Conducting maritime reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance is an enduring function for stand-in forces. Every element within the force focuses on either performing or supporting this function, of which there are two main aspects. The first orients on the potential adversary in support of fleet operations. The second focuses on threats against the stand-in force.2

Identifying adversary locations, equipment, and intentions as well as threats to the force are unquestionably intelligence tasks. This vision positions the Marine Corps as a unique collector, able to develop battlefield awareness with or without direct contact with the adversary, especially in competition.

Executing the vision requires cutting-edge intelligence collection capabilities and platforms but also experience integrating with the intelligence data and network architectures of COCOMs. Most importantly, it requires a concerted effort to be part of the collection and analysis community of that COCOM under the aegis of the interagency IC in the modern Joint Force. An inherent requirement in positioning forces forward, especially in competition, is that SIF units provide relevant and unique contributions to the common intelligence and operating picture to justify positioning them so close to the adversary. For example, a SIF can provide key collections capabilities and terminal targeting identification resources not otherwise available or degraded without the placement and access provided by the SIF.  

One common argument is that the SIF is for command and control (C2) rather than for organic collection. However, the nature of current capabilities, by both the United States and its competitors, is such that worldwide C2 of sensors, analysts, and shooters will be provided from any location. For example, the Air Force’s “480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing … comprises six groups, 23 squadrons, and three detachments operating in four locations. The mission of the 480th ISR Wing is to lead globally networked ISR operations for the U.S. Air Force while headquartered at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia.”3 It may be advantageous, especially in targeting C2, to have a sense of the collective picture, but it is not necessary to have C2 forward to control and connect ISR to over-the-horizon firing platforms—something that the COCOM must actuate anyway. The placement and access of the SIF are irrelevant for C2; they are indispensable for intelligence collection. 

Furthermore, eyes and ears for the fleet and the Joint Force require the infrastructure and connectivity to the interagency that supports robust intelligence collection. The SIF as described would be positioned forward with allies and partners—but in competition before conflict. So, contact with potential adversaries is made through sensors—intelligence collection—rather than physical contact or reconnaissance by fire. In the realm of military and defense intelligence, that contact is global for early warning and strategic preparedness, just as cognizance of global sensing by potential adversaries should be important to every unit. Establishing a baseline of normal activities is fundamental to identifying changes that indicate or warn of possible action. This baseline encompasses a spectrum of monitoring efforts from national-level surveillance systems that track broad patterns to tactical-level sensors that capture detailed, realtime data. By analyzing these activities, intelligence agencies establish a pattern of life from which identified deviations provide warning that enables proactive measures to mitigate risk. The complexity of this task requires a coordinated approach across various levels of intelligence gathering, to ensure timely reporting. At the broadest level, for the entire IC, the Director of National Intelligence describes: “The IC … monitoring and assessing direct and indirect threats to U.S. and allied interests. For this requirement, the IC’s National Intelligence Officers—and the National Intelligence Council that they collectively constitute—work closely and regularly … across the IC.”4 Therefore, to be the SIF described, Marines across the globe must tie closely to the IC and understand their intelligence role as part of that community. 

Historic Relationships
Historically, the Marine Corps has worked closely with the IC, though examples can be little-known and difficult to research due to their nature. During World War II, Marine Corps personnel were involved in Office of Strategic Services activities, integrating intelligence functions into Marine operations.5 Relevant to the Pacific theater, during the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, Marines (including a future commandant) participated in covert operations with the CIA along the coast of the People’s Republic of China during the Korean conflict, conducting the intelligence collection of the time and supporting anti-communist movements.6 In the Vietnam War, Marine reconnaissance units worked frequently in joint missions with the CIA and other agencies, including participation in the Phoenix Program, to find and maintain contact with the Viet Cong.7 In these conflicts, Marine units also utilized signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence gathered by intelligence agencies, sometimes processed as far away as Hawaii, to plan and execute operations.8 This technological integration was a fact of life for Marines. From beginnings under Al Gray after Korea and through the 1990s, sailors and Marines executed air, surface, and subsurface “direct support” SIGINT/EW operations with the fleet on behalf of NSA across the Pacific. Marine Corps IC integration changed to be more specialized with the advent of Special Operations Command and as the Corps formalized its intelligence structure with the establishment of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity in 1987.9

In Marine Special Operations Command and beyond, individual Marines remain among the most prized intelligence personnel in the Joint Force and the IC. During Operation Inherent Resolve, intelligence Marines supported joint and coalition forces in the fight against ISIS providing realtime intelligence and electronic warfare support, enabling precise targeting, and disrupting enemy communications. Also, MEUs operate under all geographic combatant commands with intelligence and reconnaissance detachments to provide for amphibious operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and crisis response scenarios. Their ability to quickly adapt and provide actionable intelligence in dynamic environments is a key asset to joint and Coalition forces.10 “What makes a good intelligence Marine is being able to identify and incorporate all the intelligence disciplines, and incorporate all the information they gather to turn into intelligence. Hard work, dedication and the motivation to do better than yesterday is what makes an exceptional intelligence Marine.”11 From Global Force Management through individual augmentation, everyone in the Joint Force always wants the individual intelligence Marine because they are known to be a well-trained, skilled, aggressive, force-multiplier who will use initiative to seize any opportunity to advance the mission.

Mission Essential Tasks
The Service should lean into its established strengths and evolving capabilities to seek executive agency for expeditionary reconnaissance as a part of intelligence. “From a multi-Service and joint perspective, the Marine Corps’ role, both historically and in emergent concepts, can be summed up in two words: expeditionary reconnaissance.”12 Reconnaissance is common and special forces already do focused advanced reconnaissance. The Service’s executive agency should be for advanced, expeditionary reconnaissance at scale, being the pillars of the complete joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities policy director for the capability. Executive agency would be the logical extension of Service concepts, provide programs and resources associated with executive agency, and align the Service with the IC in a distinct and capability-defined way for which IC resources could be channeled. More than any other war‑
fighting function, intelligence has broad connectivity and resourcing across the government through the Director of National Intelligence as well as the Secretary of Defense, the eighteen members of the U.S. IC, allied and partnered intelligence capabilities, and strong relationships with law
enforcement, diplomacy, and commerce. While intelligence comes with ample oversight and constraint to ensure liberal-democratic values endure, the opportunities outweigh the challenges, especially for a forward-deployed-focused force. To enact the operating concept’s vision, there could be no better avenue to success than the intelligence community. Taking that avenue, however, would be a radical change for the Service. 

It would be a radical change because the Service takes neither intelligence nor reconnaissance missions seriously enough to define them as core tasks for its pacing units. So, if “every element within the force focuses on either performing or supporting this function” is ever to become a reality, the Marine Corps must address the core missions of the Defense Readiness Reporting System against which the Service measures and reports its readiness.13 The Marine Corps Task List includes a comprehensive list of intelligence and reconnaissance tasks under intelligence and provides the supporting architecture in the C2 section. The tasks, however, do not describe an element producing a key capability for the fleet and Joint Force but rather focus internally on the Service’s local commander: “To assist tactical Commanders in determining and prioritizing their intelligence requirements (IR), to enable them to plan and direct intelligence, counterintelligence, and reconnaissance operations to satisfy these requirements.”14 Additionally, these tasks do not extend to the core mission essential task (MET) list for the MEU, the basic MAGTF. They instead are translated into a single task for the command element, one that is similarly worded to focus on the MEU commander rather than the broader joint or coalition forces.15 Marine infantry regiments and battalions, arguably still the fundamental units of the Service, have no core intelligence or reconnaissance tasks at all in a list revised contemporaneously with the operating concepts declaring that all elements would support these functions.16 These are the METs against which the Service measures itself officially in the Defense Readiness Reporting System to report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Core METs “define the basic capabilities of a unit,”17 so for the Marine Corps, those basic capabilities do not include intelligence and reconnaissance. Why, then, would a warfighting command—the COCOM—look to the Marine Corps to be a SIF if the Service does not even set for itself and report the tasks necessary to execute the concept? 

Intelligence Malpractice
Not only is the Service not assigning itself these tasks but it has embarked upon an experiment to invest in information as a new warfighting function by systematically divesting its Marine intelligence apparatus and abdicating its role as a member of the IC. In introducing information as a joint function, the Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment states: “To address this challenge and achieve enduring strategic outcomes, the Joint Force must build information into operational art to design operations that deliberately leverage the inherent informational aspects of military activities.”18 This cautionary approach puts modern focus on something for which militaries have always existed—sending a message of strength to adversaries through cognitive effect using operational activities and applicable characteristics; it explicitly does not insist on redirecting resources out of existing joint functions.  

By contrast, standing up the Deputy Commandant for Information (DC I) in 2017, the Corps did not produce any doctrine to define information until 2022 (MCDP 8).19 The Marine Corps perceives a change of military characteristics described in this Marine Corps doctrinal publication that requires a redirection of effort and resources (a divest-to-invest strategy) from established functions, particularly intelligence. Shortly after producing doctrine, the Marine Corps disposed of its separate Director of Intelligence (the only military Service to do so; the Coast Guard and Space Force both have two-star positions for it). The then DC I noted that “we live in an information environment all the time,”20 but we always have. The characteristics have changed in the Digital Era, but the information environment has always been part of the nature of conflict. Making sense of that environment is an essential part of the intelligence function. 

Moreover, MCDP 8 focuses on characteristics rather than nature and has the Marine Corps mirror-imaging American society onto adversaries and focusing on the kinds of information challenges associated with terrorism. The MCDP prepares the Marine Corps for the last war. About the Service shift to information, MCDP 8 states: “This change stems from advanced societies’ dependency on information … With dependence comes potential vulnerability, and with vulnerability comes possible opportunity to seize information advantages to achieve our objectives and impose our will.”21 Against autocratic peer adversaries who tightly control all internal narratives at every level, this statement assumes that the Service can wield information via open systems and applications just like those in liberal democracies. Autocracies tend to retain monopolies on information as well as violence—so much so that even terrorists rarely attempt their tactics against them. Intelligence provides the means to penetrate the information environments of autocratic systems, to understand the motivations of leadership, instructions to society and militaries, and intentions across the instruments of national power. A possible Marine Corps contribution to information might be executed through the course of Service operations, using the “inherent informational aspects of military activities,” as noted by the Joint Staff, but those operations will remain within the military sphere. Exerting informational influence in foreign contexts, by contrast, is for most of the IC a common intelligence operation, not some new function. Removing influence efforts from the strict control that the IC provides in global competition against autocracies gives the appearance not of something novel but of intelligence malpractice. 

Opportunity Cost
The Marine Corps’ fielded intelligence capabilities have been subsumed into MEF Information Groups (MIGs) supporting information control centers. The MIGs’ information control centers’ purpose is “providing information environment battlespace awareness,” describing the importance of this by saying that “Marine Corps officials had no way to know what was happening in that arena.”22 These statements show a remarkable lack of awareness of what the IC as a whole and intelligence as a discipline have been doing since inception. Intelligence exists for battlespace awareness in any domain. Having formed its cyber component by draining the human resources out of its SIGINT/EW apparatus, the Service then diversified participation in EW across specialties previously unfamiliar with it, despite the very successful history of its SIGINT/EW fields. The Marine Corps eliminated its sniper platoons and halved the number of intelligence officers for its infantry formations in one year, apparently assuming infantry movement to contact would suffice in place of any reconnaissance. In the SIF concept, however, these formations are deployed with permission in the territories of allies and partners in the first island chain. To further stir the confusion, information specialties align themselves in fielded units into G39 special activities in operations represented at the Service headquarters by the DC Plans, Policies, and Operations, rather than the staff codes represented by DC I. 

No other warfighting function, however, provides independent resources like the IC. From the interagency and inter-governmental community, data and communication architectures, and relationships, intelligence provides a resourced set of capabilities specifically applicable to the SIF concept. Instead of moving forward to present the IC and the Joint Force with a viable set of initiatives under its new operating concepts that could have been codified into executive agency within the community, thus accessing its unique programs and funding streams in National and Military Intelligence Programs, the Marine Corps moved tangibly away, divesting from intelligence at the Service level. The IC publicly reported a budget in fiscal year 2024 at ~$101.7 billion, with 13 percent growth over two years—possibly not counting all general defense intelligence, cyber, and other associated funding while still almost double the Marine Corps budget in the flat defense expenditures of the same period. 23

The Marine divestiture from intelligence decisively set the Service back at least a generation, both in manpower and resources. It should be no surprise that while COCOMs continue to ask for high-quality, individual intelligence Marines, they do not ask for Marine formations that have neither the task, the personnel, the capabilities, the integration with the IC, nor the culture to even understand a SIF. As a result, to execute its concepts, the Marine Corps will have to reorient its role in intelligence by both revitalizing intelligence structures and reorienting its units with pertinent core tasks that ensure that every element has as part of its role to either execute or support operational ISR. 

Corrective Measures
Broadly speaking, Service pacing items need core METs for ISR, beyond the sixth function of Marine aviation. These will need to be carefully written to support the fleet, the COCOM, and the IC—not just the tactical Marine commander. The Service needs to revitalize its intelligence structures starting with Headquarters Marine Corps portfolios. Aligning a deputy commandant to a recently identified, doctrine and resource-free, nascent concept unlinked to anything else in government by using the resources of existing warfighting functions is unwise. Recognizing the importance of intelligence as a warfighting function that directly supports all other functions would be far more practical, placing the nascent function under the direction of staff leadership whose moniker includes existing functions, programs, resources, and agencies to make it recognizable to those with whom the staff must interact. Something inclusive such as DC C4ISR would accomplish that mission. The Service also needs to reestablish a point of contact specifically for the IC, a Director of Intelligence, preferably at least at the grade of the two smallest Services. Then it must seek to revitalize lines of effort and thinking that lead to success with intelligence. 

Starting in the year 2000, under the first Director of Intelligence Michael Ennis, the Marine Corps began exploring an idea it eventually termed the Marine Corps Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE). The MCISRE was brought into focus by Vincent Stewart from 2009 onward with the leadership, charters, boards, and structure needed to shift from concept to reality. These efforts culminated in a MCISRE plan, published under Michael Groen in 2014 for coordinating efforts across the Service.24 Never an authoritative command like the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command, the Air Force’s 16th Air Force, or the Navy’s 10th Fleet, the MCISRE nonetheless provided an organizing feature for the Service contribution to intelligence. While a Service-wide command would be the most efficient approach in a globalized era, at the very least the MCISRE needs revitalization to work these tasks back into the Service culture and then provide a clear, distinct, intelligence program-worthy idea for the Joint Force in executive agency for expeditionary reconnaissance. 

The operating concepts developed for Force Design, however, are for the whole force (“every element”). The MCISRE will provide a focal point of knowledge, experience, and relationships to the IC that can help bring the SIF from concept to reality—but the whole force must be part of it. “Due to … flexibility, scalability, maneuverability, and adaptability,”25 the MAGTF remains the Marine Corps’ essential deploying formation. Task organization has also been an enduring Marine Corps strength and the fundamental reason for the MAGTF. Any forward deployed sense-and-make-sense function can be a task-organized enduring toolkit of the MAGTF without creating separate units. Given the mission of the COCOM, a MAGTF can certainly man, train, equip, organize, and deploy to perform operational ISR on behalf of the fleet, COCOM, Joint Force, and IC as described in the concepts. To task organize, however, the unit first needs the task. Every element must have core mission essential tasks for operational ISR. 

>Col David is the former Deputy Director for Intelligence Division under the Deputy Commandant for Information/Director of Intelligence. He is currently the Marine Chair for the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy.

Notes

1. Gen David Berger, A Concept for Stand-In Forces, (Washington, DC: December 2021). 

2. Ibid. 

3. 16th Air Force, “480th ISRW,” 16th AF, n.d., https://www.16af.af.mil/Units/480ISRW.

4. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” ODNI, Washington, February 5, 2024, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

5. Michael Decker and William Mckenzie, “The Birth and Early Years of Marine Corps Intelligence,” Marine Corps University, n.d., https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCH/Marine-Corps-History-Winter-2019/The-Birth-and-Early-Years-of-Marine-Corps-Intelligence.

6. Frank Holober, Raiders of the China Coast: CIA Covert Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999). 

7. Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

8. Naval History and Heritage Command, “The Ten Thousand-Day War at Sea: The U.S. Navy in Vietnam, 1950–1975,” Hampton Roads Naval Museum, April 22, 2021, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/hrnm/explore/VietnamExhibitPage/IntelligenceSpecialOperations/KnowingtheEnemy0.html. 

9. Michael H. Decker and William Mackenzie, “The Birth and Early Years of Marine Corps Intelligence,” Marine Corps History, 5, No. 2 (2019).

10. Notable in several CRS reports: Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 22, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21048/62; and Congressional Research Service, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42077/11.

11. Marine Corps Times, “Marines Dish on Mysterious 0211 Duty,” Marine Corps Times, August 9, 2014, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2014/08/09/intel-marines-dish-on-mysterious-0211-duty.

12. Maj Jon Schillo, “Who We Are and Where We Are Going,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 15, 2024, https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/who-we-are-and-where-we-are-going.

13. POR Readiness Branch, Commanders Readiness Handbook, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, Operations Division, 2020).

14. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCO 3500.26B, Marine Corps Task List (MCTL 2.0), (Washington, DC: June 2024).

15. Headquarters Marine Corps, NAVMC 3500.99, Marine Expeditionary Unit (New Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual, (Washington DC: November 2012).

16. Headquarters Marine Corps, NAVMC3500.
44D, Infantry Training and Readiness Manual, (Washington DC, May 2020). 

17. Headquarters Marine Corps, NAVMC 3500.106A, Ground Training and Readiness Program Manual, (Washington DC: May 2021).

18. Gen Paul Selva, “Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment,” JCS, July 25, 2018, https://www.Jcs.Mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/Concepts/Joint_Concepts_Jcoie.Pdf?Ver=2018-08-01-142119-830.

19. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 8, Information, (Washington, DC: June 2022). 

20. LtGen Lori E. Reynolds, “DCI Letter,” Marine Corps Gazette 104, No 4, (2020). 

21. Ibid.

22. Mark Pomerleau, “Here’s What Marines’ Information Command Centers Will Do,” C4ISRNET, December 6, 2019, https://www.c4isrnet.com/information-warfare/2019/12/06/heres-what-the-marines-information-command-centers-will-do.

23. Director of National Intelligence, “U.S. Intelligence Community Budget,” Director of National Intelligence, 2024, n.d., https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ic-budget.

24. MCISRE Plan, “MCISRE Plan 2015–2020,” Marines.mil, September 1, 2014, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/133/Docs/MCISRE_Final_Sept2014.pdf. 

25. Staff, “Organized for Air, Land, Sea, and Cyber,” Marines.com, n.d., https://www.marines.com/about-the-marine-corps/marine-corps-structure/air-ground-task-force.html.

Evolving the OODA Loop for Strategy

A new application of Boyd’s model

The work of the late Col John Boyd has significantly influenced the doctrine and concepts of the U.S. armed forces for the last 30 years. Boyd’s achievements during his Air Force career include substantial contributions to fighter tactics and aircraft design.1 Yet, he is better known for his ever-evolving and eclectic theoretical efforts to define conflict and for his simple decision-making model, the famous “OODA loop.”2

In this article, we introduce another construct for consideration. The authors are avowed maneuverists, who find value in Col Boyd’s wide-ranging theories, notwithstanding his contempt for battles of attrition, which are sometimes unavoidable. Boyd’s detractors criticize the underlying historical cases he drew upon and his lack of published substantive scholarship. But over the last two generations, he has arguably offered better frameworks for thinking about warfare (especially at the tactical level) than anyone else. A concept that addresses uncertainty, cognition, moral factors, feedback loops, continuous adaptation, and time-competitive decision making is quite powerful. His theory rightly stresses the value of relative tempo vice just acting faster, which Boyd clearly understood. 

Thus, we are not surprised that Boyd’s conception of war as a violent and time-competitive clash to disrupt an opponent’s mind and force cohesion has traction with many in the U.S. military and Marine warfighting doctrine.3 Boyd was respected and praised by numerous students of war.4 Additionally,  having numerous devoted acolytes, the late strategic theorist and prolific author Colin Gray, counted Boyd as an honorable mention on his list of favorite strategic theorists.5 “The OODA loop may appear too humble to merit categorization as a grand theory,” Gray observed, “but that is what it is. It has an elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of applicability, and contains a high quality of insight about strategic essentials.”6  Scholars at the Army War College support this assessment.7

Boyd’s thinking also influenced the development of the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine and underpins the Army’s concept of mission command, which embraces the delegation of responsibility and decision making down the chain of command to ensure tempo is not ceded to the enemy.8 The Navy’s Next Generation Air Dominance program, involving unmanned loyal wingmen flying with sixth-generation manned fighters, continues to assess the implications new technology will have on cockpit decision-making.9

Moreover, Boyd’s OODA construct (see Figure 1) has been popularized in both military and management circles and has taken root in the military doctrine of many NATO countries. 

Figure 1. Boyd’s full OODA loop. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 1. Boyd’s full OODA loop. (Figure provided by authors.)

But as previously noted, Boyd’s work is not without controversy or criticisms.10 Some scholars found the leap from Boyd’s cockpit experiences difficult to scale up to the operational and strategic levels of war.11 One critic labeled him a “blind strategist” who was “in the dark” due to his fraudulent reading of history.12 According to this critic, maneuver warfare somehow “corrupted the art of war” and is responsible for the catastrophic decisions made in Iraq and Afghanistan. That critique is both facile and hyperbolic. The most balanced observers of Boyd’s research acknowledge that he was not a professional historian and that his selection of historical cases reflected some bias.13

These shortcomings tempted some Army officers years ago to wishfully give the OODA loop a sendoff into academic oblivion.14 These authors focused on the simple four-step OODA loop, which is a shorthand description. They would be justified based on that abbreviated understanding. But they overlooked Boyd’s richer and expanded version that better depicts his thinking.15 There have been other efforts to construct alternative concepts including the critique–explore–compare–adapt loop and, in Australia, a pair of analysts proposed an act-sense-decide-adapt (ASDA) cycle.16 The ASDA concept stressed the competitive learning and adaptation aspects of warfare, as did Boyd.17

An Alternative Approach
Changes in the global security environment since the 1980s and ineluctable demands confronting today’s strategic planners suggest Boyd’s OODA loop could use a modest update. Thus, we propose a 4-D Model of discovery, design, decide, and disseminate/monitor. This builds upon Boyd’s OODA cycle while expanding his concept to enhance its relevance to the strategic level of war. Underpinning the need for the 4-D model are the following drivers:

  • The deliberative nature of strategy is less about making fast decisions and more about identifying and deeply understanding the right problem and the rigorous generation of a sound solution.  
  • The collective character of strategy formulation, including group dynamics between commanders, allies, staffs, and specialists, and not just one individual’s cognitive cycle. The importance of discourse in building a shared understanding needs reinforcement.18
  • The opportunity to incorporate advances in the cognitive sciences and other sciences that have occurred since Boyd developed his framework.19
  • The thrust of the military design movement has steadily influenced strategic planning.20
  • The need for a more explicit recognition of the role of risk in strategy formulation and implementation.  There are new dimensions of strategic risk that transcend traditional concepts of risk to mission and forces that must now be accounted for: the risk that action or inaction poses to democratic governance, the global economy, and nation-states’ ability to marshal both manpower and materiel to meet the exigencies of protracted war.  

In Boyd’s time, few fighter pilots or infantry commanders had to worry much about these factors. Today, they may find themselves quickly assigned to a combatant command headquarters and tasked with writing war plans and operations orders in an era of strategic competition and gray zone challenges. Thus, Boyd’s focus on operational or tactical success using the OODA cycle requires some translation for staff officers who are required to think strategically in peacetime but not yet moving to the sound of the guns. 

The “4 D” Model (Discovery, Design, Decide, Disseminate/Monitor)
Our proposed model is presented in Figure 2. We came to recognize from Boyd that these are not isolated steps; instead, they are interconnected by information flows from continuous feedback loops.21 Our model blends Boyd’s interdisciplinary efforts with additional elements and attempts to help modern-day commanders and their staffs apply it to their critical command functions. To represent the nonlinear and continuous interaction that Boyd intended, we revised our version as depicted in Figure 3. This depiction came out of Boyd’s writing about the nonlinearity of warfare and seeks to better reflect the interactive nature of the various components. 

Figure 2. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 2. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 3. (Figure provided by authors.)
Figure 3. (Figure provided by authors.)

Discovery
In place of observe, we propose discovery, which connotes a more active effort to learn and understand. Obviously, the Observe step is drawn from Boyd’s experience as a fighter pilot. Observing is not irrelevant to fighter pilots nor strategists, but a more proactive search is needed to build a comprehensive understanding of the strategic environment and the particular strategic culture of the adversary. What is necessary is an active effort to learn and appreciate what GEN McMaster called strategic empathy, which he defined as “the skill of understanding what drives and constrains one’s adversary.”22

In the discovery component, we include the identification and attempted resolution of “known unknowns” and an effort to satisfy the commander’s information requirements. We also include a recognition of the perspectives and mental modes, heuristics, and biases of key leaders and strategists, as Boyd properly noted. 

An integral component of the discovery step involves identifying political constraints (actions that must be taken) and restraints (actions that are not authorized) that will shape the design step. In an era of great-power competition between nuclear-armed adversaries, escalation control and the political imperative to find acceptable off-ramps will impact the design of strategies involving the use of force between nuclear powers and their surrogates.

Design
In lieu of orientation, we have labeled the next step of the process as design. Whereas Boyd used orientation to capture the elements of sense-making, leading to analysis and synthesis, our model explicitly uses some of the simpler components of design as practiced in joint and Service planning methodologies. Design is not a single step; it is a developing awareness based on constantly changing circumstances and imperfect information. In Boyd’s briefing lectures, he stressed that orientation never ceases but rather constantly evolves as it takes in new data.23 “Orientation isn’t just a state you’re in,” he claimed, “it’s a process. You’re always orienting.”24 Likewise with design.  

Some aspects of design theory have been incorporated within the existing joint planning process.25 While this has not been the sweeping paradigm change design advocates would like, it has helped generate the desired outcomes of the design movement (more creativity, critical thinking, challenging outdated frames, etc.). We agree with proponents who embrace complexity and novel ways to make sense of dynamic and non-linear environments and who want to exploit divergent thinking and leverage deep reflection.26

Yet, the notion of design theory and military applications is in flux. Now, as was the case a decade ago, there is little agreement on exactly what design thinking is or how to best apply it in strategy or operational art.27 The field is split between purists and pragmatists.28 While recognizing that design theory is a valuable but rather philosophical approach, we are practitioners who appreciate pragmatic applications.29 Design theory is not inconsistent with Boyd’s work, given his emphasis on complexity and systems theory, as well as the cognitive sciences.  

Design is a useful intellectual approach that can assist planners who must grapple with wicked or ill-structured problems that are non-linear, interactively complex, and have no stopping rule or final end-state.30 But planners who ignore Boyd’s ideas and attempt to use design to overcome war’s inherent ambiguity and uncertainty will be gravely disappointed.31 At best, ill-structured problems can be managed or mitigated and not permanently solved. Instead of seeking some sort of utopian end state, planners must be content with achieving an acceptable sustainable state.32

Our conception of design includes problem framing, the first step in any serious strategy formulation process.33 That enables multiple diverse approaches (or courses of action) to be generated to resolve the gap between a perceived environment and a desired change. Design generates ideations in the form of potential solutions or mitigations, and these are fed into the analysis and synthesis process via the gaming of options or courses of action. All of this is interactively refined by discourse and collaboration among commanders and staffs. Critically, the insights gleaned from this process will almost always require the approaches or courses of action to be modified, necessitating yet another round of testing and experimentation before the Commander takes a decision.  

Although doctrine still encourages strategists to develop a Theory of Victory, such verbiage can lead to over-reach when identifying the ends for which military force is going to be used. States acquire nuclear weapons to immunize themselves against regime change and existential defeat. Victory implies an outcome that is much more favorable than returning to the status quo ante or a negotiated settlement involving major concessions from both belligerents. History informs that the former is difficult to achieve and so a Theory of Success may have greater utility during strategy formulation.

Decision
The next component of the framework is the actual decision. Boyd appropriately labeled decisions as a hypothesis. This hypothesis represents a causal relationship between actions and desired ends, which is the operative theory of success in the evolving strategy.34

The commander is responsible and accountable for this decision as well as the degree of freedom of action for independent judgment that he or she delegates to subordinates and coalition members.35

In our model, we included strategic risk as an element in the decision component. Risk is an enduring reality in both strategic and operational decision making. The rigorous assessment of risk is or should be a critical and explicit step in strategy development. There is always a risk to any strategy thanks to the unrelenting reality of uncertainty in human affairs and especially war.36 Yet, it is often a weak link in U.S. strategy formulation and decision making.  

Strategic risk is more than the risk to mission or force in joint risk analysis. It can come from many sources, both internal and external.  Most of the time we look for risk from vulnerabilities or external events. The joint doctrine note on strategy suggests that risk analysis is an implicit function and relegates it to the assessment phase. It states, “Implicit to the implementation of a strategy is the identification of its associated costs and risks.”37 This is limiting and slightly problematic. Risk considerations should be explicit and start with the development of a strategy as well as execution and refinement from assessments. However, retired GEN Stan McChrystal insists that the greatest risk to our organization is from ourselves.38 Our lack of empathy, curiosity, and critical thinking leave us open to surprise from foreseeable hazards.  

Risk assessment is a continuing process based on new information, or planning assumptions that reveal themselves to be inaccurate. A strategy and design team will look at risk in its gaming and synthesis. However, a conscious effort to accept risk or modify a strategy is the responsibility of the senior official approving the strategy. Risk is not well understood, and risk management is not applied consistently and explicitly at the policy and strategic decision-making levels. The U.S. strategy community needs to sharpen its appreciation for risk as a requisite step in testing strategic choices, making risk-informed decisions, and implementing strategy.  

The inclusion of risk within the strategy process is now well recognized in U.S. doctrine but not by Boyd. Hence our inclusion of it as an explicit item to improve our capacity to appreciate risks to and from our strategy.39

Dissemination and Monitoring
After a decision has been made, it must be disseminated to all subordinate actors in such a way that captures the commander’s intent and logic. We have not used “act” since higher-level headquarters themselves do not act as much as support implementation and assessment.40 They do direct action across their formations, which must be continually assessed and which may generate the need to adapt the strategy or how it is being implemented. We specifically include monitor as a part of a commander’s function (and his staff) as it supports both mission command and documents the vital assessment process. Monitoring vice control is a notion we have absorbed from Boyd himself.41 Boyd felt that control was too focused on limiting freedom of action, which is the opposite of what learning and rapid adaptation are supposed to achieve.

Monitoring includes adopting useful assessment metrics that can help senior commanders and the civilian leaders they serve to answer the most difficult wartime question of all: is our strategy working? Bogus metrics and failing to ask this question frequently enough during a campaign can undermine the virtuous cycle of learning inherent to Boyd’s overall concept.  

Regarding transitions and change, as the Russo-Ukraine war demonstrates, war is a competition in learning and adaptation.42 This is just as true at the strategy level as it is in the conduct of warfare.

Pitfalls
Strategists must be mindful of pitfalls that can lead to less-than-optimum outcomes or outright failure. We expect our adapted model will help ameliorate them. Richard Rumelt believes that “a good strategy recognizes the nature of the challenge and offers a way of surmounting it. Simply being ambitious is not a strategy.”43 Nor are big audacious goals and broad arrows on a map conducive to sound strategy. Some of the most dangerous pitfalls to remain aware of include:

Ignoring or Stifling Criticism
• The discovery step includes gathering as much relevant information about the problem as possible—the security environment, adversaries, friendly forces, allies, and partnered nations, and required resources to implement and sustain the strategy. A bias toward happy talk and good news can result in overly optimistic judgments that seep into the design step and lead to developing facile courses of action and the downplaying of associated risks. Prudent strategists are wary of too much sunshine intruding on the process and jealously guarding their objectivity and dispassionate analysis. 

Forgotten Assumptions
• Strategy making takes time. Edward Miller has noted that “strategists are not clairvoyants,” and the development of War Plan Orange for defeating Imperial Japan in World War II was “a plan nurtured over thirty-five years.”44 Admittedly, this is a long time. Nevertheless, regardless of duration, strategy development requires that planners keep track of the assumptions underpinning their thinking and constantly cross-check them against reality. Circumstances will dictate whether old assumptions should be refined or discarded, and new ones adopted. A seemingly simple assumption like “country X or Y will or will not provide U.S. forces basing access,” can have an outsized impact on strategic outcomes. It is the impact that discarded, or newly adopted assumptions, have on the overall strategy—and the imperative to understand their second and third-order effects—that matters most.  

Interagency Cooperation
•  A strategy that integrates all elements of national power will, by necessity, involve multiple Executive Branch departments and agencies—each with its own unique organizational cultures and resource limitations. Understanding the role civilian agencies have in the strategy, and their timelines for execution, which, in most cases, differs from when the positive effects of their actions will be realized (i.e., financial sanctions and tariffs imposed, mobilization of industrial base, etc.) is crucial. Involving the interagency at the outset of the 4-D process will help promote a realistic understanding of what these stakeholders are bringing to the table, or not. 

Rigid Adherence to the Plan
• Good strategies have some organic flexibility baked into their design so they can adapt to changing circumstances during implementation. Strategy refinements and modifications are almost always necessary to meet the moves and countermoves of a thinking adversary. The U.S. “Europe First” strategy during World War II allowed for operations in the Pacific and Mediterranean without causing decision makers to lose sight of the ultimate prize. Throughout the war, military objectives were expediently modified to exploit success and more effectively align resources with changing operational and strategic priorities. There is a reciprocal relationship between policy and strategy during war that should occur naturally.45 Identifying the shifts and the strategic trade-offs that should be made and for what reasons is strategic acumen of the highest order. 

Conclusion
Like Clausewitz, Boyd deserves his place in the pantheon of useful philosophers of war. Oddly, both never really finished their work, and we are left with some questions to resolve on our own. We are not surprised Boyd’s various concepts resonate with many theorists and practitioners exposed to warfare. Despite the critics, we believe that any conception of warfare remains on solid ground with Boyd’s ideas about relative tempo, uncertainty, decision making, and adaptation. The convergence between Boyd and the Marine Corps is tied to their common emphasis on adapting to new circumstances in conflict. Ian Brown stresses, “such adaptability required a mind-set that could recognize when circumstances changed,” and the ability to “process the new information, and make those decisions necessary to adapt and triumph.”46 As noted earlier, the Army and the Navy also see some virtue in many of Boyd’s ideas.

We do not contend we have discovered the Rosetta Stone, but we offer this alternative model to help further leverage Boyd’s construct, especially for higher staff levels. We argue that Boyd would be happy to debate about the modified loop we have developed. Boyd hated dogmas and expected his ideas to germinate and evolve. Locking into a single mental model was tantamount to failure, or as Boyd colorfully put it, “You’ll get your pants pulled down.”47 His key point was to not become predictable or locked into templates which he labelled as cognitive stagnation.  

While some of Boyd’s ideas can and should be challenged, his thinking “has shifted strategists, planners, and operators from mass-based to tempo- and disruption-based conceptions of war, conflict, and competition.”48 We should continue to build on that at all levels of war. The extensive use of the OODA loop model for decision making is a testament to the pervasive utility of this concept. Yet, Boyd’s contributions go well beyond the OODA framework and are worthy of serious study. However, they do not represent the final word.  In fact, it is quite likely that the late Col Boyd would be unhappy if his provocative insights did not engender more debate and evolution. 

>Col Greenwood (Ret) currently works as a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, VA.

>>LtCol Hoffman (Ret) was, until his retirement, a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Barry Watts and Mie Augier, “John Boyd

on Competition and Conflict,” Comparative Strategy 41, No. 3 (2022).

2. Which for those not familiar with the construct stands for observe, orient, decide, and act.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC, 1997).

4. For positive assessments of Boyd’s many contributions see Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2001); Chet Richards, Certain to Win, (Bloomington: Xlibris 2004); Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: Little, Brown, 2005); Ian T. Brown, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2018).

5. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

6. Ibid.

7.  Clay Chun and Jacqueline Whitt, “John Boyd and the “OODA Loop,” War Room blog, Army War College, January 8, 2019, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/boyd-ooda-loop-great-strategists.

8. Jamie L. Holm, An Alternate Portrait of Ruin: The Impact of John Boyd on United States Army Doctrine, (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2021.)

9. John Robert Pellegrin, “Boyd in the Age of Loyal Wingmen,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/june/boyd-age-loyal-wingmen.

10. Robert Polk, “A Critique of the Boyd Theory—Is It Relevant to the Army?” Defense Analysis 16, No. 3 (2000); and James Lane, “A Critique of John Boyd’s A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” Research Gate, February 2023, unpublished thesis, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/368470051
_A_Critique_of_John_Boyd%27s_A_Discourse_on_Winning_and_Losing.

11. James Hasik, “Beyond the Briefing: Theoretical and Practical Problems in the Works and Legacy of John Boyd,” Contemporary Security Policy 34, No. 3 (2013).

12. Stephen Robinson, The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Way of War (Dunedin: Exile Publishing, 2021).

13. Frans Osinga, “Getting a Discourse on Winning and Losing” A Primer on Boyd’s ‘Theory of Intellectual Evolution,’ Contemporary Security Policy 34, No. 3 (2013). 

14. Kevin Benson and Steven Rotkoff, “Goodbye OODA Loop,” Armed Forces Journal, October 2011, http://armedforcesjournal.com/2011/10/6777464.

15. David Lyle, “Looped Back In,” Armed Forces Journal, December 2011, http://armedforcesjournal.com/perspectives-looped-back-in.

16. David J. Bryant, “Rethinking OODA: Toward a Modern Cognitive Framework of Command Decision Making,” Military Psychology 18, No. 3 (2009).

17. Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, “OODA Versus ASDA: Metaphors at War,” Australian Army Journal 6, No. 3 (2009).

18. T.C. Greenwood and T.X. Hammes, “War Planning for Wicked Problems,” Armed Forces Journal, December 1, 2009, http://armedforcesjournal.com/war-planning-for-wicked-problems. See also Ben Zweibelson, “Seven Design Theory Considerations, An Approach to Ill-Structured Problems,” Military Review (November–December 2012).

19. Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Thinking of John Boyd (New York: Routledge, 2006).

20. Ben Zweibeleson, Understanding the Military Design Movement: War, Change and Innovation (Abingdon: Routledge 2023).

21. Alistair Luft, “The OODA Loop and the Half-Beat,” Strategy Bridge, March 17, 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/3/17/the-ooda-loop-and-the-half-beat.

22. H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper, 2020); H.R. McMaster, “Developing Strategic Empathy: History as the Foundation of Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy,” Journal of Military History 84 (2020); Allison Abbe, “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in National Security,” Parameters 53, No. 2 (2023); and Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” Joint Force Quarterly 38, No. 3 (2005).

23. “The OODA Loop and the Half-Beat.” 

24. John Boyd, cited in Brett and Kate McKay, “The Tao of Boyd, How to Master the OODA Loop,” Unruh Turner Burke & Frees, September 15, 2014, https://www.paestateplanners.com/library/Tao-of-Boyd-article-2016.pdf. 

25. Daniel E. Rauch and Matthew Tackett, “Design Thinking,” Joint Force Quarterly 101, No. 2 (2021).  See also the Army Design Methodology and Marine Corps Planning Process.

26. Ben Zweibelson, “Fostering Deep Insight Through Substantive Play,” in Aaron P. Jackson ed., Design Thinking Applications for the Australian Defence Force, Joint Studies Paper Series No. 3 (Canberra: Center for Strategic Research, 2019).

27. Aaron Jackson, “Design Thinking: Applications for the Australian Defence Force,” in Aaron P.  Jackson, ed., Design Thinking: Applications for the Australian Defence Force (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2019).

28. Aaron P. Jackson “A Tale of Two Designs: Developing the Australian Defence Force’s Latest Iteration of its Joint Operations Planning Doctrine,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 17, No. 4 (2017).

29. Ben Zweibelson, “An Awkward Tango: Pairing Traditional Military Planning to Design and Why it Currently Fails to Work,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 16, No. 1 (2015).

30. “War Planning for Wicked Problems.”  

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Andrew Carr, “Strategy as Problem Solving,” Parameters 54, No. 1 (2024).

34. On Theory of Success see Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends+Ways+Means=(Bad) Strategy,” Parameters 46, No. 4 (2016); Frank G. Hoffman, “The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy, Theory of Success,” Joint Force Quarterly 97, No. 4 (2020); and Brad Roberts, On Theories of Victory: Red and Blue (Lawrence Livermore Laboratory: Center for Global Security Research, 2020).

35. Lawrence Freedman, Command, The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2022).

36. Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

37. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 2-19, Strategy, (Washington, DC: December 2019). 

38. Stanley McChrystal and Anna Butrico, Risk: A User’s Guide (New York: Penguin, 2021).

39. A point stressed by a former Combatant Commander, see Kenneth F. McKenzie, Melting Point: High Command and War in the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2024). See also Frank G. Hoffman, “A Weak Element in U.S. Strategy Formulation: Strategic Risk,” Joint Force Quarterly 116, No. 1 (2025). 

40. Drawn from Jim Storr, Something Rotten, Land Command in the 21st Century (Havant: Howgate, 2022).

41. Boyd, slide 32 from “Organic Design for Command and Control,” May 1987.

42. Mick Ryan, “Russia’s Adaptation Advantage,” Foreign Affairs.com, February 5, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage. For a deep study of adaptation in Ukraine see Mick Ryan, The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2024).

43. Richard P. Rumelt, Good Strategy/Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters (New York: Crown Business, 2011).

44. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

45. Dan Marston, “Limited War in the Nuclear Age: American Strategy in Korea,” in Hal Brands, ed., The New Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2024).

46. A New Conception of War.

47. Boyd quoted in A New Conception of War.

48. Brian R. Price, “Decision Advantage and Initiative Completing Joint All-Domain Command and Control,” Air and Space Operations Review 3, No. 1 (2024).

Sustaining the Naval Expeditionary Force

Any beach is a sustainment pathway

Sustaining the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) in a distributed maritime operating environment requires methods for assured logistics over the shore. This means bringing warfighting capabilities and life-sustaining supplies from ship-to-shore, shore-to-shore, and potentially shore-to-ship. For survivability in a contested operating environment, the NEF will need the flexibility of operating over opportune landing sites versus known and routine port facilities.

Traditional NEF operations have been tied to the Navy amphibious force. This force includes amphibious ships with attached landing craft, beach master units, and Marine elements task-organized for throughput across designated beaches. These Navy and Marine Corps forces train together during pre-deployment exercises for operational certification. Through operational experience, policies have been developed and refined to govern landing operations with deliberate collection and analysis of hydrographic data.

These policies relate to institutional confidence in a ship and landing craft commander to navigate safely through seas and to land the landing force. This approach of capabilities and policy has worked well for today’s amphibious readiness group and MEU (ARG/MEU) team.

A different approach is necessary for the employment of a NEF that is not tied to amphibious ships. Stand-in forces (SIF) operating from a distributed network of seabases and expeditionary advanced bases (EABs) in a maritime operating environment require logistics over the shore through opportune beach landing sites to survive, particularly in a contested operating environment. These forces will not have a direct tie to amphibious ships and will, therefore, not have access to the landing craft, beach master units, and Marine Corps landing support teams that are traditionally part of the ARG/MEU.

The Marine Corps’ premiere SIF is the Marine littoral regiment (MLR), which is designed to be sustained even when amphibious ships are not present. Sustainment of the SIF will occur through multi-domain distribution platforms that are likely to flow from shore-to-shore, versus the traditional ship-to-shore method that is enabled by the continuous presence of amphibious ships. The MLR will enable sea denial for the NEF, which implies there will be some presence of Navy ships in the operating area, though not necessarily amphibious ships. For the NEF to persist in a contested, distributed maritime operating environment, policies, organizations, and training must be adapted.

Policies
Intentionally beaching a ship or vessel is not a normal practice, and determining where a vessel can be safely beached is nearly a lost art. Historically, the Navy operated tank landing ships designed for landing capability directly onto a beach. This dates back to World War II. These ships have since been decommissioned in the 1990s—many of which were sold to partner nations like Mexico, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, and Spain. Since World War II, the Navy and Army have gradually shifted from beaching larger vessels to the use of ship-to-shore connectors designed for maritime-domain theater distribution. These craft include the landing craft utility, landing craft mechanized, and landing craft air cushion.

Ship commanding officers (COs) are responsible for the safe navigation of their ships, informed of the maritime operating environment across the oceans, seas, and littoral areas of operation. Most ships are not designed to beach and recover as a routine, and accidentally running a ship aground can be disastrous for the ship, and the CO. Further, there may also be impacts on the flow at the port, harbor, or canal (ex. Ever Given in the Suez Canal, 2021). Commanding officers are informed by updated maps and charts, trained navigators, experienced maritime pilots, and hydrographic safety officers. This layered combination is designed to prevent grounding and safely execute intentional beaching for deliberate
amphibious and littoral maneuver.

By policy, the Navy is responsible for providing oceanographic services for all elements of the DOD.1 Specifically, the Navy is tasked with collecting source data necessary for oceanographic, hydrographic, and bathymetric (OHB) surveys to “produce the maps, charts, and databases needed to support
navigation, operational plans (OPLANS), joint and naval operations and exercises, and intelligence preparation of the environment.”2

Today, the Navy has approximately 65 military and civilian members assigned to the Fleet Survey Team (FST) as an “expert, efficient, and responsive resource for littoral battlespace characterization and hydrographic surveys.”3 This FST construct has proven to be sufficient for a deliberate response for a crisis or disaster (such as Hurricane Katrina and Haiti earthquake relief). However, this is not responsive enough to support landings at varying opportune beaches across a distributed maritime operating environment during campaigning and when the emergent situation escalates to contested crisis response.

As an operational visualization of this challenge, consider the NEF operating with Marine Corps and Naval support elements ashore in the Philippines. The Philippine archipelago includes over 7,500 islands. The NEF will leverage this whole maneuver space to extend the range of capabilities with survivability. Not all coastlines on these islands are accessible by current landing craft and vessels, which narrows the focus on potential landing sites. Even if the entire 65-member FST were positioned in the Philippines, this would not be very responsive and efficient due to the operational necessity for tactical distribution. Fleet Survey Team members may not need to be on-site if they have the appropriate data to advise a ship CO. However, some collection of accurate, realtime data will always be necessary for safe navigation and the beaching of vessels to support littoral maneuver. Thus, the existing challenge is to have the right capability in many places at once to provide operational agility in the distributed maritime operating environment.

Organizations
Positioning the right capability at the right place and at the right time is the essence of sustainment, yet ensuring this littoral maneuver enabler capability is positioned effectively is the challenge. The organization to provide assured littoral maneuver over opportune landing sites can be accomplished by Navy and Marine Corps elements who have the expertise, the equipment, and the access.

Since forward positioning elements of the limited-capacity FST at all the possible global hot spots is not feasible, there are ways to leverage organizations that are already forward every day. In competition, the SIF has access geographically and politically to collect marine data in the littoral operating area. This includes military surveys, hydrographic surveys, and marine scientific research, all of which help to inform potential opportune beach landing sites.4 A key to collecting this data on foreign soil is diplomatic clearance, which the SIF will already have in competition.

Expanding organization options for collecting marine data will propagate beach landing site opportunities. Marine Corps meteorology and oceanography specialists may seem an obvious choice to collect marine data, though there are current limitations of capacity, and their primary focus is to support aviation operations. Intelligence specialists are another choice, though there can be some challenges to diplomatic clearance for these Marines. Explosive ordnance disposal technicians are increasing organic abilities for operations in littoral operating areas with equipment designed to operate in near-shore water. Another option may be to use infantry or engineers to conduct reconnaissance. Of note, engineers are trained to conduct tactical and technical reconnaissance for mobility. Any of these options can be appropriate with the right equipment and training. However, a key factor for these options is the acceptability of the collection and analysis by ship COs to navigate waters and beaches.

Emerging technology can be used to ensure standardized collection for integrated realtime analysis to assure safe navigation at sea. Marine data may be collected using strategic geospatial capabilities integrated with tactical-level autonomous means. In competition, forces operating ashore can use unmanned or uncrewed multi-domain systems with multi-spectral sensors. Integrating these systems in realtime, and tying them to reach-back experts can effectively identify and validate potential opportune landing sites. From the sea, unmanned or uncrewed surface, subsurface, or aerial systems may be launched from littoral maneuver connectors, or other maritime platforms, to do the same. Autonomous systems used to inform OHB surveys need not be fully dedicated to these sensors; instead, these sensors may just be bolt-on sensors that can be affixed or carried by any vehicle or craft and networked to appropriate analysis teams.

Beyond the organization to collect marine data, the SIF requires an organization to support the landing of vessels at opportune beaches. Recall the traditional shore party teams attached to an ARG/MEU to enable a landing and assure mobility at these beach landing sites. This includes Navy beach group yellow patchers, Marine Corps landing support red patchers, and engineers. For SIF, who do not have assigned, attached, or supporting amphibious ships, these same capabilities are required to assure sustainment can flow across opportune beach littoral transition points. Therefore, the SIF must organize elements to support the landing of shore-to-shore vessels.

Historical precedence exists for shore party teams to conduct reconnaissance and support beach landing areas. Australia established its first pioneer battalion in the aftermath of the failed Gallipoli campaign, forming a unit with light combat engineer functions to support beach landings. During World War II, the Marine Corps formed pioneer battalions to conduct shore-party operations during amphibious assaults to provide mobility support across beaches. Pioneer battalions were eventually redesignated to engineer battalions within the Marine Division and then to combat engineer battalions.

Today, the Navy and Marine Corps no longer have a unit exclusively organized for shore party operations, though the precedence exists and the concept has been rekindled from history. An output of the Marine Corps force design efforts since 2019 was the publishing of a Pioneer Battalion Concept of Employment. This concept presents a standing organization consisting of Navy and Marine Corps engineer and landing support specialists that would support the MLRs operating across the western Pacific area of operations. While the standing organization from this concept has not been embraced by the Navy and Marine Corps, the general concept is employed regularly during combined training and large-scale exercises.

Training
Building the institutional experience for sustaining the NEF across littoral transition points requires training. While the ARG/MEU teams conduct cyclic training for certification before deployment, units operating routinely across the distributed maritime operating area do not routinely build the same integrated training experience. The NEF must train as they will respond to crisis and fight in conflict. Deliberately training to identify and validate opportune landing sites, and then emplace the shore party team for assured mobility across littoral transition points is necessary to assure sustainment for the SIF.

In recent years, Navy and Marine Corps engineers have trained to increase integration toward the missions of expeditionary advanced base operations. Exercises Pacific Pioneer, Summer Pioneer, and Winter Pioneer have strengthened interoperability between Marine Corps engineer support battalions and Navy Seabees. These exercises have incorporated scenarios of beach landing sites and port operations, though they have not drawn in the full mission profile of OHB collection and analysis.

Transitioning from annual exercises to routine interoperability training is the next step for assured mobility. Today, Navy and Marine Corps elements are already operating forward day-to-day in a competition context. Supporting the landing of maritime vessels at opportune beaches is not the only mission for any of these units, yet they must be agile enough to shift on-call to support this mission. Even without the availability of landing craft and vessels, these elements can collect OHB data to update potential landing sites. Doing so overseas also increases interoperability with partner and host nations, and potentially has an integrated deterrent effect.

Conclusion
Sustaining the NEF in a distributed maritime operating environment necessitates the ability to maneuver between seabases and EABs using opportune landing sites that provide flexibility and survivability. To navigate across these littoral transition points, the Navy and Marine Corps must refine policy, organize, and train in competition to be always ready for crisis and conflict. The necessity of accurate OHB collection and analysis for safe maritime navigation should be matched with the existing SIF access. Additionally, transitioning from the occasional exercising of the Navy and Marine Corps Pioneer Battalion concept to routine interoperability training will ensure the NEF can persist in the contested, distributed littoral operating environment.

>Col Angell is a Logistics Officer currently assigned as the Director, Logistics Combat Element Division within Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat Development and Integration.

Notes

1. Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 3140.55C, Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and Bathymetric Survey Program, (Washington, DC: December 2018).

2. Ibid. Oceanography is the study of the ocean surface, water column, and bottom features including the propagation of acoustic, optical, and other forms of energy. Hydrography is the depiction of shallow water bottom features, coastline, beach, tides, and surf characterization. Bathymetry is the measurement of water depths and bottom contour lines with precise geographic locations. 

3. Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command, “Fleet Survey Team,” Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command, n.d., https://www.cnmoc.usff.navy.mil/Our-Commands/Naval-Oceanographic-Office/Fleet-Survey-Team.

4. Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 3128.9G, Diplomatic Clearance for U.S. Navy Marine Data Collection Activities in Foreign Jurisdictions, (Washington, DC: April 2021). 

Think, Act and Operate Differently

Our nation faces its most significant threat to national security in generations. China’s relentless military modernization and expansion has disrupted the Indo-Pacific region and threatens American interests, those of our allies and partners, and the overarching global order. Other actors seek to further destabilize the globe, adding to the continually growing and evolving challenges we face. The requirement for us to answer the call—every call—necessitates a unique mindset among all of us, one that can deal with multiple, disparate, even seemingly unrelated yet subtly connected events that require agility in thought and action. Logistics remains a common thread throughout these varying warfighting scenarios and often drives what we can and cannot do.

Logistics breathes life into strategy, and the changing character of war means we must think differently about delivering logistics readiness to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). We must acknowledge that sustaining the force throughout the next conflict will require many changes from our previous twenty-five years of combat to stay ahead of China’s pacing threat. These changes must be viewed through the lens of all warfighting functions—logistical readiness is not just the purview of logisticians; it requires a whole of Marine Corps commitment. This will require hard decisions to balance optimizing our current capabilities with the need to develop and apply new capabilities as force offerings to Combatant Commanders. In doing so, we ensure our logistics and installations capabilities are fully integrated with the overall Force Design plan and we provide combat credible forces to serve as effective deterrents and, if necessary, will undoubtedly prevail in conflict.

Our 39th Commandant believes that innovation keeps us ready—and I agree with him. Real innovation begins with your courage to vocalize and actualize your recommended solutions to our challenges. Innovation helps optimize current capabilities and develop new approaches against today’s problem sets to mitigate risk and increase lethality. The Marine Corps Gazette is a perfect forum for this discourse. To remain relevant in a modern fight, we need to be a modern force—our Corps needs your thoughts, voices and action to keep us most ready when our Nation is least ready.

I owe a huge thanks to all contributors. I personally read every submission and am exceptionally grateful for the tremendous commitment, thought, and time they took in drafting their respective articles. Each one was superb, and I wanted to publish all, but we had to make hard choices. The articles address many Fleet Marine Force requirements necessary to enable our Marine forces to provide relevant and credible combat forces. Critical topics such as intelligence, artificial intelligence and information systems, advanced manufacturing, the Marine Corps Global Positioning Network, health and mortuary services in a contested environment, and building installation resilience are examined in detail. Other equally valuable topics are addressed in the on-line edition of the Gazette, and I recommend those as well. The mandate to “Think, Act, and Operate Differently” is more than a tagline; it defines how we approach the multitude of challenges we face. The time to act is now.

Stephen D. Sklenka
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

Thirty years of innovation

“Force Design remains the Marine Corps’ vehicle to create innovative formations, equipment, and concepts and ensures we remain lethal on any battlefield while optimized against the pacing threat.”

—Gen Eric M. Smith

The Marine Corps must continually evolve given the changing global balance of military capabilities, a proliferation of emerging technologies, and a growing assertiveness among the Nation’s strategic competitors. To address these core challenges, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) guides a process of innovation through concept development, experimentation, prototyping, research, analysis, and wargaming. 

For 30 years since its inception, MCWL has spearheaded innovation. From HUNTER WARRIOR in the late 1990s, which examined squads acting as independent elements on a dispersed battlefield, to counter-improvised explosive device experimentation and fielding that saved Marine lives in Iraq and Afghanistan, to today’s Family of Integrated Targeting Cells efforts that will support stand-in forces, MCWL continues to serve as the headlights of the Marine Corps. Those headlights are illuminating the way ahead for what Gen Eric Smith, 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps, has described as the “righteous journey” of force design. Force design—as a general, enduring modernization process rather than a particular set of investment or divestment decisions regarding specific platforms and organizations—requires the creative vision to foresee the future force that will be necessary to meet the challenges of tomorrow’s battlefield.

Under the leadership of BGen Simon Doran, MCWL generates and examines threat-informed operating concepts and capabilities and provides analytically supported recommendations to inform subsequent force design and development activities. The long-term modernization efforts of the lab are balanced with the understanding that FMFs are competing with adversaries today, and they must be equipped with the latest ways and means of operating to respond to any crisis that may arise.

As suggested by its name, MCWL pursues an empirical approach to force design akin to the scientific method. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s work begins with generating a series of hypotheses about operating in the future. It then seeks to test these hypotheses through rigorous experimentation methods such as wargaming, modeling and simulation, prototype development, and live-force experiments. External studies may provide additional data and insights. Ideas that are shown to be viable are then transitioned to adjacent units in Combat Development and Integration for further development and analysis. Solutions suitable for implementation across the Marine Corps are incorporated into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The personnel in each of MCWL’s divisions provide unique capabilities and expertise to aid this process. 

Concept-Driven Force Design
Generating hypotheses about future warfare first requires MCWL to make plausible assumptions about the direction of the operating environment over a ten to twenty-year timeframe. Rather than making specific predictions about the future, MCWL’s Futures Division identifies key trends and indicators that drive change in the operating environment. By synthesizing this internal analysis with that given in referential documents such as Framework for Future Force Design, Joint Strategic Assessment, Joint Operating Environment, and Navy Force Design 2045 as well as the work of future-oriented organizations such as the Office of Naval Research, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Army Futures Command, Headquarters Air Force A5/7 (Skunk Works), the Joint Staff and others, Futures Division identifies challenges at all classification levels as well as opportunities that can be explored during concept generation. 

The lab’s modeling and simulation (M&S) capability evaluates cutting-edge technology in various operating scenarios based on the manipulation of key variables to inform resourcing
decisions. The ability to conduct iterative, quantitative analysis to support concept development activities and science and technology investments increases MCWL’s efficiency in delivering war‑
fighting effectiveness. 

One of the most impactful aspects of M&S is its ability to provide real-time feedback during wargames and live force exercises. This feedback loop enables participants to adapt tactics on the fly, learning from data as it is generated. In a fast-paced combat scenario, the ability to quickly assess the impact of a decision can mean the difference between success and failure. 

Simulations, while realistic, cannot fully replicate the unpredictability of real combat. Simulations may lack the human factors, stress, and environmental unpredictability inherent in real-world operations. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory leaders remain cautious about over-relying on M&S-generated tactics without considering the nuanced realities of live missions. Incorporating feedback from field exercises, combat training, and real-world operations into M&S ensures models remain reliable in real-world contexts. 

When combined with the qualitative analysis of future-oriented thinkers, Futures Division transforms M&S data into meaningful programmatic insights that inform invest, divest, accelerate, or sundown decisions. Looking deep at possible futures allows the Marine Corps to make necessary investments in the near term to assess the viability of leap-ahead capabilities in the long term.

Based on this understanding of the future operating environment, MCWL generates operating concepts as expressions of how warfighters, using military art and science, might employ capabilities to meet future challenges and exploit future opportunities. An operating concept’s solutions to a military challenge or opportunity are hypothesized in its central and supporting ideas. Additionally, the operating concept describes the future capabilities required to realize its desired end state. These ideas and concept required capabilities are the base units against which the experimentation efforts of MCWL are applied. They are written with a level of abstraction to provide the experiment design teams sufficient flexibility to fully explore the proposed ways and means of operating. In this way, a concept matures through experimentation as insights are gained about the conditions and standards in which certain capabilities must perform.

A collection of operating concepts beginning with 2017’s Littoral Operations in Contested Environments (LOCE) illustrates the Service’s renewed focus on supporting naval operations in joint campaigns. LOCE called for higher levels of naval integration and set the stage for Expeditionary Advance Base Operations and A Concept for Stand-in Forces. These latter two concepts described the Marine Forces projecting power toward the seaward element of the maritime domain. Maneuvering these forces is described in the draft A Concept for 21st Century Amphibious Operations (21CAO) and sustaining Marine Forces for the future fight is described in the recently signed Marine Corps Concept for Logistics (MCCL). Taken as a whole, this family of naval concepts describes the shaping, decisive, and sustaining actions of an operational approach to future warfighting. Many parts of LOCE, Expeditionary Advance Base Operations, and A Concept for Stand-in Forces are being implemented in the FMF today while 21CAO and Marine Corps Concept for Logistics require continued experimental interrogation and development before moving into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy implementation. 

Analysis through Wargaming
One method to further examine the ideas expressed in these concepts is wargaming. Through wargames that are purpose-tailored in type, size, scope, and classification level, The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Wargaming Division derives insight from gameplay that can inform concept generation and development. These games leverage the subject-matter expertise of Marines, other Services, allies, and partners, the interagency, and inter-organizational partners. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s M&S capabilities can be used in conjunction with wargames to provide greater fidelity in game design and to provide additional gameplay iterations to test player ideas. 

In fiscal year 2024, wargames analyzed Marine Corps logistics operations in contested areas to include their interdependencies with allies and partners, examined different task-organized amphibious force formations regarding their ability to employ all-domain operations, and explored the role of Marine littoral regiments outside the Indo-Pacific theater. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2025, wargames focused on crisis response planning and how the Naval Service can generate sealift capacity in support of the Joint Force. 

To remain at the forefront of technological advancement, the Marine Corps established the General Robert B. Neller Center for Wargaming and Analysis (Neller Center). Located in Quantico, VA, this state-of-the-art 100,000-square-foot facility is designed to support not just the Marine Corps, but the DOD at large and for fostering collaboration with allies and partners worldwide. The Neller Center will harness cutting-edge technologies to create realistic, complex scenarios that mirror modern warfare’s multifaceted nature. Incorporating live, virtual, and constructive simulation technologies permits exploration and discrimination of an array of strategic, operational, and tactical questions before committing substantial resources for live-force experimentation.

Another significant impact of the Neller Center will be its ability to conduct wargames at all levels of classification, ensuring sensitive information is securely integrated into simulations while providing a comprehensive operational picture based on a full suite of capabilities. A cloud-based distributed capability will enable seamless collaboration across commands, regardless of location. 

At the heart of this transformation is the Next Generation Wargame concept. The Next Generation Wargame establishes a human-centric, technology-enabled, collaborative gaming environment. It leverages decision support tools, M&S, artificial intelligence, and visualization technologies to enhance quantitative and qualitative assessments. Participants will dynamically adjust variables, explore multiple courses of action, and witness potential outcomes in a controlled setting, thus providing invaluable insights unattainable through live experimentation or traditional analog wargaming.

Gathering enhanced data from multiple validated sources allows for demonstrable, repeatable, and defensible results. Insights gained from this approach are crucial for informing senior leaders and supporting their decision making. Collaboration with the Joint Force, as well as with allies and partners, will enhance collective readiness and interoperability—essential in an ever-changing global security environment. 

Experimentation By, With, and Through the Fleet
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Experiment Division (ExDiv) plans, executes, and reports the results of threat-informed, live-force experiments conducted to advance the future warfighting capabilities of the Marine Corps. Live-force experimentation builds on the analysis generated from M&S and wargames by providing a venue to test ideas under real-world conditions and standards. Through research questions and learning objectives developed and tailored for each experiment, ExDiv generates critical insights into experimental priorities as recently demonstrated during Phase I and II of Marine Corps Infantry Battalion experimentation and during Marine littoral regiment experimentation in a III MEF Force Integration Exercise. 

ExDiv has supported Marine Corps modernization through the conduct of numerous experiments; a sampling of noteworthy ones includes: 

Phase II of Marine Corps Infantry Battalion experimentation is underway to observe and collect data on recent modernization efforts that span the man, train, and equip spectrum. Additive capabilities that enhance all-weather direct and indirect fire weapons consist of Group 2 small unmanned aircraft systems, loitering munitions, and organic signals intelligence/electronic warfare. As the character of warfare changes, ExDiv continues to work with Headquarters Marine Corps stakeholders to train and equip the warfighter contributing to a more lethal, survivable, and resilient infantry battalion required for the modern-day battlefield. 

The conditions of the future threat environment place increased importance on winning the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance battle. The Mobile Reconnaissance Battalion experiment represents a critical step in reimagining the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct multi-domain reconnaissance. Experimentation with manned and unmanned platforms in the air, maritime, and land domains will advance the modernization of reconnaissance formations, allow stand-in forces to provide critical and timely information, and extend the commander’s operational reach. 

ExDiv, in partnership with 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, has experimented with the Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft (MMRC) to provide organic littoral maneuver capabilities, supporting surveillance, intelligence collection, target acquisition, and reconnaissance while reducing detectable signatures in high-threat areas. The MMRC’s modular design enables rapid configuration for various mission needs, allowing reconnaissance units to deploy advanced sensor suites or direct-action payloads as required. 

Additionally, ExDiv and 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion are preparing to incorporate the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC) into experimental venues. These autonomous platforms enable persistent, unmanned sensing capabilities within the contested littorals. The Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Crafts enhance reconnaissance operations by autonomously monitoring critical zones, detecting potential threats, and transmitting real-time data back to commanders. The MMRC and GARC provide the maritime reconnaissance platoons the platforms, sensors, weapons systems, and ability to maneuver to support MAGTF operations in the littorals. The integration of the maritime reconnaissance platoons under the maritime reconnaissance company concept of employment sets the stage for a robust, adaptable reconnaissance capability that strengthens the MAGTF’s ability to operate across complex multi-domain environments.

Project Convergence Capstone 4 represented a milestone in the Marine Corps’ journey toward modernization goals. This Army-hosted event emphasized advanced air and missile defense systems, sensor integration, littoral mobility platforms, unmanned systems integration, and Joint Force interoperability. ExDiv worked in collaboration with Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity to improve integrating joint and combined fires and multidomain operations. ExDiv also tested a multidomain corridor concept, creating maneuver space by establishing control from the seafloor to space. This concept is expected to play a crucial role in future littoral and contested environments. Notably, ExDiv partnered with multiple DOD entities to improve sensor integration and validated capabilities like the MAGTF command and control Minimum Viable Product, which executed joint fires and enhanced weapon track capabilities through advanced sensor data sharing.

VALIANT SHIELD 24 (VS24) underscored the importance of multinational, cross-domain collaboration for the Indo-Pacific region. Taking place in the summer of 2024 in locations across the first and second island chains, VS24 included forces from every branch of the military. This exercise emphasized interoperability in multi-domain operations and refined joint training across air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. During VS24, ExDiv assisted U.S., allied, and partner forces in developing regional and global power projection capabilities. Training scenarios focused on integrating the unique strengths of each Service, from cyber operations to naval maneuvers, thus enhancing interoperability and preparing joint and combined forces to respond to crises, contingencies, and complex missions.

Equipping Today’s Warfighter with Tomorrow’s Technology
Incorporating advanced technologies into live-force experimentation helps generate more insightful learning output. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Science and Technology (S&T) Division works with the Office of Naval Research, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DOD, Marine Corps Systems Command, Program Executive Office, Headquarters Marine Corps and industry partners to develop the vision, policies, and strategies needed to leverage scientific research and technological development in support of Marine Corps combat development and some of the operating forces’ most pressing needs.

Science and Technology Division’s approach emphasizes rapid development, testing, and integration of new technologies and operational concepts, mirroring the urgency and adaptability of wartime innovation to maintain a competitive edge. Significant advantages include rapid iteration, cost-effectiveness, and increased collaboration throughout the capability development process. Providing prototypes to the FMF facilitates real-world experimentation and bottom-up refinements that foster a culture of innovation essential in today’s environment. 

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory S&T projects bridge the gap between cutting-edge technology and practical application. For example, the Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel, a 55-foot, fully autonomous vessel designed for stealth and survivability, can deliver weapons and supplies over long distances. Inspired by semi-submersible designs, the Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel provides operational options in contested environments. Recent deployments to Okinawa underscore its utility in addressing logistical challenges in the Indo-Pacific and showcase the Marine Corps’ ability to rapidly adapt to evolving operational demands. 

The Stern Landing Vessel, a precursor to the Landing Ship Medium supports littoral maneuver in support of distributed forces. Recent testing proved the Stern Landing Vessel’s capability to sustain forward-deployed units in austere and contested environments. The Marine Corps also made significant advancements in loitering munitions, increasing small-unit lethality through over-the-horizon precision targeting. These systems, including air-launched swarming munitions, reduce risks to manned platforms while providing a decisive advantage in dynamic operational scenarios.

In an increasingly interconnected and information-driven world, Marines must have access to the information they need, when they need it, at the appropriate classification levels, with the necessary authorities to act on it. Science and Technology Division, in conjunction with MCWL’s Security Division, has made significant strides in providing that information within the combat development community and the FMF including developing capabilities that will enable improved decision making and enhanced war‑
fighting capability at all echelons. For example, the Family of Integrated Targeting Cells provides a more cohesive approach to command and control of multi-domain operations by integrating realtime targeting data from multiple sources into a comprehensive, common operating picture. Leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning, Family of Integrated Targeting Cells is crucial for maintaining the technological edge of distributed Marine Corps forces and for enhancing situational awareness and coordination among joint and allied forces.

The Marine Corps’ commitment to S&T experimentation represents a bold step toward aligning innovation with operational effectiveness. Through several MCWL initiatives, the Marine Corps is redefining how technology integrates into military operations. And the Marine Corps is not going it alone. Increased cooperation with allies and partners balanced with internal innovation ensures long-term resilience. By embracing this paradigm shift S&T helps ensure Marine forces continue to thrive in an increasingly complex and contested world. 

Conclusion
A force design amounts to a set of operating concepts depicting a force that does not exist today. This future force must be equipped with the methods for operating and cutting-edge technologies that will allow it to accomplish its assigned mission against adversaries who are likewise rapidly modernizing and increasing their warfighting capability and capacity. Correctly envisioning this future force is a notoriously difficult task, a challenge that is compounded by the need to maintain readiness for inevitable near-term crises. 

Today’s operating environment is markedly different than that of 30 years ago. Since its inception, MCWL’s charge to identify novel ways and means of operating remains consistent, but trends such as increased global strategic competition and the rapid proliferation and democratization of technology demand that innovation occur more quickly. Those innovation decisions, however, must be informed and supported by a thoroughly validated body of evidence to ensure that the Service is not accepting unnecessary risk or poorly utilizing its resources.

To this end, MCWL continues to aggressively chart the course ahead for the Marine Corps force design journey. Through wargaming, modeling, and simulation, science, and technology development, and live-force experimentation, the ideas expressed in future operating concepts are rigorously examined for their viability for implementation across the force. Continuous adaptation to change against an unstable backdrop of world events requires agility, creativity, and a mindset of risk acceptance. Through MCWL’s experimentation efforts across its divisions, the Marine Corps leads the way in innovation, simultaneously adapting to today’s realities and the ever-changing battlefield of tomorrow, allowing Marines to deter conflict, and when deterrence fails, defeat the Nation’s enemies in battle.

Project Sea Wolf

2024 LtCol Earl “Pete” Ellis Essay Contest Winner: Honorable Mention

Marine boat squadron

Recent global security events have confirmed that we must accelerate preparation for contingencies. The Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Hamas conflicts are indicative of the volatile reality and delicate nature of the global security environment we currently live in. The Corps has a long tradition of achieving greater efficiency with fewer or less exquisite resources. As we prepare for potential conflicts, we must change our approach and deviate from traditional scenarios of large-scale attacks launched from the sea. The optimal advanced platforms and weapons required for the next major conflict may also not be readily available in voluminous quantities. We must embrace ingenuity and prepare to fight soon by pushing the boundaries of mature systems while creating an unfair advantage. In the words of Brad Smith, president of Microsoft, “Since the dawn of time, any tool can be used for good or ill. Even a broom can be used to sweep the floor or hit someone over the head.”1 Smith’s quote embodies how we must audaciously approach the subsequent application of solutions. 

Directives and Opportunity (Who and Where)
There is extraordinary transparency within the latest iteration of major fleet directives. The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Navigation Plan 2024 undoubtedly define the most imminent threat to the Naval Services. The CNO cautions that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is preparing for war by 2027.2 Gen Smith referenced the 2022 National Defense Strategy as an overarching directive and delineated the PRC as the primary competitor.3 The PRC remains a robustly resourced and complex aggressive global competitor. There are a variety of dissenting opinions on the U.S. military’s best counterforce response to the PRC if necessary. Overwhelming firepower is an obvious choice but an elusive retaliation plan against the PRC. However, it would be more advantageous for the Marine Corps to dissect the potency of the PRC with an alternative asymmetrical concept. 

Oddly enough, the CNO’s Navigation Plan 2024 provides insight into a new prospective priority Marine Corps mission area. ADM Franchetti illuminated the complexity of the PRC’s interconnected utilization of dual-use forces such as the Chinese maritime militia. 4 As reported by the Irregular Warfare Initiative, the Chinese maritime militia employs commercial fishing vessels to engage in coordinated aggressive sea denial swarming tactics in tandem with People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard ships.5

Reports also claim that Chinese fishing vessels frequently deceive maritime transponders and falsify their identity to evade detection.6 The Chinese maritime militia has created a Blue Ocean demand in business parlance without an existing market solution.7 Problem sets, such as the Chinese maritime militia, are best neutralized with non-kinetic resources in the advent of conflict. Neither the Corps nor the Navy have openly discussed a remedy for noncombatant vessels akin to the maritime militia in the past. Therefore, the Corps should have a vested interest in locating and interdicting fishing vessels, if necessary, as part of the overarching fleet campaign in the Indo-Pacific area of operations.

“MARSOC seeks to provide the joint force with the capability to share the operating environment; illuminate adversary actions, activities, and intentions; and provide options to impose cost, both kinetically and non-kinetically, from competition to conflict.” 8

—Gen David H. Berger

Raiders of the Lost Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) (Who 2.0 and What)
For the new project to succeed, the Marine Corps must depart from existing practices and create a spinout organization to support maritime reconnaissance.9 The traditional MAGTF construct has the potential for numerous friction points and competing interests. Traditionalists would say a new formation is simply a SP-MAGTF, but a familiar naming convention only deters progress. Therefore, a newly acquired Marine maritime reconnaissance platform and associated personnel should be a stand-alone formation. The force’s composition should remain as fluid as the virtues of the MAGTF but with an eye on externally proven structures. 

Our reverence for partners and allies is often discussed and mentioned as a strategic pillar. However, we can apply noteworthy value from our partners and capitalize on their lessons learned. In particular, the maritime expertise of the British Special Boat Squadrons.10 In experimental form, a Raider formation can reorganize in the footprint of a Special Boat Squadrons unit and be attached to an amphibious warship. The combined new formation and designated personnel would constitute a Marine Boat Squadron. Fortuitously, the Raider Regiment already has a distinguished history of operations in the western Pacific dating back to their reconnaissance collaborations with Coast Watchers during World War II.11

Raiders inherently possess the organic training, personnel, and organizational flexibility to establish a counterforce solution to the Chinese maritime militia network problem. In execution, this would reconnect the Raiders to their Indo-Pacific roots in a modern-day naval role. The optimal initial concept of operations also needs to depart from the standard ARG. Yet, the formation can remain close to the convenient and familiar accommodations of the San Antonio-Class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD). Contrarians would argue that MEUs are already capable of special operations, but there is a distinction between special operations forces and special operational capability certification. The variance concerns mission authorities, proficiency, risk tolerance, and funding. 

The possibility of Marines operating small boats soon has quietly gained traction. The Corps has a rich history with small vessels and previously operated several purpose-built riverine boats. Recently, the Marine Corps Reserve and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory expressed interest in acquiring small boats for experimentation.12 Initial reports indicate the small boats are for littoral operations. Nonetheless, the combination of history and recent events does not arrive at fulfilling an over-the-horizon maritime reconnaissance role. Inevitably, including a small boat over the horizon equipped with reconnaissance operators changes the completion of the ARG-MEU team. It provides a means to close in on a problem set with a reduced signature and decreased risk-to-force.

The trouble with requirements is the struggle between aspirational and operational reality. The notional small boat platform needs to be more survivable than rigid inflatable boats with the potential combat power of World War II patrol torpedo (PT) boats. The main priority must be to acquire a small boat with sufficient operational endurance and compatibility with amphibious ships. Secondly, additional arguments over increased firepower and missile systems will only obstruct and delay the acquisition of a platform. The projected acquisition of the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) in FY2025 for 268 million dollars should serve as a cautionary tale for a maritime maneuver vessel initiative.13 The appropriate small boat acquisition is feasible through rapid prototyping of mature sea-frame designs or commercial options at a fraction of the cost of the LSM.

“Take an institution, a technology, or a method that has been forgotten or discarded and appropriate it for your own purpose. Revive something from the past by giving it a new purpose or to reinterpret and bring to life old ideas, customs, and traditions.” 14

—Stefan H. Verstappen

Sea Wolf and the Ghost
How much is extracted and applied from history is a matter of perspective. In recent years, the Navy has demonstrated some indifference to its small-boat history. The Navy never truly realized the MK VI patrol boat’s potential and ultimately killed the program as a cost-cutting measure.15 The utility of small maritime platforms is a topic of great consternation and debate. In 2021, OPNAV N95 deemed the now-divested MK VI patrol boats as non-essential in wargaming scenarios due to their limited firepower.16 However, wargaming scenarios or firepower should not be the metrics that determine a platform’s holistic utility. If those were valid metrics, the landing craft utility and landing craft air cushion would have been decommissioned several decades ago. Since the Navy disestablished the MK VI program, the Ukrainian Navy has reportedly received the boats and employed them for patrols in the Black Sea.17 The Marine Corps must not repeat the same errors the Navy made with its contemporary assessment of patrol boats.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict has challenged assumptions regarding missile firepower on a microscale and demonstrated the potential value of asymmetric warfighting capabilities. Ukraine’s tactical maritime creativity and employment of small commercial unmanned sea drones are a valuable example of asymmetric weapons innovation.18 The Houthis have also aggressively improvised irregular warfare at sea with unsophisticated technology.19 In June 2024, Houthis utilized an uncrewed surface vehicle disguised as a fishing vessel to successfully execute a kamikaze attack on the MV Tutor in the Red Sea.20 Conversely, during World War II, ADM John “Sea Wolf” Bulkeley achieved significant tactical-level
success against superior opposition as commander of the experimental PT boat unit, Submarine Division Two.21 ADM Bulkeley’s PT boats were a combination of simplicity and power. Bulkeley’s PT boats were outfitted with depth-charge racks and achieved a maximum speed of 55 knots.22 Given the emergence of irregular maritime activities, the Raiders are well-positioned to apply relevant elements from ADM Bulkeley, Ukraine’s tactical victories, and present-day asymmetrical threats. 

The required mature technology is already tested, prevalent, and available. The carcass of the Mark VI patrol boat requires postmortem examination beyond its utility in the littoral environment focused on the conceptual supplementary intersectional platforms capable of connecting sea-based operating forces with broader expeditionary advanced base operation activities. The MK VI’s sea-frame was among its best and most relevant qualities. In particular, the MK VI’s well-deck compatibility with amphibious ships; passenger capacity; 600+ nautical mile range; and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence capabilities.23 Significant untapped potential exists in disaggregated data link interoperability and common tactical picture integration. The MK VI also left behind a codified doctrinal procedure in the Navy’s Wet Well Manual for amphibious shipping well deck interoperability to be duplicated or modified for another sea-frame. Ultimately, the specific maritime platform is less important than the collective aggregation of the essential technical systems and functionality. 

Replicator and the Expendables (How)
Resource pairing and optimization are the foundational pillars of the Marine boat squadron concept. It principally combines operators with a menu of full-spectrum tactical options. Operationalizing the spinout is achievable by pairing the formation with a San Antonio-Class LPD deploying independently from an ARG. An independent deployer reduces the potential of mission creep and operational friction with broader MAGTF command element priorities. Secondly, it provides the Marine boat squadron the latitude to modify the personnel footprint without conceding shipboard space to other elements. The Marine boat squadron also provides force planners with a unique deployment package. 

The boat squadron and associated boat of choice are 50 percent of the prospective cumulative combat power available. The DOD is transforming the other 50 percent of the equation from aspirational to operational under the umbrella of the Replicator initiative.25 The Replicator program is devoted to fielding thousands of affordable autonomous systems across multiple domains.26 

Conversely, the Marine boat squadron’s boat would make an optimal host vessel for unmanned undersea, surface, and aerial Replicator systems. The notional squadron can be supported by its resource agent with mature technology to conduct multi-dimensional reconnaissance or kinetic tasking. Prepackaged containerized loitering munition launchers are also a realistic option.27 The Replicator systems could be loaded as expendable kinetic or non-kinetic as dictated by tasking and mission authorities. The fully developed technology available from the Replicator initiative is an upgrade from the MK VI’s MK38 machinegun system and reduces the demand for permanent weight and electrical power on the host platform. 

The parallels between the past and the potential future are often peculiar. The maritime guerilla tactics and ingenuity utilized by Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) over several decades ago are a prime case study. The squadron can draw upon the LTTE Sea Tiger, the Black Tigers group’s combined conventional swarm tactics, one-way explosive fast attacks, and electronic domain exploitation.28 The Black Tigers repeatedly proved the validity and lethality of coordinated asymmetrical attacks. A well-resourced Marine boat squadron could significantly improve the LTTE’s maritime guerilla tactics via tandem manned boat and unmanned Replicator system operations for various naval targets. 

“We need to conceive new ideas to address the problems and opportunities that surround us—and we need to defy the odds and make ideas actually happen.” 29

—Scott Belsky

Catalysts of Change (Why)
A Marine boat squadron with organic boats is a sensible and realistic choice at the tactical level. Patrol-size boats do not garner the adversary’s satellite and radar resources compared to an aircraft carrier or other higher-profile ships.30 In the same regard, skeptics often portray today’s anti-access/area denial challenge as an unsolvable problem.31 Yet, a patrol boat can serve as an appropriate tactical countermeasure under the right circumstances. Logically, a missile barrage is not the appropriate countermeasure for a patrol-size boat. The anti-access/area-denial missile threat is more likely a problem for an LSM than a patrol boat. Thus, the opportunity for Marines to influence and change behavior in the maritime environment is highly probable and available now.

The maritime domain is dynamic and replete with expansive operational opportunities for willing participants. That is why nefarious vessels continuously exploit loopholes and freely deceive maritime transponder protocols. The ships engaged in continuous deception are doing so with motive and intent. There are simply too many of these vessels operating unchecked. Recently, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released a report on Iranian weapons smuggling operations in support of the Houthis spanning nearly a decade.32 According to the DIA, the United States and its allies have successfully interdicted twenty Iranian smuggling vessels at sea.33 The most concerning aspect of the DIA report is that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force has been identified as the source provider for the now seized anti-ship and guided missiles and ballistic missile components for the Houthis.34 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force activities leave several questions unanswered. How many other vessels are out at sea engaging in smuggling? What other state and non-state actors are involved in smuggling missiles and high-capacity weapons? Are we doing enough to solve this dilemma for the Joint Force? 

A Marine boat squadron will undoubtedly change the Joint Forces’ options to surveil, interdict, or neutralize vessels as needed. A forward-deployed squadron on a maritime maneuver platform can extend the battlespace for an LPD and other warships. The operators and boats can facilitate more sea space for Navy ships to operate outside adversary missile ranges. Ultimately, the capability is dynamic enough to influence the patterns and behaviors of other vessels. 

Raiders are the optimal Marines to accomplish the specialized cross-training necessary for a Marine boat squadron faster than any other entity due to their extensive pool of personnel. Moreover, the Raider screening and selection process establishes an increased baseline for the individual operator’s capabilities. In addition, Raiders are more likely to own additional exquisite, portable technical systems complementary to a patrol-style boat and Replicator systems. The Raiders’ inherent access to expansive resources accelerates the functionality and employability of a forthcoming Marine boat squadron deployment. Moreover, designating this task to special operations forces ultimately bypasses the cumbersome procedural obstructions of the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities process.35

Initiating a project of this magnitude is less complicated or expensive than the alternatives. Formally funded programmatic systems too often suffer from budgetary casualties and industrial inertia. Moreover, a Marine boat squadron project does not require special policies. Instead, it requires trust that an elite organization within the Marine Corps has the experience and ingenuity to push boundaries. 

>LCDR Fermin is a Surface Warfare Officer and Amphibious Warfare Tactics Instructor serving as the Operations Officer onboard USS Portland (LPD-27). 

Notes

1. Brad Smith and Carol Ann Browne, Tools and Weapons: The Promise and the Peril of the Digital Age (New York: Penguin Books, 2021).

2. Chief of Naval Operations, Lisa M. Franchetti, Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy 2024 (Washington, DC: 2024).

3. Gen Eric M. Smith, 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: August 2024).

4. Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy 2024.

5. Umar Ahmed Badami, “Under the Radar: Weaponizing Maritime Transponders in Strategic Competition,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, January 13, 2024, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/under-the-radar-weaponizing-maritime-transponders-in-strategic-competition.

6. Ibid.

7. W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, “Blue Ocean Strategy,” Harvard Business Review, June 6, 2024, https://hbr.org/2004/10/blue-ocean-strategy.

8. Gen David H. Berger, “Statement of General David H. Berger Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture of the Marine Corps,” Marines.mil, March 28, 2023, https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Speeches-and-Transcripts/Transcripts/Article/3360019/statement-of-general-david-h-berger-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-on-the-postu.

9. Clayton M. Christensen and Marc Benioff, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business Review Press, 2024).

10. Samuel A. Southworth and Stephen Tanner, U.S. Special Forces: A Guide to America’s Special Operations Units: The World’s Most Elite Fighting Force (Cambridge: Da Capo, 2002).

11. Ibid. 

12. Irene Loewenson, “New in 2023: Small Boats for Marine Reserve Experimentation,” Marine Corps Times, May 5, 2023, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2022/12/28/new-in-2023-small-boats-for-marine-reserve-experimentation.

13. U.S. Naval Institute Staff, “Report to Congress on Navy Medium Landing Ship,” USNI News, April 26, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/04/26/report-to-congress-on-navy-medium-landing-ship-4.

14. Stefan H. Verstappen, The Thirty-Six Strategies (Toronto: Woodbridge Press, 2017).

15. Joseph Trevithick, “Navy Confirms It Wants to Ditch Its Very Young Mk VI Patrol Boats in New Budget Request,” The War Zone, May 28, 2021, https://www.twz.com/40844/navy-confirms-it-wants-to-ditch-its-very-young-mk-vi-patrol-boats-in-new-budget-request.

16. Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “The Navy Wants to Get Rid of Its Nearly Brand New Patrol Boats,” The War Zone, February 15, 2021, https://www.twz.com/39240/the-navy-wants-to-get-rid-of-its-nearly-brand-new-patrol-boats.

17. Tayfun Ozberk, “Ukraine’s First Mk VI Patrol Boat Breaks Cover,” Naval News, January 26, 2023, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/ukraines-first-mk-vi-patrol-boat-breaks-cover.

18. H.I. Sutton, “Suspected Ukrainian Explosive Sea Drone Made from Recreational Watercraft Parts,” USNI News, October 11, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/10/11/suspected-ukrainian-explosive-sea-drone-made-from-jet-ski-parts.

19. Howard Altman, “First Look at Houthi Kamikaze Drone Boat That Struck Cargo

Ship in Red Sea,” The War Zone, June 17, 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/first-look-at-houthi-kamikaze-drone-boat-that-struck-cargo-ship-in-red-sea.

20. Ibid. 

21. William B. Breuer, Sea Wolf: The Daring Exploits of Navy Legend, John D. Bulkeley (Novato: Presidio, 1989).

22. Ibid.

23. Staff, “Mark VI Patrol Boat,” Navy.mil, n.d., https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2173363/mark-vi-patrol-boat.

24. Steven Johnson, Where Good Ideas Come From: The Seven Patterns of Innovation (London: Penguin, 2011).

25. Christopher Woodbridge and Vic Ruble, “Scuttlebutt Ep 164: Commandant’s Planning Guidance 2024,” MCA Scuttlebutt, September 26, 2024, podcast, website, 34:57, https://www.mca-marines.org/podcast/scuttlebutt/
scuttlebutt-ep-164-commandants-planning-guidance-2024.

26. U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Innovation Official Says Replicator Initiative Remains on Track,” Defense.gov, n.d., https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3657609/defense-innovation-official-says-replicator-initiative-remains-on-track.

27. Joseph Trevithick, “Shipping Container Launcher Packing 126 Kamikaze Drones Hits the Market,” The War Zone, June 17, 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/shipping-container-launcher-packing-126-kamikaze-
drones-hits-the-market#:~:text=The%20modified%20shipping%20container%20with,including%20in%20the%20maritime%20domain.

28. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, and Paul A. Povlock, A Guerilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War (Newport: Small Wars Journal, 2011).

29. Scott Belsky, Making Ideas Happen: Overcoming the Obstacles Between Vision and Reality (New York: Portfolio, 2014).

30. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette Books, 2022).

31. Future Joint Force Development, Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide (Washington, DC: 2016).

32. Defense Intelligence Agency, Seized at Sea: Iranian Weapons Smuggled to the Houthis (Washington, DC: April 2024).

33. Ibid. 

34. Seized at Sea: Iranian Weapons Smuggled to the Houthis.

35. Staff, “Dotmlpf Process,” Marines.mil, n.d., https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/889374/dotmlpf-process.

Lighting the Way

2024 LtCol Earl “Pete” Ellis Essay Contest Winner: First Place

Marines, missiles, MPF boats, and the path through PRC defenses in the Western Pacific

 

The onset of World War II saw U.S. naval forces experimenting with new technologies to mitigate territorial advantages held by the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces. As the campaign in the Pacific unfolded, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps elements found themselves operating beyond the expanses of the open ocean, closer to coastal areas. When warships were pushed to navigate inside confined waterways, the newly developed patrol torpedo (PT) boat emerged as an unexpectedly effective capability to support maritime operations. Fast, highly maneuverable, and relatively inexpensive to build, hundreds of PT boats were organized into squadrons and deployed across the Western Pacific. They proved especially useful during the Solomon Islands Campaign, engaging Imperial Japanese Navy warships attempting to transit the narrow channels of Iron Bottom Sound.1 With their elusive speed, considerable firepower, and seemingly unescapable quantity, PT boats disrupted Imperial Japanese Navy resupply and other maritime operations. Eight decades later, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as the new competitor in the Western Pacific and seeks to capitalize on similar territorial advantages within the region. Given the ambiguity surrounding a potential conflict, U.S. naval forces may again need to leverage experimental capabilities to ensure freedom of maneuver in the Pacific.

The new era of conflict will require U.S. maritime forces to contend with traditional PRC warships and more obtrusive surface vessels. Limited means to predict the catalyst for hostilities will require U.S. forces to pull existing capabilities into the fight to achieve initial operating objectives. Small, fast, and flexible watercraft will be the key to bridging the gap between the activities of warships and vessels operating at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Fortunately, U.S. naval forces already possess the tools to build a capability to address emerging threats. Marine Corps stand-in forces (SIF), deployed throughout the Western Pacific, are well-postured to operate across the continuum of competition or conflict. The maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) utility boat (UB) is a small and versatile craft currently employed by the Military Sea-Lift Command. The Javelin missile, organic to designated Army and Marine Corps formations, can support offensive or defensive operations against various adversarial threats. Combining the attributes of these seemingly disparate resources will produce a uniquely suited capability to mitigate the challenges presented by intermediate PRC threats. Teams of SIF Marines, armed with Javelin missiles and employed aboard MPF-UBs, will provide the maritime component commander with a platform to disrupt PRC operations in contested waterways.

Within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility, the PRC continues to develop and employ maritime technologies to achieve an asymmetric advantage over existing U.S. naval formations. The intricate web of anti-access/area denial capabilities is designed to deny entry and prevent freedom of maneuver throughout the first island chain (FIC). Missile boats, patrol boats, and other small watercraft present significant threats to all classes of friendly vessels attempting to transit the waters of the South China Sea (SCS). Their small size, low signature, and high speeds allow for rapid approaches to warships to penetrate minimum weapons engagement zones and operate inside defenses. The ambiguous nature of purported law enforcement or other non-military vessels strains the ability to discern intent, inhibiting the rapid engagement of prospective threats. Hefty procurement costs associated with existing and emerging U.S. anti-ship capabilities render their use against smaller PRC threats inefficient. The employment of a flexible naval asset capable of responding to threats across the spectrum of conflict will be essential to defeating coordinated layers of PRC maritime defenses. 

The Type 022 Houbei-class missile patrol boat is a pivotal element of the PLAN near-seas defense strategy. The low draft, top speed of 42 knots, and a combat radius of 250 km make these boats the ideal platform to conduct operations around PLA bases and occupied territories throughout the FIC. Armed with up to eight YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), they are capable of attacking ships at distances out to 200 km.2 When employed under the cover of PLA integrated air defense systems, they can extend their operating ranges and further reduce the availability of vital maritime terrain. They attack by converging on a target with multiple boats, engaging in swarm tactics to destroy a U.S. Navy warship or constrain its ability to maneuver. Defeating the presence and effect of Houbei-class missile boats will be critical to enable the successful execution of the U.S. maritime strategy in the Western Pacific.

Another layer of the PRC maritime defense is executed by the China Coast Guard (CCG). Deployed from coastal bases and other inshore locations, its primary function is to enforce maritime laws within China’s proclaimed territorial waters. The Jiangdao-class cutters, created from repurposed warships, allow for easy conversion from law enforcement operations to a surface warfare platform.3 The equipping of Zhongtao-class patrol boats with large-caliber machineguns and high-capacity water cannons further obfuscates their perceived threat level, complicating rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for use of force (RUF) decision making when responding to their activities.4 The pervasive presence of cutters and other patrol boats also represents a persistent PRC intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR-T) capability. To operate undetected and freely maneuver across the FIC, U.S. Naval forces must develop the means to counter CCG patrols and other ISR-T activities.

The third component of the PRC maritime defense strategy is the China Maritime Militia (CMM). Within the SCS, CMM vessels execute a variety of grey-zone tactics to enable the achievement of larger strategic objectives. Though not an official component of the PLA, they have been employed in conjunction with PLAN and CCG vessels to reinforce territorial claims during designated operations.5 Their firepower is limited, but crews are equipped with various small arms and the hulls of their boats are constructed using reinforced steel.6 This allows for the employment of aggressive tactics against civilian or military support vessels, as they engage in overt anti-access/area denial activities to deny foreign vessel operations in disputed waterways. CMM boats can also be outfitted with radars, navigation equipment, and communications to facilitate their employment as an ISR-T platform. Interdicting CMM operations will limit the disruption to sea lines of communication, providing U.S. warships the ability to operate unmolested inside the contested waters of the FIC.

Each echelon of PRC maritime defenses presents unique challenges to traditional naval operations in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. The preponderance of existing U.S. Navy capabilities in the Western Pacific are designed to engage PLAN warships or operate against high-level threats. Attempts to overcome the density and volume of lethality afforded by the Type 022 missile boats would quickly exhaust the countermeasures of the deepest operational magazines. Mitigating the pervasiveness of CCG activities to limit PRC maritime domain awareness will require the deployment of substantiative counter ISR-T capabilities. Once hostilities unfold, the ambiguous nature of CMM operations will demand a measured approach to the application of the ROE and RUF to manage the potential for escalation. Addressing intermediate threats across the spectrum of conflict will be essential to the success of U.S. naval forces operating within the web of PRC maritime defenses.

Marine Corps SIF are specifically designed to operate within contested areas, conducting sea-denial operations
to disrupt the maneuver of an adversary’s naval forces.7 Forward positioned within the FIC, they represent a foundational component of the U.S. naval strategy to mitigate the presence of PRC maritime threats. When provided with a maneuverable and low-signature watercraft, SIF Marines will be able to rapidly move about contested waters within a given area of operations. Their vessels must be fast, agile, and possess a shallow draft to allow for rapid ingress and egress of low-water areas. Crew-served weapons and other small arms will provide the organic force protection capabilities needed to ensure their survivability. A moderately ranged high-explosive projectile will offer the fire support required to neutralize or destroy smaller enemy surface vessels. Equipping SIF Marines with the requisite capabilities to deliberately shoot, rapidly move, and effectively communicate will enhance their ability to degrade intermediate PRC maritime threats in the Western Pacific.

Maritime pre-positioning force utility boats are one of the best assets to support transportation requirements within coastal areas. As a component of the Improved Naval Lighterage System, they are used by the Military Sea-Lift Command to move personnel and equipment during MPF operations. With a length of just over 41 feet and a beam of 14 feet, they have a very low profile and produce a limited radar signature during the conduct of operations. Two 660 horsepower diesel engines power a waterjet propulsion system, giving these boats significant maneuverability as they reach speeds of up to 41 knots.8 Their draft of just under three feet allows for easy navigation into and out of shallow water areas. A ramp positioned at the center of the bow enables the rapid discharge of up to 10 tons of cargo, 30 combat-loaded troops, or other materials directly onto a beach.9 The characteristics of the MPF-UB make it an ideal platform to support the maritime maneuver requirements for SIF Marines within the FIC.

The Javelin Close Combat Missile System (CCMS) is the primary anti-tank weapon for the Army and Marine Corps. It is a lightweight, man-portable, fire-and-forget missile that can easily be employed from a small vessel. In the Marine Corps, they are assigned to infantry units and employed by anti-tank missile gunners. The 8.4 kg high-explosive anti-tank warhead is autonomously delivered against targets operating at distances as far as 2,500 meters.10 The reusable command launch unit enables rapid target acquisition while also providing an enhanced daytime or infrared night vision surveillance capability. The Javelin possesses the characteristics to be the desired lethal surface-fires capability for SIF Marines conducting sea-denial operations inside the contested waterways.

Combining task-organized SIF elements, MPF-UBs, and the Javelin CCMS into a single platform will create a highly lethal capability to provide the maritime component the means to disrupt PRC operations across the spectrum of conflict. These new Marine light assault missile patrol (LAMP) boats will have the maneuverability and firepower needed to engage and neutralize intermediate adversary threats in coastal areas. Their speed will allow them to rapidly close with Houbei-class missile boats and then attack them with a volley of self-guided anti-tank missiles. Their ability to outmaneuver CCG cutters and other small craft will place them in a position to interdict maritime patrol operations or disrupt ISR-T activities inside the FIC. Marine crews armed with various small arms and crew-served weapons provide the flexibility needed to contact CMM vessels, discern their intent, and engage them if determined to be hostile. When effectively organized and widely employed within SCS, Marine LAMP Boats will be able to create opportunities for Navy warships to maneuver.

This concept is not without some disadvantages, which could impede its development and limit successful implementation. Training will be one of the primary limitations to inhibit the widespread deployment of LAMP Boats. Though infantry units are already organized with anti-tank missile gunners and machinegunners, coxswains, and navigators are not widely present in any current Marine Corps formation. Leveraging the knowledge and expertise of the Navy’s assault craft units for exercises and training can increase nautical proficiency, providing time to build capacity and mature an organic capability. Survivability is another considerable challenge within the LAMP boat concept. The MPF-UB’s relatively small size and aluminum construction will make them susceptible to deck guns, surface-to-surface missiles, or other large-caliber weapons. Crews must be prepared to maximize the MPF-UB’s speed and maneuverability to evade PLAN warships and avoid potential engagements. The final challenge to the successful employment of this concept will be the requirement for maintenance. As with other surface vessels, MPF-UBs rely on daily preventative maintenance checks and services and occasional higher-level repairs to remain operational. Littoral logistics battalions with engineer equipment mechanics or the expertise of mechanics of allies and partners will provide the technicians needed to service the MPF-UB’s two six-cylinder diesel engines. This will ensure vessels remain operational and can quickly return to the station following preventative maintenance or repairs. Mitigating the identified shortfalls will facilitate the successful employment of the LAMP boat concept while remining perceptive of other challenges during maritime operations in the FIC.

Despite the apparent challenges, the numerous advantages of the LAMP boat concept encourage the maritime component to pursue further development of this initiative. Cost is one of the primary benefits, given the limited fiscal investment required to facilitate the fielding of this platform. The price for an MPF-UB is approximately $1M and an Javelin CCMS is less than $250K for the full system; less than $100K when procuring the missile only.11 This is considerably cheaper than the estimated $3M for each Block II Harpoon missile, $2M for a Naval Strike Missile, and other high costs associated with individual ASCM systems.12 Versatility is another key advantage to the employment of LAMP boats, as they can support multiple warfighting functions. The low draft, high-payload capacity, and convenient bow ramp enable MPF-UBs to perform a variety of enabling tasks during patrols. They can easily be configured to support supply delivery, medical evacuation, or other logistics functions when not engaged in offensive operations. The most significant advantage of this concept is the ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. At the high end of the spectrum, the delivery of a volley of Javelin missiles provides a level of lethality commensurate with that of an ASCM. At the lower end of the spectrum, the ability to apply ROE/RUF considerations allows Lamp Boat crews to interrogate vessels conducting grey-zone activities and classify their status as friend or foe.

Should hostilities commence in USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, the defense in depth created by PRC anti-access/area denial capabilities has the potential to inhibit the successful entry and maneuver of U.S. naval forces. Houbei-class missile boats, CCG cutters, and CMM vessels present a variety of challenges to traditional naval operations and require a new approach for a successful campaign. Though ASCMs and other exquisite weapons systems will be essential in the fight against the PLAN, their expense and long development period could result in their untimely delivery for the prospective fight. The LAMP boat concept provides the maritime component commander with an immediately available, cost-effective, and highly lethal platform to address intermediate PRC threats within the FIC. The MPF-UB has the speed and maneuverability to keep up with Houbei-class missile boats, and the Javelin CCMS warhead is more than sufficient to neutralize the threat. They are versatile enough to interdict CCG cutters and other purported maritime law enforcement boats, disrupting PRC ISR-T activities and allowing U.S. vessels to operate more freely in the contested waterways. The LAMP boats can directly respond to CMM vessels attempting to disrupt sea lines of communication or engage in maritime surveillance, applying the appropriate level of force to neutralize their effect without concern for inadvertent escalation. The LAMP boat concept will provide the means to chart a path through echelons of mutually supporting PRC defenses, opening waterways in the SCS for U.S. warships to safely maneuver. 

>Col Rainey is currently assigned as the AC/S G-9 for Marine Corps Installations Command, following graduation from the National War College in June 2024. Before being promoted to Colonel, he served as a Military Police Officer and completed various assignments within FMF and supporting establishment organizations.

Notes

1. Edmund B. Hernandez, “Fifty Tons of Fury: Bring Back the Patrol Torpedo Boat,” Proceedings, September 2018, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/september/fifty-tons-fury-bring-back-patrol-torpedo-boat#:
~:text=PT%20boat%20action%20during%20World%20War%20II%20is%20well%20documented.

2. Dr. Sam Goldsmith, Vampire, Vampire, Vampire: The PLA’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Threat to Australian and Allied Naval Operations (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022).

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023).

4. Caitlin Campbell and Ben Dolven, China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea, CRS Report for Congress IF12550 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023).

5. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019).

 

6. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023.

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, A Concept for Stand-In Forces, (Washington, DC: December 2021).

8. Staff, “Assault Craft Unit (ACU) 1: About Us,” Navy.mil, n.d., https://www.surfpac.navy.mil/Ships/Assault-Craft-Unit-ACU-1.

9. Ibid. 

10. Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-22.37: Javelin-Close Combat Missile System, Medium (Washington, DC: August 2013).

11. Missile Defense Project, “FGM-148 Javelin,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 21, 2022, last modified April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/fgm-148-javelin.

12. Jack Montgomery, “The Navy Must Build More Missiles Now,” Proceedings, August 2013,
 https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/
2023/august/navy-must-build-more-missiles-now.

The Combined Action Platoon

Unique in the history of war 

 

Commemoration address for the Combined Action Platoon memorial at Marine Corps Museum
We who fought in the villages six decades ago have gathered here to dedicate this memorial to our fallen brothers. We thank LtGen Ron Christmas and MajGen Jim Lukeman for honoring their sacrifice.  

Historians remark upon the sheer audacity of the Combined Action Platoon (CAP). In the midst of a war with millions of combatants, twelve-man squads led by sergeants lived and died in villages amongst thousands of Vietnamese. Their mission: drive out the enemy, protect the villagers and train the farmers to defend themselves.1 In theory, those tiny squads, vastly outnumbered and isolated, should have been wiped out. In fact, they succeeded. Of the 209 villages protected by CAPs, not one reverted to enemy control.2 The CAP stands unique in America’s wars, never duplicated before or since.  

From 1966 through 1970, across hundreds of hamlets every mosquito-filled night, patrols of about five Marines and five farmers sneaked through the bush, with no night vision or on-call fires. To survive, they relied on stealth, laying down grazing fire, pitching grenades, and pulling back when incoming fire was too intense. Firefights were sudden and short, green and red tracers zipping past like dancing Christmas lights. Afterward, no one ventured into the kill zones. Only the next day might they hear from the villagers about enemy bodies carried off. No CAP ever relaxed. The peril of each night focused every Marine.  

During the day, CAP grunts ambled through the hamlets, eating duck eggs and bananas and peanuts, laughing and bartering with the villagers, respected but not feared. The ‘nghia quans’ (the farmers called PFs, or Popular Forces) patrolled and lived side by side with the Marines. Spending month after month inside the same few kilometers, the Marines and villagers came to know one another as human beings, with individual quirks. Six of the CAP Marines in this 1966 photo were killed in the besieged village of Binh Nghia.  

The village chief wrote a letter to the parents of Sergeant White, the CAP leader. Here is a direct quote:  

To Sgt. J.D. White Family … My name is trao, second village chief working with Sgt. White and Sq. Our people thank him very much, because he is very good man. Every day he is few to sleep he works too much … My people are poor and when they see a marine they very happy. When V.C. come to people, people come to talk to Sgt. Whte so Sgt. White can talk to P.F. and marine to fight V.C. Maybe die … I’ll say a Happy New Year to you. Jod bless you all …. Your friend always, Ho Yan Trao.3 

The cost was high. Of the 450,000 Marines who served in Vietnam, three percent were fatalities,4 rising to six percent among the combat battalions. In the CAPs, the fatality rate was above ten percent. The reason was that on average a CAP conducted a thousand patrols in a year. There was no embedded chain of command to ensure these patrols went out, no gunny, no first sergeant, no company commander. Instead, there was peer pressure. There were no nights off. In every CAP, sooner or later death called.  

Over five years, 540 CAP Marines were killed, while accounting for 4,900 enemy killed by rifle fire and grenades, with almost no employment of supporting arms.5 You don’t call in fire on the village where you live. Inflicting casualties on the enemy was only a means; the end objective was providing security and training the nghia quans (PFs). The CAPs weren’t interlinked; they were scattered across several thousand kilometers. Each CAP staked out five to seven square kilometers of paddies, shrubs and hooches, then fought to protect it.  

The ultimate test of the program came when the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched the 1968 TET offensive. In the Marine area in northern I Corps, tens of thousands of NVA left the mountains to assault the cities. To get there, they had to pass through the hamlets guarded by CAP patrols. The CAPs absorbed fully 47% of all the enemy attacks.6 Forewarned through the network of villagers, for eleven straight days the CAPs held firm in daily combat. The NVA found no way through.   

At its peak, CAP platoons (squads really) extended across 800 widely scattered hamlets, protecting 500,000 villagers.7 This was accomplished by 2,200 CAP Marines, three percent of the Marine total force. Given that CAP was a force multiplier, why wasn’t it expanded into a countrywide strategy?  

The CAP focus upon population protection collided with the directive from the high command in Saigon to search for and destroy the NVA forces in the mountains. To quote from the official Marine history of 1968, “The problem was a lack of a warfighting (overall) strategy. There was no yardstick for measuring the amount of resources dedicated to Mission X vs Mission Y. The CAP was seen as a drain of manpower. In fact, it saved Marine lives.”8  

The high command in Saigon opposed the CAP program. Yet no top-level meeting with the subordinate Marine command was ever convened to resolve the conflicting strategies. The top commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, criticized Marine tactics. His command disparaged the CAPs as “too manpower intensive and too slow in pacifying.”9 The command also consulted the British, whose top counterinsurgency expert, Sir Robert Thompson, concluded the opposite. He said CAP was “the best idea I have seen in Vietnam.”10 

After our troops left in 1972, Congress slashed aid to the South and forbade all air strikes. In 1975, South Vietnam fell to North Vietnam. Artillery and armor provided by China and the Soviet Union plus massed infantry caused the defeat, not some fantasy about a Marxist revolt in the villages. Quite the opposite. When the North Vietnamese troops poured in, they changed the names of CAP villages, symbolizing their frustration with the farmers who had staunchly resisted. A history of the CAP program in the Military Review magazine concluded, “The Battle for Hue City and the siege at Khe Sanh dominate the literature about the Marines in Vietnam. CAP, however, was the Corps’ greatest innovation during the war.”11 

Is the CAP concept useful in the future? My book describing the lives and deaths in a typical CAP, entitled The Village, was deleted from the Commandant’s Reading List because CAP seemed irrelevant. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the tribal and Muslim insular cultures did make it impossible for Marine squads to live inside isolated villages. Unlike in Vietnam, as outsiders (and unbelievers) Americans were not accepted, let alone warned of danger. On the other hand, CAP is relevant for the new antiship mission. Although Marines no longer read about the CAP, the small units training to deploy on remote Filipino islands will need its tactics. 

Regardless of where Marines next fight, there will be civilians and local forces. Marines don’t have the manpower to support a stand-alone advisory regiment. We will always seek the support of the local forces. The CAP proved that our infantry squads can adapt on any battlefield, due to the Marine ethos and training.  

>Mr. West, an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, served in CAP Lima-One in Chulai in 1966. He has written a dozen books about Marines in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. His forthcoming book is entitled: Who Will Fight for Us the Next Time?  

Notes

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Action_Program

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Action_Program

3. https://www.amazon.com/Village-Francis-J-West/dp/0299102343/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&dib_tag=se&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.p-mZNDimiy50ukbcHJePqf34WcdHeY7QGVcWelymYhzsODh_dEwCC7vZOsDJOpK7wUlcKoIykKApCmsweqabshyjB1zc40ZFr6VQ_r-nrAJKhD_Jx-K7MrIOvC40_P4PwQSOUHmJnWhFBbRW64yovnGhQT2YJhe41eixBDWTobY.kMlkWTIY2hPyuRhqs2FJgFYqsYZl7bEnd8yUvSMy1Aw&qid=1723471958&sr=8-1 

4. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2015/april/marines-vietnam-commitment; and https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/vietnam-war0/human-cost.html 

5. https://www.nmvetsmemorial.org/combined-action-program-monument.html

6. Weltsch, Michael D (1991). “The Future Role of the Combined Action Program” (PDF). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 February 2012. That PDF was retrieved 12 December 2007.

7. https://www.usni.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Kopets,%20Keith%20F.pdf

8. Ibid. p. 629 

9. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/US Marines In Vietnam The Defining Year 1968 PCN 19000313800_1.pdf pages 619-625

10. https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kopets.htm

11. Military Review, July-August 2002 Found as a footnote in https://www.usni.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Kopets,%20Keith%20F.pdf

A Worthy Investment in the Stand-In Force

MARSOC and Force Design

Modernization and force structure efforts for the Army resulted in plans by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to make cuts that would account for the entire size of the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) if applied by the Marine Corps.1 The Marine Corps, however, has made significant transformational efforts elsewhere with Force Design 2030, and the value of MARSOC has continued to provide a significant benefit to both the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the FMF. Marine Special Operations Command is highlighted as a key capability of the Stand-In Forces (SIF) concept in the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), “The unique capabilities contained within the MAGTF paired with the special operations capabilities of our Raiders forms a modernized warfighting capability with the agility and lethality capable of gaining and maintaining advantage from inside the [weapons engagement zone (WEZ)].”2 

Marine special operations companies (MSOC) like Marine littoral regiments (MLR) provide value at the Service level through their ability to sense, make sense, and communicate with the Joint Force. Marine Special Operations Command units offer theater special operations commands a unit of action for employment toward strategic, operational, and campaign objectives. Marine Special Operations Command additionally produces specialized human capital for the Marine Corps outside of Special Operations Officers, MOS 0370, and Critical Skills Operators , 0372, by training, manning, and equipping USSOCOM unique Special Operations Capability Specialists (SOCS), 8071, that subsequently integrate back to FMF formations. Furthermore, MARSOC leverages special operations-peculiar funding from USSCOM through Major Forces Program 11 to rapidly acquire unique capabilities to support real-world operations and preserve the force. By sustaining the integration of joint kill webs between MSOCs and the other joint SIF units, prioritizing manning through Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and driving modernization, the Marine Corps will continue to use MARSOC as a worthwhile investment as outlined by the 39th Commandant to fight and win today and set conditions to win in the future.

The problem of mature kill webs and a combined Joint all-domian command and control is not new to the Joint Forces’ efforts of modernization or USSOCOM. It is an effort where MARSOC plays a critical role, as highlighted by the 39th CPG, “Marines in the Stand-in Force, critically bolstered by our MARSOC Raiders, are the tip of the spear of the entire Joint and Combined Force.”3 Marine Special Operations Command and FMF units routinely participate in various operations, activities, and investments (OAI) in the first-island chain and throughout the globe to train against Joint Force objectives. Operations, activities, and investments like Exercise Balikatan—an annual exercise between the Philippines and the U.S. military designed to strengthen bilateral interoperability, capabilities, trust, and cooperation—demonstrate combined joint kill webs that culminate in real-world sink exercises at key maritime terrain in the first-island chain.4 The OAI further provides MARSOC units at the MSOC level to train and integrate adjacent to emerging transformational units of the Joint Force like 3d MLR, the U.S. Army 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, and Joint certified headquarters from the Marine Corps such as I MEF and 3d MarDiv, III MEF, FMF Pacific, as well as Joint headquarters from I Corps and 25th Infantry Division. Moreover, it can be stated that the problem of combined Joint all-domian command and control and kill webs, easily traced to the history of USSOCOM during Operation EAGLE CLAW, will continue to require investment and integration across the Joint Force to succeed and win during great-power competition.5

The 39th CPG states, “Ironclad discipline is the currency of our Corps. Ruthless adherence to standards is what makes us special as a Service.” This discipline and affinity toward ruthless adherence to standards and mission accomplishment are why Marines subsequently make another choice to start a journey toward a career or tour at MARSOC. Unlike the deployable units of Navy Special Warfare, Navy Special Warfare Task Groups, the MSOCs of MARSOC are enabled by a detachment of SOCS, who are special operations qualified by the Marine Raider Training Center or Marine Raider Support Group.6 The SOCS MOS has its unique pipeline based on its specialization of logistics, intelligence, communications, or fires. These Marines serve anywhere from three to five years at MARSOC before returning to the FMF. The value of a tour at MARSOC provides these SOCS unique, but operationally relevant experience that seamlessly translates to assignments at III MEF or other SIF units. A SOCS trained for intelligence gains all the skills necessary to sense and make sense for an MLR headquarters or MEU. A SOCS trained for communications can seamlessly bolt onto a task unit from a MEF Information Group or provide communication to contested logistics for a littoral logistics battalion. Manpower and Reserve Affairs must continue to assign a prioritized staffing goal at MARSOC units while incentivizing tours for Marines and those SOCS post-MARSOC to spread the knowledge and experience across the FMF. The tours at MARSOC must elevate to the equivalent of FMF by precept for career officers and Subsequent-Term-Alignment-Plan Marines to ensure talent does not transition from the Service or create an unnecessary demand for curtailed tours from a SIF unit as outlined by the Commandant to remain competitive for advancement and promotion.

A final unique characteristic of MARSOC as a part of the SIF is the ability to tap into special operations-peculiar funding for operational and training modernization, experimentation in command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting, and Preservation of the Force and Family programs. The unique funding and access to USSOCOM continue to enable greater modernization for training and operational effects with FMF and other Joint SIF units as seen during the Service-Level Training Exercise and at forward-deployed locations. The command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting advancements and experimentation continue to align with FMF advances whether the touchpoints and engagements are through wargaming or implementation of assets in support of live, virtual, or constructive training at a newly established Special Operations Training, Exercise, and Simulation Center at Stone Bay, Camp Lejeune, NC, that shares similar capability to sites hosted by Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group or Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group. Furthermore, the expansion of Preservation of the Force and Family resources have served as a model to carry over to FMF units to maintain and sustain career-long readiness. The 39th CPG states, “No single issue is more existential for our Corps than recruiting and retaining high-quality Marines.”7 Marine Special Operations Command sustains this critical effort while efficiently employing SOF-peculiar resources to accomplish the assigned USSOCOM missions as well as providing benefits to the Service.

Manpower and funding will remain a constant for all the military services like the unchanging nature of war. For the Marine Corps, it must remain a priority to man, train, and equip MARSOC units like MLRs as both serve as the critical stand-in forces for competition and conflict. For the SOCS and those that are assigned to MARSOC, Manpower and Reserve Affairs must ensure stable and continuing careers like those in the FMF. The value of MARSOC remains that they are Marines first, and special operations are what they do. Like all SOF units, the resourcing of MARSOC by the Marine Corps will allow them to fight and win both now and in the future while upholding the Special Operations Forces Truth that Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.8

>Maj Fultz is an Infantry Officer serving as the Battalion Executive Officer for the 1st Marine Raider Support Battalion. He has served in all three divisions with a most recent tour with the Stand-In Force at III MEF Command Element and 4th Mar.

Notes

1. Cole Livieratos, “Cutting Army Special Operations Will Erode the Military’s Ability to Influence the Modern Battlefield,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/cutting-army-special-operations-will-erode-the-militarys-ability-to-influence-the-modern-battlefield.

2. Gen Eric Smith, 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: September 2024).

3. Ibid.

4. Embassy Manila, “Philippine, U.S. Troops to Kick Off Exercise Balikatan 2024,” U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, April 17, 2024, https://ph.usembassy.gov/philippine-u-s-troops-to-kick-off-exercise-balikatan-2024.

5. Special Operations Warrior Foundation, “Operation Eagle Claw,” Special Operations Warrior Foundation, September 2024, https://specialops.org/operation-eagle-claw.

6. Joint Special Operations University Center for Engagement and Research, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 5th Edition (MacDill Air Force Base: November 23).

7. 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance.

8. Joint Special Operations University Center for Engagement and Research, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 5th Edition (MacDill Air Force Base: November 2023).